Fin de Siecle Social Theory

Relativism, Reduction, and the Problems of Reason

Jeffrey C. Alexander
∗
A Book Report

First Essay
Modern, Anti, Post and Neo: How Intellectuals Have Coded, Narrated,
and Explained the ‘New World of Our Time’

In this introductory essay, Jeffrey Alexander surveys what he identified as the four great
‘intellectual generations’ or ‘theoretical-cum-ideological’ periods that attempted to make sense of the
‘new world of our time.’ He situated the discussion against the background of two dramatic historical
breaks or ‘deep shifts in historical sensibility’ that took place within the 20th century. The first ‘transition’
Alexander noted as ‘a historical phase, a social struggle, a moral transformation, for better or for worse…
to the movement from feudalism to capitalism.’ (p.7) The ‘second great transformation’ or the ‘new
transition’ occurred ‘in the last five years’ (the book’s copyright is 1995) that saw the ‘transition from
communism to capitalism.’ In reviewing these theoretical narratives, he proposed to understand in
relation to ‘social and cultural history’ and as ideologies in an ‘extra-scientific’ manner. Each of these
social change theories are ideological precisely because they are explanations of the past, present and
future of a historical period (p.10).

Alexander suggested a ‘dramaturgical’ description of the four groups of theories (p.15). He

describe modernization as romantic liberal movement (p.16-19) whose typifying elements are
individualism, democracy, capitalism, science, secular, and progressive. (p.11) Modernity excludes itself
as a ‘consciousness’ by posing the binary coding of traditional:modern, of which the first is the ‘polluted’
term, the avowed enemy of modernity. Modernization was taken for granted as a universal trend which
means all societies would ‘converge’ into this ‘historical and specific Western model of development and
institutional forms.’ To many it was a scientific theory of development (p.14) and was widely held with
plausibility because it was a neat narrative that provided ‘meaning and motivation’ and ‘functioned as a
metalanguage that instructed people how to live.’ (p.13)

In a short period of time, in the late 1960s, modernization theory died (p.19). Its saccharine
features turned sour as ‘reality problems’ troubled and challenged the positive assumptions of the aspects
of modernity. Anti-modernization theory emerged as a ‘heroic radical’ narrative, exposing the cracks in
the former by showing that instead of ‘democracy and individualization, the contemporary modern period
was…bureaucratic and repressive. Rather than a free market or contractual society, modern America
became capitalist, no longer rational, interdependent, modern, and liberating but backward, greedy,
anarchic and impoverishing.’ (p.21) Anti-modernization was primarily the Left’s polemics against
industrialist-capitalist dominated modern setting (p.21-22). Its binary code of opposition is
capitalist:socialist, with the anti-moderns favoring the second term and posturing itself as saving societies
from the trepidation and cruelty brought about by modernization. This sentiment and sensibility enjoyed
relevance in the 1960s and 1970s, until their subsequent ‘deflation’ that signalled the advent of
postmodern theory.

‘By the end of the 1970s, the energy of the radical social movement of the preceding period had
dissipated. Some of their demands became institutionalized; others were blocked by massive backlash


All of the words and phrases in quotes that are not followed by page numbers are also taken from the book itself.
movements that generated conservative publics and brought right-wing governments to power.’ (p.23)
Due to this turn of events, the heroic vibes of the radical anti-modern period mellowed to modest to
‘comic.’ Postmodernism has arrived.

Alexander suggested that ‘we must deal with it (postmodernism) as the successor ideology to
radical social theory.’ (p.24) It must be seen as ‘an attempt to redress the problems of meaning created by
the experienced failure of the sixties.’ (p.25). Postmodern theories criticize radical social change theory
for not having rid itself of the ‘key tenets of…modernization;’ it was not enough, in short.
Postmodernism maintained modernity or modern as their enemy, thus it posits the modern:postmodern
code. But far from being utopian as the former two generation of theories were postmodernism have
‘coded privacy, diminished expectations, subjectivism, individuality, particularity, and localism as the
embodiment of the good.’ (p.25) It signalled the end of the ‘grand narratives,’ the ‘rise of the empty
symbol, or simulacrum, the end of socialism and the emphasis on plurality and diffence.’ (p.25-26) If
modernization was romantic and liberal, and anti-modernization heroic and radical, postmodernization is
‘comic detachment:’ ‘a play within a play, a historical drama designed to convince its audiences that
drama is dead and history no longer exists.’ (p.27)

While the critics of modernization find themselves in a bind and an impasse, the right-wing
elements gradually crept into the spotlight once more. The fall of communist and socialist regimes in the
1908s was accompanied by a resurgence of the market and democracy as espoused by the Right. (p.30-
32) This phenomenon was called ‘neo-modernism’ by Alexander. Neo-modernism’s code, unlike its
antecedent, is no longer traditionalism. For Alexander, democracy is the hallmark of this new theoretical
movement, and its opposite term is nationalism, its ‘polluted representation.’ (p.35-42) Because of the
universal or globalizing trend of the rise of market and democracy (p.32) in this era of globalization,
Alexander sees the opportunity to embark on a ‘project of universalization’ (of democratization,
especially). Neomodernization, as a ‘dramatic inflation,’ sees the world not as moving ontologically
towards market structures and democratic forms, but one that is hopefully ready for openness in terms of
finding commonalities as basis for solidarity, and tolerating political, social and economic freedoms.
(p.45-47)

This is Alexander’s neomodernist argument against the notion that modernization is a universal
trend, when in fact it was a ‘historically specific Western phenomenon.’ In contrast, he wants to redeem
the good aspects of modernity and make it universal. For him, the neomodernist sensibility will/should
thrive by maintaining a ‘decentered, self-conscious reflexivity about its ideological dimensions.’ Only by
becoming ‘aware of themselves as moral constructions—as codes and narratives—will they be able to
avoid the totalizing conceit that gave early modernizing theory such a bad name.’ (p.46)

Second Essay
Between Progress and Apocalypse: Social Theory and
the Dream of Reason in the Twentieth Century

Jeffrey Alexander views the West and the ‘the twentieth century is a unique period’ because it
was in this era when people (particularly Westerners) ‘believed so much in progress and perfection’ that
they think it can in fact be actualized in this world. A utopia that is not waiting in some other-worldly
dimension, but a promise that could be realized. Alexander said, ‘This possibility has defined the essence
of modernity. To be modern is to believe that the masterful transformation of the world is possible,
indeed that it is likely.’ (p.66) This sentiment was a product of the ‘Enlightenment, and the growth of
secular, scientific thought.’ He explains that the ‘ethos of perfectionism’ is ‘inseparable from the claims
of reason.’ He defined reason as ‘the self-conscious application of the mind to social and natural
phenomena,’ and that ‘through reason, people came to believe, we can master the world.’ Thus the
formula: Modernity can attain Progress and Perfection through Reason.

However, this ‘faith in progress’ was challenged ‘to the core’ by the tragic circumstances that
occurred within the same century. How its social theory come to grip with this experience is the objective
of this essay. (p.67)

Alexander traces the genealogy of this experience in the beginning of the twentieth century. In its
early years, the world was filled with ‘great hopes.’ Political parties were formed that committed itself to
democracy; Socialists had access to power that they used to mitigate the harsh effects of capitalism; The
developments in science and technology exponentially increase production that resulted to economic
gains more or less across classes; Human rights were recognized and extended to marginalized groups.
(p.68) These developments gave rise to a vision of progress and produced a ‘line of intellectual
reasoning, a line of social theory.’ This Alexander calls, the ‘Dream of Reason.’ (p.69)

This dream of reason found expressions in philosophy (logical positivism that ‘reduced thought to
rational and mathematical proposition’); in the arts (‘the form follows function’), psychology
(‘behaviorism that sees individuals as acting in straightforwardly rational ways’), and social engineering
(‘the belief that the world can be subjected to rational control’). (p.69-71) For Alexander, these did not
‘represent the greatest and most original achievements of twentieth century social theory.’ Ironically, it is
the negative side of this long period: ‘The dream of reason continue has continued to inspire the thought
of our time, but it is the nightmare of reason (italics added) that has captured the most profound
theoretical imaginations of the age.’ (p.71)

The ‘dark side of modernity’ was expressed by the violent, radical anti-modernism of Georges
Sorel. Sorel proposed to terrorize the bourgeoisie to ‘unmask the real, anti-progressive face of the
society.’ He ‘equated progress with violence and force,’ and rejected ‘rationality not just as an
explanation of human action but as a normative stance.’ (p.72-73) The Nightmare of Reason loomed not
only among and during the rise of socialist/communist regimes, but likewise felt among the capitalist
nations. Authoritarian communist leaders ‘monopolized reason’ in the form of state control. ‘Political
repressions’ and ‘genocidal barbarity’ were some of its disastrous outcomes. As for the non-communist
nations of the West, racial discrimination, war mentality as well as genocide characterized their conduct
especially during the war years. (p.74-77)

The nightmare of reason hovered like a dark cloud. It encouraged cynic sentiments that gave
pronouncement to the ideas that, indeed ‘God is dead,’ (Nietszche) and the ‘modern individuals are adrift
and alone.’ (Tillich) In various fields it motivated antirational currents as exemplified by the likes of
Wittgenstein in philosophy (‘words no longer reflect things’, and ‘between words and objects there is
only arbitrary relation’); Derrida in art (‘the complexity and irrationality of motive…makes authorial
intention impossible to discover’); Freud in psychology (‘the self is fragmented, contradictory, and hard
to find’ and ‘rationality is not an innate quality’); and Oakeshott in social engineering (‘the standards for
promoting and evaluating change are neither rational nor capable of providing accurate evaluations’).
(p.78-79)

Alexander finds the antidote to this nightmare of reason in the thoughts of Weber, Durkheim,
Freud and Wittgenstein, who had the advantage of theoretical insight because they ‘experienced both the
dream of reason and the nightmare of reason in its wake.’ Weber saw ‘secular rationality represented the
only possible hope for humankind.’ Durkheim pinned his hopes on science. Wittgenstein ‘continued to
see clarity and perspicuity as valuable in themselves. Freud maintained psychoanalysis can ‘reduce the
influence of the unconscious to distort reality. (p.82) Contemporary theorists who benefited from the
legacy of the above mentioned thinkers, likewise saw hope for this century. Keynes revived the ‘hope for
a humane economy.’ Sartre ‘insisted that human beings do have the capacity for freedom. Parsons
grounded freedom in his voluntaristic theory of action. Marcuse ‘insisted that transcendence is possible’
if only people would use their ‘innate human capacity for critical thought.’ Overall, Alexander suggests
that twentieth century social theory are not ‘accurate descriptions of 20th century thought,’ but
‘expressions of the dream of reason itself.’ (p.82-84)

Alexander’s synthesis deserves full quotation.

“A taut dialogue between pessimism and optimism, reason and unreason, defines the social
theory in the twentieth century. Suspended between perfection and apocalypse, what marks off the
greatest of this century’s theorists is their attempt to mediate these dichotomies. While they have
abandoned positivism and no longer see their times as embodying the dream of reason, most have not
given up on science as a hope and none has given up on reason as a possibility. They recognize the
omnipresence of irrationality with regret. Their theories are devoted to showing how the irrational works,
in different spheres, in different modes, with different results. The show this by exercising their reason,
and they hope to use their hard-won understandings to find a better way of life. This life will recognize
the ineradicable need for irrational experience and for the concrete, expressive articulation of meaning.
By augmenting our rational understanding, however, it may be possible for a form of social life to emerge
that meets those needs in a less restrictive way.” (p.85)

Third Essay
General Theory in the Postpositivist Mode: The ‘Epistemological Dilemma’
and the Search for Present Reason

The postwar period of ‘general sociological theory has been associated with the search for
nomothetic knowledge.’ Much of the early sociological works are positivist in character, styling
themselves after the empirical models of natural science. But in the latter part of the twentieth century,
positivism has been severely attacked by different variants of relativistic theories. As Alexander puts it,
‘increasingly, there have been calls for social science to give up its one-dimensional quest for cognitive
truth; social science as praxis or moral inquiry, or as a hermeneutics of the concrete have been offered as
alternatives.’ (p.90) Anti-positivists or Postpositivist who valorizes relativism as against the scientific
claims of positivism, are trapped in what Alexander calls an ‘epistemological dilemma.’ They operate
under the assumption of the dichotomous relation of positivism:relativism.

Alexander takes up this debate to ground his case for ‘general theory’ and ‘present reason.’
Although he elaborated much on what these two terms indicate, he did not offer a direct definition of
them. For the purpose of reviewing this article, I put forward the following tentative definitions of
general theory and present reason, based on my own understanding. General theory would refer to social
science thoughts or ideas that seek to be universally applicable or generally acceptable. While present
reason would be the capacity of individual human beings as meaning makers to take control of
‘conceptual constructs’ that are the stuff of any theorizing activity. In other words, present reason is the
capacity of the ‘knower’ to control what is being ‘known.’

He developed his essay be reviewing how the early thinkers managed to posit an ‘objective
world’ or ‘objective reality’ that can be studied or be objects of theorizing. This was achieved by the
process of ‘decentering,’ where the individual ‘understands the world as not revolving around them.’ In
earlier times theorizing was necessarily towards universalistic claims. (p. 92) There is problem, however,
with the recognition of the paradox that ‘this decentered world is at the same time a world view, and the
human view of it a human creation. When this agency is forgotten, universalism becomes an
objectification that seems not just to decenter human beings but to deny them. Objectivity is viewed not
as world mastery but as alienation. The consequence is the return to the concrete.’ (p.92-93)

The use of reason entails decentering and the conception of nature as impersonal; there is
depersonalization. (p.93) This was taken to imply that when we think rationally, we treat the things that is
known as objective and alienating, and depersonalization causes ‘reason to be absent.’ This line of
thinking became or understood to be the basis of science, which is a cornerstone of modern thought.
Indeed, scientism dominated the postwar social theory. (p.96-98)

Subsequently, contrasting theories reacted to challenge this scientism. Alexander pointed to the
emergence of ‘neo-romantic alternative’ of ‘contextualism’ that proposed to ‘recenter’ the knower. He
identified Geertz, Kuhn, Wittgenstein and Winch as its representatives. Contextualism basically asserts
vis-à-vis general theory that there can only be local and no universally applicable criteria for evaluation.
It borders on the relativism the kind Alexander warned to be caught in the epistemological dilemma.
Aside from contextualism, the ‘deepening skepticism about theory and truth’ added to the chorus against
the possibility of general theory based on positivism. Structuralists and poststructuralists like Saussure,
Barthes, Derrida, Levi-strauss, Foucault and Baudrillard are the figures of this movement. They were
antitheoretical and relativist. But Alexander pinpoints Richard Rorty as the ‘apotheosis of antitheoretical
relativism’ and the major obstacle to his case for general theory and present reason. (p.99-104)

One of Rorty’s major claims is that ‘universal properties do not exist.’ His philosophy is one that
is anti-foundationalist; he explains that we are at fault for trying to mirror or reflect what nature actually
is by finding basic truths or the universal type or establishing the ‘foundations of knowledge.’ Rorty
opposes such view because if this is the case we ‘will be unable to doubt or to see an alternative.’
‘Foundationalism is the end-product of an original wish to substitute confrontation for conversation as the
determinant of our belief.’ (p.107)

To this Alexander retorts: “The problems lies with his conviction that every argument against
skepticism and for universalism is an epistemological quest that is based upon reflection theory and the
absence of reason.’ (p.107) Instead, philosophers who seek foundation must be seen ‘as rational agents
who create frameworks within which to interpret a world whose objectivity and impersonality they take
on faith.’ (p.107)

Alexander agrees with Bernstein that when we appeal to reason, it ‘does not mean reason is an
ahistorical and universal standard’, but we are referring to ‘the best possible scientific reasons that can be
given.’ (p.112) Alexander also allows for ‘conditional objectivity;’ this can be established by ‘sharing a
conception that there are impersonal worlds.’ And with Gadamer, Alexander says, ‘because individuals
are open to each other, they have a chance of mutual understanding. This act of understanding means
acknowledging the decenteredness of human reality and accepting some at least of its impersonal claims.’
(p.117)

To conclude, Alexander insists that Rorty ‘misses the point’ when the latter said that ‘there is no
possibility of permanently uncontested truth.’ Alexander explains that ‘it is precisely the perspectival
quality of social science that makes its own version of foundationalim, its more or less continuous strain
of general theorizing, so necessary and often so compelling.’ (p.123)
Fourth Essay
The Reality of Reduction: The Failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu

Alexander reserved his most razor-sharp critique to the ‘most influential critical theorist in the
world of social science,’ Pierre Bourdieu. I think Alexander, being a neofunctionalist, considers it his
task to discredit his perspective’s enemy which is conflict theory, as represented by Bourdieu.

He sets the tone of his essay by saying that despite of the ‘enlightening’ and ‘amusing’ works of
Bourdieu, the latter’s ‘sociology is irredeemably flawed.’ His critical points are outlined below.

a. Bourdieu attacks symbolic structuralism in cultural theory because it does not give pride of
place to agency;
b. Bourdieu introduces the concept of ‘habitus’ to make room for agency and to outline his
theory of practice wherein the individual is accorded agency.
c. Bourdieu employs the concept ‘unconscious strategy’ to explain that individual actions are
practically rational;
d. Bourdieu views society as constituted by independent ‘fields’ where there is struggle between
the dominant and the dominated;
e. Bourdieu points to ‘symbolic violence’ as the means used for domination.

All of these propositions of Bourdieu, for Alexander, can be destroyed by looking at Bourdieu as
a crypto-Marxist through and through. The following are his commentaries.

a. Bourdieu did not make room for agency with his concept of habitus because habitus was
merely a middle-concept that facilitates the reproduction of the class structure. There is nothing the
individual can do to escape his fate in the process of placing individuals in the socio-economic categories;
b. The unconscious strategy is an ‘oxymoron’ because a strategy is a product of conscious
planning. Bourdieu’s unconscious strategy is just another mechanism in the process of class reproduction
because the individual’s unconscious forces him to behave/decide according to his class interest;
c. The ‘fields’ Bourdieu conceptualized are just sites where economic exploitation and
domination take place as, again, part of the process of class reproduction;
d. And last but not the least, symbolic violence is just an effect of the class domination by the
elite in society, the bourgeoisie.

With these observations, Alexander concludes that the present social reality can no longer be
profitably understood in the passé perspective of classical or neo-Marxism, as Pierre Bourdieu has done
unwittingly.