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Chinese Civil War – Phase II

1. Mao Zedong: ‘Three Rules and Eight Points’ (1947)


In October 1947 Mao Zedong published a brief memorandum titled ‘On the Reissue of Three Rules and Eight
Points for Attention’, which reminded the Red Army of their obligations towards civilians:

Instruction of the General-Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army


Our Army’s Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention have been practised for many years,
but their contents vary slightly in army units in different areas. They have now been unified and are hereby
reissued. It is expected that you will take this version as the standard one for thorough education and strict
enforcement. As to other matters needing attention, the high command of the armed forces in different areas may
lay down additional points in accordance with specific conditions and order their enforcement.
The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:
1. Obey orders in all your actions.
2. Don’t take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
3. Turn in everything captured.
The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:
1. Speak politely.
2. Pay fairly for what you buy.
3. Return everything you borrow.
4. Pay for anything you damage.
5. Don’t hit or swear at people.
6. Don’t damage crops.
7. Don’t take liberties with women.
8. Don’t ill-treat captives.
1. According to this source what could be reasons for Communist victory?
2. What are the values and limitations of this source for historians studying Chinese Civil War?

2. Chinese-British author Jung Chang on how the CCP gained public support (1986)
Writing in Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China [book was banned in PRC], Jung Chang offers her view on
why the CCP was able to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Chinese people in the last months of the civil war:
The Guomindang position continued to deteriorate through the late summer – and not only because of
military action. Corruption wreaked havoc. Inflation had risen to the unimaginable figure of just over 100,000
percent by the end of 1947 – and it was to go to 2,870,000 percent by the end of 1948 in the Guomindang areas.
The price of sorghum, the main grain available, increased seventyfold overnight in Jinzhou. For the civilian
population the situation was becoming more desperate every day, as increasingly more food went to the army,
much of which was sold by local commanders on the black market…
It was Communist policy not to execute anyone who laid down their arms, and to treat all prisoners well.
This would help win over the ordinary soldiers, most of whom came from poor peasant families. The
Communists did not run prison camps. They kept only middle- and high-ranking officers, and dispersed the rest
almost immediately. They would hold ‘speak bitterness’ meetings for the soldiers, at which they were
encouraged to speak up about their hard lives as landless peasants.
The revolution, the Communists said, was all about giving them land. The soldiers were given a choice:
either they could go home, in which case they would be given their fare, or they could stay with the Communists
to help wipe out the Guomindang so that nobody would ever take their land away again. Most willingly stayed
and joined the Communist army.
Some, of course, could not physically reach their homes with a war going on. Mao had learned from ancient
Chinese warfare that the most effective way of conquering the people was to conquer their hearts and minds. The
policy toward prisoners proved enormously successful. Particularly after Jinzhou, more and more Guomindang
soldiers simply let themselves be captured. Over 1.75 million Guomindang troops surrendered and crossed over
to the Communists during the civil war. In the last year of the civil war, battle casualties accounted for less than
20 percent of all the troops the KMT lost.
One of the top commanders who had been caught had his daughter with him; she was in an advanced stage
of pregnancy. He asked the Communist commanding officer if he could stay in Jinzhou with her. The
Communist officer said it was not convenient for a father to help his daughter deliver a baby, and that he would
send a ‘woman comrade’ to help her. The Guomindang officer thought he was only saying this to get him to
move on. Later on he learned that his daughter had been very well treated, and the ‘woman comrade’ turned out
to be the wife of the Communist officer. Policy toward prisoners was an intricate combination of political
calculation and humanitarian consideration, and this was one of the crucial factors in the Communists’ victory.
Their goal was not just to crush the opposing army but, if possible, to bring about its disintegration. The
Guomindang was defeated as much by demoralization as by firepower. The most immediate problem was food.
The new government urged the peasants to come and sell food in the city and encouraged them to do so by
setting prices at twice what they were in the countryside. The price of sorghum fell rapidly, from 100 million
Guomindang dollars for a pound to 2,200 dollars. An ordinary worker could soon buy four pounds of sorghum
with what he could earn in a day. Fear of starvation abated. The Communists issued relief grain, salt, and coal to
the destitute. The Guomindang had never done anything like this, and people were hugely impressed.
Another thing that captured the goodwill of the locals was the discipline of the Communist soldiers. Not
only was there no looting or rape, but many went out of their way to demonstrate exemplary behavior. This was
in sharp contrast with the Guomindang troops…
The Communists proved extremely efficient at restoring order and getting the economy going again. Banks
in Jinzhou reopened on 3 December, and the electricity supply resumed the next day. On December 29th a notice
went up announcing a new street administration system, with residents’ committees in place of the old
neighborhood committees. These were to be a key institution in the Communist system of administration and
control. The next day running water resumed and on [December] 31st the railway reopened. The Communists
even managed to put an end to inflation, setting a favorable exchange rate for converting the worthless
Guomindang money into Communist ‘Great Wall’ currency.
1. According to this source what could be reasons for Communist Victory?
2. What are the values and limitations of this source for historians studying Chinese Civil War?

3. Dean Acheson on the outcome of the Chinese Revolution (1949)


In August 1949, with the defeat of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] and his government imminent, US Secretary
of State Dean Acheson reports that the outcomes of the Chinese Revolution were beyond US control:
The reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government… do not stem from any inadequacy of
American aid. Our military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single
battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. The fact was that the decay which our
observers had detected in Chungking early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of the
Guomindang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its troops bad lost the will
to fight and its Government bad lost popular support.
The Communists, on the other hand, through a ruthless discipline and fanatical zeal, attempted to sell themselves
as guardians and liberators of the people. The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.
History has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot
survive the test of battle.
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the
control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the
reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country
has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence
but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.
In the immediate future, our historic policy of friendship for China must be profoundly affected by current
developments. It will necessarily be influenced by the degree to which the Chinese people come to recognize
that the Communist regime serves not their interests but those of Soviet Russia and the manner in which, having
become aware of the facts, they react to this foreign domination. One point, however, is clear. Should the
Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression
against China’s neighbors, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by a situation
[that violates] the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatens international peace and security.
1. According to this source what could be reasons for Communist Victory?
2. What are the values and limitations of this source for historians studying Chinese Civil War?

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