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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGESTS

I. Constitutional Law

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,


MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

Ponente: J. Bellosillo
Topic: Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions - Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
When the GSIS decided to sell by public bidding up to 51% ownership of the Manila Hotel on September
1995, a Malaysian company appeared to be the winning bidder, giving rise to the issue of whether the
Filipino First policy can be applied to oppose the transfer of the hotel which has attained national
landmark status. The Supreme Court decided in the affirmative, stating that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. — For more than eight (8)
decades Manila Hotel has borne mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

Digest:

FACTS
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.

Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x
x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.”

ISSUE(S)
WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation

RULING
The Provision is self-executing.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. lt is
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. ###

2. Macalintal v. COMELEC

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO


ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Topic: Constitutional Construction
Synopsis:
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises as one of the questions the fact that the statute in question effectively grants COMELEC the power
to canvass the votes for president and vice-president, a power granted by the 1987 Constitution
exclusively upon Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire
nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Digest:

FACTS
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises the following questions:

1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution.

2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress.

3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of
Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9189 should be declared unconstitutional

RULING
The petition is partly granted.

1. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1)
all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of
age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.

2. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to
it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The
provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress.

3. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting
rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative agency the
authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of
the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under
such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

3. SWS v. DDB

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008

Ponente: J. Velasco
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Mandatory drug testing for elective offices
Synopsis:
Does R.A. 9165, or the Comprehensive Drugs Act, indirectly prescribe a new qualification for the holding
of elective offices? The Supreme Court said that it is, because the mandatory drug test is obviously used
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator, or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Digest:

FACTS
The petitioners in these consolidated cases assail the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities. Specifically, petitioner Aquilino Pimentel contends that
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE(S)
Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional for indirectly imposing another qualification for elective
candidates?

RULING
Yes. Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.

4. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,


respondent.
G.R. No. 166471. March 22, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Indirect violations of the constitution
Synopsis:
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. It is this unwritten rule that served as the
final nail in the coffin for Section 47 of PD No. 198, which granted LTWD a legislative franchise over the
waterworks of Barangay Tawang. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions expressly and consistently
prohibit against grants of exclusive franchises by the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of
government. The assailed law however, provided that no other franchise shall be granted except upon
resolution by the board of directors of the district, subject to review by the Local Water District
Administration.

Digest:

FACTS
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that “no
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be
subject to review by the Administration.”
The NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that
LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. LTWD appealed to
the RTC and the latter set aside the NWRB’s Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled
TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid

RULING
No, it is invalid (unconstitutional). The Supreme Court ruled that the President, Congress and the Court
cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.”

Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character which is unconstitutional. Jurisprudence dictates that in case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and
to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

The dissenting opinion states two “reasonable and legitimate grounds” for the creation of exclusive
franchise: (1) protection of “the government’s investment,” and (2) avoidance of “a situation where
ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas.” The
majority ruled that there is no “reasonable and legitimate” ground to violate the Constitution. The
Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the
BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions,
is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.

On the issue that the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character is a valid exercise of police
power, the SC ruled that police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police
power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule
is basic. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held
that, “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution.” In Carlos
Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that, police power “is
‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’” In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, “police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution.

5. Oposa v. Factoran
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, et. al., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.


Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Synopsis:
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.

Digest:

FACTS
In this case, herein petitioners, through their representatives, prays that the DENR be compelled to
cancel all existing timber licenses in the country, as well as to enjoin the department from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. In its cause of action,
petitioner alleges that defendant’s refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in effect, violates the
constitutional provision on the protection and advancement of the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.’ (Section 16, Article II. id.) Secretary
Factoran claims that the petitioners failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed.

ISSUE(S)
Do the petitioners have a proper cause of action anchored on a legal right?

RULING
Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation—
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come—generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.

Concurring opinion of J. Feliciano:


As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.

6. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

WILSON P. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE


UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN
ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE,
respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 176579. June 28, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – 60%/40% Rule
Synopsis:
The foreign ownership of about 81% of PLDT’s shareholdings is violative of the constitution. The
60%/40% rule is self-executing, as it aims to reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the
development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

Digest:

FACTS
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT franchise and the right to engage in
telecommunications business. General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company, sold 26% of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 114,415 shares
of stock of PTIC.

In 1986, the said shares were sequestered by PCGG and were later declared by the Court to be owned by
the Republic of the Philippines.

In 1999, First Pacific a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong based investment firm, acquired the remaining
54% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On November 20, 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 114,415 PTIC shares through
public bidding. During the bidding, Parallax won the bid.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder
and buy the 114,415 PTIC stockholder and buy said stocks by matching the bid price of Parallax. But First
Pacific failed to do so and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was given by PTIC itself which
was then given by IPC until March 2, 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. First Pacific, through its subsidiary,
Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), entered into a Conditional sale and purchase agreement of
said shares with the Philippine Government and the sale was completed.

With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings increased from 30.7% to 37 %, thereby increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. Which violates Sec.11, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which limits the foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40%.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 11, Article XII is self-executing

RULING
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to
Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of
land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional
provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:

“x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.”

7. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and


ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Ponente: J. Bidin
Topic: Constitutional Construction – One-Title-One-Subject Policy
Synopsis:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

Digest:

FACTS
The case arose because of Rep. Ronaldo Zamora’s proposed law converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into Highly Urbanized City. It became a law on February 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.

Petitioners come before the Supreme Court, contending RA 7675 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE(S)

1. Was there gerrymandering (a manipulation of electoral constituency to achieve one’s purposes)?


2. Did the law violate the one-title-one-subject policy?
3. Are the people of San Juan properly excluded from the plebiscite of RA 7675?

RULING

1. The Solicitor General respondent is correct, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/ Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him. Thus, there is no gerrymandering;
2. No, it did not violate the one title-one subject rule under the Constitution which provide that
"Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of such conversion. Further, a liberal construction of
the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation;
3. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district repre-
sentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

8. Santiago v. COMELEC

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,


petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.


Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

9. Lambino v. COMELEC

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED


VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Amendments to the Constitution – Two-Part Test
Synopsis:
In our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test in determining whether the proposed changes
amends or revises the constitution: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
(2) qualitative test inquiries into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.

Digest:

FACTS
On 15 February 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the initiative petition an amendment or revision.

2. Whether the Lambino’s Group initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

3. Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino Group violated the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.

RULING
1. It was a Revision of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative
test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change.The (2) qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."

2. No. According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the
draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. With only 100,000 printed copies
of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to
have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.

3. Yes, The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

4.No, The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition. In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC.

10. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN


and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,
the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
respondents
G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Elements of a State – The international law concept of “association”
Synopsis:
The failed MOA-AD which was supposed to be signed between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
was questioned by several petitioners. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with
the international legal concept of association. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

Digest:

FACTS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-
AD, SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE(S)
WON contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws

RULING
YES.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some
of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to
a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4


on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last-mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
“4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The nature of the “associative” relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of “association” in
international law, and the MOA-AD—by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR—placed
itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term “associative” in the MOA-AD.

MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be
consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

11. Magallona v. Ermita

PROF. MERLIN MAGALLONA, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Territory – UNCLOS III, as incorporated by R.A. 9522
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court found RA 9522 constitutional, even with respect to what appeared to petitioners as
reduction of Philippine maritime territory. On the contrary, the law only seeks to demarcate the territorial
waters pursuant to the UNCLOS III. Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters
into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic
sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

Digest:

FACTS
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Merlin Magallona questioned the constitutionality of of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines as follows:

1. It reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris
and ancillary treaties.
2. It opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
3. Its treatment of Kalayaan Island Group as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law should be declared unconstitutional

RULING
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
12. Lansang v. CA

AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND,
INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents
G.R. No. 102667. February 23, 2000

Ponente: J. Quisumbing
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts performed in bad faith
Synopsis:
A claim for damages based on the alleged reneging of a public officer on a verbal contract of lease, an
act done in apparent bad faith, is not a suit against the state. The doctrine of state immunity from suit
applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the
public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others.

Digest:

FACTS
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved. With the change of
government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and
terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice. On the day
of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the
petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which
could not be sued without its consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in
effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent

RULING
NO. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the
state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal
capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
13. Heirs of Mendoza v. DPWH

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER VAL V. MENDOZA,


CONSTANCIA V. MENDOZA YOUNG, CRISTINA V. MENDOZA FIGUEROA, DIOSDADO V.
MENDOZA, JR., JOSEPHINE V. MENDOZA JASA, and RIZALINA V. MENDOZA PUSO,
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and the DPWH
SECRETARY, respondents
G.R. No. 203834. July 9, 2014

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be
sued, either expressly or impliedly. In order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental capacity. The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of
Packages VI and IX of the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence,
petitioners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a
contract.

Digest:

FACTS
Diosdado M. Mendoza, the owner of a business named D’ Superior Builders, was the winning bidder for
the construction of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling Road in Benguet and the engineers’
quarters and laboratory, designated as Package VI, of the Highland Agriculture Development Project
(HADP) of the DPWH. He also won the bidding for Package IX of the project. Subsequently however,
Mendoza filed a case for specific performance and damages against the DPWH, contending that the
named defendants conspired to make it appear that Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of 29%
and recommended the forfeiture of Package VI, and that the DPWH did not execute any contract for
Package IX despite the Superior Builders’ compliance with all the post-evaluation requirements. The
DPWH also recommended the rebidding of Package IX. Package IX was, in effect, canceled together with
the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. In ruling for the plaintiff (Mendoza), the trial court ruled that
in entering into a contract, the DPWH divested itself of immunity from suit and assumed the character of
an ordinary litigant.

ISSUE(S)
Did the acts of the DPWH, in entering the contracts with Mendoza, serve as implied waiver of the State’s
immunity from suit?

RULING
No. The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to
be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is
implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. The Supreme
Court explained that to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract,
there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary
capacity. The Court described the DPWH as an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own, and thus it enjoys immunity from suit.

The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of
the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that
there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.

14. Secretary of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON,


petitioners, vs. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 182358. February 20, 2013.

Ponente: J. Del Castillo


Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Unincorporated agencies performing jure imperii
Synopsis:
DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions. An
unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However,
the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of
the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in
favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business.

Digest:

FACTS
Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1998 was issued by then Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Romualdez, which set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers
of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for 3 years
but subject to annual review.

On January 25, 2000, Sec. Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2000 which amended AO 27. Under Sec.
VII, the accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two
years. Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and
proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.

Sec. VII of AO 10, was later amended by AO 66 series of 2000, which provided that the 2 year
accreditation period may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and
notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.

On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of
adverse findings regarding their products or violations committed by them during accreditation. In line
with this, former Undersecratary Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000, inviting
representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting.
During which the undersecretary handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on Violative
Products” issued by BFAD. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the
public were unfit for human consumption. PPI including the 24 drug companies present were directed to
submit within 10 days, their respective explanations on their adverse findings contained in the report.
But instead of submitting its explanation, PPI belatedly sent a letter addressed to the Undersecretary.
However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10
day period, which had expired, much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.

In a letter-reply, Undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s and therein informed PPI that, effective
immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum
No. 171-C. However, in another letter, PPI questioned the suspension.

PPI filed before the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH
Administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, the former Secretary
and Undersecretary. But the trial court dismissed the case, declaring the case to be one instituted against
the state, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.

PPI appealed to the CA and the CA reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for
the conduct of further proceedings.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the DOH can validly invoke state immunity

RULING
Yes. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver
may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.

a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions.

The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos is relevant, viz.:

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.

b) The Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and jointly liable with the other defendants for
damages which constitutes a charge or financial liability against the state.

Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the
state,” the defense of non-suability may be properly invoked. In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its
Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez
and Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its
suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition or financial
charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the national treasury which is
precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the state from.

The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.

“The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his
official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will
result in a charge or financial liability against the government.” Otherwise stated, “public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.” Moreover, “[t]he rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
[C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.”

15. UP v. Dizon

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.


ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Garnishment pursuant to a judgment award
Synopsis:
The RTC cannot direct the garnishment of public funds to satisfy a judgment debt, because the
constitution prohibits payment out of the national treasury unless it is by an appropriation made by
Congress. Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA)

Digest:

FACTS
On August 30, 1990, the UP entered into a contract with respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the
construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in
the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).

The contractor billed three (3) progress billings but the UP only paid two (2) billings. The 3rd billing
amounting to P273,729.47 was not paid due to disallowance by COA. However, despite the lifting of COA
of the disallowance, the obligation was not paid. Thus, they sought the aid of the court.

RTC directed the garnishment of public funds mounting to PhP16,370,191.74 belonging to the UP to
satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce already the final and executor judgment against the UP.
CA affirmed the RTC.
Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment
award

RULING
No, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral
and actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution
strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”

Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
1They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445(Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines).

16. ATO v. Spouses Ramos

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.


ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State
engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative.

The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
Digest:

FACTS
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August
11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the
ATO for ₱778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus,
respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.

In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense and likewise
denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.

The RTC rendered its decision on the merits in favor of the respondents. ATO appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE(S)
WON the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent

RULING

The petition for review has no merit.


The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong.

A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. "Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de
se donner loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap.
3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed.
1539, fol. 61. - Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.
Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be
severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to
defend against.
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function;
it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business. – Fr. Bernas

Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus
stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter
is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation. - National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra,
pp. 206-207

The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In
exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property
had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. - De los Santos v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,

Whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of RA 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. which abolished the
ATO, to wit:

Section 4. Creation of the Authority. - There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as the "Authority" attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For
this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the provisions of Republic Act No. 776,
as amended is hereby abolished.
xxx
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers, duties and rights, assets, real
and personal properties, funds, and revenues,

With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO
had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the
CAAP.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals.

- RIVERA

17. Hermano Oil vs. Toll Regulatory Board


HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), respondents
G.R. No. 167290. November 26, 2014

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The issue to be determined concerns the demand of the petitioner to have access to the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way. The demand was rebuffed by the
respondents and upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court ruled that, as the TRB
and the DPWH were exercising governmental functions, they were invested with the inherent power of
sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government, they could not be
sued as such.

Digest:

FACTS
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at NLEX. The petitioner
requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way, for it had
been deprived of its enjoyment and possession by the fence that barred its entry. TRB denied based on
the Limited Access Highway Act.

Hence, petitioner sued TRB and Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the grant of the
easement of right of way and damages being deprived of its property without due process, just
compensation and equal protection of the law.

In its order dated March 6, 2002,10 the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, observing as follows:The
present action against the defendants Toll Regulatory Board and its Executive Director, Engr. Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr., could be considered as a suit against the state without its consent as among the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint is to require the said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a just and
reasonable compensation of the plaintiff's property which, if awarded in the judgment against said
defendants, would ultimately involve an appropriation by the state of the amount needed to pay the
compensation and damages so awarded. Moreover, as pointed out by the defendants-movants,
defendant Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr. is sued in his official capacity so that the instant complaint against him is
tantamount to a claim against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

On October 27, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment, affirming the RTC's dismissal of the
complaint

ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondents can validly invoke the state immunity from suit

RULING
In our view, the TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially government or public functions. As
such, they were invested with the inherent power of sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or
entities of the National Government, they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting as
the agent of the TRB in respect of the matter concerned.
18. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER


COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the
name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent
G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003

Ponente: J. Azcuna
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Submission by a foreign
state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services.
The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified
equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official
residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of
Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position
of Chief of Administration he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed
respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.

Respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, respondent filed a
complaint against petitioners in RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-
defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE(S)
WON Petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit

RULING
Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. ###

19. China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR
D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG, LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR
ACTION (LUPA), KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO
M. CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN, MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES, RICARDO D.
LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G. GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA, JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, and
SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR., KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY
CLERIGO, RAMMIL DINGAL, NELSON B. TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, and EDUARDO
LEGSON, respondents.
G.R. No. 185572. February 7, 2012.

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, it nonetheless reveals the intention of
the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character. Adhering to the restrictive theory, the petitioner is therefore not entitled to immunity from suit.

Digest:

FACTS
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon
Railways Corporation for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San
Fernando, La Union.

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese
government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3%
per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui, wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project. On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a
turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement, the Buyer Credit Loan Agreement. In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in
order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement between two sovereign
states

RULING
No. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit,
and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial,
private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz.

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan
Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.

20. Arigo v. Swift

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa, et al., petitioners,
versus SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014

Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.


Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.

Digest:

FACTS
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On April 17, 2013, the
above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his
capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et. al. as respondents. Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUE(S)
Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case

RULING
NO. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-
suability of the State, is expressly provided in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that “the State may not be sued without its consent.” The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, as expressed in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Section 2, Article
II.

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows: “The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made
to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state
itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim — par
in parem, non habet imperium — that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.”

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.

21. Basco v. PAGCOR

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO


SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent
G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991

Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Local Autonomy
Synopsis:
The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state, it simply
means decentralization. Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioners here seek the annulment the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter—PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. Moreover,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. The petitioners are
particularly assailing Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local.”

ISSUE(S)
Does the PAGCOR Charter violate the principle of fiscal autonomy?

RULING
No. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The
Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it.
Its “power to tax” therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed
upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax”.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

22 Kilosbayan v. Morato

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,


EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Non-Self-Executing Provisions
Synopsis:
By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with
these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we
said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling
is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as
it sees fit.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioners seek reconsideration for the Courts decision in this case. They insists that the decision in the
first case has already settled (Please see Kilosbayan vs. Guingona) 1.) Whether Kilosbayan, Inc. has a
standing to sue and 2.) Whether under its charter the PCSO can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an online lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these
questions can no longer be reopened.

Furthermore the petitioners contented that (1) that the constitutional policies and principles
invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may
nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and
(2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people’s organizations “effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making” (Art. XIII, §16),
grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:


ART. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners is self-executing

RULING
No. the provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts
but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for
charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by
the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling
is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.” (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994))

23 Tanada v. Angara

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine


Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the
House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES,
LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO,
LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON,
NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA,
RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as
members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA,
in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, respondents
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997

Ponente: J. Panganiban
Topic: Constitutional Construction – Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

Digest:

FACTS
In order to hasten the recovery after the World War I, member countries ratified World Trade
Organization with the signing of the “Final Act” in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Philippines joined to WTO
thru Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of DTI representing the Republic of the Philippines
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiation.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.”

The Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which ratified the agreement establishing the WTO.

ISSUE(S)
Whether letter the “spirit and intent” of the Constitution is violated by the WTO Agreement which states
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods”

RULING
No, decision of the Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement is not defiant of the Constitution. What the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers
and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After
all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

Further, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy.-

24 Estrada v. Escritor

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent


A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)

Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Separation of Church and State
Synopsis:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

Digest:

FACTS
Soledad Escritor was a member of Jehova’s Witnesses. In 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. of the Las Piñas RTC to investigate Escritor, for the purpose of initiating an
administrative complaint. Estrada believes that, by living with a man not her husband and having borne a
child out of this living arrangement, she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Respondent was consequently charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct under
the Revised Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor claims that as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”

ISSUE(S)
Given that Escritor’s defense hinges on religious concerns, is the court, in interpreting the Revised
Administrative Code in her favor, in effect violating the constitutional mandate against enacting laws
respecting an establishment of religion?

RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court through Justice Puno elucidated that the Philippines adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the separation clause in the constitution. Under these
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may
be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to
an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence
of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Justice Puno’s discussion on the three theories in church and state separation:

Strict Separation; Words and Phrases; The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was
meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction
between the two.—The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect
the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the
two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the
state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of
religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict “wall of separation”
is necessary.

Unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view, which is a tamer version of the strict
separationist view, believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the state to be their
adversary—rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers. “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”—The
tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the
governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), where
the Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation” encapsulated the meaning of the First
Amendment. However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of
separation” does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but
it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations.
Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require,
accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.
Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation; Words and Phrases; The theory of benevolent neutrality or
accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall of separation,” in that, unlike the Jeffersonian
wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the
state.—The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall
of separation,” associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall
that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United
States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment
Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We Trust” on American currency; the
recognition of America as “one nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the
Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation “God save the
United States and this Honorable Court”; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of
paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer.
These practices clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential
for intervention by a god—over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government
agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the
treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong
moral dimension.

25 Republic v. Galang

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, respondent


G.R. No. 168335. June 6, 2011

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: State Policies – The Family
Synopsis:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered
into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

Digest:

FACTS
While they got married on March 9, 1994 in Pampanga, on August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the
RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was a kleptomaniac
and a swindler; that she stole his ATM card and his parents’ money, and often asked money from their
friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher (son) was confined in a hospital; that she suffers
from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child.". He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was "extremely serious" and
"appears to be incurable."

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy
did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost
got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. Psychological findings tend to
confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are
manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesn’t manifest any
sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, the
RTC nullified the marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001 finding that the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr.
Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal
and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to
the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the
wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject - are all obtaining in this case.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, while also subsequently denying the motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE(S)
WON the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy’s
psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations

RULING
Yes, it was insufficient. Therefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), challenging the decision of the CA was granted.

The respondent’s testimony merely showed the acts of Juvy which do not per se rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires since psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - had to be shown. A cause has to be
shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondent’s testimony failed to show that Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable
to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed
indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondent’s cause, as it glaringly failed to establish
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time
required by Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her
conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based
on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient.

The psychologist’s report simply stressed Juvy’s negative traits which she considered manifestations of
Juvy’s psychological incapacity
In the end, the psychologist opined - without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion - that
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.

Finally, the allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of
any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of
the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist
failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity
and incurability.

26 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents
G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012

Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Parens Patriae – Equal protection
Synopsis:
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution; The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly-
constituted authorities.

Digest:

FACTS
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of
the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article
of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as
amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing his
two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a
preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial
against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the
maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the
RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts
(2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with
the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING
(1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of
preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts
as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the
Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

27 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.


ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008

Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Separation of Powers
Synopsis:
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Digest:

FACTS
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). They assailed among others that the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

Respondents said that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances,
rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.

ISSUE(S)
WON the provision of RA 9335 creating congressional oversight violated the principle of separation of
powers

RULING
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. ###

28 Belgica v. Executive Secretary

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN
M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT,
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013

Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic: Separation of Powers/Non-Delegation of Legislative Power
Synopsis:
The Congessional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional, for violating certain constitutional principles,
particularly the separation of powers and the non-delegation of legislative powers. As a rule, the
budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the
GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted.

Furthermore, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

Digest:

FACTS
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

RULING

1. NO. the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional for violating the following principles:

i. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

ii. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That
being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
a. delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
b. authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.

iii. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

iv. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. YES. The presidential pork barrel is valid.


The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR
and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

i. PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used
to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President
may direct;
ii. PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

29 Pimentel v. COMELEC

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC


SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL
F. ZUBIRI, respondents.
G.R. No. 178413. March 13, 2008

Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Topic: Exclusivity of Qualifications to the Legislature (Senate)
Synopsis:
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Digest:

FACTS
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution
read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that “all candidates for public office x x x
both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional

RULING
YES. The Court says that it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. In the same vein, the
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution. Section 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution which is declared to be unconstitutional.

30 Asistio v. Pe-Aguirre

LUIS A. ASISTIO, petitioner, versus Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad Pe-Aguirre, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010

Ponente: Nachura
Topic: Residency and Domicile
Synopsis:
"Residence," as used in political law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.

Digest:

FACTS
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A.Asistio a
Petition for Exclusion before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City alleging that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St. Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon verification by private
respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Barangay 15 but his declared address , in truth,
falls under Barangay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. Subsequently, the petition was granted by the
MeTC.

ISSUE(S)
Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters for failure to meet the residency
requirements?

RULING
No. Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) echoed in Section 9
of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states that for a voter to be registered,
he/she must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and six months in the place where they
seek to be registered. "Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances.

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. Asistio has
always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years and his family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he
also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking
these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or
that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City.

31 Fernandez v. HRET

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF


REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L. VICENTE, respondents
G.R. No. 187478. December 21, 2009

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro


Topic: The House of Representatives - Qualifications
Synopsis:
The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where
he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day—to use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement, and the
Supreme Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.

Digest:
FACTS
On July 5, 2007, private respondent Vicente filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, praying
that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. Private respondent’s main ground for the quo
warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under
Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The HRET ruled in favor of the private respondent, basing
its decision on documentary evidence where the petitioner stated that his birthplace is Pagsanjan,
Laguna, which is within the Fourth District of said province, as well as testimonies of barangay health
workers claiming that they never saw petitioner at his purported leased residence in Villa de Toledo,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

ISSUE(S)
Is the evidence sufficient to justify the disqualification of Fernandez for non-compliance of the one-year
residency requirement?

RULING
No. The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile of origin was
Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other hand, what
petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First
District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that claim. The fact
that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment.

Furthermore, the HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in
Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places
has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that
he had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws
which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election
day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile
or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.

32 Sema v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*


BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, respondents.

Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic(s): Powers of Congress
Synopsis:
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through
a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the
“power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,”
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

Digest:
FACTS
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the
Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its
Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held
in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUE(S)
Does the ARMM have the power to create provinces and legislative districts?

RULING
No. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Consequently, MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, was declared void.

33 Aldaba v. COMELEC

G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010.*


VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA
ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which
is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based
on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.

Digest:
FACTS
The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. The 1st Legislative
District comprised of of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan,
and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress
in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested
fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a
Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality
of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000.”
Petitioners, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress provided under
the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional

RULING
Yes. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections
cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is
entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.

34 Aquino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.*


SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.

Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers
and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9716 is unconstitutional for running afoul with Section 5(3) of Article VI of the
Constitution

RULING
No, RA 9716 is a valid law. The apportioning of the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment” is a VALID LAW despite the fact that the new district is less than
250,000.00 in population.

While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000
to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.

35 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC

35. G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008


ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Reapportionment of legislative districts
Synopsis:
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Digest:
FACTS
RA. 9371 increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On March 13,
2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the
nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds arguing that the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for
the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government
unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC
Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.

Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837.
One of the commecnts of the respondent to the petition was that xxx3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case,
no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts
and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the
City's legislative apportionment.

ISSUE(S)
WON R.A. No. 9371 involve the division and conversion of a local government unit and violates the
equality of representation doctrine

RULING

NO.The petition is totally without merit. Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate
constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units,
i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government

(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:


No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.

As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among
districts.”
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision .

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision -
Section 1 - provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon,
San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise
the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and
Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation
in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on
the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law -
R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3 provides:

SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have
eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified
voters therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other
cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other
cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said
cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to their
charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both
in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

The principle of equality of representation.

The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality
of representation.
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein.

The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation.In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is
that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require
their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as
practicable.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

36 Abayon v. HRET/Palparan v. HRET, GR. No. 189506

G.R. No. 189466. February 11, 2010.*


DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 189506. February 11, 2010.*
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, respondents

Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Synopsis:
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan are the chosen representatives of the party list Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, during the 2007 elections. Quo warranto proceedings were initiated against them before the
HRET, claiming that they were not qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
embodied by their party list. Abayon countered that in his complaint, Lucaban collaterally attacked the
qualification of Aangat party list when it claimed that the latter itself did not represent marginalized
sectors, a question that belongs to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, and not the HRET. For his part,
Palparan questioned the jurisdiction of the HRET over his person, since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-
list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE(S)
Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualification of nominees of elected party list organizations?

RULING
Yes. Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. It means that, from the Constitution’s point of
view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations.
These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution
authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations
or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-
List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as “members of the House of Representatives.”

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

37 Banat v. COMELEC

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),


petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor. AANGAT TAYO,
intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Digest:
FACTS
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting
the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT
contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5
(2) of the Constitution mandatory?
2. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

RULING
1. Petition has partial merit.
The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in Veterans.
(1)First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list; (2)Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
(3)Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
(4)Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

2. Yes, We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

3. Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The remaining available seats
for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

4. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

38 Alliance for Rural & Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO) v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192803. December 10, 2013.*


ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO
PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
Votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as
part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such
elections should not be included in the divisor.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. Petitioner then filed an election
protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups.

Without waiting for the resolution of HRET, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO The petitioner asks that this Court modify the
Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the
divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for
the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list
groups are disqualified.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON COMELEC used the correct divisor for the computation of the percentage votes for the party-list
system

RULING
The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes. Invalid
votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to
improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at
all.50 All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.

We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no
cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for
a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To
do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot
but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably
made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included
in the divisor.

Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the
petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system
shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:

b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats. (Emphasis provided)

The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading
or having no shade at all;51 existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots
rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based53 automated election
system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the voter’s action.

Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained
in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts.
Thus, the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list component
of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.

We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for
the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a
substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes
validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his or her
choices.

To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for an
electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted by
the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his or
her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be counted.

Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:

Number of votes of party-list Proportion or


Total number of valid votes for = Percentage of votes
party-list candidates garnered by party-list

The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in the
ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in
relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups
whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is notified
of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not include
invalid votes. ###
39 ATONG PAGLAUM, Inc., et al., v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*


ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
*Partially abandoned Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC & BANAT vs COMELEC rulings

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved
for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.

Digest:
FACTS
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists

RULING
NO. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:

1. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
2. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
3. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
4. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
5. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
6. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
7. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory
prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to
those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people
should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution,
is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or
regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but
they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.

40 Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013.*


ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.

Digest:
FACTS
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May
2013 elections. COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia, required previously
registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary
evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC. ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC’s August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the
COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941.

After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration as a party-¬list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the
plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system

RULING
YES. It was ruled that under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list
system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to
their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.” Track record is not the
same as the submission or presentation of “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC,” which are but
mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern.
The said documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seek to achieve. This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what
constitutes a track record has certain consequences in a group’s bid for registration under the party-list
system.

Moreover, contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is
sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.

41 Amores v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

42 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

43 Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

44 V.C. Cadangen c. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

45 Bantay Republika v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
46 Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

47 Philippine Guardians Bros., Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

48 COCOFED v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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49 Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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50 Pobre v. Santiago

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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51 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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52 Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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53 Limkaichong v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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54 Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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55 Reyes v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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56 Abayon v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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57 Velasco v. Belmonte

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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58 Lico v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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59 Drilon v. De Venecia

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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60 Garcillano v. House of Representatives

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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61 Lerias v. Mercado

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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62 Dela Paz v. Senate

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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63 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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64 Senate v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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65 Chartered Bank v. Senate

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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66 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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67 Giron v. COMELEC (En banc decision)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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68 Soliven v. Makasiar

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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69 Estrada v. Disierto

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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70 Lozada v. PGMA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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71 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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72 Neri v. Senate

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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73 Biraogo v. Truth Commission

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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74 PhilConsA v. Enriquez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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75 Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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76 Rufino, et al., v. Endriga, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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77 Matibag v. Benipayo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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78 Fetalino v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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79 Kida v. Senate

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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80 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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81 League of Provinces v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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82 Gudani v. Senga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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83 David v. Arroyo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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84 Kulayan v. Tan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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85 Risos-Vidal and Lim v. COMELEC and Estrada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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86 Bayan Muna v. Romulo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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87 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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88 Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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89 Macalintal v. PET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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90 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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91 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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92 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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93 Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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94 PhilConSa v. Philippine Government

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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95 Baguio Market Vendors v. Executive Judge

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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96 Agdeppa v. Ombudsman, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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97 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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98 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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99 Republic v. Manalo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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100 Philippine Migrant Rights Watch v. OWWA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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101 De Castro v. JBC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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102 Chavez v. JBC (with MR on April 16, 2013)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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103 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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104 Villanueva v. JBC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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105 Aguinaldo v. Aquino (with MR on February 21, 2017)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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106 Re: Seniority among the 4 Most Recent Appointments to the CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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107 In the Matter of: SC Judicial Independence vs. Abolishment of JDF

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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108 Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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109 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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110 Ampong v. CSC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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111 Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno… (J. Bersamin)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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112 Reyes v. Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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113 CSC v. DBM

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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114 Funa v. Villar

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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115 Funa v. Agra

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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116 Public Interest Center, Inc., v. Elma

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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117 Funa v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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118 Funa v. Duque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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119 Pareno v. COA


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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120 Carolino v. Senga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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121 Maritime Industry Authority v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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122 NTC v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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123 Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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124 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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125 CSC v. Pobre

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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126 Nacion v. COA, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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127 Espinas, et al. v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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128 The Law Firm of Laguesma, etc. v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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129 TESDA v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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130 PEZA v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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131 Re: COA opinion on the Computation of Appraised Value of Properties…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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132 Causing v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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133 Blajonda v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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134 Galang v. Geronimo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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135 Bulilis v. Nuez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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136 Fernandez v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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137 Cawasa v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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138 COMELEC v. Espanol

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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139 Mutilan v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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140 Sevilla v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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141 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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142 Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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143 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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144 1-Utak v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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145 Maruhom v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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146 Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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147 Quinto v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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148 Luna v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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149 Cerafica v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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150 Jalover v. Osmena and COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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151 Timbol v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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152 Penera v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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153 Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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154 Santiago v. Ramos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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155 Legarda v. De Castro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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156 Roxas v. Binay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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157 Vinzons-Chato v. HRET/Panotes v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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158 Mayor Emmanuel Maliksi v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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159 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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160 Maquiling v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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161 Federico v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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162 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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163 Aratea v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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164 Talaga v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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165 Hayudini v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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166 E.R. Ejercito v. COMELEC and San Luis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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167 Maturan v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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168 Pundaodaya v. Noble

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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169 Sabili v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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170 Jalover v. Osmena

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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171 In re: Vicente Ching

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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172 Cabiling v. Commissioner of Immigration


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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173 Republic v. Sagun

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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174 Bengson v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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175 AASJS v. Datumanong

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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176 Lewis v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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177 Cordora v. COMELEC


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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178 Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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179 Republic v. Batuigas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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180 Tabasa v. Court of Appeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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181 Japson v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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182 Republic v. Huang Te Fu a.k.a. Robert Uy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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183 Jacot v. Dal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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184 Mercado v. Manzano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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185 Tecson v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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186 David v. Agbay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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187 Dennis Go v. Republic

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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188 Republic v. Li Ching Chung

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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189 Ledesma v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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190 Francisco v. House of Representatives

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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191 Guttierez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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192 Estarija v. Ranada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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193 Macalino v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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194 Gonzales III v. Office of the President

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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195 Dichaves v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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196 Salumbides v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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197 Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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198 Ombudsman v. Estandarte

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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199 Ombudsman v. CA (Ombudsman v. Lucero, November 24/ 2006)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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200 Garcia v. Miro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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201 Ledesma v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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202 Ombudsman v. Galica

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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203 Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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204 Presidential ad hoc Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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205 Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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206 Navarro v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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207 Umali v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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208 Dela Rama v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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209 Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. PB Martinez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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210 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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211 Acaac v. Azcuna

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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212 Damasen v. Tumamao

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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213 Tayaban v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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214 AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabella Properties Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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215 Canet v. Docena

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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216 Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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217 City Government of Quezon, et al. v. Bayan Com.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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218 Batangas CATV v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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219 Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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220 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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221 OSG v. CA and Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao Del Sur

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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222 Alinsug v. RTC br. 58

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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223 Municipality of Hagonoy v. Dumdum

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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224 City of Caloocan v. Allarde

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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225 Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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226 Vergara v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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227 Governor L-Ray Villafuerte, Jr., v. Sec. Robredo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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228 Republic v. City of Paranaque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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229 Hon. Paje v. Jon. Casino

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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230 SK Board of Election Supervisors of Subic v. Rigonan


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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231 Crisostomo Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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232 Municipality of San Juan v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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233 City of General Santos v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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234 Sebastian v. Lagmay-Ng

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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235 Miguel v. Montanez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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236 Borja v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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237 Lonzanida v. COMELEC (Dizon v. COMELEC, GR 182088)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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238 Montebon, et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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239 Abundo v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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240 Ong v. Alegre (Rivera v. COMELEC, GR 167591)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
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241 Latasa v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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242 Adormeo v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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243 Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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244 Naval v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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245 Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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246 Espina v. Zamora

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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247 Republic v. Pagadian City Timber

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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248 Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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249 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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250 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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251 Matthews v. Taylor

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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252 Republic v. Register of Deeds

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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253 Acebedo Optical v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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254 Avon Cosmetics v. Luna

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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255 In re: Benjamin Dacanay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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256 In re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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257 Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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258 Airlift Asia v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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259 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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260 Ugdoracion v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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I. Administrative Law

1 MMDA v. Garin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 GSIS v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 Soriano v. MTRCB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 GMA v. MTRCB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Board of Trustees v. Velasco

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
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6 Garcia v. Molina

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 NASECOR v. ERC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 PNR v. Kanlaon Construction Ent. Co. Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 Pharmaceuticals and Health Care Association Phils. v. Duque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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10 Public Hearing Committee of the LLDA v. SM Prime Holdings

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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11 Flores v. Montemayor

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 Salumbides v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 PAGCOR v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 Republic v. Transunion Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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II. Law on Public Officers

1 Eljansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Reynaldo C. Alcantara…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 CSC and DOST v. ARANDIA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 Velasco v. Obispo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Pagaduan v. CSC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 CSC v. Andal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 Ombudsman v. Cabreroy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 Abad v. Dela Cruz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 PAGCOR v. De Guzman
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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10 Argel v. Singson

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 DBP v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 Ombudsman v. De Zosa

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 Republic v. Arias

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 CSC v. Vergel De Rios


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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 SPO4 Laud v. People

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Sabijon v. De Juan

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17 Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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18 Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage, Inc. v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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19 Buena v. Benito

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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20 Lagoc v. Malaga, et al.

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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21 Ombudsman v. Caberoy

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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22 CSC v. Cotes

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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23 Causing v. COMELEC

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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24 NTC v. COA

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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25 CAAP-EU v. CAAP

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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26 Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association v. Southeast Mindanao Mining

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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27 Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Zameco II) v. Castillejos Consumers Assoc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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28 TESDA v. COA

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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29 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales

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30 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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III. Public International Law

1 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 Kuroda v. Jalandoni

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 Mijares v. Ranada

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 Razon v. Tagitis
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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Wright v. CA

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6 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

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7 US v. Purganan

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8 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr.

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Munoz


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10 Republic v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

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12 China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria

[CASE TITLE]
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13 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary Romulo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 Bayan Muna v. Romulo

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15 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
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16 Mirpuri v. CA

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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17 LBP v. Atlanta Industries, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
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18 Arigo v. Swift

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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IV. Constitutional Law II


1 Ynot v. IAC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 Beltran v. Secretary of Health

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3 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon

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4 PRC v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
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5 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 Binay v. Domingo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio

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10 Acebedo Optical v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 ABS-CBN v. PMSI
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 City Government of Quezon v. Judge Ericta

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 DOH and FDA v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 City of Manila v. Melba Tan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District


[CASE TITLE]
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17 DAR v. Berina

[CASE TITLE]
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18 DAR v. Spouses Sta. Romana

[CASE TITLE]
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19 Mactan Cebu International Airport v. Lozada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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20 Ouano v. Republic/Mactan Cebu v. Inocian/Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Cebu

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21 Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos

[CASE TITLE]
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22 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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23 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson

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24 City of Manila v. Te

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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25 NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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26 Reyes v. NHA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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27 NPC v. Manalastas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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28 Manapat v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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29 Republic v. Judge Gingoyon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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30 NPC v. Lucman Ibrahim

[CASE TITLE]
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31 Republic v. Sarabia

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32 Francia, Jr. v. Municipality of Meycauayan

[CASE TITLE]
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33 Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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34 Estate of JBL Reyes v. City of Manila

[CASE TITLE]
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35 Lagcao v. Judge

[CASE TITLE]
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36 Metropolitan Cebu Water v. J. King & Sons

[CASE TITLE]
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37 Republic v. Lim

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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38 Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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39 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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40 Gerochi v. Department of Energy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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41 Batangas City, et al. v. Pilipinas Shell

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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42 City Government of Quezon , et al. v. Bayan Com.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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43 Republic v. City of Paranaque

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44 Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Council of Cebu

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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45 Nursery Care Corp. v. Acevedo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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46 Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. BCDA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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47 Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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48 People v. Marti

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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49 Armando Yrasegui v. PAL

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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50 Zulueta v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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51 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees, et al. v. Philippine Blooming Mills

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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52 Ang Tibay v. CIR

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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53 Quisumbing v. Rosales

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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54 Shu v. Magpantay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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55 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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56 Nacion v. COA, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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57 PAGCOR v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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58 Atty. Erece v. Macalingay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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59 Dela Salle University v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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60 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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61 Department of Education v. Cuanan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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62 Dela Salle University v. CA

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63 Datufac Magudadatu v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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64 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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65 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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66 Timbol v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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67 Kuwait Airline Corporation v. PAL

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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68 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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69 Farinas v. Executive Secretary


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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70 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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71 Garcia v. Judge Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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72 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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73 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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74 Guttierez v. DBM
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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75 Himagan v. People

[CASE TITLE]
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76 Quinto v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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77 Duncan Association v. Glaxo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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78 PT&T v. NLRC

[CASE TITLE]
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79 International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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80 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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81 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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82 Prudente v. Dayrit

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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83 20th Century Fox v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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84 Sony Music v. Judge Espanol

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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85 Pilipinas Shell v. Romars International Gases Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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86 Leviste v. Alameda

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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87 Pestilos v. Generoso

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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88 Anlud Metal Recycling Corp. v. Ang

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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89 Malacat v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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90 People v. Mengote

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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91 People v. Claudio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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92 People v. Aminudin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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93 People v. Tangliben

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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94 People v. Malmstedt

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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95 People v. De Gracia

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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96 People v. Chi Chan Liu

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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97 People v. Mariacos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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98 People v. Escano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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99 People v. Valdez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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100 Villanueva v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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101 People v. Damaso

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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102 Caballes v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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103 George Antiquera v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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104 People v. Cogaed

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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105 Sanchez v. People

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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106 Valeroso v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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107 People v. Bolasa

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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108 Disini v. Secretary of Justice

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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109 Chavez v. Gonzalez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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110 KMU v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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111 Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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112 Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
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113 Vivares v. St. Theresa's College

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114 Belo-Henares v. Atty. Argee Guevarra

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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115 Gamboa v. P/SSupt. Chan

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116 BSB Group, Inc. v. Sally Go

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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117 Borjal v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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118 Tulfo v. CA

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119 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

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120 Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy

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121 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
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122 SWS v. COMELEC


[CASE TITLE]
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123 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
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124 1-Utak v. COMELEC

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125 IBP v. Atienza

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126 KMU v. Ermita/Bayan Muna v. Ermita

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127 Soriano v. MTRCB


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128 Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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129 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools

[CASE TITLE]
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130 Islamic Da'wah Council v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
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131 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

[CASE TITLE]
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132 Manosca v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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133 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
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134 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
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135 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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136 Nollora, Jr. v. People

[CASE TITLE]
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137 Estrada v. Escritur

[CASE TITLE]
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138 Perfecto v. Esidera

[CASE TITLE]
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139 Leus v. St. Scholastica's College, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
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140 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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141 Antolin v. Domondon

[CASE TITLE]
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142 Bantay Republic Act 7941 v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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143 Request for RadioTV Coverage-Estrada Trial

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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144 Bayan Muna v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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145 Chavez v. PEA and Amari

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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146 PSBank, et al. v/ Senate Impeachment Court

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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147 Hilado, et al. v. Judge Amor Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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148 In re: Production of Court Records

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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149 Request for a copy of 2006 SALN, PDS, and CV OF SC Justices, Officers…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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150 Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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151 GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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152 United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City Mayor, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
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153 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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154 Philreca v. Secretary of DILG

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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155 Frias, Jr., et al. v. Judge Sorongon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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156 Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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157 People v. Mahinay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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158 BPI v. CASA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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159 People v. Mollejo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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160 De Castro v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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161 People v. Cristobal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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162 People v. Tuniaco

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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163 People v. Lauga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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164 People v. Obrero

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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165 People v. Patungan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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166 People v. Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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167 People v. Wahiman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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168 People v. Rapeza

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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169 People v. Endino

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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170 People v. Baloloy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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171 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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172 People v. Ting Lan Uy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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173 People v. Taliman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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174 People v. Culala

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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175 People v. Tomaquin


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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176 People v. Velarde

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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177 People v. Zuela

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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178 People v. Andan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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179 People v. Maqueda

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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180 Ho Wai Pang v. People


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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181 People v. Bucalon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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182 Qui v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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183 Leviste v. Court of A ppeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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184 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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185 US v. Purganan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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186 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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187 Rodriguez v. Judge

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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188 Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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189 Taglay v. Daray

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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190 People v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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191 Sevilla v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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192 Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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193 Callangan v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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194 People v. Bermas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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195 Uyboco v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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196 Delgado v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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197 People v. Santocildes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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198 People v. Tulin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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199 Re: Request for TV/Radio Coverage of the Trial v. Joseph Estrada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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200 Go, et al. v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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201 People v. Chua

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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202 De Villa v. Director of Prisons

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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203 De Lima v. Gatdula

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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204 So v. Tacla

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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205 Teves v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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206 Estrada v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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207 People v. Angus, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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208 People v. Mortera

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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209 Adonis, et al. v. Supt. Tesoro (Director of Davao Prisons)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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210 Martinez v. Mendoza

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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211 Ilagan v. Enrile

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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212 Secretary of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff v. Manalo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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213 Razon v. Tagitis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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214 De Lima v. Gatdula

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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215 Navia, et al. v. Pardico

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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216 Spouses Pador v. Brgy. Captain Arcayan, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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217 Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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218 Reyes v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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219 So v. Tacla

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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220 Barcelona v. Lim, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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221 People v. Olvis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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222 SJS v. DDB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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223 Dela Cruz v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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224 Echegaray v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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225 Villareal v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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226 Lejano v. People/People v. Webb, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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227 People v. Judge Lagos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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228 Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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229 Dayap v. Sendiong

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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230 People v. Domingo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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231 Herrera v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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232 People v. Dumlao

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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233 People and AAA v. CA


[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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234 Ivler v. San Pedro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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235 SPO2 JAMACA v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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236 Republic v. Eugenio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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