1
FIRST DIVISION commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a 13 years old minor by
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, Accused–
Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19,
2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in
toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556–CFM and 04–1557–CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The
Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused,
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, through
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3 ], a minor 13 years of age, by then
and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named
accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age,
through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04–1558–CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused, BERNABE PAREJA
Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
then and there crawling towards her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her skirt,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape
for the reason other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor
victim’s mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a
human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed
against him.7 After the completion of the pre–trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial
on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse
took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and
March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old9 ]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein
accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together
with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the
situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who
was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of
[AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the
excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003]
incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that
she would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once.
According to AAA, [i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been
molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with
her mother not around while she and her half–siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top
of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her
vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s
mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter
was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to
report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been
sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr.
Tan issued Provisional Medico–Legal Report Number 2004–03–0091. Her medico–legal
report stated the following conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5–7 o’clock area, Type of hymen:
Crescentic
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico–legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s
mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against
him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the
daughter of his live–in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the
alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house
and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten
(10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house.
Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses
constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly
still go about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him
by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge
because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents’ separation. 10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but
convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and
February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge
of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04–1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04–1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he
is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as
minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
2
In Crim. Case No. 04–1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more
weight to the prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill
motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify
about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of
Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict
Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal
knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on
January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556
and 04–1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 04–1556 to 04–1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors
as he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was
raped.18

Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA
in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the
credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing
happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled
with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on
the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
(Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the “assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe
their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate
courts–and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.”21 While there are recognized exceptions
to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions
of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally
expected.22 As this Court stated in People v. Saludo23 :
3
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an
offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non–consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to
AAA’s ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes
important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the “date of the
commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the
complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.”26
Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that
our rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances
in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for
Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information against
him only stated that the crime was committed “on or about the year 1992.” We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the
Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as
near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it
runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and
certain as to time to inform accused–appellant of the date on which the criminal act is
alleged to have been committed.
The phrase “on or about the year 1992” encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months of
1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which
accused–appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the
prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and,
worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as
alleged in the Information, deprived accused–appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for
his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused–appellant
could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for
the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused–

appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of
the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction
anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a
pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not
specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike “on or about
the year 1992.” Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house
where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he
raped the victim in that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim
in Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not
enough to reverse Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony that militates
heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered
independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court’s judgment of
conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of
other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards
reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime
charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together
with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as
charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him and even imputed ill
motive on AAA.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this
Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. 32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse in their small house and in the presence of AAA’s sleeping
siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that
their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the
alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have
noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting
4
out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape
cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or
place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we
expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples
with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite
the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager
room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of
sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the
circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when
asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber
and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose
that growing children sleep more soundly than grown–ups and are not easily awakened by
adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that
there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape
can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter
of time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations
omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He
said that “the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and
courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity.” Pareja
pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any commotion inside their
house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the perfect
opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAA’s delay in reporting the
incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed
the crimes. AAA’s belated confession, he claimed, “cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts
into serious doubt her credibility.”37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the
blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court
has recognized the fact that no clear–cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped
or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not
negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the
sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In
cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or
common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this
case, AAA’s lack of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on
his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is
also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected
to act within reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to

demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young
victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to
predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong
to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since
each of them had to cope with different circumstances. 39
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that
Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we
explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification
of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to
her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that
she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless,
untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated
charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists.
They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or
risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico–Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, “cannot be given any significance, as
it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted.”
Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized
as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was not by
penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of
the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the
time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination
actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not
just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence
and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266–A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
5
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by
the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if
what she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM: The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and
convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or
the Anti–Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual
violence on “sex–related” orifices other than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of
rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender–free rape. “The transformation mainly
consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal
knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’”44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article
335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266–A
which reads:
Article 266–A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266–A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as
“organ rape” or “penile rape.” 45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is
carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266–A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called “instrument or
object rape,” or “gender–free rape.”47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances

enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be
a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the
offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266–A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual
assault is “[b]y any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.”
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into
her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004
incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly
establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this
account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape
through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even
though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included
in the second, and vice–versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the
variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
6
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prisión correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above–mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and
were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against
Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included
in the crime of rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of
the Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting
the Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer
in public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 – to the State, that its penal laws are not
broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the
offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such as
that in Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the
offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it
that the Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM: The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution
against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration

on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit
this Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level
of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of
attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04–1556–
CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or
not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s
favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside
from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not
able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite
being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked,
AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina.
Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that
incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself
on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which,
as we have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her
breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a
quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the
attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him
because she was angry that he caused her parents’ separation. Pareja added that these
cases were initiated by AAA’s father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. “AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such
imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father
solely by reason of ill motives or grudge.”58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment,
hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of
a minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It
is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child–victims are given full weight and credit,
since when a woman or a girl–child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión
7
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in
degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that could be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case,
absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisión
correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows:
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C.
No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused–appellant Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate
prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Topic:Rape, Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted
out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape.
The victim, AAA, was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and
sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in December 2003, February
2004, and March 27, 2004.AAA’s parents separated when she was only eight years old. At the
time of the commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and
with herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother,
together with three (3) of their children.
The first incident took place on December 2003. AAA’s mother was not in the house and was
with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, while AAA was asleep, Pareja
placed himself on top of. Then, Pareja, who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. He

then started to suck her breasts. Not satisfied, he likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus.
Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside
of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the incident for fear that
Parejamight kill her. He threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the
incident to anyone.
AAA narrated that the incident happened more than once. On February 2004, she had again
been molested by Pareja. With her mother not around and her half-siblings asleep, he again
laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. He caressed her and held her vagina and
inserted his finger in it.
With regard to the March 2004 incident, it was AAA’s mother who saw Pareja in the act of
lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother
immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then
narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by Pareja many times.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr.
Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her medico-legal report
stated the following conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s
mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
As his defense, Pareja offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him. He denied
raping AAA but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in partner and
that they all stay in the same house. He also averred that it would have been impossible that
the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, he described the layout of their house
and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses
constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly
still go about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
8
Verily, Pareja was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him
by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge
because AAA was mad at him for being the reason her parents’ separation.
The RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape for want of evidence but
convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and
February 2004 incidents, respectively.
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more
weight to the prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill
motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify
about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of
Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict
Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal
knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court seriously erred in convicting Pareja of the crimes charged
notwithstanding that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in convicting Pareja based solely on the
prosecution witness’ testimony.
RULING:
As to the Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled
with inconsistencies.
We find the argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,we
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on
the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected.
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an
offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness. The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters
that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency
regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s
ordeal. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only
when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the
evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape
becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration
practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime." Moreover, the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this
Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
Improbability of sexual abuse in their small house and in the presence of AAA’s sleeping
siblings
Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires,
but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were
not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies
9
constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr., we expounded on such occurrence in
this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples
with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite
the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager
room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of
sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the
circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when
asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber
and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose
that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by
adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that
there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape
can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of
time and place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
Demeanor of AAA as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped.
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the
blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court
has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped
or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not
negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual
act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases
where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law
spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill
her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is
also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected
to act within reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to
demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young
victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to
predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong
to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since
each of them had to cope with different circumstances.
Medical examination not indispensable

Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as
it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted."
Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized
as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was not by
penetration of the vagina.
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of
the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado, we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the
time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination
actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not
just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence
and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and
convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual
violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of
rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly
consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal
knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’"4 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article
335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A.
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
10
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual
assault is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into
her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004
incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly
establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this
account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through
carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was
proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions
between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the
second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what
he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the
variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution
against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on
the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this
Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of
proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of
attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-
CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or
not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s
favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, stated that aside
from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not
able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite
being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked,
AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina.
Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that
incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself
on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which,
as we have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her
breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a
quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in
degree,i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. The maximum
of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty that could be imposed
under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness, which, in this case, absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging
from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as
follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
11
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate
prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n
correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is adomain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts · and whenhis findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court.” – The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the „assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage
point denied appellate courts · and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.‰ While there are
recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the
identical conclusions of the trialand appellate courts on the matter of AAAÊs credibility.
Same; Same; Same; A rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone.·Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally
expected. As this Court stated in People v. Saludo, 647SCRA 374 (2011): Rape is a painful
experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to aperson’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving;
rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt
to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208170 August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a.
"Susan", Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found
accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No.
7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to
the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the
Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega
Mall, Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe
following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white
Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus
Yau a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos
(EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was
already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla
Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days,
which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was
maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS
(US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention
was demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally rescued on February
11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
12
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following
narration of the kidnapping:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair
Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out
of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with
plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San
Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of
SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong
Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant
Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed
eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to.
Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what
transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a
plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was
wearing a red mask and introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the
plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being
kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and
friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a
special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was
allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for
money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after,
he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as
well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message
purportedly from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his
liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila
about the situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police
was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding
US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro
Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made
eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual release.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to
communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with
meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also
maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made
as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD
115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani
Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were
ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No.
PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER group
proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the
overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group
moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance
upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the
driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was
being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment.
Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was
Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but
appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and
car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation,
however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he
answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was
being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after
being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK
Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant]
was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the
victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led
back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and
found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as
Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor
and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainant’s captor matched that
of appellant Petrus Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to
substantiate their claim of innocence:
13
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed
kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against him and his
family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14
years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On
September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running
some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and
time the victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00
o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be
deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from
his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They
pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the
same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became
unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were
handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered.
He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They
kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the
floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the cover of his head.
They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to
them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no
avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing
his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of
Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro,
VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The
following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and
Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos
(Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually
overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to
earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation
since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his
womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at
that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor,
Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony
that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers
allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning
before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey,
not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not
informedof his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper
every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to
Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she
lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at
Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend.
Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her
sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus
to do such errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around
7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5)
policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where
Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They,
however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband
(almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him.
She, together with her children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small
room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and they went home. At
that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong
Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3)
houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the
police, she had withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards
(Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and cellphone,
which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an
accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each
other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification
14
by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he
talked for several times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered
by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of
the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the
Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days
of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana
because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive
portion of the said decision states:
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison
term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of
the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby
therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the
preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One
Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until
full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with
certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE
INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was
living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not
mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even
when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration
of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated
February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of
the house where Alastair was held captive and not because she served food on the victim;
and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could
file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines,
represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions
and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13Petrus filed his
Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in his
brief filed before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b)
the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for
ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each
accusedappellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
15
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in
People v. Maxion15 that:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best
addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having
heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses
and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine,
with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts
or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as
to materially affect the disposition of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such
as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect
and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater
weight when they are affirmed by the CA17
In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a judicious review
of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the
same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because,
evenif the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity
of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab
with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon
ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly
Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to
time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good look
and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to
recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to
strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to
Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his

kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling
him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent.
Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted
that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over
the phone for three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his
brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent.
There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify
against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution
witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and their
testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence
that led tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime
charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.22
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of
guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and
Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor,
Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim
recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the
afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the
possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping
were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found:
one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black
blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing
the victim in lying down position and family footages, and the other one labeled
"sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM
cards; Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in
Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the
OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing
Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau;
16
marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana
Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia
Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the
possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe QTEK
Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose
whereabouts had not been known yet; and
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was
recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that
both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of
circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other
conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a
whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which
is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.24
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary
evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual.
Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter
unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took
and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite,
where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth,
Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a
ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as
principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as
an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized
that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to
commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the
testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to
him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every
breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3)

that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept
quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with
Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he
brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus’ illegal act, but also supplied
him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and giving moral
support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the
victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her
husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it was
stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of
an accomplice rather thanthat of a principal.
Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to
mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that
affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not
really detract from the credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in
affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator’s
questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not
outrightly justify the acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than
an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides,
sworn statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired.31
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the
defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of
all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32 The defense of frame-
up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be
concocted but is difficult to prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up
must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare
allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-
appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain
selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records
does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the
prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and
fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a
heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the
kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.
17
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-
appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to
or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the
RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for
ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in
the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their
warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing
that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons.35Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their
warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their
conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v.
Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the
State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.37
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of
kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the
Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, meted out
against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus
interest committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral
damages against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be
exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to ₱200,000.00, as the reasonable
compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family endured because
of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and
mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered
the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for
moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at
the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of
exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The
Court, however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the
payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because
it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation
between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People
v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all
those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should
shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only
as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual
damages in the amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking
into consideration the degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for
two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (₱573, 132.00 x 213) or ₱382,088.00;
and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or
₱191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P
182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the
amount or ₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages;
₱66,666.67 as moral damages; and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana
Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in
the amount of ₱200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The
award of actual damages in the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of
the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00;
moral damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱66,666.67; and
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of
₱91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱33,333.33.
SO ORDERED.
18
TOPIC: Kidnapping for ransom
FACTS:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private
complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the
United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white
Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall.
While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private
complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that
while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he
noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to
time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and
decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke
up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and
chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man
who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed
the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was
being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and
friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a
special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was
allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for
money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after,
he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as
well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was
allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was
served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he
was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which
was made as target for a rifle.
Complainant was rescued when members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response Task Force (PACER) intercepted the same taxi with plate number PVD 115 and
subsequently appellant led the team to his house where complainant was held captive.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petrus and Susana Yau were guilty of kidnapping for ransom
 19

HELD: he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also
supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and giving
YES. moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as
an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving
food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of
No. 7659, are as follows:
support to her husband.

1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
2. Actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and
3. Motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary
evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench.
1. Petrus is a private individual.
2. Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious
while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.
3. Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.
4. Alastair was taken against his will.
5. Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the
release of the victim.
Petrus is a principal and Susana is an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom
It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution
had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the
woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring
food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It has been an established rule in appellate
review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses,the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the
factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect.·It has been an
established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and
the conclusions drawn from the factual findings,are accorded great respect and have even
conclusive effect. Suchfactual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when
they are affirmed by the CA.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is
always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or
persons responsible therefor.·In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always
two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged;
and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the personor persons
responsible therefor, because, even if the commission ofthe crime is a given, there can be no
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained. Here, the
prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Requisites for a person to be an accomplice

1. That there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but
she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed
with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite crime of
robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in
Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.2
Antecedents
The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to wit:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he,
his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of
their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her
mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at
the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the
20
appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her
to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their
house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the
assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very
well the perpetra tor because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28,
30-32).
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his
mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor,
which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim’s death was
hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region,
measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed
posterior and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe
of the left lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103).
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were
married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years
old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on
October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby,
while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m.,
his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty
minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw
that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody,
he returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her
back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital
where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake
and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw
the appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3 12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17, 2004,
pp. 3-4).
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs
when they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry
for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to
the hospital, she noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying.
They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had
him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she
did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl
whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how
his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present
in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay
namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches
the television at the house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
 21

PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, SO ORDERED.7
he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later,
Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother Decision of the CA
and robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station
(TSN, March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.8
pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions
when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his
mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having
inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the
committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in
appellant,9 ruling thusly:
arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17;
June 15, 2005, p. 5).4
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No. MC03-7597, is
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the award of ₱57,500.00 as actual
victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on
damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of
the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and
₱25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
had then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help
around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he
had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had SO ORDERED.10
later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him
that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the Issues
primary suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that
he had assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being
years of living in the neighborhood. filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who
were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to
The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.5 Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim
occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody
Judgment of the RTC shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the
house.11
As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged under its
judgment rendered on January 27, 2006,6 disposing: Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not prove that violence or
intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that the culprit had neither broken
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @ "NONOY"
any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article
through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he could be liable only for the
293 and punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby
separate crimes of theft and homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with
sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE CASTRO y
homicide.12
BARRERA as follows:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence showed that the
1) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity;
appellant’s principal intent had been to rob the victim’s house, with the homicide being
perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively identified the
2) ₱57,500.00 as actual damages; appellant as the person who had stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the
earmarks of credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about the identity of the
3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. accused."13

Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the St ate in the successful prosecution of the accused is his
credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal
turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery
with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl,
a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant
as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may
and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination,
is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to
qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.14
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
22
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000),
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.15
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court.16 All
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of
fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court has concurred with the trial court.17
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic
qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct
examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-
examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but
not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to
perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge
favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his
testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime
charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help
upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his
credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an
adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to
communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it
concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong
showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.18

It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and
open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect
especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.19This great respect for such findings rests
mainly on the trial court’s direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its
presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during
intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting
and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the
conviction on Carl’s credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his
perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence
to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
Mendiola,20the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony
against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,21 the testimony of the three-year-
old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to full probative
weight.
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the
trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of
him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard
room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly
showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that to
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as
conclusively as the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not established that
the taking of personal property was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or by using force upon things.
The contention lacks persuasion.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.22 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The fact that the
appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly
weapon, competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation against persons that
qualified the offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the
appellant was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the
course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis
was awakened by someone shouting " Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by
the victim, whom the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering
that the original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the money
23
amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special complex crime. It is
composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.24 A composite crime is truly distinct and different
from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is
fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary
means to commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination
of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding
to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that
accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a
separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to raise the
penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege them. But they
should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the
victim in the amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.25 Under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for this
purpose need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or
attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:26
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.1âwphi1 The commission of an
offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.27
In line with current jurisprudence,28 we increase the civil indemnity to
 24

₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00.

In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs
of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of
the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of
₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned
from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of
suit.

The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses;The most important task of the
State in the successful prosecution ofthe accused is his credible and competent identification
as the perpetrator of the crime.·The most important task of the State in the successful
prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of
the crime. Hence, this appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as
the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that
the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year-old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to
and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the
family, and killed his mother.

JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions[1] seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007
Decision[2] and October 3, 2007 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and
set aside the December 3, 1998 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch
165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case
No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of
P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and
accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA CHUA the
principal amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
tiling of this case, which rate shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in original)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust
from Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks,
under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or
to return the whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in
possession of the said amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent
to defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said amount of
P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to
return the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties
presenting their evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses.
According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during
which he offered to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the
fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy
Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went
on until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document
evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In
mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00.
25
Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account
on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the Han
Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June
9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum
for the cash delivery.[7]
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when
he failed to show any document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank
checks, Check No. 02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694
dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank
checks were given with the request to deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable
him to generate funds from the sale of a property in Hong Kong. Both interbank checks were
ultimately dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and insufficiency
of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the
matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a
letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their
unregistered partnership, and was duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided
to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor's Office.[8]
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered
her the prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he
met her in 1991 and until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was
in 1995 when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that
the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United States was her investment in
this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best
judgment and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied
having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her.[9]
On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and
"P1.6" million earlier.[10] He testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested
P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine
bolts and screws under the name and style of Capri Manufacturing Company.[11] Chiok
narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned that he was swindled by one Gonzalo
Nuguid, who supplied him with dollars.[12] It was then that she immediately demanded the
return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie had invested the
money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously
issued interbank checks.[13] Chua agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained
them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her
obligation with land and machineries, insisting on recovering the "whole amount plus
interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees."[14] After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu
Que Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's
demand for the return of her funds. Chua demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok
and Yu Que Ngo requested for a lower amount because the original claim was only
P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request.[15]
In a Decision[16] dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC

conviction). Its dispositive portion reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with
interest at the legal rate to be computed from the date of demand - October 25, 1995 until
fully paid.
For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail[18] pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was
promulgated.[19] On February 15, 1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] of the
RTC conviction.
The RTC, in an omnibus order[21] dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion
for reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated
the probability of flight if released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from
receipt of this order within which to surrender before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be
ordered.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal[23] on the RTC conviction and omnibus order,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division.
On June 19, 1999, Chiok also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction against the omnibus order,[24] which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340 (bail case) and raffled to the CA Thirteenth Division.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest[25] on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant
to the omnibus order. The order of arrest was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police
Station on July 25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given
address.[26]
The Bail Case
26
On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until
further orders.[27] On September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction[28] enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of
liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because the offense for which he was convicted
is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight during the pendency of his appeal is
merely conjectural.[29] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.
On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed
separate petitions for certiorari before us seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated
September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999.[30] We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions
and reversed the CA's injunction on the arrest of Chiok.[31] Our decisions (SC bail decisions)
became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007, respectively.
The Appeal Case
On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him
to have jumped bail when the order of arrest was returned unserved.[32] The CA considered
his appeal abandoned, dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. However, on February 29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it
learned of the issuance of the TRO and injunction in the bail case on September 20, 1999 or a
day prior to the appeal's dismissal.[33]
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief [34] dated August 28, 2003
while the OSG filed its Appellee's Brief[35]dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his
Reply Brief[36] dated April 14, 2004 while the OSG and Chua replied through their Rejoinder
Briefs[37] dated October 6, 2004.
On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a
Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court,
and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
(CA acquittal).
The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's
evidence but merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already
proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the defense. It found that
Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence of the prosecution, was inconsistent and
improbable. Specifically, it was irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt
or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings which spanned for a long period of
six years with Chiok—the purpose of which was to prove that he misappropriated the
amount contrary to her instructions of investing it to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the
acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the funds
based on the instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the
element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil aspect,
the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00,[38] the amount he

admitted on record.
The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua,
on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration[39] on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed
his own motion for reconsideration,[40] on the civil liability imposed on him.
In a Resolution[41] dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration
and its supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination
of the record of the case would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied
the motions tor reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues
The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:
I. Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.
II. Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the
doctrine of double jeopardy.
III. Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
Discussion
I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.
Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case
warrant leniency on her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal.
She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment on the position of Chua [and]
that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy."[42]
We disagree with Chua.
Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the
OSG, on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court
and the CA.
In Villareal v. Aliga,[43] we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the
State, which may question the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, viz:
27
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases,
this view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question
such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same
determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this
guiding principle.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there
is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of
the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant.[44] The interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.[45] In the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General.[46] The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.[47]
Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition
filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment.[48] When through its
comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the
OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's petition as its own.[49] However, when the
OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and
adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on
personality or legal standing.[50]

In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its
conformity to Chua's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In its
Comment[51] dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition will place
Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of
Appeals in acquitting private respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of
judgment in the appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have
also reviewed the evidence of the accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential
question of misappropriation or conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us
to pronounce that his version on the matter was probably credible." Petitioner argues that a
simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily leads to the conclusion that it is
very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the
appreciation and assessment of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense
during the trial. Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals]
appreciation of evidence x x x.[52]
In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the
circumstances of this case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this
procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's
petition.
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.[53] Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and
provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to
attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or
acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[54]
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require
that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.[55] This is referred to as the
"finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:[56]
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its resources and power should
28
not be allowed to make repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire
to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice
system has built in a protection lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence
rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for
society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate
goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the
initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating
the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals
through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
would be unfair. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against
double jeopardy and its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[57] we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to
a finding of mistrial. In declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former
Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the
accused, as a sham, we found that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied
due process of law with a partial court and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian [p]resident to assure the
carrying out of his instructions."[58] We considered the acquittal as void, and held that no
double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,[59] we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach

because the CA did not have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal
when the CA found him to have jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy
attached, the circumstances of this case is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy.
A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA
resolutions in the bail case which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of
arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA
resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September 21, 1999
dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal of Chiok and the proceedings therein are null and void.
We find no merit in Chua's claims.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice
of Appeal on June 18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still
in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that
the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during the
promulgation of judgment.[60] Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the
subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal
by the RTC in its Order[61] dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely acquired jurisdiction over
Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of
arrest. Exercising jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September
21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court
may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except
in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if
the accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless,
discretionary.[62] When an accused jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it
outright.[63] In several cases, we still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at large
during the pendency of the appeal.[64]
In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because
29
the order of arrest was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration,
the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the
prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution,
which effectively replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already attained
finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions
enjoining Chiok's arrest did not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal;
the dismissal being a discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we
reject the claim of Chua that the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings
before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this
case. Particularly, she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock
proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard
and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites
the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan[65] to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham
insofar as they have resulted in acquittals."[66] Chua anchors her claim on the report
submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in the
evidence in the bouncing checks cases[67] (BP 22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN
in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been
secretly removed from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[68] is starkly different from this case.
In Galman, we concluded that there was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming
evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former President Marcos on the
prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which prevented the
prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the
intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted
to a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing
irregularities in the BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged
offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do
not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua
were in a different case and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of
the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the
CA acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the
decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify

the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of
evidence, it would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those
involving misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case.
The OSG, in fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to
file an Appellee's Brief[69] dated December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief[70]dated
October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its case
before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in
the submissions it has filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder
Brief..."[71]Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the
opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which
its decision is based, as in this case.[72]
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct
an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the
appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.[73] Chua failed to do so.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision[74] dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed
as Criminal Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch
58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand,
Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of
P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador[75] and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[76]
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged
misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank,
Annapolis account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to
him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank
30
checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for
safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment,
corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted
that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million
at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of
P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15,
1997 and October 13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is
the whole of P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is
P9,563,900.00 covered by the two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x[77]
TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is
the] subject matter of this case of estafa?
WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?
WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?
WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.[78] (Italics supplied)
Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case
involving the same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res
judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in
paragraph (c) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final

judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit.[79] Stated differently, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former
suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter
suit may involve a different cause of action.[80] This principle of res judicata bars the re-
litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.[81]
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,[82] we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a
civil action in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action
arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the
corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled
that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the
crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the offended party.
There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to the
offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves
only one civil liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single
civil liability can be the subject of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case.
However, there may only be one recovery of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,[83] where we were confronted with the similar issue
of whether an accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can
proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil aspects—subject only to
the prohibition on double recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the
offended party, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
presupposes that facts and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous
case.[84] However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and issues proving the
transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused
after its dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the
prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of
dishonor within which to pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check. Indeed, there was no notice of
dishonor established to have been furnished the accused and therefore there is more reason
that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to make good aforesaid cheeks.
The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application by giving the
drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot be said that accused was
ever given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was
31
notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was
notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the
prosecution cause must fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe
the theory of the prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be explained
hereunder.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the
accused from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of
evidence to support the charges levelled against him.
Costs de officio.
No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.[85]
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of
dishonor was first given to Chiok. The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible
was merely secondary, and was not necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no
findings of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the civil liability.
In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment bars Chua from recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[86] the foregoing amount of
P9,563,900.00 shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from
October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this
judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and
the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of
P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from
October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its
satisfaction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 32

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; It is only the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in
criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals(CA).·Chua lacks
the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on
behalf of the State,which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the
CA.

Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s
role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is
dismissed by the trialcourt or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.·The rationale
behind this rule is that in a criminal case,the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the State and not the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that
when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal,but may only
do so as to the civil aspect of the case.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202868 October 2, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL ESPERA y CUYACOT, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
CR-H.C. No. 000923 denying the appeal of the appellant Michael Espera and affirming (with
modification of the damages awarded) the Omnibus Decision2 dated September 21, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52 in Criminal Case Nos. 99-511 and
99-512, which found the appellant guilty of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by
sexual intercourse.
The following Informations were filed against the appellant:
A. In Criminal Case No. 99-511
That on or about the 26th day of January, 1999 in the municipality of Ubay, province of
Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with criminal intent and with the use of force, threat and intimidation by using a
deadly weapon – a short firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
insert his penis into the mouth of the victim [Ana3] against her will and without her consent;
to the damage and prejudice of the victim.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 266-A[,] par. 2, in relation to Article 266-B
of R.A. No. 8353.4
B. In Criminal Case No. 99-512
That on or about the 26th day of January, 1999 in the municipality of Ubay, province of
Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with criminal intent and with the use of force, threat and intimidation by using a
deadly weapon – a short firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drag
and push the victim [Ana] to the ground and with lewd designs, have sexual intercourse with
the victim against her will and without her consent; to the damage and prejudice of the
victim.
33
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 266-A[,] No. 1, in relation to Article 266-B
of R.A. No. 8353 and of R.A. No. 7659.5
The appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned.6 Pre-trial was conducted
and, thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution established that at around 11:30 in the evening of January 26, 1999, Ana
and "Susie,"7 Ana’s co-worker at the "Get Well Clinic"8 at Fatima, Ubay, Bohol decided to
share a ride as they were both residents of "Barangay Ekis"9 in Ubay, Bohol. They hailed a
tricycle at the junction of the provincial road and the barangay road, some 50 meters away
from the clinic. Streetlights illuminated the area. There was also light coming from the nearby
chapel and the houses in the vicinity. As was her wont, Susie beamed a flashlight on the front
part of the tricycle. She recognized the driver, the appellant in this case, as one of her
husband’s friends. Ana recognized the driver by face, although she did not know his name.
She noticed that he was wearing a red polo shirt and maong pants.10
Upon reaching Barangay Ekis, Susie was the first to disembark as Ana’s house was some 150
to 250 meters farther down the unpaved sloping road. Ana asked the driver to stop the
tricycle when they were near her house but he kept on driving, telling her that the tricycle’s
brakes were not working. The tricycle finally stopped at the quarry site. The appellant asked
Ana to get off as the tricycle purportedly ran out of gas. She offered to pay her fare but he
did not accept it on account of his failure to bring Ana home.11
As Ana was tracing her way home under a bright moonlight,12 she heard the rustling of
another person’s pants behind her. She realized she was being followed. She turned around.
She saw the appellant, naked from the waist up, with his red polo shirt now covering his face.
She saw a gun in his hand. She ran away from him and shouted for help. He ran after her and
immediately caught her. He covered her mouth and pointed the gun on her head. He
threatened to kill her if she shouted.13 She recognized his voice -- it was the voice of the
tricycle driver.14 She tried to ward of his hands but she lost her balance in the process and fell
to the ground. She tried to kick him but he overpowered her. He punched her in the upper
part of her stomach. She felt pain. She pretended to lose consciousness, hoping that he
would leave her.15 She was wrong.
The appellant dragged Ana by the hair to a more secluded place. After he pushed her to the
ground, she tried to stand up but he boxed her several times. She cried and begged him to
stop. Her pleas fell on deaf ears. He forcefully undressed her, removing her pants, shirt and
bra. He pinned her to the ground with his hands. He then stood and removed his pants and
underwear. He rubbed his body against her. He then knelt and placed his groin on her face.
He ordered her to suck his manhood. She refused but he punched her again in the upper part
of her stomach and forced his organ inside her mouth.16
After inserting his organ in Ana’s mouth, the appellant forcibly opened her legs and inserted
his fingers in her vagina. She cried but he continued to ignore her pleas and again threatened
to kill her.17 He commanded her to guide his sex organ to hers, she initially refused but was

left no choice when he pointed the gun at her head.18 He then forcefully penetrated her,
causing her to shout because of extreme pain. This enraged the appellant, prompting him to
bite her lips and lower jaw.19
After ravishing Ana, the appellant asked her if she knew him and if she remembered the
markings of his tricycle. She denied both, fearing that he might kill her if she would tell him
the truth. Finished with his dastardly deed, he repeated his threat to kill her. He ordered her
to remove her shirt and to blindfold herself with it. He commanded her to remain seated on
the ground until after 15 minutes from the time he had started the tricycle. She did as told.
When she sensed that he was already gone, she immediately stood up, wrapped her body
with a malong and went home.20
On the next day, Ana told her mother about what happened to her.21 And on the day after
that, when Susie visited her to ask why she did not report at the clinic, Ana told Susie that
she was raped by the driver of the tricycle who brought them to Barangay Ekis two nights
ago.22
Thereafter, Ana had herself examined by a doctor. The medical examination revealed that
she suffered multiple contusions, lacerations and abrasions on different parts of her body. In
particular, she had contusions in the right side of her face, from the jaw to the temple and at
the base of the right ear. She had bruise on the right forehead. She also had contusions
below her lower left breast and lower chest. She had a laceration running from the jaw to the
lower lip and a wound indicating a bite mark in her upper lip. There was marked tenderness
in the upper part of her stomach and there were fingernail marks in her right shoulder, left
wrist and in her back. Her labia were lacerated, her hymen was ruptured and dead
spermatozoa were found in her vagina.23
Thereafter, Ana was assisted by her parents in reporting the matter to the
authorities.24 When she saw the appellant at the police station, she recognized him although
he cut his hair and shaved his beard. And when she heard his voice, she became more certain
that he was her assailant and,25 with that realization, she could only cry and was unable to
say anything.26
Subsequently, the appellant suddenly left Ubay, Bohol without informing anyone where he
went. He was finally apprehended in Pampanga in August 2003.27
The appellant admitted that he was a tricycle driver. In his defense, he claimed that he lives
in Fatima, Ubay, 1 1/2 kilometers away from the crime scene.28 At the time of the alleged
incident, he was in his house sleeping. In fact, he was already sleeping by 6:00 in the evening
as he drank alcohol in the market earlier that day. He woke up at around 8:00 in the morning
of the following day; he noticed nothing unusual.29
Sometime after January 26, 1999, the appellant was invited by authorities to the police
station. There, he met Ana for the first time. He was informed that he is among the suspects
34
in connection with the rape of Ana. He was also informed that when Ana was asked if he was
the culprit, she did not say anything but simply cried.30
The appellant further stated that he did not drive the tricycle on January 29, 1999 because
the owner would use it for the Ubay town fiesta. After the town fiesta, the appellant left for
Manila to look for a better paying job. He was subsequently hired as a security guard and he
was arrested while he was at his post as security guard at Jollibee in Dau, Pampanga. 31
After hearing the parties, the trial court gave credence to Ana’s account of her harrowing
experience in a "richly detailed testimony, delivered in a clear, forthright and straightforward
manner."32 The results of the medical examination describing the injuries Ana suffered
underscored the truthfulness of her story. Her positive identification of the appellant as her
assailant negated his alibi. His sudden flight from Ubay, Bohol also indicated guilt on his
part.33 Thus, in an Omnibus Decision dated September 21, 2007, the RTC found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual
intercourse, both of which were committed with the use of deadly weapon. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-511 the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Art. 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal with all the accessory penalties of the law, with costs.
In Criminal Case No. 99-512 the Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph 1 in relation to Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA No. 8353 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with costs.
The accused is further ordered to pay the offended party the amount of ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity and ₱50,000 as moral damages in each of the two cases.34
The appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He asserted that the trial court
erred in convicting him despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.35 He mentioned various matters to make his point: the identity of the alleged
perpetrator of the crime was doubtful; the prosecution failed to prove that it was the
appellant who was driving the tricycle on the night of the alleged rape and that it was the
appellant who raped Ana; the darkness of the night prevented Ana from seeing clearly and
recognizing her attacker; Ana’s behavior and reaction before, during and after the alleged
rape was questionable, in particular, she did not shout when she was being chased by her
rapist, she did not do anything to prevent the assault against her, she did not call for help or
attempt to free herself when she had the opportunity; and, the medical certificate neither
stated nor proved the appellant’s involvement in the rape of Ana. 36

The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the RTC that it was proven beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant violated Article 266-A(2) and committed rape by sexual assault
against Ana when he placed his penis into her mouth after poking a gun at her head and
punching her. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC that it was proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant violated Article 266-A(1)(a) and committed rape by
sexual intercourse against Ana when he had carnal knowledge of her against her will through
force and intimidation. The medical findings detailing the injuries inflicted upon Ana further
confirm the commission of the crimes against her.37
The Court of Appeals rejected the contentions of the appellant and upheld the finding of the
RTC that his victim had positively identified him as her assailant. The prosecution established
that Susie and Ana recognized the appellant’s face when they boarded his tricycle because
the place was illuminated by streetlights and light from the nearby chapel and the houses in
the area. Moreover, when Susie beamed her flashlight at the tricycle, Ana had the
opportunity to recognize the appellant as the driver and to notice that he was wearing denim
pants and a red polo shirt.38
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that Ana identified the appellant not only by his
appearance but also by the sound of his voice. She remembered his voice when he was
negotiating with her and Susie for a ride to Barangay Ekis, when Susie disembarked from the
tricycle, and when he told her that the tricycle’s fuel had gone empty. Ana’s positive
identification of the accused-appellant as her assaulter negated the appellant’s denial and
alibi.39
The appellate court found no merit in the appellant’s claim that Ana’s failure to shout for
help and to repel the assault of her rapist eroded her credibility and made her allegation of
sexual intercourse against her will unbelievable. The appellate court noted Ana’s consistent
testimony that she ran away and shouted for help but the appellant caught her, covered her
mouth, pointed his gun at her and threatened to kill her; that she fought against him, even
when she was already on the ground, but he mercilessly punched her; that she cried and
begged him to stop but he ignored her and threatened her again; and, that she shouted
because of pain when he forcefully inserted his penis into her vagina.40
Finally, the Court of Appeals modified the appellant’s civil liability. It awarded Ana
₱30,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages
for the rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 99-511, and ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages for the rape by sexual
intercourse in Criminal Case No. 99-512.41
Thus, in a Decision dated July 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the
appellant and affirmed the Omnibus Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the RTC which
found the appellant guilty of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual
intercourse committed against Ana. The decretal portion of the Decision dated July 28, 2011
reads:
35
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No.
99-512 is ordered to pay the private complainant [Ana] ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No.
99-511, accused-appellant is ordered to pay private complainant [Ana] ₱30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.42
Hence, this appeal where the appellant adopts in full and reiterates the contents and
substance of the brief which he filed in the Court of Appeals.43 Thus, the appellant continues
to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and his case basically rests on
what he believes to be his victim’s highly doubtful identification of him as the perpetrator of
the crime.
The appeal fails.
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,44 rape
may be committed in two ways:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
As the felony is defined under Article 266-A, rape may be committed either by sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 or by sexual assault under paragraph 2.45
Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime committed by a man against a woman. The central
element is carnal knowledge and it is perpetrated under any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.46

On the other hand, rape by sexual assault contemplates two situations. First, it may be
committed by a man who inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice of another person,
whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1. Second, it may be committed by a person, whether a man or a woman, who
inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person, whether a
man or a woman, under any of the four circumstances stated in paragraph 1.
This Court agrees with the trial and the appellate courts that the crime of rape by sexual
assault was committed against Ana when a man’s sex organ was forcibly inserted into her
mouth after poking a gun at her head and punching her. This Court also agrees with the trial
and the appellate courts that the crime of rape by sexual intercourse was committed against
Ana when a man had carnal knowledge of her after delivering fist blows on her stomach,
pointing a gun at her, and threatening to kill her. The physical evidence, particularly the
medical report detailing the various injuries inflicted upon Ana, confirms the truth of Ana’s
story.
There is no question that the man who violated the person and dignity of Ana had his face
covered by a red polo shirt. The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to establish his
identity as the author of the crimes, that he is the man with the covered face.
He is wrong.
An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence until and unless his/her guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The fundamental law guarantees him/her that right.47 The
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused behooves the People of the Philippines, as
the plaintiff in criminal cases, to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only each element of
the crime but also the identity of the accused as the criminal. It requires this Court, in
reviewing criminal cases, to carefully determine and establish the following:
[F]irst, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the
credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the
prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the
elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be present. x x x.48
Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution’s primary
responsibility. Thus, in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the
prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the
commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.49
Here, the prosecution’s evidence on the identity of the appellant as the offender is clear and
unmistakable.
36
Ana and Susie positively identified the appellant as the driver of the tricycle in red polo shirt,
which ferried them to Barangay Ekis on that fateful night of January 26, 1999. Instead of
bringing Ana home, appellant brought her to the quarry in the pretext that the tricycle’s
brakes malfunctioned and the vehicle subsequently ran out of gas. Consequently, Ana was
placed in a vulnerable situation that enabled the appellant to commit the crime charged. As
Ana started to walk home from the quarry, appellant took off his red shirt and covered his
face with it and then followed her with a gun in his hand. She ran when she noticed him and
he ran after her until he caught her. He poked his gun at her, repeatedly threatened her,
mercilessly hit her and raped her twice, first by sexual assault and then by sexual intercourse.
His lust satiated, he went back to his tricycle and drove away. She recognized him as the one
who raped her when he was presented to her at the police station two days after the
incident, although he already cut his hair and shaved his beard. And she positively identified
him in open court when she gave her testimony.
While the appellant attempts to hide his identity in the blackness of the night, his identity
has been revealed and the darkness that is his cover has been dispelled by the categorical
testimonies of Susie and Ana that, while it was late into the night when they boarded the
appellant’s tricycle at the junction, they saw his face because the place was illuminated by
light from lamp posts and the nearby chapel as well as from the houses in the vicinity.
Moreover, Susie beamed her flashlight at the tricycle, giving Ana an opportunity to recognize
the appellant as the driver and to notice that he was wearing denim pants and a red polo
shirt, which was the same red polo shirt he used to cover his face. In other words, the tricycle
driver in the red polo shirt was the same man whose face was covered with a red polo shirt --
Ana’s rapist -- the appellant.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ana identified the appellant not only by his
appearance but also by the sound of his voice. She remembered his voice when he was
negotiating with her and Susie for a ride to Barangay Ekis, when Susie disembarked from the
tricycle and when he told her that the tricycle’s brakes malfunctioned and, later on, that the
tricycle’s fuel had gone empty. It was the same voice that repeatedly threatened to kill her,
ordered her to take him in her mouth, asked her whether she recognized him and his tricycle,
and directed her not to leave the scene of the crime until after he was gone for some time.
And when she met him at the police station, despite his attempt to prevent her from
recognizing him by cutting his hair and shaving his beard, it was the same voice that made
her recognize him and made her cry out of fear.
Ana’s testimony is clear, categorical, consistent and credible. Under its evidentiary weight,
the appellant’s denial and alibi collapse and crumble.
Thus, beyond reasonable doubt, the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual
intercourse committed against Ana have been established. Beyond reasonable doubt, too, it
is the appellant who committed the said crimes.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever rape by sexual assault
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be prision mayor to
 37

reclusion temporal, or a duration of 6 years and 1 day to 20 years. As there was no attendant criminal beyond reasonable doubt.―An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence until
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty is the medium period of the and unless his/her guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The fundamental law guarantees
said duration, that is, from 10 years, 8 months and 1 day to 15 years and 4 months, pursuant him/her that right. The presumption of innocence in favor of theaccused behooves the
to Articles 64 and 65 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Applying the Indeterminate
People of the Philippines, as the plaintiff incriminal cases, to prove beyond reasonable doubt
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within prision correccional (which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to six years), the penalty next lower to prision mayor, and the maximum not only each element of the crime but also the identity of the accused as the criminal. It
term shall be within the imposable penalty stated above. Hence, the RTC and the Court of requires this Court, in reviewing criminal cases, to carefully determine and establish the
Appeals correctly imposed on the appellant the indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 following: [F]irst, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into
months of prision correccional as minimum and 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the
temporal as maximum for the crime of rape by sexual assault committed against Ana with prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the
the use of a hand gun, a deadly weapon. elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be present. Proving
the identity of the accused as the malefactor is theprosecution’s primary responsibility. Thus,
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever rape by sexual in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
intercourse is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is
perpetua to death. As there was no attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in sentencing the appellant to the lesser penalty not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of
of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.50 the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the award of damages, the grant to Ana of ₱30,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00
moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages for the rape by sexual assault
committed against her is proper.51 Likewise, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages for the rape by sexual
intercourse committed against her are proper and conform with current case law.52 These
amounts shall be subject to legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.53

While no amount of money may really be sufficient to fully compensate the loss of innocence
and deprivation of dignity that Ana suffered in the ruthless hands of the appellant, the above
amounts may somehow ease her suffering and help her move on to rebuild her life and
reclaim her dignity. Finally, this Court commends her courage and strength of spirit in her
quest for justice under the law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C.
No. 000923 affirming with modifications the Omnibus Decision dated September 21, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Taliban, Bohol, Branch 52 in Criminal Case Nos. 99-511 and 99-512
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum is imposed on all amounts of damages awarded to the private offended
party from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses;The first duty of the prosecution
is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission
of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the
 38

IRST DIVISION December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from
vs. Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as justice.6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of
Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE venue.7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents. Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional
informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC.8 Later on,
additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City,
DECISION
Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court.9

BERSAMIN, J.:
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for
murder when he was arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised.
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a
individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that
letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled
in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on
by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or
the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009.14
motion.

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the
The Case
DOJ.15 On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein
Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.17
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order
issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus.2
Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion
of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed
Antecedents his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated
the request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent
civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s
Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu request.
Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on
November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in
Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI
Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a
another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.3

On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted
Civil Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial
a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
order.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding
informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons.4 On

In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18,
2011,25 respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for
mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents,26 which the
RTC in Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or
an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil
Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena.28 Petitioner opposed the
motion to quash the subpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically,
respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12,
2011;31 and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777
dismissing the petition for mandamus.34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS
FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS
ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE
PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC; and,
2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT
FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS
MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre
despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
39
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion
– the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.36
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice,
exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law."38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave
abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao
massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution
recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only
seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based
because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an
accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far
from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be
subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime
becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule
119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The

Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a
person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward
and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting
him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or
more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is
made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the
Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a
hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions
fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and
(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime
and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act
and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that
he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other
40
requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so
that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under
both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an
information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness
pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge
operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future
prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.40 The
discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive
responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court,42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised
arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice.43 Anent the requisite
that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the
public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the
trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify
to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed
to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case,44 as
well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of
the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution
to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for
admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under
Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be
included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity
for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be
meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him
of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial
court for the discharge of the witness.46 The Court shall then order the discharge and
exclusion of said accused from the information.47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a
state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony
to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation

in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the
Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to
appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his
participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an
acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement
that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,48or to compel the retraction
or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of
petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-
request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order
issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and
ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; The public prosecutors are solely
responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. The
prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department ofthe Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component ofthe power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of
discretion―the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public
prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient
to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a
respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal
cases should be filed in court.
41
Principle:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a
letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled
by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or
motion.
Case:
This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari, taken from the final order issued
on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in
Manila, dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus.
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent civilians were massacred in SitioMasalay, Municipality of
Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the
Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province.
Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 before he was
flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more
than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted
a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.On November 27,
2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding information for
murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoena to several persons.
Information for murder was also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th
Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera
transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial
of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or
in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. However, on
December 9, 2009, prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the
Prosecution filed manifestations regarding the filing of additional information for murder
against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. Later on, additional information for

murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, and the new
venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court.
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informationsfor murder
when he was arraigned. In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of
Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murders in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre.
It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors
partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009.
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was
listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion
of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed
his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated
the request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s
request.Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in
the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777), seeking to compel respondents to charge
Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011, the RTC of Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil
Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.In
their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 2011 and February 18, 2011, respondents
questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner
opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, which the
RTC of Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or
an opposition.Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011, the RTC of Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil
Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. Petitioner opposed the motion
to quash the subpoena on April 15, 2011. The parties filed other papers, specifically,
42
respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011; petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011; and
respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011.
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777
dismissing the petition for mandamus, hence, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag
as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his
admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ?
Held & Ratio:
No.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion
– the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice,
exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
 43

judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of

petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-
request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order
issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and
ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179367 January 29, 2014
UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Unilever Philippines, Inc. (petitioner),
assailing the decision2dated June 18, 2007 and the resolution3 dated August 16, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 87000. These CA rulings dismissed the petitioner's
petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit.
The Factual Antecedents
The records show that on January 17, 2002, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) applied for the issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse located on
Camia Street, Marikina City, and of an office located on the 3rd floor of Probest International
Trading Building, Katipunan Street, Concepcion, Marikina City, allegedly owned by Michael
Tan a.k.a. Paul D. Tan (respondent). The application alleged that the respondent had in his
possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold, retailed, distributed, dealt
with or intended to be disposed of, in violation of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines.
On the same date, Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 1, granted the application and issued Search Warrant Nos. 02-2606 and 02-2607.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the premises and, in the course of the
search, seized the following items:
(A) From [the respondent’s] office:
(a) 192 sachets of Creamsilk Hair Conditioner (White);
(b) 156 sachets of Creamsilk Hair Conditioner (Blue);
(c) 158 sachets of Creamsilk Hair Conditioner (Green);
(d) 204 sachets of Creamsilk Hair Conditioner (Black);
44
(e) 192 sachets of Vaseline Amino Collagen Shampoo;
(f) 192 sachets of Sunsilk Nutrient Shampoo (Pink);
(g) 144 sachets of Sunsilk Nutrient Shampoo (Blue);
(h) 136 sachets of Sunsilk Nutrient Shampoo (Orange);
(i) 144 sachets of Sunsilk Nutrient Shampoo (Green); and
(j) 1 box of assorted commercial documents.
(B) From [the respondent’s] warehouse[:]
(a) 372 boxes each containing six (6) cases of Sunsilk Nutrient Shampoo;
and
(b) 481 boxes each containing six (6) cases Creamsilk Hair Conditioner.4
The NBI thereafter filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the
respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293, specifically Section 168 (unfair competition), in
relation with Section 170, docketed as I.S. No. 2002-667.
In his counter-affidavit, the respondent claimed that he is "Paul D. Tan," and not "Michael
Tan" as alluded in the complaint; he is engaged in the business of selling leather goods and
raw materials for making leather products, and he conducts his business under the name
"Probest International Trading," registered with the Department of Trade and Industry; he is
not engaged in the sale of counterfeit Unilever shampoo products; the sachets of Unilever
shampoos seized from his office in Probest International Trading Building are genuine
shampoo products which they use for personal consumption; he does not own and does not
operate the warehouse located on Camia Street, Marikina City, where a substantial number
of alleged counterfeit Unilever shampoo products were found; and he did not violate R.A.
No. 8293 because there is no prima facie evidence that he committed the offense charged.
Rulings of the DOJ
On December 18, 2002, State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Resolution5 dismissing the
criminal complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. To quote:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidence, we find no sufficient evidence so as to warrant a
finding of probable cause to indict respondent Paul D. Tan (not Michael Tan) for violation of
Section 168 (unfair competition) in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint for Violation of
Section 168 (unfair competition) in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293 be DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.6
The State Prosecutor found that the petitioner failed to show the respondent’s actual and
direct participation in the offense charged. While the Certificate of Registration of Probest
International Trading shows that a certain "Paul D. Tan" is the registered owner and
proprietor of the office, there is no showing that he is also the registered owner of the
warehouse where the alleged counterfeit Unilever shampoo products were found. There is
also no evidence to support the claim that the respondent was engaged in the sale of
counterfeit products other than the self-serving claim of the petitioner’s representatives.
Lastly, the State Prosecutor found that the pieces of evidence adduced against the
respondent, e.g. alleged counterfeit Unilever shampoo products, by themselves, are not
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that he is engaged in unfair competition.
The motion for reconsideration that followed was denied in a resolution7 dated June 5, 2003.
On September 9, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ,8 which the
Acting Secretary of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed in her March 16, 2004
resolution. In the resolution, the Acting Secretary of Justice affirmed the State Prosecutor’s
finding of lack of probable cause.
The petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration.
On October 19, 2004, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Acting Secretary of Justice, et
al., in deciding the case in the respondent’s favor.
The Rulings of the CA
The CA, in a decision dated June 18, 2007, dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute acts of unfair
competition under R.A. No. 8293. The CA took into account the insufficiency of evidence that
would link the respondent to the offense charged. It also ruled that the Acting Secretary of
Justice did not gravely abuse her discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor’s
resolution dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause.
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforementioned decision rendered by the CA
but its motion was denied in a resolution dated August 16, 2007.
The present Rule 45 petition questions the CA’s June 18, 2007 decision and August 16, 2007
resolution.
45
The Petition
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing its petition for certiorari and in
affirming the DOJ’s rulings. It argues that while it may be possible that the respondent is not
the owner of the warehouse, the overwhelming pieces of evidence nonetheless prove that
he is the owner of the counterfeit shampoo products found therein. The petitioner also
maintains that the voluminous counterfeit shampoo products seized from the respondent
are more than sufficient evidence to indict him for unfair competition.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
upholding the Acting Secretary of Justice’s decision dismissing the information against the
respondent. The resolution of this issue requires a determination of the existence of
probable cause in order to indict the respondent of unfair competition.
The Court’s Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
Determination of Probable Cause Lies Within the Competence of the Public Prosecutor
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is
essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice.9 The prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation;10and their
findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not
subject to review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.11 Courts can neither
override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They
cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a
prima facie case.12
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself
allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely
abused.13 In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of
probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or
non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation
when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.14

Courts Cannot Reverse the Secretary of Justice’s Findings Except in Clear Cases of Grave
Abuse of Discretion
The term "grave abuse of discretion" means such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.15 In Elma v. Jacobi,16 we said that:
This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the
prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making
his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to
establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
[emphasis supplied]
An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the
complaint’s dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the
respondent’s direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State
Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership of
the warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the
conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the
petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of
the counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse.
A careful analysis of the lower courts’ rulings and the records, however, reveals that
substantial facts and circumstances that could affect the result of the case have been
overlooked. While the ownership of the warehouse on Camia Street, Marikina City, was not
proven, sufficient evidence to prove the existence of probable cause nevertheless exists.
These pieces of evidence consist of: (1) the result of the NBI agents’ search of the office and
of the warehouse; (2) Elmer Cadano’s complaint-affidavit; (3) Rene Baltazar’s affidavit; (4)
Unilever’s representatives’ claim that all the laborers present at the warehouse confirmed
that it was operated by Probest International Trading; (5) other object evidence found and
seized at the respondent’s office and warehouse; (6) the NBI operatives’ Joint Affidavit; (7)
the subsequent seizure of counterfeit Unilever products from the respondent’s warehouse in
Antipolo City; and (8) other photographs and documents relative to the counterfeit products.
These pieces of evidence, to our mind, are sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe
that the crime of unfair competition was committed and that the respondent was its author.
46
First, a total of 1,238 assorted counterfeit Unilever products were found at, and seized from,
the respondent’s office located on the 3rd floor of Probest International Trading Building,
Katipunan Street, Concepcion, Marikina City. The huge volume and the location where these
shampoos were found (inside a box under a pile of other boxes located inside the
respondent’s office) belie the respondent’s claim of personal consumption. Human
experience and common sense dictate that shampoo products (intended for personal
consumption) will ordinarily and logically be found inside the house, specifically, inside the
bathroom or in a private room, not in the consumer’s office.
Second, the failure to prove that the respondent is the owner of the warehouse located on
Camia St., Marikina City, does not automatically free him from liability. Proof of the
warehouse’s ownership is not crucial to the finding of probable cause. In fact, ownership of
the establishment where the counterfeit products were found is not even an element of
unfair competition. While the respondent may not be its owner, this does not foreclose the
possibility that he was the manufacturer or distributor of the counterfeit shampoo products.
Needless to say, what is material to a finding of probable cause is the commission of acts
constituting unfair competition, the presence of all its elements and the reasonable belief,
based on evidence, that the respondent had committed it.
Third, the result of the NBI’s search conducted on January 17, 2002 (yielding to several boxes
of counterfeit shampoo sachets) and the NBI’s Joint Affidavits in support of the application
for search warrants serve as corroborating evidence. The striking similarities17 between the
genuine Unilever shampoo sachets and the counterfeit sachets seized by the NBI support the
belief that the respondent had been engaged in dealing, manufacturing, selling and
distributing counterfeit Unilever shampoo products.
Fourth, there were also allegations that the respondent’s laborers and warehousemen who
were present during the search had confirmed that the warehouse was being maintained
and operated by Probest International Trading. The NBI investigators who served the search
warrant also claimed that several persons, introducing themselves as the respondent’s
relatives and friends, had requested them to seize only a portion of the counterfeit shampoo
products. Whether these claims are admissible in evidence or whether they should be
excluded as hearsay are matters that should be determined not in a preliminary
investigation, but in a full-blown trial.
In Lee v. KBC Bank N.V.,18 citing Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,19 we held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the
prosecution’s] evidence.1âwphi1The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits.
We also emphasized in that case that:
 47

In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility
of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.20
Finally, the subsequent events that occurred – after the filing of the petitioner’s complaint
and the institution of its appeal to the CA – are too significant to be ignored.
In its motion to reconsider the CA’s decision,21 the petitioner pointed to the reports it
received sometime in October 2005 that the respondent had resumed its operations
involving counterfeit Unilever products. Notably, these significant reports, albeit supported
by the subsequent seizure of large quantity of counterfeit Unilever shampoos22in the
respondent’s warehouse23 (located at No. 13 First Street Corner Sevilla Avenue, Virginia
Summerville Subdivision, Barangay Mambugan, Antipolo City), were ignored by the CA. We,
however, find that this development is significant, although they were not part of the mass
of evidence considered below. Even without them and based solely on the evidentiary
materials available below, we conclude that sufficient grounds exist to indict the respondent
for unfair competition.
Determination of Probable Cause Merely Requires Probability of Guilt or Reasonable
Ground for Belief
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused.24 It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.25 What is merely required is
"probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.26 Thus, in
concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the very offense charged.
Guided by this ruling, we find that the CA gravely erred in sustaining the Acting Secretary of
Justice’s finding that there was no probable cause to indict the respondent for unfair
competition. The dismissal of the complaint, despite ample evidence to support a finding of
probable cause, clearly constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and
correction.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition
filed by Unilever Philippines, Inc. The appealed decision dated June 18, 2007 and the
resolution dated August 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
The State Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to file the appropriate Information against Michael
Tan a.k.a. Paul D. Tan.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The determination of probable cause for
purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at
the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice.·The
determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially
an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with
respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to
review by the Court.

It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on
the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during
the trial proper of the case.27 As held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales:28

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. xxx
The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support
of the charge.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of
the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass
grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal
Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this
Court’s jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have
chosen to take recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant national
interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this
Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation
and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the
political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
prohibition2
These are petitions for certiorari and seeking the annulment of the orders and
resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
48
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu)
of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor
Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached
therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely
deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was
immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to collect,
preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an
investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts,
conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the victims DNA
samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal
remains and even the length of time that they had been buried. The report recommended
the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities of the remains and the time window of
death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the Regional
and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10)
possible victims after comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of
them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those discovered at the
mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid,
Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They
narrated that they were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly,
petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G.

Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central
Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement Operation
VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on suspected military
spies and civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged
with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would subject those arrested to
questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of those confirmed to be military
spies and civilians who would not support the movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed
by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena
requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their
witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and
Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of
the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a
formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was
allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an
Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola,
2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando
Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11)
Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15)
Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano
Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as
their testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent
with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18
(RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February
2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of
the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission
by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty. 34
49
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking
the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release of
petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during
the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was
then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political
offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this
case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means,
in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and the
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and
set42 the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March
2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy
of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion
charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days.45 On 3 April
2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a ₱100,000 cash
bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information
filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April
2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution
thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830
before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008
by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February
2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/

Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners Echanis
and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able
to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records
of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was
issued in compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the
request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma
Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner
Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12
August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to Motion
for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the case
pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or
Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April
2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina. 58 The petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional and immediate release of
petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April
2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina. 60 The petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with G.R.
No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echanis’s
immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these conditions:
that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his attendance and participation
in the formal peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release
50
shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later modified, such that his
temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the peace
negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under a
₱100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlad’s
motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion
on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August
2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830,
185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG
submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and
185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January
2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7
June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011,
petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no
objection to the grant of a ₱100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were consultants
of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding negotiations with the GRP peace
panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed
their bail in the amount of ₱100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations. 82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance
of the warrants of arrest.

A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the innocent
from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive
right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall
decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus,
one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim
denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and
the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a
subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden
and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed
their formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was
still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the
right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and
Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in
the records of the case without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit
of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by petitioner
Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD was agreed upon. 95Petitioner
Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating that he
was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a
mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June
1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the
Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner
Ocampo his right to due process.98
51
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of
Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,]
the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them
to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand,
Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted
their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the
required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As
long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. 100The rule was
put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution
of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was
only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that
they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct.
Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with this
claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s
wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was among those mentioned in the
Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a formal
entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that
petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to
prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully
in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that
all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to
remain passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot

now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their
own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to surreptitiously
insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing
surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit
and admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the alleged meeting. The date of
the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it
was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the case
go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to question the
execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be
heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution
rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner
Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other witnesses107 attesting to the
allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had
ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal
the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution,
it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to
the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the
prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000
National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has
been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion
for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March
2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead,
petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court on
16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce."
52
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an
examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have
ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the
records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the
charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further
elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this
Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to
cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of
facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the
Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As
stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based

thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he
sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the
[I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief
that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the
following portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the
Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of
Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of
the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a
warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are
normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in
the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior
to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-
entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including
whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes
crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a
political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. 124
53
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the
alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is
assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to
determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,126 if
during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to
wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information
for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused

or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent
court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several
others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp++i1 Even
before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo,
Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of
the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence. 130 When the indictment was
filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131We eventually ordered the dismissal of the
rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond posted
before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.1âwphi1
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis
and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from
detention under the cash bond of ₱100,000 each shall continue under the condition that
their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF
consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the
government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch
32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-
262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same
bail granted by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.
54
Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual participation as
CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or
terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is
sooner.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; Due Process; While the right
to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. A
preliminary investigation is not a casual affair. It is conducted to protect the innocent from
the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive
right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. In the context
of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with
regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the
allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and
that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to
dismiss the complaint.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations; As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence,
the preliminary investigation remains valid. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a
respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made,
and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts
of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.
Ocampo v. Hon. Abando,et. al., G.R. No. 176830, 11 February 2014
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and
the attached documents or evidence. Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a
subpoena due to the false address indicated in the undated letters of PC/Insp. Almaden and
Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero. Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their
formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still
not sent a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.
 55

On the other hand, Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against petitioners. He alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts
and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue
a warrant of arrest. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that had Judge Abando
painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them.

ISSUE: Whether the failure to serve subpoena to the accused during the preliminary
investigation will invalidate the same?

NO. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As
long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was
put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution
of offenses.

Does the failure of the judge to point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as
bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest amount to grave abuse
of discretion?

NO. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if on the basis of his evaluation he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.

The allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
The trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, “he sufficiently complies
with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the information and the
documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged.”
 56

THIRD DIVISION Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed
vs. before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents. filed a motion for determination of probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008,
he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
DECISION
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4,
2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing,
LEONEN, J.:
for resolution.14

While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an
of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty,
order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence
does not establish probable cause.
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the
assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated
not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against
petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative,
Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3 Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-
decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public
In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia,
prosecutor."18
conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and
released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission. 4
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial court, and
reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed
or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable
to remit the payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20
cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20
cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that
Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno
Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he
Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage. 5 argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown
by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is
broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove
to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x
ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted
x."22
payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.6

In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7 finding probable
that were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate
cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and
court.
estafa.

The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its
comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings
of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of
probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a
superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue
on the existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be
accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the
trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of
probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315,
fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination
of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public
prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find
probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause
exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is
a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
57
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case,
Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An
information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as
private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The
prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information, which was granted by the court.
The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and a
warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable
cause. The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case
against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the
Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended information against Billy
Cerbo, stating that:

In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of
Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the
information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for
‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the
trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper
scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require.
But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be
accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest
error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain from
interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and
move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is
resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the
facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x." 37 There
was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted
to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of
the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the
court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the
judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
58
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of
probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to
establish probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section
7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must
be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of
the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory.1âwphi1 The court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the
sound discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record
and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for
the offenses of qualified theft and estafa."41Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to
prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo
were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo,
to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint
"[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation
 59

purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found
crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)
of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory
hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the
private complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of
witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to
commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali
correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with
caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature
of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely
fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other
hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-
11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely
within the discretion of the public prosecutor. The conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the
discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds
sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information
with the court. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists.
(5) cars had been sold and released by the accused without Garcia's or the finance manager's
permission. The Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of information against accused for qualified theft and
estafa. Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice. While Alfredo's motion for
reconsideration was still pending, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed
before the Regional Trial Court. Mendoza filed a motion for determination of probable cause
before the trial court. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. Juno Cars Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Juno Cars then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether
or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.
Issue: Whether or not the determination of probable cause belongs to the public prosecutor
and not the trial court Ruling: The court ruled that conduct of preliminary investigation and
the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the
discretion of the public prosecutor. The conduct of preliminary investigation the conduct of
the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable
cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the
evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then
cause the filing of the information withthe court. Once the information has been filed, the
judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this
stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

FACTS:

A complaint filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, onJanuary
8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against accused, Alfredo Mnedoza(Mendoza, for
brevity). Juno Cars alleged that it hired Alfredo as employee. ItsDealer/Operator, Rolando
Garcia (Garcia, for brevity), conducted a partial audit of theused cars and discovered that five

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014
RAY SHU, Petitioner,
vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN
SO,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Rule 45 petit10n for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ray Shu
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 19,
2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008. These assailed CA rulings annulled the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for falsification against the respondents.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NB!) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds
of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(A4etrobank). Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner,
one in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation.
According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. Respondents
Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage as witnesses;
respondents Ramon S. Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized the deeds of real
estate mortgage signed by the petitioner in his own behalf and for the corporation,
respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the other hand, appeared in the
deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for
San Juan, Metro Manila.2 Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the two properties
securing the 3A Apparel Corporation’s loan.3
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city
prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public
documents. The NBI supported the complaint with the Questioned Documents Report No.
746-1098 (questioned documents report) issued by its Questioned Documents Division. The
questioned documents report states that the signatures of the petitioner which appear on
the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample signatures he submitted to
the NBI.4
60
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due
process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and
Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison.5 The
findings contained in the questioned documents report only covered the sample signatures
unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared with the signatures appearing on the
two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the signatures of the petitioner which
appear in several documents in Metrobank’s possession revealed that his signatures in the
questioned deeds are genuine.6 The respondents also argued that the examination of the
documents was conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate
mortgage.
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor
In a resolution dated June 25, 1999, the city prosecutor found no probable cause against the
respondents and, consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents report is not conclusive evidence
that the respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves that the sample signatures
which were submitted solely by the petitioner are different from the signatures appearing on
the questioned deeds. The pieces of evidence presented before the city prosecutor, which
were not made available to the NBI and which the petitioner does not dispute prove that the
same person executed the questioned deeds.7 The city prosecutor found that the similarities
in the sample signatures submitted by the respondents and the signatures on the two deeds
of real estate mortgage are so striking that even a layman could see that they were written
by one and the same person.
Furthermore, the documents appended to the respondents’ counter-affidavit show that the
petitioner availed of the credit line and benefited from its proceeds. Sufficient consideration
also supported the execution of the two deeds of mortgage.8 The city prosecutor also
concluded that the petitioner used his passport when he executed the questioned deeds
before the respondents-notaries public Magpantay and Miranda, without informing these
notaries that the passport had already been cancelled. This finding presumed the regularity
of the performance of duty of a notary public.9
The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary of Justice.10
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She ruled that the city
prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI questioned
documents experts. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof
of irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties.11

According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did
not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all
tended to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. The complainant’s evidence is
more credible and suffices to establish probable cause for falsification, as against the
respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting documents.12
In addition, the finding of the city prosecutor that the petitioner’s ‘credit line’ with
Metrobank is sufficient consideration for the execution of the questioned deeds, even if not
palpably erroneous, is still gratuitous and conjectural. 13
The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration prompting them
to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The respondents alleged that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolution.14
The ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice. 15
According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due process in the
proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice.16
In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the
complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present countervailing
evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the petitioner.17
In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished with
the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to file their
answer nor to comment.18
The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally involved in the
investigation of the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor, were
convinced that the evidence were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges against the
respondents. The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came from the NBI chiefs
and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate the case.19
The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to examine the
documents submitted by the parties, including the respondents’ evidence which the NBI did
not consider. The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration;20 hence, the present
petition.
The Petitioner’s Position
61
The petitioner assigned the following errors:
First, the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that they had been denied due
process in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice despite their active participation in
the proceedings through the filing of a motion for reconsideration.21
Second, the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the investigating NBI agent and the
city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides which of the
conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be given weight.22
Third, an NBI expert’s examination of certain contested documents at the request of a
private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination made. Its purpose is to assist the
court exercising jurisdiction over the case in the performance of its duty to correctly settle
the issue related to the documents.23
The Respondents’ Position
In the respondents’ Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument that they
were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of
Justice, resulting in the denial of their right to due process.24 Moreover, the questioned
documents report issued by the NBI was one-sided, thus, casting doubt on its veracity and
reliability; thus, it deserves no weight and credence.25 The Secretary of Justice erred in giving
more weight to the questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving denials.26
In addition, the respondents argued that there was no evidence pointing to them as the
perpetrators of the forgery, if indeed there had been any. The expert opinion, disclaimer of
the petitioner and the alleged lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan could only
support a finding that the petitioner did not execute the questioned deeds or obtain loans
from the bank. Too, there was no evidence that the respondents would gain pecuniary
benefits from the commission of the crime.27
The Court’s ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The respondents were not denied their right to due process
We find no merit in the respondent’s claim that they were denied due process when they
were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s appeal.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be

heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is
given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.28
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary
of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due
process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative
agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes
upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It
also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to
prosecute the persons responsible.29
Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the
respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to
the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence
of probable cause.
We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were
submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of
the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers
had the opportunity to examine these signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued the
questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the signatures
appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner’s submitted sample signatures were not
written by one and the same person.30 Notably, there was no categorical finding in the
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report, too,
was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s request for
assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive
and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate documents examination by
handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s questioned
documents report does not directly point to the respondents’ involvement in the crime
charged. Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted
by the parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for
purposes of finding probable cause – the action that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the
present case.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
62
Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.31
It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the
crime charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary
investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.32
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3)
the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.33
In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are more
in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than the findings of the
city prosecutor.
Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the Secretary of Justice did not just merely give
credence to the questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving
allegations.1âwphi1 The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties’ submitted
pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he
did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all
tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. Also, the finding in the assailed
resolution that the ‘credit line’ of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient consideration
for him to have executed the deeds is gratuitous and conjectural."
From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered sufficient evidence
showing that falsification might have been committed and that the respondents might have
been responsible therefor. The NBI’s questioned documents report states that the
questioned deeds of mortgage and the sample signatures submitted by the petitioner were
not written by one and the same person. It was also shown that the respondents Dee, So,
Magpantay and Miranda signed and participated in the execution of the two deeds of real
estate mortgage and the respondent Macillan signed and submitted these documents to the
Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted
evidence that the passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled passport.
Furthermore, as the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not show that the
petitioner received the proceeds of the loan.
The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial

In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents report issued by the NBI.
He concluded that the documents submitted by the respondents showed that even a layman
could see the striking similarities of the alleged signatures of the petitioner in the questioned
deeds and in the documents submitted by the respondents. He also concluded that the
petitioner misrepresented to the respondents-notaries public Miranda and Magpantay that
the passport used in notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled.
In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the
respondents’ defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a
party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.34 The
allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown trial in which
evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved.35 The preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence.36 Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his
technical knowledge.37
That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is highlighted
by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely
upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature.38 The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who
must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed
handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine."39
Read in this light, the respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the specimen
signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose
consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the respondents can
present evidence to prove their defense and controvert the questioned documents report;
they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the examination.
The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city prosecutor
We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor's findings should be given
more weight than the findings of the Secretary of Justice.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first
place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling
is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has
the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's determination.40
63
It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by
the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.41
Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse
the exercise of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; It is well-settled that in order to arrive at
a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. In
determining these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty.
Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is well-
settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime
charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary
investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.
CASE DIGEST: RAY SHU v. JAIME DEE, et al.
FACTS:
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds
of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Both deeds
of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while
the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation.
According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. Respondents
Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage as witnesses;
respondents Ramon S. Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized the deeds of real
estate mortgage signed by the petitioner in his own behalf and for the corporation,
respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the other hand, appeared in the

deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for
San Juan, Metro Manila. Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the two properties
securing the 3A Apparel Corporations loan.
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city
prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public
documents. The NBI supported the complaint with the Questioned Documents Report No.
746-1098 (questioned documents report) issued by its Questioned Documents Division. The
questioned documents report states that the signatures of the petitioner which appear on
the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample signatures he submitted to
the NBI.
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due
process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and
Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison. The
findings contained in the questioned documents report only covered the sample signatures
unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared with the signatures appearing on the
two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the signatures of the petitioner which
appear in several documents in Metrobank's possession revealed that his signatures in the
questioned deeds are genuine. The respondents also argued that the examination of the
documents was conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate
mortgage.
The city prosecutor found no probable cause against the respondents and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned
documents report is not conclusive evidence that the respondents committed the crime
charged.
The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor resolution to the Secretary of Justice who
reversed the city prosecutors findings.
The Secretary of Justice denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration prompting them
to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The respondents alleged that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolution.
The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE: Were respondents denied of their right to due process?
64
HELD:
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be
heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is
given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary
of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due
process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
On the respondent's allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative
agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes
upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It
also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to
prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the
respondents due process right could have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to
the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of
probable cause.
We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were
submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of
the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers
had the opportunity to examine these signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued the
questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the signatures
appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioners submitted sample signatures were not
written by one and the same person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report, too,
was procured during the conduct of the NBI's investigation at the petitioner's request for
assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive
and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate documents examination by
handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBIs questioned
documents report does not directly point to the respondents involvement in the crime
charged. Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted

by the parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for
purposes of finding probable cause the action that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the
present case.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.
It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the
crime charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary
investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows:
(1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
(2) he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are more
in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than the findings of the
city prosecutor.
Contrary to the respondent's assertions, the Secretary of Justice did not just merely give
credence to the questioned documents report and the petitioner's self-serving allegations.
The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties submitted pieces of evidence in
ruling that the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did not sign any
promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove
that he did not execute the subject deeds. Also, the finding in the assailed resolution that the
credit line of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient consideration for him to have
executed the deeds is gratuitous and conjectural.
From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered sufficient evidence
showing that falsification might have been committed and that the respondents might have
been responsible therefor. The NBIs questioned documents report states that the questioned
deeds of mortgage and the sample signatures submitted by the petitioner were not written
65
by one and the same person. It was also shown that the respondents Dee, So, Magpantay
and Miranda signed and participated in the execution of the two deeds of real estate
mortgage and the respondent Macillan signed and submitted these documents to the Office
of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted evidence
that the passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled passport. Furthermore,
as the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not show that the petitioner received
the proceeds of the loan.
The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial.
Read in this light, the respondent's' defense that there are striking similarities in the
specimen signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter of
evidence whose consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the
respondents can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert the questioned
documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the
examination.
We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor's findings should be given
more weight than the findings of the Secretary of Justice.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first
place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling
is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has
the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's determination.
It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by
the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse
the exercise of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city prosecutor.
GRANTED

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. TEODULO NANO ALAON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We are urged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103816 dated 25 March 2009, which annulled and set aside the
Resolution2 dated 18 March 2008 of petitioner Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 2002-
10728. The assailed Resolution: (1) set aside the Supplemental Resolution dated 16
December 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte; and (2) directed the filing of
the corresponding Information for three (3) counts of rape against respondent Teodulo Nano
Alaon (Alaon).
The fairly simple facts follow.
Private complainant AAA3 filed a complaint against Alaon charging him with the crime of rape
occurring on three separate but successive occasions. The first incident transpired sometime
in October 2000, while she was picking guavas that had fallen from trees at a construction
site beside Alaon’s house in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. Alaon pulled AAA towards a guava
tree; removed her shorts and underwear and simultaneously undressed himself; laid her on a
bench and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
Alaon denied the charges: AAA’s family merely fabricated the charge in retaliation to their
eviction from the land which Alaon owned.
The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable cause to indict
Alaon for three (3) counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, docketed as I.S. No. 2002-10728.
Acting favorably on Alaon’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor
downgraded the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness, ratiocinating, thus:
Going over the arguments presented in this case despite absence of comment from the
complainant, we posits (sic) that these grounds raised in said motion are all evidentiary in
character except as to the alleged physical impossibility on the part of the accused to commit
the crime as charged which merits further scrutiny. Guided by the decision in US v. Tan x x x
and People v. Domondon x x x, “thus, a man who threw a girl 7-10 years old upon the floor,
placed his private parts upon or over hers, and remained in that position or made motions of
sexual intercourse, is guilty of acts of lasciviousness,” undersigned was constrained to
66
reconsider the assailed resolution considering the undisputed state of the accused who at
the time of the alleged commission is 73 years old.
WHEREFORE, considering the aforementioned and the absence of any other incriminating
evidence other than the passing statement of the victim, it is imperative to modify our
assailed resolution from rape to acts of lasciviousness which best suits (sic) the evidence at
hand.
Let an Information for Acts of Lascviousness be filed against accused recommending the
amount of P12,000.00 for his provisional liberty.4
Consequently, an Information against Alaon was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-1021:
That in the afternoon of October, 2002 at Purok 2, Barangay Poblacion, Sta. Elena, Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and motivated by bestial lust, by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an [sic] acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of AAA, 17 years old, against her will and to her damage.5
On 28 January 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong (Secretary of Justice),
directed the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte to: (1) forward the entire records of
the case for automatic review, citing “the interest of justice and pursuant to the residual
authority of the Secretary of Justice of supervision and control over the prosecutors of the
Department of Justice;” and (2) defer the filing of the Information for acts of lasciviousness
against Alaon, or, in the event an Information has been filed in court, move for suspension of
proceedings against Alaon, “in order not to render the automatic review moot and
academic.”
The Secretary of Justice’s directive was based on a letter of BBB, AAA’s mother, narrating
what happened to AAA who is said to be suffering from an intellectual disability.
Forthwith, on 11 February 2003, the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Carmel Josa Auro
Estrellado (Prosecutor Estrellado), sent a letter to Presiding Judge Leo Intia (Judge Intia)
requesting the withdrawal of the Information for Acts of Lasciviousness in compliance with
Secretary Simeon Datumanong’s directive mistakenly assuming that Alaon filed a petition for
review before the Secretary of Justice.
On that same day, Judge Intia, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, separately found
probable cause for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness against Alaon. However, Judge Intia
took into consideration the contents of Prosecutor Estrellado’s letter and held in abeyance
the issuance of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution of the petition for review. Judge
Intia likewise directed Prosecutor Estrellado to submit a copy of the petition for review
before the trial court.
The next day, 12 February 2003, the RTC acting on the letter of Prosecutor Estrellado,

suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-1021 in accordance with Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court.
On 26 February 2003, Prosecutor Estrellado filed an Explanation/Manifestation clarifying
that:
2. The undersigned erred in concluding that a petition for review was filed by the
accused as indeed, the accused never did;
3. The undersigned realized such honest mistake only when the mother of the victim
in this case appeared before her on 24 February 2003 as it was at this time that she
was informed that there actually was no formal petition for review filed by said
complainant. According to her, she simply asked for the assistance of the
Department of Justice Central Office to review the Supplemental Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor in modifying the previous resolution issued thereon and in
changing the designation of the offense from Rape to Acts of Lasciviousness.7
Alarmed, Alaon filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set Case for Arraignment with a
prayer to lift the RTC’s suspension of proceedings and to immediately set the case for
arraignment in accordance with an accused’s right to speedy trial.
The RTC issued an Order: (1) granting Alaon’s motion and setting the case for arraignment;
and (2) confirming the earlier finding of judicial probable cause against Alaon for the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness.
During arraignment on 11 June 2003, Alaon entered a plea of not guilty.
Apparently confused, Prosecutor Estrellado, on the following day, 12 June 2003, filed a
motion to withdraw appearance, insisting that the case remained pending review by the
Secretary of Justice and as such, has been directed to withdraw appearance from the case.
On 25 June 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying Prosecutor Estrellado’s motion:
The grounds relied upon by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carmel Josa Estrellado is
not a valid ground for withdrawing her appearance as Public Prosecutor in this case. If it is
true that there is a pending petition for review filed with the Department of Justice,
suspension of the proceedings of this case is the proper recourse in accordance with Sec. 11,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, not withdrawal of appearance. x x x The
withdrawal of appearance by Assistant Prosecutor Carmel Josa Estrellado upon the directive
of the Provincial Prosecutor is tantamount to dereliction of duty which this court shall not
allow.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appearance is hereby DENIED.
67
Furnish copy of this order also to the Secretary of Justice, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong.8
Taking cue from the RTC’s latest Order, Prosecutor Estrellado filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings which Alaon opposed.
On 31 July 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, ruling
that the grounds for suspension listed in Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are
wanting. The RTC likewise set pre-trial of the case on 27 August 2003.
Trial of the case ensued.
On 18 March 2008, with the propriety of the offense charged still at issue within the
prosecution, specifically the DOJ, then Undersecretary of the DOJ, Ernesto Pineda, issued the
previously adverted to Resolution, setting aside the downgrading of the crime charged
against Alaon from rape to acts of lasciviousness. The DOJ reinstated the previous charge of
rape against Alaon and directed the filing of an Information against him for three (3) counts
of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Alaon thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution
of the DOJ for being issued in grave abuse of discretion.
On 25 March 2009, the appellate court granted Alaon’s petition and annulled the Resolution
of the DOJ, finding grave abuse of discretion in its issuance. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated
that while the Secretary of Justice had the power to review resolutions or decision of
provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor, review must be done within the
parameters set forth in the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal.9 For the
Court of Appeals, BBB’s letter clearly did not comply with the requirements for taking an
appeal by way of petition for review from the prosecutor’s resolution of a criminal case at
the preliminary investigation stage. More importantly, the accused, Alaon, in this case, was
“deprived of his right to procedural due process, as he was not given the opportunity to be
heard by filing a comment or opposition thereto.” Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that
“in treating the letter-request as an appeal from the Provincial Prosecutor’s Supplemental
Resolution, and in issuing the assailed Resolution directing the filing of the corresponding
information for three (3) counts of rape against [Alaon] on the basis thereof, the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The DOJ ascribes grave error in the appellate court’s decision and posits that:
I.
THE DOJ SECRETARY MAY MOTU PROPIO REVIEW THE RESOLUTION OF A PROSECUTOR EVEN
IN THE ABSENSE OF AN APPEAL OR A PETITION FOR REVIEW BEING FILED BY ANY AGGRIEVED
PARTY; AND,

II.
[ALAON] WAS CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT’S MOTHER’S APPEAL BEFORE THE DOJ, HENCE, HE CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT
HE WAS NOT GIVEN NOTICE OF THE SAME AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 10
We are not persuaded. However, we cannot accept in its entirety the reasons behind the
finding of the appellate court.
Initially, we note that the DOJ and even Alaon did not apprise this Court about the status of
Criminal Case No. 03-1021 before the RTC. As we shall hereafter dispose of the matter before
us, we see no reason to order that the trial that had begun be held in abeyance.
The Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion when he acted on the letter request of
BBB, the mother of the victim, AAA.
There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice’s power of review over the actions of his
subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the
Secretary of Justice’s authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines.
Chapter 7, section 38, paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 292 or The Administrative Code of
1987, defines the administrative relationship that is supervision and control:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. —Unless otherwise expressly stated
in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Unless a
different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies, the word “control” shall encompass supervision and control as defined in
this paragraph.
In Noblejas v. Judge Salas,12 we defined control as the power (of the department head) to
alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power of
control implies the right of the President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, we do not find
abuse of discretion, much more grave abuse of discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when
68
he took cognizance of BBB’s letter and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial
prosecutor’s resolution. It cannot be said that in this case, there was an “absence of a
petition for review.” There was in fact an appeal from the prosecutor’s resolution, although
not as described in the National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was, tersely put,
an appeal that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. In fact, the Secretary of
Justice acted on the letter request of BBB. What was done was not a motu propioreview.
Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate court’s holding that Alaon was deprived of his right
to procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the letter-
appeal of private complainant’s mother.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive
and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding
wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-
judicial officer.13 Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the
requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate.
The DOJ makes much of the fact that Alaon ostensibly knew of BBB’s appeal to the Secretary
of Justice.
This assertion of the DOJ cannot equate to compliance with procedural due process. To begin
with, Prosecutor Estrellado mistakenly thought that Alaon had filed a petition for review. The
confusion got clarified only after Judge Intia required the prosecutor to submit a copy of the
petition for review. Thereafter, Alaon also made a manifestation raising the error in the
prosecutor’s assertion, and moved for the lifting of the suspension of proceedings and
setting the arraignment of the case.
What Alaon eventually learned is that the records of I.S. No. 2002-10728 were with the
Secretary of Justice for his review. Alaon cannot be charged with notice that the Secretary of
Justice had treated the letter of BBB as a petition for review. Notice in this case, as a function
of an opportunity to be heard, a component of procedural due process, was not met. Once
the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should have
required Alaon to comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the requirements
for an appeal under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, indeed, precisely
for such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the one hearing the case, to
afford Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to satisfy procedural due
process. On this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaon’s
rights as it accommodated private complainant.
With our holding that the Secretary of Justice acted in excess of jurisdiction when he failed to
afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard on private complainant’s letter which he deemed as
a petition for review, we affirm the appellate court’s issuance of the special writ of certiorari,
annulling the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of two elements for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari: (1) that a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
 69

judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 103816 annulling and setting aside the 18 March 2008 Resolution of petitioner Department
of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-10728 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
In this case, the propriety of the charge against Alaon for Acts of Lasciviousness has already
been judicially confirmed by the trial court when it found probable cause for the issuance of SO ORDERED
a warrant of arrest.

However, even with the trial court’s judicial confirmation of a prima facie case against Alaon
for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and its apparent authority and jurisdiction to hear and
dispose of the case as it sees fit, we still do not find a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
under the ordinary course of law which Alaon could have availed of against the 18 March
2008 Resolution of the DOJ.
We are not unaware of the point raised by the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of
the DOJ, that the disposition of the case, whether a dismissal or continuance, or the
withdrawal and substitution of the Information to one charging three (3) counts of rape
against Alaon, rests on the sole discretion of the trial court. The intimation, of course, is that
Alaon should have availed of the remedies within the trial proceedings and not before the
DOJ.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary investigation is
considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the
nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The conduct of preliminary
investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process.
Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. Even at the
stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the requirements for substantive
and procedural due process do not abate.

Crespo v. Judge Mogul,15 and succeeding jurisprudence thereafter, teach us that:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.16 (Emphasis supplied).

While there are possible remedies available to Alaon before the trial court, these are not
necessarily plain, speedy and adequate remedies. For one, Alaon will have to await action by
the handling prosecutor before he can file the pleading corresponding thereto. The fact
remains that the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ containing specific directives upon the
Provincial Prosecutor: (1) to file an Information against Alaon for three (3) counts of rape in
relation to Republic Act 7610; (2) with the entire records of the case forwarded to him for
appropriate action; and (3) to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, would still stand if not for the writ of certiorari issued by the appellate court.
Tainted as it is with grave abuse of discretion resulting from a denial of due process, the
questioned resolution should not hamper the exercise of the trial court of its mandated
jurisdiction.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 203605 April 23, 2014
P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP. GERARDO B.
BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03 FERNANDO REYS. GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO
G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS and PO1 JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
As narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), on July 28, 2009 Lilian I. De Vera (Lilian) filed a
complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging with multiple murder the
following Philippine National Police (PNP) officers connected with the PNP Highway Patrol
Group (HPG): petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp.
Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., P03 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo
G. Blanco, P02 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner HPG
officers). The other HPG members were P/C Supt. Perfecto Palad and P/C Supt. Eleuterio
Gutierrez, Jr. Another group of accused consisted of police officers from the PNP Special
Action Force (SAF).1
In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG conspired in
carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and their 7-year-old
daughter, Lia Allana. Lilian said that at around 9:30 p.m. on December 5, 2008 she called Jun
to tell him that she was on her way to Pasay City to meet him and their daughter. She got to
Pasay City but the two did not show up. After an hour, Lilian called their house helper who
assured her that Jun and Lia had already left. Lilian tried calling Jun but she got no answer.
She again called their house helper, who informed her that there had been a shootout in
their subdivision.2
Lilian decided to go home. When she arrived at the entrance of their subdivision, the police
had blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She got a call from her
house helper who told-her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the shootout. A certain
Hilario Indiana approached Lilian and advised her to go to the hospital where Lia had been
rushed. When she got there, she learned that Lia had died of gunshot wound on the head.
Jun was found dead near a passenger jeepney with a gunshot wound on his head.3
Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind van when
police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun got out, went to the
passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety as she had been wounded. The police
officers went after Jun, however, and shot him on the head.
70
On December 28, 2009 the DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation finding
probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action that led to the
shooting of Jun and Lia for two counts of murder. On March 15, 2010 the DOJ filed the
information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City in Criminal Cases 10-
0280 and 10-0281. On the following day, March 16, petitioner HPG officers filed an omnibus
motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the
issuance of the warrants for their arrest. They also sought the annulment of the DOJ
resolution on the ground of violation of their constitutional rights. Further, they asked that
the information be quashed on the ground that the facts it alleged did not constitute an
offense.4
On June 16, 2010 the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of
probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone
from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead,
the RTC found that the evidence tends to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested
and acted merely as blocking force in a legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted
this. On the other hand the R TC issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having
found probable cause against them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order
covering petitioner HPG officers but the RTC denied the same on September 24, 2010.5
On January 21, 2011 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 117756 alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC's part.6 On June 15, 2012 the CA granted the petition. It ruled that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses
on whom the DOJ relied on. The R TC based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily on
the absence of evidence directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to the shooting of the
victim and their physical presence at the crime scene.7
In a special civil action filed before it, however, the CA pointed out that Indiana and Ronald
Castillo executed affidavits stating that petitioner HPG officers joined the SAF officers in
pursuing and shooting Jun while he was bringing Lia to a safer place. The CA said that, with
this evidence, it is for the petitioner HPG officers to rebut such testimonies at the trial.8 The
CA thus ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner HPG officers.9On
October 5, 2012 the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision and the urgent
motion to quash warrants of arrest and/or motion to suspend the implementation of the
warrants of arrest,10 hence, this petition.
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and appealable order;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in counting the prescriptive period for filing a Rule
65 petition from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG rather than by
the city prosecutor's office; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause exists against petitioner HPG
officers and in dismissing the criminal charge against them.
The Court's Rulings
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
The R TC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition for special civil action of
certiorari that assails the con-ectness of the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65
provides that such action is available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
The fact, however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may
be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing
the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it
disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further
to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar
pronouncement in Santos v. Orda, Jr.11 Of course, the People may refile the case if new
evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new
information against them. But that is another matter. For now, the CA clearly erred in not
denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
Petitioner HPG officers point out that, assuming the propriety of the filing of a special civil
action of certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the People had sixty days from
receipt of such order within which to file the action. Here, the People filed its petition for
certiorari 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque,
clearly beyond the 60-day period allowed for such action.
The OSG contends, however, that the reckoning point should be from the date the
Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal since, as held in
Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan,12 the OSG alone has the authority to represent the People
before the CA. But such a proposition is unfair. There is no reason for the RTC to serve copy
of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG since it does not enter its appearance in
criminal cases before it.
71
In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public prosecutor
who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a copy of the final
order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate time since it is a
notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor General,
however, may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required appellant's brief or
withdraw the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public prosecutor's
duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil action before an appellate
court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his recommendation to the OSG, advising it
of the last day for filing such an action. There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition
since the People is given sixty days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file
such an action before the CA or this Court.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days
from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed
out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.
Although a purely academic exercise in view of its above rulings, the Court has taken a look
into the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it clashes with the findings of the DOJ
investigating prosecutors.
The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo) in claiming that
probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.
In the sworn statement he made before the police on December 9, 2008 Indiana said: "x x x.
Tapos narinig ko ang sigaw 'Bro ang driver tumakas andyan sa jeep, duon nilapitan ng isang
naka-Vest na meron pangalan sa likod RSAF at nakabunet at pinutukan ang driver sa ulo.
Tapos nagsalita ang nagsabing RSAF 'Bro may bata pala.' Kinuha ng RSAF ang bata at dinala sa
kanilang sasakyan na kulay puti ng sasakyan. x x x."13
On the other hand, witness Castillo said in his sworn statement: "x x x. May dumaang
sasakyang papuntang gate ng UPS JV, mayroong sumigaw na mga pulis 'PLATIN NYO, PLATIN
NYO.' Biglang hinabol ng dalawang pulis ang nasabing sasakyan at pinagbabaril. May ilang
sandali ay bumalik ang dalawang pulis at sinabi nila ng 'NAPATAY NA NAMIN ANG DRIVER NG
GATE A WAY CAR, ANDOON SA TABI NGJEEP'."14
It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF officer,
identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF officer who also wore such a
vest. Castillo did not see the act of shooting but confirmed that two police officers gave
chase and took shots at the fleeing vehicle then turned back to announce to their
companions that they had killed the driver of the get-away car.
 72

The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they wore another unit's
vest. More telling is the crime laboratory report which revealed that none of the HPG
operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout.15 It did not also help the
prosecution's case that, per Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers involved in the
shootout carried long firearms, specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby armalite, and M14. 16 But the
National Police Commission issued two certifications dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the
effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not been issued long firearms from 2007 up to
2010.17

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.18 The prosecution
evidence fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 15, 2012 and
Resolution dated October 5, 2012 in CAG.R. SP 117756 and AFFIRMS the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281 that dismissed
the case against petitioners. The Court ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the charge against the
petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B.
Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, P02 Eduardo G. Blanco,
PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO2 Josil Rey I. Lucena. The Court further ORDERS the withdrawal of
the warrants for their arrest.

SO ORDERED.

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS A FINAL ORDER: The fact,
however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be taken
in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing the case
against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes
of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with
respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar
pronouncement in Santos v. Orda, Jr. Of course, the People may refile the case if new
evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new
information against them. But that is another matter.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197590 November 24, 2014
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, as represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO VILLAN MANLY, and RUBY ONG
MANLY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
There is grave abuse of discretion when the determination of probable cause is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner, due to passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.1 This Petition for Certiorari2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision3 dated October 28, 2010 and the Resolution4 dated May 10, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112479.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Antonio Villan Manly (Antonio) is a stockholder and the Executive Vice-President
of Standard Realty Corporation, a family-owned corporation.5 He is also engaged in rental
business.6 His spouse, respondent Ruby Ong Manly, is a housewife.7
On April 27, 2005, petitioner Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letter of Authority No.
2001 000123878authorizing its revenue officers to investigate respondent spouses’ internal
revenue tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior years.
On June 6, 2005, petitioner issued a letter9 to respondent spouses requiring them to submit
documentary evidence to substantiate the source of their cash purchase of a 256-square
meter log cabin in Tagaytay City worth ₱17,511,010.00. Respondent spouses, however,
failedto comply with the letter.10
On June 23, 2005, the revenue officers executed a Joint Affidavit11 alleging that respondent
Antonio’s reported or declared annual income for the taxable years 1998-2003 are as
follows:
and that despite his modestincome for the said years, respondent spouses were able to
purchase in cash the following properties:
73
1) a luxurious vacation house in Tagaytay City valuedat ₱17,511,010.0013 in the
year 2000, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale14 dated October 24, 2000;
2) a Toyota RAV4 for ₱1,350,000.00 in the year 2001, evidenced by a Sales
Invoice15 dated June 28, 2001; and
3) a Toyota Prado for ₱2,000,000.00 in 2003, evidenced by a Deed of Sale16 dated
July 9, 2003.17
Since respondent spouses failed to showthe source of their cash purchases, the revenue
officers concluded that respondent Antonio’s Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for taxable years
2000, 2001,and 2003 were underdeclared.18 And since the under declaration exceeded 30%
of the reported or declared income, it was considered a prima facie evidence of fraud with
intent to evade the payment of proper taxes due to the government.19 The revenue officers,
thus, recommended the filing of criminal cases against respondent spouses for failing to
supply correct and accurate information intheir ITRs for the years 2000, 2001, and 2003,
punishable under Sections 25420 and 25521 in relation to Section 248(B)22 of Republic Act No.
8424 or the "Tax Reform Act of 1997," hereinafter referred to as the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).23
Respondent spouses, in their Joint Counter-Affidavit,24 denied the accusations hurled against
them and alleged that they used their accumulated savings from their earnings for the past24
years in purchasing the properties.25 They also contended that the criminal complaint should
be dismissed because petitioner failed to issue a deficiency assessment against them.26
In response, the revenue officers executed a Joint Reply-Affidavit.27 Respondent spouses, in
turn, executed a Joint Rejoinder-Affidavit.28
Ruling of the State Prosecutor
On August 31, 2006, State ProsecutorMa. Cristina A. Montera-Barot issued a Resolution29 in
I.S. No. 2005-573 recommending the filing of criminal charges30 against respondent spouses,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that [respondent]
spouses ANTONIO VILLAN MANLY and RUBY ONG MANLY be charged [with] the following:
(1) Three (3) counts of Violation of Section 254 – Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax of
the NIRC for taxable years 2000, 2001, and 2003;
(2) Three (3) counts for Violation of Section 255 of the NIRC – Failure to Supply
Correct and Accurate Information for taxable years 2000, 2001 and 2003;

(3) Three counts of Violation ofSection 255 of the NIRC – Failure to Pay, as a
consequence of [respondent spouses’] failure to supply correct and accurate
information on their tax returns for taxable years 2000, 2001, and 2003.31
Respondent spouses moved for reconsideration32 but the State Prosecutor denied the same
in a Resolution33 dated November 29, 2007.
Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
On appeal to the Secretary of Justice via a Petition for Review,34 Acting Justice Secretary
Agnes VST Devanadera (Devanadera) reversed the Resolution of the State Prosecutor. She
found no willfulfailure to pay or attempt to evade or defeat the tax on the part of respondent
spouses as petitioner allegedly failed to specify the amount of tax due and the likely source
of income from which the same was based.35 She also pointed out petitioner’s failure to issue
a deficiency tax assessment against respondentspouses which is a prerequisite to the filing of
a criminal case for tax evasion.36 The dispositive portion of the Resolution37 dated July 27,
2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Chief State
Prosecutor ishereby directed to withdraw the Information filed against [respondent spouses]
Antonio Villan Manly and Ruby Ong Manly, if one has been filed, and report the action taken
thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereto.
SO ORDERED.38
Petitioner sought reconsideration39 but Acting Justice Secretary Devanadera denied the same
in a Resolution40dated November 5, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Unfazed, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari41 with the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Acting Justice Secretary Devanadera in finding no probable cause to
indict respondent spouses for willfulattempt to evade or defeat tax and willful failure to
supply correct and accurate information for taxable years 2000, 2001 and 2003.
On October 28, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision42 dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. Although it disagreed that anassessment is a condition sine qua nonin filing a
criminal case for tax evasion, the CA, nevertheless, ruled that there was no probable cause to
charge respondent spouses as petitioner allegedly failed to state their exact tax liability and
to show sufficient proof of their likely source of income.43 The CA further said that before
one could be prosecuted for tax evasion,the fact that a tax is due must first be
proved.44 Thus:
74
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated July 27, 2009 dismissing I.S. No. 2005-573 against
private respondents, AFFIRMED. However, the dismissal of the instant case is without
prejudice to the refiling by the BIR of a complaint sufficient in form and substance before the
appropriate tribunal.
SO ORDERED.45
The CA likewise denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration46 in its Resolution47 dated
May 10, 2011.
Issues
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition contending that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction in holding that:
I. A CATEGORICAL FINDING OF THE EXACT AMOUNT OF TAX DUE FROM THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED [AND THAT] SINCE THE
BIR FAILED TO MAKE SUCH FINDINGS THEYCONSEQUENTLYFAILED TO BUILD A
CASE FOR TAX EVASION AGAINST [RESPONDENT SPOUSES] DESPITE THE WELL
ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE THAT IN TAX EVASION CASES, A PRECISE COMPUTATION
OF THE [TAX] DUE IS NOT NECESSARY.
II. THE BIR FAILED TO SHOW SUFFICIENT PROOF OF A LIKELY SOURCE OF
[RESPONDENT SPOUSES’] INCOME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE BIR WAS
SUFFICIENTLY ABLE TO SHOW PROOF OF SUCH INCOME.48
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in affirming the dismissal
of the criminal cases against respondent spouses. Petitioner contends that in filing a criminal
case for tax evasion, a prior computation or assessment of tax is not required because the
crime is complete when the violator knowingly and willfully filed a fraudulent return with
intentto evade a part or all of the tax.49 In this case, an analysis of respondent spouses’
income and expenditure shows that their cash expenditure is grossly disproportionate to
their reported or declared income, leading petitioner to believe that they under declared
their income.50 In computing the unreported or undeclared income, which was likely sourced
from respondent Antonio’s rental business,51 petitioner used the expenditure method of
reconstructing income, a method used to determine a taxpayer’s income tax liability when
his records are inadequate or inaccurate.52 And since respondent spouses failed to explain
the alleged unreported or undeclared income, petitioner asserts that criminal charges for tax
evasion should be filed against them.
Respondent spouses’ Arguments

Respondent spouses, on the other hand, argue that the instant Petition should be dismissed
as petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.53 And even if the Petition is given due course, the same should still be
dismissed because no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the CA.54 They maintain
that petitioner miserably failed to prove that a tax is actually due. 55 Neither was it able to
show the source of the alleged unreported or undeclared income as required by Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 15-95, Guidelines and Investigative Procedures in the Development
of Tax Fraud Cases for Internal Revenue Officers.56 As to the method used by petitioner, they
claim that it completely ignored their lifetime savings because it was limited to the years
1998-2003.57
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Before discussing the merits of thiscase, we shall first discuss the procedural matter raised by
respondent spouses that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45.
Indeed, the remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision, final order, or resolution of the CA is
to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.58 And as a rule, if the remedy of
an appeal is available, an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is
anoriginal or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, will not prosper59 because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.60
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires; 3)
when the writs issued are null and void; 4) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5) when, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; 6) when the judgment or order is attended by grave abuse of
discretion; or 7) in other meritorious cases.61
In this case, after considering the arguments raised by the parties, we find that there is
reason to give due course to the instant Petition for Certiorari as petitioner was able to
convincingly show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
dismissal of the criminal charges against respondent spouses despite the fact that there
isprobable cause toindict them.
Although the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the conduct
and determination of probable cause,62 which is exclusively within the competence of the
Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice,63 judicial intrusion, in the form of
75
judicial review, is allowed when there is proof that the Executive Department gravely abused
its discretion in making its determination and in arriving atthe conclusion it reached.64
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a blatant abuse of authority so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice, or an exercise of powerin
an arbitrary and despotic manner, due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility, sopatent
and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of the law.65 Such is the situation in this case.
Having resolved the foregoing procedural matter, we shall now proceed to determine the
main issue in this case.
Sections 254 and 255 of the NIRC pertinently provide:
SEC. 254. Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax. – Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed under this Code or the payment thereof shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less
than Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) and suffer imprisonment of not less than two (2) years but not more than four
(4) years: Provided, That the conviction or acquittal obtained under this Section shall not be a
bar to the filing of a civil suit for the collection of taxes.
SEC. 255. Failure to File Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax, Withhold
and Remit Tax and Refund Excess Taxes Withheld on Compensation. – Any person required
under this Code or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make a
return, keep any record, or supply correct and accurate information, who willfully fails to pay
such tax, make such return, keep such record, or supply such correct and accurate
information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund excess taxes withheld on
compensation at the time or times required by law or rules and regulations shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) and suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year
but not more than ten (10) years.
In Ungab v. Judge Cusi, Jr.,66 we ruled that tax evasion is deemed complete when the violator
has knowingly and willfully filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade and defeat a part or
all of the tax.67 Corollarily, an assessment of the tax deficiency is notrequired in a criminal
prosecution for tax evasion.68 However, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,69 we clarified that although a deficiency assessment is not necessary, the fact that a
tax is due must first be proved before one can be prosecuted for tax evasion.70
In the case of income, for it to be taxable, there must be a gain realized or received by the
taxpayer, which is not excluded by law or treaty from taxation.71 The government is allowed
to resort to all evidence or resources available to determine a taxpayer’s income and to use

methods to reconstruct his income.72 A method commonly used by the government isthe
expenditure method, which is a method of reconstructing a taxpayer’s income by deducting
the aggregate yearly expenditures from the declared yearly income.73 The theory of this
method is that when the amount of the money that a taxpayer spends during a given year
exceeds his reported or declared income and the source of such money is unexplained, it
may be inferred that such expenditures represent unreported or undeclared income.74
In the case at bar, petitioner used this method to determine respondent spouses’ tax
liability.1âwphi1 Petitioner deducted respondent spouses’ major cash acquisitions from their
available funds. Thus:
And since the underdeclaration is more than 30%of respondent spouses’ reported or
declared income, which under Section 248(B) of the NIRC constitutes as prima facie evidence
of false or fraudulent return, petitioner recommended the filing of criminal cases against
respondent spouses under Sections 254 and 255, in relation to Section 248(B) of the NIRC.
The CA, however, found no probable cause to indict respondent spouses for tax evasion. It
agreed with Acting Justice Secretary Devanadera that petitioner failed to make "a categorical
finding of the exact amount of tax due from [respondent spouses]" and "to show sufficient
proof of a likely source of [respondent spouses’] income that enabled them to purchase the
real and personal properties adverted to x x x."78 We find otherwise.
The amount of tax due from respondent spouses was specifically alleged in the Complaint-
Affidavit.79 The computation, as wellas the method used in determining the tax liability, was
also clearly explained. The revenue officers likewise showed that the under declaration
exceeded 30% of the reported or declared income.
The revenue officers alsoidentified the likely source of the unreported or undeclared income
intheir Reply-Affidavit. The pertinent portion reads:
[Respondent spouses] are into rental business and the net profit for six (6) years before tax
summed only to ₱1,238,938.32 (an average of more or less Php200,000.00 annually). We
asked respondent [Antonio] if we can proceed to his rented property to [appraise] the
earning capacity of the building [for] lease/ rent, but he declined our proposition. Due to
such refusal made by the respondent, [petitioner], thru its examiners,took pictures of the
subject property and came up with the findings that indeed the unexplained funds sought to
have been used in acquiring the valuable property in Tagaytay x x x came from the
underdeclaration of rental income.80
Apparently, the revenue officers considered respondent Antonio’s rental business to be the
likely source of their unreported or undeclared income due to his unjustified refusal to allow
the revenue officers to inspect the building.
76
Respondent spouses’ defense that they had sufficient savings to purchase the properties
remains self-serving at thispoint since they have not yet presented any evidence to support
this. And since there is no evidence yet to suggest that the money they used to buy the
properties was from an existing fund, it is safe to assume that that money is income or a
flowof wealth other than a mere return on capital. It is a basic concept in taxation that
income denotes a flow of wealth during a definite period of time, while capital is a fund or
property existing at one distinct point in time.81
Moreover, by just looking at the tables presented by petitioner, there is a manifest showing
that respondent spouses had under declared their income. The huge disparity between
respondent Antonio’s reported or declared annual income for the past several years and
respondent spouses’ cash acquisitions for the years 2000, 2001, and 2003 cannot be ignored.
Infact, it makes uswonder how they were able to purchase the properties in cash given
respondent Antonio’s meager income.
In view of the foregoing,we are convinced that there is probable cause to indict respondent
spouses for tax evasion aspetitioner was able to show that a tax is due from them. Probable
cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, is defined as such facts that are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, that the accusedis
probably guilty thereof, and that he should be held for trial.82 It bears stressing that the
determination of probable cause does not require actual or absolute certainty, nor clear and
convincing evidence of guilt; it only requires reasonable belief or probability that more likely
than not a crime has been committed by the accused.83
In completely disregarding the evidence presented and in affirming the ruling of the Acting
Justice Secretary Devanadera that no probable cause exists, we find that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As we have said, ifthere
is grave abuse of discretion, the court may step in and proceed to make its own independent
determination of probable cause as judicial review is allowed to ensure that the Executive
Department acts within the permissible bounds of its authority or does not gravely abuse the
same.84
We must make it clear, however, that we are only here to determine probable
cause.1âwphi1 As to whether respondent spouses are guilty of tax evasion is an issue that
must be resolved during the trial of the criminal case, where the quantum of proof required
is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Before we close, we must stress that our ruling in this case should not be interpreted as an
unbridled license for our tax officials to engage in fishing expeditions and witch-hunting. They
should not abuse their investigative powers, instead they should exercise the same within
the bounds of the law. They must properly observe the guidelines in making assessments and
investigative procedures to ensure that the constitutional rights of the taxpayers are well
protected as we cannot allow the floodgates to be opened for frivolous and malicious tax
suits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 28, 2010 and the
Resolution dated May 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112479 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated August 31, 2006 and November 29, 2007 of
State Prosecutor Ma. Cristina A. Montera-Barot in LS. No. 2005-573 finding probable cause to
indict respondent spouses Antonio Villan Manly and Ruby Ong Manly for Violation of
Sections 254 and 255 of the National Internal Revenue Code are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Manly is a stockholder & executive vice president of family-owned realty corporation
and also engaged in rental business.
On April 27, 2005, BIR issued Letter of Authority (LA) authorizing its revenue officers to
investigate Spouses Manly’s internal revenue tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior
years.
On June 6, 2005, BIR issued a letter to Manly spouses requiring them to submit documentary
evidence to substantiate the source of their cash purchase of a 256-square meter log cabin in
Tagaytay City, a Toyota Rav 4 and a Toyota Prado.
Since Spouses Manly failed to comply with the letter, the revenue officers concluded that
Manly’s Income Tax Return (ITR) for taxable years 2000, 2001 and 2003 were underdeclared.
And since the underdeclaration exceeded 30% of the reported or declared income, it was
considered a prima facie evidence of fraud with intent to evade the payment of proper tax
due to the government.
The BIR, thus, recommended the filing of criminal cases against Spouses Manly for failing to
supply correct and accurate information in their ITRs.
The Spouses Manly opposed the said complaint due to lack deficiency tax assessment.
ISSUE: Whether a deficiency assessment is necessary before one can be prosecuted for tax
evasion.
HELD:
NO. A deficiency assessment is not necessary before one can be prosecuted for tax evasion.
In this case, tax evasion is deemed complete when the violator has knowingly and willfully
filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade and defeat a part or all of the tax.
Corollarily, an assessment of the tax deficiency is not required in a criminal prosecution for
tax evasion.
77
However, it is necessary to prove the fact that a tax is due before one can be prosecuted for
tax evasion.
*** A warrant of distraint and levy (wdl) is proof of the finality of the assessment and renders
hopeless a request for reconsideration, being tantamount to an outright denial of the same
and makes it deemed rejected.
The remedy is to file an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within fifteen (15) days from the
issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy.
*** The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is empowered to suspend the collection of internal
revenue taxes and custom duties in cases pending appeal only when:
1) in the opinion of the court the collection by the BIR will jeopardize the interest of the
government and/or the taxpayer;
2) the taxpayer is willing to deposit the amount being collected or to file a surety bond for
not more than double the amount of the tax to be fixed by the court.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR CLAIM OF REFUND
The taxpayer has within thirty (30) days from receipt of the commissioner’s decision to file
the appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals and within two (2) years from the date of payment.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The remedy of a
party aggrieved by a decision, final order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) is to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which is a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case; Exceptions. Indeed, the remedy of a party
aggrieved by a decision, final order, or resolution of the CA is to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which is a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. And as a rule, if the remedy of an appeal is available, an action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is an original or independent action
based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, will not
prosper because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; 2) when
the broader interest of justice so requires; 3)when the writs issued are null and void; 4) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5)when, for
persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; 6) when the
judgment or order is attended by grave abuse of discretion; or 7) in other meritorious cases.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 20044 and July 26,
20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the
petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1689.7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was
the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him
to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer
of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development
Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy his higher
investment return.8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned
the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his investment to
almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through
several checks he issued in the name of State Resources.9 In return, Gracia also issued several
checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six
Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently
dishonored when Dy deposited them.
78
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks.
Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned
from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding
the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the
construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their
promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint
Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all
incorporators and/or directors of State Resources.11
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila,
Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable
cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions.16 The
petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004
order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.17 The CA
noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination
of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA
concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him.18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dy’s
affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa.
Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafato exist, the swindling must have been
committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at
least a group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the
petitioners’ false representations and was defrauded into parting with his money, causing

him damage.19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the
public in general or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then
the offense charged should only be for simple estafa.20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to
believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in his
cited factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the
existence of probable cause against themfor the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As
early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the
assertion that Dy advanced funds for this corporation.22 They question the fact that it took Dy
almost five years to file his complaint despitehis allegation that he lost almost
₱100,000,000.00.23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and
void. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD
1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was
formed to solicit funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple
estafaand syndicated estafaare two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to
petitioners were erroneous because these warrants pertained to two different crimes. 24
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DENYthe petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the petition
for certiorarithe petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave
abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denialof their twin motions to defer
arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v.
Transmed Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45
petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind
of review that this Court should undertake given the distinctionsbetween the two remedies.
79
In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast,
a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition
for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial court’s
denial of petitioners’ motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to
ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated
to personally determine the existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the
prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s
findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by
both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
complaint orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed
to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause.28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and
their co-accused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with
the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this
stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
the accused.In doing so, he need not conduct a de novohearing; he only needs to personally
review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not
present any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004
order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the
suspension of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-
accused De Joya’s motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-
accused Spouses Hao’s own petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the
resolutionby the Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused DeJoya’s motion to

determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses Hao’s motion to lift warrant of arrest
have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of warrants of arrest by this
presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances strong enough
in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that in fact
happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his
personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was
probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the
executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level,
undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable
cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa,
whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these
provisions, the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the
corresponding penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of
deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the
reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
which induced him to part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party
suffered damage.31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State
Resources and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business
80
relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial representations, Dy initially
invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he
eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding
checks representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored upon
deposit.34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Danny’s
construction and realty business.35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners’ constant
assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s invested money and its supposed earnings. 36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The
petitioners inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to
Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s construction
and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they admitted in
their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.37This
admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding
themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for
investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is
intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not
have placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead
us to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the
crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are
present: 1) estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC
was committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more
persons; and 3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged
that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners,
but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused

who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement
for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited
by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought
investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also
deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not
complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means
of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s
denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested.41 This must be distinguished
from the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal
information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of
probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is
a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
81
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the
petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would
defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in
the court’s custodyto avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different
crimes. Simple estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the
petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if
there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or
the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21,
2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment
should be suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right.1âwphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency
of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period,
the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the
petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the
petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the
petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of
the petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous
invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners'
commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may
properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may
be weighed.
 82

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny
Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.

SO ORDERED

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure;Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause; A

warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed. A
warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. This must be distinguished from
the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal
information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; UnderSection 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution
of the prosecutor pending at either the Department of Justice (DOJ), or the Office of the
President (OP). However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Under Section 11(c), Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is apetition for review
of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President.
However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office. As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for
review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet,
they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely. We emphasize that
the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In
SpousesTrinidad v. Ang, 641 SCRA 214 (2011), we explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period,
the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces,
Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to
report the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ
Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime
and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the
Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less
than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police
Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.10
83
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able
to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of
some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said
complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that
they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to
the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The
CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the
meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to
answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was
pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law

upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY
WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON
WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was
ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers'
invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule
112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the
police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have
undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners
were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
84
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for
its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay
the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the
proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules
have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their
origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in
their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed
under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15,
1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the
Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or
free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass
upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land,
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or
Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only
those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which
must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless
arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that,
according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings
 85

likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in
the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or
the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at
least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions
under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the
officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to
arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest
were based on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found
support under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to
exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the
Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in
Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has
been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the
present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its
phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and
Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law
principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In
Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal
Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained,
persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the
duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
that of confinamiento.

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the
be arrested has committed it; and
presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court
confinement to another.
competent to try him.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested,
shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which
provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in
the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is
about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest
persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable
cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground
of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied
with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not
necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually
committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition,
it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was
tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and
the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because
the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the
particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to
be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and
leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
86
B. The 1940 Rules of Court (Restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to
the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the
validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause
(or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and
whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should
be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether
the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964
Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section
6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was
re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but
should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with
the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes
of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was
qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a
person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of
the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person
87
sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted
to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the
element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been
committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable
cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed
the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must
be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was
discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth
Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The
necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one,
but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is
synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual
basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest
situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer
possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar
to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent

persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular
circumstances and the particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his
possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not
meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is
a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a
witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not
verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based
on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable
cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of
the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent
and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested.
88
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining
probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or
an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the
officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of
arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced
heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although
these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of
facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the
judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable
cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The
Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not
presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no

opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent
the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our
jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of
the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994.
It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance.
On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest
Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime.
With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered
to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of
the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-
INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest
was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the
arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there
was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been
committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the
offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's
identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim
and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest
was held invalid.
89
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime
was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting"
officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman
who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements
made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute
"personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held
valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered
in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal
knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim
herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court
upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The
policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants
pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that
the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and
of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held
valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed
them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different
directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio
dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the
authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the
victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was
spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of
Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of
the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of
the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police
headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but
suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him
up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as
Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The
police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the
petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that
the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed
it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the
element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure
that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their
probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
90
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they
were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with
the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following
must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed;
and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable
cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were
arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances
that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably
discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the
facts in its decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however,
that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of
the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the
alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the
Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed
at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took
place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding
that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at
the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso
indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph
Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was
issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical
check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident,
showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area,
right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral
aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L
ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the
attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma,
periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime
less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community
where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty.
Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners
were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of
the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude
that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers'
observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify
as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as
the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but
voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case
even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had
another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts
to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b),
91
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to
the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not
have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-
cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in
this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place,
its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot
investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators
were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative
command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners'
second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other
to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have
the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did
not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to
follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the
application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have
acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
 92

perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them
before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94 Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. Thepurpose of a
preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held
petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been
for trial. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915), we defined probable cause as
issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3
the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
of the Revised Rules of Court.96
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by
the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of
clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is
legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case.
Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of
the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion,
the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary
system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial
of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated
January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the
criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; Probable Cause; Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word probable cause as the basis of the arresting officer’s determination
on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word
probable cause as the basis of the arresting officer’s determination on whether the person to
be arrested has committed the crime. Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015
TERESITA A. CIRON, Petitioner, v. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, FLORIZA A. BRIONES AND TERESITA P. BUTARDO- TACATA, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS GRAFT INVESTIGATION & PROSECUTION OFFICER II OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NONNA O. BELTRAN, 2nd ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR,
RAUL E. CONTRERAS, CITY PROSECUTOR, BOTH OF NATIONAL PROSECUTION OFFICE, IRIGA
CITY, AND SANTIAGO D. ORTEGA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the Joint Resolution2 dated February 16,
2009 and the Joint Order3 dated June 1, 2010 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
in OMB-L-C-08-0527-G, OMB-L-C-08-0662-H, and OMB-L-C-08-0663-H, which dismissed
petitioner Teresita A. Ciron's (Ciron) complaint charging respondents Nonna O. Beltran
(Beltran), Raul E. Contreras (Contreras) and Santiago D. Ortega, Jr. (Ortega, Jr.) of violating
Section 3 (e)4 of Republic Act No. (RA) 30195 for lack of probable
cause.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
Pursuant to the criminal complaints filed by Ortega, Jr., the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iriga City (OCP-Iriga) found probable cause to indict Ciron, then Credit and Collection Officer
of the University of Saint Anthony (USANT), of two (2) counts of estafa in connection with the
latter's failure to remit the following amounts: (a) P239,542.22 representing deductions
made from the salaries of the employees of USANT in payment of various accounts (I.S. Case
No. 2004-093);6 and (b) P2,656,117.37 representing tuition and other fees collected from the
USANT students in the school year 2001-2002 (I.S. Case No. 2004-094).7 Consequently,
Informations therefor were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC),
respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. IR-6760 and IR-6759.8
Subsequently, Ciron filed the following motions: (a) motion for a bill of particulars alleging
that both Informations were deficient because they simply state that the estafa was
committed "during the period from June, 2001 to May 31, 2002" without specifying when
she received the money;9 and (b) supplement motion for re-investigation.10 On January 17,
200511 and January 27, 2005,12 the RTC issued Orders directing the prosecution to amend
said Informations and state therein the particulars sought for by Ciron, as well as to conduct
re-investigation of the charges against her.13 This notwithstanding, the OCP-Iriga issued two
(2) Resolutions14 both dated June 30, 2006 holding that there is no cogent reason to alter,
modify, or reconsider its earlier resolutions finding probable cause against Ciron
for estafa and, accordingly, ordered the elevation of the case back to the RTC.15
93
Due to the OCP-Iriga's insistence of the sufficiency of its Informations, the RTC issued an
Order16 dated August 9, 2006 (August 9, 2006 Order) dismissing both Criminal Case Nos. IR-
6760 and IR-6759 without prejudice to their re-filing.17 Such Order attained finality on
September 2, 2006.18
In view of the dismissals without prejudice of the aforesaid criminal cases, the OCP-Iriga
reviewed the evidence on hand pertaining to I.S. Case Nos. 2004-093 and 2004-094 resulting
in its issuance of two (2) Supplemental Resolutions dated March 28, 200819 and June 10,
2008,20 which were penned by Beltran in her capacity as 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor and
approved by Contreras as City Prosecutor.21 In these Supplemental Resolutions, the OCP-Iriga
recommended the filing of a total of 21 Informations for estafaagainst Ciron, broken down as
follows: (a) as regards I.S. Case No. 2004-093, Ciron accumulated the amount of P239,542.22
in twelve (12) separate instances and, thus, the filing of the same number of Informations is
in order;22 and (b) as regards I.S. Case No. 2004-094, Ciron was able to obtain the aggregate
sum of P2,656,117.37 on nine (9) occasions, necessitating the filing of the same number of
Informations before the RTC.23
Aggrieved by the actions of the OCP-Iriga, Ciron filed a Complaint-Affidavit24 dated July 14,
2008 against Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega, Jr. before the Ombudsman, accusing them of
violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In her complaint, Ciron contended that since the August 9,
2006 Order had already attained finality, the OCP-Iriga could no longer revive nor reinstate
the estafa charges against her without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before it.25 Thus,
Ciron concludes that Beltran and Contreras' acts of issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and
filing the Informations for estafa before the RTC were made with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross negligence and gave unwarranted preference to Ortega, Jr., to her
prejudice since she had to post bail to secure her temporary liberty.26
In her counter-affidavit,27 Beltran denied the charges against her and maintained that she
issued the Supplemental Resolutions after reviewing all the evidence.28 She argued that the
August 9, 2006 Order was without prejudice and, as such, the OCP-Iriga still had the authority
to issue new resolutions and to file new Informations even without the filing of a new
complaint.29 Also, she pointed out that Ciron failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to her by filing a motion for reconsideration of the OCP-Iriga Supplemental
Resolutions and/or elevating the case to the Department of Justice (DOJ) via petition for
review.30
For his part,31 Ortega, Jr. denied conspiring with Beltran and Contreras. He emphasized that
Ciron's predicament was her own doing when her motion for bill of particulars resulted in the
filing of multiple cases against her.32 Contreras, on the other hand, did not submit his
counter-affidavit.33
The Ombudsman Ruling
In a Joint Resolution34 dated February 16, 2009, the Ombudsman found no probable cause to
indict Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega, Jr. of the violations charged, and accordingly, dismissed

the complaint against them. It did not find any showing of manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Beltran and Contreras when they issued
the Supplemental Resolutions, as they were made after a circumspect review of the records,
as well as the voluminous evidence submitted by Ortega during the preliminary investigation.
The Ombudsman likewise agreed with respondents that Ciron should have sought
reconsideration of the Supplemental Resolutions or a review thereof before the DOJ instead
of filing her complaint before it.35
Dissatisfied, Ciron moved for reconsideration,36 which was, however, denied in a Joint
Order37 dated June 1, 2010, hence, this petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents of violating Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether an Information should be filed. In this relation, it is settled that the
Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when
there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.38 The Court's pronouncement
in Tetangco v. Ombudsman39 is instructive regarding this matter, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the
determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.Otherwise, the functions of the
Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.40(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
94
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaints against respondent for lack of probable
cause.
As already stated, respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for issuing
the Supplemental Resolutions without Ortega filing a new complaint before the OCP-Iriga.
The essential elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting
in conspiracy with such public officers41); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.42
As will be explained hereunder, the Ombudsman correctly found that Beltran and Contreras'
acts of issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and filing of new Informations before the RTC,
even without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before the OCP-Iriga, is in accordance with
prevailing rules and jurisprudence and, thus, were not tainted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
Ciron posits that the August 9, 2006 Order dismissing the cases against her without prejudice
had already attained finality and, as such, Beltran and Contreras should have required Ortega
to file a new complaint before the OCP-Iriga for preliminary investigation before reviving the
charges against her. In support of her argument, Ciron cites Bañares II v. Balising43 (Bañares
II) where it was held that "[a]fter the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has
become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a
party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint."44
Her reliance on Bañares II is misplaced.
In Bañares II, the private prosecutor attempted to reinstate the criminal cases which had
been dismissed without prejudice by mere motion more than two (2) months after it had
notice of the order of dismissal, without a motion for reconsideration or an appeal having
been filed. The Court explained that an order dismissing a case without prejudice can attain
finality if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed and that, in such
case, the proper remedy to revive the case is not to file a motion as the court already lost its
power to amend or modify its order, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond
the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final
judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for
the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore
 95

becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint
case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.45(Emphasis and underscoring against respondents since the issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and the filing of the
supplied) new Informations against Ciron even without a new complaint having been filed for
preliminary investigation were done in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence.
In Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco46 (Ortigas), a civil case which was cited
in Bañares II, the Court explained the nature of dismissals without On a final note, the Court emphasizes that in our criminal justice system, the public
prejudice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary prosecutor, which is the Office of the Ombudsman in this case, exercises wide latitude of
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court.51 Courts cannot
the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations and
assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or in the determination of probable cause where the Ombudsman's discretion prevails over
"revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another judicial discretion except when there is grave abuse of discretion, 52 which does not obtain in
complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees this case.cralawred
prescribed by law. x x x.47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court is not oblivious to the fact that Bañares II, where criminal cases were involved, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Joint Resolution dated February 16, 2009 and
uses the phrase "file a new complaint." It must be clarified, however, that Bañares the Joint Order dated June 1, 2010 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-08-0527-G,
II and Ortigas merely state the rule that when an order dismissing a case without prejudice OMB-L-C-08-0662-H, and OMB-L-C-08-0663-H are hereby AFFIRMED.
has attained finality, the case may no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer
within the court's power to modify or amend; instead, the action must be instituted SO ORDERED.c
anew. Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary investigation in
order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, it must be emphasized that "complaint" in civil
cases is different from a "complaint" in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; An order dismissing a case without
initiatory pleading filed in court,48 whereas in criminal cases, what is filed in court is an| prejudice can attain finality if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely
Information and not a complaint, which is filed before the public prosecutor for purposes of filed and that, in such case, the proper remedy to revive the case is not to file a motion as the
conducting a preliminary investigation. Thus, "complaint" for purposes of reviving a case
court already lost its power to amend or modify its order. InBañares II v. Balising, 328 SCRA
must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.
36 (2000), the private prosecutor attempted to reinstate the criminal cases which had been
Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which hafve been dismissed dismissed without prejudice by mere motion more than two (2) months after it had notice of
without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final, the order of dismissal, without a motion for reconsideration or an appeal having been filed.
or thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense.49 The Court, therefore, disagrees The Court explained that an order dismissing a case without prejudice can attain finality if no
with Ciron's view that a new complaint for preliminary investigation had to be filed before motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed and that, in such case, the
the charges against her could be revived. proper remedy to revive the case is not to file a motion as the court already lost its power to
amend or modify its order.
Anent the argument that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled
that the same is only required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence only in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of
the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or
may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside
from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the
same offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal.50 Since
none of the foregoing instances obtain in this case, the Court holds that the OCP-Iriga,
through Beltran and Contreras, need not conduct another preliminary investigation before it
can issue the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent Informations
in court.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled
People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the
informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in
the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation
to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
96
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five
hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four
billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having
then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking
undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in
consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of
corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then
the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further
the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close
personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT")
of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns
and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for
and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure
and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering
and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently,
request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks,
commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as
accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction contract, for the PROJECT.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed
form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first
assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT
SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT
APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS.
1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED
JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4
OF R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED
PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE
APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
97
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT
OF INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1. Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730
entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v.
HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG)
against Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini
had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth,
extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and
the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship
xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in
exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful
concert, active collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and influence with the
latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits
through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as
unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse

Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse
Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo
Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for
appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus
the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to
your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case which we believe
is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements
are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan;
(ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the
respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are
constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of
the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint
against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts
subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s
properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or
were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court
finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x
x18
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that
it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said
preliminary investigation with an even hand.
98
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG
would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject
of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the
preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were
reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became
the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
2. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not
allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
(E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated
by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained
to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual
not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be
prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed
from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover
ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and
defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini
only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal
cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the
contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns
& Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the
construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in
subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With
Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case
No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini
pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
99
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the
President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of
the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full
text of which follows:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent
or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
(bold emphasis supplied)
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are
mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of
limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the
qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive
mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private
individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3. The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and
given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini
obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the
contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the
PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective
100
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption
of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct
bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times
the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the
amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved
on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not
being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2
of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.
That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the
facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the

fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts
would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that
the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v.
Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases
which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too.
Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at
the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject
herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an
exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed,
and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in
the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to
the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the
2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run
from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case
to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public
officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly
well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission
of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly
publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in
relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in
the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the
course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the
legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the
PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary
investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
101
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running
of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in
set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or
information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not
yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground
that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential

elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the
offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to
trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case
No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically
put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines,
conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by
taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his
office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini,
President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective
contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public
officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct
bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini
made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
102
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in
committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would
make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be
placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or
indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted
Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that
President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material
or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal
relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or
contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1)
Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the
PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions
promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
 103

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Prescription of Offenses;

Actions; The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription.―We note, too, that the criminal
complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for theconduct the preliminary investigation. In accordance
with Article 91of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the
Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on
the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly
sustained.―It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on
the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained.
The fundamental test in determining whether amotion to quash may be sustained based on
this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde
are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the
elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution
to proceed to trial.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198389 December 11, 2013
VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated April 29, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated
August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192. The CA affirmed with
modification the Decision4 dated July 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 88, finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Roallos was charged in an Information5 for the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108825 before the RTC, viz:
The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of one [AAA] 6, a minor, 15
years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and kissing her cheek, against her will
which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA] as a
human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.8 On June 24, 2002,
the pre-trial conference was deemed terminated. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.9
104
Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of
the Aguinaldo Vets and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA’s mother, worked
as the secretary and treasurer of Roallos.
On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City; BBB, however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s
office and wait for the latter to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos
inside the AVACC office.
AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked
outside to see if anybody was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and
asked her if there was any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached.
Thereupon, Roallos held AAA’s hand and intermittently pressed it. He then asked AAA if
there is anything else aching in her body. AAA said none. Roallos then placed his left hand on
the table while his right hand was on AAA’s right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a
chair without a backrest while Roallos was standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand
towards AAA’s right breast and mashed it. AAA asked Roallos why he is touching her. Roallos
ignored her. He then mashed AAA’s left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but Roallos still
ignored her and, instead slid his hand towards AAA’s abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet
and pushed her chair towards Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after
about ten minutes, Roallos returned to the office and approached AAA. He then asked AAA if
she was hungry, the latter told him that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos then
offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but the latter refused the offer. AAA then
felt Roallos’ body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. AAA
was unable to escape as there was no space in front of her; she just turned her face to avoid
his kiss. He then held AAA’s right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left
cheek. AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself from the grasp of Roallos.
Roallos then left the office. This time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait
for her mother to return.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA
then relayed what Roallos did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident.
Roallos, however, denied having done anything to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the
office. However, BBB saw that Roallos was following them. Fearing that Roallos would do
something to harm them, BBB and AAA immediately entered the office of the Department of
National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo. They were then advised by the employees
therein to go to DND’s legal department office, where they were advised to report the
incident to the police authorities.
AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared.
They then referred the report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect
the arrest of the accused. Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to
the police station for investigation.

In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the
incident, he merely stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her
mother; that he went out of the office twice to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further
claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He
likewise averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he
made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of
[P]20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and pay the fine of [P]15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
Roallos’ Amended Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC in its Order13 dated
June 30, 2008.
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC
Decision dated July 26, 2007, albeit with the modification that the awards of moral damages
and civil indemnity were both increased to ₱50,000.00.
Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise
denied by the CA in its Resolution15 dated August 19, 2011.
In support of the instant petition, Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction
considering that the Information filed against him was defective since it charged two
crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He further argues that he was
denied due process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary investigation. Roallos also
asserts that his arrest was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of
arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge against him should have been dismissed
considering the unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.
Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB
signed the Information that was filed against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the
prosecutor had no authority to file the said Information and, accordingly, the charge against
him was defective.
105
Furthermore, Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 only applies when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they
indulge in lascivious conduct due to the coercion of an adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims
that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA
is not a child engaged in prostitution. In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
Issue
Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming
Roallos’ conviction for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of any merit.
First, Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him
with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the
Information is clear – Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation
to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that
Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.
The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed
in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
In any case, "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information."16
The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against
Roallos clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]
2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse[; and]

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17
(Emphasis supplied)
The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts
towards AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise
alleged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years
of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.
In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos
criminally liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that
AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident. Further, the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed lascivious conduct towards AAA, who is a
child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the
lower courts, which this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of
the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that
this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.18 The Court
finds no reason to overturn the factual findings as the lower courts in this case.
Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law
covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section
5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies
not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."19
Second, Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any
warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise
untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped
from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the
106
quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection
is deemed waived.21 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without
raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and
must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which,
necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted
by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led
to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his
Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never
raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman’s verdict, entered a plea of not guilty
during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the
scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was
only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever
argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has
therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. 23 (Citations omitted and
emphases ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the
supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he
actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived
any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was
violated.1âwphi1 The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether
said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.24 In order for
the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from

the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.25
As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the
prosecution did not, in any way, seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay in the
proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not
render the charge against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to
the filing of the Information against Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment
against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim, AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for
the indictment of Roallos.26 The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of
both AAA and BBB to the charge against Roallos.
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Notwithstanding that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos shall be
entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor medium
to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the
penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of
which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua.
The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum – fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months;
medium – seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and
maximum – reclusion perpetua.27
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this
case, both the RTC and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the minimum term to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term. The
Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts in the amount of ₱15,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity
awarded by the CA.1âwphi1 The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount of ₱20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC
to ₱50,000.00 and imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the amount of
₱50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence,28 the Court deems it proper to reduce the
award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil
indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.
107
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary
awards for damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid.29
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated April 29, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that
Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is ordered to pay ₱15,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00
as civil indemnity. He is likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages
at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In any case, the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without
raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. In Villarin v. People, 656 SCRA500 (2011), the
Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised.
The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his
plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary
investigation. x xx It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise
any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary
investigation. Indeed, he actively participated inthe proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is
deemed to have waivedany perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectivelysubmitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
 108

VIVENCIO ROALLO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013

Facts:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls
to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes
(Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse punished under
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." Roallos
asserted that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of arrest.
He said he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo
any preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Roallos’ claim that his arre st was illegal for lack of warrant of arrest ,
non-information of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any
preliminary investigation tenable.

Held:

Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of
arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable. An accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise
any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary
investigation. He actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is
deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations
Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City,
Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation
(Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search
warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the
Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the
local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the
international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the
other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave
radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination
country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the
called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide
international long distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone
lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or
109
frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the
originating country or the country where the call is originated."9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to
WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call
service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call
using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line.
After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification number
(PIN) provided under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the
destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign.
The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the
records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This
indicated that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with
address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was
found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines
registered to WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-
up access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s
IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended, 13 on unauthorized
installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through
their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they
illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted
contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF
of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-
backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business
revenues from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation
of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type
approval license from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly
revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign
exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the
prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to
be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and
servers that would be taken.14

On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly,
the following warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing
police officers to seize various items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of
Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B.
Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova Christine L.
Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business address at 11/F
IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting
information, applying the process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording
or storing information; and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statements, receipts, contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet
Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy
Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103,
21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data
terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting
information applying the prescribed process of the information and
supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of
transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines
and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more
signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable
of connecting telephone lines;
110
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording
or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts,
contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of
Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig
City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data
terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting
information applying the prescribed process of the information and
supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of
transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines
and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more
signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable
of connecting telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording
or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts,
contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National
Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10
monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.20 Planet
Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not
devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the
Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken
computers, were also seized. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed
their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1)
the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did
not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of
the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in
his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines)
Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and
Capwire both provided international direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed
by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the
call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet
religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the
nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were
ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had
failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required
under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA
reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid
and effective.28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised
was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it
questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for
Reconsideration.30
111
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet
Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated the two
Petitions.33
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following
procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no
personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants
were not general warrants.
OUR RULING
I.
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search
warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and
control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an
information, but by the filing of an application therefor.34

Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application for a search
warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a
trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue
which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is
reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from
those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued
by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.36(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those
warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it
cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65
petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The
Court held therein as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to
return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory? In
Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
112
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the
order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise,
a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized
under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this
criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory
character because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.39
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a
main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether
the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before
the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or
denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in
Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something
more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case
yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of
the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications
for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending
criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC,
there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants
were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial
judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search
warrants.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed"
by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing
to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search
warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching
questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll
bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court
will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for
the application for the search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause
necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the
first place. In support of their contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no
113
law punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed
that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not
overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass
charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with
NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it
deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation which it is entitled
to had the call been properly routed through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations
constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of,
because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future earnings
and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative,
contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and
opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali
that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime,
not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business
committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the
consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or the use of force upon things.48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business
as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we have already held that
the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its
telephone services and business:
x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case,
take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls
were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not
being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes
the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR
is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information
describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions
"stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the
accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the
trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state
that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT.
Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper
offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section
14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the
crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to
ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the
charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept
of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes
ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We
therein upheld the Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft
against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international
simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing and completing of international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these
calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits telephone calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the
use of these communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the
unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of
providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal property under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction"
penalized under said article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the
installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners
may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection
without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the
Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila
Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas
meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or
pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped
gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters
as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and
114
conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of
probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search warrants, the test
calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either
Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by
him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued
presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified,
they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable
cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will
not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali
that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected,
however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in
the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not
commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test
calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the
trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead,
the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search
warrants are general warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the
items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants
because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-
encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to
seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se,
and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority
to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer
equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of
particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily

allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the
description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the effort and the time element
involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed
for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of the OSG’s position that the
scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be
described with calibrated precision. According to the OSG, assuming that the seized items
could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used
in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the
discretion over which items to take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional
provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the
following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
115
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has
been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be
searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the
illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and
certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant
shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for.
Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the
search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required "wherever and whenever it is
feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute
detail.63 The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be
seized.64
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to
pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard
put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred
percent precision. In
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the
performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of
conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior
to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
 116

telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or

routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll
bypass operations."67

In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s milady

worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because these
items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to bear a relation to the offenses
charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20
August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; The public prosecutor has direction and
control of the prosecution of (a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search
warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC.5. Who must prosecute criminal
actions. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The above provision states the general
rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of (a)ll criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or information. However, a search warrant is obtained,
not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on
a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries,
as duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal
must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in
its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner
Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not
obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to
Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him
to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down
on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
117
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home
crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his
Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza
(TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They,
likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1,
1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as
follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD
ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a
Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him
on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing
Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts
of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child
abuse,5 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal
Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:
I exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,]
and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime
charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are
mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the
affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the
information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance. 11
Ruling of the Court
118
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law
in her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to
questionsof law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by
the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of
its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section
4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the
exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the
collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set
forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar
and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further
disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean
or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a
school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that
her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy
even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. 13 She could not justifiably claim that
she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of
Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused
by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of
the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and
tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified
that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the
said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object.
Wound No. 3 is located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have
been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of
the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he
walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
119
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw
him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held
the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said
that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional
trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner,
compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust
again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither
her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on
cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner
was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for
maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents manifested
that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of
June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were
not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of
law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in
the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against
the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the
challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on
the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did
not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence
had been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court.
The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however,
because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the
lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense
and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical
and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents
necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error
that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v.
People,21 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting
the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has
been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery,"
explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct
at any time a matter of law and justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
120
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the
victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The
victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil
Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her
being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period
pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a deterrent to
other public school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code,
supra, against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute
parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould
not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate damages,
which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no
question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat
least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the
treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability,
to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four
years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day
of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610,
which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum
period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was
alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The
revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
 121

punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period,
whose three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the
minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for
the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the
maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the
maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six
years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine
months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner
shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. The information explicitly averred the offense
of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition ofchild
abuse found in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 ofthe Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no
longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form
and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to
the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so,
resulting in her waiver of the challenge.

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Internal Rules of theSupreme Court; Exceptions
Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (SC) in Which the SC May
Review Findings of Fact by the Lower Courts. It is true that the limitation of the review to
errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court may review
findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the
issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the
trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are notd isputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial
appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the
lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception is recognized when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166414 October 22, 2014
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a
plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final
judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an
interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari
because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Antecedents
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal, seeking to
reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December
21, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for
certiorari and prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorariby the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC Judge Danilo A.
Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions to quash the two informations charging
themwith less serious physical injuries by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan,
Bulacan), and denied their motion for reconsideration anent such dismissal.
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003 outside the
house of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan
gave rise to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that
mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano,3 Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the
petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated homicide (victim being
Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275; with less serious physical injuries (victim being
Josefina) in Criminal Case No. 03-276; and with less serious physical injuries (victim being
Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277, all of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003
after the parties submitted their respective affidavits, the MTC issued its joint
resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause against the petitioners for less serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and Criminal Case No. 03-277, and set their arraignment
on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003, the petitioners moved for the reconsideration of
122
the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their having
been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of
less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical
injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.6 On November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed
upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for
reconsideration.7 Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash
and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment.8
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less
serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004.9 It explained its denial of the motion
to quash in the following terms, to wit:
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal of the
records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can
be fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.
Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical Injuries are
hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.10
Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but the
MTC denied their motion on March 25, 2004.11
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004
denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned
to Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.
On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari because:
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11, 2004, the
issuesraised in the motion toquash are matters of defense that could only be threshed outin
a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged

injuries of the private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed
against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other hand, this
court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of fact insofar as the instant petition is
concerned, to rule on the issue as to whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute
the petitioners for the alleged less physical injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial on
the merits. x x x.12
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion on July 9,
2004.13
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the
dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.
However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being
an appeal; and ruling that they should have filed their notice of appealon or before August
18, 2004 due to their receiving the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3, 2004.14
On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.15
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS’ RULING
DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND
PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT PERPETRATED BY THE PETITIONERS. 16
Ruling of the Court
123
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.
Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of
the petition for certiorarion May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration
onJuly 9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final
by reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the
RTC.17 The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of
appeal,18 taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.19
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari
and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently
erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs
to address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress
is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC
considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and
unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the
supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the
medical attendance for them. Indeed, the timeand the occasion to establish the duration of
the incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,
challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its facein point of law, or for
defects apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one
offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.22
By alleging in their motion to quashthat both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one
of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that

the facts charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is
necessary to refer to the law definingthe offense charged, which,in this case, is Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently states:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries– Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or
shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1)
that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries
inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required
medical assistance for more than 10 days.
Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To answer this query,
the Court refersto the averments of the complaints themselves, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 03-276
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
motivated by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries that will require
a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the
same period of time attached Medical Certificate (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.23
Criminal Case No. 03-277
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused
MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO
inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to
15 days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical Certificate hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW.24
124
The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries were
specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant "that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate
his customary labor for the same period of time;" while that in CriminalCase No. 03-277
alleged that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right
and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO;" and (b) the
petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical injuries [that] will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication."
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25 the complaints sufficiently
charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints onlyneeded
to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal
acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary,
were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the "complaints do
not provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical
attendance rendered on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period
exceeding ten (10) days;" and the medical certificates attached merely stated that "the
probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15
days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the healing periods were merely
speculations, surmises and conjectures ."They insist that the "private complainants should
have presented medical certificates that would show the number of days rendered for
medication considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2)
months after the alleged incident."26
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.1âwphi1
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the
duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place
only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v.
Sandiganbayan,27 the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of
the parties’ respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate
allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering whether a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the
information.28 It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof.29 The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before
the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish
probable causethat the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable
doubtof the guilt of the accused be removed.30

We further agree with the RTC’s observation that "the issues raised in the motion to quash
are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits.
Indeed, proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could
only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of
competent evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition for the dismissal of
the criminal cases against them for less serious physical injuries is to prevent the trial court to
hear and receive evidence in connection with said cases and to render judgments thereon. x
x x All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial of
the merits."31
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by bringing
the special civil action for certiorariin the RTC, the petitioners deliberately disregarded the
fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions
were, firstly, the petitioners must show thatthe respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and,secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32
The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their
recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or
exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that
would have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained
unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was procedurally
and substantively correct because the duration of the physical incapacity or medical
attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at the early stage of
dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the
denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely
terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to
enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC
be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and
assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33 Certiorari was not
available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions
promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
125
emedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Complaint or Information;According to Section 6,Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, the complaintor information is sufficient if it states the names of the
accused; thedesignation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissionscomplained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended arty; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense;and the place where the offense was committed.·According
toSection 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint orinformation is sufficient if it
states the names of the accused; thedesignation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissionscomplained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offendedparty; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; andthe place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental testin determining the sufficiency of the averments in a
complaint orinformation is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, ifhypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.
FACTS:
The mauling incident involving neighbors end up with filing of criminal case in the MTC for
frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented
proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby
rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for
less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still
pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because
the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution
sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners
presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the deferment of the
arraignment. The MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less serious
physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
of the MTC in the RTC. RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari. The
petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion.
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they
advanced in the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being
the wrong remedy.
 126

ISSUE#1: Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper in assailing the decision allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were
of RTC dismissing an original action for certiorari. appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.

HELD#1: NO.
The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of appeal, taken within
15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Yet, the petitioners
chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the
CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and
impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address
jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the
denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC
to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the
complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for them.
Indeed, the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
ISSUE#2: Is it proper to invoke a motion to quash the information filed in the MTC in this
case?
HELD#2: NO.
ISSUE#3: Is the presentation of medical certificates that will show the number of days
rendered for medication essential during filing of complaint, considering the complaints were
filed two (2) months after the alleged incident?
HELD#3: NO.
[T]he presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims’ need for
medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or
during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan, the preliminary
investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties’ respective affidavits,
counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial,
and is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the information. It is not yet a trial on the
merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of
the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is
required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be
removed.

[T]he motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges
the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
apparent on its face. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for
the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one
offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged
the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver
the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187000 November 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO,
ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA and
RAMON NAVARRO,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is based
on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order the amendment to be made.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 29, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are the following:
Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Dionisio R.
Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison
(NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to
drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the
Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine
samples tested positive.
After confirmatory tests doneby the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those twenty-one (21)
urine samples, which included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming
the result of the initial screen test. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged
with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) under identical
Informations,3 which read as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, accuses AQUILINO ANDRADE
for Violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any
127
manner introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug inviolation of the aforecited
law.4
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June
29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006.5
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165,
which reads:
6. A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals that the accused
did not commit the offense charged. Under RA 9165, the offense of Violation of Section 15
thereof is committed by a person apprehended or arrested for using dangerous drug, and
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory test, to wit:
7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous
drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing and serve
as basis for filing the proper information in court. In fact, the accused were merely called to
the Maximum Security Conference Hall in the morning of June 30, 2003 and with seventeen
(17) other inmates made to undergo drug testing, pursuant to the directive of then Sr. Usec.
Santiago. It was only after they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information
for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them.
8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons subject to mandatory and
random drug tests, who if found positive after such drug test shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 15. x x x
National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections are not included in the
enumeration. Thus, even if the accused have been found positive in the mandatory or
random drug test conducted by BUCOR, they cannot be held liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the accused were
apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA
9165 which led to the June 30, 2003 screen test, or that the accused are subject to
mandatory or random drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a showing that the
same was conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the apprehension or arrest of the
offender through a confirmatory test within fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in
accordance with the provisions of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the screening test, thus
depriving them of the right to challenge the same through a confirmatory drug test within
the required fifteen (15)-day period after receipt of the positive result.6

Respondents' lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he intends to pursue the
Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents' previous counsel,7 hence, the pre-trial and trial were
reset to September 29, 2006.
The pre-trial and trial were further reset to November 29, 20068 due to a typhoon that
occurred on the earlier scheduled date.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial
and trial, issued an Order9 granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss,10 ruling as
follows:
To be liable under this Act the following essential requisites must be present:
1. The offender must have been arrested or apprehended for use of dangerous
drugs; or apprehended or arrested for violation of RA 9165 and the apprehending
or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person arrested or
apprehended on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward
manifestation is under the influence of dangerous drugs; or must have been one of
those under Sec. 36 of Art. III of RA 9165 who should be subjected to undergo drug
testing;
2. The offender must have been found positive for use of dangerous drug after a
screening and confirmatory test;
3. The offender must not have been found in his/ or her possession such quantity
of dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act;
4. That if the offender arrested or apprehended has been found to be positive for
use of dangerous drugs after a screening laboratory examination, the results of the
screening laboratory examination of test shall be challenged within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any
accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry or some such modern method.
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the inmates were not apprehended nor arrested for
violation of any provision of R.A. 9165. These inmates were in the National Bilibid Prisons
(NBP) serving sentences for different crimes which may include also drug offenses. They
were subjected to drug tests only pursuant to the request made by then Director Dionisio
Santiago. Furthermore, they were not one of those persons enumerated in Section 36 of the
said Act who may be subjected to mandatory drug testing. Hence, the first essential requisite
has not been complied with. If one essential requisiteis absent, the Court believes that these
inmates cannot be held liable for the offense charged. They may be held liable
administratively for violation of the Bureau of Corrections or NBP rules and regulations
governing demeanor of inmates inside a penitentiary but not necessarily for violation of Sec.
128
15 of R.A. 9165. The court need not discuss the other elements of the crime as the same has
become moot and academic in view of the absence of the first essential element.
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information these
cases are ordered DISMISSED with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA after its Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's Order, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the public
respondent Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Cases Nos. 06-
224, 06-229, 06-231, 06-232, 06-234, 06-235, 06-237, 06-238, 06-239 and 06-241, STAND.
SO ORDERED.12
Consequently, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution
dated February26, 2009. Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner asserts the following argument:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MAY NOT BE
HELDLIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165.13 According to
petitioner, the CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule
117 of the Rules of Court having been already arraigned before availing of the said remedy.
Respondents, however, insist that the CA is correct in upholding the RTC's decision dismissing
the Informations filed against them. They claim that since the ground they relied on is
Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, their motion to quash may be filed even after
they have entered their plea.
Basically, the issue presented before this Court is not so much as the timeliness of the filing
of the motion toquash, but whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of
respondents' motion and eventually dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause.
This Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that the facts
alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds

provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been
arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after
arraignment because their failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead
is deemed a waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under
the above-provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential. The mistake lies inthe
RTC's dismissal of the case.
The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of
probable cause and not on the ground raised by respondents, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Informationthese
cases are ordered DISMISSED with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.15
Section 2,16 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a
motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the
respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do
not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information has been
filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.18
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,19 this Court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is
129
a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.20
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. In People v. Inting:21
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial – is the function of the Prosecutor.22
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it isonly for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should beissued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.23
In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the determination of
whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without
orin excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction.24 In this particular case, by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents,
there was already an admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have
ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for the crime
committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of whether the material
averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for

trial.1âwphi1 In fact, in their motion, respondents claimed that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not constitute an offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion
to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to
evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the
Information without dismissing the case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the
ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus:
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on
an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.25
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be
denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information.26 Generally, the
fact that the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment.27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to
amend the information.28 In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases
without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. In
People v. Talao Perez,29 this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the information in
question is defective, as pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can
be cured by amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should
have ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt about the
sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a
new information befiled, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds
when the complaint might easily be amended.30
Even the CA admitted that the RTC erred in that regard, thus:
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, requires that the prosecution should first
be given the opportunity to correct the defects in the information before the courts may
grant a motion to quash grounded on Section 3(a), and it may only do so when the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the information suffers from the same defect
130
despite the amendment. Pursuant to this rule, it would thus seem that the trial court did err
in this regard.31
The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that "whatever perceived error
the trial court may have committed is inconsequential as any intended amendment to the
informations filed surely cannot cure the defects,"32and to justify such conclusion, the CA
proceeded to decide the merits of the case based merely on the allegations in the
Information. Such pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without giving
the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the
Informations. In People v. Leviste,33 we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and
represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in
a manner consistent with public interest.34 The prosecutor's role in the administration of
justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or
her to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of
the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the
judge may or is disposed to do.35 The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused
the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence tothe end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent
may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. 36 In the conduct of the
criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct
of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what
evidence to present or who to call as witness.37Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the
State the opportunity to present its evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have
effectively curtailed the State's right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29, 2008 and Resolution dated February 26, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100016 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; Under ordinary circumstances, a
motion to dismiss may no longer be allowed after the arraignment because their failure to
raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their
objections. It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have
been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after
arraignment because their failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead
is deemed a waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides: Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
 131

provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule. However, since the After confirmatory tests done by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those twenty-one (21)
ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under the above urine samples, which included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming
provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential. the result of the initial screen test. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged
with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) under identical
Same; Same; Motion to Quash; In a motion to quash, the Supreme Court (SC) shall not Informations,
consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged.·Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June
29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006.5
states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those
stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case,
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
what the respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the
the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165
Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC
judge.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial
and trial, issued an Order9 granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.
Same; Same; Amendment of Information; When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of
the complaint or information, the Court should direct its amendment or that a new
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the Information
information be filed, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when
these cases are ordered DISMISSED with costs de officio.
the complaint might easily be amended. If the defect in the information is curable by
amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file The CA affirmed the trial court's Order
an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not
constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to the PETITIONER: the CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule
prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the court should 117 of the Rules of Court having been already arraigned before availing of the said remedy.
givethe prosecution an opportunity to amend the information. In the present case, the RTC
judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend RESPONDENTS: the CA is correct in upholding the RTC's decision dismissing the Informations
the defect in the Informations. In People v. Talao Perez, 98 Phil. 768 (1956), this Court ruled filed against them. They claim that since the ground they relied on is Section 3(a), Rule 117 of
that, even granting that the information in question is defective, as pointed out by he the Rules of Court, their motion to quash may be filed even after they have entered their
accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by amendment, the lower court plea.
should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the Fiscal to amend the
information. When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, ISSUE: whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and
eventually dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause.
the court should direct its amendment or that a new information be filed, and save the
necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be
HELD: YES
amended.

FACTS: The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of
probable cause and not on the ground raised by respondents.

Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Dionisio R.

Section 2,16 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a
Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison
motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the
(NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the
drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the
respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do
Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine
not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
samples tested positive.

The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information
has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.18
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,19 this Court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.20
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it isonly for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should beissued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no
capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.23
In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the determination of
whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without
orin excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
132
jurisdiction.24 In this particular case, by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents,
there was already an admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have
ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for the crime
committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of whether the material
averments in the complaint or information are sufficient to hold respondents for
trial.1âwphi1 In fact, in their motion, respondents claimed that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not constitute an offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion
to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to
evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the
Information without dismissing the case.
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be
denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information.26 Generally, the
fact that the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment.27 Corollary to this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to
amend the information.28 In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases
without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. In
People v. Talao Perez,29 this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the information in
question is defective, as pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can
be cured by amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should
have ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt about the
sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a
new information befiled, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds
when the complaint might easily be amended.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29, 2008 and Resolution dated February 26, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100016 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194236 January 30, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
PATRICIO RAYON, SR., Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 27, 2010 decision1 of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00582-MIN at1irming in toto the November 19, 2007 judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. The RTC judgment found appellant Patricio
Rayon, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 1 O(a), Article VI of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 2006-174, and of qualified rape in Criminal Case No.
2006-175.
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 1 O(a), Article VI of R.A. No.
7610 and with qualified rape in two separate informations tiled before the RTC. The
appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment to both charges. Joint trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
XYZ declared on the witness stand that she and the appellant got married on March 3, 1990;
they begot five (5) children, namely: AAA, XXX, YYY, Jr., BBB, and ZZZ. She stated that AAA is
"mentally deficient," but could play musical instruments.3
XYZ recalled that when she was still pregnant with their fifth child, the appellant would bring
AAA in a videoke bar without her knowledge, and they would usually return home at 1:00
a.m. Upon their return, AAA would complain of experiencing loose bowel movement, and of
pain in her stomach. One time, when XYZ arrived at their house after buying rice, she saw the
appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs; the appellant then put his hand on AAA’s
breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina.4 When the
appellant noticed XYZ’s presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare
food. XYZ felt "bad and afraid," but did not confront the appellant. 5 She instead went to the
kitchen to do her chores.6
On December 16, 2005, BBB revealed to XYZ that the appellant had raped her. XYZ requested
assistance from a municipal social worker who, in turn, told her to file a case before the
police.7
133
BBB recalled that while she was in her room in December 2005, the appellant grabbed her
and removed her short pants and panty; the appellant then removed his short pants,
mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain, but could not shout
because the appellant covered her mouth with his hands.8 Afterwards, the appellant inserted
his penis into her anus.9 BBB disclosed the incident to XYZ who, in turn, accompanied her to
the police.10
Dr. Agnes Cagadas, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, stated that
she examined AAA on December 23, 2005, and found a healed hymenal laceration at 7
o’clock position.11 She also examined BBB on the same day, and found her hymen to be
intact. She, however, explained that the hymen of 96% of sexually abused children remains
intact.12 Dr. Cagadas also testified that there could have been a penetration of BBB’s inter-
labia.13
XXX, the sister of AAA and BBB, narrated that every time the appellant came home from
work, he would instruct AAA to sit on his lap; the appellant would also embrace AAA and
touch her vagina. XXX added that the appellant allowed AAA to watch him take a bath.14 BBB
also disclosed to her that the appellant "sodomized" her, and inserted his penis into her
vagina.15
Dr. Marlou Bagacay Sustiguer, a psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
testified that she conducted a psychological test on AAA, and found her to be autistic. She
declared that AAA lacked motor coordination, and had a very low intelligence quotient.16 Dr.
Sustiguer also found AAA to be incompetent to testify in court.17
Evidence for the Defense
The appellant confirmed that XYZ is his wife, and that the alleged victims are their daughters.
He claimed that XYZ falsely accused him of raping AAA because he disallowed her to have an
American "pen pal." He further maintained that AAA was usually in their neighbor’s house
when he comes home from work. The appellant also denied BBB’s allegation that he
sodomized her.18
On cross-examination, the appellant confirmed that AAA is a "special child." He also
maintained that he is close to his two daughters.19
The RTC and the CA Rulings
In its judgment of November 19, 2007, the RTC found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 in
CriminalCase No. 2006-174, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years,
four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 2006-175, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape under Article 266-A, in relation with Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. It also ordered him to pay BBB the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment in toto. The CA held that BBB narrated in detail
how the appellant had raped her; and that it was inconceivable for an eight-year old child to
fabricate a story against her own father if there was no truth to her allegation. It also gave
weight to Dr. Cagadas’ finding that the appellant’s penis penetrated the labia minora of BBB’s
vagina.
The CA likewise ruled that the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to prove that the
appellant sexually abused AAA. It held that XYZ, BBB and XXX all testified that they witnessed
the appellant’s lustful caressing of AAA’s breasts and vagina.
Finally, the CA disregarded the appellant’s defense of denial as this defense cannot be
accorded evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of credible witnesses testifying on
affirmative matters.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to affirm with modification the July 27, 2010 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00582-MIN, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 2006-174, we find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is ordered to pay AAA P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral
damages, and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay a P15,000.00 fine.
In Criminal Case No. 2006-175, we increase the amounts of the awarded civil indemnity and
moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, respectively. We also order the appellant to
further pay BBB P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
a. In Criminal Case No. 2006-174
XYZ positively identified the appellant as the person who embraced AAA and spread her legs;
who held AAA’s breast; and who placed his hand inside the latter’s underwear sometime in
2002. XYZ’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her daughter XXX who declared
that the appellant would embrace AAA and touch her vagina whenever the appellant came
134
home from work. Notably, Dr. Cagadas found a healed hymenal laceration at 7 o’clock
position on AAA’s private part.
The RTC found XYZ’s and XXX’s testimonies credible and convincing. The CA affirmed this
finding. It is settled that "the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior
on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its
assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case."20
b. In Criminal Case No. 2006-175
BBB positively identified the appellant as the person who grabbed her and removed her short
pants and panty while she was in her room; and who thereafter inserted his penis into her
vagina.
We stress the lower court observation that BBB, who was just nine years old when she
testified, spoke in a clear, spontaneous and straightforward manner. She never wavered in
identifying the appellant despite the defense’s grueling cross-examination. As the lower
courts did, we find her testimony credible. A young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a
crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her
private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her
motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. 21 We see no plausible reason why
AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this
crime did not happen.
Moreover, Dr. Cagadas concluded that there had been penetration of BBB’s female organ,
possibly in the inter-labia. While Dr. Cagadas found BBB’s hymen to be intact, she
nevertheless wrote in her Medico-Legal Report on BBB that "a finding of normal hymen does
not prove nor
disprove sexual abuse.22" She also testified that the hymen of 96% of sexually abused
children remains intact. As we explained in People v. Capt. Llanto:23
The strength and dilability of the hymen varies from one woman to another such that it may
be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse, or on the other hand, may
be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue. In some
cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman has given birth. [citations omitted]
At any rate, Dr. Cagadas’ finding is merely corroborative; it is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.

The Appellant’s Defenses
We are unconvinced by the appellant’s defense that XYZ falsely accused her of having raped
AAA because he disallowed her to have an American "pen pal." It is unnatural for a parent to
use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if doing so would subject her to
embarrassment and even stigma. We find it hard to comprehend that a mother would
sacrifice her own daughter and present her to be the subject of a public trial if she, in fact,
had not been motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished.
As regards the allegation of BBB that she had been raped by the appellant, the latter merely
denied this charge. However, the appellant did not present any evidence to show that BBB
had any ill motive to testify against him. In fact, he declared that BBB has been close to him.
This Court has consistently held that where no evidence exists to show any convincing reason
or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify against an accused, the testimony deserves
faith and credit. Moreover, the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is
enough to sustain a conviction.
The Crimes Committed
a. In Criminal Case No. 2006-174
The courts a quo found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 which provides:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. [emphasis
and italics ours]
This "provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation
and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development." 24 We stress
that Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse other than child prostitution and other sexual
abuse under Section 5, attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, child trafficking
under Section 7, attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 8, and obscene
publications and indecent shows under Section 9.
135
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 charged the appellant with violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The body of the Information, however, alleged that
the appellant sexually molested AAA; kissed her; mashed her breasts; fondled her; and
forcibly opened her legs. These acts, to our mind, described acts punishable under Section
5(b) of the same law, which reads:
Section. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period. [italics ours]
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
(1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.25
Corrolarily, Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases reads:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.

In People v. Montinola,26 "the Court held that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual
abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an
adult."
In the present case, all the elements of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 have
been established. First, the appellant embraced AAA, parted her legs, touched her breasts,
inserted his hand inside the victim’s underwear, and touched her vagina. Second, the
appellant used his moral ascendancy over her daughter in order to perpetrate his lascivious
conduct. Finally, AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, based on her
birth certificate and on her mother’s testimony.
There is no dearth of jurisprudence holding that the appellant’s acts in the present case
amounted to a violation of 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. In People v. Sumingwa,27 the
Court found the appellant therein guilty of four (4) counts of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 for rubbing his penis against the victim’s vagina, fondling her
breasts, and forcing her to hold his penis. In Navarrete v. People,28 the Court affirmed the
therein accused’s conviction for acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 for poking the victim’s vagina with a cotton bud. In People v. Candaza,29 the Court also
affirmed the therein accused’s conviction for acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 for kissing the lips, mashing the breasts, and licking the vagina of the victim.
Similarly, in Amployo v. People,30 the Court found the appellant guilty of violation of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 for touching the victim’s breasts.
We stress that "the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, xxx but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information."31 The averments in the information against the appellant in Criminal Case No.
2006-174 clearly make out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.32
b. In Criminal Case No. 2006-175
For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2)
he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was
demented.
Carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years of age is statutory rape. In the
present case, the prosecution established that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his
eight-year old daughter, BBB, in December 2005. Article 266-B, paragraph 6(1), however,
qualifies the rape by a father of his daughter who is below 18 years of age. The presence of
the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship raises the crime of statutory rape to
qualified rape. Simply put, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, qualified rape is
statutory rape in its qualified form.33 The CA was therefore correct in affirming the
appellant’s conviction for qualified rape.
136
The Proper Penalties and Civil Indemnities
a. In Criminal Case No. 2006-174
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.34 We consider the alternative circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code against the appellant, since it has
been established that the appellant is AAA’s father. Since there is an aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum
period, that is, reclusion perpetua. Besides, Section 31 of R.A. No. 7610 expressly provides
that the penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is, among others, the parent of the victim.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we order the appellant to pay AAA the following
amounts: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and he is also ordered to pay a P15,000.00 fine.35
b. In Criminal Case No. 2006-175
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the
victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. Nonetheless, we cannot impose the death penalty in view of R.A.
No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines."
Pursuant to this law, we affirm the trial and appellate courts’ imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.1âwphi1
We increase the amounts of the awarded civil indemnity and moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, respectively, as these amounts are proper when the
circumstances surrounding the crime warrant the imposition of death were it not for the
abolition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 9346. We likewise order the appellant to pay BBB
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.36
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the July 27, 2010 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00582-MIN with the following MODIFICATIONS:
I. In Criminal Case No. 2006-174:
(a) the appellant is found guilty of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610;
(b) he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and
 137

(c) he is ordered to pay AAA the following amounts: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00
as fine.

II. In Criminal Case No. 2006-175:

(a) the amount of civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;

(b) the amount of moral damages is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and

(c) the appellant is further ordered to pay BBB P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The characterof the crime is not determined
by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances
in the complaint or information.―We stress that„[t]he character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, xxx but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint orinformation. The averments in the information against the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 clearly make out a charge for violation of
Section5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No.
7610 (Criminal Case No. 2006-174) and with qualified rape in two separate informations filed
before the RTC. The body of the Information, however, alleged that the appellant sexually
molested AAA; kissed her; mashed her breasts; fondled her; and forcibly opened her legs.

ISSUE: As between the caption and the body of the information, which take precedence? Is
the conviction proper?

RULING: The conviction is proper, however, the accused is not guilty of committing a
violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, as what was contained in the caption of the
information. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
The averments in the information against the appellant in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 clearly
make out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta,
challenging the June 27, 2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision affirmed the January 12, 2004
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No.
20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The CA resolution denied
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with
Concordia O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:That
sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the
Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by
the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and
General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the fabrication and erection of the
structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit and checking
of all construction materials delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and confidence,
and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc.,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence
and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away from the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel
beams of different sizes with a total value of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and
consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA
MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of
₱2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.5
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao
remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo
Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna
138
Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus,7 as well as documentary evidence consisting of a
security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The
prosecution’s pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and
erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon
family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It
hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It
assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the
receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction materials.8
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck
driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15
pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along
Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed
Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5
meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini
Street, Baguio City.9
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s warehouse
on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook. Engr.
Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that
the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to
conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from
Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There,
Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter
to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the
steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer
be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to ₱2,269,731.69.10
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that
AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr.
Marigondon’s motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials. 11
The RTC’s Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision,12 the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It gave
credence to the prosecution witnesses’ straightforward and consistent testimonies and
rejected the petitioner’s bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to
indemnify Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment,
and to pay Engr. Marigondon ₱100,000.00 as moral damages.

The CA’s Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’
statements, and reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee.13
In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed
the RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies deserve full credence in the absence of any improper motive to testify
falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his status as Anmar’s
employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner’s
defense of denial for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to
Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied15 the motion for reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed the
present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed
"sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the
information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti
was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
counters that the issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of
the calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact, not
of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent contends that
the evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner’s liability for qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming
the RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the commission of the crime
139
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if
it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section
11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the
information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the
words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce
the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of
the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the
charge to enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a
material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.17 Clearly, the
month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and
309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done
without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or

intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide
flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction
materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the
owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or
corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged
stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the
stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this
Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice
to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence."19 "In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the
property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking."20
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus
delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano
and Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos
Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the
petitioner’s conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved
the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the
project site.
Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and
to indemnify Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full
payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the penalty
imposed on the petitioner.
140
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their
corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty
must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a
felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties.21 Thus, the courts
must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not
"life imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days of imprisonment." In
qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC
which provides that "the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Article 309."221âwphi1
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is
₱2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds
₱22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to be
imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to 10 years
of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct ₱22,000.00 from
₱2,269,731.69, which gives us ₱2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided by
₱10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than ₱10,000.00. We now have 224 years that
should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft
should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the
penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two
degrees higher, the correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005 decision and the November 24,
2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; When the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information.―A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
 141

constituting theoffense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an
offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information. (italics supplied;emphasis ours) As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the
date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure adds: Section 11. Date of commission of theoffense.―It is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis
ours]Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.

FACTS:

Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner with the crime of qualified theft. The
petitioner, Anthony V. Zapanta, then Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building
Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR. A Mojica
Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building construction.
AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel
framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. The petitioner instructed the truck
driver, and about 10 Anmar welders to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide
flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway. On
another occasion, he again instructed the driver and welders to unload about 5 to 16 pieces
of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams on Marcos Highway. Later, Engr.
Aquino, project manager of AMCGS informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange
steel beams has been returned to Anmar’s warehouse as reflected in the logbook. The
petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty.” In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge
against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him. The prosecution offered in
evidence oral testimonies as well as documentary evidence as established facts.

RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. CA set aside the petitioner’s arguments and
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Later, CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed,
the petitioner filed the present petition.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189343 July 10, 2013
BENILDA N. BACASMAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are three consolidated cases: (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated 16
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189343), (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari2 dated 15
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189369), and (3) Petition for Review on Certiorari3 dated 12
October 2009 (G.R. No. 189553). All assail the Decision4 in Crim. Case No. 26914 dated 7 May
2009 of the Sandiganbayan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Alan C. Gaviola ("Gaviola"), Eustaquio B. Cesa ("Cesa"), Benilda N.
Bacasmas ("Bacasmas") and Edna J. Jaca ("Jaca") are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and are sentenced to suffer in prison
the penalty of 12 years and 1 month to 15 years. They also have to suffer perpetual
disqualification from holding any public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the City
Government of Cebu the amount of Nine Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand, Seven
Hundred Fifty-two and 60/100 Pesos (Php 9,810,752.60).5 (Emphasis in the original)
The Petitions also question the Resolution6 dated 27 August 2009 denying the Motions for
Reconsideration7 of the Decision dated 7 May 2009.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu.8 Benilda B. Bacasmas (Bacasmas),
the Cash Division Chief, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189343.9 Alan C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the
City Administrator, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189369.10 Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City
Treasurer, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189553.11
By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing cash
advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales), who
then submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter approves the
request, she affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City Treasurer Cesa for
142
his signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify that the expense or cash
advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct supervision.12
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for processing
and pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate available
funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures are properly certified and supported by
documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. She
then prepares an Accountant’s Advice (Advice).13
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the
check. After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then signs.
Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns the check.14
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where
Gonzales signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to
acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment.15
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and records
the cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it within five
days after payment.16
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement
(RD). An RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names of the local government
employees who were paid using the money from the cash advance, the amount for each
employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified by the City Auditor and
are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division for recording in the official cash book.17
On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001 creating a team to conduct an
examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division, City
Treasurer’s Office of Cebu City.18
This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March 1998.19 The examination revealed an
accumulated shortage of ₱9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the
cash and accounts of Gonzales.20 The team found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca
failed to follow the above-mentioned procedure, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine
million pesos on the part of the city government. Specifically, the team said in its report that
there were irregularities in the grant, utilization, and liquidation of cash advances; shortages
were concealed; and inaccurate and misleading pieces of information were included in the
financial statements.21 These irregularities were manifested in the following: additional cash
advances were granted even if previous cash advances had not yet been liquidated, cash
advance vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash
advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or
end-of-the-month pay period.22

The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and
approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks despite
the deficiencies, which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160; Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit (COA),
specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002.23 According to the COA, the
violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss of a huge amount of
public funds at the hands of Gonzales.24
Hence, an Information25 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 2001 against Bacasmas,
Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:
That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA,
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then
the City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively,
of the Cebu City Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other [sic], with
deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-
Designate of the Cebu City Government, to obtain cash advances despite the fact that she
has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M. GONZALES to accumulate
Cash Advances amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TEN day of March 1998, and for
sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100
(₱9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains unliquidated, thus accused in the
performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M. GONZALES
and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the Cebu City
Government.26
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the COA Auditors who had conducted the
examination on the cash and accounts of Gonzales: Cecilia Chan, Jovita Gabison, Sulpicio
Quijada, Jr., Villanilo Ando, Jr., and Rosemarie Picson.27 The COA Narrative Report28 on the
results of the examination of the cash and accounts of Gonzales covering the period 20
September 1995 to 05 March 1998 was also introduced as evidence.29
Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held liable, because it
was not her responsibility to examine the cash book. She pointed to Jaca and the City Auditor
as the ones responsible for determining whether the paymaster had existing unliquidated
cash advances. Bacasmas further testified that she allowed the figures to be rounded off to
the nearest million without totalling the net payroll, because it was customary to round off
the cash advance to the nearest amount.30
Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances. Hence, when
he signed the vouchers, he merely relied on Jaca’s certification that Gonzales had already
liquidated her cash advances. Besides, he said, he had already delegated the function of
determining whether the amount stated in the disbursement voucher was equal to the net
143
pay, because it was humanly impossible for him to supervise all the personnel of his
department.31
Jaca admitted that cash advances were granted even if there were no liquidations, so that
salaries could be paid on time, because cash advances usually overlapped with the previous
one. Additionally, she acknowledged that when she affixed her signatures to the vouchers
despite the non-attachment of the payrolls, she was aware that Gonzales still had
unliquidated cash advances.32
Lastly, Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware of any
anomaly. Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the signatures of Cesa and Jaca.33
The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated 7 May 2009, did not give credence to the defense of
the accused, but instead afforded significant weight to the COA Narrative Report submitted
in evidence. It found that the accused, as public officers, had acted with gross inexcusable
negligence by religiously disregarding the instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher
and by being totally remiss in their respective duties and functions under the Local
Government Code of 1991.34 Their gross inexcusable negligence amounted to bad faith,
because they still continued with the illegal practice even if they admittedly had knowledge
of the relevant law and COA rules and regulations.35 The Sandiganbayan held that the acts of
the accused had caused not only undue injury to the government because of the
₱9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to
obtain cash advances to which she was not entitled.36 Lastly, it found conspiracy to be
present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had confederated,
connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the government
through the loss of public money.37
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the
7 May 2009 Decision.38 Their motions impugned the sufficiency of the Information and the
finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and unwarranted benefit.39 To support
their innocence, they invoked the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan,40 Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan,41 Sistoza v. Desierto,42 Alejandro v. People,43 and Albert v. Gangan,44 in
which we held that the heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates.45 The Motion for Reconsideration of Jaca also averred that her criminal and
civil liabilities had been extinguished by her death on 24 May 2009.46
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution47 promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because the
three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional, and
conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or
employee.48 Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information.49 The
Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence.
Claiming that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance
of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances.50 The
anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable

because of the shortage amounting to ₱9,810,752.60.51 It further declared that the
aforementioned cases cited by the accused were inapplicable, because there was paucity of
evidence of conspiracy in these cases.52 indicate, if taken collectively, that they are vital
pieces of a common design.- albeit ostensibly separate and distinct Here, conspiracy was
duly proven in that the silence and inaction of the accused 53 Finally, the Sandiganbayan
decided that although the criminal liability of Jaca was extinguished upon her death, her civil
liability remained.54 Hence, the Motions for Reconsideration were denied. 55
Thus, Bacasmas, Gaviola, and Cesa filed their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari, in
which they rehashed the arguments they had put forward in their Motions for
Reconsideration previously filed with the Sandiganbayan.
We resolved to consolidate the three Petitions on 23 November 2009.56 The Office of the
Special Prosecutor was required to comment on the three Petitions,57 after which petitioners
were instructed to file a Reply,58 which they did.59
Petitioners, through their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Comments, bring
these two main issues before us:
I. Whether the Information was sufficient; and
II. Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019
We deny the Petitions.
I.
The Information specified when the crime was committed, and it named all of the accused
and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the offense charged.
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the
accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was
committed.
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it did
not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in violation of
their right to be informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the accused were
named, as Gonzales was not charged in the Information; and third, the Information did not
specify an offense, because negligence and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.
144
The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no
inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the
following reasons:
First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof.60 The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.61 Here, the
date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day alone,
but rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence,
stating the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but
impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a period during which the crime
was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before and until 5
March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a result of petitioners’
acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government and unwarranted benefits to the
said paymaster.
Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, to wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the
latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances.62 Cesa is wrong.
The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed
Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading
to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her
alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the Information.
Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and

3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused. 63
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners,64 in the same Information does not mean that three distinct
offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been
committed through any of the modes provided by the law.namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith"
and "inexcusable negligence" 65 In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the
presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple
negligence.
Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of one’s actions or omissions.66
II.
Petitioners’ gross negligence amounting to bad faith, the undue injury to the government,
and the unwarranted benefits given to Gonzales, were all proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioners do not controvert the first element of the offense but assail the Sandiganbayan’s
finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury and unwarranted benefit. Nevertheless,
their contention must fail.
Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith when they approved and
disbursed the cash advances in violation of law and rules and regulations.
have to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on
the proper procedure for the approval and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules and
regulations state that cash advances can only be disbursed for a legally authorized specific
purpose and cannot be given to officials whose previous cash advances have not been settled
or properly accounted for. being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City
Administrator –Petitioners 67 Cash advances should also be equal to the net amount of the
payroll for a certain pay period, and they should be supported by the payroll or list of payees
and their net payments.68
However, petitioners failed to observe the foregoing. We quote hereunder the findings of
the COA team as contained in its Narrative Report:
A. Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of cash advances:
145
1. During the period, September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998, records and
verification documents show that additional cash advances were granted (Annex
13), even if the previous cash advances were not yet liquidated.
It resulted in excessive granting of cash advances, which created the opportunity to
misappropriate public funds since excess or idle funds were placed in the hands of
the paymaster under her total control and disposal. This is in violation of Section
89, PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and paragraph 4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002.
2. The amounts of cash advances for salary payments were not equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a pay period in violation of par. 4.2.1. COA Circular No.
90-331. Section 48 (g), COA Circular No. 92-382 and par. 4.2.1, COA Circular No. 97-
002. In fact, all cash advance vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls
or list of payees to determine the amount of the cash advance to be granted, and
that the face of the disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as Annex 14)
did not indicate the specific office/ department and period covered for which the
cash advance was granted in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. No. 90-331, Section
48(e) COA Cir. 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 COA Cir No. 97-002. The amount of
the cash advance could therefore be in excess of the required amount of the
payroll to be paid since it can not be determined which payroll, pay period and
department employees are going to be paid by the amount drawn. Consequently,
the liquidations which were made later, cannot identify which particular cash
advances are liquidated, considering that there are other previous cash advances
not yet liquidated, thus resulting in the failure to control cash on hand.1âwphi1
3. Cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within 5 days after
each 15 day/end of the month pay period in violation of par. 5.1.1 COA Cir. 90-331
and 97-002 and Section 48 (k) of COA Cir No. 92-382. In fact, the balance of
unliquidated cash advance as of December 31, 1997 per audit, amounted to P
10,602,527.90 consisting of ₱6,388,147.94, ₱3,205,373.16 and P 1,009,006.80 for
General, SEF and Trust Fund (Annex 15) respectively, in violation of Par. 5.8 COA Cir
Nos. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92-382. However, the
balance shown was understated as of December 31, 1997 by ₱2,395,517.08 as
discussed in items D.2 pages 15 & 16.
Records showed that part of the total cash advances of ₱12,000,000.00 appears to have been
used to liquidate partially the previous year’s unliquidated cash advance/balance of
₱10,602,527.90 since the accountable officer liquidated her cash advance by way of cash
refunds/returns from January 8-14, 1998 in the total amount of ₱8,076,382.36 (Annex 15 E)
in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. 90-331, Section 48 of COA Cir 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA
Cir. 97-002.
The concerned City Officials (refer to Part III of this report) signed, certified and approved the
disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and signed and countersigned the corresponding

checks despite the deficiencies which are violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs.
The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds within her total control
and disposal, resulting in the loss of public funds, due to the flagrant violations by the
concerned city officials of the abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.
On the other hand, the verification and reconciliation of the paymaster’s accountability
cannot be determined immediately because the submission of financial reports and its
supporting schedules and vouchers/payrolls by the Accounting Division was very much
delayed (Annex 16), in violation of Section 122, PD 1445, despite several communications
from the Auditor to submit said reports, latest of which is attached as Annex 16.a.
D. The following practices of the Office of the City Accountant resulted in inaccurate and
misleading information in the financial statements including the balance of unliquidated cash
advances in violation of Section 111 and 112 of PD 1445:
1. Cash returns made on January 8 to 14, 1998 were recorded in the accounting
records as credits to Mrs. Gonzales accountability in December 1997 amounting to
₱8,075,382.36 as shown in the subsidiary ledger (Annex 20. 1-4) and as evidenced
by the official receipts (Annex 20a. 1-6) as follows:
2. Some liquidations/ disbursements in January 1998 were included as credits to
accountability or a reduction of the paymaster's accountability as of December
1997 amounting to ₱2,395,517.08.
3. Verification of accounting records maintained in the Accounting Division
revealed that the index cards (Annex 21) as a control device in the processing of
cash advance voucher recorded only cash advances granted to Paymaster. It failed
to show the liquidations/ disposition of public funds. Hence, unliquidated balance
of cash advances can not be determined at a glance when a cash advance voucher
is being processed by the accounting personnel.
E. Other Deficiencies:
1. There were two claimants who alleged that they did not receive the financial aid
intended for them as fire victims. However, payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim.
2. There were two (2) cash advance vouchers (Annex 22b. 1-2) which bear no
approval of proper official in BOX marked as "C" hereof, yet checks were issued in
violation of Section 4.5 of PD 1445 which provide that disbursement or disposition
of government funds of property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper
officials. x x x
146
3. Accounting records showed that JV #354 under Trust Fund in the amount of
₱147,200.00 was a liquidation on December 31, 1997. x x x one payroll supporting
the JV was signed by only one (1) person x x x. The other two payrolls supporting
the JV were not signed/ approved by the concerned officials, which means that the
payrolls were not valid disbursements.69 (Emphases supplied)
The above findings of the COA cannot be any clearer in thoroughly describing the illegal and
anomalous practices of the accused which led to the loss of ₱9,810,752.60 in people’s
money.
When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted that she did not consider
the net pay, which was lower than the amount requested, when she affixed her signature to
the vouchers, because it was supposedly common practice for the paymaster to round off
the figures.70 Furthermore, she signed the vouchers after relying on the representation of
Jaca, Cesa, and Gaviola.71
the periods covered by the vouchers were not stated; the employees who were to be paid
by the cash advance were not specified; no supporting documents were attached to the cash
advances requested; and there was no determination of whether the amounts requested
were equivalent to the net pay.During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted
that he had affixed his signature to the vouchers, because they had already been signed by
Bacasmas, Cesa, and Jaca despite the incompleteness thereof –72
Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the personnel, he instructed
Bacasmas to examine and check the documents before signing them.73 Thus, once Cesa saw
the signature of Bacasmas, he immediately assumed that the documents were in order, and
he then signed the vouchers.74
These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance with their respective duties in
the grant of cash advances. Moreover they repeatedly failed to do so. Bacasmas signed 294
requests for cash advance, 11 disbursement vouchers, and 7 checks. Cesa signed cash
advance requests and 299 disbursement vouchers. Gaviola approved 303 disbursement
vouchers and signed 355 checks.
not inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons are affected.All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, were guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. Gross and inexcusable negligence is characterized by a want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act 75 Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.76 It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.77

Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures on
the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements laid down by
law and rules and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete information
therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the absence of payroll to support the cash
requested, and the disparity between the requested cash advances and the total net pay.
What is worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for the reason that it
was "common practice" in their office not to follow the law and rules and regulations to the
letter. For them to resort to that defense is preposterous, considering that as public
employees they are required to perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.78 The law and the rules are clear and do
not provide for exceptions.
Petitioners’ acts show that they were unified in illegally approving irregular cash advance
vouchers in order to defraud the government.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners’ acts not only show gross negligence amounting
to bad faith, but, when taken together, also show that there was conspiracy in their willful
noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the government.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in the execution
of an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.79 Direct proof is not essential to
show conspiracy.80 It is enough that there be proof that two or more persons acted towards
the accomplishment of a common unlawful objective through a chain of circumstances, even
if there was no actual meeting among them.81
A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed without passing through several
offices, including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that they would have us believe that
they were not in conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and approved by
them in a course of 30 months, without their noticing irregularities therein that should have
prompted them to refuse to sign the vouchers. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the
cash advances to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the government of such a
large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the first place, had they been
circumspect in performing their functions.
Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they were also unified in
not reporting the negligence of their cohorts because of their own negligence. Cesa himself
admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash advances, yet he signed the
vouchers. He also failed to inform the other officials that they should not sign the vouchers
and tolerated their negligence when they affixed their signatures thereto. Petitioners,
through their admissions before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were irregularities in
the vouchers; still they failed to correct one another, because they themselves signed the
vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein.
Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan82 that heads of
offices cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally
147
examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their
signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not
adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and
unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in
Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each voucher
in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by rules and
regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was
proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash advance.
Petitioners wrongly approved Gonzales’ cash advance vouchers, thereby causing a loss to the
government in the amount of ₱9,810,752.60.
The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue injury to any
party, including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his or her functions. Here, the Sandiganbayan found that
petitioners both brought about undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted
benefit to Gonzales. It is not mistaken.
Undue injury means actual damage.83 It must be established by evidence84 and must have
been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.85 On the other hand, unwarranted
benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without justification or
adequate reasons.86
When a cash examination is conducted, the paymaster should present her cashbook, cash,
and cash items for examination.87 Upon assessment thereof in the instant case, it was
discovered that ₱9,810,752.60 was missing, as plainly evidenced by the COA Narrative
Report, from which we quote:
It is beside the point that no one complained about not receiving any salary from the city
government. The fact remains that more than nine million pesos was missing – public funds
lost, to the detriment of the government.
This undue injury was brought about by petitioners’ act of approving the cash advance
vouchers of Gonzales even if they lacked the requirements prescribed by law and rules and
regulations, and even if Gonzales had failed to liquidate her previous cash advances, thereby
clearly giving her an unwarranted benefit.
No less than the Constitution declares that public office is a public trust.89 Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.90Petitioners, by intentionally approving
deficient cash advance vouchers, have manifestly failed to live up to this constitutional
standard.

III.
The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one
month as minimum to 15 years as maximum is fully justified.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law such as
R.A. 3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this law, and the minimum
term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same law. The penalty for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one
month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income."
Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as
maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is within the range fixed by law.
However, we are aware that if the range of imposable penalty under the law were to be
divided into three tiers based on the length of imprisonment, the penalty imposed in this
case would be on the highest tier. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have explained the
reason behind its imposed penalty, for while Section 9 of R.A. 3019 seems to grant it
discretion over the indeterminate penalty to be prescribed for violation of Section 3(e), this
Court finds it only proper that the anti-graft court justify the latter’s imposition of the highest
possible penalty. Otherwise, the exercise of this discretion would appear to be whimsical –
something that this Court will not tolerate. After all, it is our duty to be vigilant in ensuring
the correctness and justness of the ultimate adjudication of cases before us.
Nevertheless, we find the imposition of the highest range of imposable penalty in this case to
be fully justified.1âwphi1 In Jaca v. People of the Philippines,91 promulgated on 28 January
2013, the Court convicted the very same petitioners herein of exactly the same kinds of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 as those in the present case and imposed therein the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum. The
violations in that case arose from acts of gross inexcusable negligence similar in all respects
to those committed in this case, except for the amount of cash shortages involved and the
identity of the paymaster who benefitted from the acts of petitioners. Even the period
covered by the COA audit in Jaca – 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 – is exactly the same
as that in the present case. It is therefore clear that the Court has previously determined
these identical acts to be so perverse as to justify the penalty of imprisonment of 12 years
and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum. Hence, we adopt the same penalty in this
case.
Indeed, the penalty imposed is justified, considering the extent of the negligent acts involved
in this case in terms of the number of statutory laws and regulations violated by petitioners
and the number of positive duties neglected. The Court emphasizes that petitioners violated
not just one but several provisions of various regulations and laws namely: Sections 89 and
122 of P.O. 1445, Section 339 of R.A. 7160, paragraphs 4.1.2, 4.1.7, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 5.1.1 of
148
COA Circular No. 97-002, paragraphs 4.2.1, 4.1.5, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 90-331~ and
Section 48 (g), (e), and (k) of COA Circular No. 92-382. Worse, they admitted being aware of
these regulations. These circumstances. coupled with the number of times such instances of
violations and negligence were wantonly and systematically repeated, show that their acts
bordered on malice. Hence, we are convinced that the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan is warranted.
Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the need to stop these corrupt practices that drain
local government coffers of millions of pesos in taxpayers' money, which could have been
utilized for sorely needed services. In fact, as discussed in its Narrative Report, the COA team
found instances where fire victims alleged that they did not receive the financial aid intended
for them and yet the payroll showed that there were initials/signatures indicated therein
acknowledging receipt of said claim. This diversion of people's money from their intended
use has to end.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27 August 2009
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Contents of a Sufficient Information.―An
information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused;
(b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was
committed.
Same; Same; Same; It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof.―It is not necessary to state the
precise date when the offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient
thereof. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not
having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20
September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the
crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date
and a period during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed
petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by
Gonzales as a result of petitioner’s acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government
and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199210 October 23, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICARDO M. VIDAÑA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04019, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricardo M Vidana which affirmed the
Decision2 dated June 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 33 in Criminal Case No. 2163~G The trial court convicted appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña
of one (1) count of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The accusatory portion of the lnformation3 dated February 6, 2004 for rape in relation to
Republic Act No. 7 61 0 reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 2003, at x x x Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd designs and intent to have carnal knowledge of [AAA4], his own daughter,
a minor, 15 years old, and while using his influence as a father, over said minor, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and sexual intercourse
with said minor against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
After more than a year of being at large since the issuance on September 1, 2004 of the
warrant for his arrest,5appellant was finally arrested and subsequently arraigned on January
30, 2006 wherein he pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge of rape.6
The prosecution’s version of the events that transpired in this case was narrated in the
Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief in this manner:
[Appellant] and wife [BBB] were separated in 1998. They have four (4) children namely:
[AAA], [CCC], [DDD] and [EEE]. In 1999, [appellant] began living in with a certain Irene
Valoria, his common-law wife, who became the aforementioned children’s stepmother. They
were staying in a one-bedroom house owned by a certain Edgar Magsakay at Sta. Maria,
Licab, Nueva Ecija. At night, [appellant] and his common-law wife sleep in the sala while the
children occupy the bedroom. [AAA] is the eldest of the brood and was 15 years old in the
year 2003, having been born on 13 June 1988.
149
Around midnight of 16 September 2003, [appellant] was alone at the sala and the children
were asleep inside the bedroom. [AAA] suddenly was jolted from her sleep when somebody
pulled her out of the bed and brought her to the sala . She later recognized the person as her
father, herein [appellant], who covered her mouth and told her not to make any noise. At the
sala, [appellant] forcibly removed [AAA]’s short pants, t-shirt, bra and panty. As she lay
naked, [appellant] inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA]’s ordeal lasted for about five
(5) minutes and all the while she felt an immense pain. [Appellant] tried to touch [AAA]’s
other private parts but she resisted. During the consummation of [appellant]’s lust upon his
daughter, he warned her not to tell anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings.
The next day, [AAA] went to the house of Francisco and Zenny Joaquin. Spouses Joaquin are
friends of [appellant], whose house is about 500 meters away. Zenny Joaquin noticed
something was bothering [AAA] so she confronted the latter. [AAA] broke down and revealed
to Zenny what happened to her at the hands of [appellant]. Taken aback by the trauma
suffered by the young lass, Zenny promptly accompanied [AAA] to the police to report the
incident.
The examination of the medico-legal officer on [AAA] revealed "positive healed laceration at
7 o’clock position positive hymenal tag."7 (Citations omitted.)
On the other hand, the defense presented a contrasting narrative which was condensed in
the Accused-Appellant’s Brief, to wit:
[Appellant] together with his family were living in the house of Edgar Magsakay in Sta. Maria,
Licab, Nueva Ecija. He has four children but only three, namely: [EEE], [CCC] and [DDD] were
staying with him. His daughter [AAA] was staying with his kumpare Francisco Joaquin at
Purok 2, Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija, since August 15, 2003. He did not have the
opportunity to visit her nor was there an occasion that the latter visited them. On September
16, 2003 at 4:00 to 5:00 in the morning, he was at the fields harvesting together with Irene
Valoria (his wife and stepmother of his children). They finished at around 5:00 to 6:00 in the
evening, then they proceeded home (TSN November 14, 2008, pp. 2-4).
[EEE] corroborated in material points the testimony of his father [appellant]. (TSN, February
13, 2009, pp. 2-5)8
Trial on the merits ensued and at the conclusion of which the trial court rendered judgment
against appellant by finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 in
relation to Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the assailed June
26, 2009 RTC Decision is reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, this
court sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA] ₱50,000 in moral damages. 9
 150

Insisting on his innocence, appellant appealed the guilty verdict to the Court of Appeals but
was foiled when the appellate court affirmed the lower court ruling in the now assailed
March 18, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 26 June 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 2163-G, finding the accused-
appellant RICARDO M. VIDAÑA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.10
witnesses, we are thus inclined to affirm the facts as established by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was delivered in a
straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. The pertinent portions of her
testimony are reproduced below:
[PROS.] FLORENDO

Hence, appellant takes the present appeal and puts forward a single assignment of error: Q We are referring to this particular case. During the last setting, you stated that you were
raped on September 16, 2003. Is that right Miss Witness?
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 IN RELATION TO SECTION 31 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610.11 A Yes Sir.

Appellant vehemently denies his eldest child’s (AAA’s) allegation of rape by asseverating that Q And where were you at that time on September 16, 2003 when your father raped you?
he could not have raped AAA because, on the date when the alleged rape took place, she
was living in Francisco and Zenny Joaquin’s house and not in his residence where the alleged
A In our house at x x x, Nueva Ecija, Sir.
rape was consummated. This assertion was corroborated on material points by appellant’s
son, EEE. Furthermore, appellant insists that the credibility of AAA is suspect since her
narration of the alleged rape incident does not indicate that she resisted appellant’s carnal Q And what were you doing before your father raped you on September 16, 2003?
desires.
A We were sleeping with my siblings, Sir.
We find no merit in appellant’s contention.
Q And where was your father at that time?
Not unlike most rape cases, appellant hinges his hopes for freedom on undermining the
credibility of AAA’s testimony. Since AAA is the only witness that can connect appellant to A He was also there in our house, Sir.
the crime, appellant beseeches this Court to take a closer look at AAA’s testimony and, at the
end of which, render a judgment of acquittal. Q He was sleeping with you?

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted A No Sir. They were sleeping in the sala.
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.12 Furthermore, it is likewise settled that
the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are Q You said "they". You mean your father has companions?
entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the
best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen A When my stepmother is present, she was sleeping with my father, Sir, but when she was
observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the not there, my father sleeps alone in the sala, Sir.
occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offense charged.13
Q So, about what time of the day on September 16, 2003 that you said you were raped by
A careful review of the evidence and testimony brought to light in this case does not lead to a your father?
conclusion that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were mistaken in their assessment of
the credibility of AAA’s testimony. Absent any demonstration by appellant that both tribunals A I cannot remember exactly the time, Sir. As far as I can recall, it was almost midnight, Sir.
overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or
misunderstood a circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the
Q And you said you were sleeping?
 151

A Yes Sir. Q What did he do to you while you were already in the sala?

Q How were you awakened? A He forcibly removed the shorts I was wearing then, Sir.

A He pulled me out of the place where we were sleeping, Sir. Q You were only wearing shorts at that time?

Q You were sleeping on a bed? A Yes Sir. Shorts and also a dress.

A Yes Sir. Q What dress was that?

Q You said you were pulled. Who pulled you from your bed? A T-shirt, Sir.

A My father, Sir. Q Aside from the shots and t-shirt, you were not wearing anything?

[PROS.] FLORENDO A I was wearing shorts, t-shirt, panty and bra, Sir.

At this point, Your Honor, may we just have it on record that the witness is crying again. Q Did your father succeed in removing your shorts?

PROS.] FLORENDO A Yes Sir.

Q He pulled you to what place? Q What else did he do after removing your shorts?

A He pulled me to the sala where he was sleeping, Sir. A He also removed my panty and inserted his penis into my vagina with a warning that I
should not tell it to anybody because he will kill us all, Sir.
Q I thought your father had a companion in the sala at that time?
Q What do you mean by "penis"?
A When my stepmother was not there, he was alone in the sala, Sir.
A "Titi", Sir. (Male sexual organ)
Q When your father pulled you, you did not shout, you did not scream?
Q His sexual organ was erected or not at that time?
A I was not able to shout or scream because he covered my mouth and told me not to make
noise, Sir. A Erected, Sir.

Q Was that your first time that your father raped you on September 16, 2003? Q And he inserted it to what part of your body?

A No Sir. A Inside my vagina, Sir.

Q So, he pulled you out of the bed, out of the bedroom and took you to the sala? Q And what did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A Yes Sir. A It was painful, Sir.


Q And how long was his penis inserted inside your vagina?
A About five (5) minutes, Sir.
Q Aside from that, he did nothing to you? He only inserted his penis?
A Yes Sir.
Q He did not kiss you?
A No Sir.
Q He did not touch your other private parts?
A He was trying to touch my other private parts but I resisted, Sir.
Q And after doing that, what did he do next if there was any?
A Nothing more, Sir.14
The quoted transcript would show that when AAA testified and, thus, was constrained to
recount the torment she suffered at the hands of her own father, she broke down in tears in
more than one instance. This can only serve to strengthen her testimony as we have
indicated in past jurisprudence that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of
the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that the
victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience. 15 It is also worth noting that
appellant’s counsel did not even bother to cross-examine AAA after her direct examination
by the prosecutor.
We have previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story
that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her
charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father.16 That legal dictum
finds application in the case at bar since appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient
improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping
his own flesh and blood. His allegation that AAA’s admission in open court, that she is not
close to him and that they do not agree on many things,17 cannot suffice as a compelling
enough reason for her to fabricate such a sordid and scandalous tale of incest.
With regard to appellant’s contention that AAA’s lack of resistance to the rape committed
against her, as borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth to her accusation, we rule
that such an argument deserves scant consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the
failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission
152
to the criminal acts of the accused since rape is subjective and not everyone responds in the
same way to an attack by a sexual fiend.18
Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the
moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby
forcing her to do whatever he wants.19 In other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor,
actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence
of the father would suffice.20
We likewise rule as unmeritorious appellant’s assertion that he could not have committed
the felony attributed to him because, at the date of the alleged rape, AAA was not residing at
the place where the alleged rape occurred. Jurisprudence tells us that both denial and alibi
are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime, thus, as between a
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail.21
Moreover, we have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is
credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. 22 Based on this
doctrine, the corroborating testimony of appellant’s son, EEE, who, undoubtedly, is a person
intimately related to him cannot serve to reinforce his alibi.
In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant.1âwphi1 However,
the trial court erred in impliedly characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuse under
Sections 5 and 31 of Republic Act No. 7610.
Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that "the complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it." The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime
punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the relevant portions of which
provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The same statute likewise states:
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the information with feloniously having carnal
knowledge of his own minor daughter against her will by using his influence as a father.
Considering further that the minority of AAA and her relationship to appellant were both
alleged in the information and proven in court, the proper designation of appellant’s felony
should have been qualified rape. As such, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
of parole, in lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No. 934623 must be imposed.
Furthermore, in line with jurisprudence, the award of moral damages should be increased to
₱75,000.00 in addition to the award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00, respectively.24 Likewise, interest at the rate of 6%
per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04019, affirming the conviction of appellant Ricardo M.
Vidaña in Criminal Case No. 2163-G, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole is imposed upon
appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña;
(2) The moral damages to be paid by appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is increased from
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);
(3) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);
153
(4) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00); and
(5) Appellant Ricardo M Vidaña is ordered to pay the private offended party
interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6) per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Under Rule110, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court, it is required that „[t]hecomplaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Under Rule
110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that „[t]he complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is
no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime punishable
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the relevant portions of which provide: Article
266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape iscommitted·1) By a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force,
threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
 154

SECOND DIVISION Registered with RDO No. 21

G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014 6. Mendez Weigh Less Center

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner, Registered with RDO No. 4 – Calasiao Pangasinan
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents. Based on these operations, the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns
for taxable years 2001 to 2003 and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct
DECISION amount of taxes due the government.6

BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 651 filed by Dr. Joel C.
Mendez (petitioner) assailing the June 12, 2007 and August 13, 2007 resolutions2 of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)3 The assailed resolutions granted the prosecution's Motion to
Amend Information with Leave of Court and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
ANTECEDENTS
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Department of
Justice against the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a
single proprietor doing business and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to
2003 under the following trade names and registration addresses:5
1. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 39 – South Quezon City
2. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with RDO No. 39 – South Quezon City
3. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with RDO No. 40 – Cubao
In his defense, the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor
under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he
countered that he did not file his income tax returns in these places because his business
establishments were registered only in 2003 at the earliest; thus, these business
establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his alleged failure to file his income
tax return.7
After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause
against petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and
for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year
2003, in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code.8Accordingly an Information9 was
filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No.
8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997). The Information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of
[the CTA] the above named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of
"Weigh Less Center" with principal office at No. 31 Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with
several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income Tax Return (ITR) with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges
and interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
The accused was arraigned11 and pleaded not guilty on March 5, 2007.12 On May 4, 2007, the
prosecution filed a "Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court."13 The amended
information reads:

4. Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic

That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of
[the CTA] the above named accused, doing business under the name and style of "Weigh Less
Registered with RDO No. 47 – East Makati Center"/Mendez Medical Group", with several branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City,
Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail
5. Weigh Less Center to file his income tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for income earned for

the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated
amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring and
boldfacing in the original).14
The petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the required period; thus on
June 12, 2007,the CTA First Division granted the prosecution’s motion.15 The CTA ruled that
the prosecution’s amendment is merely a formal one as it "merely states with additional
precision something already contained in the original information."16The petitioner failed to
show that the defenses applicable under the original information can no longer be used
under the amended information since both the original and the amended information
charges the petitioner with the same offense (violation of Section 255). The CTA observed:
the change in the name of his business to include the phrase "Mendez Medical Group" does
not alter the fact the [petitioner] is being charged with failure to file his Income Tax Return...
The change in the branches of his business, likewise did not relieve [the petitioner] of his
duty to file an ITR. In addition, the places where the accused conducts business does not
affect the Court’s jurisdiction... nor ... change the nature of the offense charged, as only one
[ITR] is demanded of every taxpayer. We likewise see no substantial difference on the
information with the insertion of the phrase ‘for income earned’ for it merely stated the
normal subject matter found in every income tax return.
The petitioner filed the present petition after the CTA denied his motion for
reconsideration.17 THE PETITION
The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial
amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense.18 Thus,
he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Adopting the observation of a dissenting CTA justice, he claims that to change the allegation
on the locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to
Muntinlupa and Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he
would have to assume.
The petitioner adds that the change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to
2002 would also alter his defense considering that the difference in taxable years would
mean requiring a different set of defense evidence. The same is true with the new allegation
of "Mendez Medical Group" since it deprived him of the right, during the preliminary
investigation, to present evidence against the alleged operation and or existence of this
entity.19 In sum, the amendments sought change the subject of the offense and thus
substantial.20 RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT
155
The respondents claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the
CTA resolutions. Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the remedy of appeal to
the CTA en banc is the proper remedy, to be availed of within fifteen days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. The filing of the present petition was clearly a substitute for a lost appeal.
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the CTA did not commit an error of
jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, the assailed resolutions
were in accord with jurisprudence. The amended information could not have caused surprise
to the petitioner since the amendments do not change the nature and cause of accusation
against him. The offense the petitioner probably committed and the acts or omissions
involved remain the same under the original and the amended information, i.e., his failure to
file his ITR in 2002 for income earned in 2001 from the operation of his businesses.21
Neither would the change in the date of the commission of the crime nor the inclusion of the
phrase "Mendez Medical Group" cause surprise to the petitioner since he was fully apprised
of these facts during the preliminary investigation. Likewise, the original information already
alleged that the petitioner’s failure to file an ITR refers to "taxable year 2001."
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the preparation of the defense contemplated in the
law does not strictly include the presentation of evidence during the preliminary
investigation because this stage is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence. ISSUES:
1. Is the remedy of certiorari proper?
2. Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment
are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
COURT’S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
Preliminary consideration
The petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. After failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider its
admission of the amended information, the only remedy left to the petitioner is to file a
petition for certiorari with this Court.
Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is not
available to the petitioner. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a
party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the
nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail. What Section 9 Rule 922 of the
Rules of the CTA provides is that appeal to the CTA en banc may be taken from a decision or

resolution of the CTA division in criminal cases by filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 1, Rule 43, the remedy of a petition for review is available
only against a judgments or a final order.
A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely,
or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an
aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental
matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the
present case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s only remedy after failing to
obtain a reconsideration of the ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, while we rule that the petitioner availed of the correct remedy, we resolve to
dismiss the petition for failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion, much less
gravely abused its discretion.
Amendment of information
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of
amending the information:
Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to
jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court.23 Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the
information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is
sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second
paragraph of Section 14.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the
prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may
prejudice the rights of the accused.24 One of these rights is the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is
given life during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against him. The theory in
156
law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on
the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the
prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
To illustrate these points, in Almeda v. Judge Villaluz,25 the prosecution wanted to
additionally alleged recidivism and habitual delinquency in the original information. In
allowing the amendment, the Court observed that the amendment sought relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. Since they do
not have the effect of charging an offense different from the one charged (qualified theft of a
motor vehicle) in the information, nor do they tend to correct any defect in the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the amendment sought is merely formal.
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,26 the prosecution sought during trial to amend the information
from frustrated to consummated murder since the victim died after the information for
frustrated murder was filed. The accused refused to be arraigned under the amended
information without the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. In sustaining the
admission of the amended information, the Court reasoned that the additional allegation,
that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial
court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Again, there is no change in the nature
of offense charged; nor is there a change in the prosecution’s theory that the accused
committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim; nor does the amendment affect
whatever defense the accused originally may have.
In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the
original one;27 or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as
formal amendments.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged
change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the
phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change
and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase
"for income earned." We cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any
substantial right of the petitioner as accused.
The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income
earned"
At the outset we note that the actual year of the commission of the offense has escaped
both the petitioner and prosecution. In its Motion to Amend the Information, the
prosecution mistakenly stated that the information it originally filed alleged the commission
of the offense as "on or about the 15th day of April, 2001" – even if the record is clear that
that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002. The petitioner makes a similar erroneous
allegation in its petition before the Court.

Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007 resolution, denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the CTA implicitly ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in
the information by correctly citing what the original information alleges. This,
notwithstanding, the petitioner still baselessly belaboured the point in its present petition by
citing the erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion to amend instead of the original
information itself.28 This kind of legal advocacy obviously added nothing but confusion to
what is otherwise a simple case and another docket to the High Court’s overwhelming
caseload.
That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only
consistent with the allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the
taxable year 2001. Since the information alleges that petitioner failed to file his income tax
return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be committed when
petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the due date of filing, which is on April of
the succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the addition of the phrase "for the income earned"
before the phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal amendment since
the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that is already contained
in the original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the
income earned for the preceding taxable year.
The nature of the remaining two items of amendment would be better understood, not only
in the context of the nature of the offense charged under the amended information, but
likewise in the context of the legal status of the "Mendez Medical Group."
The addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical
Group and the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation
Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), a resident citizen who is engaged in the
practice of a profession within the Philippines is obligated to file in duplicate an income tax
return on his income from all sources, regardless of the amount of his gross income.29 In
complying with this obligation, this type of taxpayer ought to keep only two basic things in
mind: first is where to file the return; and second is when to file the return. Under Section 51
B of the NIRC, the return should "be filed with an authorized agent bank, Revenue District
Officer, Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which
such person has his legal residence or principal place of business in the Philippines."
On the other hand, under Section 51 C of the NIRC, the same taxpayer is required to file his
income tax return on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of April of each year covering income
for the preceding taxable year.30 Failure to comply with this requirement would result in a
violation of Section 255 of the NIRC which reads:
Section 255. Failure to File Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax
Withhold and Remit Tax and Refund Excess Taxes Withheld on Compensation. - Any person
required under this Code or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax,
make a return, keep any record, or supply any correct and accurate information, who wilfully
157
fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such record, or supply correct and accurate
information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund excess taxes withheld on
compensation, at the time or times required by law or rules and regulations shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000) and suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but
not more than ten (10) years. [emphasis supplied]
Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the
petitioner should have filed a consolidated return in his principal place of business,
regardless of the number and location of his other branches. Consequently, we cannot but
agree with the CTA that the change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s
operation in the information does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not
change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.
Still, the petitioner cites the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division31 in claiming
that the deletion of San Fernando (Pampanga City) and Dagupan City deprives him of the
defenses he raised in his counter-affidavit.
In Matalam, the prosecution charged the accused with violation of RA No. 3019 for "[c]ausing
undue injury to several [government employees] thru evident bad faith xxx by illegally and
unjustifiably refusing to pay [their] monetary claims xxx in the nature of unpaid salaries
during the period when they have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials and
other benefits." After a reinvestigation, the prosecution sought to amend the information to
allege that the accused –
[c]ause[d] undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service [several government]
employees, xxx to their damage and prejudice amounting to ₱1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid
salaries during the period when they have been illegally terminated including salary
differentials and other benefits.32
The accused moved to dismiss the amended information for charging an entirely new cause
of action and asked for preliminary investigation on this new charge of illegal dismissal.
The Sandiganbayan observed that (i) there is a clear change in the cause of action (from
refusal to pay to illegal dismissal); and (ii) the main defense of all the accused in the original
information – the lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary
claims of the complaining witnesses – would no longer be available under the amendment.
After finding, however, that the complainants’ demand for monetary claim actually arose
from their alleged illegal dismissal, the Sandiganbayan allowed the amendment because an
"inquiry to the allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit
substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information." 33
As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment made after he had
pleaded to the original information, Montenegroruled34 that prejudice exists when a defense

under the original information would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as
amended.35 Applying this test, the Court disallowed the amendment for being substantial in
nature as the recital of facts constituting the offense charged was altered.36
The inapplicability of Matalam to the present case is obvious. Here, the prosecution’s theory
of the case, i.e., that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001
did not change. The prosecution’s cause for filing an information remained the same as the
cause in the original and in the amended information. For emphasis, the prosecution’s
evidence during the preliminary investigation of the case shows that petitioner did not file
his income tax return in his place of legal residence37 or principal place of business in Quezon
City or with the Commissioner. In short, the amendment sought did not alter the crime
charged.
At first, a change in the location of branches alleged in the information may appear to
deprive the petitioner of his defense in the original information, i.e., the petitioner’s
branches in Dagupan and San Fernando were registered only in 2003 and were therefore "in
existent" in 2001. However, this is not the kind of defense contemplated under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and broadly under the due process of law.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the opportunity given to the accused to present his
defense evidence during the preliminary investigation is not exhaustive. In the same manner
that the complainant’s evidence during preliminary investigation is only required to establish
the minimal evidentiary threshold of probable cause, the evidence that the respondent may
present during trial is not limited to what he had presented during the preliminary
investigation, so long as the evidence for both parties supports or negates the elements of
the offense charged.
To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment
of an information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the
accused previously had under the original information. This test, however, must be read
together with the characteristic thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the
nature of the crime or the essence of the offense charged. 38
In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information,
alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount
of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
We also reject for lack of merit petitioner’s claim that the inclusion of the phrase "doing
business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group" after his preliminary
investigation and arraignment deprives him of the right to question the existence of this
"entity."
158
The petitioner however has not drawn our attention to any of his related operations that
actually possesses its own juridical personality. In the original information, petitioner is
described as "sole proprietor of Weigh Less Center." A sole proprietorship is a form of
business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor
or owner thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to secure licenses and permits, register the
business name, and pay taxes to the national government without acquiring juridical or legal
personality of its own.39
In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is "doing
business under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given
the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of the phrase "doing business under the
name and style" is merely descriptive of the nature of the business organization established
by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his profession. As a phrase descriptive
of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the "entity" "Mendez
Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its business owner -
petitioner himself.
At any rate, we agree with the prosecution that petitioner has no reason to complain for the
inclusion of the phrase "Mendez Medical Group." In the Reply-Affidavit it submitted during
the preliminary investigation, the prosecution has attached copies of petitioner's paid
advertisements making express reference to "Mendez Medical Group."40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes
of the action or proceeding completely,or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in
such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal.·A judgment or order is
considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a
particular stage of the same action; insuch case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is
appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves
something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the present case, the
order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s only remedy after failing to obtain are
consideration of the ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule65.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Information; Under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless
of the nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused
enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14. There
is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to
jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of
 159

facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information,
regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the
accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section
14.
no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused
might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as amended. Applying this test, the
Court disallowed the amendment for being substantial in nature as the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged was altered.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment,
particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused; The theory in law
is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the
basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution
must establish its case on the basis of the same information. Once the accused is arraigned
and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial
amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. One
of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the
accused of the charge against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins
to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information
read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of
the same information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Amendments that do not charge another offense different from
that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are
considered merely as formal amendments. Amendments that do not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution’s theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume are considered merely as formal amendments. In the present case, the amendments
sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change in the date in the commission
ofthe crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase „doing business under the
name and style of Mendez Medical Group; (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of
petitioner’s operation;and (iv) the addition of the phrase for income earned. We cannot see
how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as
accused.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Information;

Prejudice exists when a defense underthe original information would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the Information as amended. As to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by an amendment made after he had pleaded to the original information,
Montenegro ruled that prejudice exists when a defense under the original information would

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174461 September 11, 2013
LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
We decide the appeal tiled by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28, 2006
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA decision affirmed the
July 27, 2000 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1130.
The Facts
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m.,
Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo
knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy
Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his
left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long.3 Malana, who was with
Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by
Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at
Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.4
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together
with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. 5 At
that point, the petitioner uttered,"Johan, patay na," in a loud voice.6 The petitioner and her
co-accused putdown the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s feet and
pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house. Thereafter, they
returned to the house and turned off all the lights.7
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and
informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello conducted an
investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied
having any knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information8 for homicide on January 12,1989 against the petitioner
and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130.Both accused were arraigned and pleaded
160
not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits
accordingly followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children,
Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed
that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report,
and the banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army prevalent in
their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal.
gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance.
The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass;
another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed
beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive
based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who
both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the
positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right
hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC
to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the
CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its appreciation of
the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of
Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies;
(2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner’s motive in killing
the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-
Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies; and (4) in considering the paraffin test
results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the
discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do
not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The
CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are therefore not substantial. The
petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained
unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is only necessary when a serious
doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer of the decision was not the judge
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not necessarily make the decision
erroneous.

In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative
evidence presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the
crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting her of the crime of
homicide.
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
Our Ruling
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both inconsistent
and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the witnesses on these
grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was based on doctrinal precepts
that should not apply to her case.
Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not
affect their credibility
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay,
the petitioner pointed to the following in consistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana’s July
21, 1988 affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the ground for
cover and heard another shot louder than the first two. This statement is allegedly
inconsistent with his declaration during the direct examination that he saw the petitioner
and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22, 1988affidavit of Cuntapay likewise
stated that he heard two burst of gun fire coming from the direction of the petitioner’s house
and heard another burst from the same direction, which statement is allegedly inconsistent
with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in
his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard
two shots, while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already
hit. According to the petitioner, these and some other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the
testimony of the two witnesses effectively destroyed their credibility.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the
statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do
not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve
to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth
161
rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not been
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and evenimpro babilities, unusual, for no person has
perfect faculties of senses or recall.9
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly
declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The
inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the
administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an
affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony
in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions
intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of
events as the affiant knows them.10 Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes
amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be
taken out of context.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that the
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him
on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally
incomplete.11 As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter
prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in court.12
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the
petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the
petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor
details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that
the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the
trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.13 We find no reason
to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving credence
to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.
It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard
the case
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize
that the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same
court that rendered the decision.14
We do not share this view.

The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because
the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is
not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic
notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.15
Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard
the evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling
completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate courts do when they review
the evidence of the case raised on appeal.16 Thus, a judgment of conviction penned by a
different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.
Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness
We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of the
assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove
the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime.17
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana and
Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the killing.
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at
all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.18
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really witness the
shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of Mallo (and did
not state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame argument whose merit
we cannot recognize.
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They
both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a
gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The
fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots does not
automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the actual shoot in gas this was in
fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that
"whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he failed to state in his
affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony and
the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details or additional
facts that serve to supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements
cannot be ruled out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eye witnesses, the failure to cite
the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
162
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for committing the
crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and
satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior
The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and
Cuntapay on the claim that these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and contradictions,
but also by improbabilities and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed out the numerous
improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on their reliability and
credibility.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the farmers
in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m., while
everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm (that is,
before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of putting
down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a criminal
would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly incredible that
Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to escape if indeed he
was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when Malana heard the cocking of
guns and the opening of the door, he did not become scared at all; (5) that Malana and
Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the authorities; (6) that it was highly
improbable for Malana to turn his head while running; and (7) that it was unusual that
Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the shooting.
We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of these
claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit. Human
nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given situation.
Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and
conformity inaction and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react
differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard human
behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or frightful
experience.19
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the
petitioner who, in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail
that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor and even
inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as follows:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents required by law to
be entered therein.
All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a
public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report
need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was
conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.20
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was
presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually
conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the
requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the
forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the
chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence
of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of
Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself
admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence
from a match she allegedly lighted.21 Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is
admissible as evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test
raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the report observed the regular
procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the
performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the
petitioner’s contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process was
163
conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we
presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to
corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that the petitioner shot the victim.
Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave
traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off with
tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely
a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she
was convicted. The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the
rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus,
we do not see any merit in this claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even
after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not
great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of
the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information, as amended.22
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date of the commission
of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment and would not
prejudice the rights of the accused because the nature of the offense of grave coercion
would not be altered. In that case, the difference in the date was only about two months and
five days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause
surprise on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.24 The act
may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which
date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances,
the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal
amendment, we proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed.25 Procedural due process requires that
the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the
specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly
meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is
thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the imputed crime.26
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal
amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged
in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial
rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance
with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The
purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first
time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the
164
accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of
the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently
show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a
difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the
jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of
homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect
the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is
still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the
petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the
petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption
of innocence has been successfully overcome.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting
the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia
I. Kummer.
SO ORDERED.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Amendment of Complaints; Pleadings and Practice; Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the
plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.―The petitioner claims that she was not
arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted. The petitioner’s
argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and
misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit
in this claim. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable
to the complaint orinformation, as amended.―A mere change in the date of the commission
of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an
 165

amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment
would not alter the nature of the offense. The test as to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call fora second plea since the amendment is only as to
form.―We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to
form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the
first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the
accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of
the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; The need for
arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however
pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments.―The need for
arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information orcomplaint. This however, we
hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that,
by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any
surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights
ofthe accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
Kummer v. People ,G.R. No. 174461, 11 September 2013
Leticia J. Kummer was convicted of the crime of homicide by the Regional Trial Court. Such
judgment of conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal. Seeking to
reverse her conviction, Kummer filed an appeal to the Supreme Court in which she claims
that she was not arraigned after the information for which she was convicted was amended
after she had entered her plea.The amendment of the Information involved the change of
the date of the commission of the crime from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988.
She also argues that the decision of the trial court was void in so far as trial court that heard
the testimonies of material witnesses was not the same court that rendered the decision.
Whether the change of date is a formal or substantial amendment?
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not
great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of
the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
NOTE: The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information, as amended.
Whether an arraignment is necessary after the introduction of formal amendments to the
Information?
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal
amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged
in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial
rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not
call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an
arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time.
Whether a judgment rendered by a judge who did not conduct the trial of the same case is
valid?
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because
the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is
not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic
notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. Thus, a judgment of conviction
penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.

ISSUES/RULING:

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it
toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated
September 13, 20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City,
Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of
the complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal
violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently,
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash
bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred
that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
166
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended
prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the
physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had
admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act
of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the
accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted
should be quashed.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead,
he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who
is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts
to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife,
or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common
child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long
as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently,
the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's
assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code
are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former.
Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders
whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating
relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime,
such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent,
the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance
with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
167
SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law.
In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days
to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the
petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made.1âwphi1
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned,
hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying
the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October
5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-
5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and
the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Amendmentof Pleadings; Section 14 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court providesthat an information may be amended, in form or in
substance,without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.·Sec. 14 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that aninformation may be amended, in form or in
substance, withoutleave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In
thepresent case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned,hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of theInformation and in denying the motion to quash
the same.
FACTS:
 Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders of
the (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 which denied petitioner's Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.

 Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information: x x x the above- named accused, being
then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair,
punching complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and
degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4ςrνl1
 RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest. The latter
posted a cash bond and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
 Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was
no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.
 In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner
had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that she sought payment of
the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then
inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her
which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the
latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC
denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties'
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident.
ISSUES:
W/n the act of petitioner which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead,
he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used
in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
168
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely:
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he
has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6ςrνl1
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity7
because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the
degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the
same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,
the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose
violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating
relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime,
such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent,
the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance
with Sec. 7 of the said law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.