* Stare Decisis
El Pueblo Filipinas vs. Marcaida [GR No. L-953, 09/18/47]
Tala Realty vs. Banco Pilipinas [GR No. 137980, 06/20/00]
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor [79 Phil. 249 (1947)]
* Res Judicata
Agilent Technologies vs. Integrated Silicon Technology [GR No. 154618,
04/14/04]
Cayana vs. CA [GR No. 125607, 03/18/04]
Urabana Velasco vs. People’s Homesite [GR No. L-39674, 01/31/78]
* Law of the Case
Argel vs. Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]
Buaya vs. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00]
Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596, 04/08/91]
JM Tuason vs. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78]
Uy Lee vs. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75]
* Finality of Decision
o Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99]
o Buaya vs. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00]
Legal Case of Stare Decisis
Doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous
judicial decisions unless they contravene the ordinary principles of justice
- “let the decision stand”
- The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by
decisions in earlier cases.
- The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform
strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a
conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or
they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-953 September 18, 1947
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS,
querellante-apelado,vs.
PEDRO MARCAIDA,
acusado-apelante.
D. Victoriano H. Endaya en representacion del apelante.El Procurador
General Auxiliar Sr. Ruperto Kapunan,Jr., y el Procurador
Sr.Esmeraldo Umali en representacion del Gobierno.
(From Spanish to English)
PABLO, J .:
Satrata of an appeal by Peter Marcaidaque was sentenced for the crime of
treasonafter LaVista corresponding to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessorypenalties prescribed by law and to pay a fine of P10, 000 and the
costs of Juico. Theappellant points out three errors incurred, according to him,
the Court of Pueblo.1.oCITIZENSHIP Declaring loyalty and accused were
sufficiently proven; 2D Givingcredit to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses, and 3 . or Al convict the accused of the charge No. 3.
The defense contends that the evidence of record cuindadania not prove
thedefendant's alliance and Philippine Commonwealth algobierno. The
transcript of theshorthand notes Aue says the defendant is natural Lopez (a
native of Lopez). Thedefense argues that the witness testified in Tagalog
saying: "Taga Lopez" and said"ay sa panganak Lopez." Aperece No such
thing on the record. If true, it is strange or that counsel did not request the
Juzgadoque order the court reporter to do so statedin his notes. When a party
is not satisfied with the traduction of a statement of awitness should be asked
to enter in cars ne only translation but also translated theoriginal statement,
failing, correct sepresumira official interpreter's translation.
But even admitting? says the defense? that the defendant was natural for
Lopez,Quezon province, its cuidadaniafilipina not properly tested. In support
of thiscontention invoked Article IV of the Constitution, which came into
force on November 15, 1935. (Article XVI, Section 6, Constitution.) The
hearing of this case took lugarelJuly 15, 1946. If the defendant was I born, for
example, a day after the Constitutioncame into force on the day of the hearing
was not more than ten years and eightmesesde age, and then committed the
offense at the age of about nine to years now. Although the record shows
sunacimiento date, however we are sure that it was achild? Or so old when I
go into view. No querallado the prosecutor would have aserious crime.
Certainly, not born before and after entering into force the Constitution.Can
not be accepted, therefore, its provisions.
Article 2 of the Jones Act approved by Congress on August 29, 1916,
provides asfollows: "That all the people of the Philippines that the April 11 of
milochocientosninety-nine were Spanish subjects? Oles and then resided quea
in these islands, andtheir children born after that date will be considered and
taken as citizens of thePhilippine Islands, excepting those who have preferred
to retain their loyalty tolaCorona of Espaòa accordance with the provisions of
the Peace Treaty between theUnited States and Espaòa, signed in Paris on
December 10 of 1898, and with theexception of those that after that date have
been from another country CITIZENS: ....
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Philippines dated 1 July 1902, reads as
follows:"All inhabitants of the Philippines residing therein and deabril eleven
of 1899 wereSpanish subjects? oles residents in these islands and their
children born after thatdate, shall be deemed and held as citizens of the
Philippines and as such conderechoto the protection of the United States,
excepting those who have eligado retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peacebetween the United
States and Espaòa signed in Paris on December 10 of 1898.
The defendant is called Peter Marcaida. By its name, can be Filipino, both
Spanishand South American. Nohay proof that a resident of the Philippines
and subject bothSpanish on April 11, 1899. If I was a resident and was not
subject both Spanish couldnot acquire Filipino because CITIZENSHIP would
remain abroad.
If it was subject both Spanish and resided in the Philippine Islands on April
11, 1899,automatically became cuidadanofilipino unless CITIZENSHIP opted
to retain bothSpanish, but since there is such evidence, the presumption is that
the is Filipino.
If born after the April 11, 1899 to parents who were subjects both Spanish
follow thenationality of those: both Spanish, if their parents have wanted to
retain their loyaltywing Crown Espaòa, and Filipino, if they chose to lose . No
evidence presented inone way or another: can serentonces both Spanish and
Filipino.If born after the April 11, 1899 of Filipino parents is Filipino.
It may happen that a descendant of a South American has been established in
theprovince of Quezon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, when his father
refused touse the provisions of the naturalization law, then the defendant is
abroad: seguenationality his father.
If a descendant of a cuidadano both Spanish has started to reside in the
Philippinesafter the Treaty of Paris, would continue to be both Spanish unless
you naturalized.Nor is there evidence to that effect, then it is both Spanish,
abroad.
Paz Chua Uang by the mere fact of being born in the Philippines was
declaredbecause it was sibdita Philippine espa? Ola or daughter of a subject
both Spanish on April 11, 1899. (Chua v. Secretary of Labor, 68 Phil., 649.)
This doctrine implicitlyrevoked Roa against Insular Collector of Customs (23
Phil., 321) and subsequent.(Va? Insularde Manager or against Customs, 23
Phil., 491, United States v. TianseOng, 29 Phil., 352; United States against
Ang, 36 Phil., 915, Go Julian against theGovernment Philippine Islands, 45
Phil., 301; Haw against Insular Collector of Customs, 59 Phil., 646.) In the
case of Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim vezlaadopted another theory is
sitting in the matter of Roa, but The Court was divided inthe ratio of four for
three. Elactual Chief Justice and Judge Imperial were dissenters.The judge felt
that the simple Villareal birth in the Philippines not cuidadano makesone
Filipino, but concurred in part because of Roa ladoctrina was applying for
more than 20 years. The principle of stare decisis is the main reason that
prompted most tore-adopt the theory of Roa. In his dissent, the current
President of the Court said:
The Majority says nothing in support of the correctness of theRoa
ruling, and seekssimply to justify its continued observance upon the fact That
it "had been adhered toand accepted for more than 20 years before the
adoption of the Constitution," andThat not " Also only this Court but lower
courts had consistently and invariablyFollowed it, the executive and
administrative agencies of theGovernment hadtheretofore abide by it, and the
public generally had acquiesced in it. I do not yield tothis court policy. If we
induced the Government and the public to follow and accept anerror for some
time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them tofollow
and accept the same error discovered eleven. The rule of stare decisis doesnot
apply to the Extent of perpetuating an Error (15 CJ, p. 918.) It is the duty of
everycourt to review its own decisions without fear and reluctance to revise
them (Baker vs.Lorillard, 4 NY, 257.) As was well said in a case, " I hold itto
be the duty of this courtto examine its freely own decisions, and, When That It
Has Fallen satisfied into amistake, to correct the error by overruling its own
decision. An Acknowledged mistakemust be more venerable and more
inveterate than it can be made by any singledecision before it can claim upon
the principle of Impunity stare decisis. "(Vs. Leavitt.Blatchaford, 17 NY, 521,
523.)" Precedents are to Be Regarded As the greatstorehouse of experience,
not always to be Followed, but to be looked to as beaconlights in the progress
of judicial investigation. "(Per Bartley, CJ, in Leavitt vs. Morrow,6 Ohio St.,
71, 78.) Their "authority must yield to the force Often of reason, and to
theParamount Demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized
society, andthe law ought to speak with a voice responsive to These
demands." (Norton vs .Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.) "(Torres and
Gallofin against Tan Chim, 69Phil., 518.)
In matters of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, p. 249, ante, and Lam Swee
Sang v.Commonwealth of the Philippines, p. 249, ante, we have stated
definitivelyabandoned this theory and adopted the deChua v. Secretary of
Labor. The reason issimple. The theory of jus soli in America is absolute
elsimple American birth According to its constitution and the decision in
United States v.. Wong Kim Ark (169U. S., 649). The American Constitution
never came into force in the Philippines. Thetheory of jus soli in the
Philippines in accordance with the law of 1 July 1902, passedby the U.S.
Congress that, under the Treaty of Paris, is one that has dedeterminar parole:
that the Philippines-born Filipino citizen with esconsiderado if a resident
andsubject both Spanish or child of a resident and subject both Spanish on
April 11,1899. If a foreigner or child of an alien in aqeulla date can not be
cuidadano Filipino.The defendant then, according to the evidence enautos
may be Filipino or foreigner.
Under the Treason Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, any resident in
thePhilippines, owing allegiance to the
UnitedStates or the Government of the PhilippineIslands, or war will formare
heciere common cause with their enemies and helpingthem socorriendoles
within or outside those Islands, the crime committed treason.The section 1 of
the Act is unasimple transplantation over the provisions of theCriminal Code
which reads as American FOLLOWING: "Whoever, Owing allegianceto the
United States, levies war against them or adhere to Their enemies, giving
themaid and comfort Within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of
treason. " (Sec. 1,Crim. Code: RS, sec. 5331; Mar. 4.1909, c. 321, sec. 1, 35
Stat., 1088.)
"Treason against the United States," says the American Constitution, "shall
Consistonly in levying against them, or in adhering to Their Enemies, giving
them aid andcomfort." (Section 3 [1], Article III.)
In both American and domestic extranjros can commit the crime of
treason.Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of America during the
time of hisresidence. (Carlisle vs. U.S., 21 Law. Ed., 426; Raditch vs.
Hutchins, 24 Law. Ed.,409.) The British hold the same theory. (De Jager vs.
Attorney General of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) Need not be a U.S. Citizen for
them to commit the crime of treason.But the Revised Penal Code have
excluded the foreign nationals can only commit. Article 114 reads: "Whoever,
owing allegiance to the United States or theGovernment of the Philippine
Islands, sinser of foreign nationality, I do them formarewar or common cause
with their enemies, helping or socorriendoles inside or outsidethese Islands
shall be punished with the penalties of reclusion temporal to death anda fine
not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. " Executive Order No.44,
recognizingthat it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code punish for
the crime of treasonagainst foreigners living in the Philippines who have
helped the enemies, amended Section 114, are adding to a paragraph of tenor
FOLLOWING: "Likewise, any alien,residing in the Philippine Islands, who
commits acts of treason as defined inparagraph 1 of this article Shall be
punished by prision mayor to death and Shall paya fine not to Exceed 20,000
pesos." (Executive Order No. 44, May 31, 1945.)
If the defendant is Filipino, owing allegiance to the Commonwealth
Government andmust be condemned for treason, but sies abroad can not be
punished for actscommitted prior to the amendment of Article 114 of the
Revised CodigoPenal. Asevidence of unamanera not establish clear that the
defendant is Filipino, can not becriminally responsible for the crime of
treasonIt reverses the judgment appealed. He ordered his immediate release
the costs of trade.
Case Digest on
El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida
F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of
treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos
thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on
account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous
cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application
of jus soli for citizenship was established.
I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar
R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of
perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found
out that a previous judgment was erroneous.
Case Digest on
El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida
F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of
treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos
thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on
account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous
cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application
of jus soli for citizenship was established.
I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar
R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of
perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found
out that a previous judgment was erroneous.
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Slxmis
The instant Petition presents a classic example where the application of the
principle of stare decisis comes into play.
The facts may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1979, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
faced a legal problem with respect to its branch site holdings. Republic Act
No. 337, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, provides that banks
may only invest in real estate up to fifty percent (50%) of their net worth.[1]
This ceiling on real estate holdings posed a bar to respondent’s plans for
expansion and to address the problem, its major stockholders agreed to set up
an entity to which its existing branch sites may be unloaded. The said entity
would also acquire new branch sites for it, with all such branch sites,
including those unloaded, to be leased to respondent bank. It was thus that
petitioner was organized, its name TALA being an acronym of four (4) of the
major stockholders and directors of respondent, namely: Antonio Tiu, Tomas
B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Missdaa
On August 25, 1981, pursuant to the foregoing arrangement, respondent sold
eleven (11) real estate properties housing its branch sites to petitioner,
including the Davao branch site subject of the instant suit. Immediately
following the sale, petitioner leased the same branch sites to respondent.
According to respondent, petitioner was merely holding out such properties
for it for a three percent (3%) per annum add-on to their carrying cost.
Respondent further claims that it was part of their agreement that the said
properties would be returned to it at its pleasure at the same transfer price.
At present, therefore, there stand pending cases filed by respondent against
petitioner for reconveyance of all such branch sites held by petitioner on the
ground that the latter is a mere trustee of respondent.
The present Petition, however, stems from an action for ejectment wherein the
issue was which of two (2) different contracts of lease presented by each party
governs them. For its part, petitioner presents an 11-year amended lease
contract allegedly executed on August 25, 1981 before Notary Public
Generoso Fulgencio. On the other hand, respondent presents a 20-year lease
contract executed on the same date, August 25, 1981, but before Notary
Public Jose Dimaisip.
The lease arrangement subject of this case also covered the other branch sites
held by petitioner in other locations, i.e., Malabon, Sta. Cruz, R. Hidalgo,
Parañaque, Marikina, Malolos, Cabanatuan, Lucena, Urdaneta, La Union,
Iloilo and Cotabato. Aside from the present case, therefore, other similar cases
for ejectment have been filed where, ultimately, the question of which among
the two lease contracts is valid becomes an issue.
Under the terms of the eleven-year amended contract presented by petitioner,
the lease expired on August 31, 1992. Petitioner claims that thereafter, the
lease was extended on a month-to-month basis on the condition that whatever
terms and conditions are agreed upon would retroact to September 1, 1992.
The parties’ negotiations failed to yield any results, whereupon petitioner
informed respondent that the rental rates shall be those it submitted to the
latter, which were based on a study by the Asian Appraisal Co., Inc.,
retroactive to September 1, 1992. More particularly, rates were as follows:
Two Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (P200,840.00) monthly
with a rental escalation of ten percent (10%) per year, with four months
deposit, four months advance deposit, and a Five Hundred Thousand Peso
(P500,000.00) goodwill.
Respondent refused to comply with these terms. Instead, it continued to pay
rent in the old monthly rate until March 31, 1994, when it totally ceased
paying any rent. This prompted petitioner to demand from respondent, in a
letter dated April 14, 1994, payment of its accrued rentals. Petitioner also gave
notice to respondent that at the end of the month, the month-to-month lease
over the premises would no longer be renewed. This was followed by a letter,
dated May 2, 1994, demanding that respondent pay its obligations under the
lease and vacate the premises. Sdaadsc
On March 27, 1995, petitioner instituted a Complaint for Ejectment against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2109-95. On June 5, 1995, respondent filed its Answer. After the
submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the court a quo rendered
its Decision on July 20, 1995,[2] dismissing the Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, after finding that the real issue, i.e., which of the two
contracts of lease was controlling, was not capable of pecuniary estimation.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City affirmed the decision in
toto on June 13, 1996.[3] With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,[4] docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 48667.
On January 12, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned
Decision,[5] holding that both lower courts erred in refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over the case when the issue of validity of lease contract is
intertwined with the issue of possession. However, it dismissed the Petition to
maintain judicial stability and consistency, it appearing that in other similar
ejectment suits brought before the Court of Appeals, the twenty-year lease
contract presented by respondent had been upheld. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was granted in that respondent was ordered to pay unpaid
rentals to petitioner.[6] Subsequently, however, on Motion for
Reconsideration of respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and
revoked its order for payment of back rentals.[7]
Petitioner now seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals upon
the following grounds –
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE RULING OF THE COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 39104 AS THE LAW OF
THE CASE BETWEEN HEREIN PARTIES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT EJECTING
RESPONDENT FROM THE LEASED PREMISES."[8]
In its favor, respondent argues that "only decisions of the Supreme Court
establish jurisprudence or doctrines." And that is exactly what we are faced
with at present.
On February 17, 2000, the Second Division of this Court, through Mr. Justice
Sabino R. De Leon, Jr., rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 129887 between the
same parties, this time involving respondent’s Urdaneta, Pangasinan branch,
finding the eleven-year lease contract presented by petitioner as a forgery and
consequently upholding the validity of the twenty-year lease contract.
Resolving this identical issue, the Decision states, to wit - Rtcspped
"Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease contract
controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC, however, that the eleven (11)-
year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive
Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the
contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the said contract,
Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and (3) the
said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the
latter’s rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 383-384.).
Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation that
rightly make any court suspicious and wary of imputing any legitimacy and
validity to the said lease contract.
Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino
testified that he was responsible for the daily operations of said bank. He
denied having signed the eleven (11)-year contract and reasoned that it was
not in the interest of Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). That fact was
corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipino’s Legal
Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials
allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal
initials (Id., p. 385).
The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring
submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his monthly notarial report
with copies of acknowledged documents thereto attached. Under this
procedure and requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such notarial
report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire consequences
including the possible revocation of the notary’s notarial commission. HTML
The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala Realty’s alleged
eleven (11)-year lease contract did not retain a copy thereof for submission to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the proper RTC militates against the use of
said document as a basis to uphold petitioner’s claim. The said alleged eleven
(11)-year lease contract was not submitted to the Central Bank whose strict
documentation rules must be complied with by banks to ensure their
continued good standing. On the contrary, what was submitted to the Central
Bank was the twenty (20)-year lease contract.
Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino deliberately omitted
to submit the eleven (11)-year contract to the Central Bank, we do not
consider that fact as violative of the res inter alios acta aliis non nocet (Section
28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: "Sec. 28. Admission by
third party – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided."; Compania General
de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil. 472, 477[1909]) rule in evidence. Rather, it is
an indication of said contract’s inexistence.
It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease
contract which is the real and genuine contract between petitioner Tala Realty
and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year
lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is
entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as it pays the
agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions thereof (Art.
1673, New Civil Code)."
In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court, we have no option but
to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year contract
presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. "Stare decisis et non quieta movere."[9] katarungan
That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the
subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[10] to wit –
"Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing
that although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in
Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted separately.
Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the
allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on
the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with
respect to the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to
the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such
accident, of which there is only one truth. Otherwise, one would be
subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on
the other!
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court’s policy of
maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim
"stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason &
Corp. v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]). In Woulfe v. Associated Realties
Corporation (130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case
were presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court
was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger
v. Gill (75 Ohio App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the
doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to
the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata
doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis
simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different" (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118A, 394, 395 [1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v.
Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa. 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re Burtt’s Estate,
353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J. M. Tuason v. Mariano,
supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties
in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of "stare decisis et non
quieta movere."
(underscoring, Ours) Kortex
Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No.
129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that in the instant case is
located in Davao, we can very well apply the conclusion in G.R. No. 129887
that it is the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not
only are the parties the same, but more importantly, the issue regarding its
validity is one and the same and, hence, should no longer be relitigated.
Petitioner is even barred from questioning our adherence to the ruling in G.R.
No. 129887 since it categorically declared in its Petition that the same was
"likewise filed so that any favorable ruling in said petitions (referring to G.R.
Nos. 129887 and 132051) may be extended or made to apply in the instant
case."[11] Petitioner cannot now complain that the ruling in G.R. No. 129887
regarding the validity of the twenty-year lease contract is not binding in this
case simply because the same is unfavorable to it.
Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected for
non-payment of rentals, we do not agree with the ruling in G.R. No. 129887
that since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate
which it unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did not agree, there lies
no ground for ejectment. In such a case, there could still be ground for
ejectment based on non-payment of rentals. The recent case of T & C
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals[12] is instructional on this
point. It was there cautioned that --
"The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly
rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16, 1993, despite
demands to pay and to vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if private
respondent deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter the
legal situation of private respondent since the account was opened in private
respondent’s name. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of private
respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700.00 to
P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as amended by
R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have done was to deposit the
original rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the
name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this Court held in Uy v. Court of
Appeals (178 SCRA 671, 676 [1989]): Sclaw
The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 (P150.00 per
month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on the part of the lessor to
accept was justified. However, what the lessee should have done was to
deposit in 1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was made only in
1984 indicating a delay of more than four years.
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the
ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only
the current rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the
lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been
instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs."
(Underscoring, ours)
While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the
payment of rentals due from the eleventh year to the twentieth year of the
lease, to wit –
"3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the LESSEE shall
pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY
(P1,020,000.00) Philippine Currency representing advance rental to be applied
on the monthly rental for the period from the eleventh to the twentieth
year",[13]
the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for rent on
the property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989.[14]
Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April, 1994,
it gave petitioner good ground for instituting ejectment proceedings.[15] We
reiterate the ruling in T & C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever
petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate, it
should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have deposited the
original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of,
and with notice to, petitioner. This circumstance, i.e., respondent’s failure to
pay the rent at the old rate, does not appear in G.R. No. 129887. Thus, while
we are bound by the findings of this Court’s Second Division in that case
under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that respondent’s failure to pay
any rentals beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment
from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No.
129887. In this case, we uphold petitioner’s right to eject respondent from the
leased premises. Xlaw
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48667 is SET ASIDE insofar as it denies the
prayer for ejectment of petitioner.
Judgment is rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject premises and
to restore possession thereof to petitioner. Respondent is also ordered to pay
rent in the amount of P20,500.00 per month computed from April, 1994 until
such time as it vacates the subject property, with interest thereon at the legal
rate.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. Sclex
Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas 6.20.00
“disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail”
RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in
accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same questions relating to
similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided
upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same
issue (“stare decisis et non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts
are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.
G.R. No. 47616-September 16, 1947
JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 47623 September 16, 1947
LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Lucas
Lacson for appellants.
Antonio V. Raquiza for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
On 15 October 1941, a decision was promulgated in thecase of Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 47616,whereby this Court affirmed the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which hAd granted the writ of habeas
corpus applied for by tan Chong, on the ground that he, being a native of the
Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the
Philippines.
On the same date, in the case of Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 47623), this Court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition of the applicant for naturalization filed in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant, having been born in Sulu,
Philippines, of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, is a citizen of the
Philippines. The dismissal of the petition implies and means that there was no
need of naturalization for the applicant who is aFilipino citizen.
On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in both cases by
the Solicitor General. The latter contends that even if the petitioner in the first
case and the applicant in the second were born in the Philippines, of a Chines
father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, still they are not citizens of the
Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their birth,
and prays that both decisions be set aside and the judgments appealed from be
reversed. This motion for reconsideration was pending in this Court when the
Pacific was broke out. During the battle for liberation, the records of both
cases were destroyed. Upon petition of the Assistant Solicitor General, Mr.
Roberto A. Gianzon, therecords were reconstituted in accordance with the
provisionsof Act. No. 3110. The record of the first case, G.R. No. 47616,was
declared reconstituted on 5 June, and of the second case, G.R. No. 47623, on
28 June 1946. Upon these reconstituted records, we now proceed to dispose of
the motion for reconsideration.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the principle of jus soli
applies in this jurisdiction. It is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which provides that "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." In the case
of U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S., 649, the SupremeCourt of the United
States applying the principle of jus soli held that a person born in the United
States of Chinese parents domiciled therein is a citizen of the United States. It
further held that the Fourteenth Amendment was declaratory of the common
law as existed in England and in the United States before and after the
Declaration of independence. From that decision, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,
with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented. The principle of jus soli
was the rule in this jurisdiction until the 30th of September, 1939, when in the
case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor (68 Phil., 649), this Court abandoned it
and held that a person of Chinese parentage born in the Philippines in 1941 is
not a citizen thereof, because she followed the citizenship of her Chinese
parents and she is not a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of
section 2 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. But in the
cases of Torres and Gallofin vs. Tan Chim (69 Phil., 518), decided on 3
February 1940 (69 Phil., 518), and Gallofin vs. Ordoñez, decided on 27 June
1940 (70 Phil., 287), this Court reverted to the rule of jus soli laid down in the
cases prior to the decisionin the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra.
The Solicitor General heeding the opinions of the Assitant Secretary of State,
Mr. G.S. Messermith, of 15 January 1938; of the Second Assistant Secretary
of State, Mr. Alvey A. Adee, dated 12 September 1921, and of the Acting
Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson, of 5April 1912, who held that a
person born in the Philippines of alien parentage is not a citizen thereof,
because the common law principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitutiton of United States was not extended to the Philippines — the
same opinions upon which the Solicitor General had relied in the case of Chua
vs. The Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule applying the
principle of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be abandoned — urges upon
this Court to reconsider its decisions in the cases under consideration.
In the case of Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil.,494, the Court applied
the principle of jus soli to a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother, and in so doing it cited the case of U.S. vs. Gosiaco, 12
Phil., 490 where, according to the Court, the principle had been applied. But
nowhere in the decision of the last mentioned case was such principle applied,
because the only question passed upon was whether a person detained for not
having a certificate of registration, as required by Act 702, could be admitted
to bail pending determination of his appeal by this Court as to whether he did
come within the provisions of said Act.
In the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,315, this Court passed
upon the question as to whether a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother, legally married; is a citizen thereof. In this case
this Court took into consideration the provisions of articles 17, 18 and 19 of
the Civil Code in viewof the fact that the petitioner was born on 6 July 1889;
the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris; section 4 of the
Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902) and the amendatory Act of
Congress of 23 March 1912, these being the laws then applicable.
Commenting on sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, this Court said:
By section 4 the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which
prevails in the United States was extended to the Philippine Islands, but with
limitations. In the United States every person, which certain specific
exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that country. Under section
4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1889, of parents who were
Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are
at themoment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. From
the reading of section 4 and taking into consideration the Act of March 23,
1912, it is clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the
Philippine Islands who did not come within the provisions of said section, and
also that Congress did not then by express legislation determine the political
status of such persons. Therefore, the inquiry is — Did Congress intend to say
that all of the inhabitants who were not included in section 4 are to be
"deemedand held to be" aliens to the Philippine islands? (Pp. 333-334.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
In answering the question in the negative, this Court cited the case of an
unmarried woman, a native of Porto Rico, 20 years of age, who arrived in
New York by steamer from Porto Rico on 24 August 1902. She was detained
at the Immigrant station, examined by a board of special inquiry, and
excluded. The writ for habeas corpus having been denied by the Circuit Court,
for the reason that she might become a public charge, she appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States which held that she was not an alien to the
United States. But the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case cited does not answer negatively the question asked by this Court,
because it does not appear that she is of alien parentage and it appears that she
was a resident of Porto Rico on11 April 1899. (192 U.S. 1.) Further
commenting on section 4, this Court said:
This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the
Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other inhabitants shall not be
citizens. Neither does it declare that other inhabitants shall be deemed to be
aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare that aperson
situated as in the appellant shall not be nor shall not elect to be a citizen of the
country on his birth. The appellant could, as we have said, elect to become a
citizen of the United States had he been born in that country under the same
circumstances which now surround him. All the laws and the rulings of the
courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the
United States. While it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of
Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to this country, but that they must be
expressly entended by Congress, nevertheless, some of the basic principles
upon which the government of the United States rests and the greater part of
the Bill of Rights, which protects the citizens of that country, have been
extended to the Philippine Islands by the instructions of the President to the
first Philippine Commission and the Philippine Bill. (P. 339-340.)
The declaration that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the
Philippines is tantamount or equivalent to declaring that those who do not
belong to that class shall not be. Realizing the weakness of the position taken,
in view of the express provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill, as
amended, and of the fact that the Constitution of the United States and Acts of
Congress do not apply ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, the Court hastened
to add another ground in support of the pronouncement that petitioner Roa is a
Filipino citizen, and for that reason entitled to land and reside in the
Philippines. The additional ground is that the petitioner's father having died in
China in 1900, his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship which he being
under age followed upon the death of his father. The concluding
pronouncement in the decisionof the case is, as follows:
The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was
therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having
expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country.
If all the native inhabitants residing in the Philippines on the 11th day of April
1899, regardless of their alien parentage, are citizens thereof, the amendatory
Act of Congress of 23 March 1912 empowering the Philippine Legislature to
provide by legislation for the acquisition of Filipino citizenship by those
natives excluded from such citizenship by the original section 4 of the
Philippine Bill, would be meaningless.
We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted to us for
decision. We know that the decision upon the motion for reconsideration in
these cases is momentous. We have given the time and the thought demanded
by its importance. While birth is an important element of citizenship, it alone
does not make a person a citizen of the country of his birth. Youth spent in the
country; intimate and endearing association with the citizens among whom he
lives; knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the greatness and
security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideals, and in the ability of the
country's government to protect him, his children, and his earthly possessions
against perils from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the
country against such perils, are some of the important elements that would
make a person living in a country its citizen. Citizenship is a political status.
The citizen must be proud of his citizenship. He should treasure and cherish it.
In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, "the question of citizenship in a
nation is of the most vital importance. It is a precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition." (U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.) Citizenship, the
main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual
allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the
principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would
encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both
countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens.
The pinciple of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The
doctrines or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how
sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The
principleof stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict
between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and
abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.
It appears that the petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo, Laguna,
in July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, left
for China in 1925, and returned to the Philippines on 25 January1940. The
applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May 1900, of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether they were
legally married, so in the absence of proof to the contrary they are presumed
to be lawfully married. From the date of his birth up to 16 November 1938,
the date of filing of his application for naturalization, and up to the date of
hearing, he had been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino
woman and has three children by her. He speaks the local dialect and the
Spanish and English languages.
Considering that the common law principle or rule of jus soli obtaining in
England and in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, has never been entended to this
jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Actof 29 August 1916);
considering that the law in force and applicable to the petitioner and the
applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is sec. 4 of the Philippine
Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 March 1912, which
provides that only those "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands," we are of the
opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the
second case, who were born of alien parentage, were not and are not, under
saidsection, citizens of the Philippine Islands.
Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it
cannot divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who had been declared to be
Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court in the first case confirming the lower
court's judgment is set aside; the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila appealed from is reversed; the petitioner is recommitted to the custody
of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with in accordance with law;
and the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the decree of
theCourt of First Instance of Zamboanga appealed from granting the
applicant's peition for naturalization filed on16 November 1938 is affirmed,
for the applicant comes under section 1 (a), Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, and possesses the qualifications required by setion 3 of the same Act, as
amended, which was the law in force at the time of the filing of the petition
for naturalization. No costs shall be taxed in both cases.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Hontiveros,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the entire majority opinion. I concur inthe revocation of the
doctrine of jus soli enunciated, among other cases, in Roa vs. Insular Collector
of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Besides, the ruling in that case can not be invoked
in favor of the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 nor of the applicant in G.R. No.
47623 for the reason that, while Tranquilino Roa in that case was born in the
Philippines in theyear 1889, when articles 17 et seq. of the Civil Code were
yet in force here and made him a Spanish subject, the said petitioner and
applicant in the instant cases were born, although also in the Philippines, 1915
and 1900, respectively, i. e., after the abrogation of said articles, due to their
political character, upon the changeof sovereignty following the treaty of Paris
ending theSpanish-American war (Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23
Phil., 315, 330; Halleck's International Law, Chapter 34, par. 14; American
and Ocean Insurance Companies vs. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. [26 U.S.],
511 542, 7 Law.ed., 242). As declared in the majority opinion, the citizenship
of said petitioner and applicant should be determined as of the dates of their
respective births.
At the time the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 was born (1915) the law on
Philippine citizenship was contained in the Philippine Bill, section 4, as
amended by the Act of Congress of March 23, 1912. Under this provision said
petitioner could not be a Filipino citizen upon the date of his birth because his
father, who was legally married to his mother, was a Chinese citizen and not a
subject of Spain. If his father had been a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899,
like his mother, who was a native Filipina, before their marriage — and in that
case, after said marriage, she would have acquired the citizenship of her
husband even if she had been a foreigner — then under section 4 of
thePhilippine Bill, as amended, said parents of said petitioner would have
become citizens of the Philippines unless they should have elected to preserve
their allegiance to Spain in the manner and within the period therein
prescribed; and then, too, the petitioner upon being born in 1915 would
automatically have acquired Philippine citizenship. But such was not the case.
The applicant in G.R. No. 47623 could not possibly be a Filipino citizen upon
his birth (1900) because, aside from the fact that his father, who is presumed
to have been legally married to his mother, was a Chinese subject, there was
no law on Philippine citizenship at that time, because, firstly, even the
aforecited articles of the Civil Code had previously been abrogated, as already
stated by the change of sovereignty in the Philippines following the Spanish-
American war, secondly, said articles at any rate did not regulate Philippine
citizenship nor did they make said applicant's father a Spanish subject, and,
thirdly, the Philippine Bill was not enacted until July 1, 1902.
In the case of the applicant in G.R. No. 47623, his father was a Chinese
subject on April 11, 1899. And his mother, upon her marriage with her
Chinese husband, acquired his nationality. So that when said applicant was
born in 1900 his parents were Chinese subjects. When the Philippine Bill was
enacted on July 1, 1902, therefore, said applicant and his parents were not
subjects of Spain and consequently could not have acquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of section 4 thereof. It was only after the Philippine
Naturalization Law was enacted, pursuant to the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916 (Jones Law), that the said applicant had his first opportunity to
become a naturalized citizen of this country.
Consequently, I reach the same conclusion as the majority.
Case Digest on JOSE TAN CHONG VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR GR
47616 SEPTEMBER 16, 1947LAM SWEE SANG VS. THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILS.GR 47623 SEPTEMBER 16, 1947
FACTS:
Petitioners in the two cases are both of born of a Chinese fatherand a Filipino
mother. The first petitioner was granted writ of habeascorpus since he was
declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrineof jus soli, which says that
when one is born in a country, he acquiresthe citizenship of that country. Such
has been said to be the samewith the second petitioner. Second petitioner’s
petition fornaturalization was dismissed since he no longer needed to
benaturalized. The Solicitor General opposed such decision, saying thatthe
two are not citizens of the Philippines pursuant to the laws existingduring their
time of birth.Before this, the Court, with regard to cases like this, used
theprinciple of jus soli, adopted from the US Constitution, which says thatall
those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its jurisdiction is a
citizen of the US.The Solicitor General mentioned that the principle of jus
soliwasn’t extended to the Philippines. In a previous case wherein jus soliwas
used was based in a prior case, which mentioned the principle of jus soli but
wasn’t actually the issue at hand. Furthermore, if ever theprinciple of jus soli
was extended, it had its limitations. The law thatprevailed then mentioned that
if one was born after a certain date andin accordance with other conditions,
which would only be the timewhen one is considered a citizen. Otherwise,
they are not to beconsidered citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not precedents regarding citizenship should beupheld, following
the principle of stare decisis?
HELD:
No, the principle of stare decisis doesn’t mean being blindadherence to
precedents. Even if the doctrines laid down have beenfollowed for years, if it
has been found to be contrary to law, it shouldbe abandoned or reconsidered.
Principle of stare decisis shouldn’t beapplied if there is conflict between law
and precedent.Given that the law enforced during the time of birth of
twopetitioners doesn’t allow them to be citizens of the Philippines, even if
precedence tells that they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines,cannot
be declared Filipino citizens.
Res Judicata
Res judicata denotes an important legal doctrine that generally means that
once a matter is judicially decided, it is finally decided. The doctrine bars re-
litigation of matters that have already been determined in adjudication.
Broadly, res judicata bars the reconsideration of settled civil matters.
Specifically, res judicata precludes only subsequent suits on the same cause of
action between the same parties after a final judgment on the merits.
Res judicata can also mean the judged matter itself. In other words, a matter
that is final such as a claim or cause of action that is settled or a judgment,
award, or other determination that is considered final and bars re-litigation of
the same matter.
“The defendant initially responded with a motion to dismiss on res judicata
grounds.”
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD., petitioner, vs.
INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, TEOH KIANG HONG, TEOH KIANG SENG,
ANTHONY CHOO, JOANNE KATE M. DELA CRUZ, JEAN KAY M.
DELA CRUZ and ROLANDO T. NACILLA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision dated August 12, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574, which dismissed Civil Case No.
3123-2001-C and annulled and set aside the Order dated September 4, 2001
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Petitioner Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. (“Agilent”) is a foreign
corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the
Philippines.[1] Respondent Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines
Corporation (“Integrated Silicon”) is a private domestic corporation, 100%
foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
assembling electronics components.[2] Respondents Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh
Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of
Integrated Silicon’s board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean
Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members.[3]
The juridical relation among the various parties in this case can be traced to a
5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (“VAASA”), entered into
on April 2, 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard
Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (“HP-Singapore”).[4]
Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture
and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HP-Singapore, for its
part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery
to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase
price of the finished products.[5] The VAASA had a five-year term, beginning
on April 2, 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written
consent.[6] On September 19, 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon,[7]
HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to
Agilent.[8]
On May 25, 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for “Specific
Performance and Damages” against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim
Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor, docketed as Civil Case No.
3110-01-C. It alleged that Agilent breached the parties’ oral agreement to
extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that defendant be ordered
to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as
earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to
pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.[9]
On June 1, 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty.
Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was
not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to
assail the court’s jurisdiction over the person of Agilent.
On July 2, 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon,
Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela
Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla,[10] for “Specific
Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin,
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages”, before the Regional Trial
Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, docketed as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-
C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering defendants to
immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries and the
materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of
Integrated Silicon. It further prayed that defendants be ordered to pay actual
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.[11]
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C,[12]
on the grounds of lack of Agilent’s legal capacity to sue;[13] litis
pendentia;[14] forum shopping;[15] and failure to state a cause of action.[16]
On September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and
granted petitioner Agilent’s application for a writ of replevin.[17]
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.[18]
In the meantime, upon motion filed by respondents, Judge Antonio S. Pozas
of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.
The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where
Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is pending.
On August 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for
certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 4,
2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR
RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BEFORE RESORTING TO THE REMEDY OF
CERTIORARI.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF
CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF LITIS
PENDENTIA, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO.
3110-2001-C.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF
CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
SHOPPING, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO.
3110-2001-C.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 323-2001-C BELOW
INSTEAD OF ORDERING IT CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL CASE NO.
3110-2001-C.[19]
The two primary issues raised in this petition: (1) whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents’
petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of
the September 4, 2001 Order; and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.
We find merit in the petition.
The Court of Appeals, citing the case of Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO v.
ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc.,[20] held that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No.
3110-2001-C and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary
before resort to a petition for certiorari. This was error.

Jurisdiction is fixed by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests jurisdiction over
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C in the RTC.[21]
The Court of Appeals’ ruling that the assailed Order issued by the RTC of
Calamba, Branch 92, was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction due to litis
pendentia and forum shopping, has no legal basis. The pendency of another
action does not strip a court of the jurisdiction granted by law.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that a Motion for Reconsideration was not
necessary in view of the urgent necessity in this case. We are not convinced.
In the case of Bache and Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Ruiz,[22] relied on by the Court
of Appeals, it was held that “time is of the essence in view of the tax
assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of which
immediate and more direct action becomes necessary.” Tax assessments in
that case were based on documents seized by virtue of an illegal search, and
the deprivation of the right to due process tainted the entire proceedings with
illegality. Hence, the urgent necessity of preventing the enforcement of the
tax assessments was patent. Respondents, on the other hand, cite the case of
Geronimo v. Commission on Elections,[23] where the urgent necessity of
resolving a disqualification case for a position in local government warranted
the expeditious resort to certiorari. In the case at bar, there is no analogously
urgent circumstance which would necessitate the relaxation of the rule on a
Motion for Reconsideration.
Indeed, none of the exceptions for dispensing with a Motion for
Reconsideration is present here. None of the following cases cited by
respondents serves as adequate basis for their procedural lapse.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission,[24] the
questioned order was null and void for failure of respondent tribunal to
comply with due process requirements; in Matanguihan v. Tengco,[25] the
questioned order was a patent nullity for failure to acquire jurisdiction over
the defendants, which fact the records plainly disclosed; and in National
Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals,[26] the questioned orders
were void for vagueness. No such patent nullity is evident in the Order issued
by the trial court in this case. Finally, while urgency may be a ground for
dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration, in the case of Vivo v.
Cloribel,[27] cited by respondents, the slow progress of the case would have
rendered the issues moot had a motion for reconsideration been availed of. We
find no such urgent circumstance in the case at bar.
Respondents, therefore, availed of a premature remedy when they
immediately raised the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari; and the
appellate court committed reversible error when it took cognizance of
respondents’ petition instead of dismissing the same outright.
We come now to the substantive issues of the petition.
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means “a pending suit.” It is
variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. While it is normally connected with the control which the court has
on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more
interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.[28]
The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the identity of parties in Civil
Cases No. 3123-2001-C and 3110-2001-C. Well-settled is the rule that lis
pendens requires only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties.[29]
There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest
between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the
latter was not impleaded in the first case.[30] The parties in these cases are
vying over the interests of the two opposing corporations; the individuals are
only incidentally impleaded, being the natural persons purportedly accused of
violating these corporations’ rights.
Likewise, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the
plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa,
does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the
case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.[31]
The identity of parties notwithstanding, litis pendentia does not obtain in this
case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The rights
asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two
subjects of controversy presented for adjudication; and two causes of action
are clearly involved. The fact that respondents instituted a prior action for
“Specific Performance and Damages” is not a ground for defeating the
petitioners’ action for “Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and
Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and
Damages.”
In Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C filed by respondents, the issue is whether or
not there was a breach of an oral promise to renew of the VAASA. The issue
in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, filed by petitioner, is whether petitioner has
the right to take possession of the subject properties. Petitioner’s right of
possession is founded on the ownership of the subject goods, which ownership
is not disputed and is not contingent on the extension or non-extension of the
VAASA. Hence, the replevin suit can validly be tried even while the prior
suit is being litigated in the Regional Trial Court.
Possession of the subject properties is not an issue in Civil Case No. 3110-
2001-C. The reliefs sought by respondent Integrated Silicon therein are as
follows: (1) execution of a written extension or renewal of the VAASA; (2)
compliance with the extended VAASA; and (3) payment of overdue accounts,
damages, and attorney’s fees. The reliefs sought by petitioner Agilent in Civil
Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, are as follows: (1) issuance of a
Writ of Replevin or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; (2) recovery
of possession of the subject properties; (3) damages and attorney’s fees.
Concededly, some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both
actions. It cannot be said, however, that exactly the same evidence will
support the decisions in both, since the legally significant and controlling facts
in each case are entirely different. Although the VAASA figures prominently
in both suits, Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is premised on a purported breach
of an oral obligation to extend the VAASA, and damages arising out of
Agilent’s alleged failure to comply with such purported extension. Civil Case
No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, is premised on a breach of the VAASA
itself, and damages arising to Agilent out of that purported breach.
It necessarily follows that the third requisite for litis pendentia is also absent.
The following are the elements of res judicata:
(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[32]
In this case, any judgment rendered in one of the actions will not amount to
res judicata in the other action. There being different causes of action, the
decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other.
Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other
case. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity of the causes of
action. Whatever difficulties or inconvenience may be entailed if both causes
of action are pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is not the
dismissal order of the Court of Appeals. The possible consolidation of said
cases, as well as stipulations and appropriate modes of discovery, may well be
considered by the court below to subserve not only procedural expedience but,
more important, the ends of justice.[33]
We now proceed to the issue of forum shopping.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum-
shopping was laid down in the case of Buan v. Lopez.[34] Forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other. There
being no litis pendentia in this case, a judgment in the said case will not
amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and respondents’
contention on forum shopping must likewise fail.
We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that may be suffered by
both petitioner and respondents if replevin is granted by the trial court in Civil
Case No. 3123-2001-C. If respondent Integrated Silicon eventually wins Civil
Case No. 3110-2001-C, and the VAASA’s terms are extended, petitioner
corporation will have to comply with its obligations thereunder, which would
include the consignment of properties similar to those it may recover by way
of replevin in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. However, petitioner will also
suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of replevin, resort to which is not only
allowed but encouraged by law.
Respondents argue that since Agilent is an unlicensed foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, it lacks the legal capacity to file suit.[35]
The assailed acts of petitioner Agilent, purportedly in the nature of “doing
business” in the Philippines, are the following: (1) mere entering into the
VAASA, which is a “service contract”;[36] (2) appointment of a full-time
representative in Integrated Silicon, to “oversee and supervise the production”
of Agilent’s products;[37] (3) the appointment by Agilent of six full-time staff
members, who were permanently stationed at Integrated Silicon’s facilities in
order to inspect the finished goods for Agilent;[38] and (4) Agilent’s
participation in the management, supervision and control of Integrated
Silicon,[39] including instructing Integrated Silicon to hire more employees to
meet Agilent’s increasing production needs,[40] regularly performing quality
audit, evaluation and supervision of Integrated Silicon’s employees,[41]
regularly performing inventory audit of raw materials to be used by Integrated
Silicon, which was also required to provide weekly inventory updates to
Agilent,[42] and providing and dictating Integrated Silicon on the daily
production schedule, volume and models of the products to manufacture and
ship for Agilent.[43]
A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from
bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a
foreign corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country. The
Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or
assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws.
The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation
“doing business” in the Philippines from accessing our courts.
In a number of cases, however, we have held that an unlicensed foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine
courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited from said corporation.[44] Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of
estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract
with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity
applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations.[45] The application of this
principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later
taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where
such person has received the benefits of the contract.[46]
The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in
Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign
corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue
before the Philippine courts;[47] (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing
business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts
on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any
business transaction[48]; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the
Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has
contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the
foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine
courts;[49] and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines
with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any
transaction.
The challenge to Agilent’s legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not
it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on
what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the
Philippines, as this Court observed in the case of Mentholatum v.
Mangaliman.[50] The Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts
constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines.
Jurisprudence has it, however, that the term “implies a continuity of
commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject
of its organization.”[51]
In Mentholatum,[52] this Court discoursed on the two general tests to
determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as “doing
business” in the Philippines. The first of these is the substance test, thus:[53]
The true test [for doing business], however, seems to be whether the foreign
corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it
was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over
to another.
The second test is the continuity test, expressed thus:[54]
The term [doing business] implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or
works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the
progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.
Although each case must be judged in light of its attendant circumstances,
jurisprudence has evolved several guiding principles for the application of
these tests. For instance, considering that it transacted with its Philippine
counterpart for seven years, engaging in futures contracts, this Court
concluded that the foreign corporation in Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals and Spouses Lara,[55] was doing business in the Philippines. In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Japan Airlines (“JAL”),[56] the Court
held that JAL was doing business in the Philippines, i.e., its commercial
dealings in the country were continuous – despite the fact that no JAL aircraft
landed in the country – as it sold tickets in the Philippines through a general
sales agent, and opened a promotions office here as well.
In General Corp. of the Phils. v. Union Insurance Society of Canton and
Fireman’s Fund Insurance,[57] a foreign insurance corporation was held to be
doing business in the Philippines, as it appointed a settling agent here, and
issued 12 marine insurance policies. We held that these transactions were not
isolated or casual, but manifested the continuity of the foreign corporation’s
conduct and its intent to establish a continuous business in the country. In
Eriks PTE Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Enriquez,[58] the foreign corporation
sold its products to a Filipino buyer who ordered the goods 16 times within an
eight-month period. Accordingly, this Court ruled that the corporation was
doing business in the Philippines, as there was a clear intention on its part to
continue the body of its business here, despite the relatively short span of time
involved. Communication Materials and Design, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, ITEC, et al.[59] and Top-Weld Manufacturing v. ECED, IRTI, et
al.[60] both involved the License and Technical Agreement and Distributor
Agreement of foreign corporations with their respective local counterparts that
were the primary bases for the Court’s ruling that the foreign corporations
were doing business in the Philippines.[61] In particular, the Court cited the
highly restrictive nature of certain provisions in the agreements involved, such
that, as stated in Communication Materials, the Philippine entity is reduced to
a mere extension or instrument of the foreign corporation. For example, in
Communication Materials, the Court deemed the “No Competing Product”
provision of the Representative Agreement therein restrictive.[62]
The case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been
adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation. The Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 (the “FIA”; Republic Act No. 7042, as amended),
defines “doing business” as follows:
Sec. 3, par. (d). The phrase “doing business” shall include soliciting orders,
service contracts, opening offices, whether called “liaison” offices or
branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or
periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity, or
corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity
of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain
or of the purpose and object of the business organization.

An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act
No. 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not
constitute “doing business” in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended
by Republic Act No. 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed
“doing business”:
(1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic
corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as
such investor;
(2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such
corporation;
(3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the
Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s or distributor’s
own name and account;
(4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or
broadcast media;
(5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the
purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines;
(6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company
to be used in the processing of products for export;
(7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and
(8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale
which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines
machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the
same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services.
By and large, to constitute “doing business”, the activity to be undertaken in
the Philippines is one that is for profit-making.[63]
By the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilent’s activities in the Philippines were
confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the
purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2)
consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing
of products for export. As such, we hold that, based on the evidence
presented thus far, Agilent cannot be deemed to be “doing business” in the
Philippines. Respondents’ contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to
file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our
courts.
Finally, as to Agilent’s purported failure to state a cause of action against the
individual respondents, we likewise rule in favor of petitioner. A Motion to
Dismiss hypothetically admits all the allegations in the Complaint, which
plainly alleges that these individual respondents had committed or permitted
the commission of acts prejudicial to Agilent. Whether or not these
individuals had divested themselves of their interests in Integrated Silicon, or
are no longer members of Integrated Silicon’s Board of Directors, is a matter
of defense best threshed out during trial.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574 dated August 12,
2002, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is
REINSTATED. Agilent’s application for a Writ of Replevin is GRANTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Case Digest Agilent Technologies Singapore vs. Integrated Silicon
Techngology Philippines Corp.
[GR 154618, 14 April 2004]
Facts: Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. is a foreign corporation,
which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation is a private domestic
corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and assembling electronics components. Teoh Kiang Hong,
Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current
members of Integrated Silicon’s board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela
Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members.
The juridical relation among the various parties in the case can be traced to a
5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA), entered into
on 2 April 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard
Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (HP-Singapore).
Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture
and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore.
HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon;
transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated
Silicon the purchase price of the finished products. The VAASA had a five-
year term, beginning on 2 April 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by
mutual written consent. On 19 September 1999, with the consent of Integrated
Silicon, HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to
Agilent. On 25 May 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for “Specific
Performance and Damages” against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim
Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor (Civil Case 3110-01-C),
alleging that Agilent breached the parties’ oral agreement to extend the
VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that Agilent be ordered to execute a
written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured
and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
On 1 June 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty.
Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was
not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to
assail the court’s jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On 2 July 2001,
Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng,
Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M.
dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla, for “Specific Performance, Recovery of
Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, and Damages”, before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 92 (Civil Case 3123-2001-C). Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin
or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued
ordering Integrated Silicon, et. al. to immediately return and deliver to Agilent
its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic
components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon; and that the
latter be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-
2001-C, on the grounds of lack of Agilent’s legal capacity to sue; litis
pendentia; forum shopping; and failure to state a cause of action. On 4
September 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted
Agilent’s application for a writ of replevin.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, upon
motion filed by Integrated Silicon, et. al., Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch
92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case 3123-2001-C. The case was re-
raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case 3110-
2001-C is pending. On 12 August 2002, the Court of Appeals granted
Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order
of the trial court dated 4 September 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case 3123-2001-C. Agilent filed the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether a foreign corporation without a license is incapacitated from bringing
an action in Philippine courts.
Whether Agilent was doing business in the Philippines.
Held:
1. A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from
bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign
corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country. Section 133 of
the Corporation Code provides that "No foreign corporation transacting
business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall
be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be
sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals
on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." The
aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation “doing
business” in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases,
however, the Court held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine
citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation.
Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from
challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the
same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny
corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic
corporations. The application of this principle prevents a person contracting
with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance
with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits
of the contract. The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to
bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if
a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it
cannot sue before the Philippine courts; (2) if a foreign corporation is not
doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine
courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent
of any business transaction; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the
Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has
contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the
foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine
courts; and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with
the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
2. The challenge to Agilent’s legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or
not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule
on what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the
Philippines, the Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute
doing or transacting business in the Philippines. An analysis of the relevant
case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA, as amended by RA
8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not
constitute “doing business” in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by RA 8179) provides that the
following shall not be deemed “doing business”: (1) Mere investment as a
shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do
business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee
director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing
a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts
business in the representative’s or distributor’s own name and account; (4)
The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast
media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the
purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6)
Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be
used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the
Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated
contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the
Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines,
servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar
incidental services. By and large, to constitute “doing business”, the activity to
be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making. Herein, by
the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilent’s activities in the Philippines were
confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the
purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2)
consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing
of products for export. As such, Agilent cannot be deemed to be “doing
business” in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s contention that
Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license
before it can sue before our courts.
G.R. No. 125607. March 18, 2004]
RUFINA C. CAYANA, JOSEFINA C. RABINA, MERCEDES C. DE
GUZMAN, and SUSANA C. SAMBALE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. PASTOR & ROSITA CAYABYAB, SPS.
MARCELIANO & ROSALIA CAYABYAB, SPS. RAFAEL &
ROSEMARIE CAYABYAB and INSURANCE CORP. OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant case involves an unfortunate, albeit all too common, property
dispute among siblings.
The petitioners, Rufina Cayana, Josefina Rabina, Mercedes de Guzman and
Susana Sambale, and respondents Pastor and Marceliano Cayabyab are
children of the spouses Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab. The other
respondents, Rosita and Rosalia Cayabyab are the wives of Pastor and
Marceliano Cayabyab, respectively. Respondent Rosemarie Cayabyab-Ramos
is the daughter of Marceliano Cayabyab, while respondent Rafael Ramos is
the former’s husband. Their dispute involves two parcels of land[1]
specifically described thus:
First Parcel ¾ A parcel of land Lot A, (LRC), Psd-231284, being a portion of
Plan Psu-136181, LRC Rec. No. N—8805, situated in Rosario, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. Bounded on the E by Mactec River; SE by Agapito Cabrera; SW
by Anselmo Cabrera; NW by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area
of 11,735 square meters, more or less. Covered by TCT No. 29332 and
assessed at P1,730.00; and
Second Parcel ¾ A parcel of land Lot 2-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36621,
being a portion of Lot 2 described on Plan Psu-70452, GLRO Rec. No. 41762,
situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N by Ludovico
Cayabyab & Agapito Cabrera; E by Eduvejas Cabrera and Lot 2-B of
subdivision plan; S by Lot 2-B and W by Clemente Cruz, containing an area
of 20,000 square meters more or less. Covered by TCT No. 117094, declared
under Tax Decl. No. 29333 and assessed at P2,600.00.
It appears that Raymundo Cayabyab, with the marital consent of Eulalia
Cayabyab, sold the First and Second Parcels to Pastor Cayabyab by virtue of
two Deeds of Absolute Sale[2] respectively dated March 3, 1976 and May 13,
1965. Thereupon, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 117134 and
117094 covering the First and Second Parcels, respectively, were issued in the
name of Pastor Cayabyab.
After the death of Raymundo Cayabyab on March 20, 1976, his wife Eulalia
Cayabyab executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim,[3] dated June 4, 1976, on
the subject parcels of land, alleging that the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor
of Pastor Cayabyab were forgeries. However, on June 17, 1976, she executed
another Affidavit[4] recognizing Pastor Cayabyab’s title and requesting the
cancellation of the adverse claims earlier annotated on the titles of the subject
properties.
On February 9, 1977, Eulalia Cayabyab, together with her children,
Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo, filed a
Complaint[5] against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab for the annulment of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the
corresponding TCT Nos. 117134 and 117094, and reconveyance of the First
and Second Parcels. They alleged that both parcels were fraudulently
registered in the name of Pastor Cayabyab by means of the forged Deeds of
Absolute Sale. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15298.
On February 28, 1977, Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab entered into an agreement
of counter guaranty with the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP)
with respect to the Second Parcel.
On June 12, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab mortgaged[6] the First Parcel to the Rural
Bank of Urbiztondo.
On October 10, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rosafina
Reginaldo for P15,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
Subsequently, TCT No. 117134 was cancelled and TCT No. 124304[8] was
issued in the name of Rosafina Reginaldo on October 11, 1977. On the same
day, the mortgage over the First Parcel was cancelled.[9]
On December 23, 1977, Rosafina Reginaldo mortgaged[10] the First Parcel to
the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00.
Meanwhile, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 proceeded. Pastor and
Rosita Cayabyab filed an Answer asserting the validity of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale but were subsequently declared in default after failing to appear
at the pre-trial conference. Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.
In a decision[11] dated June 17, 1978, the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan declared the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and
March 3, 1976, and the corresponding TCT Nos. 117094 and 117134 covering
the Second and First Parcels, respectively, null and void. The court, however,
denied the prayer for reconveyance in view of the plaintiffs’ evidence
attesting to the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab is still the owner and possessor of
the subject properties. No appeal was taken and the decision consequently
became final.
On April 21, 1981, the mortgage over the First Parcel was foreclosed and the
Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, as the highest bidder, bought the property.[12] The
bank consolidated its title on August 2, 1982[13] and TCT No. 142479[14]
cancelling TCT No. 124304 was issued in its name on August 19, 1982.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale[15] dated September 3, 1982, the Rural Bank of
Urbiztondo sold the First Parcel to Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab for the
amount of P7,221.95. Two days later, the latter were issued TCT No.
142887[16] cancelling TCT No. 142479.
For the amount of P10,000.00, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab sold the
First Parcel to Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Estate Property[17] dated January 14, 1983. On January 25,
1983, TCT No. 143859[18] cancelling TCT No. 142887 was issued in the
name of the Ramos spouses.
On June 8, 1983, the petitioners herein as plaintiffs, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 37, a Verified Complaint[19]
docketed as Civil Case No. 15937 against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab,
Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos and ICP.
They prayed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of Rosafina
Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael Ramos and
Rosemarie Cayabyab; cancellation of TCT Nos. 124304, 142479, 142887, and
143859 issued in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo,
Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos,
respectively; and recovery of possession of the First and Second Parcels by
virtue of an alleged deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by
Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners herein.
As regards the Second Parcel, the plaintiffs prayed that ICP or Pastor
Cayabyab, in whose name TCT No. 117094 remained, be ordered to surrender
the title. It appears that ICP was not served with summons because it had
already ceased to exist due to bankruptcy.[20]
The plaintiffs theorized that the documents sought to be annulled are
fictitious, simulated and entered into in bad faith as the defendants had full
knowledge of the pendency of, as well as the consequent decision in, Civil
Case No. 15298.
On the other hand, the defendants claimed that all the transactions over the
First Parcel were entered into free from all liens and encumbrances not
inscribed in the title.
Recognizing the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 on the nullity of the
Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in favor of Pastor
Cayabyab, the trial court rendered on August 22, 1989, a Decision in Civil
Case No. 15937 in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. The plaintiffs to be the true and lawful owners over the landholdings in
question;
2. The annulment of all documents pertaining thereto; namely, Exhs. C,D,
& E;
3. The cancellation of TCT No. 124304, TCT No. 142479; TCT No.
142887 & TCT No. 143859;
4. The defendants restore possession of the landholdings in question to
plaintiffs;
5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of
P20,000.00 as moral damages;
6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of
P5,000.00 as/for attorney’s fees;
7. The defendant Pastor Cayabyab and/or Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines to surrender TCT No. 117094 free from all liens and
encumbrances;
8. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
9. The dismissal of defendants’ counterclaim; and
10. The defendants to pay the costs of this suit.[21]
The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to
the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. According to them, the institution of
Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and allowed them to
adduce evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of
land.
Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision[22] dated
August 21, 1995, held that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there
being no identity of the causes of action in Civil Case No. 15298 and Civil
Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public
documents, the former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March
3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the corresponding TCTs for the First and
Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case covered not only the
annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but
also the recovery of possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation
inter vivos executed by Eulalia Cayabyab.
The Court of Appeals also upheld the validity of the deeds of sale and the
corresponding TCTs in favor of the appellants, declaring that the affidavit
cancelling the adverse claim annotated in TCT No. 117134 was duly admitted;
that the subsequent sales transactions have not been proven to be simulated or
fictitious; that no notice of lis pendens was recorded in the title; and that the
appellees were not able to prove their claim of title having failed to present the
original or certified true copy of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos or to
prove the existence and due execution of the original deed.
Hence, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court, accordingly
declaring that the deeds of sale as well as the TCTs which emanated from
them valid and enforceable, and the appellants the true and lawful owners and
possessors of the properties in question. The Court of Appeals denied the
appellees’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution[23] dated July 11,
1996.
In the instant Verified Petition[24] dated July 30, 1996, the petitioners
reiterate their argument that the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976
and May 13, 1965, the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second
Parcels, and the subsequent transfers of the subject properties are all null and
void by virtue of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring them to
be so. They allege that a notice of lis pendens and an affidavit of adverse
claim were duly annotated on the TCTs covering the two parcels of land.
Hence, Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael
and Rosemarie Ramos should be considered purchasers in bad faith. The
petitioners further claim that the considerations for the subsequent transfers
were grossly inadequate leading to the conclusion that the respondents were
motivated by a desire to execute fictitious deeds of conveyance. The
petitioners also insist that the First and Second Parcels were donated to the
petitioners by their mother, Eulalia Cayabyab, through an alleged Donation
Inter Vivos attached to the petition as Annex “F”. Finally, they reiterate that
Pastor Cayabyab and ICP entered into a contract of guaranty over the Second
Parcel despite the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the
title.
In their Comment[25] dated October 8, 1997, the respondents contend that
whatever doubts may have been raised by Eulalia Cayabyab on the validity of
Pastor Cayabyab’s title were removed when she executed the Affidavit
requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims inscribed in the titles. Hence,
the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 in favor of
Pastor Cayabyab are legal and valid. The deed of donation inter vivos
allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab did not vest ownership and
possession over the subject properties in favor of the petitioners because of the
prior sale to Pastor Cayabyab. Besides, Eulalia Cayabyab did not have the
right to donate the subject properties to the petitioners because there was no
previous partition of the intestate estate of Raymundo Cayabyab.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1998, the Court denied the instant petition for
non-compliance with the Resolution of February 25, 1998, requiring the
petitioners to file a reply to the respondents’ Comment. The petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Reply[26] dated September 21, 1998. In our
Resolution of November 16, 1998, we granted the motion, reinstated and gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda.[27]
The pivotal issue is whether the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 operates to
bar the respondents’ defenses and counterclaims in Civil Case No. 15937.
The petitioners insist that the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
15298 has settled with finality the nullity of Pastor Cayabyab’s title.
Following the principle of res judicata, the respondents, as transferees of
Pastor Cayabyab, should not have been allowed to adduce evidence to prove
their ownership of the subject parcels of land.
The appellate court, however, ruled that the principle of res judicata does not
apply there being no identity of causes of action in the two cases.
The trial court and the appellate court both erred in the manner by which they
treated and applied the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 to the instant
case. This error apparently stems from a misreading of the provisions in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the effect of judgments. Section 47, Rule 39
thereof provides:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person,
or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a
particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of
the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.
The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment,
under paragraph (b) above and conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph
(c) is well-laid. In Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,[28] we held:
There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when, between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as
to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could
have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second
cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first
judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein.[29]
For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered
on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action
between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the
third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.
In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos.
15298 and 15937, and consequently, the application of the doctrine of res
judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their
maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of
action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is
a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different
states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two
actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.[30]
We find that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No.
15937, which involves the annulment of the subsequent transactions and
TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the recovery of possession
thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily
more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the
annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the
corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. Furthermore, the
decision in Civil Case No. 15298 necessarily turned only upon whether the
Deeds of Absolute Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case
No. 15937 will also have to include a determination of the good or bad faith of
the subsequent purchasers. Res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
Nonetheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have applied the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of
Quezon City,[31] the concept of conclusiveness of judgment was explained,
thus:
xxx conclusiveness of judgment—states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue
and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but
merely identity of issues.[32]
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the final decision in Civil
Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor
of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject parcels
of land precluded the Court of Appeals from further adjudicating on the
validity of the said deeds and titles.
The appellate court’s pronouncement that “the decision in Civil Case No.
15298 which declares null and void the deeds of absolute sale dated May 13,
1965 and March 20, 1976 and the corresponding TCT is not conclusive upon
the action in Civil Case No. 15937”[33] is, therefore, flawed.
It is likewise utterly erroneous for the appellate court to have disregarded the
final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs
covering the two parcels of land. It is axiomatic that decisions which have
long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts and the
appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court’s final
judgment.[34]
The issue concerning the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13,
1965 and March 3, 1976 and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject
properties must be laid to rest. These documents cannot be relied upon by
Pastor Cayabyab and his successors-in-interest as the basis of their claim of
ownership over the First Parcel.
Having said that, we find it necessary still to determine whether the
respondents who take title over the First Parcel from Pastor Cayabyab were
purchasers in good faith, i.e., whether they bought the property without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and paid a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before they had
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.[35] If so,
their rights will be protected and the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and
the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties cannot be
successfully invoked to invalidate the titles subsequently issued, for it has
been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid
title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes.[36]
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no
way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.[37] However, this principle admits of an unchallenged exception:
…a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient
facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title
of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or
arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not
merit the protection of the law.[38] [Emphasis supplied]
A judicious evaluation of the records and the applicable legal principles leads
us to the conclusion that the subsequent purchasers of the First Parcel were
not purchasers in good faith.
First. The Court notes—and it is not disputed—that Rosafina Reginaldo, the
Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and
Rosemarie Ramos are successors-in-interest of Pastor Cayabyab, having
purchased the First Parcel after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
15298. In the case of the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and Rafael and Rosemarie
Ramos, they even purchased the property after the decision in Civil Case No.
15298 had been rendered.
The records reveal that a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,[39] dated
November 18, 1985, was filed by Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano
and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Cayabyab assailing the
order and resolutions of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15937, delegating the
reception of the plaintiffs’ evidence ex-parte to the Branch Clerk of Court and
denying the defendants’ motions for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals[40] set aside the questioned order and resolutions and directed the
respondent Judge to allow the defendants to adduce their evidence. The
decision was anchored, among others, on the defendants’ representation that
the plaintiffs were neither parties nor intervenors in Civil Case No. 15298 but
have only laid claim on the subject properties as donees.[41] This allegation is
patently false since, as previously mentioned, Eulalia Cayabyab and her
children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo
Cayabyab, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. Even so, the decision
apparently became one of the bases for the respondents’ claim that the
institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues thereby
allowing them to adduce evidence in support of their claim of ownership and
possession of the subject properties, a stand sanctioned by the appellate court
in the instant case.
Second. It is important to emphasize that Marceliano Cayabyab was among
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298, contrary to the vehement denial in his
Answer,[42] dated July 21, 1983, in which he claimed that “answering
defendants (Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab) are not parties to the said case
and are totally strangers as regards the same.”[43]
Third. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298, Eulalia Cayabyab and
her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina,
Buenaventura and Josefina, filed a new case[44] for the annulment of certain
documents affecting several parcels of land, including the two parcels subject
of the instant petition, against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab and Rosafina
Reginaldo. This was revealed by the respondents themselves in their
Comment[45] dated October 8, 1997 and Memorandum[46] dated January 20,
1999.
Parenthetically, in order to bolster their claim of valid title, the respondents
constantly underscore the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab executed an
Affidavit[47] dated June 17, 1976, affirming the genuineness of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and requesting the cancellation of
the adverse claims annotated on the TCTs covering the First and Second
Parcels. It should be noted, however, that after executing the Affidavit on June
17, 1976, Eulalia Cayabyab herself filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. 15298)
for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the reconveyance of the
subject properties on February 9, 1977. It is beyond this Court’s power to
hypothesize on the reasons for Eulalia Cayabyab’s change of mind. What is
clear is that the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which
subsequently became final. Eulalia Cayabyab’s Affidavit which was executed
before the institution of Civil Case No. 15298 cannot, by any means, be
construed as a bar to the final decision declaring Pastor Cayabyab’s titles null
and void.
Curiously, the respondents never questioned the petitioners’ assertion that a
notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of the TCT covering the First
Parcel. The trial court did not rule on this point but the Court of Appeals
declared that there was no such notice annotated on TCT No. 117134.
Whether there was an annotation inscribed in TCT No. 117134 will not,
however, affect the Court’s finding that the respondents are not purchasers in
good faith.
To summarize, the records disclose circumstances indicating that Rosafina
Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and the respondents Marceliano and
Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos were not purchasers in
good faith.
Rosafina Reginaldo purchased the First Parcel during the pendency of Civil
Case No. 15298. Moreover, she was one of the defendants, together with
Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, in Civil Case No. SCC-552 filed by Eulalia
Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana,
Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina for the annulment of certain documents
concerning several parcels of land, among which was the First Parcel.
As for the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, it became a mortgagee of the First
Parcel initially on June 12, 1977 and later, on December 23, 1977, after the
filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298 on February 9, 1977. After
the decision in the case became final, the bank purchased the property during
foreclosure proceedings. It later sold the property to Marceliano Cayabyab,
one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298.
As regards Marceliano, his participation in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and SCC-
552 seals his knowledge of the petitioners’ claim over the subject properties.
Likewise, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos cannot feign ignorance of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 and the final decision therein declaring
null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued
in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. The fact that the parties are family members
also convinces the Court that the respondents’ assertion of lack of knowledge
of Civil Case No. 15298 and the petitioners’ claim over the subject properties
is a mere pretext.
As regards the Second Parcel, it is not disputed that TCT No. 117094 is in
Pastor Cayabyab’s name and possession. Emanating, as it did, from the final
decision in Civil Case No. 15298, Pastor Cayabyab’s title is null and void.
The final issue pertains to the deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed
by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners. The trial court sustained the
existence and validity of the deed and declared the plaintiffs, the petitioners
herein, to be the true and lawful owners of the subject properties.
Interestingly, petitioner Rufina Cayana verified the existence of the deed of
donation inter vivos on direct examination. She declared:
Q: You said, you know the two parcels of land, subject of this litigation,
why do you know them?
A: I know them, sir, because I am one of the owners of said parcels of land.
Q: Who are your co-owners?
A: Mercedes C. de Guzman, Josefina C. Rabina and Susana C. Sambale,
sir.
Q: How did you and your co-owners acquire these two parcels of land?
A: By way of donation intervivos executed by our mother, Eulalia Aquino
Vda. De Cayabyab, sometime on January 5, 1980, sir.
Q: Do you have a copy of that donation intervivos?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Showing to you this document, entitled ‘Donation Inter-Vivos”, will you
go over this if this is the same document you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir, that is the one.
ATTY. PALMA:
May we pray that this document be marked as Exh. A.[48] [Emphasis
supplied.]
Petitioner Josefina Rabina also confirmed the existence of the deed. She
testified:
Q: Is there any document regarding the donation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Showing to you this deed of donation, is this the deed of donation you
are referring to?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: There is a signature above the typewritten name ‘Eulalia Aquino Vda. De
Cayabyab,’ do you know those (sic) signature is that?
A: Yes, sir, this is the signature of my mother.[49] [Emphasis supplied.]
The appellate court, however, pronounced that the petitioners were not able to
prove their claim of ownership of the subject properties as they failed to
present the original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos.
The Court of Appeals, in fact, held that the purported Exhibit “A” is actually
the allegation on the existence of the alleged deed contained in the complaint
itself.[50]
Due to the conflicting findings of the trial court and the appellate court, we
requested[51] the transmittal to this Court of, among others, the deed of
donation inter vivos marked as Exhibit “A” for the plaintiffs during the direct
examination of Rufina Cayana. In her reply dated September 2, 2002, the
clerk of court informed the Court that the entire original records of Civil Case
No. 15937, including Exhibit “A,” were listed in the trial court’s records as
among the exhibits forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
However, except for the Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs-Appellees[52]
which lists Exhibit “A,” the records of this case are bereft of any showing that
the plaintiffs formally offered in evidence the original or certified true copy of
the deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab.
The fact that it was only when they filed the instant petition that the
petitioners actually attached as Annex “F”[53] a copy of the said deed is
further proof of the petitioners’ lapse. As a rule, the court shall not consider
evidence which has not been formally offered.[54] This being so, the donation
in favor of the petitioners cannot be upheld.
This leaves us with the question of who the rightful owners of the subject
properties are. The Court holds that the First and Second Parcels properly
belong to the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab, the same to be
partitioned in accordance with the law on succession.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the trial court is accordingly
REINSTATED but with the modification that the First and Second Parcels
should be included in the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab and
partitioned in accordance with the law on succession.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
Case Digest CAYANA VS. CAGR 125607 MARCH 18, 2004
FACTS:
It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father, with themarital consent
of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of the respondents in this
case. At the death of the father, the motherfiled an Affidavit of Adverse
Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of their son wereforgeries. However, later on, she
issued an affidavit withdrawing suchadverse claims.Later on, together with
petitioners of this case and respondentMarceliano, they filed a case against
respondent Pastor, for thecancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
reconveyance of the twoparcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor
entered into anagreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation
usingsecond parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank andsold
first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who thenmortgaged the
land to respondent bank.As the civil case against respondents was ongoing,
respondentsfiled an answer but were found to be in default, the court
allowedpetitioners to file evidence ex parte.The court decided the civil case in
favor of petitioners, declaringthe deed of absolute sale null and void but
denied the prayer forreconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner
of the land.No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was
deemedfinal.The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and
thebank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it
torespondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses
M.Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos.The petitioners
filed a verified complaint for the nullification andcancellation of the deeds of
absolute sale of the respondents. Theyasked also for the possession of the 2
parcels of land due to thealleged donation inter vivos of their mother.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of thedecision included
the application of res judicata. Respondentsappealed this to the CA
contending the misuse of res judicata. CAdecided in favor of the respondents.
It held that res judicata wasinapplicable and also, declared the deeds of
absolute sale and TCT’svalid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was
an affidavitwithdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of
landwere not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was
noevidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes abar to the
defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?
HELD:
Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effectof judgments
or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 47.
Effect of judgments or final orders.—
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
asfollows:(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or
inrespect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of
adeceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legalcondition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to another,the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing,the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of theperson; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the
death of thetestator or intestate;(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order
is, with respect to thematter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could havebeen raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
andtheir successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencementto the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing andunder the same
title and in the same capacity;(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successorsin interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
ornecessarily thereto.
Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment is not applicable tothis case since
the requisites for these two to apply are not present.There is ‘bar by prior
judgment’ when, between the first case wherethe judgment was rendered and
the second case which is sought to bebarred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.The judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to thesubsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in
controversy,including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as
toevery matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat theclaim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which mighthave been offered
for that purpose and of all matters that could havebeen adjudged in that case.
But where between the first and secondcases, there is identity of parties but no
identity of cause of action, thefirst judgment is conclusive in the second case,
only as to thosematters actually and directly controverted and determined and
not asto matters merely involved therein.
For res judicata to apply, theremust be (1) a former final judgment rendered
on the merits; (2) thecourt must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and theparties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
actionbetween the first and second actions. According to the appellate
court,the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present inthis
case.The doctrine that should have been followed in this case isconclusiveness
of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in aformer suit and there
was judicially passed upon and determined by acourt of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgmenttherein as far as the parties
to that action and persons in privity withthem are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future actionbetween such parties or their privies, in the
same court or any othercourt of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or
different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority.The decision of the trial court, which was final, declaring thedeeds
of absolute sale null and void, precluded the CA from furtheradjudicating the
validity of the deeds and titles.
G.R. No. L-39674 January 31, 1978
URBANA VELASCO AROC, assisted by her husband CELESTINO
AROC, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION and
CIRILO B. GARCIA and FELICIANA BITO, defendants-appellees.
Benjamin A. Bongolan for appellant.
E.B. Garcia & Associates for appellees Garcia and Bito.
GUERRERO, J.:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No.
46525-R entitled "Urbana Velasco Aroc assisted by her husband Celestino
Aroc, Plaintiff-Appelle, versus People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
and Cirilo B. Garcia and Feliciana Bito, Defendants-Appellees," pursuant to
the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court per its Resolution dated
October 31, 1974 since the appeal involves pure questions of law.
Plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals the order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dismissing on the ground of
res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the award and sale of a
parcel of land, known as Lot 6, Block E-144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon
City, to defendants-appellees Cirilo R. Garcia and his spouse, Feliciano Bito,
by the other defendant-appellee PHHC, and the cancellation of the certificate
of title issued to said spouses.
The facts are stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thus:
From the allegations of the complaint we gather that as early as 1956 plaintiff
and her family started occupying one-half of the lot in controversy while a
certain Alfonso Naparan and his family occupied the other half. In 1956
plaintiff constructed a house of strong materials worth P3,270, planted fruit-
bearing trees and fenced the portion occupied by her. In May 1956 she filed
with defendant corporation an application for the award and sale of said
portion to her. She filed another application in January 1957. Later she
discovered both applications were missing from the files of defendant
corporation. Upon suggestion of an official of the latter, she reapplied for the
same portion of Lot 6 on February 3, 1966. However, Lot 6 was unlawfully
and in bad faith awarded and sold to defendants spouses who were
disqualified from purchasing it, since they had previuosly purchased a 1,450-
square meter lot (Lot 12, Block W-28) from defendant corporation and
already owned several lots in Greater Manila.
It is further gathered that plaintiff formally protested the award and sale of Lot
6 to defendants spouses with the Board of Directors of defendant corporation.
The investigating officer recommended the rescission of the conditional sale
of Lot 6 and the award of the lot to plaintiff and Alfonso Naparan. In spite of
said recommendation defendant corporation executed a deed of sale in favor
of defendant-spouses. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106146 covering the
lot was subsequently issued to them by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
At the time of the filing of the complaint an January 22, 1968, plaintiff and
her family still occupying one-half portion of the lot.
In its answer with counterclaim, defendant corporation denied the material
allegations of the complaint and, as special and affirmative defenses, alleged
that the complaint stated no cause of action; that plaintiff was a mere squatter
of Lot 6; that the award and sale of said lot to defendants-spouses was legal
and valid, for they had complied with the requirements imposed by defendant
corporation for its acquisition; and that plaintiff's claim had been passed upon
by an investigating committee which found the same to he without basis.
Defendants-spouses likewise denied the material allegations of the complaint.
They set up as special and affirmative defenses the following: that there was a
pending action to quiet title and/or recovery of possession of Lot 6 with
preliminary injunction and damages filed by them against Alfonso Naparan
and herein plaintiff Civil Case No. Q-10442) and in her answer she raised the
same issues of fact and law alleged by her in the present complaint; that there
was a valid ground to dismiss the new complaint due to the pendency of Civil
Case No. Q-10442 between the same parties for the same cause of action; that
Lot 6 was lawfully awarded and sold to them by defendant corporation and if
ever plaintiff suffered damages her action should be against the corporation;
that plaintiffs could no petitioner question the validity of the award and sale,
since it was duly approved by the General Manager of defendant corporation
after the investigations on plaintiff's protest had been conducted and she had
been given the opportunity to air her grievances, but her protest was dismissed
for lack of merit.
Defendants-spouses later ammended their answer to include the i following
allegation:
6-A That on December 26, 1968, the Honorable Judge Honorato r,. Masakyan
Branch V of this Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. Q-10442, the
dispositive portion of Which is quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Cirilo B.
Garcia and against defendants Alfonso Naparan and Urbana Velasco Vda. de
Aroc, plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia the rightful and legal owner of Lot 6, Block E-
144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon City, and ordering the defendants Alfonso
Naparan and urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc and all person claiming rights
under them to vacate the premises in question and restore the possession
thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay the plaintiff the sum P500.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
so much so that the above decision having become final and executory, there
is nothing left for this Honorable Court to do except to dismiss the instant
complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata, otherwise their will be no
more end to the controversy, as the parties will be litigating, all over again on
the same issues.
Two days after the filing of the amended answer, defendants spouses moved
for the dismissal of the action on the ground of res judicata or bar by prior
judgment. Attached to their motion were the complaint, answer and decision
in Civil Case No.
Q-10442. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action.
Appellant now assails before this Court the order of dismissal, claiming that
the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the requisite that there must be
Identity of cause of action between the two cases not being present, since the
case on appeal is for annulment of the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants-
spouses while Civil Case No. Q-10442 was for quieting of title and/or
recovery of possession. Thus, the sole issue to determine is whether or not the
final judgment in civil case No. Q-10442 is a bar to the case before us. This
involves a question of law (Bengua vs. Abay, CA-G.R. No. 19408-R, July
30,1959) which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. It is for
the Supreme court to pass upon the issue in accordance with Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended. Said section vests in the Supreme court
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of
law are involved.
Plaintiff-appellant, litigating this case on appeal as a pauper-litigant, contends
that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint on the ground of res
judicata. We find the contention to be meritorious.
In determining whether the final judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. Q-
10442 for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession, constitutes res
judicata as would bar the appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-11807,
now subject of this appeal, for annulment of award and deed of sale and
cancellation of the certificate of title to the land, We must examine if between
these two cases the requisites of res judicata are present, namely: 1) The
former judgment must be final; 2) It must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, 3) It must be a
judgment on the merits; and 4) There must be, between the first and second
actions, Identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. 2 It is only in
the Identity of cause of action that the parties dispute and disagree.
The term "cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant,
and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 3
Is there Identity of cause of action between the two aforementioned cases, the
first case for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession and the second
case for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of certificate of
title? This query can be answered by a searching look into and a careful
perusal of the records of said two cases.
In the first case, the records disclose that on Sept. 16, 1966, defendant-
appellee, Colonel Cirilo V. Garcia, filed against plaintiff-appellant Urbana vs.
Aroc and Juan Alfonso Naparan the complaint alleging that plaintiff therein is
the absolute owner in fee simple of the parcel of land, Lot No. 6, Block E-144
Pinahan Subdivision; that he acquired the land by way of purchase from the
PHHC on December 8, 1965; that said lot is now titled in the name of the
plaintiff and is covered by TCT No. 106146 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, that defendant therein, Urbana Velasco Aroc, asserts a claim of
ownership and right of decision to the land and in fact still occupies the land,
that defendant's claim of ownership and possession is invalid, ineffective and
prejudicial to plaintiff's title as owner in fee simple, consequently entitling
plaintiff to bring an action to remove the cloud on and to quiet his title; that
defendant owns a house constructed on the western portion of the land and
refuses to demolish or remove the same notwithstanding plaintiff's demand
therefor. The above allegations state the basic or ultimate facts which
constitute complaints cause of action.
Defendant Urbana Velasco Aroc having filed her answer on November 29,
1966 but failed to appear at the trial of the case, judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, declaring him the rightful and legal owner of the land,
and ordering defendant to vacate the premises in question and restore
possession thereof to the plaintiff plus the payment of attorneys fees and costs.
The above judgment became final and executory during the pendency of the
present case.
In the second case, now subject of this appeal in Civil Case No. 11807
instituted on January 22, 1968, the plaintiff therein Urbana Velasco Aroc
alleged that she is a bona fide occupant and possessor of the one-half portion
of Lot 6, Block E-144 Pinahan Subdivision,: that she started occupying the lot
as early as 1952; that in 1956, she built her own house therein made of strong
materials. introduced improvements and fenced the area; that she applied for
the award and subsequent sale to her of the one-half portion in May, 1946,
reiterated in January, 1957 and re-applied on Feb. 3, 1966; that the lot was,
however, awarded later to the defendant Cirilo V. Garcia and his wife
Feliciana Bito in bad faith, contrary to law and public policy.
The complaint further alleged that the awardees Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana
Bito are disqualified from purchasing Lot No. 6 because they had earlier
purchased a parcel of land formerly belonging to the PHHC, consisting of
1,460 sq. meters, known as Block 12, Lot W-8 covered under TCT No. 31596
of the land records of Quezon City, aside from the fact that they are already
owners and possessors of several other 'lots in Manila and in the suburbs; and
that the award to the spouses Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito was in
violation of the charter provisions of the PHHC. The above allegations
likewise establish the ultimate facts that constitute the cause of action of
plaintiff (now the appellant), entitling her to the one-half portion of Lot 6.
Considering now the cause of action in the first case and the cause of action in
the second case, the conclusion is inevitable that one is different from the
other; that they are not one and the same cause of action. The first seeks only
to remove the cloud on the title of the land. The action is premised on Art.
476, New Civil Code, which provides:
Art 476. When ever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, remembrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may, be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to teal
property or any interest therein.
The second seeks not only the nullification of the award and sale to the
awardee, the cancellation of the Certificate of Title, but also places in issue
the power and authority of the grantor (PHHC) to make the award and sell the
land to one disqualified to purchase the same, the awardee being a Colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as admitted by the PHHC. 4 The
qualification of the purchaser is likewise placed in issue. These issues are
more basic and fundamental than the quieting of the title and the removal of
the cloud on such title.
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a
second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally
applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or
whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule
that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however,
the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would
be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the
maintenance of the other. It has been said that this method is the best and most
accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties and it has even been described as
infallible. 5
Applying the test accordingly, We hold that the evidence needed to prove the
allegations of the second cause of action must necessarily be more than that in
the first case for in the herein second case, additional evidence must be
adduced to prove that the PHHC acted in violation of its charter, that the
PHHC made the award in violation of the presidential directive alleged in
plaintiff's "Opposition to Motion and to Reinstate Writ of Preliminary
Injunction," evidenced by a letter dated January 12, 1967 of the President of
the Philippines to the General Manager of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, directing the Board of said corporation to award the lots in the
Pinahan Area, Quezon City, to the actual and bona fide occupants there; 6 that
the awardees have previously purchased another lot from the PHHC and were
the owners of several other lots in Manila and Quezon City which disqualified
them from acquire the lot in controversy, evidenced by Annexes A & B. 7
There is merit to the claim of the appellant that the legality of the award and
sale of the lot in controversy was not directly litigated in the first case not only
because the defendant therein did not appear at the trial to adduce evidence,
but also because the PHHC, the grantor and vendor of the property, was not
impleaded as a party litigant in the case.
It is also a general rule that a judgment in an action to quiet title is not
conclusive as to matters not in issue and determined particularly where such
matters could not have been determined in such action. 8
Since the power or authority of the PHHC was not in issue in the first case to
quiet title, and neither was the qualification of the awardees, the plaintiff
therein, directly determined the judgment in said case is not conclusive and
binding in the pre. sent case for annulment of the award and sale, and the
cancellation of the title of the awardees or purchaser.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dated February 19, 1970 is hereby reversed
and the records remanded to the said court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Fernandez, JJ., concur
Case Digest URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. PHHCGR L-39674
JANUARY 31, 1978
FACTS:
The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of the Court of
First Instance dismissing on the ground of res judicata thecomplaint to declare
null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land.Appellants are occupants of
one-half of a parcel of land. Theyconstructed a house and made some
improvements on the land. Theylater on filed with appellee corporation
application for the award andsale of such portion of land. They did this for
several times withoutany action from appellee corporation. They later found
out that theparcel of land had been unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and
soldto appellee spouses, who according to appellants, are disqualified
frompurchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land alreadyfrom
appellee corporation together with other properties. Appellantsfiled a case
against the appellee corporation and spouses.In defense of the spouses, they
contend that the case should bedismissed due to the ground of res judicata. A
case was alreadydecided in their favor, wherein the issue was regarding
quieting of title. They contend that appellants are barred by prior
judgment.The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of
theappellants, using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata.
Itcontended that the prior case had already been final and executoryand that
there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss thecomplaint of the
appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
No, it is not. For the principle of res judicata to apply, fourrequisites must be
present: the former judgment must be final, it musthave been rendered by a
court with proper jurisdiction over the case,it must be a judgment on the
merits, and there must be, between thetwo cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action. In
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010Page 10
of 147
this case, it is only with regard to cause of action that the
partiesdisagree.Cause of action is defined to be an act or omission of
secondparty in violation of the legal rights of the other, and its
essentialelements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of
thedefendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of saidlegal
right.In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the quietingof title or
removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the caseat bar, the cause
of action was not only to ask for the nullification of the award and sale of the
parcel of land but also, it questions thevalidity of appellee corporation’s award
and sale of the parcel of landto the spouses. Given such, the two causes of
action are differentfrom one another.In the application of the doctrine of res
judicata wherein it issometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of
action, the testnormally employed is to consider the identity of the facts or
whetherthe same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts and
evidencewould sustain both, then the former would be a bar to any
subsequentaction. Otherwise, there wouldn’t be. And with applying such test,
itis found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of
action.Given aforementioned circumstances, the second cause of actionis
remanded to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.
Law of the Case
The principle that if the highest appellate court has determined a legal
question and returned the case to the court below for additional proceedings,
the question will not be determined differently on a subsequent appeal in the
same case where the facts remain the same.
The law of the case expresses the rule that the final judgment of the highest
court is the final determination of the rights of the parties. The doctrine of
"law of the case" is one of policy only, however, and will be disregarded when
compelling circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law
decided on the prior appeal. Such circumstances exist when an intervening or
contemporaneous change in the law has transpired by the establishment of
new precedent by a controlling authority or the overruling of former decisions.
Courts have ruled that instructions—directions given by the judge to the jury
concerning the law applicable to the case—are the "law of the case" where the
appealing defendant, the petitioner, accepted the instructions as correct at the
time they were given.
[A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131. August 20, 2001]
MIGUEL ARGEL, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERMINIA M. PASCUA,
RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 (Miguel Argel v. Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br.
25, Vigan Ilocos Sur). - This is an administrative complaint for Gross
Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M.
Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.[1]
Complainant alleged in his complaint that respondent Judge rendered a
Decision dated 19 August 1993[2] in Crim. Case No. 2999-V entitled People
v. Miguel Argel convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had
already been previously acquitted by respondent in her Decision[3] dated 22
July 1993, promulgated on 13 August 1993. Complainant contends that
respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
In a letter-explanation dated 7 March 1994 respondent Judge alleged that she
rendered the judgment of acquittal dated 22 July 1993 because she
erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the
accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. Her mistake
was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not
attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. However, when she
re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private
complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that
there was indeed one in the person of Tito Retreta. Hence she "revised" her
previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the
accused guilty of murder. Fully aware of her prior decision of acquittal,
respondent nevertheless ordered the police to bring complainant Argel to court
not for the purpose of having him incarcerated but only to inform him of her
new decision so that he could be made to answer for his civil liabilities arising
from the crime. Before she could explain the matter to complainant, the
latter's brother already filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of
Appeals.[4] According to respondent, she decided to await the hearing of the
petition before setting complainant free so that she could give him a copy of
her new decision.[5]
In his Reply to the letter-explanation of respondent, complainant additionally
charged respondent with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution
in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of
stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision.[6]
In a Memorandum dated 11 May 2001 the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent be fined P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law.
As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-
V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was
promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who
positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after
respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the
fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon re-
reading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her
intention to"revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as
"uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the
decision."[7] The reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was
rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her
attention.
Respondent Judge explained that the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she
wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent
Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta,
sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P60,000.00 for actual damages.
Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to
amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in
nature,[8] to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the
dispositive portion,[9] or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a
moro-moro or mock trial.[10] A final decision is the law of the case and is
immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
incorrectness.[11]
In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its
promulgation.[12] It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment[13]
except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order
reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to
modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case.[14]
Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a
decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the
decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the
bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and
judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have
known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without
violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[15]
The fact that respondent never had any intention of having complainant
incarcerated on the basis of the second decision but only to make him answer
for the civil liabilities arising from the crime, as respondent explained, cannot
exculpate her from administrative liability. On the contrary, such thinking on
the part of respondent that she could still "revise" a promulgated decision of
acquittal even for such a purpose underscores, not mitigates, her gross
ignorance.
We cannot write finis to this case without also commenting on respondent's
negligence in the preparation of her decision. Judges have always been
reminded to take down their own notes of salient portions of hearings and not
to rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes. The pivotal testimony of Tito
Retreta would not have been overlooked and consequently disregarded had
respondent prepared her own notes and read them as she was supposed to.
WHEREFORE, for Gross Ignorance of the Law respondent Judge Herminia
M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, is FINED P20,000.00, the same
to be deducted from her retirement benefits. Since respondent has already
compulsorily retired as of 18 September 1998, let her retirement benefits be
immediately released to her minus the amount of P20,000.00 herein imposed
on her as fine.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Case Digest of Argel vs. Judge Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]
Facts:
Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered decision convicting
him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously
acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel contends that respondent is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and of violation his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. Pascua acquitted Argel of murder because she erroneously
thought that there was no witness that could have identified the accused. Her
mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness
was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. After
reviewing, she revised her decision finding Argel guilty of murder. Pascua
ordered the police to bring Argel to court to inform him of his liabilities
arising from the crime.Argel charged Pascua with gross negligence for not
exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure
that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records
before writing the decision.
Issue:
Is a decision once final no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration?
Ruling:
Yes.
Ratio:
Except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity
caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a
travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial, a final
decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of
any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal
is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction
or amendment
except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order
reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to
modify its order or decision doesnot extend to a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case
PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO.,
Inc., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong,
resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial
review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and
executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the
entire proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional
evidence, not to conduct a trial de novo.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the August 28, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52999,
dismissing Petitioner Paquito Buaya's appeal of the trial court's Order dated
November 13, 1995, which denied his Petition for Relief. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED.
The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the
Appellant."[2]
The Facts
The facts of this case are as follows:[3]
"On July 31, 1985, x x x Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., the
[respondent] in the present recourse, filed a complaint against Paquito B.
Buaya, its erstwhile [b]ranch [m]anager for Cebu and the [petitioner] in the
present recourse, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83,
representing his unremitted premium collections owing to the [respondent].
For failure of the [petitioner] and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-
trial, the [petitioner] was declared x x x in default, and the [respondent] was
allowed, by the [c]ourt, to adduce its evidence, ex parte. On the basis of the
evidence of the [respondent], the Court a quo promulgated a Decision, dated
September 17, 1987, in favor of the [respondent], the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and
against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of
P678,076.83 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid; the sum equivalent to 25% of [respondent's] claim as and for
attorney's fees plus the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.' (at page 135, Records).'
The [petitioner] appealed, from said Decision, to [the CA], entitled and
docketed 'Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., versus Paquito B. Buaya, CA-GR.
No. 17329.' On March 30, 1990, this [c]ourt promulgated a Decision in favor
of the [petitioner] annulling the Decision of the [c]ourt a quo and remanding
the case to the lower [c]ourt for further proceedings. (at page 154, Records).
The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory. Accordingly, the
[c]ourt a quo issued an Order setting the case for hearing on December 13,
1990 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (at page 169, Records). The [petitioner]
himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing. [Petitioner's] motion
was granted by the [c]ourt a quo and the hearing was reset [to] February 15,
1991, at 8:30 in the morning. However, the hearing was reset to March 14,
1991, at the same time, on motion of the [respondent] (at page 180, Record).
The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing set
on March 14, 1991 on the ground that his [c]ounsel, Atty. Bartolome A.
Avancena, had died and [petitioner] needed time to engage the services of
new counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16, 1991 at the same time (at page
187, Record). However, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the resetting
of said hearing on the ground that he needed [more] time to secure the
services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to July 26, 1991, at the same
time. But then, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the postponement of
said hearing on the ground that 'he was weak and sickly'. However, the
[respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt reset the
hearing to November 29, 1991, at the same time, but subject to the condition
that if, for any reason, the [petitioner] still failed to appear on said setting,
such failure shall be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence (at page
250, Records). On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel Maranga, the new
counsel of the [petitioner], filed a 'Motion to Postpone'. The [respondent]
opposed [petitioner's] motion. On December 19, 1991, the [c]ourt a quo issued
an Order denying [petitioner's] motion and declaring the [petitioner] to have
waived his right to adduce evidence in his behalf (at page 222, Record). The
[respondent] forthwith filed a motion praying the [c]ourt to reinstate its
Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for
Reconsideration' of the Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991.
On March 18, 1992, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's]
'Motion for Reconsideration' and granting [respondent's] motion for the
reinstatement of its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed
a 'Petition for Certiorari' with [the CA], entitled and docketed as 'Paquito
Buaya versus Hon. Fernando Agdamag, et al.,['] CA-G.R. No. 27814 (SP),
assailing the Orders of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991 and March
18, 1992. On August 24, 1992, [the CA] promulgated a Decision dismissing
[petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit (at page 261, Record). The Decision of
this [c]ourt became final and executory on June 28, 1993 (at page 282).[4] On
[m]otion of the [respondent], the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order, dated October
29, 1993, directing the issuance of a [W]rit of [E]xecution (at page 298,
Record). The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of said Order,
dated October 29, 1993. On March 16, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order
denying motion (at pages 359-360, Record). On April 12, 1995, the
[petitioner] filed a 'Notice of Appeal' from said Order. However, on May 11,
1995, the [c]ourt [a quo] issued an Order declining to give due course to the
appeal of the [petitioner] considering that the Decision of the [c]ourt had
already become final and executory (at page 365, Record). On June 2, 1995,
the [c]ourt a quo issued a Writ of Execution. On July 27, 1995, the [petitioner]
filed a 'Petition for Relief from Order'. On November 13, 1995, the [c]ourt a
quo issued an Order denying the Petitioner's 'Petition for Relief."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA denied petitioner's appeal which centered on these issues: (1) whether
the September 17, 1987 Decision of the trial court had become final and
executory, and (2) whether the failure of petitioner to inform his new counsel
of the status of the case before the trial court constituted "mistake and
excusable negligence."
In view of the amount involved in the collection suit, the CA disbelieved
petitioner's contention that he had failed to apprise his counsel of the status
and the particulars of the case in the trial court. Granting arguendo that he did
make such omission through sheer inadvertence, his counsel was duty-bound
to familiarize himself with the case before accepting the same, specially
because litigation had already commenced. Such omission did not constitute
"mistake or excusable negligence" that would have entitled him to relief from
the trial court's judgment. Thus, he deserved to suffer the consequences of his
own mistake or omission.
Noting that the validity of the March 18, 1992 Order of the trial court
reinstating its September 17, 1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA
and the Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of petitioner for
resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal was solely designed to further
derail the execution of the lower court's Decision.
Besides, the present posture of petitioner is antithetical to his earlier "Petition
for Relief from Order," which was denied by the trial court. In filing said
action for relief, he was admitting that the Decision of the trial court had
become final and executory. Hence, he cannot claim the Decision's nullity.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for resolution:[6]
"I - Petitioner is presenting in this petition a question of law which is believed
or which appears to be one of first impression, namely: Can a decision of a
Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated
by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter
and thereafter order its execution?
"II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for
having been rendered without notice to the [petitioner] of the pre-trial and
subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the
presentation of evidence for the [petitioner] and without anymore requiring
the presentation of [respondent's] evidence for cross-examination by the
[petitioner]?"
The Court's Ruling
This Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Annulled Decision
Petitioner persistently avers that no trial court can reinstate a decision that has
been annulled by the CA because such a decision is "dead" in legal
contemplation.
We disagree. We doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim that the September
11, 1987 Decision of the trial court was annulled by the CA, because his
Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. He merely alleged that
"[t]he aforesaid judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment by default x
x x so that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by [petitioner], in its decision
rendered on March 30, 1990, SET ASIDE said judgment and ordered the case
to be REMANDED to the court of origin for FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. x
x x."[7] This allegation shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and
set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to
enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with
the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed
to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence.
Moreover, the failure of petitioner to attach a copy of the March 30, 1990 CA
Decision, which he claims annulled the September 11, 1987 trial court
Decision, is an added reason why this Petition should be denied. True, said
CA Decision is not in question here. Nonetheless, an authentic copy thereof
should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial
court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA.[8] Hence, a copy of the
latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition."
Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's
dismissal.[9]
We also reject the assertion of petitioner that the CA Decision of August 24,
1992 did not affirm the reinstatement of the September 11, 1987 trial court
Decision, but only sustained the denial of his Motion for Postponement. This
is simply not true. The CA specifically resolved the issue of the legality of the
RTC Orders dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992, which not only
denied petitioner's Motion for Postponement but also reinstated the September
17, 1987 trial court Decision.[10] The appellate court ruled that respondent
judge showed no arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant the grant
of that Petition.[11] Hence, there was no need for the CA to explicitly
reinstate the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision. Indeed, petitioner
cannot be allowed to prevent that RTC Decision from attaining finality by
engaging in useless hairsplitting distinctions. On this dilatory practice, the CA
clearly and cogently ruled:
"x x x. The [Petitioner] raised the same issue in his Petition for Certiorari in
CA-GR No. 27814 (SP) filed with this Court where he assailed the validity of
the Order of the Court a quo, dated March 18, 1992, ordering the
reinstatement of the Decision of the Court a quo, dated September 17, 1987,
and this Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit, and, [i]n
effe[c]t, affirmed the aforesaid Order of the Court a quo. The [petitioner] filed
a "Petition to Review" with the Supreme Court, from said Decision of this
Court and the Supreme Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition. Appellant's
penchant [for] resurrecting the same issue in the Court a quo x x x, in the
present recourse, deserves the severest condemnation as it was designed solely
to further derail the execution of the Decision of the Court a quo. x x x."[12]
Second Issue: Final and Executory Judgment
Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he had
waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered
plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that
both parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present their
respective sets of evidence.
We disagree. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further
hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein
respondent) had rested its case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision
was rendered. In fact, the evidence adduced by herein respondent became the
sole basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987.
Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial
court become final and executory on June 28, 1993.[13] A Writ of Execution
of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17,
1987 Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes
a ministerial duty of the court.[14] It is axiomatic that once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is
erroneous.[15] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the
risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.[16]
The February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354 barred not
only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the Petition, but also any other
issues that might have been raised therein. An existing final judgment or
decree -- rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is
conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all
other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.[17]
Indeed, nothing decided on in the first appeal, between the same parties and
the same facts, can be reexamined in a second or subsequent appeal. Right or
wrong, the decision in the first appeal is binding on both the trial and the
appellate courts for the purpose of that case and for that case only.
Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not
allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has
been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should
not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same
issues filed by the same parties.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong,
resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial
review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and
executory judgments.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Case Digest BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC.GR 139020 OCTOBER 11, 2000
FACTS:
On July 31, 1985, Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed acomplaint
against Paquito B. Buaya, a manager of their Cebu branchfor the collection of
the principal amount of P678,076.83, which isallegedly his unremitted
premium collections owing to the Stronghold.For failure of Buaya and his
counsel to appear at the pre-trial, he wasdefaulted and Stronghold was allowed
to present his evidences,without the other party. On the basis of Stronghold’s
evidence, thecourt decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of
Stronghold.Buaya appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in
favor of Buaya, annulling the decision and remanding the case to the
lowercourt for further proceedings. The lower court therefore set a hearingon
December 13, 1990 but Buaya filed a ‘Motion of Postponement’ of the
hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gaveseveral reasons to
postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991,Stronghold opposed the motion, but
the court granted Buaya’s motionprovided that the next time he does it, it will
be considered a waiver of his right to present evidence. Stronghold filed a
motion to reinstate itsprevious decision dated, September 17, 1987. Buaya
filed a motionfor reconsideration but was denied. He files a ‘Petition for
Certiorari’ assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of
merit.On June 28, 1993, the court’s decision has became final and
executoryand thus denied all other appeals made before it.
ISSUES:
1. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by theCourt of
Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which renderedthe decision or any trial
court for that matter and thereafterorder its execution?
2. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for
having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of the pre-trial and
subsequent hearing and remanded to the courtof origin for further
proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trialcourt merely require the
presentation of evidence for Buaya andwithout anymore requiring the
presentation of Stronghold’sevidence for cross-examination by the Buaya?
RULING:
This petition has no merit. DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was notannulled by the
CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it hadmerely been set aside. This
shows that the trial court's Decisionwas reversed and set aside, not annulled,
by the appellate court.Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to
present hisevidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of thetrial
court reinstating its original decision after he had failed totake advantage of
the ample opportunity given him to presentevidence. An authentic copy
thereof should have beensubmitted to support his claim that the Decision of
the trial courthad indeed been annulled by that of the CA. Hence, a copy of
the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] wouldsupport the petition."
Failure to attach or submit it is sufficientground for this Petition's dismissal.
2.Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes finaland
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as amatter of right, it is
axiomatic that once a decision attainsfinality, it becomes the law of the case
regardless of any claimthat it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgmentmay no longer
be altered even at the risk of occasional legalinfirmities or errors it may
contain. Litigations must end andterminate sometime and somewhere. The
effective and efficientadministration of justice requires that once a judgment
hasbecome final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of thefruits of the
verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filedby the same parties.
G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals 1
erred in reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment; and
(2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished
by merger.
We rule for the petitioner on both counts.
It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita,
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in
the name of the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way:
. . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit
of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering
transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of
Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig
River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City
Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro
Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record). 2
As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title,
as follows:
Entry No. 7712/T-5000 –– CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY –– It is
hereby made of record that a construction of private alley has been undertaken
on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the
aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City
Engineer subject to the following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley
shall be at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed
so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall be
open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley has
been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with concrete
canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and
upkeep of the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6) That
the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall
be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been
constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay
pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any
indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or
new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions
set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not.
Pub. of Manila. 3
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of
neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against
the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private
respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order
lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished
by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the
purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another
adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4)
the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a
"temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final
termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond
by the plaintiff. 4 (the petitioner herein).
Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above
defenses.
On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court
a quo ruled on the same as follows:
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the
merit (sic) and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record). 5
On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the
temporary mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the defendant,
and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit.
The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack
of merit. (Summary Judgment, p. 6). 6
The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a
petition for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted
cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the
respondent Court of Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation
"without prejudice [to] the final outcome of 7 the private respondent's own
appeal (subject of this petition).
In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary
judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment
was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up
by the private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished.
According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on
ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that
since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger"
brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the
very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous
owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event,
the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition.
There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale
executed between the private respondent and the seller, had been constituted
on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same
charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain
open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7)
That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow
the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and
drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. .
." 8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the alley was in defiance of
these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the
servitude of way.
The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in
denying injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent Appellate Court committed
an error of judgment and law.
It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent
is the owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established
and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming
the easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to
have the private respondent respect the easement already existing thereon. The
petitioner is moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but
that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance
imposed on the same
There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not
an easement exists on the property, and as we indicated, we are convinced that
an easement exists.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere
right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an
independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong. 9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.
10 Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they can not, however, be alienated 11 from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately. 12
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable
from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of
the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a
portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for
the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." 13 and precisely, the former owner,
in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of the
easement, thus:
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to
adjust the purchase price from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to
THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00) 14
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of
the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put
up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of
Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in
favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a
personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community,
or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. 16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement"
to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate,
17 in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant
owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of
no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public –– if that
is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary
judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals held that it (the trial
court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error.
Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where
there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts
appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits of record. 18 In one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial
court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money to which the
defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce
receipts. 19 We held that under the circumstances, the defense was not
genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another
case, we rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered property
and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a summary
judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens
Certificate and under the law, Torrens titles are imprescriptible. 20
We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment
rendered thereon, on the ground that from the records, the plaintiffs were
clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven
years. 21 We likewise allowed summary judgment and rejected contentions of
economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a contract for the
reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions. 22
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense,
indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly,
the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the
answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and can
not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.
As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of
the ritual of a trial where, from existing records, 23 the facts have been
established, and trial would be futile.
What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent –– and
consequently, the challenged holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as
well –– is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in
its CA-G.R. No. 13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which
it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back of the
private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case
No. 273. As the petitioner now in fact insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment,
which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14, 1988,
in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as "law
of the case" is known in law, e.g.:
xxx xxx xxx
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis supplied).
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a
second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the
prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a
definite determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action
below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently
to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the
compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in
substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will
not be questioned on a second appeal.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the
law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the
party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-
77). (Emphasis supplied.)
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be
regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions
are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that
all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5
C.J.S. 1286-87). (Emphasis supplied.) 24
CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to
determine the rights of the parties regarding the easement, subject of the
controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation"
it may have, at a glance, suggested a different cause of action.
And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CA-
G.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after all, it was the one that initiated the
cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that
precipitated that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation
of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the injunction decreed by the
lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of
forum-shopping, as we have described the term:
xxx xxx xxx
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where
the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25
to which contempt is a penalty. 26
As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private
respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be made to profit from its
act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its
applicability as the law of the case.
As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the
will of the owner.
In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, 27 this
Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto, declared that a personal
servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act" 28
of the landowner, and is not "contractual in the nature," 29 and a third party
(as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to claim its
benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that
a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract and that "[t]he act of
the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an
offer . . . " 30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence
no contract." 31
The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal
titans (they would contend even more spiritedly in the "larger" world of
politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who,
because of the paths they have taken, have shaped history itself; after all, and
coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an easement has been
constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the
question is whether it is still existing or whether it has been extinguished. As
we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the private
respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley,
from its use.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW
CAUSE why they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also
administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Case Digest Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading [GR No.
90596, 04/08/91]
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land located in
Ermita, Manila, The private respondent’s (de Guzman) title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of
way: a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit
of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering
transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of
Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig
River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City
Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro
Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record).
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of
neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not an easement exists on the property even after
the property was sold. AFFIRMATIVE. Easement cannot be separated from
the tenement and maintain an independent existence.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner’s contention that the deed of sale “excluded” it, because as a mere
right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintains an
independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable
from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner’s claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of
the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of
the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put
up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of
Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in
favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense,
indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly,
the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the
answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and
cannot militate against the petitioner’s clear cause of action.
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A.
TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A.
TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses
JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of
the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares,
respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in
forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein
they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at
Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by
Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by
Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has
an area of three hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their
father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case
No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently
or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and
that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan,
Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on
July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the
Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa)
which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior
judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The
grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that
a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova,
who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were
allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT
No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic
title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land
covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the
lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the
instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the
trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding
in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in
lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed
irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of
the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision
of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is
annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their
support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their
action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT
No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs.
Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-
26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs.
Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a
reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de
la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95
Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre,
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs.
Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA
1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
(follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes
evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in
Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that
OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be
relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the
expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial
court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without
costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.
Case Digest on JM Tuason vs. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78]
JM TUASON AND CO. INC. VS. MARIANOGR 3314O OCTOBER 23,
1978
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint praying that they be declare downers of a
certain parcel of land located in Rizal. They alleged that their father acquired
this land with a Spanish title. They alleged that petitioner fraudulently or
included the land in an original certificate of title. They also alleged that
transfer certificates of title were issued to petitioners irregularly. Given such,
they are praying that the titles derived there from be declared void due to
irregular proceedings. The lower court issued an order requiring the parties to
produce documents to support their allegations. With this, the petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition, inter alia, that the lower court be
ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding the case.
Before this present complaint, the respondents had already filed a complaint
questioning the validity of the titles of petitioner, wherein the lower court and
the SC upheld its validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents?
HELD:
They cannot anymore question. Considering the principle of stare decisis, the
respondents cannot anymore continue with their action without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts of the validity of the titles and no longer
open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the
merits be relit gated again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies
at the expense of other litigants.
Uy Lee vs. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75]
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses
Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio
Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an
area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of
defendants (now petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo).
Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their answer with affirmative
defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on
January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of
reconveyance of the homestead land in question, free of all liens and
encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon the payment by the latter to
them of the repurchase price of P16,000.00;
(2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession
of said land;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon presentation to him
of the deed of reconveyance and payment of his legal fees, to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue a
new one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, married
to plaintiff Alberta Vicencio; and
(4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action.
The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal)
Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and
later an urgent motion for reconsideration (pp. 114-116, Ibid), which were
both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113-114,
Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119-124, Ibid).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal was affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 27-45, Rollo). A
timely motion for reconsideration (Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was
filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. (Annex C to
Petition, p. 87, Ibid)
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy
Lee and Henry Lee.
The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No.
732 in the name of Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of Emiliano Simeon,
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771
which Ignacio had obtained from the government way back in 1935. (p. 28,
Ibid)
After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by
his spouse, Alberta Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private respondent) Emiliano
Simeon and his brother Deogracias Simeon, as the only surviving heirs,
executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties
left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to
Deogracias and Lot No. 2 to Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering
the said lots could not be found, they were simply described as "Homestead
No. 82945." (Ibid)
On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private
respondents) agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee (Exh. 1). Upon
request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband, plaintiffs (now private respondents)
furnished him with a copy of the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2) and a
certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal that "there is no
certificate of title issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at Antipolo covered by
Plan F-54569". Defendants (now petitioners) likewise verified the status of the
property from the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands
(pp. 48-49, Ibid).
On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed of
sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of defendants (now Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and
Henry Lee. The document prepared by defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer,
Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman, described the property as "Lot 2 of Plan F-
954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial partition
(Exh. 2). (p. 29, Ibid)
The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her
own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands (Exh.
G.), in which application she expressly acknowledged that said property is a
public land previously occupied by Ignacio Simeon and his heirs. The
application was denied (p. 50, Ibid).
Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in
their names under the provisions of Act No. 496. The Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land court, favorably acted upon their
application in a decision dated December 7, 1957 (Exh. 5). However, before
the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it
was discovered that the land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to
register in their names, "has already been patented and is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting upon this information, the Court of
First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its decision of
December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid)
Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a
motion praying for the issuance of a substitute owner's duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.) which was "irretrievably lost
during the early period of the American liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The motion
was granted. (p. 31, Ibid)
On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a document
entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With Partial Sale"
(Exh. B), wherein the adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon
and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and the sale by the latter of his share to
Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. On that day,
Original Certificate of Title No. 732 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in the name of Emiliano
Simeon. Later that day, the new Transfer Certificate was cancelled and
replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 (Exh. 14) in
the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject to the provisions of
... the Public Land
Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid)
What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now
substituted by surviving spouse Alberta Vicencio as private respondent)
Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the property sold to the spouses Lee. The
Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:
"On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty.
Valeriano Santos, sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita Uy Lee, advising
her that he desires to repurchase the parcel of land situated at Antipolo, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 in your name' and
requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five
days from receipt hereof." Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants
did not bother to make any reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty.
Santos wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating the demand of Emiliano
Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant Vita Uy
Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the
defendants did not reply to the second letter. Consequently, for the third time,
on June 24, 1961, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee
repeating the same demand, with a warning that if nothing is heard from her
within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to court. Still the
defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants,
Atty. Santos did not take any court action and apparently because of this
indifference of their former counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso Peña (p. 32, Ibid).
"On March 2, 1962, Atty. Peña addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee
reiterating that Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in
question. After receipt of this letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and
through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote Atty. Peña on March 12, 1962,
that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even
assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of
five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view
of this flat refusal of the defendants to resell the lot in controversy to the
plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p. 33, Ibid)
Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from
defendants (now petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141 which provides as follows:
Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from
the date of conveyance.
There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free
patent (p. 36, Ibid), and that its sale is subject to redemption within five (5)
years from the execution of the deed of sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and
Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G. 5187; Bayaua vs.
Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29
SCRA 736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan.
30, 1970, 31 SCRA 329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid) Likewise, there is
no question that private respondents instituted the action to compel petitioners
to resell the land to them only on June 25, 1965 when the redemption period
had already elapsed. (p. 27, Ibid) The main issue to be resolved is whether the
three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse)
Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year
period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private
respondents to repurchase the property.
Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their
nature, to first examine the other questions raised herein.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient
and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve
petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32,
Brief for Petitioners) Petitioners based this assignment of error on the
requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states:
Sec. 4. Findings of the court. — Every decision of the Court of Appeals
shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it."
More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to
include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent
(now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy
Lee before the expiration of the period within which redemption could be
made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating that such omission
has impaired their position on appeal as another question is raised by them on
the basis of the "terminology of those three letters". (Ibid).
We find no merit in this contention.
At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like
the one invoked by petitioner are to be given liberal construction. (Rule 1,
Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had the occasion to rule, the findings of
facts which as found by the court and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept.
28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465) It is
not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the exhibits
presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so would
be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of documents when
reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the
purpose of the rule. The respondent Court did not disregard the three letters in
question. Neither did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each letter was
properly referred to in the decision and its message clearly reflected thereon.
Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court misunderstood the
communication.
Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the
testimonies of Henry Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and respondent
Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that
these matters cannot be inquired into a review on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45,
Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. Court of
Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20
SCRA 54; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687;
Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97)
Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the
Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase
the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the
first three letters sent by private respondent (now substituted by surviving
spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the
five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of
private respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo).
The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of
Emiliano Simeon's "desire to repurchase" the land and requested that the latter
be informed of Lee's conformity on the matter within five days from receipt
(t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The second letter sent on November 3, 1960 (Exh. J)
reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third letter
dated June 24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a warning
that if nothing is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days from
receipt, respondent Simeon would seek judicial intervention (Ibid). In no
instance was it shown that private respondent offered or tendered the
repurchase price.
Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private respondents'
desire to repurchase the property and demanding its resale did not constitute a
proper exercise of the right of legal redemption, absent an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment (p. 17, Brief for Petitioners). Petitioners argue
that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the former
intends to redeem the property sold, but he must at the same time offer to
repay the price. (p. 21, Ibid).
This view deserves consideration.
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to
exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot
avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the
price of the sale ...".
Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is not
sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the former
desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately thereupon offer to
repay the price ...". Likewise, in several other cases decided by the Supreme
Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394;
Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la
Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases) where the
right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was a
definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the vendor.
Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited
above is an obiter dictum because in that case, the period of redemption had
prescribed thereby rendering immaterial the question of whether or not a
tender of payment was made. This might be so; nevertheless, a dictum which
generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule
(21 C.J.S. 309) may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing
Karameros vs. Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508).
Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna
vs. Javier and Cruz, 110 Phil. 172, where the appellant failed to tender
payment of the repurchase price within 30 days after the court below had
decided by final judgment that the contract sue upon was a pacto de retro and
not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives a
vendor a retro "the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final
judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a
true sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked in the subsequent case of
Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In that case,
Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a part of
the repurchase price of P19,313.95. Holding that the vendor who desires to
redeem the property should offer to repay the price, the Court went further and
declared that the full amount of the repurchase price should be tendered.
It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his
desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of
redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to
properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year period,
the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an
action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.
Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment was
ordinarily required, that the same was not necessary in the instant case
because petitioner Vita Uy Lee refused their demands for reconveyance.
It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired,
respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon sent
petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters — one in June 1960, the other in
November of the same year, and the third in June 1961 — demanding the
resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the
letters, she did not send any reply. It was only when Simeon wrote her a
fourth letter, this time after the redemption period had elapsed, that petitioner
Lee expressly signified her refusal to resell the land in question on the ground
that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid).
The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to
Simeon's first letters as refusal on petitioners' part to resell the property in
question and held that such refusal rendered tender of payment unnecessary
(pp. 61-63, Ibid).
This position is untenable.
Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by
respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of
respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of
payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that
tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused
to permit the repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go,
69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground
that under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the tender of
payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown above to be
justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence did
not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had
he wished to do so, provided that the same was made within five-year period.
Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed an action to
compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period.
WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have
lapsed, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
entered dismissing the complaint.
No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Aquino J, took no part.
Finality of Decision
The initial decision of the judge will become final 35 days after issuance.
Initial decisions are not precedential.
(a) Exceptions. The initial decision will not become final if any party files a
petition for review within the time limit for filing specified in § 1201.114 of
this part, or if the Board reopens the case on its own motion.
(b) Petition for review denied. If the Board denies all petitions for review, the
initial decision will become final when the Board issues its last decision
denying a petition for review.
(c) Petition for review granted or case reopened. If the Board grants a petition
for review or a cross petition for review, or reopens or dismisses a case, the
decision of the Board is final if it disposes of the entire action.
(d) Extensions. The Board may extend the time limit for filing a petition for
good cause shown as specified in § 1201.114 of this part.
(e) Exhaustion. Administrative remedies are exhausted when a decision
becomes final in accordance with this section.
[54 FR 53504, Dec. 29, 1989, as amended at 62 FR 59992, Nov. 6, 1997]
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99]
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
"(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority.
The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order x x x creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a
possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To
be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law
before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon x x x.
(4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, x x x the Honorable Court in
issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty
has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel."
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public
respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which
provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order x x x
is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this
Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not
lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the
petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment
will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the
various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern
matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty
was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this
Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its
implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this
reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the
Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999
and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she
has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the
interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence
can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public
respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered
in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a
place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation."[1] To start with,
the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is
appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of
this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out
in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-
entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
`WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section
19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by
the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and
counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.'
and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and executory and
is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippines.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office"
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21,
1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October
28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court
that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations
as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of
this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No.
8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177
cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight
clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot
divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2]
xxx
"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers
nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.[3]
There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes
final.[4] x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.[5]
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance,[6] viz:
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has
elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned
thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself,
which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution,
in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide
for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common
law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law.
It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible
that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in
jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however
a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement.
Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution[7] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice.[8] For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out
by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its
own Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary
to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents
that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is
that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to
enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction,
this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These
rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and
effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal
cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to
the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."[9] Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted
but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on
its surface. In In re Cunanan[10] Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law,
enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953[11] which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x
x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any
attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question."[12] The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x
x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.[13]
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its
decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6,
1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice
recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC,
Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x x a certified true copy of the
Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or
announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such
trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching
this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to
stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives
herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that
recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask
this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and
control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV
of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No.
8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that
laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the
precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive
clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
`without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency
powers at all times." (Underscoring supplied) For instance, the President
cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise
date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might
even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by
the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of
execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III
(Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
9. The `right to information' provision is self-executing. It supplies 'the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of
the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc
in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987]."
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution
of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on
December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the
public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public
respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court
has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This
Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was
not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now
estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said
relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters
the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department x x x. By
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function."[14] Public respondents cite as their authority for this
proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
"Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall
also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of
power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides
the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of
their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights
can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity.[15] As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that
due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution."[16] The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effect is the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time
amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But
by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have
even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution
of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that
they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the
public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle
of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously
distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner
filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at
about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has
been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal
of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino
Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and
that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other
senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S.
Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death
penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even
then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1999[17] at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent
Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as
he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem
of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to
repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the
Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and
surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading
under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It
was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has
no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and
the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority
felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a
time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And
verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session.
Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but
took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner. The suspension was temporary - - - "until June 15, 1999, coeval
with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is
going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled,
among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the
execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop
at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize
haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed
the certainty that the legislature will not change the circumstance of petitioner
as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable
considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one
its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result,
i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review
capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will
repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as
follows:
xxx
"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel."[18]
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman
Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided
for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and
the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on
this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressmen as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up to 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez
resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House "x x x does not desire at this time to review Republic
Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request
Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of heinous
crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO
should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x x the
question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and
will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment."[19] In
our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate
on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably
blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-
death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure,
any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a
democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse
of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to
tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x x
x it is the very purpose of the Constitution - - - and particularly the Bill of
Rights - - - to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities."[20] Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of
justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The
flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the
mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering
justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be
fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.[21]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the
date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest on ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE301

SCRA 96, JANUARY 19, 1999
Facts:
Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethalinjection (RA
8177) The Supreme Court issued a temporaryrestraining order restraining the
execution of said party. Saidexecution was set for Jan. 4, 1999 but the
petitioner filed his VeryUrgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998.
The Court wasin recess at the time but a Special Session was called to
deliberate onsaid matters. Furthermore, Congress was a new one with about
130new members whose views on capital punishment were stillunexpressed.
The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of thelaw is going to be made). It was
alleged that sine it is already finaland executory, the Supreme Court has lost
its jurisdiction with thecase.

Issue:
Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, theSupreme Court
has gone beyond its jurisdiction since the case isalready final.

Ruling:
It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whatthe SC could not
do is alter the decision. In the case at hand, the SCdid nothing of the sort.
Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers nor thecase. By the finality of the judgment, what the
court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to executeand
enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of thecourt to execute
its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify oralter the same. The
former continues even after the judgment hasbecome final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latterterminates when the judgment becomes
final. For after the judgment has become final, facts and circumstances may
transpire which canrender the execution unjust or impossible.