Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by
. . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office.
Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following
the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article
reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved
in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever
be discovered.

To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the
case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable
obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.

After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe
their victory to electoral robbery? How may?

The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of
certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and
privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15,
1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and
corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a
result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in
question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The
defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of
the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the
trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown
and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed
because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary
individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing
the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper
authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them,
because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated.
Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are
reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal
Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting
language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his
ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force,
and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig,
supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without
fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of
their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
and to pay the costs of both instances.

The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in
his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the
beginning of this decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United
States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the
President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant
decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and
(2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of
the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a
principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of
origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig
case has never again been elevated to this court.

There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above
described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case,
are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but
a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court.
And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision.
We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the
opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates
to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of
article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the
reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the
court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just
mentioned.

1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was
enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious
defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects
of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of
laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated
certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny
and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez
([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia
and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with
calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the
elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is
indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by
means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to
prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are
within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With
these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult
any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that
where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of
the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary
implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so
much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is
not necessary to make a pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. —
Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines
and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as
before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.

Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason,
crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the
same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers,
crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found,
punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and
threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the
title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be
word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article
condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any
person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or
the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult
of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of
America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste,
religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task,
therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of
a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and
institutions of the American Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
(American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542;
Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in
the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of
course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new
government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in
the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the
press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain
could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they
have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to
the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan
[1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by
proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and
providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of
things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation
of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political
power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still
effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there
was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a
determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had
been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been
forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional
principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs.
U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President
McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in
mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be
made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment
of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been
made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom,
and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the
most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will
inevitably within a short time command universal assent.

The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs.
Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar,
and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand
obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials
who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as
set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are
likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and
has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to
indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and
whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every
man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred
rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once statutes
of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable
if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of
England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and
Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum
magnatum is not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the
Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was
soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as
a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous
and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation
by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as
that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by
implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the
gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the
American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in
the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its
terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the
people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they
are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect
and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an
official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no
place under the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment
should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with
respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof,
outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an
authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal
Code or under the Libel Law.

I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do not
have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the performance
of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 209287 February 3, 2015

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. TERRY L. RIDON, KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI
ZARATE, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209135

AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN
MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209136

MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209155

ATTY. JOSE MALVAR VILLEGAS, JR. Petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209164

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND
LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209260

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209442

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN M. ABANTE AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA;
AND THE BUREAU OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V. DE LEON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209517

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS
1ST VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA NARTATES, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
CONSOLIDATED UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (CUE-NHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAP-DSWD CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION (EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
PRESIDENT OF THE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA (KKK-MMDA), Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209569

VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (V ACC), REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.1

Before the Court are the Motion for Reconsideration2 filed by the respondents, and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration3 filed by
the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, the respondents assail the decision4 promulgated on July 1 2014 upon the following procedural
and substantive errors, viz:

PROCEDURAL

WITHOUT AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY, ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF ANY
INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT CONFER ON THIS HONORABLE COURT THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DAP AND NBC NO. 541

II

PETITIONERS’ ACTIONS DO NOT PRESENT AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY AND THEREFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION

III

PETITIONERS HAVE NEITHER BEEN INJURED NOR THREATENED WITH INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE OPERATION OF THE DAP AND
THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO HAVE NO STANDING TO BRING THESE SUITS FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

IV

NOR CAN PETITIONERS’ STANDING BE SUSTAINED ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE BRINGING THESE SUITS AS CITIZENS AND AS
TAXPAYERS

THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IS NOT BASED ON A CONSIDERATION OF THE ACTUAL APPLICATIONS OF THE DAP IN 116
CASES BUT SOLELY ON AN ABSTRACT CONSIDERATION OF NBC NO. 5415

SUBSTANTIVE

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT PROPERLY INTERPRETED "SAVINGS" UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE GAA

II

ALL DAP APPLICATIONS HAVE APPROPRIATION COVER

III
THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER SAVINGS TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS PURSUANT TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

IV

THE 2011, 2012 AND 2013 GAAS ONLY REQUIRE THAT REVENUE COLLECTIONS FROM EACH SOURCE OF REVENUE ENUMERATED IN
THE BUDGET PROPOSAL MUST EXCEED THE CORRESPONDING REVENUE TARGET

THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE WAS WRONGLY APPLIED6

The respondents maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized;
that the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue;7 that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation;8 and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion.9

On their part, the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442 pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court
thereby:

FAILED TO DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL ALL MONEYS UNDER THE DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM
(DAP) USED FOR ALLEGED AUGMENTATION OF APPROPRIATION ITEMS THAT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL DEFICIENCIES10

They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities
and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442, and partially grant the motion for reconsideration of
the respondents.

The procedural challenges raised by the respondents, being a mere rehash of their earlier arguments herein, are dismissed for being
already passed upon in the assailed decision.

As to the substantive challenges, the Court discerns that the grounds are also reiterations of the arguments that were already
thoroughly discussed and passed upon in the assailed decision. However, certain declarations in our July 1, 2014 Decision are
modified in order to clarify certain matters and dispel further uncertainty.

1.

The Court’s power of judicial review

The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a conceptis an ordinary species of
interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination.11

This argument cannot stand.

The consolidated petitions distinctly raised the question of the constitutionality of the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly
their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection. Hence, the matter is still entirely within the Court’s competence, and its determination does not pertain to Congress to
the exclusion of the Court. Indeed, the interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is
because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive. As clarified in Endencia and Jugo v. David:12

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to
the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

xxxx

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws,
but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled
by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither
wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.13

The respondents cannot also ignore the glaring fact that the petitions primarily and significantly alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Executive in the implementation of the DAP. The resolution of the petitions thus demanded the exercise by the Court
of its aforedescribed power of judicial review as mandated by the Constitution.

2.

Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being
an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.14
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power
to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the
limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the
purse.16 Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an
effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541
cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein
are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment
under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the
parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.17

Respondents contend, however, that withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations under the DAP are savings
that may be used for augmentation, and that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments were made pursuant to Section 38 Chapter
5, Book VI of the Administrative Code;18 that Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code are
consistent with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, which, taken together, constitute "a framework for which economic
managers of the nation may pull various levers in the form of authorization from Congress to efficiently steer the economy towards
the specific and general purposes of the GAA;"19 and that the President’s augmentation of deficient items is in accordance with the
standing authority issued by Congress through Section 39.

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 25. x x x x x x x

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.

xxxx

Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. - Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and
whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized
to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects
of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the
regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from
budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred
from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for
personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department,
office or agency concerned. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In the Decision, we said that:

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as
"portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of
the definition was further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated
allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed.
This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.

xxxx

The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments. But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments, to wit:

xxxx

Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the
funds to other PAPs.20

We now clarify.

Section 38 refers to the authority of the President "to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any
agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act." When the President suspends or stops expenditure
of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any
obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned.

It is necessary to reiterate that under Section 5.7 of NBC No. 541, the withdrawn unobligated allotments may be:

5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn;

5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or

5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and projects not considered in
the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current year.

Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the suspension or stoppage of expenditures
through the issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original
programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which the allotments were withdrawn has not been
discontinued or abandoned. Consequently, as we have pointed out in the Decision, "the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had
been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings
impossible."21 In this regard, the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But then, whether the
withdrawn allotments have actually been reissued to their original programs or projects is a factual matter determinable by the
proper tribunal.
Also, withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to NBC No. 541 which shortened the availability of appropriations for MOOE
and capital outlays, and those which were transferred to PAPs that were not determined to be deficient, are still constitutionally
infirm and invalid.

At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations
– savings included – pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code22 does not apply to the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on
Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the CFAG –

x x x contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need
only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution
becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x23

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it
allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects
of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the
mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only
those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39
cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by
the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

In this connection, the respondents must always be reminded that the Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform.
No act that conflicts with the Constitution can be valid.24 In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,25 therefore, we have emphasized
the importance of recognizing and bowing to the supremacy of the Constitution:

x x x The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty
to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on
its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate
what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate
branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

Also, in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,26 we have reminded that: – The role of the Constitution cannot be
overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by
which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines
must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it.27

3.

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA
The respondents posit that the Court has erroneously invalidated all the DAP-funded projects by overlooking the difference between
an item and an allotment class, and by concluding that they do not have appropriation cover; and that such error may induce
Congress and the Executive (through the DBM) to ensure that all items should have at least ₱1 funding in order to allow
augmentation by the President.28

At the outset, we allay the respondents’ apprehension regarding the validity of the DAP funded projects. It is to be emphatically
indicated that the Decision did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court
recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the country’s economy,29 and acknowledged its laudable purposes, most
especially those directed towards infrastructure development and efficient delivery of basic social services.30 It bears repeating that
the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development.

Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on
the basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that originally did not contain any appropriation for some of the expense categories
(personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond
with the program specified in the GAA. The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to
create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the
President.31

After a careful reexamination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we find merit in the respondents’ argument.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President,
the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v.
Ochoa,32 we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item-veto power of the
President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not be only general provisions, thus:

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of
the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts
of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court
characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and notonly "general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that
the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and
the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-
item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its
own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered
as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would
equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. x x x (Emphasis supplied)33

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the
appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the
Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same
vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar,34 we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure
with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item
in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation
purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility
allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.

Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the cave at that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may
be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation
cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions
under Rule 65.

4.

Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible

The respondents assail the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of cross-border transfers made by the President. They submit that
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer of appropriation, not savings. They relate that cross-border
transfers have been the practice in the past, being consistent with the President’s role as the Chief Executive.35

In view of the clarity of the text of Section 25(5), however, the Court stands by its pronouncement, and will not brook any strained
interpretations.

5.

Unprogrammed funds may only be released upon proof that the total revenues exceeded the target

Based on the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs, the respondents contend that each source of revenue in the budget proposal must exceed
the respective target to authorize release of unprogrammed funds. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling thereon nullified the intention of
the authors of the unprogrammed fund, and renders useless the special provisions in the relevant GAAs.36

The respondents’ contentions are without merit.

To recall, the respondents justified the use of unprogrammed funds by submitting certifications from the Bureau of Treasury and the
Department of Finance (DOF) regarding the dividends derived from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-
owned and controlled corporations.37 In the decision, the Court has held that the requirement under the relevant GAAs should be
construed in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were denominated as "standby appropriations." Hence,
revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses.
We have even cautioned that the release of unprogrammed funds based on the respondents’ position could be unsound fiscal
management for disregarding the budget plan and fostering budget deficits, contrary to the Government’s surplus budget policy.38

While we maintain the position that aggregate revenue collection must first exceed aggregate revenue target as a pre-requisite to
the use of unprogrammed funds, we clarify the respondents’ notion that the release of unprogrammed funds may only occur at the
end of the fiscal year.

There must be consistent monitoring as a component of the budget accountability phase of every agency’s performance in terms of
the agency’s budget utilization as provided in Book VI, Chapter 6, Section 51 and Section 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987,which state:

SECTION 51. Evaluation of Agency Performance.—The President, through the Secretary shall evaluate on a continuing basis the
quantitative and qualitative measures of agency performance as reflected in the units of work measurement and other indicators of
agency performance, including the standard and actual costs per unit of work.

SECTION 52. Budget Monitoring and Information System.—The Secretary of Budget shall determine accounting and other items of
information, financial or otherwise, needed to monitor budget performance and to assess effectiveness of agencies’ operations and
shall prescribe the forms, schedule of submission, and other components of reporting systems, including the maintenance of
subsidiary and other records which will enable agencies to accomplish and submit said information requirements: Provided, that the
Commission on Audit shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Budget, issue rules and regulations that may be applicable when
the reporting requirements affect accounting functions of agencies: Provided, further, that the applicable rules and regulations shall
be issued by the Commission on Audit within a period of thirty (30) days after the Department of Budget and Management
prescribes the reporting requirements.

Pursuant to the foregoing, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Commission on Audit (COA) require agencies
under various joint circulars to submit budget and financial accountability reports (BFAR) on a regular basis,39 one of which is the
Quarterly Report of Income or Quarterly Report of Revenue and Other Receipts.40 On the other hand, as Justice Carpio points out in
his Separate Opinion, the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) sets quarterly revenue targets for aspecific fiscal
year.41 Since information on both actual revenue collections and targets are made available every quarter, or at such time as the
DBM may prescribe, actual revenue surplus may be determined accordingly and eleases from the unprogrammed fund may take
place even prior to the end of the fiscal year.42

In fact, the eleventh special provision for unprogrammed funds in the 2011 GAA requires the DBM to submit quarterly reports
stating the details of the use and releases from the unprogrammed funds, viz:

11. Reportorial Requirement. The DBM shall submit to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance separate quarterly reports stating the releases from the Unprogrammed Fund, the amounts released and purposes thereof,
and the recipient departments, bureaus, agencies or offices, GOCCs and GFIs, including the authority under which the funds are
released under Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund.

Similar provisions are contained in the 2012 and 2013 GAAs.43

However, the Court’s construction of the provision on unprogrammed funds is a statutory, not a constitutional, interpretation of an
ambiguous phrase. Thus, the construction should be given prospective effect.44

6.

The presumption of good faith stands despite the obiter pronouncement

The remaining concern involves the application of the operative fact doctrine.

The respondents decry the misapplication of the operative fact doctrine, stating:

110. The doctrine of operative fact has nothing to do with the potential liability of persons who acted pursuant to a then-
constitutional statute, order, or practice. They are presumed to have acted in good faith and the court cannot load the dice, so to
speak, by disabling possible defenses in potential suits against so-called "authors, proponents and implementors." The mere
nullification are still deemed valid on the theory that judicial nullification is a contingent or unforeseen event.

111. The cases before us are about the statutory and constitutional interpretations of so-called acts and practices under a
government program, DAP. These are not civil, administrative, or criminal actions against the public officials responsible for DAP,
and any statement about bad faith may be unfairly and maliciously exploited for political ends. At the same time, any negation of
the presumption of good faith, which is the unfortunate implication of paragraphs 3 and 4 of page 90 of the Decision, violates the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and is inconsistent with the Honorable Court’s recognition that "the implementation of the
DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country."

112. The policy behind the operative fact doctrine is consistent with the idea that regardless of the nullification of certain acts and
practices under the DAP and/or NBC No. 541, it does not operate to impute bad faith to authors, proponents and implementors who
continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence and regularity in the performance of official functions and duties. Good faith is
presumed, whereas bad faith requires the existence of facts. To hold otherwise would send a chilling effect to all public officers
whether of minimal or significant discretion, the result of which would be a dangerous paralysis of bureaucratic activity.45
(Emphasis supplied)

In the speech he delivered on July 14, 2014, President Aquino III also expressed the view that in applying the doctrine of operative
fact, the Court has already presumed the absence of good faith on the part of the authors, proponents and implementors of the
DAP, so that they would have to prove good faith during trial.46

Hence, in their Motion for Reconsideration, the respondents now urge that the Court should extend the presumption of good faith
in favor of the President and his officials who co-authored, proposed or implemented the DAP.47
The paragraphs 3 and 4 of page 90 of the Decision alluded to by the respondents read:

Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is
not always the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where the
nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result would
ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply.

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone,
and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their
criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.48 (Bold underscoring is supplied)

The quoted text of paragraphs 3 and 4 shows that the Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor imputed bad
faith to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP. The contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed their good
faith by pointing out that "the doctrine of operative fact xxx cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative
and other liabilities." Note that the proper tribunals can make "concrete findings of good faith in their favor" only after a full hearing
of all the parties in any given case, and such a hearing can begin to proceed only after according all the presumptions, particularly
that of good faith, by initially requiring the complainants, plaintiffs or accusers to first establish their complaints or charges before
the respondent authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP.

It is equally important to stress that the ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or not due
diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact.49 The want of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals other
than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.50

For sure, the Court cannot jettison the presumption of good faith in this or in any other case.1âwphi1 The presumption is a matter of
law. It has had a long history. Indeed, good faith has long been established as a legal principle even in the heydays of the Roman
Empire.51In Soriano v. Marcelo,52 citing Collantes v. Marcelo,53 the Court emphasizes the necessity of the presumption of good
faith, thus:

Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every
person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Specifically, a public officer is presumed
to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any
clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith" does not simply connote
bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong,
a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.

The law also requires that the public officer’s action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. x x x

The Court has further explained in Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. v. Trinidad-Lichauco: 54

We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular performance of official duty", yet these presumptions
are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Many civil actions are oriented towards overcoming any
number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly be geared towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to
allow a party to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or
unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere
ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as
excess verbiage, save perhaps for the provisions laying down the legal presumptions.

Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers, further enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of
the State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law.55 However, the presumption may be disputed.56

At any rate, the Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend to the proponents and implementors of the DAP the benefit of
the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with the adoption of the invalid acts and practices.
7.

The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine

As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where
nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply.57 In so ruling, the Court has
essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification
of the ₱144.378 Billions58 worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind
the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the
Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot
sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and SUBJECT TO THE FOREGOING CLARIFICATIONS, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents, and DENIES the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No.
209442 for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the Decision promulgated on July 1, 2014 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and
practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory
definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer
that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General
Appropriations Acts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque,
Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling
out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage
their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of
American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the
actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to
refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9
although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines
since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area
of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x
subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each
House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of
said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and
realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent
that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For
the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people,
either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects.
Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is
determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the
Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when
"one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a
new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on
"National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would
release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal
treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also
began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects
such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was
revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum
appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding,
prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial
funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the
implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to
1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of
projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were
receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the
list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an
allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million
each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the
1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency
concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which
shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b)
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also
stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds
appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except
that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad
ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as
the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38
Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the
Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly,
―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had
the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program
Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all
of which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior
consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing
agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was
expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47
The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the
funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year,
2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless,
the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In
2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda
of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu
concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases.
In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors,
explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in
the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the
appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount
of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available
to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was
made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of
agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to
NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on
lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as
the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds
was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of
Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy,
and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the
allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF
Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships,
outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification,
as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present
cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds
of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to
set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in
the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created
under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two
(2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former
law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who
reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding
the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the
lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said
that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of
school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A
few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private
accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs
set up by Napoles.98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99 covering the use of
legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the
DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in
PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to
have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed
by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were
either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization
of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not
compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According
to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing
"one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition
of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S.
Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from
further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever
name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego
(Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-
sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109
The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012
(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation
with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was
docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to
comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the
Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members
of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral
Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the
Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the
Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas
filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated
September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments
scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General
Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM
and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process
and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the
Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised
in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d)
the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary
issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that
the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case
or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe
for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality
of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since
said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing
law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your
Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to
execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of
the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the
meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the
President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report,
because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the
report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he
has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations
of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks
and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and
expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present
petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the
coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are
needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms
that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the
laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when
the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the
findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s
constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances
will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is
a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national
budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not
cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious
iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface
wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course
of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the
political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best
position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents"
and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to
resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise
of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution
and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of
the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner
impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm
constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court
cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully
contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable
that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be
classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148
The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure"
but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues
involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to
file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of
previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these
principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar
call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based
on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any
"convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP
cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil
Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved
by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to
propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since
said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not
involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154
In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the
power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it
to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is
apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire
"Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing
reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s
fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification
authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is
a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority,
and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence,
should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law
and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa
quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others,
the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment
identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises
serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has
effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle.
These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System,"
"Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through
the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds
will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or
inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the
political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is
comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the
PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System
as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for
local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including
its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators,
either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the
2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a
collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to
refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In
the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation
of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another
or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on
the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171
and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to
another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned
and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court
explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related
activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the
Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget
as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr.,
the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between
them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight
is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
As the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past
the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in
the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the
Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects
and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains
"ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘
proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to
propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that
"everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from
the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF
projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2
provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority
list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district
concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by
legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators
have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release
through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds
shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area
of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any
realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment
from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.
The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘
reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor
General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the
individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much,
Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an
identification from the legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make
sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if
he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense,
Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been
substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral
Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought
that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the
question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as
the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now
surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been
done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or
informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has
vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress,
acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative
power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing
agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of
delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote
the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation
involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature
as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The
President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms
part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204
As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained
that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making
power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of
the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader
point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of
power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find
his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered
by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the
same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207
impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary
check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase
the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of
the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts
of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court
characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that
the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and
the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-
item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its
own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered
as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would
equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that
the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available
as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be
tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both
the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and
hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement
also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation
of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."212
Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting"
and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are
barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is
constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum
amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter
is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional
Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them
"from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF
excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds
are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public
officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of
congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the
2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of
government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of
his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use
thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders
on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate
funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may
be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the
policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units
(LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the
Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to
provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its
strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important,
imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted
by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of
such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for
local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual
members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement,
previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork
Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which
are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the
"abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally
established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives
– and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork
Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal."
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the
sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting
the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that
have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole
credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local
autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the
Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively
provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section
8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development
Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of
PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary
and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing,
petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law."239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which
means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law
may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made
impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization
may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32
P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate
means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the
intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific"
purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation
of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such
as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share
representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
(Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which
creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a
determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system
of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since
they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-
enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the
2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation
to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making,
or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a
law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3)
reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase
"for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have
passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken
down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding,
it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be
told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used –
as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended
by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be
readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the
second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority
in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the
delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public
services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its
pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release
to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the
case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by
the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include
the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential
that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request
for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of
the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126
SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of
their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative
issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that
said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these
cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant
to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public
concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a
proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and
report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public
record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be
proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested
by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records
may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget,
lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR
and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the
political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to
the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued
Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by
the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be
implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as
they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to
the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds
under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that
once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are
already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter
rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential
effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of
the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on
the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by
obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular
2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are
yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall
cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval
or clearance by competent authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay.
Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the
disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of
funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the
issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The
NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO;
so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to,
therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect,
therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of
the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released –
meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but
instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and
its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view
of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity
of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should
be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has
the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise
the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court
must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of
budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has
herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or
similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today,
while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden
duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators –
whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-
enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of
project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific
projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to
be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds
covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking
that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of
these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the
same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of
Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the
irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche,
Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F
emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz
Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho,
Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf
of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C.
GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY
MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his
own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department
of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority,
HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D.,
collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department
of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the
general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly
embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As
in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive
liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in
their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a
member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as
citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH
Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of
public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is
an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced
to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would
no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce
the number of the poor.45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation"
of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people)
the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with
their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to
curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted
to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility
willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance
with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes
any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall
well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation
by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency
Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and
the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of
the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie
Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others.
On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the
principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;
2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9
and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device
capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold
to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted
male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on
August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means
will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning
services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that
policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009,
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for
comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the
RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of
modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it,
the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior
to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by
a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to
play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will
be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political
wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in
view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by
the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often
sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis
of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down
the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of
the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the
chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every
claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has
yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since
no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court
has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law
have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers
in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens
and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains
no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products
and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in
fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives
that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the
product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH
Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH
Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of
male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized
the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the
family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon
that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there
is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific
fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized
ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to
prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all
reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human
life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the
decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records
reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x
x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized
ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients
which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a
total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum
is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then,
as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it
to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really
be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to
raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today
are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take
the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to
life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left
to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the
life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be
assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I
raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to
ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying
"no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the
committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your
Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a
viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes
that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of
the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large
diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165
According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of
life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with
DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in
mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision
passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not
to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose
of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including
Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or,"
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that
the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the
RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that
which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is
an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman
suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest.
Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life
is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted
in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier.
And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is
not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device
will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds
that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital
pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health
product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized
ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily"
will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization
in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of
the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in
a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in
the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as
compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177
Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners
assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
(Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives
per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees
with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that
are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH
Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and
kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to
plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others,
the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is
still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the
government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this
point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up
to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices
are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL
by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the
FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables,
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not,
are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives
but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that
"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-
giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very
thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another
health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that
compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are
too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects,
mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of
those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality,
non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are
not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of
fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be
used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks
to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In
other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only
the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to
keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section
7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights
of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing
an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in
a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of
the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional
religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church,
and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God
which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its
secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this
part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief
and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has
been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of
two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to
the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215
In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law,
but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test
continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of
religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided
the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling
state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger"
test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or
"grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom
of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The
Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on
the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This
right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise
would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was
the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test,
by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation
in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation
of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section
3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and
children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that
one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with
the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state
interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty.
The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH
Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life
health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of
one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom
follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in
the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on
the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS
Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of
Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved
in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part
'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to
comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of
the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be
free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the
media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept
then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative
of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the
RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to:
1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to
one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive
use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act
of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being
contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by
the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still
be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the
last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women,
in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive
health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions
and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities
are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and
training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and the
right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths
per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point
by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to
48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still
insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle
of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good"
effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both,
provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's
life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never
pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same
to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in
the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article,
Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family
as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their
common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband
and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population.
This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State,
which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on
the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244
Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will
not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of
parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal
and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether
or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to
the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to
information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a
person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not
be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even
if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States
and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-
of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the
1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the
youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering
that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior,
gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under
the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their
children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does
not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also
exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same
time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their
plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally
withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the
assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On
the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to
Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest
and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are
not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right
must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the
guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed
by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is
to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider
their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers
to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice
of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even
to the point of revoking such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization
and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to
the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for
sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness
or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to
require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs
and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those
cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as
the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the
hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will
provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it
cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law
does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM,
alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State
of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the
ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by
the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends
to all matters of general concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated
from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to
it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law
as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written
law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or
form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on
the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem
of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population
but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have
helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still
struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have
an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population
and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It
is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for
the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and
cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the
judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will
still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents
or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-
in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA,
ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA,
JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL
DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO
MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM
MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA,
MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D.
CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE,
VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU,
YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L.
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to
be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a
political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to,
not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance,
guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside,
but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under
the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted
and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding
the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses'
House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on
the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the
period of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against
the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays
that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a
writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions
of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his
petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition
for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to
the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding
therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of
the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void;
and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is,
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives
be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which
they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations
of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting
further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they
acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which
they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and
the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance
with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives
be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting
the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment
Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry
into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on
or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.;
and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much
less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and
that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include
them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that
insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues
raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in
Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by
this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to
be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution,
did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred,
if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth
in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches
of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution,
such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in
the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to
wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks
and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x
x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and
the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution
has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the
reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes
the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review,
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative
check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot
be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under
Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment
process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on
the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the
impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of
mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial
review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In
Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under
the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing
to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental
importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court,
the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish
it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . .
. that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring
that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary,
they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit;
and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and
the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the
legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it
with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of
the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented
as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91
Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated.
A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members
of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and
based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does
will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses
of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement
of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-
going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the
House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the
Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to
dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned
second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to
rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power
is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during
the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among
the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing
with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the
will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed
to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on
the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of
martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In
17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14
months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word
famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15.
But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays."
Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting
that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not
the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what
her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital
duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable
...

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the
Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the
judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also
in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there
is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for
votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial
power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104
(Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases
taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a
recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others
are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high
crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope
of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is
invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in
aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than
is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro
and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement."
Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified
complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred
to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to
apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants,
signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least
one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues
to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the
present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis
for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by
the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments
and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very
much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than
being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of
amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even
if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason,
they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less
than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply
place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators,
singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of
an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the
Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of
the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal
or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid
the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove
an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant
the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason
to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all
the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has
yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae
affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which
have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial
and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved
by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I
have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United
States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18,
we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF,
so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the
text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph
(2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala
sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can
bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other
hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House
and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by
a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the
proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the
same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles
of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is
at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate"
which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they
understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as
they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to
the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is
a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations
stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states
that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles
that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not
taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given
by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has
the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has
absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules,
viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it
was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United
States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin
where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a
rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it
is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this
enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments
of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely
to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality
of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the
new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once
more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as
the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is
this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel pro vision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded
that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as
earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual
and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate
what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air
their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith
– offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate
any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of
the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at
the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of
jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found
the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.
What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter
or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches
of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over
the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the
limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable
of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before
the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 193459

Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE CARPIO MORALES,
ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, VELASCO, JR.,*
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN NACHURA,
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG BRION,
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN PERALTA,
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF BERSAMIN,
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY- DEL CASTILLO,
GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG ABAD,
PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING VILLARAMA, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL PEREZ,
UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); MENDOZA, and
FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, SERENO, JJ.
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY

RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS),
Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,

Respondent-Intervenor.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of
September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article
VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. [3] who, by Memorandum
of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite
and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint [5] against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by
Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and
Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to
Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, [8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, [9] instructed Atty.
Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs
Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, [10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of
Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints
to public respondent.[11]

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public
respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file
an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance
of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether
valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file
an answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13]

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct
the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court
subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment
on the petition

The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent
(through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5,
2010.

Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing
of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not
exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
investigation.[17]

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment proceedings are
beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and
(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

xxxx

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI
of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under
the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects,
includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [21]

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the
Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22]

Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the
petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present
petition[23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints.

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite

of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged
conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke
judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged
violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation
she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father
influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the
finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere
suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc.
v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in
order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case,
the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission
to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of
the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. [28]
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it
decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]

Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In
addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness
and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)

JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be
deprived of due process of law?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due
process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.

JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were objections
relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that
this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.

JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the
committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the material or
pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice,
hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator. [30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and
substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of
Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as
the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be
relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As
mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the
impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her
answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination that the
complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not
your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly
Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer
starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept
petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite,
conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the
basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. [35]

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional
grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In
the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form
and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House
of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a verified complaint or resolution,[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. [37]

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is made necessary.This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing.[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence,
such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the
allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the
Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
complaints, which involve matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]

Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published
only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of information, not
necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations [43] which held that the Constitution
categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment
Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.

Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of
court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory. [44] (emphasis
supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times. [45] A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various
rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional
offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46]

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May
14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,[47] it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made
the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.

In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-
stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their
promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general
meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. [49]

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to have been
used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much
the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a
specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.

Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its
rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In
the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case
of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal term in the English
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is
the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly
notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive,
without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a
forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either
a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado
intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there
is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds
for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement,
like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4
which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other proceduralrequirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any
circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing
even its details.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases
where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity
of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment
complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the
purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper
to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption
of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. [55]
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans
such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain
provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the
present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the
filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively
proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine
or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on
it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already
been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act
of taking initial action on the complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to
the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings ─ Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof ─ clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term
initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly
Commissioner Maambongs statements[66]that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing
of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that
initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, [67] for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission
deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of
the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.

MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for
conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.

xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have
here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to
revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment
proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than
the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee
to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would
like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a
majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited
under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?

MR. BENGZON. One-third.

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the case
before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of
Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:

[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18,
we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress.

Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the
filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint
moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She
submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already been
done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the impeachment
proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioners
line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing
would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her
reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint [74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic
rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring
the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints
filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint
exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate
the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to
naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be
barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable
matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely
intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-
limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses
who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and
restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and
file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they
would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or
third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge
them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body
that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition[76] in Francisco,
a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the
Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the
House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must
deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the
Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling
the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by
the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the
House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring
the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently
unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate
thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a
matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the
referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against
the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it
becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three
session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution
states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment
complaint filed by the Baraquel group.For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in
Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period
started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the
complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.[81]

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall
that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent
simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable
officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined
in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings,
which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of
all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary. [84]

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the
Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress.The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no
cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the
then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political
considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue
should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group
of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material
and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the
even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[85]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to
it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86]

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall
conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for
impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of
Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary
regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose
behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly
cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of
the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of]
legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest
category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a
lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else
but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave
it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means
filing andreferral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints
during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to
the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of
protection for an impeachable officer abound.The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of
complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before
bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour
(owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the
Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint
will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression.

Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the
number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur.What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative
aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an
absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not
concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the
impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable
officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to
operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the
constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules

on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment
Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the
House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of
Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in
effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.

First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the
application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment
complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the
grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her
performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the
deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one
offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the
broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds
for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to
which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal
prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must
already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the
issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the
exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office even
for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during
the oral arguments.

Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant
constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House[93] which has yet to
pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice
it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article
of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment. [94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment
complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the
Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after
determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is
the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation
as merely contemplated.[96]

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to
make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. [97]

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her
claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails.Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation which
the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public
respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued
by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case
No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-
trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that
his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide).
Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the
public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing
this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated
in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability
of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited
drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss
of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from
post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted
or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the
MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order
for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in
which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses
of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4,
6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and
"simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under
the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity
to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed
to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way
of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are
crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is
not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding
penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands
on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a
crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated
Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes
by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion
of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes
undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions
for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365
starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal
of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving,"
arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in
1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting
C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33
(promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses
was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of
an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries
arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency
with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest
in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless
imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the
same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of
Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one
and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-
not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva,
41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial
court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming
the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the
case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88).
Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the
same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints
were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed
against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein
he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the
owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance
two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga
who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay
City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of
the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among
other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the
Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First
Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been
sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of
the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru
the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order
of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent
acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under
either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying
penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-
criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately
following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in
which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the
first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though
under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article
365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52
we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if
there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for
the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the
Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as
provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and
applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting
two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back
in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other
charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined
with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows
only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not
to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

THE METROPOLITAN MANILADEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 170656

AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman
of the Metropolitan Manila Development Present:
Authority,
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., CARPIO MORALES,
Respondent. AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
x --------------------------------------------- x
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 170657
the METROPOLITAN MANILADEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman
of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority,
Petitioners,

- versus -

MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 15, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:

Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of
people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x, [1]
have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing
vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping peoples energies and patience in the process.

The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.

Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in
Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.

The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,[2] which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police
power. The second assailed Order of November 23, 2005[3] denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are not disputed:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
GREATER MANILA MASS TRANSPORT SYSTEM, the pertinent portions of which read:

WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater
Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, owing to
the continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and economically viable locations in these provinces;

WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in
Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impedes [sic]
the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-
based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the
different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding requirements to immediately implement and render
operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensure their expeditious
prosecution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:

Section 1. THE PROJECT. The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.

Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4) interim
intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well as those that shall hereafter be developed,
to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, and southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project shall
concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and south Metro Manila commuters as
hereinafter described.

Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as
the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such infrastructure development work as
may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable
and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agencies and/or entities owning
them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or private
persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or implementation of the projects, in
accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local government units, government-
owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes of this
Executive Order.[4] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous
buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; [5] and the MMDA had recommended a plan
to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities[6] which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution
No. 03-07 series of 2003[7]expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport
modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located
along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.[8]

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with
a provincial bus operation,[9] filed a petition for declaratory relief[10] before the RTC[11] of Manila.

In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was
poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in
the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. [12] This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of
its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.

Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the
power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, AN ACT CREATING THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and
related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating
as common carriers.[13]

Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory
relief[14] against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.

Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along
EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, [15] Mencorp prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its bus
terminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan
and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of
Manila.

Mencorps petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Virons petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.

Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.[16]

In the Pre-Trial Order[17] issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate
traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and
the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they
be required to use the common bus terminals.

Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.

By Decision[18] of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924,
which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management.

The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject
matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was an unreasonable exercise of police power; that the authority of the MMDA under
Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and
that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there
being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to undertake or
cause the implementation of the Project.[19]

Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O.
mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and
Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and
to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created
by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.

The petition fails.

It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of
justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally true, however,
that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition, [20] their Comment of April 29,
2003 opposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO, [21] and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.[22]

In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their
respective petitions for declaratory relief,[23] and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking. [24] There
can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.[25]

The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof
exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy.[26] A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. [27]

In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets
out in clear strokes the MMDAs plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision
of mass transport terminal facilities x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-bound
commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than one
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made
effective immediately.

The MMDAs resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale
circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support of
the immediate implementation of the Project.

Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes. The 7 th Whereas clause proceeds to
mention the establishment of the North and South terminals.

As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the
terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer[28] and Position Paper,[29] in fact affirmed that the government had begun
to implement the Project.

It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents
bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under
Section 1, Rule 63[30] of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it does not
persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to
coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents
would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals.

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean,
among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a
deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement. [31] Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law
or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied
by respondents.

On to the merits of the case.

Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they
argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed
with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.

Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the Presidents authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of
the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, her residual
power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of
the police power.

E.O. No. 125,[32] which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry
(now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-A,[33] read:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development and regulation of
dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and
reliable postal, transportation and communications services.

To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:
(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communications systems;
(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications
systems in a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety, service, and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, and for this
purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose development programs include
transportation and communications as an integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of
such program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs of the
government in coordination with other institutions concerned;
(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and for
the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and Communications, hereinafter
referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and shall be appointed by the
President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as
may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of and
exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of
authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation
and communications.

As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise the
mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other
issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the
President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation.

Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful
execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37,
Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs.
Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word
"control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or merely direct
the performance of a duty.[34]

Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power of the State,
suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs
for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously
discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these
powers partake of the nature of police power.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people.[35] This power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that
salus populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated.[36] By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards [37] as well as by
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of
1991.[38]

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish
or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law,
is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation,
and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.

To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area [39] as a special development and administrative region and placed the
administration of metro-wide basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic
management.[40] Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-
wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives and
priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which shall
indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions;

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,
subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and
education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by
all other government agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic
rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this
purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic
services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local
government unit concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.[41] In that case, the Court stressed:
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and
traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and
goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to to set the policies concerning
traffic and coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs. In addition, the MMDA may install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No.
7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services
in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself,
viz:

SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the
MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.

Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling
in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin[43] that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of
a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.[44] Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams,[45] this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court
therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,[46] this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. [47] As such, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the
exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the
E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined,
is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport
systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public in general.

Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x. [48] Common carriers with terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated
common parking areas.
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,[49] two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given the
exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed,
maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.

The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted
an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Paras[50] and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,[51] this Court held that the assailed ordinances were characterized by
overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found that the
compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the
cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper,
hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and
unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be
instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even
entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents terminals can be considered a
reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents bus terminals
brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of colorum buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the
streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic
situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.

As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of public convenience
confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges.[52] As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of
the people.

Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not only because no
authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the
elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with x x
x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x.

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require[53] in approving any franchise or
privilege.

Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act[54] provided that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice
and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:

(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing the same as well
as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.
(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities,
where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnish sufficient business to justify
the construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of the said public service reasonably warrants the
original expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary
service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or
lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of
traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of
our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the
DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to implement
cannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra
vires.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 203834 July 9, 2014

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER VAL V. MENDOZA, CONSTANCIA V. MENDOZA YOUNG,
CRISTINA V. MENDOZA FIGUEROA, DIOSDADO V. MENDOZA, JR., JOSEPHINE V. MENDOZA JASA, and RIZALINA V. MENDOZA PUSO,
Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and the DPWH SECRETARY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the 20 June 2012 Decision2 and the 15 October 2012 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86433. The Court of Appeals set aside the 29 October 2001 Decision4 of the Regional.Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 36, in Civil Case No. 90-53649.

The Antecedent Facts

The case stemmed from an action for specific performance and damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction, filed by Diosdado
M. Mendoza (Mendoza), doing businessunder the name and style of D’ Superior Builders (Superior Builders) against the defendants
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), then DPWH Secretary Fiorello R. Estuar (Estuar), Undersecretary Edmundo V.
Mir (Mir), Nestor Abarca (Abarca), United Technologies, Inc. (UTI), UTI’s President Pedro Templo (Templo) and UTI’s Project Manager
Rodante Samonte (Samonte). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53649.

Mendoza was the winning bidder for the construction of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling Road in Benguet and the
engineers’ quarters and laboratory, designatedas Package VI, of the Highland Agriculture Development Project (HADP). His total bid
for materials and labor was ₱16,176,878.58. He was also the winning bidder for the construction of the 15-kilometer barangay roads
(Sinipsip-Akiki, SinipsipMaalad, and Madaymen) in Benguet, designated as Package IX of the HADP, with a bid of ₱10,527,192.14.
The DPWH hired UTI as consultant for Packages VI and IX, under the direct charge of Templo and Samonte.

On 2 March 1989, Mendoza received the Notice to Proceed for Package VI of the HADP. During the pre-construction survey,
Mendoza alleged that he discovered that the whole stretch of the 15-kilometer project had no right-of-way, in violation of Ministry
Order No. 65. He brought the matter to the attention of the DPWH and UTI but according to him, it was only resolved on 29
November 1989 when the affected landowners and farmers allowed passage at Mendoza’s risk. Mendoza alleged that the
defendants, except for Estuar, conspired to make it appear that Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of29% and
recommended the forfeiture of the contract.

Mendoza further alleged that as regards Package IX, the DPWH did not execute any contract despite the Superior Builders’
compliance with all the post-evaluation requirements. The DPWH also recommended the rebidding of Package IX. Package IX was, in
effect, canceled together with the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. The DPWH blacklisted the Superior Builders from
participating inany bidding or entering into any contract with it for a period of one year.
On 2 August 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 (trial court) issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
defendants from rebidding Package VI and fromawarding Package IX to another contractor, and to cease and desistfrom withholding
the equipment of Superior Builders.

On 20 August 1990, the DPWH, Estuar, Mir and Abarca filed an opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818 that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. They
likewise alleged that Superior Builders failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. They further alleged that the owner of the road,
GregorioAbalos (Abalos) issued a certification that he never disallowed passage to Superior Builders’ vehicles and equipment and
road right-of-way was never a problem. They also alleged that Superior Builders started mobilization from 12 to 15 July 1989 and
resumed its operationsfor one week in December 1989. They also alleged that on 20 November 1989, the Office of the Sangguniang
Panlalawiganof Benguet passed Resolution No. 1176 recommending the termination of the contract between the DPWH and
Superior Builders. They reiterated the allegations in their Opposition in their Answer.

For their part, UTI, Templo and Samonte alleged that Superior Builders had 10 calendar days to commence with the project from the
time it received the Notice to Proceed on 2 March 1989 or until 12 March 1989 but it failed to do so. They alleged that Superior
Builders only mobilized one bulldozer and one loader out of the 47 units required in the contract. They alleged that at the time of
the filing of the case, Superior Builders had only mobilized eight units, a majority of which were not working. They alleged that
Superior Builders failed to mobilize sufficient number of materials, equipment and personnel and that by 25 October 1989, it already
incurred negative slippage of 27.97% that they were compelled to recommend the termination of the contract for Package VI and
rebidding of Package IX.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 29 October 2001 Decision, the trial court ruled that the termination of the contract over Package VI and the non-award of
Package IX to Superior Builders were arbitrary and unjustified. The trial court ruled that under the original plan, Package VI was
inaccessible from the starting point which is a privately-owned road. The trial court ruled that there was no showing of any attempt
by the government to secure right-of-way by expropriation or other legal means. The trial court held that Superior Builders could not
be faulted for its failure to perform the obligation within the stipulated period because the DPWH made it impossible by its failure to
acquire the necessary right-of-way and as such, nonegative slippage could be attributed to Superior Builders. The trial court further
ruled that inentering into a contract, the DPWH divested itself of immunity from suit and assumed the character of an ordinary
litigant.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Department of Public Works and Highway thru its Secretary, United
Technologies, Inc. and Rodante Samonte to pay plaintiff Diosdado M. Mendoza, jointly and severally, ₱1,565,317.70 as
reimbursement for materials and labor on the accomplishment and ₱1,617,187.86 performance bond forfeited, ₱8,817,926.00 as
rental value for eight (8) units of equipment for twenty-six (26) months from December 21, 1989 to January 24, 1992 at ₱339,151.00
per month, with interest at the legal rate until fully paid; ₱300,000.00 for moral damages, ₱150,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and costs.

The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is declared moot and academic but defendant Department of Public Works and
Highways thru its Secretary is ordered to turn over to plaintiff, and the latter is authorized to take delivery of the construction
equipment still under the control of the DPWH.

The counterclaim of the private defendants not being substantiated is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.5

The DPWH and the DPWH Secretary (respondents before us) appealed from the trial court’s decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 June 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissed Mendoza’s complaint for specific
performance and damages for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the DPWH’s forfeiture order of Package VI of the HADP as well asthe non-award of Package IX to
Superior Builders was justified. The Court of Appeals found that Superior Builders incurred a negative slippage of31.852%, which is
double the limit set by the government under DPWH Circular No. 102, series of 1988. Tracing the slippages incurred by Superior
Builders,the Court of Appeals declared:

As early as May 25, 1989, or about two (2) months after the notice to proceed was issued, defendant UTI,the consultant for the
government’s HADP, issued a "first warning"to plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders for having already incurred a slippage of
7.648% due to late implementation, with time elapseof 13.80%. Defendant UTI instructed plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders to
submit a "catch-up" program to address the slippage.

Subsequently, on June 25, 1989, plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders incurred a slippage of 11.743% with corresponding time
elapse of 19.63% (106 days from effectivityof contract) and was given a "second warning."

On July 25, 1989, the negative slippage reached 16.32%, with corresponding time elapse of 25.18% (136 days from effectivity of the
contract). As a consequence, plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders was issued a "final warning."

In its August 11, 1989 letter, defendant UTI reminded plaintiffappellee D’ Superior Builders of itsprevious instructions to bring the
construction materials for the engineers’ quarters, office, and laboratory. Defendant UTI noted:

"We could not find reasons why you cannot immediately bring your construction materials at site, 50 kms. from Baguio City, whenin
fact, there [were] [continuous] deliveries of some construction materials under Contract Package XI, whose site is located 102 kms.
from Baguio City." Thereafter, on September 25, 1989, the negative slippage of plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders reached
21.109% with elapsed time of 36.66% (equivalent to 198 calendar days), or already at "terminal stage" pursuant to DPWH Circular
No. 102. Defendant UTI, thus, urged plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders to show positive actions and speed up its operations,
otherwise the former would be compelled to recommend the termination of its contract.

The following month, on October 25, 1989, plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders’ negative slippage reached 27.970%, still at
"terminal stage."The consultant mentioned several reasons for the slippage, such as: (1) late implementation of construction of the
engineers’ building, (2) non-implementation of work itemsdue to lack or non-operational equipment as site, and (3) continued
absence of plaintiff-appellee’s Project Manager.

In November 1989, the negative slippage of plaintiff-appellee D’ Superior Builders was already 31.852%, or more than double the
limit of what is considered as being at "terminal stage", which is 15%.6

Superior Builders’ performance prompted the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Benguet to pass a Resolution on 20
November 1989 recommending the termination of the contract for Package VI that also eventually led to the forfeiture of the
contract for Package VI. The Court of Appeals noted that there were letters and monthly conferences where UTI, through Samonte
and UTI’s Resident Engineer Federico Vinson, Jr. (Vinson), consistently reminded Superior Builders of its obligations and deficiencies.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the delay in the execution of Package VI was due to Superior Builders’ delay, particularly its
failure to mobilize itspersonnel and equipment to the project site.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the area where there was a right-ofway problem was only the first 3.2 kilometers of the 15.5-
kilometer project. Hence, Superior Builders could have worked on the other areas and the right-of-way issue could not justify the
31.852% negative slippage it incurred. The Court of Appeals faulted the trial court for skirting the issue on state immunity from suit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there should be a distinction whether the DPWH entered the contracts for Package VI and Package
XI in its governmental or proprietary capacity. In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DPWH’s contractual obligation was
made in the exercise of its governmental functions and was imbued with public interest.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 29, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 36, Manila in Civil Case No. 90-53649 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Plaintiff-
appellee’s complaint for specific performanceand damages with prayer for preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

The heirs of Mendoza, namely, Licinia V. Mendoza, Peter Val V. Mendoza, Constancia V. Mendoza Young, Cristina V. Mendoza
Figueroa, Diosdado V. Mendoza, Jr., Josephine V. Mendoza Jasa, and Rizalina V. Mendoza Puso (petitioners in this case)filed a
motion for reconsideration, at the same time seeking to substitute Mendoza as the plaintiff-appellee in view of Mendoza’s death on
25 April 2005 during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals.

In its 15 October 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for substitution. In the same resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that first, petitioners were not denied due process when they were not informed that the case was re-
raffled when the original ponenteinhibited himself from the case. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no requirement of
notification under Section 2(b), Rule III of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA). Further, the action on the inhibition was
attached to the rolloand duly paged in compliance with Section 4, Rule V of the IRCA. Second, the Court of Appeals ruled that
contrary to petitioners’ claim, the issue on the absence of road right-of-way was considered in its 20 June 2012 decision. The Court
of Appeals emphasized that under DPWH CircularNo. 102, series of 1988, the allowable rate of slippage is only 15%. In this case,
Superior Builders reached 31.852% negative slippage and thus, the termination of the contract was justified. The Court of Appeals
noted that Abalos issued a certification that he never disallowed the passage of Superior Builders’ vehicles and equipment. The
Court of Appeals alsonoted that as early as May 1989, Superior Builders was instructed to carry out road works where there were no
right-of-way problems. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that mere entering into a contract by the government does not
automatically amount to a waiver of immunity from suit. The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, the road construction was in
the exercise of the DPWH’s governmental functions. The Court of Appeals also ruled that it was established that Superior Builders
was at fault and thatit exceeded the allowable limit of slippage set by law. Petitioners came to thisCourt assailing the 20 June 2012
Decision and 15 October 2012 Resolution ofthe Court of Appeals.

The Issues

Petitioners raise two issues before us:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the forfeiture of the contract in Package VI of HADP and
the non-payment of the cost of materials, labor on the accomplishment and the rental value of the heavy equipment were justified;
and

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the DPWH has no juridical personality of its own and
that Mendoza’s action was a suit against the State.

The Ruling of this Court

We deny the petition.

On Negative Slippages

The first issue raised by petitionersrequires a review of the negative slippages incurred by Superior Builders and the reasons for the
slippages.

The records of the case showed thatSuperior Builders incurred the following negative slippages:

1. As of 25 May 1989 – 7.648%

2. As of 25 June 1989 - 11.743%

3. As of 25 July 1989 – 16.32%

4. As of 25 September 1989 - 21.109%

5. As of 25 October 1989 – 27.970%

6. As of November 1989 - 31.852%

Presidential Decree No. 1870,series of 1983 (PD 1870),8 states:

1. Whenever a contractor is behind schedule in its contract work and incur 15% or more negative slippage based on its approved
PERT/CPM, the implementing agency, at the discretion of the Minister concerned, may undertake by administration the whole ora
portion of the unfinished work, or have the whole or a portion of such unfinished work done by another qualified contractor through
negotiated contract at the current valuation price.

Undeniably, the negative slippage incurred by Superior Builders, which reached 31.852%, far exceeded the allowable slippage under
PD 1870.

Under Department Order No. 102,series of 1988 (DO 102),9 the following calibrated actions are required to be done for
infrastructure projects that reached certain levels of negative slippage:

1. Negative slippage of 5% ("Early Warning" Stage): The contractor shall be given a warning and required to submit a "catch-up"
program to eliminate the slippage. The PM/RD/DE10 shall provide thorough supervision and monitoring of the work.

2. Negative slippage of 10% ("ICU" Stage): The contractor shall be given a second warning and required to submit a detailed action
program on a fortnightly (two weeks) basis which commits him to accelerate the work and accomplish specific physical targets which
will reduce the slippage over a defined time period. Furthermore, the contractor shall be instructed to specify the additional input
resources – money, manpower, materials, machines, and management – which he should mobilize for this action program. The
PM/RD/DE shall exercise closer supervision and meet the contractor every other week toevaluate the progress of work and resolve
any problems and bottlenecks.

3. Negative slippage of 15% ("Make-or-Break" Stage): The contractor shall be issued a final warning and required to come up with a
more detailed program of activities with weekly physical targets, together with the required additional input resources. On-site
supervision shall be done at least once a week. At the sametime, the PM/RD/DE shall prepare contingency plans for the
termination/rescission of the contract and/or take-over of the work by administration or contract.

4. Negative slippage beyond 15% ("Terminal" Stage): The PM/RD/DE shall initiate termination/rescission of the contract and/or take-
over of the remaining work byadministration orassignment to another contractor/appropriate agency. Proper transitory measures
shall be taken to minimize work disruptions, e.g., take-over by administration while rebidding is going on. The discretion of the
DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play when the contractor shall have incurreda negative slippage of 15% or
more.11

In this case, Superior Builders was warned of its considerable delay in the implementation of the project as early as 29 April 198912
when the progress slippage reached 4.534% due to the late implementation of the project. Thereafter, Superior Builders received
the first,13 second14 and final15 warnings when the negative slippages reached 7.648%, 11.743% and 16.32%, respectively. By the
time the contract was terminated, the negative slippage already reached 31.852% or more than twice the terminal stage under DO
102.

Petitioners claimed that the negative slippages were attributable to the government. Petitioners cited the right-of-way problem
because the construction site was privately owned.The construction of the building for the field office laboratory and engineers’
quarters was also delayed because it took months for the DPWH to approve the revision of the building layout.

We note that Superior Builders received the Notice to Proceed dated 22 February 1989 on 2 March 1989.16 The Notice to Proceed
stated that "the number of days allowable under [the] contract will be counted from the date [the contractor] commence[s] work or
not later than the 8th of March 1989."17 On 17 April 1989, more thana month after the project was supposed to start, Mendoza
wrote Templo that Superior Builders would start the construction of Package VI and that their "Survey Team [would] immediately
start the preconstruction survey of the project x x x."18 In two separate letters dated 27April 1989, both addressed to Samonte,
Mendoza informed UTI that: (1) there was an existing building on the site where the bunkhouse was supposed to be constructed,
which had to be cleared and demolished first; and (2) the first fivekilometers of Package VI allegedly belonged to private residents
who were asking for compensation before they could proceed with the road construction.19

The right-of-way problem was confirmed in a letter dated 2 May 1989 sent by Vinson to DPWH Director Heraldo B. Daway of the
Cordillera Administrative Region.20 In a letter dated 9 May 1989 addressed to "The Project Manager," Mendoza requested for the
temporary suspension of work effective 22 April 1989 due to the right-of-way problem regarding the first five kilometers of the
project.21 Samonte denied the request in a letter dated 24 May 1989 on the ground that Superior Builders can carry out work in
sections without right-of-way conflict. Samonte likewise reminded Superior Builders to mobilize all the required construction
resources in order not to prejudice its performance on the project.22
Apparently, despite the denial of its request for temporary suspension of work, Superior Builders did not mobilize all the required
resources as directed by Samonte. In a letter dated 15 June 1989 to Mir, Mendoza stated that Superior Builders had started the
"mobilization of equipment and personnel since last week,"23 meaning, the mobilization of the construction resources started on
the first week ofJune. However, in a letter dated 24 June 1989, Vinson called the Superior Builders’ attention that as of 21 June
1989, it only mobilized one dozer and one loader at the jobsite.24

The Minutes of the Meeting dated 7 July 198925 showed that Gloria Areniego (Areniego), the Superior Builders’ representative,
assured the delivery of additional equipment on site"next week" or the second week of July. The minutes also showed that Superior
Builders was again advised to start working on the sections not affected by the right-of-way problem.26 In addition, Samonte asked
Areniego for the time when Superior Builders would start the demolition of the building where the engineers’ office and quarters
would be built. Areniego promised that it would start on July 14.27 However, Superior Builders still failed to comply, prompting
Vinson to send another letter dated 22 July 1989 to Superior Builders, noting that "since the arrival of your One (1) unit Dozer and
One (1) unit Loader last 21 June 1989, no other construction equipment had been mobilized on site to date."28

The right-of-way problem turned out to affect only the first 3.2 kilometers of the project. However, as the Court of Appeals pointed
out, Superior Builders was not able to go beyond the 3.2 kilometers because of the limited equipment it mobilized on the project
site. Further, the Court of Appeals noted that Superior Builders’ bulldozer broke down after three days of work, proving that
Superior Builders had been remiss in its responsibilities as a contractor. In addition, Abalos denied in a certification that he
disallowed the passage of Superior Builders’ vehicles and equipment on the road within his property from the time of the
commencement of the contract in March 1989.29

In short, Superior Builders could have proceeded with the project, as it was constantly reminded to do so, but it capitalized on the
right-of-way problem to justify its delays.

In a letter30 dated 2 October 1989 by Bial A. Palaez (Palaez), Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator, addressed to
Benguet Provincial Governor Andres R. Bugnosen (Bugnosen), Palaez informed Bugnosen that when he visited the project with
Kibungan Mayor Albert Mayamnes on 14 July 1989, they observed the following: (1) Superior Builders only constructed 100linear
meters of road at Masala; (2) there was no sign of work activity; and (3) there were only one bulldozer, one payloader and a fiera on
the project site, which were all under repair and not functional. When they visited the project on 31 August 1989, there were no
activities and they were not able to meet the project engineer or the workers on the project site. In addition, the construction of the
building for engineering purposes had not started as of 27 September 1989. Thus, the Provincial Government of Benguet passed
Resolution No. 117631 on 20 November 1989 recommending to the DPWH the "Termination of Contract or Disqualification of
Contractor Pertinent to HADP Project."

Given the foregoing, the DPWH was justified in forfeiting Package VI for Superior Builders’ failure to comply with its contractual
obligations. We also note that Package IX of the HADP was tied to the completion of Package VI because the Asian Development
Bank could not approve the award of Package IX to Superior Builders unless its work on Package VI was satisfactory to the DPWH.32
This explains why Package IX had to be rebid despite the initial award of the project to Superior Builders.

The Court of Appeals likewise correctly ruled that the DPWH should not be made to pay for the rental of the unserviceable
equipment of Superior Builders. The Court of Appeals noted that (1) Superior Builders failed to mobilize its equipment despite
having the first 7.5% advance payment under the contract, and (2) even when the trial court issueda temporary restraining order on
2 August 1990 in favor of Superior Builders, it failed to remove the equipment from the project site. As regards the delivery and
value of the materials, the Court of Appeals found that the supposed delivery was only signed by Areniego without verification from
UTI’s Quantity Engineer and Resident Engineer. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Superior Builders should be made
tobear its own losses.

On Governmental v. Proprietary Functions

Petitioners assail the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the contract entered into by the DPWH was made in the exercise of its
governmental, not proprietary, function and was imbued with public interest. Petitioners likewise assail the Court of Appeals’ ruling
that the DPWH has no juridical personality of its own and thus, the suit was against the agency’s principal, the State. Petitioners
further argue that the DPWH entered into a contract with Mendoza and by its act of entering into a contract, it already waived its
immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit is anchored on Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Section 3. The State may not besued without its consent.

The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be sued, either expressly or
impliedly.33 There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract
or it itself commences litigation.34 This Court explained that in order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, thus:

x x x. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its
nonsuability. The State "will be deemedto have impliedly waived its nonsuability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no suchwaiver
may be implied." Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in
derogation of sovereignty.35

In Air Transportation Office v. Ramos,36 the Court expounded:

An unincorporated agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunityfrom suit because it is invested with
an inherent power of sovereignty. x x x. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of
the former because its function is governmental or incidentalto such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.37

Having made this distinction, wereiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit.38 The then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, now DPWH, was created
under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public
Highways and transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works of Highways. Section 4 of EO 710 provides:

SECTION 4. The Ministry shall exercise supervision and control over the following staff bureaus which are created in the Ministry:

(1) Bureau of Construction, which shall provide technical services on the construction, rehabilitation, betterment, and improvement
of infrastructure facilities;

(2) Bureau of Design, which shall undertake project development, engineering surveys, and designs of infrastructure facilities;

(3) Bureau of Equipment, which shall provide technical services on the management of construction and maintenance equipment
and ancillary facilities;

(4) Bureau of Maintenance, which shall provide technical services on the maintenance and repair of infrastructure facilities; and

(5) Bureau of Materials and Quality Control, which shall provide research and technical services on quality control and on the
management of materials plants and ancillary facilities for the production and processing of construction materials.

The Ministry of Public Works and Highways was later reorganized under Executive Order No. 124, series of 1987 (EO 124). Under
Section 5 of EO 124, the Ministry shall have the following powersand functions:

Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. — The Ministry, in order to carry out its mandate, shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Provide technical services for the planning, design, construction, maintenance, and/or operation of infrastructure facilities;

(b) Develop and implement effective codes, standards, and reasonable guidelines to ensure the safety of all public and private
structures in the country and assure efficiency and proper quality in the construction of public works;

(c) Ascertain that all public works plans and project implementation designs are consistent with current standards and guidelines;

(d) Identify, plan, secure funding for, program, design, construct or undertake prequalification, bidding, and award of contracts of
public works projects with the exception only of specialized projects undertaken by Government corporate entities withestablished
technical capability and as directed by the President of the Philippines or as provided by law;
(e) Provide the works supervision function for all public works construction and ensure that actual construction is done in
accordance with approved government plans and specifications;

(f) Assist other agencies, including the local governments, in determining the most suitable entity to undertake the actual
construction of public works and projects;

(g) Maintain or cause to be maintained all highways, flood control, and other public works throughout the country except those that
are the responsibility of other agencies as directed by the President of the Philippines as provided by law;

(h) Provide an integrated planning for highways, flood control and water resource development systems, and other public works;

(i) Classify roads and highways intonational, regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay roads and highways, based on
objective criteria it shall adopt; provide or authorize the conversion of roads and highways from one category to another;

(j) Delegate, to any agency it determines to have the adequate technical capability, any of the foregoing powers and functions.

It is clear from the enumeration of its functions that the DPWH performs governmental functions. Section 5(d) states that it has the
power to "[i]dentify, plan, secure funding for, program, design, construct or undertake prequalification, bidding, and award of
contracts of public works projects x x x" while Section 5(e) states that itshall "[p]rovide the works supervision function for all public
works constructionand ensure that actual construction is done in accordance with approved government plans and specifications."

The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of the HADP were done in the
exercise of its governmental functions. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by
entering into a contract.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not
be sued without its consent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 June 2012 Decision and the 15 October 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 86433.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO
MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO,
all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978

MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,

vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO,
all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Julian M. Armas, Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners.

Isidro L. Padilla for respondents.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council
under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or
proprietary function of the municipality.

A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of Malasiqui, and the members of
the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on
January 22, 1959, and which was attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.

The following facts are not in dispute:

On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage
the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959
Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela"
was "5-½ meters by 8 meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a row in
front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side — with bamboo braces." 1

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad
Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the
group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went
up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente
Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where
he died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover
damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual
members of the Municipal Council in 1959.

Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.

The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal
ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal
ordinance. 2

After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence
'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the
municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a
stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on
entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was
accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. 3

The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968, the Court of Appeals through its
Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V. Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial
court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4

The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition stated at the sentence of this
Opinion and which We repeat:

Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it or a
private or proprietary character?
1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper
corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. 5

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and
promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate. 6

As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally a difficult matter to determine. The
evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence, for instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and
are stated in textbooks have set down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of
attending circumstances.

In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards
the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community. 7

Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers
and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private.
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in
the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual capacity, and not for the
state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)

In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice Grant T. Trent, relying mainly on
American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease,
preservation of public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are
corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as
municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 9

2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons.

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be. had from
the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties
honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 11 In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al.,
1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the
construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the
province could not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and
maintenance of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay
monetary consideration. 12

With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract
13 or ex delicto. 14

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or
servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal
corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil
actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec. 1610,1647,
cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)

3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the ho of the town fiesta in 1959 by
the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the
municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons,
such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case
it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council.

This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act
for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the
state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the
town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is
private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a
municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element,
however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes
private or proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
15

4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. . .

On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now petitioners), that a member of the
"extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or
"telon", and that when many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent
appellate court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal" braces located semi-
diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened
with a bamboo twine. 16 That being the case, it becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal
braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed negligence as
there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence.

At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done go.
The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and
fastened them on top of the stags for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and
unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. 17

The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the
construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of
bamboo material We likewise observe that although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts,
nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest?

The Court of Appeals thus concluded

The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to take the
necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection
with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating
on the stage which was not constructed to meet the additional weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for
the death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)

The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the
Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misapprehension of facts." 18

Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the
circumstances of the case." 19

Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during the town fiesta was a "donation"
offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of
Malasiqui accepted the donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the
stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put up
a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure
the personal safety of the participants. 20 We agree.

Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which was an action against the city for
injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your
City Week" and one of the features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was
invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for Damages in favor of plaintiff, the District
Court of Appeal, Second district, California, held inter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a
"governmental one" of the city, that defendant owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and
plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of sufficient
illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. 21

We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate
the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui
residents responded to the call for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the
participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.

Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee
on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality.
Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting
within his assigned tasks. 22

... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are
the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their
duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties
relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly
be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed.,
Vol IV, p. 2879)

5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and
created the fiesta committee.

The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23

In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta
is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the
stage, in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and
the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 24

We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against the for this particular article
covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or
misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.

If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are concerned, it is because of a plain error
committed by respondent court which however is not invoked in petitioners' brief.

In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz Castro, held that the Supreme Court
is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution
are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51 of the Rules
of Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case.

The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was
not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same
footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle
that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it 26 and the latter are
not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees
or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27

xxx xxx xxx

The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he
Must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt
11, p. 207)

Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it, but
because of some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To make an
officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as
contributed to, or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-208, Ibid.)

xxx xxx xxx

Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are not personally liable for the negligent acts of
the exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.)

On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show
that said petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform.

6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court. Petitioner-municipality assails the
award.

Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be granted when the court deems it
just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding
attorney's fees, the records show however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an
extrajudicial compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but failed to comply;
and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the
courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just cause. 28

We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a matter of judicial discretion.
The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is
concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993).
Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED,

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which
the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1]
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social
security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other
government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby direct the following:

SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference
System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.

SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing
guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following
as members:

Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority

Secretary, Department of the Interior and

Local Government

Secretary, Department of Health

Administrator, Government Service Insurance

System,

Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing Director, National Computer Center.

SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.

SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social
Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of
their respective systems.

SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National
Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information
dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security
Identification Reference.

SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the
concerned agencies.

SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the
IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.

SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24,
1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O.
No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Petitioner contends:

"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE
ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."[2]

Respondents counter-argue:

A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;

C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;

D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]

We now resolve.

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.[5]

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to
be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the
rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation
of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.[6] Respondent Executive Secretary Torres
has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification
system.[7] All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental
right.

II

We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond
the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The
blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws
will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power
belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."[8] The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.[9] The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[10] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[12] In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.[13]

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14] The executive power is vested in the
President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.[16] It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17]

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.[18] He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.[19] Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative
power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.[20]

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."[23]

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy.[24] We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance"[25] and "embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people."[26] The Code is
divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of
the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the
Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization
and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as
well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the
internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the
effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government.[27]

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first
time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that
it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no
protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights
and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the
plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative
legislation. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative
legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."[28]

III

Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."[29] In
the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,[30] the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it
ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,[31] viz:

"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and
substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers `in any house' in time
of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: `The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[32] we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru
Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:

"xxx

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own.

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a
private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection
of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.

x x x.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a
person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.[35] It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,[36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer,[38] the revelation of trade
and industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.[40] Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law,[41] the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.[44]

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference
number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application
designs."

Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of
biological data."[45] The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise
confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics.[46] A
physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and
keystroke.[47] Most biometric identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN) for initial identification. The
biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card
or PIN.[48]

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern
therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks[49] and becomes a
means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access
is provided.[50] Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern
of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print.[51] Another biometric method is known as
the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people.[52] The
latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red
cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the
individual's personal "heat signature."[53]

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts. Today,
biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in
encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state
what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to
privacy of our people is not groundless.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning."[54] This is an admission that the
PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of
A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement
of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the
chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files.[55] The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.[56]
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal information
about the individual.[57] Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said
order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy
and guaranty the integrity of the information.[58] Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.[59]

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people
will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.[60] The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[61] The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.[62] They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.[63]

The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a
national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution.[64] The computer is capable of producing a
comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes.[65] It can continue adding
to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged
character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject.[66] Once extracted, the
information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.

Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as
speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the
ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather
wait for the fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness
of the expectation.[68] However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may
serve to create or diminish this expectation.[69] The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases.[71] The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more
widely accepted.[72] The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the
advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a
reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the
policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds
of the ID System.

Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes
the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.[73] Republic Act No. 1161
prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports.[74] These laws, however, apply to records and data with the
NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the
National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to
Congress.

Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship
test.[75] He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government
services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He
concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.[76]
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[77] we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual
report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy.
The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[78]

The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A.
3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to
avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional
scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give
the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not
irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must
satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude
abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to
prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights
protected by the Constitution.

The case of Whalen v. Roe[79] cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and
addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substances
Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a
recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a
centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some
people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to
public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts.[80] The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded
a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e, the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a
constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the
misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made
upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute
was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and
requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It
also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of
the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital
safeguards.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to
accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the
efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information systems in different countries make use of the
computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient
management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities.[81]
Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for
those who have to frame policy and make key decisions.[82] The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet,[83] introduced the concept of cyberspace[84] and the information superhighway where the
individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and
databases connected to the net.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires
that the law be narrowly focused[85] and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.[86] Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:

"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-- has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age-- industrialization,
urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."[87]

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources--
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves
on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent
will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone
will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping,
the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."[89] Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick
in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, G.R. No. 167798

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and
ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BAYAN MUNA Representatives G.R. No. 167930

SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO
A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, Present:
GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
ANAKPAWIS Representatives PUNO,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO QUISUMBING,
and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, CARPIO,
Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO CORONA,
and RENATO M. REYES, JR. CARPIO-MORALES,

of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ CALLEJO, SR.,

of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO AZCUNA,
of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE TINGA,
of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG CHICO-NAZARIO,
of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, and
of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, VELASCO, Jr., JJ.
AMADO GAT INCIONG,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,
SHARON R. DUREMDES of the
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
IN THE PHILIPPINES, and
BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC)
of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR
RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),
Petitioners,

- versus -

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI,
in his capacity as Director-General
of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
and the Administrator of the Promulgated:
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO),
Respondents. April 19, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and costly redundancies and higher
costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding several identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification cards in government to
reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of government-
issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the
attainment of the following objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the use of
multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members
or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be
limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference number shall form part of the
stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the
fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to Harmonize All Government
Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and
harmonize all government ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority. In addition to his
organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID system containing only such data
and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or mayors, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of ensuring
government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical working groups, to provide
such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies shall adopt
such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient
public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited
to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy shall be allowed or tolerated
under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization
of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology; and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under
such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management shall be provided to carry
out the objectives of this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with this executive order,
are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.

Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.[1]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R.
No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the
implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions.

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and
penalizes those without ID.[2]

Issues

Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft
of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental
significance to the people. The petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government
entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently
unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID
cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420 applies only to government entities that
issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even
prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS,[3] SSS,[4] Philhealth,[5] Mayors Office,[6] LTO,[7] PRC,[8] and similar
government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that
issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their
IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the
use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government
services;

c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure
compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1)
Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of
Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like
moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.

These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities, and even by the
private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will
reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot
collect or record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the
nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government entities collect and record
more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs
they issue are dissimilar.

In the case of the Supreme Court,[9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data,
namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color
of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of
Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the
sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in Section 3, plus the fingerprint,
agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far
more data than the proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme
Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly
achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems
as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format
for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items
in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in
Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that
are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing
government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can
individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,
compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or
to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under
existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards.[10] This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. [11] The adoption of a uniform ID
data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public
services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative
power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive
department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or
repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability,
compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO
420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require
legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID cards to
their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to
insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a
condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a
club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card
system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card
system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory
on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of
personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities
covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not
compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding
the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and
recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to
government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental
functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only
difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID
number, and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of
identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should undertake cost savings, achieve
efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service to the public. The
collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the
Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to
unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government
entities under the Executive department.If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID
data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve
the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their
right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of
personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to
privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain against the unified ID system under EO
420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card
itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored
for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of
EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the
Supreme Courts ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording,
and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following
safeguards are instituted:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall
be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or
tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written
authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology;

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant
data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and
shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the
confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries have
compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the
Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. [12] Even with EO 420, the Philippines will
still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health
services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their
mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to
suffer substantial losses arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence
of a reliable ID system.

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v.
Connecticut,[13] U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,[14] and Whalen v. Roe.[15] The last two
decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the present case.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives
because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme
Court: Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. Because the facts and the
issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on individuals from public
records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice
Department is that the State can collect and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public records
across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal
identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such information with officials of
States, cities and other institutions.The Department of Justice treated such information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent
and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt
information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated
as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section
7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are
exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly
confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or
the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information. In Whalen, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports identifying patients
who received prescription drugs that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized
database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed
because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters
confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character
of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community
does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for
disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data
required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients
taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative
of the right to privacy.

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,[16] the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for
seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by public health officials.The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that recordkeeping and
reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patients
confidentiality and privacy are permissible.

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, [17] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required doctors
performing an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors name, the womans age, the number of prior
pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the
marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated: The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it
cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion more difficult.

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld
in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy,the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far benign and
cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID
purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial
examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v.
Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by
this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions
under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing
laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish
a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card
issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government
entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a
proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive
department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his
capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL,
SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting
in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006

BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO,
Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and
GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006

PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C.
ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought,
however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished."1

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to
guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal
branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be
indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the
sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to the following
officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP
Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that
Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered
on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon
delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo
Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in
the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation,
on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who,
by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his
utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated
September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which
various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to
study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it
"was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the
previous] week."

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the
report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution
and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be
conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and
Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs.
Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte
vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December
1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December
1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall
secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle
of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another
letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project]
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not
secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged
wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security,
informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is
authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that
no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the
Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP
officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of
regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator
Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel
Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase
II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and
Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed
before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael
Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the
Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have
standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be
declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before
Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them
from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to
participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges that the
tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should
they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner,
are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-
governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts
of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute
the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by
E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary
Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the
validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued
enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals
information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and
prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the
challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in
the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between
the executive and legislative branches of the government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and other military
officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15
dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the
President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the
President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the
alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of
Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December
12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18
having invoked E.O. 464.

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R.
Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21
communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the
February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking
their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and
observing E.O. 464.

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were ventilated: (1)
whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28,
Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue
of whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed
to discuss it in their respective memoranda.

After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, paying particular
attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is
unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22

Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in G.R. No. 16966725
and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.

Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was granted, subsequently
filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues
resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:

Art. VI, Sec. 2130

Art. VI, Sec. 2231

Art. VI, Sec. 132

Art. XI, Sec. 133

Art. III, Sec. 734

Art. III, Sec. 435

Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36

Art. II, Sec. 2837

Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for
the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid
exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the disagreement between
the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.

Standing

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667 make it clear that
they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the investigations called by the different
committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not
shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O.
464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted
due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and that of the other
petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents
contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."40

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the implementation of
E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the
issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic
system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of
Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial
and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed,
legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and
are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna),
Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its
committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O.
464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of
Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared
policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will
benefit the nation.48

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-
petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the
IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of
other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through
the principle of checks and balances.52

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential
decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,53 this Court held that
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its
petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of
transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the
case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of
standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a
"generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-
Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its hearings
after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.

Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her
consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that
they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with
regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to
attend without the President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of
preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of
E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials
concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464
does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar
officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner
Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for
adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the
possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution,
consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of
inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that
Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the
Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by
the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate
or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power
of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the
power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the
Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress
to regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power
of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise
legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial
review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and
thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way
for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any
person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its
invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there
would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires
that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to
the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear
pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to
members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case,
attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall
under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its
provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986
Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of
the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact,
comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive
privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations,
and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on
the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another
variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information
of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the
confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our
government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The
courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a
qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements
applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to
documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those
documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in
all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given
procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity
of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain
tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest
in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a
privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge
of a President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be
balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was
not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege
to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House
of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations
against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of
Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the
Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term
in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for
the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those
values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying
a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly
stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive
privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The
same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets
and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear
principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be
valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to
discuss the validity of these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether
they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are.
Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’
possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which
provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to
"conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the
framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of
the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular
problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself
has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee
deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite
them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse
to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come
when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or
congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21.
Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if
he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears
noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the
question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of
this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to
Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article
on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as
Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is
Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power
in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section
31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of
check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we
are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from the same
assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour.
Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being
complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner Maambong’s
committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress.
Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department.
His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation
initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour
in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary
system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall
determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently
understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be
required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from
them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to
obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States
there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the
legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the
executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out.
The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under
a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce
made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its
legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in
a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid
of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section
22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power
is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the
fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate,
Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to pass on the
constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries
in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is
valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all
officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in
the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered
by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature,
Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the
President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a
misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information
and not to categories of persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to
persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of
information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus
proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege,"
such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress.
This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The
proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which
already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the President under E.O.
464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This
determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive
branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied
nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:

In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No.
464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive
Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The
Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring
supplied)

The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be
resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view
of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited officials are
covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the
designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive privilege.
Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting
the statement that the invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not
reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.

Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the President or the
heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and
that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has
been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it
is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even
against Congress. Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers.
The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings
which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the
situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive
privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the
particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very
nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section
3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the
executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase
"confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified
as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As
U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:

The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not
to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under
one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.93 These, in
substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and,
more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the
Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring
supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its objection to
claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free
expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown – nor even alleged – that those
who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be
set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories
objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a matter of internal
policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and certain’ reasons for
preserving the confidentiality of requested information."

Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as
well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze
the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its
sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not
recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable
determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling
reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds
therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102

We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as
true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent
respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his)
reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to
avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to
consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any
such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[, and]
cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of
particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself – his say-so
does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to
answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to
prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the
very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office
mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of
government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.

Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to
the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it
claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is
privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from
appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already
discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role
and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the
instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this
score.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of
E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must
indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege,
for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials
does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it,
and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners
are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry,
but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense,
that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed
to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and
have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above,
just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for
publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect
the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the
publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due
process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings
and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring
supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid.
Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall
have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and
FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.

Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal
Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin
Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected.
Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by
petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William
Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party,
chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon
nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member
of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the
objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado
as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina
Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in
his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as
at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo
M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power
or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color
of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the
powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio
and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be
made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening
and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification
of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens
Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators
chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3)
Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in
Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged..
hereinabove.".

Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from
paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.

"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they
be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the
election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said
respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and
(b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated
himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is
not the proper remedy. .

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that
the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective
representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy
available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino
vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate,
and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of
said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of
a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to
determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon
the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the
other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either
an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39;
emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction
over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate
and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the
authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be
no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined
in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of
an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do
so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents,
in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members
thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of
a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a
political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83
Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case
at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-
after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the
Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2)
Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act
on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs.
Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the
Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of
the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization,
which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being
conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue,
therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista
Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.

xxx xxx xxx

The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper
remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore,
whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use
petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the
Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact.
During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956,
Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined
the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved
and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court.
Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose,
because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of
anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned
opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not
respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation
of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution."
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement
of Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is
not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this
connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts
to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the
executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the
departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently
used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio
St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance
with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is
correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual
vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view
contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.

xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised
by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50
Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41,
37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely
because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and
acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a
political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a
constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and
the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the
government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional
document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination
.. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question.
The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise
of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue
raised by the parties herein.

II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of
the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In
the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens
Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a)
that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator
Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot
give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion
would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in
the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further
stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support
of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate
adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator
Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being
the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised -
whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators
Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349,
350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22,
1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended,
on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10
p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party,
nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now
making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two
other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado
and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm
conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista
Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my
objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion
hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal
Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the
nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the
other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine
(9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is
mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby
"waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these
respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely
complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-
respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of
Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the
privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word
"privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not
anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of
1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party,"
which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-
330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.

"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the
existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't
believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of
right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to
nominate," adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is
such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when
Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the
Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered
into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a
fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct
from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953
election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.

"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And
whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the
representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation ..
approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the
Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral
Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege"
to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not
only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no
room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second
largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the
constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is
imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of
which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the
solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been
uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous
or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a
contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any
way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more
restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except
as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical
construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may
he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so
essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to
change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest
doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is
demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the
word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with
respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore,
as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why
"shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered
directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution
and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the
adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M.
Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the
lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions.
The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in
some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a
great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic
laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a
camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in
some countries, like England and Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by
Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority
party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority,
and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a
position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices:
committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that
justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the
majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from
becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they
were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being
then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and
injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members:
Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest
number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral
tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party
lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.

"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the
legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted
to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt
also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was
the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States,
and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that
would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of
the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some
members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would
insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the
power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral
Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the
minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from
experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party
from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these
questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with
this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there
would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the
majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties,
we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied
in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate?
Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the
application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act
impartially in these electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party
interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be
applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best
guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral
Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the
justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three
justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in
electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the
majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the
Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he
asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world.
When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive
function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they
must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples
of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt
need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in
which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres
miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a
dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como
los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidisrno?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
emphasis supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an
Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices
were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes,
in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission
or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be
induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as
each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with
judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved
to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal
so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power.
That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is
hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they
will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned
were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be
chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that
in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in
disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they
will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan
motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling
and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators
who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan
motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution
when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and
secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or
motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis
supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the
Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as
representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators
Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral
Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the
party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said
parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In
the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution",
pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350,
351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover
the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is
within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not
within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from
those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction,
the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances,
and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its
object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in
connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the
legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all
of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the
other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best
be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of
mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed
by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence
of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial
construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with
the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to
the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute
prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and
the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On
the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when
a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a
compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite
conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute
must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of
the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and
that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices
of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the
essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and
void. 11.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at
bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by
the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the
spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated
by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in
the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12
has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said
member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously,
Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position,
therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same
were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of
the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in
said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein
would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in
lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election
protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of
fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their
character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent
upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of
selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of
the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could
not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection,
particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it
difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the
pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above
stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in
the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are
worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal
basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or
16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates
of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the
elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only
one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to
the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6
members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an
interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could
entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.

xxx xxx x x x.

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the
majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests
are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary
to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3
Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the
majority party in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party
candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court."
(Emphasis supplied.).

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even
those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved.
(11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization,
of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is
founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there
can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his
rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate
to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted
that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator
Tañada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not
in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar,
the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent
from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who
have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in
the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the
one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the
Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator
Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however,
that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure
members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election
of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that
it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of
the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have
not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be,
as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such
capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as
regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number
of votes therein." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was
impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by
the party having the second largest number of votes, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation
of the constitutional provision involved. Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.

"Sir:.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of His Excellency, the President, in
which you request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution':.

`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.'.

"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is impossible to comply
with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Assembly.'.

"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of
the six members to be chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes.

"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral Commission
shall be composed of `three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of vote three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court ..(Aruego, The Framing of
the Phil. Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally adopted by the Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, an
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).
"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention of the framers of our Constitution
was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to
decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if
not exclusively on partisan considerations.

"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six
members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three
minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise
the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been intended. We cannot
say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional
provisions must always have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable
and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be
taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstances may have so changed as to
make a different rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any
member of the minority party is protested. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority
party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor.
Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party
disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it
was first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion, as well as, the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional
Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine
members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there
being no other party entitled to such nomination.".

Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally organized, with six members of the
National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were
introduced and duly adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of
Congress. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each house, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution.).

If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be assumed to
have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of
the Secretary of Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of
the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly
ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all
times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of Congress.

It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further
that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is
neither controlling nor necessary.

Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the second largest of votes,
the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not
absurd, would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the
possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the
Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise
membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other hand, he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some such
argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence, integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House
who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the
Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.

In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party, the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to
the constitutional mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endencia, J., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.

I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.

The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the Constitution.).

I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character and that this character is true
not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the
members shall be chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction.

"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory effect than is true of any
other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its
character is such as to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the very principles of our institutions,
involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy, are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the
framers of a constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it .." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3,
p.84.).

The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista Party, has
refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other members the Senate may not elect said two
other members. And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the
interests of the minority. This holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first Place, it renders nugatory the
provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory
provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of
electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the
minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third
place, it would make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate,
superior to and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a
procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a
provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect
that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral
Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason.

I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members must be construed as a
waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of
reason. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes
membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected, can be reconciled.
Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make them
both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles. The reconciliation is brought about in
this case by the principle of waiver.

While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said
mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not
clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil.,
44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central
Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43
Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50
Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban,
49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs.
S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 157 U. S.
429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.

2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of the Electoral Tribunals under
the Constitution as amended.

3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of the Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off.
Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz.,
1778; De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs.
Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51 Off. Gaz., 5607.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From the very nature of the American system of government with
Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government, it has devolved on the judiciary
to determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the fundamental law. All the departments are of
the government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to judge of the Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act
under the obligations imposed in the instrument, and in the order of time pointed out by it. When the, judiciary has once spoken, if
the acts of the other two departments are held to be unauthorized or despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights
of the citizen, they cease to be operative or binding.

xxx xxx x x x.

"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of government and the
judges are sworn to support its provisions, the court are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. It is their duty in
authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their
opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.

"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional
cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of
the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating
their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge
and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as
to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion
that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-
715; emphasis supplied).
5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; State vs.
Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710;
Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs. Melver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6
N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.

6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled
to six in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority
members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the
explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been intended; We cannot say
that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional
provisions must always have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable
and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be
taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstance may have so changed as to
make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any
member of the minority party is protected. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority
party to act as a check on the majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor.
Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party
disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it
was first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional
Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine
members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there
being no other party entitled to such nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.

6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up or discussed, until the events
leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).

6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral Commission formed
part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court
deemed it unnecessary to refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.

7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the following language:.

"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the
party that received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party which is the Nacionalista Party now, and three to
represent the party receiving the next highest number of votes therein, meaning the minority party, the party receiving the next
highest number of votes. But there was a great deal of opinion that it would be better if this political organization, so far as the
legislative department is concerned, could be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to
each Electoral Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great majority of the delegates to the
constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why we have nine members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in
the Senate. And one reason that I remember then and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three
members representing a party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it would be better that even on
that hypothesis or on that supposition it would be better, in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes
against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the case because then it would
be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are supposed to be
beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having reached the highest judicial position of the land, these persons would
likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).

8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.
9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

10 Senator Lim said:.

"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second largest number of
votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart
of a senator belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I agree with Your Honor, Your Honor can see that the spirit of
the provision of the Constitution is clear that the three must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the other
three nominated must belong to the party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow
Your Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be maintained, because partisan considerations enter when one is
with the majority party, and that no party should prevail, Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution
is precisely to obviate that to the extent that the only three can be nominated from the party having the largest number of votes and
three from the party having the second largest number of votes." (Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis
supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

The statement of Senator Sabido was:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power.
That is the ideal situation.".

xxx xxx x x x.

".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those participating in the electoral
tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order
to insure impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349, 352; emphasis supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

Senator Cea declared:.

".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the Senate in the Electoral
Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350; emphasis supplied.).

The words of Senator Paredes were:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members
three of them belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three from, the party having the second largest number of
votes so that these members my represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as
protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).

11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but, also, by the fact that constitutional
provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be mandatory, "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The
pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:.

"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The
courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to
disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as
mandatory, and not to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This presumption as to
mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The
analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing
upon the provisions of a Constitution.
"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said that neither
by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely
directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without reference to the
rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur. 686-687; emphasis supplied.).

12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.

13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court, recalled that:.

"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the
minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to
the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the
non-partisan character of the commission."(emphasis supplied.).

Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or grant of authority in the
Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by resolution of one House of Congress, a mere creature of
said charter.

14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or a total of six (6)
members of the Tribunal.