CrimPro [Arrest]
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SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU
November 3, 1993
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
 The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the
filing of appropriate charges against several persons,
including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay
of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
 Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was
not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr.
 On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an
"invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear
for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
said camp.
 At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively
identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio
Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating
him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on
"arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in
Manila.
 The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as
his counsel.
 After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on
Sanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with
Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken
to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he
remains confined.
 The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging
Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,
Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and
Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta.
 Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a
warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the
petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
 The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently
expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said
cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven
cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
 On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were
amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravating circumstance.
 On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash
the informations substantially on the grounds now
raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral
arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of injunction.
ISSUES/HELD:
WON Sanchez was unlawfully withheld of his right to
Preliminary Investigation- NO
WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue of
the jurisdiction subsequently acquired)
The Preliminary Investigation.
 The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13,
1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not
accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
 On the other hand, there is no support for the
petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel,
Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on
August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the
affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan
and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental
affidavits
 The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never
disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel
speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy
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Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would
now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
 Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed
or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
 Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present
at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the
right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence
in his defense.
 At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over
the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
information. 6
 If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is
flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused,
order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the
proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the
case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no
reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness
in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.
The Arrest
 "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody
of the person making the arrest.
 Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. 12
 The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued
by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear
at the said camp for investigation.
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 In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-
ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez
was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise
of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of
arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to
defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he
went without protest (and in informal clothes and
slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch
him.
 It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438,
the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but
merely "invited" for questioning.
 It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the
petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who
first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño
himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the
two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
 His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court,
 It is not denied that the arresting officers were not
present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the
killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor
because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements
of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and
killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June
29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest,
it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been
committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
 The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be
sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
 Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102
Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
 Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized.
— If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
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issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
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any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
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PEOPLE V. SEQUINO
November 13, 1996
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
 The witnesses present by the prosecution in its evidence
in chief were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, police
officers Elpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo and Mario
Remulta, Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna Areola, Emilio
Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, and
Presentacion vda. de Broniola, while Olympio Lozano
was presented as rebuttal witness.
 Only the accused testified in their defense.
 PEOPLE: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of
Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro
Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the
Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw P50,557.17 The bank's
cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle
driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to
the hacienda on one of the bank's motorcycles. Serafin
drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and
Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a
money bag which he hung over his left shoulder.
 As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the accused,
armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered
them to stop. Godinez heard a gunshot. Broniola had
fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the
motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over
Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan,
with gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money
from the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-
accused. With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home,
leaving Broniola behind. 8 Meanwhile, Serafin had
proceeded to the house of the Broniolas, which was near
the crime scene, and informed Broniola's wife of the
incident. 9
 SPO Elpidio Luna, Luna went to the crime scene where
he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then
had milled around the site informed Luna "that the
culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes
were compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized
as toilet paper with a stool on it [which] was somewhat
newly delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet 1with
the name " Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the
father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida."
(EEEEWWW)
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 After finding Nenito Melvida,Luna asked Melvida to go
with him to the barangay captain's house. Melvida
hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon
him to go with Luna.
 The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took
Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was kept
at the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for
investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his
fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo
and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his supper.
Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only
after the police had filed criminal charges against him he
had posted bail. Melvida was not assisted by counsel
during the police investigation, although Luna assured
the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who
is a lawyer, was present, While Luna claimed he asked
the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted that
this request did not appear in the record of the
investigation. Luna's investigation of Melvida was not
reduced into writing.
 In the course of Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted
that he kept "his share from the loot" in his house.
Melvida then was brought to his house where he got
P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a
shoe which he delivered to the policemen.
 During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo
Mondigo, Melvida admitted that his (Melvida's)
companions during the robbery were Vicente Tumangan
and Ermelindo Sequiño, Immediately, Mondigo and
policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of
Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequiño on the
porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of
Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached
Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his
waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the
bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires
Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. When
ask if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan
answered in the negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then
brought Tumangan and Sequiño to the police station.
Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the
Municipal Mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of
the
holdupppers.
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 Mondigo further declared that the police recovered
P22,526.00, but could not explain any further how the
recovery was made and from whom. As to this amount,
SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian of the
Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he was
entrusted with the P22,526.00 which, according to the
station commander, was "recovered in connection with
the highway robbery case."
 The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a
frame-up for their exculpation.
 The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's evidence
and in its decision it found the accuseds guilty of robbery
with homicide
ISSUES:
Was there an arrest of the accused? YES;
Is it valid? NO
Are the admissions during the investigations valid? NO
 Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused
Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense," 44 and it is
made "by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest." 4Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon
the latter's "invitation" was a submission to Luna's
custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in
the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being
held to answer for the commission of the said offense.
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 Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry
must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was
effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure .
There was NO valid warrantless arrest in this case.
 Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable
suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.
 After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial
investigation. The custodial investigation commenced
when the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the
authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect
thereof. his brought into operation paragraph (1) of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
the accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
his right to be informed of these rights.
 There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed
of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not
assisted by counsel during the investigation.
Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these
constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and
deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an
investigator's duties prior to and during custodial
interrogation laid down in Morales vs. Enrile and
reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases.
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DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. VASQUEZ
January 27, 1993
REGALADO, J.
 An information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner
with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section
3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of
the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the
accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
 On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which pertinently states in
part:
 “As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered
extensive physical injuries which required surgical
intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in
the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak
(sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an
extended period be on her feet because she is still in
physical pain. . . . .
 On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor
Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be
considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings and further seeks
leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail
bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be
accepted.
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion,
she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her
personal appearance for now until such time she will
(sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near
fatal accident.
 Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed
that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.”
 Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond
for her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance
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 On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation
"that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his
office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building
located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around
3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was
accompanied by a brother who represented himself to
be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a
physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for
about fifteen minutes. "
 Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued
a resolution, setting the arraignment of the accused and
setting aside the court's resolution which ordered her
appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division
of said court on or before June 5, 1991.
 In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that
her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended
that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7
 Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum
thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases for violations of RA 3019 and libel.
Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued
by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases
pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order,
took into consideration the fact that according to
petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5,
1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence
the advisability of conserving and affording her the
opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet
said contingency.
 The Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the
arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the
Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein
petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further
initiative from her through counsel. 8
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 On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued. The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this
Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
 Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against
petitioner which reads as follows:
 The hold departure order was issued by reason of the
announcement made by petitioner, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she
would be leaving for the United States to accept a
fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner
likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino
communities in the United States in line with her
crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft
and corruption.(IRONIC)
ISSUES:
WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of herein petitioner - YES
WON there was a valid posting of bail bond.- YES
** WON the hold departure order deprived her of her
due process rights- NO
 We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount
of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion
"she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to
claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after
she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court
and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
 It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail
bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15,
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1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her
own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed
a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for
the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the
security of a recognizance.
 With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner
should accordingly and necessarily admit her
acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of
the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance
which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in
dealing with the courts of justice.
 Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that
she did not personally appear before respondent court
to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same
ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was
petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of
the cash bond, who requested respondent court to
dispense with her personal appearance until she shall
have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.
It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around
and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own
request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.
 It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold
departure order violates her right to due process, right
to travel and freedom of speech.Petitioner is in error.
 Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them.
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction,
a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental
powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has the power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the
court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of
its authority over the principal matter, even though the
court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be
within its cognizance.
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 Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.
Such being the case, with more reason may a party
litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where
he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the
court or the opposing party, the result of which is that
the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What
ought to be done depends upon the particular
circumstances.
 To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise
of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the accused.
 It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which
we have declared legally valid and complete despite the
absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by
reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds
hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since
under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail
bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed
down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the
effect that:
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 A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
 Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as
the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
 Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and
the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial,
and at the same time, to put the accused as much under
the power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him.
 Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by
no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).(recent case daw ito sinabi)
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PLACER V. VILLANUEVA
December 29, 1983
ESCOLIN, J.
 During the period from March 30 to April 14, 1982,
petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his
assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan 13
informations(see case for complete list).
 These informations, except the last four, were certified
to by the respective investigating Fiscals as Follows:
"that a preliminary examination has been conducted by
me in this case, having examined 'the complainant and
his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements,
and other evidence submitted before this Official there is
reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has
been commited and that herein accussed is probably
guilty thereof " The informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
12219 and 12220 bore the certification of 3rd Assistant
Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan that I am filing this
information upon directive of the Minister of Justice,
who upon review of this resolution of the undersigned
investigating fiscal has found prima facie case against
herein accused, 1 while the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2nd
Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy in this wise: "I am
filing this information upon directive of the City Fiscal
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 911, who, upon
review of the resolution of the investigating fiscal now
on temporary detail with the office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Sur, has found prima facie case
against the herein accused."
 Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge
issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing of
said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the
propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of
arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the
questioned orders, requiring petitioners to submit to the
court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and
other documentary evidence in support of the
informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of
judicial review of the findings of probable cause by
petitioners.
 Petitioners filed two separate motions for
reconsideration of said orders, contending that under
P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine
the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
examination/investigation, and that their findings as to
the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the
issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. On April 28,
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1982, respondent judge denied said motions and
reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the
supporting affidavits and other documents within five
(5) days from notice.
 Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders and to
compel respondent to issue the warrants of arrest in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222.
 Meanwhile, the respondent, in addition to his duties as
presiding judge of Branch I of the City Court of Butuan,
was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court,
as Judge Jesus Ruiz, presiding judge of said sala, had
retired from the service. The informations filed by
petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant
because of respondent's firm refusal to issue the
corresponding warrants of arrest for want of affidavits
of the witnesses. Thus, as disclosed by petitioner's
urgent motion, 6no warrants had been issued in 113
informations as of July 15, 1982.
 On July 12, 1982, respondent judge received Our May 19,
1982 Resolution requiring him to comment on the
petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of
the petition itself, respondent issued on the following
day, July 13, and Omnibus Order directing petitioners to
submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other
evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having
failed to secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order,
petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits and
documents on July 15, 1982 in order to avoid further
delay in the prosecution of these cases.
 This move on the part of the petitioners would have
rendered the instant petition moot and academic. But
while respondent gave due course to some of said cases
either by issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some
other appropriate action, he refused to issue the
warrants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419,
12420 and 12422, and instead ordered the records
thereof remanded to the City Fiscal "for further
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation," for on the
bases of said affidavits, respondent found no prima facie
case against the accused.
 Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to
restrain respondent from enforcing the orders subject of
the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take
CrimPro [Arrest]
cognizance of, all the informations filed in his court.
They contend that the fiscal's certification in the
information of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue a
warrant of arrest; and that such certification binds the
judge, it being supported by the presumption that the
investigating fiscal had performed his duties regularly
and completely.
 Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an
exercise of his judicial power to review the fiscal's
findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the
failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits
destroys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of petitioners' official duties, particularly in
the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the
City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations
filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution
witnesses and other documentary evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the certification of the investigating fiscal in the
information as to the existence of probable cause
obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of
arrest. – NO
 The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest is the existence of probable cause. Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
 P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to
determine the existence of probable cause. Thus: If on
the basis of complainant's sworn statements and
documents submitted, the investigating dismiss the
raise. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a
subpoena .... (Sec. 1 [b], RA 5180, as amended by P.D.
Nos. 77 and 911).
 The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in
the information to be filed by him that he has examined
the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of
the sworn Statements and other evidence submitted
before him there is reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof
 There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon
the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest,
But does such certification bind the judge to come out
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial
function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on
the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the
following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court:
 Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied
from the preliminary examination conducted by him or
by the investigating officer that the offense complained
of has been committed and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
 Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing , a warrant or
order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
certification and require the submission of the affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this
evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of
the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and
July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-
standing practice had been attached to the informations
filed in his sala, respondent found the informations
inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after
petitioners had submitted the required affidavits,
respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of
arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.
 German to the issue at hand is the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases applicable to the following,
to wit:
 “B. Criminal Cases:
Violation of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
Violations of the rental laws;
Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6)
months imprisonment, or a fine of One Thousand Pesos
[1,000.00], or both irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom; Provided, however, that in offenses
involving damage to property through reckless
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable
fine does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00].”
CrimPro [Arrest]
 In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with
the court is mandatory. Section 9, par. 2 of said Rule
prescribes that "the complaint or information must be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses in such number of copies as there are
defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files.
 Section 10 of the Summary Rule provides:On the basis of
the complaint or information and the affidavits
accompanying the same, the court shall make a
preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case
outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to
require further proceedings to be taken. In the latter
case, the court may set the case for immediate
arraignment of an accused under custody, and if he
pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he
pleads not guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall
issue an order, accompanied by copies of all the
affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing the
defendants to appear and submit his counter-affidavit
and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later
than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
 Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever
required, shall cause the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists
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after an examination in writing and under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses.
 The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of
affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is to
enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the
case outright or to require further proceedings.
 One last point. It appears that after petitioners had
submitted the required affidavits of witnesses, the
respondent judge ordered Criminal Cases Nos. 12417,
12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422 remanded to the City
Fiscal for further preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. We hold that respondent did not abuse
his discretion in doing so. From the informations and
affidavits presented to him, he found the charges
patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue
the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only
expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety
and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule
on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent
judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of
the charge if, from the information and the affidavits
attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently
without basis or merit.
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PEOPLE V. INTING
July 25, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
 Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-
Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for
allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant,
Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission
or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
 Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo
Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete
City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in
court; (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence
submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to issue a
resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.
The directive to conduct the preliminary investigation was
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752 dated January
14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the
constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code
which implements the constitutional provision.
 After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint,
Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed
with the respondent trial court a criminal case for
violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor.
 In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent
court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC
Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
 However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the
accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its
September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty.
Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The court stated that it "will give due course to the
information filed in this case if the same has the written
approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the
prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and
control of the latter."
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 In another order, the court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15)
days from receipt to file another information charging the
same offense with the written approval of the Provincial
Fiscal.
 Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an
order dated December 8, 1988, the trial court quashed the
information. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a
Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial
Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional
Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation
and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
NO
 We emphasize important features of the constitutional
mandate that " ... no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge ... " (Article III, Section 2,
Constitution)
 Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the
two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the
same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial is the function of the Prosecutor.
 The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz
(171 SCRA 39 [1989]): “Judges of Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That
authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13,
14 and 16 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, was
removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
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Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, which deleted all
provisions granting that power to said Judges. “
 We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other
basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function ... (but)
part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive,"
(2) that wherever "there are enough fiscals or prosecutors
to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are
counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to
them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does
not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately
exercised."
 The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an
RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary
investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient
ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority, when such a
pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there
is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords,
rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because
both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to
order arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in
nature.
 The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in
nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind
of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged
with the judge. It is in this context that we address the
issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to
the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding
election offenses.
 Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution mandates the
COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the
COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause
and for filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
election and the concomittant authority to investigate and
prosecute election offenses is not without compelling
reason. The evident constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free,
orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people
and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and
duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in
achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
 From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions
relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither
explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the
Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and
hear election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office as contradistinguished from the
clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first
instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the
Election Code of 1978.
 It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election
offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with
the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the
conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA
281 [1987])
 Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the
prosecution of election offenses.
 It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the
COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so,
because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is
made and the information is filed with the court, the judge
will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
 CrimPro [Arrest]
SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR
November 14, 1988
PER CURIAM
 Background (NOT IN THE CASE): Beltran and Soliven
broadcasted over the radio that President Aquino hid
under her bed during the coup d’etat and were charged
with libel. Soliven invokes Pres. Aquino’s immunity from
suit to get off the hook. (Soliven:”I can’t sue her therefore
she can’t sue me.”)
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
 Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
 The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has
apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
is not an accurate interpretation.
 What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
 Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts.
 On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously
adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein
provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
 It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated
from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
 NOTES on non-arrest issues:
On issue of presidential immunity
The privilege form immunity from suit (which is aimed to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from
any hindrance or distraction considering that President’s
job requires all of her time and attention) pertains to the
President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President’s
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused. Moreover, the President has the
right to waive such privilege but it is only him/her that
could decide to do so.
On WON petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President
Moot and academic
SOJ denied the motion and found prima facie case; SOJ
denied the appeal, Executive Secretary denied the appeal.
Beltran impliedly waived right to refute by filing “Motion
to Decalre Proceedings Closed”.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Lim, Sr. vs. Felix
February 19, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Quick Summary:
The petitioners were accused to have been responsible for
the death of CCOng. Moises Espinosa and his security
escorts and the injury caused to another one. The Judge,
relying solely on the Prosecutor’s certification issued
warrants of arrest against the accused. It was help that this
is grave abuse of discretion. The jusge may rely on the
Prosecutor’s certification but it has to be supported by
reports, affidavits, etc.
Facts:
-March 17, 1989 - An assassin attacked and killed Cong.
Moises Espinosa and his security escorts Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro and Artemio Fuentes around the Masbate
Domestic Airport. Dante Siblante survived but was injured.
-For the purpose of a preliminary investigation, an
amended complaint was filed by the investigator from the
PC Criminal Investigation Service accusing Vicente Lim, Sr.,
Mayor Susana Lim, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez,
Jr., Nonilon Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho for multiple murder and frustrated
murder.
-The court issued an order stating that after weighing the
affidavits and answers given by the witnesses, a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
-The same Order ordered the arrest of petitioners and
recommended bail in the amount of P200,000 which was
reduced to P150,000 for Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon
Bagalihog.
-The records were transmitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor, and Fiscal Alfane who was designated to
review the case affirmed the finding of prima facie case
against the petitioners but ruled that the crime should
have been murder for the killing of the 4 victims and
physical injuries for inflicting gunshot wound on the
buttocks of Siblante.
-Fiscal Alfane filed 4 informations of murder and
recommended no bail.
-Vicente Lim and Susana Lim filed for change of venue but
was denied.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
-Vicente Lim and Susana Lim filed several motions and
manifestations praying that (1) the records of the
preliminary inquiry be transmitted to the Court for its
personal determination of the existence of probable cause
as well as its determination of guilt, (2) movants be given
ample opportunity to file their motion for PI as a matter of
right and (3) they be allowed to file for reduction of bail or
for admission of bail in case the Court may be convinced of
the existence of probable cause.
-The Lims reiterated in another manifestation that the
court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists
probable cause in light of the recantations of witnesses in
the preliminary investigation. These were opposed by the
prosecution.
-The court denied the motions and manifestations and
issued warrants of arrest against the accused stating
that it is just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s
certification since each information is complete in
form and substance and there is no visible defect on its
face. Both the MTC and the provincial prosecutor
found probable cause.
-The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering
the judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents
to cease and desist from implementing the warrant of
arrest.
-The Court issued in another Resolution a preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering and directing the
respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal
effects of the warrant of arrest without bail against Jolly
Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog,
and release them from detention. It also issued a TRO
ordering the judge to cease and desist from implementing
the warrants against Nestor Lim and Kho.
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: YES.
-The addition of the word ‘personally’ after the word
‘determined’ and the deletion of the grant of authority by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to ‘other
respondent officers as may be authorized by law’ does not
mean that it is required that the judge personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
CrimPro [Arrest]
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. What
the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. What the judge has to do is to
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest, or, if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
Interpretation of Article III, Sec 2
-Only the Judge and the Judge alone determines the
existence of probable cause.
-The certification of the Prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
-There is a difference between the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or released. The first is made by the Judge;
the second is made by the Prosecutor.
-Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the Judge
relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor. This
would mean that it is the Prosecutor who determined
probable cause.
IN THIS CASE, the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he relied solely on the Prosecutor’s
certification. Petition is Granted.
CrimPro [Arrest]
PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
April 14, 1988
Narvasa, j.
Quick summary:
Shooting incident. Complaint filed before the Judge who
determined probable cause for issuance of warrats of
arrest without investigation by the Fiscal.
Court held that there’s no need to complete the two stages
in order to issue the warrant. The completion applies only
to the filing of an Information.
Facts:
-July 27, 1985 – shooting incident occurred in Lanao del
Sur in which at least five people died and two others were
wounded.
-The following day, Atty. Batuampar who claimed to be the
counsel for the widow of one of the victims filed a letter-
complaint with the Provincial Fiscal and asked for a “full
blast preliminary investigation” of the incident. The letter
adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being
implicated by the parties but none was identified. Fiscal
requested that all cases related to the incicdent be
forwarded to his office which had taken cognizance of the
said cases.
-Aug 10 – a criminal complaint for multiple murder was
filed before the respondent Judge by PC Sgt Jose Laru-an.
Respondent Judge examined personally all three witnesses
under oath thru close and direct supervision. The Judge
approved the complaint and issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners and 50 John
Does.
-The petitioners and the SolGen argue that the prelim
investigation was not done in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Sec 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court and that the failure constituted a denial to
petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings
leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrests. They
contend that it would have been impossible for the Judge
to determine probable cause for 64 persons in a matter of
hours and issue the warrants in the same day. The Judge
allegedly relied mainly on the supporting affidavits which
were obviously prepared already when presented to him
by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.
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-The petitioners assert that the Judge disregarded the
Fiscal who had already taken cognizance of the case.
-Discussion of Section 3 of Rule 112 (pls see previous case
on the two stages of prelim investigation)
ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue
the warrant of arrest without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for PI. [is the completion of the
procedure in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua
non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?]
HELD: No. The PI has been completed as far as the Judge is
concerned. After receiving the complaint and examining
the witnesses, he determined that there was probable
cause.
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for PI
must be completed. What the Rule provides is that no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the
RTC may be filed without completing that procedure. But
nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be
completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. Section 6
allows that the warrant be issued even before the opening
of the second phase.
-Modification introduced by RA 3838: The judge must
examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination
under oath and reduce to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers.
-The rule is that such issuance need only await a finding of
probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure
of PI.
-The questions asked by the Judge satisfied the Court that
the determination of probable cause was not arbitrary.
-The time it took the Judge to determine probable cause is
not an issue.
-The Court is not prepared to question the propriety of the
respondent Judge’s finding of probable cause or substitute
it judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put
to the witnesses during the preliminary examination.
-The warrant of arrest in question validly issued against
the petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after
proceedings, to which no irregularity has been shown to
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attach, in which the respondent Judge found sufficient
cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime
complained of.
-HOWEVER, warrant issued against 50 John Does, not one
of whom is identified, is in the nature of general warrants.
Void.
-Fiscal’s declaration of intent to investigate did not legally
inhibit Judge. Complaint was legally brought to the Judge,
not the Fiscal.
FINAL JUDGMENT: valid as it orders the arrest of
petitioners.
Voided to the extent that it is issued against 50 John Does.
Notes:
Searching questions and answers:
..only, taking into consideration the purpose of the
preliminary examination which is to determine "whether
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there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused
held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show
the commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof.
What would be searching questions would depend on what
is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the
offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the
possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age,
education, status, financial and social circumstances, his
attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes,
opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age,
status, family responsibilities, financial and social
circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the
subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The
questions, therefore must to a great degree depend upon
the Judge making the investigation. ...
CrimPro [Arrest]
PEOPLE VS CA
January 21, 1999
Panganiban, J.
Quick summary:
Rosalinda Dy was shot at pointblank range by Jonathan
Cerbo in the presence of Billy Crespo. Judge ordered that
the case against Billy Crespo be dismissed and that the
warrant be recalled.
Facts:
-Aug 30, 1993 – Rosalinda Dy was allegedly shot at
pointblank range by Jonathan Cerbo in the presence of his
father Billy Crespo.
-Sept 2 – eyewitness Elsa Gumban executed an affidavit
positively identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo
as the assailant.
-Sept 30 – Jonathan executed a counter affidavit claiming
that the shooting was accidental.
-Oct 6 – MTC found probable cause for the crime of murder
after PI and resolved to forward the records of the case to
the Provincial Prosecutor.
-Info for murder filed. Daughter of the victim executed an
affidavit-complaint charging Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in
the crime. Billy Cerbo denied.
-Prosecution filed an amended Info including Billy Cerbo.
Warrant of arrest later issued.
-Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant because of
lack of probable cause.
-Judge ordered that the case against Billy Cerbo be
dismissed and that the warrant be recalled.
-CA affirmed the Trial Court’s decision finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the act of the Judge.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the the Information against
Billy Cerbo for want of evidence is proper.
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HELD: NO.
-The determination of probable cause is an executive
function. The Trial Court does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of
such function.
-The public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined
by law.
-The determination of probable cause in the issuance of
arrest warrants is a judicial function.
-The objectives of the two officers are different, which is
why the jusge cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s
certification.
-It is not required that the complete or entire records of
the case during the PI be submitted to the judge. What is
required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment
or to verify the findings of the prosecutor.
-a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if
he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing
so
Allado and Salonga inapplicable
Allado: evidence presented did not meet the standard of
probable cause
Salonga: no prima facie case against a person sought to be
charged with a crime.
Main witness in this case is not a conspirator of the crime.
-The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present
case being pro forma, inasmuch as the requisite copy and
notice were not duly served upon the adverse party, the
trial court had no authority to act on it.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People vs. Lumayok
October 1, 1985
Alampay, J.
*The confession was acquired by torturing and maltreating
the accused.
Facts: Lumayok was charged with the crime or Rape with
Murder for allegedly raping Gloria Belmos and killing her
to conceal the commission of the crime.
(denied by the accused)
Mansueto Bemos went to the house of Edwin Rico and told
him that his daughter was missing. The handbag of the
victim was found and some 100 meters away from it, a
black comb belonging to accused Lumayok was also found.
Eventually, the body of the victim was found. The accused
admitted to the police officer that he raped the victim and
that he killed her after. He said that he did so because his
bride-to-be (another girl) left him.
(version of the accused)
-he was playing basketball with Edwin Rico and other
companions. Edwin Rico borrowed his black comb and
never returned it (the comb found near the victim’s
handbag). He said that he went home right after and that
Edwin Rico went to his house in the evening and asked
him to help in the search for Gloria Bemos. Edwin Rico’s
group found the body of the victim.
-The policemen on a pretext that they needed Lucio
Lumayok to accompany them in buying petroleum, invited
him. He readily went with them.
-He denied the accusation regarding the rape and murder
of Gloria Bemos but he was maltreated and tortured.
-The investigating policemen burned his penis and his
pubic hair. They shaved his head and threatened that they
would get the skin off his head if he wouldn’t tell them that
he did that. They told him that they would help him in
court if he signs.
-He put his thumbmark on the paper without knowing the
contents as he was illiterate.
ISSUE: WON the admission of the accused may be used as
evidence and establishes his guilt.
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HELD: No.
-The accused was not informed of his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination or that he was afforded
opportunity to avail himself of assistance of a counsel.
-The purported confession is in English and there is no
mention that the question answered by the accused had
been translated by anyone.
-The confession was not submitted to the Municipal Judge.
-The following requisites were not observed:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... .
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he
might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
- It was a mistake for the trial court to accept the testimony
of Sanciano Satorre saying that he burned the accused’s
pubic hair and that the accused allowed him to do so. Such
is beyond basic human instincts and the ordinary normal
behavior of persons.
-The initial reaction of the accused was to deny having
committed the crime. HE signed the confession with a
thumbmark, but denied again during trial. It goes to show
that he did not understand the confession.
CrimPro [Arrest]
PEOPLE VS ALBIOR
June 30, 1988
Cortes, J.
Facts: The accused, together with other men, was charged
with Robbery with Homicide with Rape. They allegedly
robbed the house of Florencio Garces in Project 8, Quezon
City and raped Dana Garces.
-Albior pleaded not guilty. After trial, the trial court found
Albior guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
-Agent Teofilo Jamela of the CIS Investigation Section
testified that Albior and Vasquez (his co-accused) admitted
that they served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered
the victim’s room. Vasquez stated that Manansalang and
Reyes related to him that earlier that day they robbed the
house of the victim, and in the course of the robbery, Reyes
raped and killed the victim.
-Agent Dayco stated that he interrogated the persons to
whom the typewriter stolen from the Garces residence was
sold and that the first buyer pointed to Manalangsang and
Vasquez as the persons who sold it to him.
-Sgt Prado testified that the panty of the victim and the
stolen Adidas shoes were found in Vasquez’s house.
-Albior testified that he was at the house of his cousin in
Baesa, Quezon City when the crime was being committed.
He said that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect
tin which the confession was written, and signed it
only because he was told he’d be released if he signed
it.
-Vasquez testified that during a drinking spree where
accused Manalangsang and Albior were also present,
Bernardo Reyes recounted how he and Manalangsang
robbed the house of the victim, and how he hit her with a
baluster when she awoke. Reyes brought out the panty of
the victim. Vasquez denied having sold the stolen
typewriter and said that it was Manalangsang who sold it.
He said that he signed the extra-judicial confession
because he was threatened at the CIS headquarters
with physical violence.
-The trial court held that the extrajudicial confession of
Albior was voluntarily and freely given.
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ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confession of Albior was
valid.
Held: No.
-7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... .
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he
might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
-lack of assistance of counsel in Albior’s waiver of his right
-It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks
Tagalog, Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn
statement is in Tagalog (Exh. "N"]. It does not suffice that
an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present during the
interrogation (as stated in the sworn statement) because
by virtue of its being written in Tagalog, Albior was
deprived of the opportunity to comprehend through his
own reading what he was signing.
Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the
sworn statement because he was promised that he would
be released adds to the conclusion that he did not
understand what he was signing. No reasonable person
would believe the promise that he would be re leased if he
knows that he had just signed a statement admitting his
participation in the commission of a very serious offense.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Tudtud
J. Tinga (2003)
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes once declared: “it is less evil that
some criminals escape than that the government should play
an ignoble part.” Hence, given a choice between letting
suspected criminals escape or letting the government play
an ignoble part, to this Court, it should be the former 1
 Sometime during July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station (Davao) received a report from a “civilian asset”
named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud
 Solier related that his neighbor Tudtud was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their
area
 Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section of the
Toril Police Station conducted “surveillance” on Solier’s
neighborhood
 For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that
Tudtud was involved in selling marijuana, according to
his neighbors
 On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that
Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back
later that day with new stocks of marijuana
 Solier described Tudtud to the police as big-bodied and
short, and usually wore a hat
Version of the Police:
 That same day, a police team (wearing civilian clothes)
posted themselves near Toril bus stop to await
Tudtud’s arrival
 At about 8:00 pm, two men disembarked from a bus
carrying a carton box and one of the men fit Tudtud’s
description
 The police thereafter approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers
 They informed Tudtud and companion (Dindo Bolong)
that they had information that stocks of illegal drugs
would be arriving that night
 Tudtud denied that he was carrying any drugs
 The police then asked him if they could see the contents
of the box; Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright” and
opened the box himself
 The box contained pieces of dried fish, but beneath it
were two bundles, wrapped in a plastic bag and
newspapers
 Tudtud was then told to unwrap the packages and they
contained what seemed to the policemen as marijuana
leaves
1 J. Tinga used the abovequoted as backdrop in
discussing the merits of the case–arte lang ito. For more
quotable quotes. 
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 The police thus arrested Tudtud and Bulong, informed
them of their rights and brought them to the police
station
Tudtud’s Version:
 He testified that he did not know co-accused Bolong
and that on the day of the arrest, he just came from
Cotabato where he sold pairs of Levi’s pants (his
sideline)
 He testified, further, that upon alighting from the bus, a
man who identified himself as a police officer,
approached and pointed a gun at him
 Said police officer inspected the bag Tudtud was
carrying but found nothing except for pairs of Levi’s
pants
 Then, the same police officer ordered him to open a
carton box some 2 meters away. Tudtud claims that the
box was already there when he disembarked from the
bus
 Out of fear and intimidation, he proceeded to open said
box and inside were pieces of dried fish and
underneath was something wrapped in cellophane
 Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the police
officer declared that it contained marijuana and
thereafter abruptly handcuffed Tudtud
 Meanwhile, the confiscated items were turned over to
the PNP Crime Lab for examination and tests confirmed
that the same was marijuana
 Tudtud and Bulong were subsequently charged before
the Davao RTC with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs; Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty
 The defense, however, reserved their right to question
the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the
evidence against them
 On trial, prosecution presented as witnesses, among
others, the arresting officers and Solier
 Defense, on the other hand, denied the charges and
cried frame-up
 RTC found against Tudtud and convicted him together
with Bolong
 On appeal, the defendants raised the following issue:
WoN the confiscated marijuana is admissible as evidence,
it having been seized in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures? – Otherwise stated
(and for our purposes), WoN they were validly arrested
and searched
HELD: NO WAY! The Decision of the Davao RTC is
REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong are
hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence
CrimPro [Arrest]
RATIO:
Application/Construction of Const. and Rules of Court on
Warrantless Arrests and Searches
 According to Sec 2, Art III (Const.), the rule is that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes “unreasonable”
 In conjunction with Sec 3(2), Art III (Const.), any
evidence secured in violation of Sec 2 will be
inadmissible in evidence “for any purpose in any
proceeding”
 The proscription in Sec 2, Art III, however, covers
only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The
following instances are NOT “unreasonable”
searches even in the absence of a warrant thru Sec
5(a), Rule 113:2
1) Search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec 12, Rule
126)3
2) Search of evidence in “plain view”
3) Search of a moving vehicle
4) Consented warrantless search
5) Customs search
6) Stop and Frisk
7) Exigent and emergency circumstances
 Under Sec 5, Rule 113, “reliable information” alone
is not enough to constitute probable cause, much
less is it sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest 4
 In addition, the same rule requires that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense” (in flagrante delicto)
 Further, in conjunction with Sec 6(a), Rule 113, the
officer arresting a person in flagrante delicto must have
personal knowledge of that fact (i.e. the act must be
committed in his presence or within his view)
 THEREFOR, for the exception in Sec 5(a), Rule 113 to
apply, two elements must concur:5
2 Rule 113, Sec 5: A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense x x x
3 Sec 12, Rule 126: Search incident to lawful arrest.
– A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant
4 The reason is obvious (People v. Montilla and
People v. Doria): Any one an informant points out to a
police officer as a possible violator of the law could be
subject to search and possible arrest. This would clearly be
a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting
an arrest or conducting a search and seizure.
5 People v. Burgos (cited in People v. Aminnudin) 
note that J. Tinga actually listed jurisprudence that
deviated significantly from Burgos and Aminnudin where
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1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime
2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer
(personal knowledge or probable cause);
reliable information alone is insufficient
 Simply stated, all the above rules require personal
knowledge on the part of the officers making the in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and the
subsequent warrantless search
 IMPORTANT: A statute or rule which allows exceptions
to the requirement of warrants of arrest/search
warrant is strictly construed. Any exception must
clearly fall within the situations where securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary
The Rules as Applied to the Facts of this Case:
 In the instant case, RTC justified the warrantless search
of appellants’ belongings under the first exception,
namely: a search incidental to a lawful arrest THIS IS
UNTENABLE
 It is significant to note that the search in the case at
bar preceded the arrest. Jurisprudence holds that
the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed
 CAVEAT: a search may precede an arrest as long as
such a search is substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest AND that the searching/arresting authority
have probable cause6 to make the arrest at the outset
of the search
 The question, therefore, is whether the police had
probable cause to arrest appellants without a judicial
warrant NO!
Absence of Personal Knowledge, ergo, No Probable Cause
 To repeat, mere “reliable information” or tip from a
“civilian asset” is not enough to constitute probable
cause. The same “tip” also does not translate into
“personal knowledge” on the part of
arresting/searching officer of facts constituting a belief
warrantless arrests based on mere “reliable information”
or where the arrested persons did not perform overt acts
which indicated that they have committed, is committing
or will commit a crime were upheld. He did not go into
details about these cases but simply declared that the rule
in Burgos and Aminnudin “more faithfully adheres to the
letter of Sec 5(a), Rule 113.
6 Probable Cause is an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested.
CrimPro [Arrest]
that person to be arrested/searched is in flagrante
delicto as to justify the warrantless arrest and search
 Appellants in this case were neither performing any
overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would
hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to
be, committed  even if the police’s version is to be
believed, carrying a carton box out of a bus is not at all
suspicious
 More importantly, the knowledge of the herein
arresting/searching officers that appellant Tudtud was
in possession of marijuana cannot be described as
“personal,” having learned the same only from their
unreliable informant Solier
 Solier in his testimony said that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors (ergo, hearsay)
 Even the police officers were not fully convinced of the
reliability of Solier’s information as they felt it
necessary to conduct their own surveillance
 But even if we take into account the “surveillance”
information, it still does not constitute “personal
knowledge” on the part of the police officers as they did
not actually stalk out Tudtud to catch him in the act of
selling drugs. Instead, the police merely collected
information from Tudtud’s neighbors, which again is
hearsay, not personal knowledge
No Urgency to Justify Not Applying for Proper Warrant
 Moreover, the records of the case suggest that the
policemen need not have resorted to warrantless
arrest/search because they actually had ample
opportunity to apply for the proper warrant  they
received Solier’s info at 9am and Tudtud was expected
to arrive still at 6pm; Toril RTC was merely 16 km away
from the Police Station
 Procedural dispatch in procuring warrants under
certain circumstances7 as in this case are sanctioned by
the Supreme Court even after office hours, weekends
and legal holidays;8 hence there was no reason for the
police officer’s omission to secure the proper judicial
warrant
 At the trial, one of the arresting police officers
intimated that the real reason why they did not procure
the proper warrant was that they were not too
confident that they could establish probable cause
7 Memorandum Circular No. 19 (1987): All
applications for search warrants relating to violation of x x
x Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no
longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge x x x
under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located
8 Memorandum Circular No. 13 (1985): x x x an
application for search warrant may be filed directly with
any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required
to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof
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 And although in the process of approving or denying an
application for a warrant, the determination of
probable cause by the law enforcers is not binding to
the judge, such apprehension on the part of the police
raises serious question on and further erodes the
existence of “personal knowledge” on their part of
appellant’s culpability
No Consented Warrantless Search
 The requisites for the valid waiver of the right against
unreasonable searches (consent to warrantless search)
are:
1) It must appear that the right exists
2) The person concerned had knowledge (actual or
constructive) of the existence of such a right
3) Said person had actual intention to relinquish the
right
 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish
requisites 2 and 3
 Although the records disclose that Tudtud said “it was
alright” for the police to search his belongings and that
he did not resist the same, the Constitution and
jurisprudence require a lot more than the presence of
such circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of a
constitutional right
 Acquiescence to a loss of a fundamental right is not to
be presumed, hence, the fact that a person failed to
object to a warrantless search does not amount to a
permission thereto
 Too, considering that the search came after the men
who approached Tudtud had identified themselves as
police officers (and allegedly pointed a gun at him), the
above rule is applied more strictly
 The courts do not place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; thus, a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law
 Also, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving
that the search was without consent
 All told, the police officers were unable to meet the
exacting requirements of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court to justify the warrantless arrest of Tudtud’s
person and the subsequent warrantless search of his
belongings. Evidence taken therefrom is inadmissible.
And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant,
the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained
CrimPro [Arrest]
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
People v. Chua
J. Ynares-Santiago (2003)
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is
 On Sept 21, 1996, police officers of PNP Angeles ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt
received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant Chua was about to deliver drugs that RATIO:
night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City
 On the basis of this lead, a team of police operatives  RTC, in convicting Chua, ruled that the warrantless
was formed to accost Chua. They positioned themselves arrest was valid as Chua was accordingly arrested in
across the street fronting Thunder Inn Hotel flagrante delicto while then carrying prohibited drugs,
 At around 11:45pm, a car driven by Chua arrived and hence, the subsequent search of his person was also
parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest and akin to
 After Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest- “stop-and-frisk”this is UNTENABLE
O juice box walking towards the entrance of the Hotel,  The RTC confused two principles on warrantless
police officers hurriedly accosted him and introduced searches, i.e. search incidental to a lawful arrest (in
themselves as police officers flagrante delicto) and “stop-and-frisk”
 In the course of said arrest, a small transparent plastic  These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
bag with a crystalline substance protruded from Chua’s of (1) the requisite quantum of proof before they may
pocket. Forthwith, police officers subjected him to a be validly effected and (2) in their allowable scope
“body search” which yielded 20 pieces of live .22 caliber
bullets; same officer also peeked into the contents of Searches in flagrante delicto Stop-and-frisk Searches
the Zest-O box, and saw that it contained a crystalline  Arrest precedes search  Search precedes arrest
substance (arrest preceded the search)  Probable cause (personal  Probable cause is not
 The police confiscated the small transparent plastic knowledge) is required required; well-grounded
bag, the Zest-O juice box, the bullets, and Chua’s car;  arresting officer may suspicion is enough,
said items were brought to the PNP Headquarters in search the person of the provided that according to
Angeles City arrestee and the the surrounding conditions
 Initial field test conducted at the PNP Headquarters surrounding area where and the officer’s
(not at the crime scene) revealed that the seized items evidence may be located; experience, a person of
were methamphetamine hydrochloride/shabu he may also seize any suspect behavior may be
 Thereafter, these items were subjected to further property found which was reasonably believed to be
examination at the PNP Crime Lab where, after due used in the commission of potentially dangerous
testing, it was concluded that the crystalline substances the crime, or the fruit of  limited search of outer
yielded positive results for shabu the crime, or that which clothing of a person for
 Appellant Binad Sy Chua was then charged with may be used as evidence weapons or contraband
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for
Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate  A warrantless search incidental to an arrest in flagrante
Informations delicto is necessary because the suspect has already
 He pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment and the cases been caught red-handed while committing, has just
were jointly tried committed or will commit a crime at the
 The defense presented an entirely different version of presence/within the view of the arresting officer
the facts9 which, in sum, intimated frame-up  “Stop-and-frisk,” on the other hand, is defined as the act
 RTC of Angeles City rendered judgment acquitting Chua of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
for Illegal Possession of ammunition but convicting him interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or
for Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, hence, this contraband
appeal  Common elements of a stop-and-frisk are: (1) the police
officer firstly introduces himself properly and make
ISSUE: WoN warrantless arrest of Chua and the initial inquiries; (2) then approach and restrain a
subsequent search of his person which yielded material person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct;
evidence against him (shabu) were conducted in a lawful and (3) check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly
and valid manner concealed weapons
 It serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
HELD: NO. The decision of the RTC of Angeles City effective crime prevention and detection; 10 and (2) the
convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is REVERSED interest of safety and self-preservation11

9 This, however, was not passed upon in the

discussion of the merits, thus, it might not be relevant. 10 That a police officer may, under appropriate
Tanong niyo na lang sa akin if you’re interested  circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
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the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law on
Inapplicability of in flagrante delicto and stop-and-frisk stop-and-frisk
 In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto
nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to Inapplicability of Other Valid Means of Warrantless
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent Searches
search and seizure made by the police operatives  Search (of evidence) In Plain View – (1) there was no
on Chua valid intrusion; (2) the evidence, i.e., the plastic bag, the
 For a valid arrest in flagrante delicto, two elements Zest-O box which contained shabu and the pieces of .22
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered
execute an overt act indicating that he has just (the police intentionally searched for these items and
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to were not “in plain view”)
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the  In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a
presence or within the view of the arresting officer  search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
both elements are not present in this case search, or a customs search. It cannot also fall under
 The records of the case reveal that there was no overt exigent and emergency circumstances
manifestation that Chua has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime (he was
merely entering a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O box
which is not a suspicious activity)
 Also, it has been held that “reliable information”
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest leading to the only conclusion that
there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest
preceding the search of Chua
 Further militating the case of the prosecution is the fact
established by the arresting officer’s testimony on trial
to the effect that they have already known and
investigated Chua’s drug-dealing activities for two
years prior to his actual arrest this only means that
whatever information the civilian asset relayed to the
police on the night of the arrest was not an “on-the-
spot” tip which may excuse them from obtaining the
proper warrant of arrest
 All circumstances considered, there was also no
valid “stop-and-frisk” in the case of Chua
 For one, he was first arrested before the search and
seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession (contrary to established stop-and-frisk
principle that requires the search to precede the arrest)
 Also, the fact reveals that the police operative failed to
make any initial inquiry into Chua’s business in the
vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was
carrying; they merely identified themselves as
policemen but this was when they have already
arrested Chua
 Further, Chua was not exhibiting any unusual and
suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with

person for purposes of investigating possible criminal

behavior even without probable cause
11 to permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals with is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could be used against
him
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Mendez
J. Mendoza (2002)
 Appellants Renante Mendez and Rene “Baby”
Cabagtong were charged with the crime of rape with
homicide of one Candy Dolim
 Upon arraignment, they pleaded “not guilty” and then
trial ensued
 The prosecution’s theory (supported by its witnesses’
testimonies): On the morning of Dec 8, 1996, Candy was
asked by her father to go out and collect bets for the
PBA endings game from the local residents. She never
returned that evening and her relatives looked for her
in vain. She was to be found only on Dec 12, brutally
molested and lifeless 
 Later, the victim’s father heard reports that a certain
Ronnie Cabagtong was involved in the killing of his
daughter, hence, he filed a complaint against Ronnie
 This caused Ronnie’s warrantless arrest (and
detention) together with appellant Mendez; but while
Ronnie was being investigated at the police station, his
mother Aurea arrived and declared that she knew what
really happened to Candy and offered to be a witness.
She pointed to appellants Mendez and Baby Cabagtong
as the perpetrators
 Aurea testified that on the night of Dec 8, appellants
went to her house looking for Ronnie and that her son
asked her to let the two inside. She testified that she
saw appellants washing their clothes to remove
bloodstains on them when the two spent the night in
her house
 Ronnie Cabagtong, for his part, claimed to be an
eyewitness to the crime. He testified that on the
evening of Dec 8, he was in a local Betamax screening
place where the victim and the appellants were also
present. He said that Candy left early and that
appellants followed her. He himself left the place 5
minutes later and on the way home, he allegedly saw
from 3 meters away appellants raping Candy. It was
raining and there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he
recognized appellants because of a lantern which
illuminated the place. After witnessing the crime, he
casually proceeded home and went to sleep only to be
awakened by appellants coming to his house (and the
rest in Aurea’s story)
 Ronnie’s statement, however, was never put into
writing, but he was released from custody as a result
thereof. And by the strength of his and Aurea’s
testimonies, appellant Mendez was kept in custody,
supposedly for “further investigation” while a manhunt
for Baby Cabagtong was ordered
 Baby Cabagtong was subsequently arrested, but not by
the police but by a civilian (barangay tanod). His arrest,
like Mendez’s was without warrant
 Investigating officer SPO2 Cernio testified that the
arrest of appellant Mendez without a warrant was
based on their knowledge of his guilt
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 The tanod who arrested Baby Cabagtong, also without
warrant, testified that his conduct was sanctioned by
the citizens’ arrest law and that he based his arrest of
Baby from the statement of Aurea Cabagtong
 The defense, on the other hand, presented a theory
diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution’s – that
the crime was committed by one Randy Gomba, and not
by appellants
 This is supported by their own “eyewitness,” one
Josefina Bernas who testified that on the night of the
crime, while she and her husband were making copra,
they heard a woman crying. When Josefina went to see
what it was, she saw a girl being raped by a man.
Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy Gomba
 The RTC was swayed by the prosecution’s case (giving
particular weight to Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtong’s
testimonies) and convicted appellants of the crime and
sentenced them accordingly
 Upon appeal, the appellants raise the following issues:
1.) WoN RTC erred in finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
2.) WoN their warrantless arrests were valid
HELD: YES, the RTC committed an error in finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged; and NO, the warrantless arrests made against
appellants were NOT VALID. The decision of the RTC
Loaogan, Northern Samar is REVERSED and accused-
appellants Renante Mendez and Rene “Baby” Cabagtong
are ACQUITTED of the crime of rape with homicide on the
ground of reasonable doubt
RATIO:
Issue #1: Error in the Finding of Guilt
 The RTC favored the prosecution by giving credence to
Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtong’s testimonies. It should
not have, because certain circumstances make these
testimonies suspect! For one, it is highly doubtful how
Ronnie could have witnessed the rape considering that
it was raining and there was no moonlight. His
contention that there was a lamp illuminating the area
is belied by the testimony of another prosecution
witness who described the crime scene as uninhabited
and surrounded by thick foliage. Thus, there could not
have been any lamps in the area. Also, Ronnie’s
behavior after he allegedly witnessed the crime, if he is
to be believed, is contrary to normal human reaction
(he casually proceeded home and went to sleep as if
nothing happened). The police also took at face value
Ronnie’s and Aurea’s testimony against appellants
without considering (or overlooking) the ulterior
motive that the former has in pointing to appellants as
the culprits (heck, it resulted to Ronnie’s release from
custody, for crying out loud!)
CrimPro [Arrest]
 RTC also did not probe the police why there was no
investigation to follow up the lead coming from the
defense’s witness Josefina Bernas coursed through the
Barangay Captain. Could it be that the police were keen
on pinning the blame on appellants because they were
easy targets due to their bad reputation in their
community?  this, together with the other
circumstances mentioned above, constitute reasonable
doubt meriting the appellants’ acquittal
Issue #2: Invalidity of Appellants’ Warrantless Arrests
 Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have
personal knowledge of the commission of the crime so
as to justify the warrantless arrest he made of appellant
Renante Mendez
 “Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without
warrant under §5(b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon “probable cause,” which means “an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is
based on actual facts, i.e., when it is supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
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create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested
 It is also important to note that the only time the police
had actual evidence/information against appellant
Mendez was when Aurea Cabagtong came forward and
pointed to him (Mendez) and Baby Cabagtong as the
perpetrators
 The police clearly did not have reasonable grounds in
causing Mendez’s arrest without warrant because the
witnesses (Ronnie and Aurea) only surfaced when he
was already arrested
 Baby Cabagtong’s arrest without warrant cannot also
be sustained. He was arrested by a civilian who was not
a witness to the crime nor part of the investigating
team. Such arresting person (barangay tanod) could not
have had personal knowledge of the incident and this
was proven on trial when he testified that he merely
based his arrest on the information supplied by Aurea
Cabagtong to the police. This does not constitute
personal knowledge to constitute a valid citizens’ arrest
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Doria
J. Puno (1999)
 In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan
District PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two civilian informants (CI) that a
certain "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
Mandaluyong City
 Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a
buy-bust operation, so they arranged a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" scheduled on Dec
5, 1995 in Mandaluyong through their CI
 Members of Narcom prepared marked money worth
P1,600 as payment to the supposed drug-dealer; PO3
Manlangit was to be the poseur-buyer
 At 7:30 in the morning of Dec 5, "Jun" appeared and the
CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying
one kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the
marked bills and "Jun" instructed them to wait for him
at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street
while he got the marijuana from his associate
 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place and
took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and
gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua (back up police) rushed
to help in the arrest
 They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on
him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money
at the house of his associate named "Neneth." "Jun" led
the police team to Neneth's house nearby at Daang
Bakal
 The buy-bust team found the door of Neneth's house
open and the woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman
as his associate
 As SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the marked bills,
PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house; and
standing by the door, he noticed a carton box under the
dining table
 One of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was
something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper
appeared similar to the wrapper of the marijuana
earlier "sold" to him by "Jun"
 PO3 Manlangit's suspicion was aroused, hence, he
entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He
peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten
(10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."
 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth"
and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the
marked bills and turned them over to the investigator
at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned
that "Jun" is appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado while
"Neneth" is appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama
 After trial, the Pasig RTC convicted the accused-
appellants. The trial court found the existence of an
"organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced
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both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of
P500,000.00 each
 Upon this appeal, the appellants raised the following
issues:
1. WoN the “buy-bust” operation was valid – YES
2. WoN the consequent warrantless arrest and
search of appellants were valid – as to Doria, YES,
but as to Gaddao, NO.
HELD: The “buy-bust” operation was valid absent any
showing of ill-motives or abuse of power on the part of the
arresting officer, hence, DORIA'S warrantless arrest and
search arising from such lawful exercise is UPHELD. His
conviction perforce must be AFFIRMED. The warrantless
arrest and subsequent search of Gaddao, on the other
hand, is tainted with fatal procedural irregularities which
merit her ACQUITTAL based on reasonable doubt
RATIO:
On Buy-Bust Operation (Entrapment v. Inducement)
 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed
by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of the commission of an offense
 It evolved12 from the increasing use of informers and
undercover agents in the detection of crimes,
particularly liquor and narcotics offenses
 Unlike in the American jurisdiction, entrapment is not a
defense available to an accused in our jurisdiction;
instead, it is inducement/instigation that is a possible
defense in cases such as this one
 The distinction between entrapment and instigation
has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations because recently, it has become common
practice for law enforcement officers to engage in buy-
bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offender13
12 J. Puno extensively discussed the legal history, as
usual, of entrapment and inducement in Common Law and
how it reached our criminal law jurisdiction. The only
point being, the standards/tests to be applied in
construing a valid from illegal entrapment (tantamount to
inducement/instigation) are both subjective and objective.
It is “subjective” when the courts merely looks into the
accused's predisposition towards the crime he was busted
for regardless of the level of inducement the police has put
in him in committing the crime. And, consequently, it is
“objective” when the courts look into the conduct and
procedure by the arresting officers of the buy-bust
operation, i.e. whether the police may have exceeded the
standards of proper investigation.
13 This is due mainly to the fact that anti-narcotics
law are mala prohibita which impels government, in
CrimPro [Arrest]
 To determine whether there is entrapment or
instigation, our courts have mainly examined the
conduct of the apprehending officers, not the
predisposition of the accused to commit the crime
(objective test) → this demands, on the part of the
arresting officer, that details of the buy-bust transaction
be clearly and adequately shown (i.e. every detail of the
process from the initial meeting, offer, acceptance,
promise of payment and exchange in the sale of illegal
drugs must be presented and proved in court)
 However, entrapment, as it is often results to
derogation of fundamental rights (against unreasonable
searches and seizure, among others), the presumption
as to regularity of performance on the part of the law
enforcers cannot be applied → this presumption cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally-protected rights of the individual
 Fortunately for the prosecution, in the case at bar, the
law enforcers were successfully able to show and prove
in court the details of the buy-bust operation that led to
the warrantless arrest of Doria; notably, Doria was not
able to rebut the same
 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received,
appellant Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
 The buy-bust/entrapment thus valid, Doria's
warrantless arrest perforce falls within the exceptions
contemplated in Sec 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 → it is
beyond cavil, the facts of the buy-bust now clearly
established, that Doria was caught red-handed
committing the crime of selling prohibited drugs (in
flagrante delicto). At such a point, the police officers are
not only right but actually duty-bound to arrest him
without warrant
 The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search
of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box
of marijuana and marked bills are entirely different
matters
 The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was
arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills
were likewise made without a search warrant. It is
claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit"
and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest →
this is UNTENABLE
 To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant
Gaddao must fall under any of the 3 instances
enumerated in Sec 5, Rule 113
detecting and punishing violations of these laws, to rely,
not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals (as
in common criminal cases like murder, theft, arson, ect
which are mala in se), but upon the diligence of its own
officials. This means that the police must be present at the
time the offenses are committed either in an undercover
capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons
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 However, the records and testimonies of the arresting
officers show otherwise
 Unlike appellant Doria, appellant Gaddao was not
caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to
give ground (probable cause) for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 (in flagrante delicto).
 Also, contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was
no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her
 Neither could her warrantless arrest and search be
justified under Sec 5(b), Rule 113 → "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under
this rule must be based upon "probable cause" which
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion."14
 A perusal of the records show that Gaddao was arrested
solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused Doria → however, this is does not
constitute “personal knowledge” enough to form
probable cause on the minds of the arresting officers of
Gaddao's culpability as Doria's associate in pushing
drugs precisely because Doria did not point to
appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business,
but merely as the person with whom he left the marked
bills
 Save for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that Gaddao was
engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless arrest had,
in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable
 Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it
follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest
 Finally, the Narcom agents cannot claim justification of
their unwarranted search and seizure of Gaddao's
person, property and house on the basis of the doctrine
of “search (of evidence) in plain view”
 Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence
 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
14 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest
CrimPro [Arrest]
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search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
 It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object
itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object in question is inside a closed container
(such as in the instant case)
 As testified by PO3 Manlangit, while he was standing by
the door of Gaddao's house, he allegedly had a view of
the interior of said house and that a few meters away
was the dining table and underneath it was a carton
box. The box was partially open and revealed
something wrapped in plastic
 However, he later admitted that he merely presumed
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same
plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close
scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper
was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest
its contents to a viewer, ergo, “in plain view” doctrine
does not apply
 The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure
without the requisite search warrant was in violation of
the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court
CrimPro [Arrest]
Cadua v. Court of Appeals
J. Quisumbing (1999)
 In the evening of Jan 2, 1992, members of the QC
Central Police District were patrolling the vicinity of
Fairview, QC when they received a radio dispatch
requesting them to proceed to an address where a
holdup of 2 women has just been reported
 At said address, police officers found the women who
stated that the alleged hold-uppers had just fled; the
police officers requested the victims to board the patrol
unit in order to facilitate the search for the hold-uppers
 While patrolling the area in the direction where the
victims pointed the hold-uppers ran toward, the
policemen noticed 2 men walking alongside each other
and as the officers slowed down to get a closer look, the
victims identified them as the hold-uppers, one of
whom is petitioner Doria
 The police officers stopped, alighted from the vehicle,
and called out to the suspects. As they approached the
suspects, petitioner Cadua was about to pull something
tucked at the right side of his waist. The officers
promptly pointed their firearms at Cadua and warned
him not to move
 An officer thereafter frisked Cadua and found in his
possession a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver while the
search of Cadua's companion (Aguilar) yielded a fan
knife. Cadua and companion were then arrested
 Verification of the confiscated firearm revealed that
Cauda was not a valid license holder thereof
 Complaints for Robbery, Concealment of a Deadly
Weapon and Illegal Possession of Firearms were filed
by the police with the City Prosecutors Office
 However, the prosecutor found only the case for Illegal
Possession of Firearms warranting the filing of an
Information because the case for Robbery is wanting
probable cause due to the victims’ later doubts as to the
identity of the respondents
 The information for Illegal Possession was then filed
and upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued, resulting in Cadua’s
conviction
 Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA, which
affirmed in toto the assailed decision
 The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was based on probable cause and that the police
officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to
his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an
incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his
possession admissible in evidence
Petitioner’s Arguments
 Petitioner contends that his arrest is null and void,
hence, the search conducted by the police officers as an
incident to his arrest is likewise defective
 According to him, the police officers incorrectly
premised their action to justify his warrantless arrests
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(i.e. that he was the hold-upper); and that since the
victims later on disclaimed petitioner's identity as the
holdupper and that no case of robbery was filed against
him, any probable cause or personal knowledge thereof
alleged by the arresting officers had been totally
negated
 Thus, petitioner now posits that, absent probable cause
or personal knowledge by the arresting officers, the
arrest and the incidental search are illegal; hence, the
"paltik" they seized is inadmissible in evidence
 Petitioner also imputes ill-motives on the part of the
police officer for sustaining his warrantless arrest by
planting evidence of the “paltik” against him in view of
the supposed “blunder” they have committed in
apprehending him when he turned out not to be the
hold-upper
 He cites findings on record which showed that he was
negative for powder burns, although the "paltik" at the
time of its confiscation was positive for gun powder
residue
People’s Arguments
 At the time that petitioner was arrested, the police
officers had probable cause to arrest him based on the
information given by the hold-up victims. Petitioner
Cadua and his companion, Aguilar, were positively
identified by both women as the perpetrators of the
robbery even before the police officers alighted from
the car. When the police officers effected the arrest,
they already have probable cause and personal
knowledge that petitioner was a suspect in an offense
just committed
 As a logical consequence, the search incidental to the
arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered admissible in
evidence
 Also, the finding that petitioner was negative for
powder burns is immaterial because whether or not
petitioner fired the gun is not pertinent to the charge of
illegal possession of firearms. It also does not follow
that just because a person is found negative for powder
burns, he did not fire a gun
 The People also asserts that petitioner Cadua’s
warrantless arrest is valid because, in the presence of
the arresting officer, he was attempting to commit an
offense (he made an attempt to pull the revolver which
was tucked in his waist)
ISSUES:
1.) WoN CA erred in affirming his conviction - NO
2.) WoN the search of the “paltik” was valid as an
incident of a lawful arrest15 - YES
HELD: There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings by
the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The CA
15 Only issue #2 is relevant for our purposes
CrimPro [Arrest]
did not err in affirming Cadua’s conviction and the
warrantless arrest and consequent search on him were
valid. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION (lesser sentence). However, since
petitioner has already served more than 7 years, 5 months
in prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal
penalty now imposed for his offense (subsidiary penalty
for unpaid fine is included), he is hereby ordered
RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for any
other lawful cause
RATIO:
On Finding of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
 Suffice it to say that both elements of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms are present and proved
in this case: (1) that such a firearm existed and (2) the
accused did not have a license/permit to possess the
same.
On Frame-up
 Petitioner’s cry of frame-up to the effect that the police
made up charges for illegal possession just so they
would not go “empty-handed” because their original
apprehension of him for robbery was a “blunder” is not
persuasive. The uncorroborated claim of the Cadua that
he had been framed is self-serving and baseless
On Warrantless Arrest
 There was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless
arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of
firearms
 The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate
court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Sec 5, Rule 11316
 In the case at bar, through police dispatch to the scene
of a crime report and in the presence of victims, it was
ascertained that a robbery had just been committed,
and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that
petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect by the
victims
 Therefor, as to the element of personal knowledge, the
officers could not be faulted. They clearly acted with
reasonableness and on probable cause  there was a
legitimate, verified complaint by the victims and
consequently, they formed a reasonable suspicion that
the persons pointed out at the scene by the victims
were the perpetrators of the offense
16 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; x x x
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 This in itself is sufficient justification for the officers to
call the attention of the accused at that point in time
when he was identified as a suspect by the
complainants
 It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in
arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion
 Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant
any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show
that such person has committed, or is about to commit,
any crime or breach of the peace
 Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to
be guilty
 Petitioner also failed to dispute the arresting officer’s
testimony that he was attempting to draw out the
unlicensed gun when the former called on and
approach him. Actual possession of an unlicensed
firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw out, by
itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer contemplated in Sec 5(a), Rule
113
 The fact that the robbery case was never brought to
trial does not mean that the legality of the arrest was
tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the
indubitable existence of the crime
 It is not necessary that the crime should have been
established as a fact; the legality of apprehending the
accused would not depend on the actual
commission of the crime but upon the nature of the
deed, where from such characterization it may
reasonably be inferred by the officer to whom the
law at the moment leaves the decision for the
urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the
citizen
On Warrantless Search
 Given the warrantless arrest of Cadua has already been
established to be lawful and valid, the incidental search
and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in
question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Sec 12,
Rule 12617
 Clearly, it falls among the exceptions to the necessity
for a search warrant, which is the warrantless search
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (in
flagrante delicto)
 Warrantless search incident to an arrest in flagrante
delicto includes that of searching the person of one who
is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected
17 Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
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with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its
commission
 In the instant case, when petitioner was searched
contemporaneously with the arrest, the "paltik" was
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found in his possession, and seized. Moreover, at that
moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of
the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that
petitioner was armed
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Montilla
January 30, 1998
Regalado, J.
FACTS
 Ruben Montilla alias "Joy," was charged for violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, before the RTC. RTC convicted him and
imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant.
He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
 Evidence of the prosecution: Montilla was
apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. near a waiting shed
by members of the Cavite PNP Command based in
Dasmariñas. Montilla, according to the two officers,
was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a travelling bag and a carton box, which
marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
 These two officers later asserted in court that they
were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.
That informer had informed them the day before
arrest that a drug courier, whom said informer could
recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same
informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the
appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger
jeepney.
 Montilla disavowed ownership of the prohibited
drugs. He claimed that while he indeed came all the
way from Baguio City, he travelled to Dasmariñas,
Cavite with only some pocket money and without any
luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look
up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job
at a garment factory in said locality, after which he
would return to Baguio City. He never got around to
doing so as he was accosted by the police. He further
averred that when he was interrogated at a house in
Dasmariñas, Cavite, he was never informed of his
constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of
the P500.00 which he had with him.
 Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated Montilla's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory
where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,
although, as the trial court observed, she never
presented any document to prove her alleged
employment.
 Montilla disputes the trial court's finding that he was
legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited
drugs.
ISSUE
1. WON the trial court erred in convicting Montilla on the
basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was
produced that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers only
testified on the alleged transporting of Marijuana.
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2. WON the failure to present the informant is fatal to the
case of the prosecution.
3. WON the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the
course of an unlawful warrantless search and
seizure.
4. WON the imposition of the death penalty is proper.
RATIO
1. NO. Prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing
that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to
Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit
drugs, Montilla had already run afoul of that particular
section of the statute.
 Section 418 could be violated by the commission of any
of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof,
such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away,
distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and
the like. The governing rule with respect to an offense
which may be committed in any of the different modes
provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if
the offense is alleged to have been committed in one,
two or more modes specified therein. This is so as
allegations in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be considered as a
description of only one offense and the information
cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness.
2. NO. The non-presentation of the informer in this
instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.
 The testimony of said informer would have been, at
best, merely corroborative of the declarations the
arresting officers before the trial court, which
testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon
matters in which they had personally taken part. As
such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed
with by the prosecution, more so where what he
would have corroborated are the narrations of law
enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity
18SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed.
CrimPro [Arrest]
is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides,
informants are generally not presented in court
because of the need to hide their identities and
preserve their invaluable services to the police.
Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present
in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to
dictate that course. Finally, Montilla could very well
have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
compel that eyewitness to appear before the court
below, but which remedy was not availed of by him.
3. NO. The search and seizure was justified as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
 Montilla contends that the marijuana bricks were
confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless
search and seizure. The police authorities had already
been apprised by their informer of his impending
arrival, hence those law enforces had the opportunity
to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance
should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure
of marijuana, as well as his arrest.
Search Warrant
 Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the
general rule that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; (2)
searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk"
measures have been invariably recognized as the
traditional exceptions.
 In this case, the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would
be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a
courier coming from Baguio City in the "early
morning" of June 20, 1994. The informant did not
know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at
which particular part of the barangay there would be
such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise
time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein
the drugs were concealed and whether the same were
arriving together with, or were being brought by
someone separately from, the courier. The information
relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for
the police officer to obtain the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is an indication that the
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informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
that he knew him by name.
 In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling
but all the coincident and ambient circumstances
should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact,
the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay
down a dragnet at the possible entry points to
Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day
notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning"
arrival of the courier. If the courts of justice are to be
of understanding assistance to our law enforcement
agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic
appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of
the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the
placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.
Lawful Arrest
 The search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs was justified as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
 A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from
the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting
an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence
with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to
arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause,
while largely a relative term the determination of
which must be resolved according to the facts of each
case, is understood as having reference to such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as
to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
 In the case at bar, as soon as Montilla had alighted
from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand
by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin
recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag
and carton box which appellant was carrying at the
time. The officers thus realized that he was their man
even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent
looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached Montilla, introduced
themselves as policemen, and requested him to open
CrimPro [Arrest]
and show them the contents of the traveling bag,
which Montilla voluntarily and readily did. Upon
cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the
prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further
search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage
to their headquarters for questioning.
 There were sufficient facts antecedent to the search
and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were
already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the
officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that
Montilla was in the act of violating the law. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that Montilla was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant
were both justified.
 Furthermore, Montilla consented to the search when
he opened the bag without being forced or intimidated
to do, which should properly be construed as clear
waiver of his right to be secure from unreasonable
search.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
4. NO. Reculsion perpetua is the proper imposable
penalty.
 The law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In
the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
consequently provides the rules to be observed in the
application of said penalties. Since there were neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
Montilla's violation of the law, hence the second
paragraph of Article 63must necessarily apply, in
which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
the proper imposable penalty. Furthermore, there was
neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any
victim.
DISPOSITION The judgment of the RTC is MODIFIED in
the sense that Montilla shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Burgos
September 4, 1986
GUTIERREZ, J.
NATURE
Appeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben Burgos of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion
FACTS
 Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information from
one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntarily
surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating
that accused Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
join the NPA with the use of a firearm against his life, a
team was dispatched the following day to arrest
Burgos. Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother
of accused, the team was able to locate Ruben Burgos,
who was plowing his field at the time.
 When asked about the firearm, the accused denied
possession of it, but after questioning the accused’s
wife, the police were able to locate and retrieve the
said firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the ground
below their house. The police, after accused pointed
them to the location, were also able to retrieve alleged
subversive documents (a notebook and a pamphlet)
hidden underground a few meters away from the
house.
 To prove accused’s subversive activities, Masamlok
testified that accused came to his house and told him
to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with
him. The threat to his life and family forced Masamlok
to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA seminar
where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly
that he is an NPA together with his companions, to
assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the
group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal
possession, a person in charge of firearms and
explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused
was not among the list of firearm holders
 On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he
was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied
ownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured,
mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was
forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2
witnesses as well as Ruben’s wife Urbana, were
presented by the defense in support of the accused’s
denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimed that
it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.
 The RTC after considering the evidences presented by
both prosecution and defense convicted accused
Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of subversion. The RTC justified the warrantless arrest
as falling under one of the circumstances when arrests
may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule
113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It stated that even if
there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact
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that “the authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities from a
reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial
warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of
Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter.”
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure
of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents
would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. “A person charged with
an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.”
ISSUES
1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his
house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
documents conducted in a lawful manner.
2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD
1. NO Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against
wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty
of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. In this case,
the arrest was made without warrant and since it does not
fall within the exceptions of arrests that can be made
without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine applies.
 Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. There is
no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever
knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it
came in its entirety from the information furnished by
Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given
by Burgos’ wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos was not
in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time.
 The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be
considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info
given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a
reasonable ground that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In
arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it
is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not
CrimPro [Arrest]
enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this
case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed
a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime
not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment
it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of
a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More
important, We find no compelling reason for the haste
with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the
accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if
indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no
showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise,
there is no showing that the whereabouts of the
accused were unknown.
 The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer
was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not
required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There
was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his
charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the need to go through the process of
securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest
becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused
while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest
being unlawful, the search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed
legal as being mere incidents to an illegal arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or
that consent was given by the accused to be searched
simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to
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object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein.
2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and
the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in
evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is
the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict
Burgos beyond reasonable doubt.
 Although it is true that the trial court found
Masamlok’s testimony credible and convincing, the SC
is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the
trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in
People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to
question of credibility the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason that it was able to observe the demeanor,
actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the
trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute
for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions
upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial
court where the record discloses circumstances of
weight and substance which were not properly
appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case,
Masamlok’s testimony was totally uncorroborated.
Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the
military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly
he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he
would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok
may be considered as an interested witness. His
testimony cannot be said to be free from the
opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and
even fabricated for it was intended to secure his
freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were
other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar
who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony
that the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive
acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.
DISPOSITION Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Jayson
November 18, 1997
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
 Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866 in the RTC of Davao City. The information
alleged the possession of a .38 caliber revolver without
the necessary license to possess the same. In addition,
the same .38 caliber revolver was used by Jasyon in
killing one Nelson Jordan.
 Evidence of the prosecution: Jayson, then a bouncer at
the “Ihaw-Ihaw” nightclub, shot one Nelson Jordan. He
was arrested after he had been pointed by
eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was
a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, four
live bullets, and one empty shell. The firearm and
ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt
and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military
Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao
Metropolitan District Command. The mission order
authorized accused-appellant to carry the said firearm
and twelve rounds of ammunition “to intensify
intelligence coverage” and was for a three-month
duration subject to several restrictions.
 March 1991 - Jayson was initially charged with
murder in an information RTC but after plea-
bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide.
 July 15, 1991 – Jayson was charged with illegal
possession of firearm.
 September 1991 – the trial court found Jayson guilty of
the crime of homicide and sentenced him to
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
 October 1991 – the information charging him of illegal
possession was amended in order to allege that the
firearm subject of the charged had been used in the
killing of one Nelson Jordan.
 June 1993 – he was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession by the RTC and sentenced him to 20 years
of imprisonment. The RTC found that Jayson acted in
good faith, believing that the mission order and
memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.
 CA - increased the penalty on to reclusion perpetua
and, in accordance with Rule 124, §13 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure
 Jayson maintains that he acted in the good faith belief
that he was authorized to carry the firearm. He argues
that the failure of the prosecution to present as
witness the government official who had certified that
he was not a holder of a firearms license is fatal to the
prosecution of this case.
ISSUES
1. WON the warrantless arrest and search were valid.
2. WON Jayson is guilty of illegal possession of firearm.
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3. Whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A.
No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, can be applied to
this case on the theory that it is more favorable to
Jayson.
RATIO
1. YES.
 Jayson’s arrest and the seizure from him of the firearm
were made without any warrant from a court.
 SPO1 Tenebro testified that at around 10:00 in the
evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen
Camotes and Racolas were patrolling in their car, they
received a radio message from their camp directing
them to proceed to the “Ihaw-Ihaw” on Bonifacio
Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly,
they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim,
Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as the
one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested Jayson.
Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial
number 91955. The firearm was covered by a mission
order and memorandum receipt.
 The case at bar falls under Rule 113, §5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure19: There was a
shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the
crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as
the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact
Jayson had not gone very far (only ten meters away
from the “Ihaw-Ihaw”), although he was then fleeing.
The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of
facts indicating that Jayson was the assailant.
 The subsequent search of accused-appellant’s person
and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise
lawful under Rule 126, §1220.
2. YES.
 Jayson: the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt
and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-
Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao
Metropolitan District Command.
 Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission
orders to civilian agents of the AFP as he was not any
of the following officers mentioned in the
19 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: . . . .
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
20 Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866,
§5(a). Major Arquillano claimed, however, that
Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him to exercise
this function so that people would not be “swarming
in Calida’s office.” Full faith and credit cannot be given
to such bare assertion. Not only was there no written
delegation of authority to Major Arquillano, it is even
doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of
the unit had authority to issue mission orders, could
delegate this authority to his deputy.
 Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a
mission order because he was a mere reserve of the
Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without
regular monthly compensation. In fact he worked as a
“bouncer” in a nightclub, and it was as a “bouncer” that
he used the gun seized from him.
 Even assuming that the issuance to Jayson of the
mission order was valid, it is clear that, in carrying the
firearm inside the nightclub where he was working as
a “bouncer,” Jayson violated the restrictions in the
mission order. These restrictions prohibited him from
carrying firearms in places where people converge
unless on official mission.
 Nor can Jayson claim to have acted in the good faith
belief that the documents issued to him sufficed as
legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the
Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence
of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by
special law.
3. NO
 Even though the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter
cannot be applied in this case so as to favor Jason in
view of the proviso in §1 that the first paragraph,
providing for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases
where another crime has been committed. Nor can the
third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal
possession of firearm as a mere aggravating
circumstance because, although the gun seized was
used in the commission of a crime, this case concerns
solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The
criminal case for homicide is not before us for
consideration.
 Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance
with the ruling in People v. Quijada, that a person who
kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is
guilty of homicide or murder as the case may be
under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal
possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Terry v. Ohio
December 12, 1967
Warren, C.J.
FACTS
 A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown
beat which he had been patrolling for many years,
observed two strangers (petitioner and another man,
Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which they
did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of
the route was followed by a conference between the
two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a
third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two
men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed
them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of
blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached
the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked
their names. The men "mumbled something,"
whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted
down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat
pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer
ordered the three into the store. He removed
petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered
the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He
patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and
seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat
pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his
pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under
petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt
the guns. The three were taken to the police station.
 Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress
the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the
prosecution theory that the guns had been seized
during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court
denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer
had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were
acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was
warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection,
had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
The court distinguished between an investigatory
"stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer
clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for
evidence of crime.
 Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an
intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that "no substantial constitutional question" was
involved.
ISSUES
WON the search and seizure in this case violates Fourth
Amendment. NO
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RATIO
Exclusionary Rule
 The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. This inestimable right of
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in
his study to dispose of his secret affairs. The specific
content and incidents of this right must be shaped by
the context in which it is asserted. For what the
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures,
but unreasonable searches and seizures.
Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked
down the street in Cleveland.
 For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the police
conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the
evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. Ever
since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been
recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless
police conduct. The only effective deterrent to police
misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words
serves another vital function--'the imperative of
judicial integrity.'
 Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the
context in which the judicial process of inclusion and
exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with
constitutional guarantees and disapproves other
actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in
a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect
of legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule
withholds the constitutional imprimatur. Exclusionary
rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial
control. It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques
on the ground that much conduct which is closely
similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon
constitutional protections.
When is a person seized and what constitutes a search
 Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house
and prosecution for crime--'arrests' in traditional
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And
it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search’. It
CrimPro [Arrest]
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
When the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred. In this case there can be no question, then,
that Officer McFadden 'seized' petitioner and
subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him
and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.
What is reasonable
 It is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search (or seize) against the invasion
which the search (or seizure) entails. And in justifying
the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion. In making that
assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief' that the action taken was appropriate
Whether the stop and frisk of Terry was reasonable
 We consider first the nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved. One general interest
is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection. It was this legitimate investigative function
Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to
approach petitioner and his companions He had
observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series
of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but
which taken together warranted further investigation.
 There is the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. We cannot blind ourselves to the need for law
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where
they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an
officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer
or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person
is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm.
Distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a
limited search for weapons
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 The former, although justified in part by the
acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting
officer from assault with a concealed weapon, also
justified on other grounds and can therefore involve a
relatively extensive exploration of the person. A
search for weapons in the absence of probable cause
to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
its initiation. It should be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might
be used to harm the officer of others nearby, and may
realistically be characterized as something less than a
'full' search, even though it remains a serious
intrusion.
 An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution.
It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having
its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by
future interference with the individual's freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction
ultimately follows.
 The protective search for weapons, on the other hand,
constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable,
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not
follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a
person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to
warrant a belief that the person has committed or is
committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified,
absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions
short of an arrest.
 Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be
struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that
there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of
the police officer, where he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime. The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger. And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to
his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.
 The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with
McFadden's hypothesis that these men were
contemplating a daylight robbery--which, it is
reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the
use of weapons--and nothing in their conduct from the
time he first noticed them until the time he confronted
them and identified himself as a police officer gave
him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.
 The sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer and
CrimPro [Arrest]
others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for
the assault of the police officer.
 We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was
properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time
he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons,
Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
take swift measures to discover the true facts and
neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The
policeman carefully restricted his search to what was
appropriate to the discovery of the particular items
which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course,
have to be decided on its own facts.
DISPOSITION Affirmed.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Padilla v. Court of Appeals
March 12, 1997
Francisco, J.
FACTS
 At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26,
1992, Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were
inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant when he
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast
down the highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident considering the
inclement weather. Manarang heard the screeching of
tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle
using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver.
After having sent a radio report to the PNP for
assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who
effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
 The driver rolled down the window and put his head
out while raising both his hands. They recognized the
driver as Robin C. Padilla. A gun tucked on the left side
of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja made the move
to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's
hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal
papers. SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be
shown in the office. After disarming appellant, SPO2
Borja told him about the hit and run incident which
was angrily denied by appellant. By that time, a crowd
had formed at the place. SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed out
to appellant the fact that the plate number of his
vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood
were dented. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his
misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by
holding their hands with one hand. His gesture exposed
a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
appellant's back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this
and so when appellant turned around as he was talking
and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from appellant. Suspecting that Padilla
could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he
had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla from
going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door
of Padilla's vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying
horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a
long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-
automatic mode. He asked appellant for the papers
covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that
they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the
arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal
possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to
Padilla his constitutional rights.
 At the Traffic Division, Padilla voluntarily surrendered
a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol. He also
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine.
During the investigation,Padilla admitted possession of
the firearms stating that he used them for shooting. He
was not able to produce any permit to carry or
memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms
 A Certification was issued which stated that the three
firearms confiscated from Padilla, an M-16 Baby
armalite, a .357 caliber revolver and a .380 Pietro
Beretta, were not registered in the name of Robin C.
Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three
firearms were not also registered in the name of
Robinhood C. Padilla
 Padilla was correspondingly charged on December 3,
1992, before the RTC with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. The lower
court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but
granted his application for bail. During the
arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered for
Padilla after he refused, to make any plea. Padilla
waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case.
 RTC convicted Padilla of the crime charged and
sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum".
 Padilla filed his notice of appeal. Pending the appeal in
the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced
that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, a
motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution
of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed
respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's
conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 CA affirmed the decision, cancelled the bailbond and
directed RTC to issue the Order of Arrest of Padilla.
 After his vigorous resistance and success on the
intramural of bail, the SolGen now makes a complete
turnabout by praying for Padilla’s acquittal.
 Padilla’s contentions: (1) that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under
the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential
agent authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms;
and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the arrest was illegal
2. WON he is confidential agent authorized to carry the
subject firearms.
3. WON the penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
CrimPro [Arrest]
RATIO
1. NO. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued
for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
illegal.
 Warrantless arrests are sanctioned under Sec. 5 21.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it
has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run - an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds
at once to the scene."
 Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen
(who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the
hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in
any way affect the propriety of the apprehension.
 A suspect cannot defeat the arrest which has been set
in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the
police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid
or take action. The exigent circumstances of - hot
pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public
place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation
in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The
Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere
"reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto
with possession of an unlicensed firearm and
ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest was
proper as he was again actually committing another
offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace
officer.
21"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of
petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph
(b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves
the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling
plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang),
and the dented hood and railings thereof. These
formed part of the arresting police officer's personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's
Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and
run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers
acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information.
 any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from
his failure to quash the information, his participation
in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.
 The firearms and ammunitions are admissible as
evidence. The five (5) well-settled instances when a
warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,
are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements
of which are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and
d. "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
 the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms
and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
search which, as it is commonly understood, is a
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.
CrimPro [Arrest]
The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-
16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within
"plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently
discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when
he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero.
The same justification applies to the confiscation of
the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance
at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near
the driver's seat
 With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag
containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of
petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to
quash the information estopped him from assailing
any purported defect.
 Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions
were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner,
their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search of the passenger compartment and containers
in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing
distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This
satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i)
the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the
arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
The products of that search are admissible evidence
not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like
herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or
the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense.
2. NO
 In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have
the corresponding license or permit to possess. The
first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms
and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified
and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 Petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances.
 The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and
executed long after appellant had been apprehended
on October 26, 1992.
 If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and
Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at
least during the preliminary investigation. But neither
appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that
appellant is authorized to possess and carry the
subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and
Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his
evidence in court, appellant could have produced
these documents to belie the charged against him.
Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness
stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
 The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Police Supt. Durendes denied under
oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission
Order and declared further that he did not authorize
anyone to sign in his behalf. His surname thereon, we
note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." In
addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices
have the authority to issue Mission Orders and
Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the
Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander
nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander.
Having emanated from an unauthorized source,
petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt
are infirm and lacking in force and effect.
3. NO
 It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional
prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the
nature of the punishment that determines whether it
is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not
cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.
 Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the statute in question lies with the
appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case.
 With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court
as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce
the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v.
Lian where the Court en banc provided that the
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indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal
possession of firearm, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, should be within the range
of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12)
of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
DISPOSITION the decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the
crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum.
CrimPro [Arrest]
UMIL V. RAMOS
July 9, 1990
PER CURIAM
Nature: Petitions of Habeas Corpus
Summary:
The case involves 8 petitions of habeas corpus:
(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos; (2-3) GR 84581-82, Roque
and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano; (4-5) GR 84583-
84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.; (6) GR 83162,
Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.; (7) GR 85727, Espiritu
v. Lim and Reyes; (8) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.
The respondents, in their respective Returns, assert that
the privilege of the writ is not available to the petitioners
as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as
their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the
informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court found, in its careful review, that the detainees
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of
their constitutional right to liberty, and that the
circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
release on habeas corpus. It invoked Section 5, paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
justifies arrests without warrant.
“(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just be
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; x x x”
And based on the records of the case, it shows that the
detainees had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their
arrests without warrant were clearly justified.
FACTS:
3. GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos
Based on a confidential information, CAPCOM found that a
member of an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound
in a hospital. On verification, they found Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA, and responsible for the killing of 2
CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at
the 2 CAPCOM soldiers in the car.
He was charged of Double Murder with Assault Upon
Agents of Persons in Authority, docketed with no bail. A
petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioners and a
returns were filed by respondents. With Dural were
Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva, who, the latter two,
posted bail and was released.
4. GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa
and Montano
When Wilfredo Buenaobra was apprehended, he admitted
that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to
Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.
Amelia Roque, on the other hand, was a member of the
National United Front Commission (NUFC) and admitted
ownership of subversive documents found in the house of
her sister. She was also in possession of ammunition and
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.
How these two were arrested were as follows. One Rogelio
Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who surrendered to
the military gave the latter information about his
comrades and also the location of a certain house occupied
by Renato Constantino, which is used as a safehouse of the
NUFC and CPP-NPA.
Because of this, the house was placed under surveillance
and pursuant to a search warrant, they found several items
in the house. Constantino, confronted, could not produce
any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, etc. Hence, he was arrested and although he
refused to give a written statement, he admitted that he
was a member of both NUFC and CPP.
Later that night, Buenaobra arrived and was accosted,
readily admitting tthat he was a regular member of the
CPP/NPA. Among other items found in his possession was
a piece of paper containing information about Amelia
Roque. From this lead, they went to the place written in
the paper, presented themselves as military, and was able
to search, even without warrant, the premises. The place
was another safehouse and Roque admitted that the
documents found belonged to her and that the other
occupants of the house had no knowledge of them.
CrimPro [Arrest]
A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both
Buenaobra and Roque.
5. GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et
al.
Both arrived at the house of Constantino, which was still
under surveillance. The military agenst noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines. When frisked, they found them
to be carrying loaded guns. They also found a bag
containing subversive materials. In both sets of items, no
permit or license to possess or carry were produced.
Hence they were arrested.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both
Anonuevo and Casiple, alleging that they were unlawfully
arrested without warrant and that the information filed
against them are null and void for having been filed
without prior hearing and preliminary investigation.
6. GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.
With a search warrant issued by the Judge of RTC of Pasig,
agents of the PC Intelligence and Command conducted a
search at the house of Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-
NPA. During the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived with Danny
Rivera. With them were found subversive documents and
firearms. As regards the firearms, since Ocaya could not
produce any license or permission to possess them, she,
along with Rivera, were arrested.
Petition for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of the two.
7. Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Roque alleged that
the firearms and ammunitions were “planted” by
the military agents to justify the arrest.
8. GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes
Espiritu claims that about 5am, he was awakened by his
sister who told him that a group of men wanted to hire his
jeepney. But once he came down, he was immediatel
arrested. When he asked for a warrant of arrest, the men
bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeep.
Upon petition for habeas corpus, the respondents claim
that the detention was justified in view of the Information
filed against him. and that when he was arrested, he had in
fact just committed an offense that afternoon during the
press conference but gave the lawmen the slip when he
was about to be arrested.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
9. Nazareno v. Medina, et al.
Regala, arrested for killing, pointed to Nazareno when the
former was questioned. Because of this, Nazareno was also
arrested without warrant. When Nazareno posted bail and
petition for habeas corpus, both were denied by the judge
of the RTC.
ISSUE: WoN the arrest of the petitioners without warrant
was justified.
HELD: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos
The writ, concerning Umil and Villanueva, is already moot
and academic and accordingly dismissed, since the writ
does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who
has been released on bail.
As to Dural, although he was arrested not during the
commission of the crime but a day after, his arrest without
warrant not, as a whole, unjustified. The reason is that, as a
member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization,
his offense is considered continuing. Subversion, being a
continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as
at can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested, that of being a member.
Furthermore, with the criminal case against him for
“Double Murder, etc.” and in its conclusion he was found
guilty of the charged and sentenced accordingly, the writ
of habeas corpus is therefore no longer available to him.
 GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa
and Montano
The contention of respondents that petitioners are officers
and/or members of the NUFC of CPP was not controverted
or traversed. Hence, it must be deemed admitted. For the
same reasons as (1), their arrest without warrant was
justified. Furthermore, as regards Roque, her arrest
without warrant was also additionally justified because
she was, at the time of arrest, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess them.
 GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et
al.
Their arrest without warrant was justified because they
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions when
they were apprehended. There is also no merit in the
CrimPro [Arrest]
contention about the information since, under Sec 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court,
“Sec 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a
warrant.—When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the RTC the complaint or information may be
filed by the offended party, peace officer, or
fiscal without a preliminary investigation x x x”
Both refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of RPC, in which case, no preliminary investigation
was conduction. After the informations had been filed
however, they also didn’t ask for such investigation. Hence,
they cannot now claim that they have been deprived of
their constitutional right to due process.
 GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.
Vicky Ocaya’s arrest without warrant is justified because
at the time of the arrest, she was in flagranti delicto. (There
is no decision regarding Rivera)
 No evidence was given by the petitioners
regarding this and that there was no ill-motive on
the part of the arresting officers that would cause
the said arresting officers in this cases to accuse
the petitioners falsely. The arrest was not a
product of witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but
the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by no less than former
comrades of the petitioners in the reel
movements. Furthermore, the petitioners, when
arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a cap, but were arrested in
such time, place, and circumstances, from which
one can reasonably conclude that they were up to
a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes
Peittioner’s release upon petition of habeas corpus was
unwarranted because his arrest wan in accordance with
Rule 113, Sec 5 (b) of the RoC and that the petitioner is
detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus,
though bail may be allowed. But the bail must be lowered
from P60k to P10k because it is much too high.
 Nazareno v. Medina, et al.
Nazareno’s arrest without warrant was justified. The
judge’s decision was based on facts of the law and so this
Court will not disturb the same. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same greounds exist
to elieve that the person sougth to be detained
participated therein.
 The rule barring petition for habeas corpus is
this—that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process
or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court. Every phase and aspect of the
petitioner’s detention must be inquired by the
court—from the moment the petitioner was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes
upon the merits of the petition and only after such
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied and this is exactly was the Court has
done.
DECISION: The petitions are all DISMISSED except GR
85727, Espiritu v. Lim.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Umil v. Ramos
THIS RESOLUTION (October 3, 1991) ULTIMATELY DENIED THE PETITION.
[I’ll merely be quoting the Court, no need to go to the factual
circumstances and analyses, since at the end, they’re the
same as the 1990 decision.]
 The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a
begins with the statement that the decision did not
rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere
suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his
arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely
applied long existing laws to the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are
the outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership
therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or
sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people — not the Court — that
should repeal, change or modify them.
 In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the
detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into
whether their questioned arrests without warrant were
made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were
made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance
with law.
 There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace
officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases
express authorized by law. The law expressly allowing
arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which
a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
 In the present cases, the focus is understandably on
Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of
the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and documents in their
possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed
by the records, strengthen the Court's perception
that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are
supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of
certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on
the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested
are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of
determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas
corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
 As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile,
and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court
finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the
same, particularly in the light of prevailing
conditions where national security and liability are
still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor
from the communist rebels. What is important is that
every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality
via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly
look into — and all other appropriate courts are
enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest
without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of
Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution,
are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the
detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention
but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be
either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as
warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere
suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without
warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of
the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions,
not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance
with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules
of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are
probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace
officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show,
the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests.
More than the allure of popularity or palatability to
some groups, what is important is that the Court be
right.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
People v. Mahinay
February 1, 1999
Per Curiam
Facts: Mahinay were also
 Larry Mahinay accused of Rape with Homicide of a 12- found
year-old girl (Ma. Victoria Chan)  Police report filed + referral slip addressed to
o RTC convicted him and sentenced him to death, hence Valenzuela Prosecutor’s Office
the automatic review  After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was
 Accused and victim lived in the same neighborhood. On finally arrested in Ibaan, Batangas
the day of the crime, Mahinay, who was a houseboy, o Brought to Valenzuela Police Station, and with
asked permission from his employer (Isip) to go out with assistance of counsel, executed an extra-judicial
his friends. Apparently, he and his friends went on a confession wherein he admitted to committing the
drinking spree (in Mahinay’s version of facts, he said crime and narrated how it happened.
that they consumed, like, 3 cases of Red Horse. *idol. o Pointed to 2 of his friends as co-conspirators.
LOL.*).  When Information was filed, he pleaded not guilty.
 Mahinay was seen by different people at different times
that day at different places within the neighborhood. Issue # 1: W/N circumstancial evidence enough to prove
Victim, too. guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Mahinay Victim Held/Ratio # 1:
8AM: drinking spree  Absence of any direct evidence relative to the
10 AM: already drunk, asked commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
permission from Isip to go out Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him
with friends from any liability because under the Rules on evidence
Around 4PM, seen by and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may
Isip’s sister-in-law be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the
[Norgina Rivera]  following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
catching birds inside circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
Isip’s unfinished house are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
Around 6-7PM, Sgt. Roberto Between 8-9PM, Sgt. beyond reasonable doubt.
Suni, who went to his in-law’s Suni saw victim  Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
house, met appellant along standing in front of the support a conviction, all circumstances must be
Dian St. (their neighborhood) gate of the unfinished consistent with each other, consistent with the
while on his way house hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
9PM  showed up at Norgina’s Meanwhile, victim’s time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
store to buy lugaw mom noticed that her and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
- according to Norgina, he daughter was missing guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and
appeared uneasy, deep in [around 9PM] inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which,
thought in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
- hair disarrayed, drunk, evidence in its effect upon the court.
walking in a dazed manner  In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to
several circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough
Isip: appellant failed to show review of the Court is more than enough to prove
up for supper that night appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
2AM the next day  boarded a 7:30AM the next day  Issue # 2: W/N extra-judicial confession admissible
jeep, alighted at the top of the someone found victim’s Held/Ratio: Yes. No proof that Mahinay was, as alleged by
bridge of NLEx and then body inside septic tank him, coerced to execute EJC.
disappeared
Police tried to find Mahinay, When they returned at CRIMPRO RELEVANT [hindi ko talaga malaman kung saan
even going to Caloocan, but the scene of the crime, nanggaling ito. As in bigla na lang isinama ng court. adik.
was futile found different items of Although I think, it’s because at that time, the SC was still
clothing positively queasy with the death penalty law, and would like to
identified by victim’s sentence as few accused as possible.]
mom as the victim’s
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order
Near the septic tank, to ensure that the evidence against and accused were
items belonging to obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of
CrimPro [Arrest]
the rights of the people lays down the procedure,
guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining,
inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do
and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at
and during the time of the custodial interrogation in
accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and
Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-
enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in
the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be informed in a language
known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and
understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent
and that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer,
he must be informed that no custodial investigation in
any form shall be conducted except in the presence of
his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any
time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
messenger – with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or
any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any
of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a
lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he
must be warned that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he
may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be questioned with
warning that once he makes such indication, the police
may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has
already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial
waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless
of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or
evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Valdez
March 3, 1999
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
 Crime: illegal transport of marijuana buds/leaves in
violation of Sec. 4 of RA 6245 (DDA of 1972)
 In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1 Bernardo
Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue, Ifugao
waiting for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao.
 A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an
Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This
asset described to him the physical appearance of
the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag.
 Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they
proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao.
 There they alighted and stopped an ordinary Dangwa
passenger bus bound for Baguio City.
 Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person
concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon,
Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the
air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for Manila.
 When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano bearded
the aircon bus and looked for that person from among
the passengers and noticed him holding the green bag.
He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus.
This fellow followed holding the bag.
 Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the
bag and saw a water jug colored red and white and a
lunch box. He told this man to open the jug and the lunch
box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as
contents.
 At this time, suspect revealed his name to be Samuel Yu
Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was left behind
and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the accused to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial
Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao. He turned over the
accused including the contents of the green bag to his
superiors for further investigation
Accused’s version
 He came from a friend’s birthday celebration and was
only returning to Nueva Ecija. He said that he had a
hang-over, fell asleep with someone else beside him,
who allegedly was the one carrying the green bag. When
he woke up, guy beside him was gone, green bag still
there.
Issue: W/N the arrest was constitutional and legal.
Held/Ratio: YES.
 Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can
be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 The abovementioned constitutional provisions serve as
safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person,
papers and effects. The right of a person to be secure
against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which
allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest or search warrant must be strictly construed.
We cannot liberally consider arrests or seizures
without warrant or extend their application beyond
the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To
do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and yet, so
deserving of full protection and vindication.
 Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal
and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
 On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
 In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since
he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A
crime was actually being committed by the
appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it
is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search
warrant when the search was conducted over the
personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was
then and there committing a crime
CrimPro [Arrest]
 in the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped off
by a civilian "asset" that a thin Ilocano person with a
green bag was about to transport marijuana from
Banaue, Ifugao. Said information was received by SPO1
Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a
ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital
town of Ifugao province. Thus, faced with such on-the-
spot information, the law enforcer had to respond
quickly to the call of duty. Obviously, there was not
enough time to secure a search warrant considering the
time involved in the process.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 Evidently, there was definite information of the identity
of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs
at a particular time and place. SPO1 Mariano had already
an inkling of the identity of the person he was looking
for. As a matter of fact, no search at all was conducted on
the baggages of other passengers. Hence, appellant's
claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for
evidence of a crime has no factual basis.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. Veloso
October 20, 1925
Malcolm, J.
Facts:
 Jose Ma. Veloso was found guilty by the CFI of Manila of
the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority
(A252, Penal Code).
 A building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a
member of the House of Representative of the Philippine
Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
 The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-
called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a
gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F.
Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to
the club and verified this fact.
 As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo
of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for,
and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of
the municipal court. The search warrant had “John
Doe” as defendant.
 Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the
Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of
the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the
premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of
police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a
telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house.
Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the
outer door.
 Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons
were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he
wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant.
 Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was
Representative Veloso and not John Doe [idk if he
thought that John Doe was actually a name and not an
alias. If he did, ang bobo, takte.], and that the police had
no right to search the house. Townsend answered that
Veloso was considered as John Doe.
 As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained
gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show
him the evidence of the game, however Veloso
insistently refused. When the police lost patience, they
took hold of him, but he fought back, injuring one of the
officers.
 In the end, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and
long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards,
cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
 In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons
arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them
were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance
for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso.
Issue: W/N the search warrant was valid.
Held/Ratio: YES.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
 Commonwealth v. Crotty, C.J. Bigelow:
o It was always necessary to express the name or give
some description of a party to be arrested on a
warrant; and if one was granted with the name in
blank, and without other designation of the person to
be arrested, it was void.
o This rule or principle does not prevent the issue
and service of a warrant against a party whose
name is unknown. In such case the best
description possible of the person [descriptio
personae] to be arrested is to be given in the
warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate
clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his
occupation, his personal appearance and
peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other
circumstances by which he can be identified.
 In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and
the search warrant itself described the building to be
searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City
of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a
sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.
o The police officers were accordingly authorized to
break down the door and enter the premises of the
building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club.
o When inside, they then had the right to arrest the
persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game,
and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of
the crime.
o It has been held that an officer making an arrest may
take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime,
or which may furnish the person arrested with the
means of committing violence or of escaping, or which
may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but
not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi)
 The affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John
Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely,
in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects
used in violation of the Gambling Law."
o As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the
manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe
as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
o It must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo
was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not
the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the
family, which the law carefully protects in all of its
sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It
was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high
sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but
CrimPro [Arrest]
intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a
character, unlike in the home, there would
commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
Does and Richard Roes whose names would be
unknown to the police.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Babst v. National Intelligence Board
September 28, 1984
Plana, J.
[I did not dwell on the merits of the libel case. Dun lang sa
crimpro relevant ako nag-focus.]
Facts:
 Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and
reporters of various local publications.
 At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have
allegedly been summoned by military authorities who
have subjected them to sustained interrogation on
various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments,
beliefs, associations and even their private lives.
 Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from
respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene
Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads:
Madam:
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby
requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine
Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch
attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on
confidential matters being looked into by this Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be
considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance with law.
Petitioners’s arguments
- respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings
which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on
free expression since they have the effect of imposing
restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media
- that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent
punishment of petitioners for lawful publications
- that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing
the "free flow of information and petition and opinion,"
indispensable to the right of the people to know matters
of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of
the Constitution
- that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual
liberty.
- Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo,
petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent
to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence,
referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in
previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
Respondents’s arguments
- no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not
pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners
- that what respondents have sent to petitioners were
neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere
invitations to dialogues which were completely
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
voluntary, without any compulsion employed on
petitioners
- that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to
elicit information and exchange Ideas and that the
expression of personal preferences and opinions by
members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to
the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed
by petitioners.
- Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that
petitioners have no cause of action against respondent
Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a
member of respondent Board and has filed the libel
case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not
pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore,
respondents aver that this case has been rendered
moot and academic because the proceedings before
NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the
interrogations) have already been ordered terminated
by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director
General and Chairman of the NIB, and said
proceedings have in fact been terminated.
Issue: W/N the issuance of letters of invitation were
constitutional and legal.
Held/Ratio: Petition not granted, because it is already
moot and academic. The acts sought to be prohibited
[note that this was originally a petition for prohibition]
have been abated.
BUT,
“Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily,
an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some
questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain
circumstances, however, such an invitation can
easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where
the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a
time when the country has just emerged from martial
rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and
the designated interrogation site is a military camp,
the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly
voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his
peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the
invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to
appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this
Committee will be constrained to proceed in
accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director
general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating
the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.”
Dissents mainly commented on the fact that ponente should have directly
ruled on the matter in light of the issue being of public interest.
CrimPro [Arrest]
People v. del Rosario
April 14, 1999
Bellosillo, J.
Facts:
 Crime: Robbery with Homicide of Virginia Bernas
 Trial Court convicted Joselito del Rosario of the crime
and sentenced him to death, hence, automatic review
 Trial court convicted on the basis of eyewitness Paul
Vincent Alonzo’s account that:
o Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1½)
meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused
Joselito del Rosario.
o At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag.
o After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed
with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to
help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the
woman sending her to the ground.
o Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the
head.
o The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle
of accused del Rosario where someone inside received
the bag.
o The armed man then sat behind the driver while his
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle
sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the
plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the
driver, after which he went to the nearest police
headquarters and reported the incident
 Del Rosario’s account however, goes like this:
o He was hired by “Boy” Santos for P120.00. Their
original agreement was that he would drive him to
cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum.
o However, despite their earlier arrangement boy
Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to
fetch “Jun” Marquez and “Dodong” Bisaya. He (del
Rosario) acceded.
o Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot
of Merced Drugstore at the public market.
Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the
corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.
o The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas
and grappled with her for the possession of her bag.
Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help
“Dodong” Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave
and seek help but “Boy Santos” who stayed inside
the tricycle prevented him from leaving and
threatened in fact to shoot him.
o Meanwhile, “Dodong” Bisaya succeeded in taking the
victim’s bag, but before boarding the tricycle “Jun”
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while
she was lying prone on the ground.
o After the shooting, they drove for a while, then the
three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to
inform the police authorities about the incident
otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
Rosario then went home. Because of the threat,
however, he did not report the matter to the owner of
the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police
Issue #1: W/N del Rosario can be exempted from criminal
liability.
Held/Ratio: YES. Basically, SC took more credence with
del Rosario’s account than with Alonzo’s. Remember Crim
1 on Exempting Circumstance – uncontrollable fear.
Issue # 2: W/N there was conspiracy
Held/Ratio: NO. Malamang, since he’s exempted, then he
did not conspire with other accused.
Issue # 3 (CRIMPRO RELEVANT): W/N del Rosario’s
constitutional rights as regards his right to remain silent
were violated.
Held/Ratio: YES.
Circumstances of del Rosario’s arrest:
 Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle,
police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was
summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's
name and was invited for interview.
 del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on May
13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused
informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and
the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they
reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and
Capt. Cruz.
 After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed
of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that
lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a
brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun.
 While all of these were happening, accused del
Rosario was at the back of the school, after which
they went back to the police station.
o The investigator took the statement of the accused on
May 14,1996; was only subscribed on May 22,1996.
o All the while, he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal.
o His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He
also executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of
Ex-Judge Talavera.
 Also, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because
allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence
against him and they were afraid that he might attempt
to escape.
CrimPro [Arrest]
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers
after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened
by RA 7438 to include "the Practice of issuing an
'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section
2 of the same Act further provides that -
x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone
acting under his order or in his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in
a language known and understood by him of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice,
who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien
large measure of immediacy between the time the
offense was committed and the time of the arrest,
and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime,
a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the
sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the
person making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person
to be taken into custody has committed the crime.
Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply
with these requirements since, as earlier
explained, the arrest came a day after the
consummation of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time the accused was
arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed the offense
since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware
of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle
only during the custodial investigation.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was

deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From
the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house
of the barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor
made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The
police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the
latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless
slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to
establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain
silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the
crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible
against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

Issue # 4 (CRIMPRO RELEVANT): W/N del Rosario’s

arrest was lawful.

Held/Ratio: NO.

 Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent

requirements before a warrantless arrest can be
effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a