1. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.

SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR

G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207, otherwise known as
the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003." The said
law mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona
fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries,
as well as the disposition to government institutions. The Committee formulated the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207. The petitioners filed a petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to prevent respondents from
enforcing the IRR of R.A. No. 9207. They assailed that the IRR is invalid on the ground that it is
not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 3.1 (a.4), 3.1 (b.2), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1) of the rules and
regulations of R.A. No. 9207, should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical.

RULING:

NO. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so
warrant. A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In any case, petitioners’ allegation
that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in
excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
2. ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO CAPALLA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201112, October 23, 2012

FACTS:

The COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an
Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections
(AES Contract) which is a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase (OTP) the goods listed
therein consisting of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both software and hardware. The
COMELEC was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option but opted not
to exercise the same except for 920 units of PCOS machines with the corresponding
canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in Basilan,
Lanao del Sur and Bulacan.

On March 6, 2012, the COMELEC issued a resolution to consider exercising the OTP
subject to certain conditions. It issued another resolution resolving to exercise the OTP in
accordance with the AES Contract. On March 29, 2012, it issued a resolution resolving to accept
Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012.
Finally, it issued a resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming 2013
elections.

Claiming that the foregoing COMELEC issuances and transactions entered pursuant
thereto are illegal and unconstitutional, movants filed separate petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
COMELEC Resolutions on the grounds that the option period provided for in the AES contract
had already lapsed; that the extension of the option period and the exercise of the option
without competitive public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the
COMELEC purchased the machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On
the other hand, respondents argue that there is no prohibition in the contract or provision of
law for the extension of the option period; that the OTP is not an independent contract in itself,
but is a provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had already satisfied the
public bidding requirements of RA 9184.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed resolutions and in executing the
assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

RULING:

NO. Clearly, under the AES Contract, the COMELEC was given until December 31, 2010
within which to exercise the OTP the subject goods listed therein including the PCOS machines.
The option was, however, not exercised within said period. But the parties later entered into an
extension agreement giving the COMELEC until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it.
With the extension of the period, the COMELEC validly exercised the option and eventually
entered into a contract of sale of the subject goods. The extension of the option period, the
subsequent exercise thereof, and the eventual execution of the Deed of Sale became the
subjects of the petitions challenging their validity in light of the contractual stipulations of
respondents and the provisions of RA 9184.

In June 13, 2012 Decision, the court decided in favor of respondents and placed a stamp
of validity on the assailed resolutions and transactions entered into. Based on the AES Contract,
the court sustained the parties’ right to amend the same by extending the option period.
Considering that the performance security had not been released to Smartmatic-TIM,
the contract was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual agreement of
the parties, such amendment being reduced in writing. To be sure, the option contract is
embodied in the AES Contract whereby the COMELEC was given the right to decide whether or
not to buy the subject goods listed therein under the terms and conditions also agreed upon by
the parties.

While the contract indeed specifically required the COMELEC to notify Smartmatic-TIM
of its OTP the subject goods until December 31, 2010, a reading of the other provisions of the
AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may
include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the
extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective.
3. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GSIS vs. ALBERT M. VELASCO
G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct for their

alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees, and placed them
under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of
certain employee privileges but were denied because of their pending administrative case.
Petitioners promulgated Resolution Nos. 372 and 197 disqualifying employees with pending
administartive case from step increment and other benefits and privileges. Respondents filed a
petition for prohibition and claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the
ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and
that they are being punished without hearing. In the September 2004 Decision, the RTC granted
respondents’ petition for prohibition, restraining petitioners from implementing the above
resolutions.

Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case because it
involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners pointed out that the trial court should have
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board exercising quasi-
legislative and administrative functions is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC.

RULING:

No. Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts
emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further
enforcing the said resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over
respondents’ petition for prohibition.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
 granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Also, the petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may
be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial
court, as the case may be. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Therefore, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance
of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the
venue was properly laid before it.
4. MERALCO vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
No. L-46245, May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, Meralco
Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel
pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder
of the public highway. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the
provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued tax declarations,
containing the assessed values of portions of the pipeline.

Meralco appealed the assessments to the defendants, but the latter ruled that pipeline
is subject to realty tax because they are contemplated in Assessment Law and Real Property Tax
Code.

Meralco filed a special civil action of certiorari to review the decision of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. The OSG contends that certiorari is not proper in this case
because the Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse its discretion and
Meralco Securities was not denied due process of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for certiorari was properly availed of in this case.

RULING:

Yes. The court hold that certiorari was properly availed of in this case. It is a writ issued
by a superior court to an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to be elevated for review and
correction in matters of law. The rule is that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-
judicial power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the statute. “The
purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions”. The review is a part of the
system of checks and balances which is a limitation on the separation of powers and which
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
5. Nunal vs. COA and Municipality of Isabela, Basilan
G.R. No. 78648
January 24, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan but was

administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and
for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board exonerated petitioner and
reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator. Petitioner was again dismissed
for lack of confidence by the Municipal Mayor and thus, he filed a suit for mandamus and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal
Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela before the CFI and prayed for
reinstatement. During the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela
abolished the subject position in its Resolution No. 902, pursuant to the provisions of the
Local Government Code.

A compromise agreement was executed between the parties and petitioner was
considered as retired upon the receipt of the monetary considerations therein. Petitioner
collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no provision for the same had been
included in the Compromise Agreement.
Petitioner filed his claim for separation pay but the Provincial Auditor stated that the
payment thereof was subject to the availability of funds. COA denied the claim for
separation pay and disallowed the others payments made to petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent COA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition

HELD:

Ther In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the
meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted
for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other
pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course
to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal
basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.

The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the Municipality of

Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in Court. Thus, the payments to
petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries, P21,387.71 as total accumulated
vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal
in the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld.
6. Sim vs. NLRC and Equitable PCI-Bank
G.R. No. 157376
October 2, 2007

FACTS:

Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging
that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian
Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she
was promoted to Manager position but she received a letter from Remegio David informing
her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged
mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. Respondent denied any employer-
employee relationship between them, and sought the dismissal of the complaint. Labor
Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of
merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court
of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed
the petition due to petitioner's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was nonetheless denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.

HELD:

Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special
civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.

There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
 (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

As stressed in Cervantes v. Court of Appeals:

It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a
matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who
seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with
the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense
with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a
concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
7. Milwuakee Industries Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
G.R. No. 173815
November 24, 2010

FACTS:
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by petitioner Milwaukee Industries Corporation (Milwaukee) assailing the
February 27, 2006 Verbal Order and the June 1, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). Public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) notified
Milwaukee of its intent to examine their books of account and other accounting records for
all internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other unverified prior years. Milwaukee complied
with the directive and submitted its documents to CIR. CIR issued three undated
assessment notices together with a demand letter and explanation of the deficiency tax
assessments. Milwaukee allegedly owed a total of ₱173,063,711.58 corresponding to
the deficiencies on income tax, expanded withholding and value-added taxes for the 1997
taxable year to which they protested.

Due to CIR’s inaction, Milwaukee filed a petition for review before the CTA and
manifested its intention to present documentary rebuttal evidence. CTA permitted
Milwaukee to present rebuttal evidence but Milwaukee, however, moved for resetting on
the scheduled hearings. Milwaukee was able to partially present its rebuttal evidence in a
commissioner’s hearing then the CTA scheduled another hearing. The CIR waived its
right to cross-examine petitioner’s witness. Milwaukee moved for the postponement of
the pre-marking and presentation of its rebuttal evidence. Milwaukee moved for
reconsideration of the CTA’s verbal order and moved to toll the running of the period
for filing its formal offer of rebuttal evidence to which the CTA denied for reconsideration
but allowed its motion to suspend the period for filing of formal offer of rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent CTA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to be allowed to present rebuttal evidence, and its subsequent
motion for reconsideration thereon.

HELD:
In order for a petition for certiorari to succeed, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer
acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public
respondent exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is
so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

"As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness
should be served thereby." Furthermore, this discretion must be exercised intelligently. In
this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough opportunity for Milwaukee to
present its rebuttal evidence.
8. Ongsuco and Salaya vs. Hon. Malones
G.R. No. 182065
October 27, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been newly
renovated. A meeting was held in the Office of the Municipal Mayor which involved
petitioners regarding the Public Market. Revenue measures were discussed including an
increase in rentals for market stalls and imposition of goodwill fees of P20,000 every
month. An ordinance was enacted promulgating the increased rentals for the stalls and
the imposed goodwill fees. However, a resolution was issued moving to have the
meeting declared inoperative as a public hearing. Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls without any lease contract,
as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and
interested applicants.

Petitioners filed with the RTC a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against
respondent. The court dismissed the petition. The RTC found that petitioners could not
avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that
mandamus would not lie in this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right
to the use of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the
municipal government. Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where
respondent’s acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve the exercise of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The RTC also dismissed the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843 on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellee Mariano Malones who was then the Municipal Mayor
of Maasin has committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what
circumstances petitions for prohibition and mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
 praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person --

whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. On the other hand, the
remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner
for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to
do the act required to be done.

In this case, petitioners’ primary intention is to prevent respondent from

implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from
petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market.
Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in.

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a
"tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions"; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."
9. JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner, v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 193978 | February 28, 2012

FACTS: President Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged
excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of
Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the
Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances,
and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on its findings,
officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves
unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as well as other
irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards
of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued
EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles
and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs
and GFIs.

EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs
from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and
from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their
employees.

The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition's
dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this case.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known
as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the
President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.

RULING: No. Petition is dismissed.

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question
judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-
judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy;
instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a personal stake or
material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and
based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and
other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he
has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the
petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

The petition has been mooted by supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has
already been rendered moot by the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in
the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine
their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform
this act. With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now
authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
10. ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B. OLAGUER vs. BANGKO
SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD
G.R. No. 192986 | January 15, 2013
FACTS: Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and its President, Eduardo Olaguer claim that they
are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public and so they filed Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 ROC seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of R.A. No.
7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-
MB in 1982, which "suspended" the Usury Law of 1916 (Act No. 2655).

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to,
among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans
and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.

In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982. Section 1 of
the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits.

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari will prosper.

RULING: The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari, as well as to grant
due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari
being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the
procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as
mere technicality. As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body
or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that
applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.
11. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR AND CITY
COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY
G.R. 156684 | April 6, 2011

The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of
their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families.
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income. On October 2, 1997, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost
housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners became alarmed,
and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of Resolution No.
552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The
City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to
initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to
purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for prohibition will lie against expropriation.

RULING: No.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of
the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This
bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating
the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is
thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power
of eminent domain, the power of the review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be
left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of
their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may
remedy of prohibition become available.

Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution
expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property
was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge,
for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a
verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such
verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the
petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.
12. WINSTON F. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RUDY C. TESORO
G.R. No. 169005 | January 28, 2013

FACTS: In February and March, 2003, GSIS published an Invitation to Pre-Qualify to Bid for the
construction of the GSIS Iloilo City Field Office (GSIS-ICFO) Building. Out of the 8 pre-qualified
contractors, only four submitted their financial bids.
The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) declared the bid of Embrocal Builders, Inc. as the
"Lowest Calculated and Responsive Bid." The other bidders were informed of their
disqualification only on Dec. 10, 2003 through a letter signed by the GSIS Iloilo Field Office
Manager.
BAC recommended to the Senior Vice-President of the Field Operations Group (SVP-FOG),
herein private respondent Rudy Tesoro, that the proposed construction of the GSIS-ICFO
building be awarded to Embrocal for P 55,350,000. The Notice of Award dated Nov. 4, 2003 was
signed by Manager Teruel, Mateo Basa, Jr., VP Area II-FOG and private respondent. The
Contract for the Construction of the GSIS-Iloilo Office Building was executed between GSIS
represented by private respondent and Embrocal represented by its President.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for
certiorari.

RULING: Yes.
A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for
certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court
acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.

jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.
13. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ ET AL
G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173
March 21, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch
121 of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent Velasco was a
senior state prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the Ombudsman and
sought his indictment before the Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in
his capacity as a prosecutor: 1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the
accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness; 2. Engaging in
private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner; 3.
Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse
Complaint was conducted.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) committed grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of its discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute criminal complaints.
HELD:
No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in a manner so patent
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The determination of grave abuse of
discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise
of its powers is precisely the province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. However, we
highlight the exceptional nature of that determination.
Notably, the burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has
failed to discharge this burden. She merely states why she does not agree with the findings of
the Ombudsman, instead of demonstrating and proving grave abuse of discretion. In her
arguments, petitioner would also have us pass upon the factual findings of the Ombudsman.
That we cannot do, for this Court is not a trier of facts.
14. ALFREDO O. ESTRERA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154235-36
August 16, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner is employed with the Philippine Postal Corporation as POSTMAN II and assigned at
the Registry Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro City Post Office. Estrera is the Regional
Director, Region 10 of the Philippine Postal Corporation.
BOMBO RADYO, DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the alleged pilferage and/or loss of
PVAO checks and foreign mail matters and other alleged anomalies. Petitioner [herein private
respondent] was reassigned from the Cagayan de Oro City Office to the Motor Transport
Section, Mail Distribution Center. petitioner [herein private respondent] filed a motion to quash
based on the following grounds: (a) that the complaint was not under oath; (b) the
complaint was only signed by Alfredo Estrera and not the Postmaster General; (c) that the
complaint should have been signed by the fact-finding body; (d) that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted before the filing of the charge; (e) that the alleged affidavit of
complaining witnesses were executed after respondent was investigated.
Petitioner [herein private respondent] came to this court on prohibition, injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order and damages.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTITORARI IS PROPER

HELD:
NO. In People v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded thus: As observed in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not
the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
In this case, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning the correctness
of the CAs rulings. Hence, since the issues involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the
writ of certiorari cannot be availed of by petitioner.
15. NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO
CITY and EQUITABLE PCI
G.R. NO. 165001
January 31, 2007

FACTS:
In the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 78673, dismissing its special civil
action for certiorari and affirming the dismissal orders dated January 13, 2003 and April 14,
2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, acting as a special
commercial court, in Civil Case No. 02-27278.
New Frontier Sugar Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell
due, petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (2000) some time in August 2002.[2] Finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance, the RTC issued a Stay Order dated August 20, 2002, appointing Manuel B.
Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial
hearing on the petition
PCI bank filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that petitioner
is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets
left. On January 13, 2003, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and
dismissing the case. Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which
was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE IT AS IMPROPER, APPEAL BEING AN AVAILABLE REMEDY
HELD:
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition
of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an
original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to
correct the alleged errors.
The Omnibus Order dated January 13, 2003 issued by the RTC is a final order since it terminated
the proceedings and dismissed the case before the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be
done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order.
16. JUAN B. BANEZ VS. HON. CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 159508
August 29, 2012

FACTS:
The petitioner has directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari filed on September 4,
2003 to assail the orders dated March 24, 2003 (reversing an earlier order issued on February
18, 2003 granting his motion to dismiss on the ground of the action being already barred by
prescription, and reinstating the action),2 April 21, 2003 (denying his motion for
reconsideration),3 and August 19, 2003 (denying his second motion for reconsideration and
ordering him to file his answer within 10 days from notice despite the principal defendant not
having been yet validly served with summons and copy of the complaint),4 all issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, in Malolos City in Civil Case No. 722-M-2002,5 an action
for the recovery of ownership and possession. He alleges that respondent Presiding Judge
thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari is proper
HELD:
The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the orders denying his
motion to dismiss. It is settled, however, that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being
merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is
not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings
in which it is issued. To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only delays
the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts.
But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without
jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. This is because as to such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
17. MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR
G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014

FACTS:

On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J.
Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, asserting that Hayudini
should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that
Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in
fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.

Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List
of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Despite
the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on January 31,
2013. On that same day, the COMELEC’s First Division dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to
cancel Hayudini’s CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false
representation as to his residency.

Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, Reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of
Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. On May 13, 2013,
Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and,
consequently, took his oath of office.

On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second
petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it
gave due course to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a
supervening event.

Corollary thereto, the proclamation of respondent GAMAL S. HAYUDINI is hereby declared null
and void and without any legal force and effect. SALMA A. OMAR is hereby proclaimed as the
duly-elected Mayor for South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the qualified candidate obtaining the
highest number of votes, considering the doctrine laid down by the case Aratea v.
Comelec13 that a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less, to a valid
vote

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion on its decision.

HELD:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific
grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the arbitrary
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having
been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross. Here,
Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions with
grave abuse of discretion.

Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of filing of CoC for
the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March
26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed
within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-
five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Clearly, Omar’s petition was
filed way beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient
explanation as to why his petition was not served personally to Hayudini.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the COMELEC’s
liberal treatment of Omar’s petition.

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite
period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest,
which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and
delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that
"in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of
elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election
disputes."

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction.1âwphi1 The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real
choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means
within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist
of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the
electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.32

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be
elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to
support a petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially
excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming
the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he
needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for said
office," Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he
was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.

Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural
deficiencies, South Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality
he is supposed to govern, thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation.
Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy. Hayudini
likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his
proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed.
What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a
winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome − a necessary legal consequence − of the
cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78.

It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a mayoralty candidate is that he must be a
resident of the city or municipality where he intends to be elected. Thus, under Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a candidate must certify under oath that he is
eligible for the public office he seeks election. In this case, when petitioner stated in his CoC
that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public
office, but it turned out that he was declared to be a non-resident thereof in a petition for his
inclusion in the list of registered voters, he therefore committed a false representation in his
CoC which pertained to a material fact which is a ground for the cancellation of his CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner's ineligibility for not being a resident of the
place he sought election is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, since the grounds
enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to the
commission of prohibited acts, and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country.
18. SPOUSES RUBEN AND MYRNA LEYNES vs FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, and SPOUSES GUALBERTO &
RENE CABAHUG-SUPERALES
G.R. No. 154462 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

Spouses Superales were the actual occupants and possessors, being lawful owners of a certain
parcel of a residential lot within the Nebrada Subd., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, containing an
area of Three Hundred Thirty Six Square Meters, more or less, and registered in the name of
Rene Cabahug Superales, in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Davao del Sur. Sometime
in February 2000, spouses Leynes through force, stealth and strategy encroached upon and
occupied a portion of the titled property consisting of 76 square meters, more or less,
dispossessed the [spouses Superales] and constructed therein a comfort room as an extension
of their house without first obtaining the required building permit from the Municipal
Engineers Office, of Bansalan, Davao del Sur.

Spouses Superales promptly called the attention of spouses Leynes and protested their
intrusion into their property but notwithstanding their protestations, spouses Leynes continued
on their construction and occupation of a portion of the property. Spouses Superales reported
to the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Poblacion, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, spouses Leynes
encroachment on their titled property and the illegal construction being made on a portion of
their property. Amicable Settlement of the dispute was however, repudiated by spouses Leynes
when they refused to recognized the relocation survey conducted on the property of spouses
Superales and prevented the surveyor from planting monuments on the boundary between the
lot.

That as per relocation survey conducted, spouses Leynes have encroached and occupied a total
of Seventy Six Square Meters of spouses Superales titled property, thereby reducing the area of
the lot from 336 Square Meters, more or less to 260 Square Meters. Spouses Superales also
complained to the Municipal Engineers Office in order to stop the illegal construction
undertaken by spouses Leynes, but the complaint fell on deaf ears as no action has been taken
by the Municipal Engineers Office on the said illegal construction. Spouses Leynes have
unlawfully occupied and are continuously occupying illegally a portion of the property
consisting of 76 Square Meters.

Summons together with a copy of the aforementioned Complaint was served on the spouses
Leynes on May 10, 2000, giving them ten (10) days from receipt within which to file their
answer pursuant to Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The 10-day period for the
filing of the spouses Leynes answer prescribed on May 20, 2000, a Saturday. The spouses
Leynes filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May 22, 2000, and their Motion to Admit
Belatedly Filed Answer with attached Answer with Counterclaim the day after, on May 23,
2000. The spouses Leynes explained that they were not able to file their Answer with
Counterclaim on May 20, 2000, even though there were court employees on duty that
Saturday, because they had to serve first a copy of said pleading on the spouses Superales
counsel, whose office was located in Davao City.

The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion for Judgment on May 23, 2000, in
which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer to the Complaint
within the prescribed period, then judgment could now be rendered based on the evidence and
allegations contained in the Complaint.

The spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC Judgment to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21 of Bansalan, Davao del Sur. In its Decision dated July 9, 2001, the RTC affirmed the appealed
MCTC Judgment. The spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration in which
they sought the recall of the Decision dated July 9, 2001 and the remand of the case to the
MCTC for trial on the merits. However, the RTC, in a Resolution also strangely dated July 9,
2001, refused to reconsider its earlier decision. In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes petition outright for being the wrong remedy
and for failure to state the material dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
considering that it denied a petition on a mere technicality.

HELD:

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be
a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion
The remedy of appeal to the Court of Appeals was available to the spouses Leynes, only
that they failed to avail of it in time. We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is
not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an
appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These
two remedies are mutually exclusive. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used
as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals held, the spouses Leynes Petition for Certiorari failed to
comply with the requirement under Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that a petition
for certiorari should indicate material dates, such as when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. The spouses Leynes did not
refute that their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals did not state the date they
received a copy of the RTC Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. That the said
Resolution was strangely dated July 9, 2001, the same date as the RTC Decision sought to be
reconsidered, is immaterial. The timeliness of the filing by the spouses Leynes of their petition
before the Court of Appeals is determined from the date they received the challenged RTC
resolution and not the date the RTC issued the same.

The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. A special civil action under Rule 65
is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule,
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that
under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be
dismissed outright.

Given the peculiar circumstances extant in the case at bar, the dismissal of the spouses Leynes
Petition for Certiorari would result in the miscarriage of justice. The spouses Leynes were
unjustly declared in default by the MCTC and deprived of the opportunity to present arguments
and evidence to counter the spouses Superales Complaint. Hence, we are accepting and giving
due course to the spouses Leynes petition in the interests of substantial justice and equity.

The spouses Leynes were served with the summons on May 10, 2000. The last day of the 10-
day period within which the spouses Leynes should have filed their answer, May 20, 2000, fell
on a Saturday. The next working day was May 22, 2000, a Monday, on which the spouses
Leynes did file their Answer with Counterclaim. Based on the aforequoted rules, the spouses
Leynes answer was filed within the reglementary period, and they were not in default. The
MCTC should not have rendered an ex parte Judgment against them.
19. MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO vs. THE HON. SAMUEL REYES, ROBERT O. PHILLIPS and
MAGDALENA YSMAEL PHILLIPS, et al.
G.R. No. L-24581 May 27, 1968

FACTS:

It appears that the Perez Rubio spouses owned shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc.
registered in their names and in the names of Joaquin Ramirez and Joaquin Ramirez, Jr. On April
13, 1963 the Perez Rubios, with the conformity of the Ramirezes, sold said shares to Robert O.
Phillips and Sons, Inc. for P5,500,000.00 payable in installments and other conditions agreed
upon.

On June 23, 1964 Robert O. Phillips and Sons, Inc., and Robert O. Phillips himself and his wife,
entered into an agreement with the Perez Rubios deferring payment of the April 30, 1964
installment already overdue to August 31, 1964.

In the meantime, Robert O. Phillips, in his behalf and in that of his wife and Robert O. Phillips
and Son, Inc., entered into negotiations for the sale of their shares of stock in Hacienda Benito,
Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco. Upon being in formed of this, the Perez Rubios, through their
attorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez, reminded the Phillips spouses and the Phillips corporation in
writing of their obligations under the contract of sale of April 13, 1963 and reminded them in
particular that the shares subject matter thereof were still subject to the payment of the unpaid
balance of the sale price. They gave a similar notice to Alfonso Yuchengco, but expressed no
objection to the sale provided the obligations in their favor were satisfied.

On March 26, 1965, the Phillips (individuals and corporation), through their attorney, sent a
letter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in substance, that the only obstacle to the
consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. was
their letter of November 24, 1964 and warned that unless the same was withdrawn by March
29, they would seek redress elsewhere. On March 27, 1965, the Perez Rubios, for their part,
wrote the Phillips that due to the latter's inability to comply with the former's conditions, the
negotiations going on between them were cancelled, and should the full amount due to them
remained unpaid by noon of March 31, 1965, they would file action in court in the afternoon
thereof. However, on March 30, 1965, stealing a march on the Perez Rubios, the Phillips
(individuals and corporation) filed a civil case mentioned heretofore where they obtained, ex-
parte, a preliminary injunction.

On April 8, 1965 the Perez Rubios filed a motion to dissolve the above reproduced writ of
preliminary injunction, which the respondent judge denied on May 6, 1964. But even before
the motion aforesaid could be acted upon, they also filed their answer to the complaint with a
counterclaim of P4,500,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of the sale price of their shares.
Because of this the Perez Rubios were charged with contempt.
The original petition for certiorari filed in this case is based principally on the allegation that, in
taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 8632 and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex-
parte mentioned heretofore, the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion and,
as a consequence, the petition prayed that the respondent judge be restrained from in any way
proceeding with the case, and to restrain the respondents Phillips from proceeding with the
sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. or any of its assets to Alfonso Yuchengco or
to any other person, or from performing any act which will diminish the value of said shares of
stock or deplete the assets of the company.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction issued ex-parte by the respondent
judge was unjust and improvident.

HELD:

We are of the opinion and so hold, that the writ of preliminary injunction issued ex-parte by the
respondent judge was unjust and improvident. Without hearing the party concerned, and
without any legal justification, it restrained a creditor (Perez Rubio) from enforcing his
undenied right to collect from his debtor and the latter's guarantors the sum of P4,250,000.00
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of his shares in Hacienda. It is a fact that
the debtor Corporation (Robert O. Phillips and Sons, Inc.) and its guarantors, the Phillips
spouses, do not deny the indebtedness, and yet, notwithstanding its extraordinary amount,
they attempted to sell all the shares of stock of Hacienda without making any reasonable
provision for the payment thereof. For them to prevent their creditor from enforcing his right
to collect, and for the Court to enjoin said creditor from enforcing that right in any lawful
manner is, in any language, rank injustice.

The burden of petitioner's case — aside from the annulment of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the respondent judge on April 1, 1961 is that all the material events
that transpired after the filing of his original petition show that the Bank, Robert O. Phillips and
Sons, Inc., the Phillips spouses and VVDC, conspired amongst themselves to put the properties
of Hacienda and the assets of the latter's guarantors — the Phillips spouses —, beyond his
reach and thus make it impossible for him to collect the sum of P4,250,000 still unpaid
on the purchase price of his shares in Hacienda sold to the Phillips corporation; that
they sought to accomplish this by having the Bank foreclose the mortgage constituted on the
properties of Hacienda and acquire them at the foreclosure sale; that, in fact Hacienda, through
Robert O. Phillips, has already conveyed its properties to said Bank; that after acquiring them,
the Bank world transfer them all to the hurriedly organized VVDC, who would then become
their owner and from whom it would be at least difficult to enforce the vendor's lien thereon
claimed by petitioner.

The alleged conspirators, of course, deny the conspiracy and aver that the mortgage in favor of
the Bank existed long before the sale of petitioner's shares to the Phillips corporation; that at
the time the Bank commenced the judicial foreclosure proceedings, more than P7,000,000.00
were due to it from Hacienda and the other corporations defendants who were either owned
or controlled by the Phillips spouses; that the foreclosure proceedings were instituted in good
faith exclusively to protect or enforce the rights of the Bank; that as a result of the aforesaid
foreclosure proceedings the mortgaged properties were lawfully acquired by it; that while
thereafter there had been negotiations for the acquisition of said properties by VVDC, the same
were held in abeyance by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; that
there could have been no attempt to make futile the enforcement of petitioner's right to collect
the amount due to him from the Phillips corporation and the Phillips spouses because after the
sale of the one-hundred thirty five hectares to the Bank by Hacienda, the latter still had
somewhere around fifty-eight hectares of land.
20. TOMAS MEDRAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTINA ZAMORA, and BONIFACIO DIONES
G.R. No. L-1350 March 26, 1949

FACTS:

On November 29, 1945 the court of first Instance of Mindoro rendered a judgment awarding
the ownership and possession of a piece of land to herein petitioner Tomas Medran as against
the adverse claim of Bonifacio Diones who was consequently ordered to vacate and pay
damages. On January 10, 1946 the defendant Diones and Zamora were duly notified of that
judgment, they filed their notice of appeal presenting subsequently on January 30, 1946, the
corresponding record. On February 18, 1946, petitioner moved for dismissal of the appeal for
the reason that no bond had theretofore been submitted. Acting on the motion on February 19,
1946, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the appeal as prayed for and also the execution of
its judgment of November 29, 1945.

On March 18, 1946, respondents presented an appeal bond together with a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, asserting that the delay was due to the absence of
Diones from his home town the sickness of his wife and the minority of his daughter who could
not therefore attend to the submission of the required bond. The motion was opposed, and
Judge Alejandro Panlilio denied it on May 10, 1946.

On May 25, 1946, respondents filed a second motion for reconsideration based substantially on
the same grounds alleged in the first motion. Again the petitioner objected, and the court
(Judge Mariano C. Melendres) sustained his objection and denied such second motion on June
19, 1946. Respondents again filed a third motion for reconsideration before Judge Meynardo
Farol based upon the same grounds previously set out in the first and second motions for
reconsideration. Judge Farol in an order of August 7, 1946, reinstated the appeal, holding that
respondents' failure to file the bond was due to excusable neglect.

Petitioner lost, no time, and filed with the appellate court a motion to dismiss the appeal,
reiterating his view that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro had already
become final and executory through the tardiness of the attempted appeal, and that Judge
Farol's order giving it due course was palpably issued in excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro had already
become final and executory since the multiple motions of reconsideration were opposed.

HELD:

The order of the Court of First Instance of February 19,1946, dismissing the appeal was
undoubtedly valid, because the defeated parties had failed to submit an appeal bond in due
time. The would-be appellants could obtain are vocation of that order, upon a motion for relief
from accident, mistake or excusable negligence, pursuant to Rule However, if their petition for
relief is denied, they should appeal. They should not submit motions for reconsideration to one
judge after another, hoping to obtain from the former what was refused by the latter.

In the interests of justice, litigants should not be allowed to iterate identical motions
speculating on the possible change of opinion of the court or of the judges thereof. The
stability vs. court directive and the appearance of complete judicial detachment, is
incompatible with repeated motions to reconsider, specially if submitted months apart.

The respondents should have appealed within thirty days from notice of the order of May 10,
1946, denying relief. As respondents failed to do so, the order became final, and there was no
remedy available to obtain a revision of the main decision; in other words, the dismissal of the
appeal became unassailable and the main decision executory.

It might be suggested that the second motion for reconsideration and the third motion for
reconsideration suspended the thirty-day period within which to appeal the order denying
relief. Supposing that the second suspended it, the third did not suspend, because it was based
on identical ground as the bond, and this Court has held that a second motion for new trial
based on the same grounds as the first does not suspend the period for perfecting the appeal,
"because "the court's time is valuable" and "to file two separate motions on the same grounds
and for the same purpose is to trifle with courts."

In a spirit of liberality we have explored the possibility to consider the third motion for
reconsideration as an independent petition for relief on account of mistake or accident. But we
found it would be too late, because it was submitted more than sixty days after the
respondents Zamora and Diones had been informed of the order dismissing the appeal. On
March 4, 1946, counsel for respondents Zamora and Diones received copy of the order of
dismissal; and from this date to July 29 a period of more than days had elapsed.

The arguments have been advanced that, (a) We may not disturb the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals; (b) said court had "jurisdiction" to decide whether it had jurisdiction or not;
and (c) any error in the exercise of such jurisdiction may be corrected only on appeal — and
not by a special civil action like this.

We have heretofore, in special proceedings (prohibition and mandamus) impeded lower courts
from entertaining tardy appeals. The Court of Appeals, specifically, was, by prohibition,
restrained from acting on a case even after it had decided it had jurisdiction over it over it. It
was also restrained from taking cognizance of an appeal in a civil case in which the appeal bond
had not been filed in time. No reason why we should act differently now.
21. G.R. No. 158271, APRIL 8, 2008

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

China Bank granted respondent Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) an
Omnibus Credit Line in the amount of P90, 000,000.00. Alleging that ACDC failed to comply with
its obligations under the Omnibus Credit Line, China Bank filed a Complaint for recovery of sum
of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

The RTC issued an Order granting China Banks prayer for writ of preliminary attachment.
Consequently, as shown in the Sheriff’s Report, the writ of preliminary attachment was
implemented levying personal properties of ACDC, i.e., vans, dump trucks, cement mixers, cargo
trucks, utility vehicles, machinery, equipment and office machines and fixtures.

Upon motion of China Bank, the RTC issued a Summary Judgment in favor of China Bank. China
Bank filed a Motion to Take Custody of Attached Properties with Motion for Grant of Authority to
Sell to the Branch Sheriff with the RTC, praying that it be allowed to take custody of ACDCs
properties for the purpose of selling them in an auction.

ACDC filed its Opposition to the June 15, 2000 Motion arguing that there can be no sale of the
latter’s attached properties in the absence of a final and executory judgment against ACDC.
According to the CA, selling the attached properties prior to final judgment of the appealed
case is premature and contrary to the intent and purpose of preliminary attachment for the
following reasons: first, the records reveal that the attached properties subject of the motion
are not perishable in nature; and second, while the sale of the attached properties may serve
the interest of China Bank, it will not be so for ACDC. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not review for certiorari is the right action to be filed by petitioner under rule
45?

RULING:

No. The court said that, considering that the assailed CA Resolutions are interlocutory in nature
as they do not dispose of the case completely but leave something to be done upon the
merits, the proper remedy should have been by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as
provided for in Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC,[20] which provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

XXX
(b) An interlocutory order;

The court said that, in any of the foregoing instances, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65, and the present petition for review
on certiorari should have been dismissed outright. However, in many instances, the Court has
treated a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, such as in cases where the subject of the recourse was one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The present petition does not involve any issue on
jurisdiction, neither does it show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to sell the attached property.

The court further ruled that, an attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before
entry of judgment whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon
hearing with notice to both parties, that the attached property is perishable or that the interests of all the
parties to the action will be subserved by the sale of the attached property, in which the petitioner failed
to prove. The petition was denied and the assailed decision of the CA was affirmed.
22. G.R. No. 76028, APRIL 6, 1990

SPOUSES JOSE R. LANSANG, JR. and ELSIE D. LANSANG and ROBERTO CO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL L. GUMBAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch XXIII, RENATO SALANGSANG and
INTERWORLD ASSURANCE CORP., represented by EVANGELINE B. BACONGCO respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Renato Salangsang filed an action for damages arising from a vehicular
accident against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato. In his answer,
petitioner filed a third party complaint against private respondent Insurance Corporation. The
pre-trial was held but no settlement was reached. Trial commenced and private respondent
Salansang presented his evidence.

On September 12, 1984, the court issued an order resetting the hearing of the case to
November 8, 1984. At said date of hearing neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. The
case was deemed submitted for resolution on same day. Petitioners explained to the trial court
the reasons for their absence at the November 8 hearing to be (a) their counsel, Atty. Rufino
Bañas who was then a member of parliament failed to appear at the hearing due to
pressing and urgent work at the Batasang Pambansa; and (b) petitioner Jose Lansang, Jr.
was in Manila and since his mother died in September, 1984, he was still in Manila when the
order of September 12 was issued setting the case for hearing on November 8. Petitioner
Roberto Co was out of town since 1983.

On January 25, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to set aside order or
decision dated December 8, 1984 and to allow them to present evidence reiterating the
foregoing reasons, and a supplement dated February 6, 1985 alleging that the damages
awarded are excessive and unwarranted, so that if they are given the chance to present
evidence, they can show that private respondent did not suffer such damage in his business.

The motion was denied and the petitioners filed their notice of appeal/certiorari. The trial court
approved the appeal and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court. The appellate court denied due course to and dismissed the petition.
Thereafter, petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary. The Court of Appeal rendered a decision denying due course
to and dismissing the petition. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was
denied. Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal taken by the petitioners from the decision of the trial court
deemed abandoned when they filed a petition for certiorari? And, was the appeal inconsistent
with the remedy of certiorari?
RULING:

No. The court said that, after a judgment had been rendered and an appeal therefrom had been
perfected, a petition for certiorari relating to certain incidents therein may prosper where the
appeal does not appear to be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, appeal
and certiorari are not remedies that exclude each other. The availability of the ordinary course
of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari.

In this case, after judgment was rendered, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
is in effect a motion for the trial. The circumstances of the case justify the grant to petitioners
of another day in court. The petition is granted.
23. G.R. No. L-25771 March 29, 1982

URBANO JACA and BONIFACIO JACA, petitioners,

vs.
DAVAO LUMBER COMPANY and HONORABLE MANASES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, respondents.

FACTS:

Urbano Jaca is a licensee of a logging concession located in Davao City, together with him is
Bonifacio Jaca engaged in the logging business of producing timber and logs for export and/or
domestic purposes. Davao Lumber Company is a business corporation with which plaintiffs had
business dealings covering the sale and/or exportation of their logs.

Sometime in 1954, herein parties-litigants, Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca (plaintiff) and Davao
Lumber Company (defendant) entered into an agreement whereby plaintiffs may secure, by
way of advances, either cash or materials, foodstuffs, and/or equipment from the defendant
corporation; that the payment of such account was to be made either in cash and/or by
plaintiff's turning over all the logs that they produce in the aforesaid concession to the
defendant, and in the latter case, the current prices, either export or domestic, of the logs at
the time of their delivery was to be considered; that while the aforesaid business relationship
between the parties was subsisting, defendant made plaintiff Urbano Jaca execute in its favor a
chattel mortgage, a copy of which instrument. however, plaintiffs were never furnished but
that as far as they can recollect the primary conditions of such chattel mortgage were that
plaintiffs would turn over to defendant corporation all the logs they may produce from the
aforesaid concession the same to be priced either as export or domestic and their value to be
applied by defendant to, and be credited for, the account of plaintiff's indebtedness, and
further that in case of need, plaintiffs may secure, by way of advances, either cash, foodstuffs,
materials or equipment's, under an "open credit account"; that under the aforementioned
"open credit account" relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant, orders were secured
by plaintiffs, by way of advances, from the defendant, this to be paid by them with plaintiffs'
production from their concession, liquidating those old accounts and keeping all accounts
current.

Plaintiffs made repeated demands on defendant for a formal accounting of their business
relationship from 1954 to August 1963 but Defendant Company failed and refused. Much to
their surprise, plaintiffs received letters of demand from defendant to pay their accounts which
was according to defendant long overdue.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for Accounting, Return of Price Differentials and Damages against
Davao Lumber. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the company. Plaintiffs
appealed. Pending such appeal, Davao Lumber filed a motion for execution pending appeal
which the lower court granted. One of the grounds stated in the order of execution pending
appeal for allowing such execution was plaintiff’s refusal to deliver the mortgaged chattels.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, having availed of the remedy of appeal are barred form
filling a petition for certiorari?

RULING:

No. The Court said that, although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the
special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The
availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that
must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It will not immediately relieve
petitioners from the injurious effect of the order granting execution. The slow and inexpensive
remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent judge from executing his decision requiring
petitioners to pay the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to dismiss the petition on the
ground that petitioner has already availed of the remedy of appeal will only aggravate the
patent injustice already inflicted on petitioners. The reasons stated in the order granting
execution pending appeal are not sufficient.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the orders granting execution pending appeal
and the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution pending
appeal are nullified and set aside.
24. G.R. No. 88396 July 4, 1990

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, and POLYSTYRENE MANUFACTURING CO.,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:

A petition for preliminary injunction was filed before the public respondent to enjoin the
petitioner MERALCO from disconnecting electrical service to the private respondent
Polystyrene Manufacturing Co., Inc. The public respondent Judge issued a Temporary
Restraining Order, commanding the defendant Meralco to maintain the status quo and not to
disconnect electric service to Polystyrene at the same time, setting the hearing on the prayer
for preliminary injunction. At the hearing on February 23, 1988 on the prayer for the writ of
preliminary injunction, respondent Polystyrene presented evidence in support of its prayer.
Petitioner MERALCO'S counsel appeared and manifested that he would not be presenting any
documentary evidence and instead requested that he be given until February 29, 1988 within
which to file his written opposition to the petition. This was granted by the respondent Judge.

Petitioner MERALCO filed its Answer with affirmative defenses and counter-claims. The
respondent Judge issued an Order setting the pre-trial conference for April 28, 1988 at 8:30
a.m. with notice to both parties' counsels for the pre-trial, petitioner MERALCO's counsel failed
to appear. Upon verbal motion of Polystyrene MERALCO was declared as in default and
Polystyrene was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte on April 29, 1988 before a
commissioner. The court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.

MERALCO filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Lift Order of Default and to Vacate Judgment
by Default but was denied. A new counsel for MERALCO filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment praying that the Decision dated April 29, 1988 be set aside and a new trial he held on
the merits which was also dismissed, and considering that the decision had become final and
executory, issued a writ of execution.

A notice of appeal was filed by the petitioner to the CA. And as earlier stated, respondent court
dismissed the said petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the petition
for certiorari filed with it was not the proper remedy to assail the questioned orders and
judgment by default rendered by the respondent judge?

RULING:
No. The court said that, while the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of in the
alternative situation where an appeal would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, this is on the theoretical assumption that the right to appeal is still available in the
case. If, however, the remedy by appeal had already been lost and the loss was occasioned by
petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies, certiorari cannot lie as a substitute
or a tool to shield the petitioner from the adverse consequences of such neglect or error. The
two remedies are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident that petitioner had
ample opportunities to appeal the default judgment rendered against it by the court a quo, to
wit, after the default judgment itself was rendered and, later, after its motion to lift the order
of default and to vacate the default judgment was denied by the trial court. It nevertheless
deliberately allowed the period for appeal to pass without interposing one. Worse, despite the
then availability of the remaining period for appeal from the denial of its motion to lift the
order of default and to vacate the default judgment, it opted to wait and subsequently file a
petition for relief from the judgment 5 which by then was final and executory, with the added
misfortune that said petition could not claim any procedural validity both technically and on the
merits.

Considering the circumstances of the case, the court finds no reversible error in the dismissal by
respondent court of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari. The petition was denied and
the decision appealed from was affirmed.
25. SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990

Facts:

On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in
Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows:

Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )

Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m

On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register
of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described;

Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral
Beach Development Corporation I

On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil
Case No. 4062.

Issue:

Whether or not the lands are alienable properties of the State.

Held:

No. The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by
remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved. Generally,
the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient administration of justice is
ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. They must lead to the proper and just determination of litigation,
without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities.
 Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
26. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICIY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS, INC. (NASECORE),
represented by PETRONILO ILAGAN; FEDERATION OF VILLAGE ASSOCIATIONS (FOVA),
represented by SIEFRIEDO VELOSO; and FEDERATION OF LAS PIÑAS VILLAGE (FOLVA),
represented by BONIFACIO DAZO
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (MERALCO)

G.R. No. 190795 July 6, 2011

Facts:

The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), created under the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA), used to apply the Return on Rate Base (RORB) method to
determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the services it provides.
The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity charges in the
Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43(f) of the EPIRA allows the ERC
to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of internationally accepted rate-
setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions. The ERC, through a series of resolutions,
adopted the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to set the allowable rates DUs may
charge their customers. Meralco, a DU, applied for an increase of its distribution rate under the
PBR scheme docketed as ERC Case No. 2009-057 RC (MAP case) on 7 August 2009. Petitioners
NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA, and Engineer Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions
for Intervention to oppose the application of Meralco.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process of law was violated when the ERC
issued its Order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their
comment.

Held:

No. There has been no denial of due process, at most only an Irregularity in the
Precipitate Issuance of the Assailed Decision, which Irregularity ERC has Sought to Remedy.
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted,
there is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the issuance of the
assailed Decision, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to
present all their pleadings and evidence in the MAP case. Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear
in most of those hearings. Although it is true that the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its
Decision, its subsequent act of ordering petitioners to file their comments on Mallillin’s MR
cured this defect. Any defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by
the filing of a MR. Thus, denial of due process cannot be invoked by a party who has
had the opportunity to be heard on his MR.
 Petitioners have chosen the wrong remedy and the wrong forum; the real motive for
bringing petition was to obtain an indefinite TRO, this the court cannot countenance

Section 1, Rule 23 of the ERC’S Rules of Procedure expressly provides for the
remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration, viz:

A party adversely affected by a final order, resolution, or decision of the Commission

rendered in an adjudicative proceeding may, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, file a motion for reconsideration. In its motion, the movant may also request for
reopening of the proceeding for the purpose of taking additional evidence in accordance with
Section 17 of Rule 18. No more than one motion for reconsideration by each party shall be
entertained.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a petition for certiorari may be filed
when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law". The "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed decision. Thus, it is a well-settled rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari. The purpose of this rule is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.
However, this requirement is not an ironclad rule. The prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with if petitioners are able to show a concrete, compelling,
and valid reason for doing so. The Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and take
cognizance of the petition if it raises an issue of paramount importance and constitutional
significance.
27. CARLITO L. MONTES
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Sixth Division, Office of the Ombudsman, Department of Science and
Technology

G.R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006

Facts:

In this Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Carlito L. Montes (Montes) seeks to prohibit
the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) from
implementing the suspension order dated 28 June 2000. The suspension order was issued in
relation to the Decision dated 17 January 2000 and Order dated 2 March 2000, both of the
Office of the Ombudsman, in "Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla v. Carlito L.
Montes," docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0556.
OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 is the administrative complaint filed by complainants therein
Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes, Chief of the Legal
Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that on 15 July 1999, while Montes was in the process of
adducing evidence against Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for misconduct
he had filed against them before the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private conversation he had had with the
DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation at the DOST Secretary’s
Office without the DOST Secretary’s knowledge and consent a few days after 28
November 1993. Montes publicly played the illegal tape recording during the hearing and
subsequently marked it as Exhibit "VV.

Issue:

Whether Montes is entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST
Secretary from enforcing the suspension order.

Held:

No. For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following
requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower
court or agency.
 When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order on 28 June 2000, Montes’ motion
for reconsideration was still pending before the appellate court. Montes thus had the
remedy of filing a petition for prohibition before the appellate court as an incident of the
petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration he had previously filed therewith. Had
Montes brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would,
have been consolidated with his petition for certiorari, thereby bringing under the competence
of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Evidently too, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, which we enjoin
litigants and lawyers to strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition
should be dismissed. The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing
more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of
purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli.
28. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
v.
DEFENSOR

G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006

Facts:

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the
creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On
March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a
parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national
government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the440 hectares of the reserved site from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize
the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s
socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.
(Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented
by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity
and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,otherwise known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.

Issue:

Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for
being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.

Held:

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-

judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations, which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on
the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in
the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
29. Galicito vs. Aquino
February 28, 2012

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of
the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and
other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on its findings,
officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves
unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as well as other
irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards
of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued
EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles
and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs
and GFIs.

EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs
from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and
from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their
employees.

The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition's
dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this case.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known
as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the
President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy?

HELD:

No, under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial,
quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
30. Ermita vs Aldecoa-Delorino
June 7, 2011
FACTS:

Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused her discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and granting the writ of preliminary injunction as
the exercise of the quasi-legislative functions of the President cannot be enjoined. He avers that
writs of prohibition lie only against those persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
By granting injunctive relief, petitioner contends that public respondent effectively preempted
the trial of and pre-judged the case, given that what private respondent seeks is to stop the
implementation of E.O. 486. Further, petitioner contends that the grant of injunctive relief was
not supported by fact and law, for what APMP sought to be protected was "future economic
benefits" which may be affected by the implementation of the E.O. – benefits which its
members have no right to since protective tariff rates are government privileges wherein no
one can claim any vested right to.
Private respondent prays in its Comment for the denial of the present petition, alleging that,
among other things, the petition is premature as petitioner failed to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Omnibus Order of public respondent, and maintaining the
propriety of the remedy of prohibition which it filed to assail the E.O.

ISSUE:
Whether public respondent erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition and not granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition?

RULING:

No. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it
by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
"respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
Thus, even if the petition was denominated as one for prohibition, public respondent did not
err in treating it also as one for certiorari and taking cognizance of the controversy.
31. Enriquez vs. Macadaeg
September 30, 1949

FACTS:

The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in
Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at
an execution sale but that, notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner
of said property, subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and refused
to surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter brought suit (Meliton Yburan
vs. Marcelo Enriquez and The Philippine National Bank, civil case No. R-552 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu) to have himself declared owner of said property and placed in possession
thereof. Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of
real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mandamus is the proper remedy?
HELD:

No, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion,
mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a
tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in
defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained
in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is
available in the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory
nature, is not appealable.
32. Disterlleria Limtuaco vs. Advertising Board of the Philippines
November 28, 2008

Facts:

AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, NON-profit corporation composed of several national

organizations in the advertising industry.
Destileria applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement
entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)."
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement.
After AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public, it recalled the clearance previously
issued.
Petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as
property right.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of prohibition under Rule 65 is proper?

Ruling:

No. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such
recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b)the
tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicialfunction is a
term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies,
which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.
Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are
not the acts of a tribunal, board officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private
organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were
vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case.
33
Pimentel vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties
of department secretaries.
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur Yap (Agriculture),
Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino
Cruz Jr (National Defense), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph Durano (Tourim) and Michael
Defensor (Environment and Natural Resources) on August 23, 2004 except Yap on August 15,
2004. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties. The Congress commenced regular
session on July 26, 2004 and Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo Lacson, Alfredo Lim, Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena
III filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents. The Senators contended that
pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary shall be designated as acting
secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while Congress is in session there can
be no appointments without first obtaining consent from Commission on Appointments. When
Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
the same respondents.

Issues:
Whether or not the President may appoint in acting secretaries without the consent of
the Commission on Elections while Congress is in session.

Held:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the appointment of Gloria
Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of the Congress, the
petition has become moot. However, as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-

gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
 The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
34
Funa vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 184740
February 11, 2010

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare
as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria
Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation,
which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. During the
pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. Petitioner argues that
Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not
present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be
resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective
February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and
academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent
with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.

Held:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in
government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with
standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
But even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar
its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be
a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another
office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated
OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
35
Tolentino vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the

Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill
the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on
May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.
The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6
years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend
that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA
6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet
the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of
these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14
May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's
standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that
COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because
of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the petition is moot.

Held:
1. A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows that what
petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in
which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration
that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May
2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special
election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these
Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor
their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements
pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not
seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners
prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely
incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
2. COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and
its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render
the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and
academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or
board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently,
the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, we took cognizance of a petition to set
aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had
already taken place. Since the question of the validity of the order sought to be
annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided
before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar to its
resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the
validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs
failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to
arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the
date of the election.
36
Tan vs. Comelec
GR No. 73155
July 11, 1986

Facts:
Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of Negros del
Norte), petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court
a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelec from conducting the plebiscite
which, pursuant to and in implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our
Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and estimated annual income. Petitioners
also contend that a number of voters were excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to
the inhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of
the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental. Comelec contends that the law is not
unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the
requisites of the LGC have been complied with. They submit that the case has now become
moot and academic with the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734
were in favor of the creation of the new province while only 30,400 were against it.

Issue:
Whether or not a writ of Prohibition can be issued, directed to Respondent Commission
on Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986.

Held:
The Court find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be
dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by
petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in
enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial
inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to
say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot
properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or
differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.
885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt
scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct
of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the
decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and
void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not,
however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the Court find no legal
basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885
and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the
creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not
exist.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the
Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism
displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence
of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our
Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the
hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a
worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there
would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.

Wherefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The

proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and void.
 37.Uy kiao eng v. nixon lee gr no 176831 1-15-2010

FACTS:

Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng,
herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic
will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate
and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the
presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending
that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The
RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this
latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent
sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment
of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn
of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent?

RULING:

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the

name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of
duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when
the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
 The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything
to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule,
mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer,
board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that
such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public
or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that
he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however,
does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
 38.Go v. ca gr no 120040 1-29-1996

FACTS:

To secure a loan of P93,200.00 with 14% interest p/a, petitioners on June 15, 1978,
constituted a real estate mortgage over their house and lot covered by TCT No. 30532 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City in favor of herein private respondent Manuela Realty
Development Corporation (Manuela). For alleged petitioners failure to heed Manuelas
repeated demands for payment of the loan, Manuela moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the subject properties pursuant to a provision in the deed of mortgage. The ex-officio sheriff of
Makati City conducted a public auction sale on September 9, 1989, where Manuela submitted
the lone and winning bid of P251,15 1.74, petitioners alleged outstanding debt at the time.
After the expiration of the redemption period, Manuela filed its affidavit of consolidation of
ownership before the Register of Deeds. Thus, ownership of the mortgaged properties was
consolidated in Manuela and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. T-1884) was thereafter
issued in its name.

Petitioners filed on August 21, 1989, and later amended on November 20, 1989, a
complaint for recovery of ownership of the subject properties against Manuela before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-4839. They
alleged payment of five hundred dollars ($500) to Manuela sometime in 1982 by money
transfer order through Security Pacific National Bank, and payment of the entire loan as all their
installment payments, if added, will amount to P95, 946.67 which sum is more than their
contracted loan. Petitioners also raised as an issue the alleged invalidity of the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the subject properties and usury on the ground that the stipulated 14% interest
p/a exceeds the 12% applicable interest ceiling. In its answer, Manuela countered that
petitioners failed to pay their obligation and, in fact, argued that it was their continued default
thereof which caused their outstanding debt to increase. Manuela maintained that the extra-
judicial foreclosure sale in question was valid and the 14% stipulated interest was not usurious.
Petitioners subsequently moved for summary judgment attaching their joint affidavit which
Manuela opposed, albeit without attaching its own counter-affidavit. The trial court found that
there are genuine issues of facts that need to be fully ventilated, thus the motion was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case before public respondent Court of Appeals2 by way of mandamus
to compel the trial court to render summary judgment, but to no avail. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, the instant petition posing the above query.

ISSUE:

May respondent court be compelled by mandamus to grant the motion for summary
judgment when there is no genuine issue as to a material fact raised in the opposition thereto?

RULING:
 The petition lacks merit. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. The propriety of
rendering summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court rests on the sound exercise
of the Courts discretion. Petitioners failed to establish a mandatory and ministerial duty on the
part of the trial court to render summary judgment. Likewise, they failed to show a clear legal
right to the relief sought. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial
dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. Litigants, like the herein petitioners, may not be
permitted to impose upon the court their notions of how cases should be resolved. Neither may
they be allowed to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion by the court in a particular way.
The court has to decide a question or issue according to its own judgment or understanding of
the law, as well as the laws applicability to the attendant facts and circumstances.
 39.Cudia v. the superintendent of the pma gr no 211362 02-24-2015

FACTS:

Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia who was supposed to be the salutatorian of his batch,
receive the Philippines Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy. Cadel 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of
the PMA, the country’s premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in
Baguio City. He belonged to the “A” Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation
on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as
the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets
1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members. Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending
that the case be formalized.

ISSUE:

Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted by the

CHR is of such great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may honor, uphold, and
respect.

RULING:

No. Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense
Act"). Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has
the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to
the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not
empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the
cadet’s dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the
HC’s finding of guilt in terminating his military service.

Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as
amended by E.O. No. 1005), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the
Honor System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture.
 Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning." As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP
in accordance with Section 30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9,
Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic
freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
 40.De castro v. jbc gr no. 191002 03-17-2010

FACTS:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor,
an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that
they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to
be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President
its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the
shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch
62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by
the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING:
 Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is
one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct
the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff
has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform
the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance
of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
 41.Bf homes inc. V. nation water resources council gr no 78529 9-17-1987

FACTS:

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. is a subdivision owner and developer in Paranaque, Metro

Manila. In 1973, BF Homes, Inc. filed a petition for a certificate of public convenience and for
authority to charge water rates before the then Board of Power and Waterworks (See records
of Civil Case No. 6307, RTC, Makati, Branch 143). In 1977, the Board of Power and Waterworks
was abolished and its powers and functions relative to waterworks were transferred to the
National Water Resources Council (NWRC) (Sec. 11 [e], PD No. 1206).

On October 24, 1983, NWRC in its Resolution No. 22-A, series of 1983, granted a
Certificate of Public Convenience to respondent BF Homes, Inc., for the operation and
maintenance of waterworks system at the BF Homes Subdivision in Paranaque, Metro Manila.
In the same resolution, NWRC approved the Compromise Agreement dated May 24, 1983
entered into between BF Homes, Inc. and BF Paranaque Homeowners Association, Inc., in
NWRC Case No. 78-037, embodying the water rates chargeable to customers.

On November 21, 1983 and December 16, 1983, NWRC issued two other orders
increasing the water rates in view of the increase in the costs of electricity.

ISSUE:

The core issue for resolution is: which Court has jurisdiction over actions to annul
Orders, Resolutions and/or Decisions of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) relative
to water rates — the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals?

RULING:

The re-examination sought is impressed with merit.

The National Water Resources Council (NWRC) was created by P.D. No. 424 on March
28, 1974 and was vested with the general power to coordinate and integrate water resources
development, and among others, to formulate and promulgate rules and regulations for the
exploitation and optimum utilization of water resources, including the imposition on water
appropriators of such fees or charges as may be deemed necessary by the Council for water
resources development.

P.D. No. 1067, which enacted the Water Code of the Philippines, Identified the NWRC as
the administrative agency for the enforcement of its provisions and was "authorized to impose
and collect reasonable fees or charges for water resources development from water
appropriators" (Art. 83).
Plainly, the NWRC is ranked with "inferior courts," which, under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines promulgated by this Court on January 11, 1983, are listed as the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Explicit as well is the proviso
that NWRC decisions on water rights controversies are appealable to the Court of First Instance.
In the light of those specific provisions, we find no room for the pronouncement of the
Appellate Court in the "SP 02778 Decision" that the NWRC is at par with the Regional Trial
Court.
42. M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc., represented by Cesar Calimlim and Laila Balois, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable Ombudsman, Jesus P. Cammayo, Arturo Santos, Manuel Factora, Teodoro
Barrozo, Manuel Roy, Ronald Manalili and John Ulassus, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155307 June 6, 2011

The facts of the case:

In 1999, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a contract for the
construction of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) Building (Phase I)
with Royson and Co., Inc. (Royson). The contract was approved by DPWH Secretary and
construction ensued.

An excavation of sixty meters deep was made on the area. Thinking that its property adjacent
to the project site was under threat of erosion, petitioner sent letters addressed to Royson
asking that Royson hasten the construction of a retaining wall. Construction of a provisional
slope protection measure was then started. Unfortunately, unusually heavy rains triggered the
collapse of a portion of the slope protection, resulting in a landslide. Petitioner alleged that the
landslide caused cracks in the house owned by. Thus, petitioner complained against the project
before the Regional Director of the DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region (DPWH-CAR) and
the Office of the City Mayor.

The DPWH-CAR engineers submitted a Memorandum stating, that the affected part of the lot
claimed by the complainant is actually part of the BGH property.

Royson subsequently proceeded to build reinforced concrete slope protection, a grouted

riprap, and a retaining wall for the compound. However, when these were already substantially
completed, the retaining wall of the BGHMC Project collapsed.

Asserting that its property was damaged as a result, petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against all respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that his
property has now become virtually useless and danger-prone and can no longer be used
profitably as the surrounding land has been eroded due to respondents’ gross negligence,
incompetence and/or malicious conduct because they failed to construct a perimeter fence
in the excavations despite the fact that petitioner had written Royson about the possibility of
an erosion. Petitioner charged all the respondents of causing undue injury to it in the discharge
of their official and administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
inexcusable negligence.

In its resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint after finding no probable cause to
hold any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Ombudsman found no evidence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence on the part of the respondents in the construction of the BGHMC Building. Further,
it noted that the damage was not within petitioner’s property but on a portion of BGHMC’s
property which petitioner merely encroached. The Ombudsman also denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition contending
that the Ombudsman acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed resolution and order.

Issue:
1. Whether or not, petition for mandamus may issue directing the Ombudsman to file
information against the respondents.

2. Whether or not, the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against all the respondents.

The Ruling of the Court:

The Court dismissed the petition. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is
unavailing to petitioner, for mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial,
not a discretionary duty. In the performance of an official duty involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the
other, except where there is grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority.

The determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with the
sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person,
any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has the
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances,
should be filed or not.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to

believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The Supreme
Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The Court
refrains from interfering except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the
Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause may only be assailed through certiorari
proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must
be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Here, however, an examination of the records, as well as the assailed resolution and order of
the Ombudsman dismissing the case against all the respondents for insufficiency of evidence,
shows that the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

The Ombudsman noted that petitioner failed to point out specific evidence and concrete proof
that respondents demonstrated manifest partiality or evident bad faith in the construction of
the BGHMC and its retaining wall. Petitioner has not shown that respondents were impelled by
such motives in the performance of their official duties and functions. Neither did petitioner
establish that respondents acted with gross inexcusable negligence. The findings of the
Ombudsman are based on substantial evidence. As long as substantial evidence supports it, the
Ombudsman’s ruling will not be overturned.
43. Pablo Burguete, petitioner,
vs.
Jovencio Q. Mayor, as Provincial Governor of Romblon, and Esteban B. Montesa, as Acting
Municipal Mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, respondents.
G.R. No. L-6538 May 10, 1954

The Facts of the Case:

The petitioner, Pablo Burguete (Burguete), is the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of
Romblon; the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor (Mayor), is the provincial governor of Romblon;
and Esteban B. Montesa (Montesa), the acting municipal mayor of Badajoz.

On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the
justice of the peace court of Badajoz. The case was then forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Romblon.

On November 13, 1952, Mayor suspended the petitioner as mayor on the ground that a
criminal case against him was pending, and that it was the standing policy of the Administration
to place under suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action involving moral
turpitude is pending adjudication before the competent court. He also directed Montesa to act
as mayor. Burguete now filed to the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto
against Mayor and Montesa.

The case for serious slander against Burguete is still, pending in the Court of First Instance. He
has filed a motion to quash but was denied andthe case could not be tried on the merits due to
the non-appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution. No administrative investigation by
the provincial board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not, mere filing of information for libel against a municipal officer is sufficient
ground for dispensing him from office.

The Court’s Ruling

The questions raised are not new. In the case of Lacson vs. Roque, the Court held that the mere
filing of information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing
him. The same may be said with regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel
does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file
a criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending
him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely, according to the time that would elapse
before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal.
The Court ruled that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified. Hence, it ordered
respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is ordered to reinstate Pablo Burguete in his office as municipal
mayor of Badajo and to oust the respondent Esteban B. Montesa.
44. Uy Kiao Eng, Petitioner,
vs.
Nixon Lee, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010

The facts of the case:

Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of
petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, a petition for mandamus with
damages to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the
allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother
to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner posited that the same be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action and for lack of cause of action. Petitioner denied that she was in custody
of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will and they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.

The RTC granted the demurrer upon reconsideration. Aggrieved, respondent sought review
from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the
writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and
sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his
deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval
or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.

On motion for reconsideration, the CA granted the motion and issued the writ and ordering the
production of the will and denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner brought the matter
before the Supreme Court, contending that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy.

Issue:
Whether or not, the petition for of a writ of mandamus is the proper by the respondent for the
production of the subject will.

The Court’s Ruling:

The Court did not sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
The Court ruled that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent because
there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is noted
that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting
probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not
as provided in Rule 76, Section 1. An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections
2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. There being a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause
of action in his petition.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, directed to

some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station
of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes
the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for
the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ
is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution. Mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.

As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the
court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On
the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required.

Further, mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, it will not lie
to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some
obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate
to enforce a private right against an individual.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. The grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.
45. SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION vs. NESTOR M. CANDA, et. al.
G.R. No. 160932 January 14, 2013

FACTS:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in
Loboc, Bohol. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, seeking to be exempt from the
requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). However, upon evaluating the
nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, Canda, then Chief of EMB in
Bohol, found that the project is located within a critical area, hence, Initial Environmental
Examination is required, and that the project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof
of social acceptability should be established.
Petitioner then appealed Canda’s findings to EMB Regional Director Lipayon, claiming that
it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay
waterworks project of the DPWH that had recently been issued a CNC. Lipayon thereafter
required the petitioner to submit several documents to enable the EMB to determine whether
the project was within an environmentally critical area or not, and a CNC will only issue upon
compliance thereof. Petitioner submitted such certifications required but the certification from
PHIVOLCS did not state whether the project area was within a critical slope. Instead, the
certification stated that the project site was approximately 18 km west of the East Bohol Fault.
Due to this, Lipayon declared that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and
that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the RTC alleging that it was now
entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the certification requirements;
and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the
same area. However, the RTC dismissed the petition stating, among others, that the
determination of whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that pertained to the
EMB; that the RTC would not interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB to review the
merits of the petitioner’s application for the CNC; and that there was already a pending
appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary. Hence, this appeal brought directly to the
Court via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.

HELD:
No. Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner as it failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand
the performance of the act by the respondents. The petitioner did not establish that the grant
of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. A
reading of the P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) shows that the grant or denial of
an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who
must determine whether the project or project area is classified as critical to the environment
based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in
extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party aggrieved, and where without its aid there
would be a failure of justice. It is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance
of a pre-existing duty. Mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty
to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal
right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act. This extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of
duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
46. MARIA NATIVIDAD VDA. DE TAN vs. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-12944 March 30, 1959

FACTS:
Petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, and a
bona fide member of the 1st Regiment, United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a
guerrilla organization duly recognized by the Army of the United States and forming part and
parcel of the Philippine Army. Tan Lian Lay died in the service and was duly recognized as a
guerrilla veteran and certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered
meritorious military services during the Japanese occupation. Petitioner then filed an
application for back pay under the provisions of R.A. No. 897, and a resolution and letter of the
Veterans Back Pay Commissions (VBPC). However, VBPC denied the request on the ground that
aliens are not entitled to back pay, despite its previous stands entitling alien members for back
pay. Upon said refusal, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel VBPC to
delare Tan Lian Lay as entitled to backpay rights, privileges and prerogatives under R.A. No.
304, as amended by R.A. No. 897.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering the VBPC to give due course
to the claim for backpay. VBPC then appealed contending, among others, that mandamus will
not lie to compel the exercise of a discretionary function.

ISSUE:
WON mandamus was the proper remedy

HELD:
Yes. VBPC's discretion is limited to the facts of the case, i.e., in merely evaluating the evidence
whether or not the claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United
States Army. Nowhere in the law is the respondent Commission given the power to adjudicate
or determine rights after such facts are established. Having been satisfied that deceased Tan
Chiat Bee was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, having served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a
guerrilla unit recognized by the United States army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to his widow's application.
47. JOVENTINO MADRIGAL vs. PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ, et. al.
G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990

FACTS:
Public respondents Gov. Lecaroz, Vice-Gov. Zoleta, Provincial Board of Marinduque members
Riego and Principe abolished petitioner Madrigal's possition as a permanent construction
capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for
fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the
poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential.
Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and in its 1st Indorsement, declared the
removal of Madrigal from the service illegal. Gov. Lecaroz moved for a reconsideration but the
Commission denied the same.
Then, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting implementation of the
resolution and consequently, reinstatement to his former posistion. But the Provincial Board
denied because the former posistion no longer exists. Instead, it ordered the appropriation of
the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries. So, Madrigal filed a petition before the CFI (now
RTC) against public respondents for mandamus and damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration
of his abolished position in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2)
reinstatement to such position; and (3) payment of his back salaries plus damages.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that Madrigal's cause of
action was barred by laches. Madrigal appealed.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus and damages on the ground
of laches

HELD:
No. The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from
the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. This provision is an expression of policy on
the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may not be unduly retarded; delays in
the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers may well be applicable to employees in the civil service.
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for
one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice
may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative
remedy. Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is
fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality
by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions
of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues
with finality. In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not
the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.
48. SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ vs. JOSE DIAZ and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 135885 April 28, 2000

FACTS:

Jose and Juan Diaz are brothers, and together with their sister, Marita, owned in common, as
co-heirs, a parcel of land, with improvements thereon, in the following proportions: Defendant
Juan J. Diaz — 6/8; Plaintiff Jose Diaz — 1/8; Marita D. Papa — 1/8. They then sold the
property to PHILAMGEN for P125,000.00. Thus, the corresponding amounts pertaining to each
co-owner from the sale were as follows: Juan J. Diaz — P90,000.00; Jose Diaz — 15,000.00;
Maria D. Papa — 15,000.00. Immediately after, Juan purchased a 1,000 sq.m. lot for
P140,00000, using as part of the purchase price Jose's P15,000.00 share of the sale of the first
property, and thereafter caused title thereto to be issued in his name, all with the knowledge
and without objection of Jose.

Jose then wrote to the spouses a letter demanding from them an amount of at least P2 million
as his share of the actual value of the second lot which can reasonably be placed at P30 million
but the spouses, however, refused to honor the demand.

Consequently, Jose filed an action for sum of money with the RTC. Then, upon motion by the
then plaintiff, the RTC declared the spouses in default for failure to file an answer on time.
Spouses sought for reconsideration of the order of default but was denied. On appeal, the CA
ruled that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy and ultimately dismissed
the petition. However, during pendency of appeal, proceedings in the RTC continued.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the CA erred in ruling that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy
(2) WON a special civil action for certiorari pending before the CA shall stay the proceddings
of the case in RTC

HELD:
(1) No. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of such extraordinary
remedy, the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. In this case, no such circumstances
attended the denial of the petition.

(2) No. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt
the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable
conclusion is that for so long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the
special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exist and there is nothing to prevent
the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court
nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction.
49. VITAL GOZON VS. CA (G.R. No. 129132)

FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the
various offices of the Ministry of Health. Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted from Chief
of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital to Medical Specialist II. De la Fuente filed a
protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. It was ignored so she brought this to Civil Service
Commission. Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that the demotion/transfer of
appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void. Such
resolution became final. De la Fuente then sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical
Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation of the
Commission's decision. Dr. Gozon did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters nor took take steps
to comply or otherwise advise compliance with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. De la Fuente instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of " mandamus
and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative
Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory
resolution. Vital-Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the
said resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly
Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be
complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On her motion for reconsideration,
Vital-Gozon argued that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages
in a mandamus action and referred this to the Office of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals
denied the motion and ruled that the Solicitor General has no authority to appear as counsel
for respondent Gozon.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against
a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the
defendant officer

HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and
specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages, " and finding none,
concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance
of claims for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to
claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at
all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral,
exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling
within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a
mere procedural one allowing the joining of an action of mandamus and another for damages,
is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an
act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of
damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly
not the case. It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or
civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was DENIED and the resolution
was affirmed.
50. ROMY’S FREIGHT SERVICE VS CA (GR 141637)

FACTS: Private respondents were relieved from work in Romy’s Freight Service. Aggrieved,
they filed a case for illegal dismissal. Executive labor arbiter Jesselito Latoja ruled that
petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents,
representing 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on
rest days and holidays, and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its decision, reversed and set aside the labor
arbiter’s ruling. It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and
dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively
dismissed by petitioner.

Petitioner faults the CA for reversing the decision of the NLRC. It asserts that the petition for
certiorari of private respondents should have been dismissed outright for failure to file a
motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the petition for certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been dismissed
outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the petition
for certiorari with the CA

HELD: As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule.
Private respondents’ petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.

The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private
respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue
raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was
proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for
reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
51. CERVANTES VS CA (GR 166755)

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage and custody of minor children
before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The trial court resolved to grant the
annulment of the marriage based on private respondents psychological incapacity, award to
petitioner the custody of the minor children, and order the liquidation of the conjugal
properties. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial and to Admit
Answer which the trial court granted in an order. In addition, private respondent was awarded
visitation rights over the minor children. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order which was
granted by the trial court. The trial court set aside the Order and affirmed the Resolution
granting the annulment of the marriage and directed the parties to submit an inventory of their
conjugal assets. The trial court ordered that the conjugal properties which include the conjugal
abode, certificate of stock and motor vehicle, should be sold and the proceeds thereof be
divided equally between the parties. Respondent filed a motion for execution of the
resolution, while petitioner prayed for its reconsideration. The trial court declared that the
resolution has become final. A writ of execution was accordingly issued.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
Resolution and the Writ of Execution.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that the Resolution of the trial court had
long become final and executory for failure of petitioner to file a timely motion for
reconsideration or appeal. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. However, in a Resolution the Third
Division of the Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: WON filing a motion for reconsideration before recourse to the special civil action of
certiorari would be futile because the trial court had already ordered the execution of the
judgment

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. (Emphasis supplied)

As held in Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga, the plain and adequate

remedy referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order
or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

An examination of the records, specifically the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals, reveals that petitioner not only failed to explain his failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the August 27, 2004 Order of the trial court; he also failed to show sufficient
justification for dispensing with the requirement. Neither did he show that the case falls under
any of the above exceptions. It was only in the motion for reconsideration of the November 22,
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and in the instant petition that he explained why he
dispensed with the filing of prior motion for reconsideration.

It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a

matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a
writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination
of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement
of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid
reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition.
52. REPUBLIC VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL (GR 192908)

FACTS: Two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the name
of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent): (1) to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of
a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressway Project (MCTEP). (2) to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039
square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent. Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an
amended complaint alleging that the subject land originated from a free patent title and should
be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant to Section 112 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. In 2005, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of an order of
expropriation and was granted in both two cases. The trial court denied St. Vincent’s motion
for reconsideration granting expropriation. The lower court, however, modified its Order
and required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to
one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriated. The
Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Seeking to avail the extra ordinary
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a
motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted
the motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition for certiorari. The Republic filed its
petition for certiorari for having been issued an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the
Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out
of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12- SC. The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation
pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in the case and in consideration of substantial justice. The CA rendered the
assailed resolution dismissing the Republic’s petition for certiorari on the ground that the
petition was filed out of time. The CA denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence,this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in denying the petition of certiorari for being filed out of time

HELD: YES. The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted
the Republic’s motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition
filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. The CA granted
extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules. The present petition
may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its
merits. What seems to be a “conflict” is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the
foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves
a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within
sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day
period subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Labao v. Flores subsequently laid down
some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule: The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of
parties to a speedy disposition of their case. However, there are recognized exceptions to their
strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the
time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of
the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the
judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional
circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be
extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases. Accordingly, the CA should
have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the
extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because
of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP);
and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.
53. LTS Philippines Corp. v. Maliwat, et. al.
G.R. No. 159024 January 14, 2005

FACTS:
Jocelyn Maliwat, Myra Estanislao, Rhodelia Bautista, and Ma. Theresa Rolle, received
separate notices of termination from their employer, LTS Philippines Corporation. In the said
notice, it was alleged that the sales and profitability of LTS Philippines had been completely
affected by the recent economic crisis and that it had decided to reduce its personnel. Maliwat
and others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and accrued monetary benefits
against LTS Philippines and Julie Evangelista. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
complainants and awarded to each of them vacation leave and sick leave conversion, 13 th
month pay and attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA’s
decision. Instead of awarding vacation leave and sick leave conversion, and 13 th month
pay, it awarded separation pay. LTS Philippines and Evangelista filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. They received the resolution denying the motion on January
16, 2003. However, they filed their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals only on
March 18, 2003. CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period (60 days from notice of resolution).
LTS Philippines and Evangelista filed a motion for reconsideration stating that an honest
mistake in their computation of the sixty-day period as provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court was caused by their counsel’s heavy workload. The motion was denied.
Hence, LTS Philippines and Evangelista filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting
that by dismissing their petition merely because it was filed one (1) day beyond the
reglementary period without taking into account the substantial issues raised therein, the CA
thereby perpetuated the reversible error in affirming the decision of the NLRC. They maintain
that the petition had been prepared for filing in the CA three days before March 18, 2003, but
because of the heavy workload of their counsel brought about by equally important and
pressing matters, said counsel inadvertently computed March 18, 2003 as the last date for filing
the petition, instead of March 17, 2003.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for certiorari should have been granted notwithstanding that it was
filed beyond the reglementary period

HELD:
NO. Petition denied. CA should not be faulted for dismissing the petition for certiorari
for having been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period. As a rule, periods prescribed
to do certain acts must be followed with fealty as they are designed primarily to speed up the
final disposition of the case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Deviations from the rules
cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices
of the parties. Parties who fail to file their pleading within the periods provided for by the Rules
of Court, through their counsel’s inexcusable neglect, resort to beseeching the Court to
bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof, thus, sacrificing
efficiency and order. The Court cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice and
bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.
The petitioners’ counsel was inexcusably negligent in failing to file their petition
within the period therefor. A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of
the period of time left to file pleadings, and to see to it that said pleadings are filed before the
lapse of the period. If he fails to do so, his client is bound by his conduct, negligence and
mistakes. If the failure of the petitioners counsel to cope with his heavy workload should be
considered a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be no end to
litigations so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced.
54. Desiderio De Los Reyes v. People
G.R. No. 138297 Janaury 27, 2006

FACTS:
Philippine Coconut Authority filed a case with the Municipal Trial Court against
Desiderio De Los Reyes and Myrna Villanueva, and several others, for violation of Republic Act
No. 8048, otherwise known as The Coconut Preservation Act of 1995. It was alleged that the
defendants cut down and processed more or less 440 coconut trees without the required
permit from Philippine Coconut Authority. De Los Reyes and Villanueva, instead of filing their
counter-affidavits, filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. MTC denied the motion on the
ground that in cases cognizable by the MTCs, an accused is not entitled to a preliminary
investigation. Thereafter, they filed a Motion to Quash the complaint on the ground that the
allegations do not constitute an offense. It was again denied by the MTC. Hence, they filed a
petition for certiorari with the RTC alleging that MTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied their Motion to Quash. RTC dismissed
the petition, petitioners later filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Then,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter affirmed the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order of the
RTC dismissing their petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON petition for certiorari is the proper remedy

HELD:
NO. Petition denied. What they should have done after the CA rendered its Decision
affirming the RTC Orders was to seasonably file with SC an appeal via a petition for review on
certiorari pursuant to Rule 45. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It was
reiterated that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Assuming arguendo that petition
for certiorari is proper, still it should be dismissed fo5r failure to observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Petitioners should have filed their petition for certiorari with CA, pursuant
to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Moreover, the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period. They
received a copy of the RTC Order denying their motion to dismiss on March 2, 1998. On April
21, 1998, they received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration. Under
Sec. 4, Rule 65, they had sixty (60) days from April 21, 1998 to file the petition, however, they
only filed it on May 6, 1999 or after one year.
It is a dictum that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not
certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on
the merits, an appeal therefrom is the next legal step.
55. Festo Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo
G.R. No. 192793 February 22, 2011
FACTS:
Festo Galang, Jr. was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010
Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. Subsequently,
Nicasio Ramos, also a mayoralty candidate, requested the COMELEC to conduct a manual
reconciliation of the votes cast. The Municipality Board of Canvassers made erasures and
corrections on the Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation. The total number of votes remained
the same, only the date was erased and changed to correspond with the date of the manual
reconciliation. Ramos filed an election protest against Galang before the RTC. On May 27, 2010,
the court sheriff served summons with a copy of the petition by leaving the same with a certain
Gerry Rojas, who was at Galang’s residence. Galang appeared in court and requested a
copy of summons with copy of election protest. The judge, Geronimo, directed him to file a
proper pleading, and on June 11, 2010, Galang filed a Motion to Admit Answer, to which was
attached his Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim. RTC, finding the service of
Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11,
2010, as filed out of time. Galang filed an Omnibus Motion but it was denied. Hence, he filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, alleging that Geronimo acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's Service of Summons on May 28, 2010 on a
person not residing in petitioner's residence.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for certiorari was properly filed with SC

HELD:
NO. Petition dismissed. The petition for certiorari should have been filed with the
COMELEC. Sec. 4, Rule 65 provides that in election cases involving an act or an omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari
questioning an interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case is
considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The Court held in J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial
tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals,where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error,
the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
 Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal Officials provides that COMELEC has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective
municipal officials, hence it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
56.Republic v. CFI of Lanao Del Norte
G.R. No. L-33949 October 28, 1973

FACTS:

This decision resolves the issue to the three consolidated cases. In the first case, the
Republic of the Philippines and the Board of Investments filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with preliminary injunction against the order of CFI of Lanao Del Norte denying
their motion to dismiss the complaint against them notwithstanding their having invoked
therein the grounds of improper venue and non-subality of the State. In this case, Iligan
Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. (IISMI) seeks specific performance by the Republic of certain
contracts it has with them and the Export Import Bank of Washington. In the second case, The
Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibiton, with preliminary
injunction against the order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by CFI of Lanao Del Norte
ordering the removal of IISMI from their watchlist of debtors of government financial
institutions and further enjoininig Central Bank to allow IISMI to import raw materials by
utilizing its own resources. In the third case, Development Bank of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order and writ of preliminary injunction issued
by CFI of Lanao Del Norte enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by DBP of various
mortgages in its favor or IISMI. The presiding judge of the CFI of Lanao Del Norte, Judge
Tandayag, was replaced during the proceedings.

ISSUE:
WON the replacement of the respondent judge in a petition for certiorari results to
termination of the petition

HELD:

NO. The Court terminated this proceedings, and ordered to resume the proceedings in
the action for specific performance filed by IISMI against the Republic and BOI. The termination
was to give way to the continuation of the action for specific performance. However, the
continuation of the proceedings was not because of the replacement of Judge Tandayag in the
lower court. It is the change of circumstances of the cases themselves rather than the
replacement that warrants the further proceedings. A judge who is sued, although names as
defendant or respondent in the pleadings, is no more than a nominal party therein. Under
Section 5 of Rule 65, he is not a real party in interest, whereas what Section 18 of Rule 3 refers
to is an officer whose official interest in the action is such that the suit cannot be maintained
against his successor. Special civil actions against judges do not have that character, for, in
essence, these remedies do not differ from ordinary appeals, which obviously are not dismissed
merely because the trial judge has died, resigned, retired or has been transferred or removed
from office. Indeed, to apply the rule to judges of inferior courts would make the determination
by the superior courts of the cases questioning their actuations largely dependent, not on the
correctness or incorrectness of the rulings of the judge concerned but on whether or not they
would continue in office, thereby throwing overboard the whole system of procedure designed
to insure that all courts and judges must act in accordance with law.
57. Montalban v. Canonoy
A.C. No. 179-J, March 15, 1971.

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against then Judge Mateo Canonoy of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, charging said respondent
With (1) favoritism and partiality, (2) ignorance of the law, (3) vindictiveness, and (4)
incompetence and dereliction of duty.
Notwithstanding that even on its face the complaint failed to state a clear and strong basis for
any disciplinary action, We opted to make the respondent answer, considering that
complainant is alleged to be the offended party in a case of adultery against his wife whom
respondent had acquitted and the Court felt that it was best to have more information about
the allegation of complainant that such acquittal was part of a series of acts of respondent
betraying bias, partiality, vindictiveness and ignorance of the law. When the respondent filed
his answer denying the charges and disclosing more details surrounding his questioned
actuations, We resolved to give complainant an opportunity to file a reply, which he did. After
going over the said pleadings and evaluating the allegations thereof,
Issue: WOW the CA sufficiently dispose of the accusation of the complainant.
Held: Yes. Regarding the filing by respondent in the Court of Appeals of his own answer in the
above-mentioned case, We consider satisfactory the explanation of respondent that while he
agrees that ordinarily, under Sec. 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is
challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the
proceeding, in this particular case, he had to file an answer in order to belie personal attacks of
ignorance of the law and of bias, prejudice, favoritism, vindictiveness and other base motives.
Indeed, when the actuations of a judge are assailed on grounds other than legal ones, and
imputing to the judge personal motives, the judge cannot be blamed if he takes personal
interest in trying to disprove the imputations. Neither can We find fault in his promptness in
filing said answer, since that is precisely to be encouraged in all litigations in order to speed up
the administration of justice.
58. Amargo v. CA
G.R. No. L-31762, September 19, 1973

Facts: This case originated in the City Court of Manila, Branch III, where private respondents
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner who, according to the complaint,
refused to pay the increased monthly rental of P180.00 (from P140.00) for the use and
occupation of private respondents' premises. Petitioner filed an answer. After trial the City
Court rendered judgment ordering petitioner to vacate the leased premises.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after a pre-trial conference,
set the case for hearing, on which date petitioner's counsel manifested the court that after
private respondents shall have presented their evidence, he would submit the case for decision;
whereupon, Presiding Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio dictated in open court, in the presence of both
parties' lawyers, the following Order, to wit:

Atty. Manuel Jimenez, Jr. for the defendant manifested to the Court that after the plaintiffs
have presented their evidence he will submit the case for judgment. The parties agreed that the
reception of the evidence be delegated to a Commissioner in the person of Atty. Romulo J.
Lapuz.

The court accordingly delegated the reception of private respondents' evidence to

Commissioner Lapuz. In said proceeding, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the witnesses for
private respondents, after which the latter submitted the case for decision. Petitioner's counsel
informed the commissioner that he would file a motion with the court for permission to
present evidence for the petitioner.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review, contending that the Order
dated June 20, 1969 of the Court of First Instance of Manila re-stating her counsel's
manifestation that he would submit the case decision after presentation of private
respondents' evidence to a commissioner, is not supported by stenographic notes, and that in
view of the absence of stenographic notes to support incident, "a strong indication exists to
show that the statements contained in the blank form were not really the manifestation made
by counsel during the hearing of said date."

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue: WON respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "the petition for review suffers
from the legal defect that the plaintiffs in the ejectment case were not joined as parties
respondents."
Held: No. As the parties in whose favor reliefs were granted by the court of First Instance of
Manila in its decision, there is no question that private respondents were indispensable parties.
They had such an interest in the controversy that a final decree could not proceed without their
presence. True it is that it was an order of the court which was being assailed in the petition for
review, but that circumstance did not dispense with the need for private respondents' inclusion
in the proceedings. This requirement is explicit from the express provision of section 5, Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court. In various cases We held that where the party interested in
sustaining the order complained of has not been included as a co-respondent in the proceeding
contrary to section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules, the petition for writ of certiorari is defective. And it
must have been with this realization that in the present petition for review by certiorari filed
with this Court, petitioner has now included the plaintiffs in the ejectment case as party
respondents.
60. Arvisu v. Vergara
G.R. No. L-3934, December 28, 1951

Facts: Sometimes in 1949 Matias E. Vergara, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of
L.H. Golucke, deceased brought an action in the Municipal Court of Rizal City against Maria C.
Arvisu to eject her from a house and lot belonging to said estate and the collection of unpaid
rents. Alleging that the property had already been adjudicated by a final court order in favor of
Golucke’s heirs, the defendant Maria C. Arvisu moved for the dismissal of the action; but the
municipal court denied the motion on the ground that no evidence had been presented to
sustain it. Forthwith, the said defendant petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a writ
of certiorari to reverse the order denying her motion, alleging that the said order constituted an
abuse of discretion. Having been required to answer the petition, the administrator filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that certiorari did not lie since petitioner had her remedy by
appeal.

Issue: WON the Court of First Instance erred in holding that her remedy was by appeal.

Held: It is not disputed that the municipal court of Rizal city had jurisdiction over the case which
it refused to dismiss, and while this refusal is alleged to constitute abuse of discretion no claim
is made that the abuse is grave. Unless the abuse of discretion is grave, certiorari will not lie to
correct an order denying a motion to dismiss. The contention that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and hence not appealable is without merit since Section 2 of
Rule 41, Rules of Court, does not prohibit an appeal but merely postpones it until after final
judgment is rendered in the case.

Under Section 8 of Rule 67, once the answer to the petition for certiorari is filed "the court may
order the proceedings complained of to be forthwith certified up for review and shall hear the
case." But it is not mandatory upon the court to order the elevation of the proceedings and to
hear the case. The court may deny the writ if from the answer it finds that the petition should
be dismissed in the interest of justice. (II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., p.
180.) In principle, dismissal would also be proper if before answer is filed, the attention of the
court is called to the fact that from its own allegations the petition appears to be without merit.
62. LAO SENG HIAN V. LOPEZ
GR No. L-1950 May 16,1949

FACTS:
An action for unlawful detainer was filed by Jose Ocampo against Lao Seng Hian for refusal to
leave the land and the house or barong-barong built therein. The municipal court ordered Lao
to pay P5,250 a month as damages suffered by Ocampo due to Lao’s refusal to leave.
An application for certiorari was filed by Lao before the Court of First Instance alleging that the
money claim involved in the unlawful detainer case removed Municipal Court’s jurisdiction
over the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court may be removed due to the amount of
money claim.

RULING:
No. The amount of P5,250 a month whose recovery is sought in the pleading is obviously
intended to represent reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.

The quantum of the money judgment demanded is immaterial to the court’s jurisdiction. Any
amount for rents or in the nature for rents is allowable in an action of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. This is so because rents or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises
is only incidental or accessory to the main action for the restitution of possession unlawfully
withheld.

Therefore, irrespective of money judgment, the municipal court still has jurisdiction over the
action of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
63. BUNYI V. FACTOR
GR No. 172547, June 30, 2009

FACTS:
Ruben Labao was married to petitioner Precy Bunyi. Ruben was allowed to stay at the rest
house of Fe Factor as an act of good will considering that he was sickly and had no means of
income. Fe Factor is one of the co-owners of a piece of land in Las Piñas City owned by her
grandparents. It was her father Enrique who constructed several houses including the
subject property and a rest house. The members of the Factor family continued to visit
such compound. Precy Bunyi and her mother Mila Bunyi were tenants in one of the
houses in the compound. When Ruben Labao died, Fe discovered that Precy and Mila forcibly
opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor
family and occupied the premises.

Factor filed a complaint for forcible entry against the Bunyi. On the other hand, Bunyi
questioned the claim of ownership of Fe over the property and the prior ownership of her
father Enrique. According to them, the property was owned by Ruben and that Precy with her
husband moved into the property.

The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Fe. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed
the decision of the MeTc and denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was force, threat, intimidation and stealth committed by the petitioners
in occupying the subject residential house as to render the respondents the physical possession
of the property.

RULING:
Yes. The Court find in favor of the respondent.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. Possession de facto is the physical possession of real
property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry
case. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party’s possession, provided, that he
has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the
respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation threat,
strategy or stealth. The Supreme Court, in Baes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, explained:

“In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not
have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that
is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.”

Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not stay in it.
So when petitioners entered said property without the consent and permission of the
respondent and the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession. Moreover, the
presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property
constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
64. DE PRIETO V. REYES
GR No. L-21470 June 23,1965

FACTS:
An action for illegal detainer was filed on April 7, 1952 by Consuelo de Prieto against Pacencia
Reyes in the Municipal Court on the ground that Reyes through stealth, strategy and
misrepresentation built a barong-barong on De Prieto’s lot. Reyes filed a motion to dismiss
assailing the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court as the case was not brought within one
year from unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession and alleged that she was a bona
fide occupant since December 3,1948 when she bought the house from Dominador Merced.
The Municipal Court ruled in favor of De Prieto and ordered Reyes to vacate and pay P5.00 a
month from February 8,1952. Reyes appealed to the Court of First Instance. The CFI found that
De Prieto learned the existence of the house in January of 1952 and in February of that year,
letters were sent asking Reyes to vacate but was not given attention. The CFI affirmed the
decision of the Municipal Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both trial courts lacked jurisdiction in entertaining the unlawful detainer suit as
the action was filed more than one year from the knowledge of Reyes’ encroachment.

RULING:
No, the contention is unmeritorious.

There is a natural difference between an entry secured by force or violence and one obtained
by stealth, as in the case before us. In the latter case, the owner or possessor of the land cannot
be expected to enforce his right to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter
before learning of the clandestine intrusion.

The possession or detainer becomes illegal only from the time that there is a demand to vacate.
The year for bringing the action for illegal detainer should be counted only from demand to
vacate.

In this case, the demand to vacate was made in February of 1952 and the complaint was filed in
April. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction over the case for unlawful detainer.
65. Benguet corp. V. Cordillera Caraballo Mission Inc
G.R. No.155343 9-2-2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Benguet Corporation owns Pilo mineral claim covering several hectares of
land in Virac, Itogon, Benguet. It planted pine trees in compliance with the directive of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and built roads, buildings and
security gates in the covered area. Sometime in September 1997, petitioner discovered that
representatives of respondent Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. (CCMI) bulldozed and leveled
the grounds within its Pilo mineral claim in preparation for the construction of a school. Despite
petitioners demands to cease, respondents continued with the construction activities.

Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents. MTC ruled in favor of
petitioners prior possession of the land and ordered respondents to vacate the premises,
restore complete possession to the petitioner, and pay the cost. RTC reversed the judgment of
the MTC and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It found that the
complaint did not state the means of dispossession and did not constitute an action for forcible
entry. CA also dismissed the petition on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint failed state a cause of action that would not constitute
an action for forcible entry.

HELD:

Yes. In actions for forcible entry, it may be stressed, two allegations are mandatory for
the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession
by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of
these means, the proper recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action
to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.

Nothing in the complaint before the MTC would show how the entry was effected nor
how dispossession took place. The complaint merely stated that petitioner’s caretaker noticed
an ongoing bulldozing and leveling activities. The allegations that these activities were
illegal and that respondents entry was unlawful are not statements of bare facts but
conclusions of law. The complaint should have specified what made the activities illegal and the
entry unlawful. Without these ultimate facts, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
66. Esteban v. Marcelo
G.R. No.197725 7-31-2013

FACTS:

The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony
Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land located at Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong
City, since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the
property. In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the
respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a
monthly rental fee of ₱50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped
paying the rental fee. On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the
respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate
within five (5) days from receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to
vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses
on December 6, 2005.

Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; with
the jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must vacate the
property, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 1673 of the New Civil Code, on the grounds of
expiration of the lease and nonpayment of monthly rentals. Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully
affirmed the MeTC ruling. CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of
dispossession in 2001 when the respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the
complaint for ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed; hence, the case no longer
involved an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion publiciana that should
have been filed before the RTC.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer has prescibed.
(2) Whether or not the petition is irregular due to failure to implead compulsory heirs.
HELD:

(1) No. The one-year prescription period is counted from the last demand to pay and
vacate. The Revised Rules of Court clearly so state that there should first be a demand to pay or
to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.

Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the
premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has
failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make
unlawful withholding of possession. Before the lessor may institute such action, he must
make a demand upon the lessee to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate
the premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the
tenant’s refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal
violates the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.

(2) No. While all co-owners are real parties in interest in suits to recover properties,
anyone of them may bring an action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Only the co-
owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property becomes an indispensable
party thereto; the other co-owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
 67. Desbarats v. Laureano
G.R. No. L-218175 9-27-1966

FACTS:

On January 21, 1958, the Desbarats filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Josefina Segarra Vda. de Laureano, the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC),
and E. S. Baltao& Co., Inc., for recovery of possession of a parcel of land located at Sta. Ana,
Manila. The action was based on a contract of lease of the aforementioned parcel of land,
entered into by plaintiffs, as lessor, and defendant Laureano, as lessee, on September 2, 1949,
at a monthly rental of P155.00 for a period of 10 years, and subject to the condition that any
building or improvement built thereon by the lessee shall belong to the lessor upon
termination, revocation, or cancellation of the contract. This agreement was amended on
November 28, 1959, to enable the lessee to assign in favor of the RFC, her leasehold rights on
land, together with the machineries to be acquired and the building to be constructed out of
the proceeds of a loan she had contracted from the assignee bank, to secure the payment of
the said loan of P50,000.00.

It appears also that on November 12, 1953, the lessee conveyed unto E. S. Baltao& Co.
her leasehold right on the land and the improvements and machineries found thereon, in virtue
of which, E. S. Baltao& Co. took possession of the premises and paid the monthly rentals to the
lessor, through the lessee, until November, 1954. This contract was never approved by the RFC
and the lessor. The lessor addressed a letter to the lessee demanding payment of the unpaid
rentals or vacate the premises. on April 29, 1955, the lessor already filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for rescission of the contract and damages against the lessee., On
July 30, 1955, the lessor filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Court of Manila
(Civil Case No. 38823), which, in view of Laureano's objections, was amended twice. This case
was ultimately dismissed upon the lessor's own motion on November 26, 1955. On August 2,
1957, a new complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the lessor in the Municipal Court of
Manila impleading the lessee Laureano, the RFC, and E. S. Baltao& Co. as parties-defendants.
Defendant Laureano objected to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the complaint
was filed more than one year from the letter of demand of March 11, 1955.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer has prescribed.

HELD:

No. The letter sent on December 27, 1957 is construed as a "new demand" thus the
action filed on January 28, 1958 would be one for unlawful detainer, falling within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court. For, although it is true that the lessee was required to pay
the rentals or vacate the premises by letter of March 11, 1955, which should make the lessee's
possession unlawful from that time, the lessor has also the privilege to waive the right to bring
the proper action, or to allow the lessee to continue in his occupation, thereby legalizing the
same.

In a case, the Court ruled that despite the lessee's failure to pay the rent after the first
demand, the lessor did not choose to bring an action in court, but "suffered the lessees to
continue occupying the lands for nearly two years," the lessor's inaction was construed as
waiver of his right to file the case, and his tolerance of the lessees' possession of the property,
considered to have legalized the said otherwise unlawful possession. Consequently, the cause
of action for illegal detainer was therein declared to have accrued only when the second
demand for rents and for surrender of possession was not complied with.

In the case at bar, there is hardly any doubt about the lessor's efforts to collect the
unpaid rentals or to repossess the property, since the demand was made on March 11, 1955.
Not only did they persistently bring court action to enforce their rights, but that, demands were
made even on the RFC and the actual occupant of the premises, E. S. Baltao& Co. The letter of
December 27, 1957 itself, cited by appellant, shows that it was not just another demand, but a
reminder to her to comply with an alleged agreement reached by their counsels, that she was
going to voluntarily vacate the premises. It appears therefrom, that if no action was taken by
the lessor from October 31, 1957 when the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed by
the Municipal Court of Manila, until December 27, 1957 when the reminder was made, it was
because the plaintiffs (lessor) were expecting that the lessee would voluntarily give up the
possession of the property as allegedly agreed upon. Clearly, since the making of the demand in
March, 1955, the lessee's occupancy of the property has always been unlawful. Consequently,
the accionpubliciana, for recovery of possession of the property instituted on January 28, 1958
was properly filed in the court of first instance.
 68. Yu v. De lara G.R. No.l-16084 11-30-1962

FACTS:

The disputed property involved is Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Grace Park
subdivision with an area of 682.5 meters, is the disputed property. It was originally registered in
1916 subsequently acquired by the Philippine Realty Corporation and sold by it in 1956 to
plaintiff-appellant John O. Yu, a Filipino citizen, who obtained title in his name. In 1945 several
persons settled on the property and constructed houses thereon without mission from, or
contract with, the Philippine Corporation, then the registered owner. On various dates
thereafter, between 1947 and 1952, appellants here brought the houses of those settlers and
continued in occupancy thereof without paying any rents to the owner of the land. In February
1957 plaintiff-appellee advised them in writing to vacate within 30 days, and in view of their
refusal filed a complaint of unlawful detainer within the statutory period of one year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant was unlawfuly withholding the disputed property

HELD:

Yes. The Court did not give merit to the Appellants contention that since there is no
showing that there was any promise on their part, express or implied, to return the land to
appellee, or that they failed to do so after their right to retain it had expired, they cannot be
considered as unlawfully withholding possession.

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary fiction for ejectment is the property remedy
against him. In any event, whatever might be said on this point in so far as it relates to the
original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court — and hence to the appellate
jurisdiction Court of First Instance — it does not appear that the question was raised in the
former court at all. Consequently the latter court could take cognizance of the case — as one
for recovery by the owner of the right of possession in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, pursuant to section 11 of Rule 40.
69. Larano v. Calendacion
GR No. 158321, 27 September 1966

FACTS:
Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Laguna. Petitioner and respondents
executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-square meter portion of
petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500,000.00 as down payment and the balance payable
in nine installments of P500,000.00 each, until September 2001.
Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland was transferred to
respondents under the condition that they shall account for and deliver the harvest from said
riceland to petitioner. Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and to account for
and deliver the harvest from said riceland. Petitioner sent respondents a demand letter to
vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but as her demand went unheeded,
she filed a Complaint against respondents for unlawful detainer before the MTC praying that
respondents be directed to vacate the riceland and to pay P400,000.00 per year until they
vacate, as reasonable compensation for the use of the property, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
In their Answer, respondents admit the execution of the Contract to Sell but deny that it
contains all the agreements of the parties. They allege that petitioner has no cause of action
against them because the three-year period within which to pay the purchase price has not yet
lapsed; that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint failed to allege
that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made upon them. The MTC rendered a
decision, ordering defendants, among others to immediately vacate the premises in question.
On appeal to the RTC, the judgment was affirmed subject to modification as to the amount they
are to pay the plaintiffs. The CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint
for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings before the MTC for want of jurisdiction.
It held that the issues in the case extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer
suits where only the issue of possession is involved; that the case is not a mere detainer suit but
one incapable of pecuniary estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC, not the MTC.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.

RULING:
No. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Neither can it be made to depend on the
exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The test for determining the
sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. The facts upon which an action for
unlawful detainer can be brought are specially mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is
decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession. Applied to the
present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites for the purpose of
bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with
the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply
and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land
and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action
for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in
order that said cause of action may be pursued.
Mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not
automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand
must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
It is clear from the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of unlawful detainer.
What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the
terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made
demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract the payment of the
installments and the accounting and delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-
day period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated by
law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Clearly, the basic issue
raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of possession but interpretation, enforcement
and/or rescission of the contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear
and determine.
70. Go Tiamco v. Diaz
GR No. L-7 22 January 1946

FACTS:
Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action in the Municipal Court of Manila against Yao Boom
Sim (alias Co Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam (alias Go Si Pio) for unlawful
detainer of the building located at 503 Sto. Cristo Street, Manila. At the trial, plaintiff offered
Exhibit A as evidence, which is a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants
prior to the action. Objection was to the evidence upon the ground that the fact sought to be
proved thereby was not alleged in the complaint. The objection was sustained, and an action
for mandamus was brought by plaintiff to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The writ of
mandamus was granted, and when the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the evidence
was admitted. After trial, judgement was rendered against defendants who appealed to the
Court of First Instance. The notice, Exhibit A, was a part of the record elevated on appeal. In the
Court of First Instance, the complaint filed in the municipal court was reproduced. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of a
notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the
municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and, as a
consequence, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the
case. The motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, this action for mandamus
against the Court of First Instance of Manila to reinstate the petitioner's case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer case was validly dismissed.

RULING:
No. The order of dismissal is erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a
wrong construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the
case; and (3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself.
A demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to
pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is to
terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.
A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice to the tenant
who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words upon the expiration of the term of a
lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate
the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even
before the expiration of the five days provided in Rule 72, section 2. Indeed, upon the
expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when,
with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days, as provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessor's acquiescence may be
inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. But tacit renewal in such case, being a new
contract, is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation
being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense.
 Passing now to the facts of the case, the SC finds that there has been in that case a notice to
quit, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. That notice, which is Exhibit A, has been
offered and admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even supposing, without
conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by evidence.
True that this evidence was admitted upon objection of the defendant.
The complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the municipal court, which is not only a substantial,
but almost a literal, copy of the form given in the Rules of Court, is sufficient.
A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of
what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our duty is to construe the law and not
our will, for in administering the law we have no will but the will of the law. The form provided
by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental policy. It
discloses that in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully
withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning
having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired
as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
71. Consing v. Jamandre
G.R. No. L-27674, May 12, 1975

FACTS:
Plaintiffs (now petitioners) filed in the MTC a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer
against defendant (now respondent) for taking possession of Haciendas "Aida" and "Fe"
through force, intimidation, stealth and strategy despite the contract of sublease executed on
October 19, 1962, (the date plaintiffs-petitioners took possession and management of the
leased premises) by and between the former, as sub-lessee, and the father of the latter, Cirilo
Jamandre, as sub-lessor. Defendant-respondent filed his answer and averred that he took-over
the haciendas in question seven months after the death of his father, Cirilo Jamandre, because
of the failure of plaintiffs-petitioners to comply with the terms and conditions of paragraphs 3
and 4 of the contract of sub-lease. MTC rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the
defendant Jose T. Jamandre, and ordered the latter to vacate from and restore to plaintiff the
possession of Hdas. "Aida" and "Fe". On appeal to the CFI, plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment but the same was denied by the Court, ruling that “After considering the pleadings
in the present case and the provisions of Rule 19 in connection with the Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the plaintiff is not entitled to
summary judgment..” The MR was denied. The CFI rendered judgment ordering, among
others, the defendant to vacate the premises of xxx Hdas. "Aida" and "Fe" and to deliver
the possession thereof to the plaintiffs. The defendant-respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered judgment reversing that of the court a quo. Plaintiffs-petitioners
maintain that summary judgment should have been rendered by the court a quo in view of the
failure of the defendant-respondent to file a counter affidavit or verified opposition. Besides,
defendant-respondent admits having taken possession of the leased premises. Petitioners
argue that the contractual stipulation in the contract of sub-lease with the herein respondent,
authorizing the latter to take possession of the leased premises even without resorting to court
action is illegal and violative of due process. They maintain that this is tantamount to a
renunciation of one's day in Court and, therefore, null and void. Besides, this might open the
floodgates to violence which our law seek to suppress. Respondent on the other hand
maintains that he took possession of the leased property because he is authorized to do so
under the contract. Respondent also claims that the stipulation "without necessity of resorting
to any court action", in the contract of sub-lease is not tainted with illegality because it does
not provide for the use of force in the taking of possession by the sub-lessor(respondent in the
present case) and, therefore, the same is not offensive to the law against forcible entry or to
public policy which, for the preservation of the public peace, does not allow taking the law into
one's own hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease between the parties
authorizing the herein respondent, as sub-lessor, to take possession of the leased premises
including all its improvements thereon without compensation to the sub-lessee (herein
petitioners) and without the need of judicial action is valid and binding.

RULING:
 Yes. This stipulation is in the nature of a resolutely condition, for upon the exercise by
the Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is deemed
terminated. This kind of contractual stipulation is not illegal, there being nothing in the law
proscribing such kind of agreement. As held by this Court in Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., G.R. No. L-11897, October 31, 1964; 12 SCRA 276, 286:

Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, in case of reciprocal obligations, the
power to rescind the contract where a party incurs in default, is impliedly
given to the injured party. Appellee maintains, however, that the law
contemplates of rescission of contract by judicial action and not a
unilateral act by the injured party; consequently, the action of the
Shipping Administration contravenes said provision of the law. This is not
entirely correct, because there is also nothing in the law that prohibits
the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of
the contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without court
intervention.In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. As already held,
judicial action is needed where there is absence of special provision in
the contract granting to a party the right of rescission.
Judicial permission to cancel the agreement was not, therefore, necessary because of the
express stipulation in the contract of sub-lease that the sub-lessor, in case of failure of the sub-
lessee to comply with the terms and conditions thereof, can take over the possession of the
leased premises, thereby cancelling the contract of sub-lease. Resort to judicial action is
necessary only in the absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.
Plaintiffs-petitioners are not entitled, as a matter of right, thereto. Summary judgment can only
be granted where there are no questions of fact in issue or where the material allegations of
the pleadings are not disputed. Such is not true in the case at bar. Firstly, defendant-
respondent maintains that plaintiffs-petitioners failed to comply with the terms and conditions
of their agreement. Secondly, in view of such failure on the part of plaintiffs-petitioners, the
defendant-respondent maintains that under their contract of sub-lease he is authorized to take-
over the possession of the leased premises.
72. Nuñez v. Slteas Phoenix Solutions, Inc., Through Its Representative, Cesar
Sylianteng
G.R. No. 180542 12 April 2010

FACTS:
The subject matter of the instant suit is a parcel of land situated in Manila and
registered in the name of respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. Despite having acquired
the same thru the Deed of Assignment executed in its favor, it appears that respondent was
constrained to leave the subject parcel idle and unguarded for some time due to important
business concerns. An ocular inspection conducted by respondent’s representatives revealed
that the property was already occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21 other
individuals. Initially faulting one Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its verbal
demands to vacate the subject parcel, respondent filed its complaint for forcible entry
before the MeTC of Manila. Additionally impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants
of the property, respondent filed an amended complaint, alleging, among other matters, that
thru its representatives and predecessors-in-interest, it had continuously possessed the subject
realty, over which it exercised all attributes of ownership, including payment of real property
taxes and other sundry expenses; that without the benefit of any lease agreement or
possessory right, however, petitioners and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the
property by means of strategy and stealth; and, that according to reliable sources, the latter
had been in occupancy of the same parcel since 1999. Petitioner averred that the property
occupied by him is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng, with whom he
had concluded a subsisting lease agreement over the same, and that, in addition to
respondent’s lack of cause of action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case for lack of prior demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to the barangay
authorities for a possible amicable settlement. With the parties’ further failure to abide by
their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor from the
Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, the record shows that respondent submitted
a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla who determined that petitioner
was, indeed, occupying a portion of the subject parcel. Relying on said report, the MeTC went
on to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against all the defendants and ordering the
latter to, among others, vacate the subject premises. On appeal, the foregoing decision was
affirmed in toto by the RTC Manila. Dissatisfied with said Order, petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review filed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals dismissed said petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to try the instant case considering that the
elements of forcible entry are not present and additionally there is a question of ownership.

RULING:
Yes. Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved, there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment
cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts by express provision
of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition to being conferred by law, however, a court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims asserted therein. In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the
exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential
for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their
prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be
filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of the physical possession of the property. As it is not essential that the complaint
should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said
conditions. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through
stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTC’s jurisdiction, our
perusal of the record shows that respondent’s amended complaint was able to make
out a cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the
subject parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its
predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised
over the same all attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and other
expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants
have succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and strategy; and, that its
subsequent demands to vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers. Considering that the
test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff, the SC finds that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction
over the case.
73. ANTONIO CO TIAMCO, petitioner,
vs.
POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, YAO BOOM SIM (alias Co Hue), YAO KA
TIAM (aliasChua Kui), and SY GUI GAM (alias Go Si Pio), respondents.
G.R. No. L-7 January 22, 1946

FACTS:
Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action for unlawful detainer against Yao Boom Sim (alias Co
Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam (alias Go Si Pio) for the building located at
503 Sto. Cristo Street, Manila.
An action for mandamus was brought by plaintiff to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
writ of mandamus was granted, and when the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the
evidence was admitted. After trial, judgement was rendered against defendants who appealed
to the Court of First Instance.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was no allegation in the
complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and,
therefore, the municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and, as a consequence, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. The motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, this action
for mandamus against the Court of First Instance of Manila to reinstate the petitioner's case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for unlawful detainer may be dismissed on the grounds that
there was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate

RULING:

No. In an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding"
imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other
source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has legal in the beginning having
no other source than a contract, express or implied possession which has later expired as a
right and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief
and concise and though apparently too general it is so worded as clearly to apprise the
defendant of the substance of the claim. Other detail like the one-year period within which the
action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules must be
proved but need not be alleged in the complaint.
Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the
complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in
such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose
more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18,
20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said: "The real test of a good pleading under the
new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and
prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if
it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to
the particular matter that is stated too generally." This justifies the form of complaint provided
by the Rules in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
74. JESUSA VDA. DE MURGA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUANITO CHAN, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-24680 October 7, 1968

FACTS:
Jesusa Vda. de Murga was the owner of two parcels of land in the City of Zamboanga.

On January 31, 1949, a contract of lease over said two lots was entered into by and between
Jesusa Vda. de Murga as lessor, and Juanito Chan as lessee, the basic terms of which pertinent
to the present case are: The period of the lease was ten (10) years from January 31, 1949; the
lessee to pay a monthly rent of P500.00 within the first ten days of every month; with the
consent of the lessor, the lessee may introduce improvements on the land; and in the event
that the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall not exercise the right to purchase the building or
buildings belonging to and constructed by the said Juanito Chan granted her for any reason or
cause, the contract of lease shall be automatically renewed.

On July 23, 1958, the lessor informed the lessee of her willingness to renew the lease for five
years at a monthly rent of P700.00 to which the lessee pleaded to lower the renal rate to
P400.00. The lessor refused.
On February 4, 1959, the lessor made demand on the lessee to vacate the premises.
Disregarding the written demand of the lessor, dated February 19, 1959, the lessee chose to
remain in the possession of the leased premises and insisted that the contract of lease
stipulated an automatic renewal of the lease, and conformably thereto, he has a right to
continue occupying the premises.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City ordered the lessee to vacate the premises.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased
rental or otherwise to vacate the land is the kind of demand contemplated in the Rules.

RULING:

No. The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or
otherwise to vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in
unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby
merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation
and necessary demand is first made. (Manotok vs. Guinto, L-9540, April 30, 1957.)

The lessor may, under Article 1569 of the Civil Code, judicially disposses the lessee for
default in the payment of the price agreed upon. But where such default is based on the
fact that the rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an action for ejectment
cannot lie. (Belmonte vs. Martin, 42 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 2146.)
In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter of February 19, 1959, that the
obligation to vacate the leased premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to
agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. As the lessee, however, was in the physical
possession of the land by virtue of a prior contract of lease, and the demand was in the
alternative imposing a new rental, even without taking into account the efficacy of the
stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease, which shall be discussed hereafter, in the
light of the ruling in Belmonte vs. Martin, supra, without any subsequent definite demand to
vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which would
give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.
75. ANGELINA CANAYNAY, ET AL., petitioners and appellees,
vs.
FELICIANO SARMIENTO, and GUILLERMO ROMERO, in his capacity as Judge of the Justice of
the Peace Court of Parañaque, Rizal, respondents. FELICIANO SARMIENTO, appellant.

G.R. No. L-1246 August 27, 1947

FACTS:

Feliciano Sarmiento is the lawful owner of that certain parcel of unregistered and
unsurveyed residential land located at San Dionisio Parañaque, Rizal. On January 15, 1920,
the defendants entered into a verbal contract with the Sarmiento whereby the latter leased to
the former the land under an agreed rental of P3 a month, payable at the end of each month.
Sarmiento has several times verbally demanded the defendants to pay the unpaid rentals and
to vacate the premises in question, the last demand having been made on them personally and
in writing on August 3, 1946, but they failed and refused and still continue to fail and to pay the
rentals now amounting to P828 and to vacate the premises .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the demand to pay unpaid rentals to the lessees by the lessor to which
the former did not comply makes the possession of the lessees unlawful

RULING:

No. The fact that it is alleged in the complaint that defendant failed to pay the rents
since after August 25, 1923, does not make unlawful defendant's withholding of possession of
the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession
of the premises. It is the owner's demands for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant
has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant's refusal or failure to vacate, which make
unlawful withholding of possession. There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a
defaulting tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year, several years, or even
decades. That consent, no matter how long it may last, makes lawful tenant's possession. Only
when that consent is withdrawn and the owner demands tenant to leave the property is the
owner's rights of possession asserted and the tenants refusal or failure to move out makes his
possession unlawful, because it is violative of the owner's preferential right of possession.
76. SPOUSES EUTIQUIANO CLUTARIO and ARACELI CLUTARIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, RTC Judge of Quezon City, Branch C
(100), and SPOUSES MELQUIADES GANDIA and MARIA V. GANDIA, respondents.

G.R. No. 76656 December 11, 1992

FACTS:
Spouses Melquiades Gandia and Maria V. Gandia, are the owners of a two-storey
residential apartment located at No. 56 Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. Since 1961,
petitioners have been staying on the ground floor by virtue of a verbal lease agreement for a
monthly rental of P150.00.
On May 9, 1980, private respondents sent a letter to the petitioners giving them ninety (90)
days to vacate the premises since they have decided to occupy the entire apartment, including
the ground floor leased to petitioners. Because petitioners did not heed the demand letter,
private respondents brought the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay for settlement, but
was unsuccessful. Another demand letter was sent by private respondents to petitioners on
January 20, 1981.
On March 4, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner
Araceli Clutario1 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City.
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment on January 16, 1984 dismissing the complaint on the
ground that private respondents "failed to support their causes of action with substantial
evidence.” Upon appeal, the decision was reversed. The CA likewise affirmed the ruling
of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears constitute a waiver of
the default in the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for ejectment.

RULING:

No. In light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well as the prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court rules that the acceptance by private respondents of the petitioners-
lessees' back rentals did not constitute a waiver or abandonment of their cause of action for
ejectment against the latter.

Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause
for judicial ejectment of a lessee. Having proved one of such grounds, i.e., arrears in payment of
rent for three (3) months at any one time, private respondents may legally eject petitioners
without having to prove the other grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to bolster their action
for ejectment, private respondents invoked in their complaint a second ground for ejectment,
namely, their need for the leased premises.
77. Golden Gate Realty Corp. V. IAC
G.R. No.74289 7-31-1987
FACTS:
On November 26, 1980, petitioner Golden Gate Realty Corporation filed three separate
complaints (13436, 13439, and 13462) for ejectment against respondent Emilio Young and two
other defendants before the City Court of Iloilo. On November 4, 1981, a motion to dismiss was
filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that the complaint failed to allege prior
demand to vacate the premises. An opposition thereto was filed by the petitioner claiming that
only a demand to pay rentals due is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer citing as its
authority Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. On December 1, 1981, the motion to dismiss
was denied ruling that there is no word or phrase in paragraph 7 of the complaint categorically
saying that the defendants 'vacate the premises'. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied by the same court. On December 7, 1981, petitioner filed its motion to declare
respondents in default which was granted and the reception of evidence was set on December
17, 1981. On January 19, 1982, the City Court of Iloilo rendered a decision in the ejectment case
in favor of petitioner and against private-respondents and the two other defendants. On
February 29, 1984, a writ of execution was issued in Civil Case No. 13439 where the City Sheriff
ejected the respondent spouses Emilio and Alberta Young and scheduled for auction sale the
properties levied upon. On May 4, 1984, respondent Young filed Civil Case No. 15712 which
seeks to nullify 13439. On even date, respondent-Court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo) issued ex
parte a temporary restraining order, enjoining the petitioner herein and the City Sheriff of Iloilo
from conducting the sale at public auction and set the hearing for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction to May 11, 1984 which was reset to May 21, 1984 (Annex "K"). On May
21, 1984, petitioner filed its answer and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted. On June 4, 1984, the RTC-Iloilo issued the
questioned order nullifying the decision in Civil Case No. 13439 of the City Court of Iloilo for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the respondent trial court, for the said
city court to have acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case which was filed by the
petitioner, the demand to vacate by the latter should have been couched in definite and not
conditional words. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied to the ejectment case.
The court, further, permanently restrained the petitioners from enforcing and executing the
annulled decision and directed the Sheriff to desist from carrying out the public auction sale
and to return the properties levied upon by him to the private respondents.
The petitioner appealed contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing a temporary restraining order and in extending the effectivity thereof; in issuing a final
injunction based on the evidence presented during the hearing of an application for a
preliminary injunction; and in enjoining the enforcement of a judgment that has become final
and executory. On January 28, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition ruling that the
trial court acted correctly in issuing a temporary restraining order and in extending the same
because the prescribed 20-day period for the efficacy of such an order is not a hard and fast
rule. Accordingly, where the party against whom a temporary restraining order is directed
adopts a posture which would unreasonably prevent the court from deciding the propriety of
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction within the prescriptive period as in this case where the
petitioner filed its answer three days before the expiration of the restraining order, the Court
may, as an exception and on a case to case basis as justice dictates, extend the period of
effectivity of such order provided that such extension is definite and does not go beyond
another twenty days. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the twenty (20)-day period of efficacy of a temporary restraining order
is non-extendible and the courts have no discretion to extend the same, otherwise the
life of such provisional remedy would be only permissive and not mandatory as
intended by the rule.
2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in declaring that the City Court has no
jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 13439 for lack of demand to vacate.
HELD:

1. Yes. In the recent case of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Hon. Vivencio M.
Ruiz, et al. (G. R. No. L-33952, March 9, 1987) we ruled that a temporary restraining
order has a limited life of twenty (20) days:
"Finally, under Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary restraining
order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining
order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on
the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20-days, the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary restraining order can no longer exist
indefinitely for it has become truly temporary (Board of Transportation v. Castro, 125 SCRA 417
(1983) citing Dionisio, et al., v. Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, G.R. No.
61048 promulgated on August 17, 1983). xxx."

We, therefore, rule that the respondent trial court erred in extending the period of the
temporary restraining order for another ten (10) days in order to give itself more time to decide
on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. We also rule that the said
court should not have permanently enjoined the sheriff from conducting an auction ale and
more importantly, it should not have annulled the proceedings in Civil Code No. 13439 altoge-
ther because by doing so, the said court pre-empted itself from conducting any further trial on
the merits of the case. It went beyond the extent of the relief that the called-for hearing may
grant, and that is, the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

2. As in the above-quoted case, when the private respondents defaulted in the payment of
rents in the amount of P18,000.00, they lost their rights to remain in the premises.
Hence, when the petitioner demanded payment of the P18,000.00 due and unpaid
rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the owner was giving strong
notice that "you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you
thrown out of my property." The word "vacate" is not a talismanic word that must be
employed in all notices. The alternatives in this case are clear cut. The tenants must
pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing which they
 must move out. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them.
Hence when the petitioner demanded that either he pays P18,000.00 in five days or a
case for ejectment would be filed against him, he was placed on notice to move out if he
does not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to vacate. As held by the city
court:
"x x x But the court feels that there is no necessity that such a word 'vacate' or a phrase
containing the word 'vacate' must have to be so stated categorically in the complaint. It could
be gleaned from the complaint that the plaintiff, through its counsel 'gave notice to the
defendant to pay the sum of P18,000.00 within five (5) days from receipt of his letter and failing
to do so a case of ejectment would be filed against him.' Such allegation substantially connotes
that warning is given to the defendant that in case he fails to pay the amount demanded of him
as rentals in arrears, then he has to vacate the premises. There is no necessity of so
categorically stating the word 'vacate' or the phrase containing the word 'vacate' the premises
in the allegation in the complaint."

Therefore, we find that the City Court of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 13439
and rendered a valid and final judgment which may very well serve as a basis for invoking the
principle of res judicata in Civil Case No. 15712.
78. La Campana v. CA
G.R. No. 88246 6-4-1993
FACTS:
On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased a building and
lot in Quezon City to respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation for a period of 4 years
beginning March 1, 1982. On January 22, 1986, Cascade received a demand letter for full
payment of the rentals in arrears and unpaid water bill totalling P73,902.00 within a period of
three days. On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for ejectment
with preliminary attachment in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City alleging the non-
payment of rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by the plaintiff on the
defendant praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment for the amount of
P73,820.60 to answer for the unpaid rentals. The defendant was also asked to vacate the
premises and to pay the unpaid rentals in the sum of P73,820.60 plus the amount of P15,000
monthly starting from March 1986 as the reasonable value of the use of the premises. On April
4, 1986, Cascade filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Discharge of Attachment which was
denied by the trial court on April 15, 1986, and reconsideration of such denial on June 30, 1986.
Cascade then filed a petition for review on certiorari with prohibition in the Court of Appeals,
again assailing the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court claiming that there was no
allegation in the complaint that Cascade was unlawfully withholding possession of the leased
premises. Instead, it was averred that Cascade was removing its properties from the leased
premises, a clear admission that it had the intention to voluntarily vacate the premises upon
the expiration of the lease contract. The allegation that the petitioner had failed to pay the
monthly rental amounting to P73,820.60 as of February 1986, showed that the complaint was
for collection of unpaid rentals and not for ejectment. On July 28, 1986, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition filed by Cascade, holding that it was actually a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition that should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court. Judge
Punzalan of the Metropolitan Trial Court found that the defendant had indeed vacated the
leased premises on March 3, 1986. It also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P40,237.70 as unpaid rentals (after deducting the rental deposit and withholding tax),
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. Cascade appealed to the Regional Trial
Court questioning the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court but Judge Tadeo, Jr. affirmed the
appealed decision and on September 29, 1987, denied reconsideration. In its subsequent
petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Cascade again challenged the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, but this time on a different ground pointing out that in the complaint
for ejectment, La Campana failed to allege that prior demands had been made upon the
defendant to vacate the premises. On February 8, 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals
reversed the challenged decision and dismissed the complaint. La Campana and, surprisingly,
even the trial judge filed separate motions for reconsideration. On May 11, 1989, the
respondent Court of Appeals denied both motions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
HELD:
No. The reason is that the lack of the averment that there was demand to vacate the
premises was never raised by the private respondent in the Metropolitan Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court, and not even in the Court of Appeals in G.R. Sp No. 09550. The private
respondent had questioned the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for ejectment but for the collection of a sum of
money. The answer it later filed did not raise the lack of the said allegation but in fact,
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, actually sought affirmative relief therefrom. Defendant
further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises. In the case of Jakihaca v. Aquino, this Court held on a similar question: As a
general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of
the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. In the case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30, cited in Tejones v. Cironella, 159 SCRA 104, We held: “It is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
Upon this same principle is what we said x x x to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable
practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.
79.Tiu v. CA
G.R. No.l-32626 1-28-1971

FACTS:
Petitioner Tiu instituted an action for ejectment against respondent Choa Kim before
the City Court of Manila (Branch VI). After due trial, said Court rendered judgment ordering the
defendant Choa Kim and all persons claiming under him to vacate the premises and to
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff therein; ordering defendant further to pay plaintiff
the sum of P9,000 as rentals in arrears up to and including December 31, 1968, plus the sum of
P1,500 as monthly rental beginning January 1, 1969, and likewise to pay the plaintiff in concept
of attorney's fees the sum of P2,000 and costs. Defendant Choa Kim appealed to the CFI-Manila
wherein the latter rendered a decision: (1) Ordering defendant to vacate and turn over to
plaintiff the peaceful possession of that parcel of land located at, and known as, Nos. 671-673 T.
Alonzo Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila; (2) Sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the monthly
rental of the rate of P1,500.00 from July, 1968, until defendant actually vacate the land of
plaintiff; and (3) Sentencing defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00, as and for
attorney's fees. Private respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he
seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner, on February 3, 1970, filed with the
Court of Appeals, a motion to dismiss appeal on the grounds: (1) That the said appeal is
frivolous and, therefore, without merit; (2) That said appeal is prosecuted manifestly for delay;
and (3) That the question raised is unsubstantial to require consideration (Annex "B"), to which
private respondent filed an opposition (Annex "C"). Petitioner on February 18, 1970, filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss appeal, anchored on the ground that the Court of First Instance
of Manila having affirmed in full the judgment of the City Court of Manila, the only legal remedy
left to the defendant-appellant (herein private respondent) is to elevate the matter to the
Court of Appeals on a Petition for Review, pursuant to Republic Act No. 5433 which was
approved on September 9, 1968 (Annex "D"). To this, private respondent filed his opposition
(Annex "E"), and later petitioner filed her reply thereto (Annex "F"). Respondents having
answered the petition filed herein, and Petitioner having replied thereto, this case was set for
hearing. However, petitioner elected to submit the case on the pleadings already filed whereas
private respondent asked for and was given an opportunity to file a rejoinder to petitioner's
reply. The latter pleading having been filed this case is now deemed submitted for decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent's appeal should be allowed to run its course, considering that
private respondent's right over the property in question is based on a lease contract which had
admittedly expired.

HELD:

No. Private respondent would persist in remaining on the premises by virtue of the
unproved allegation that petitioner-lessor is not the owner thereof. Yet it is clear that not
claiming ownership in himself, he cannot in an ejectment proceedings raise that very question.
This Court had time and again held that the fact of lease and the expiration of its terms are the
only elements of this kind of action. Plaintiff need not prove his ownership and defendant
cannot deny it, and if defendant denies plaintiff's ownership he raises a question unessential to
this action. (Sevilla vs. Tolentino, 51 Phil., 333, 337; Centeno vs. Gallardo, 93 Phil., 63, 67.)
Evidence of ownership in ejectment cases can be admitted only for the purpose of determining
the character and extent of possession and damages for detention. (Section 4, Rule 70, Revised
Rules of Court.) The fact of lease having been admitted by private respondent as well as the
expiration of the term thereof, there can be no question that the issue of ownership is foreign
to the action. Indeed, it matters not that private respondent was already an occupant of the
leased premises when he executed and signed the contract of lease, because the basis of the
ejectment suit is the very contract of lease. Private respondent cannot now be heard to impugn
what he had previously admitted, which includes the fact that petitioner is the owner of the
premises. Neither can he confuse the issue by raising the question of title to defeat the right of
petitioner to the possession of the premises and to eject him therefrom. Under Sec. 3, Rule 131
of the Revised Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
As the case now stands, private respondent's only justification to remain on the premises in
question is based on a defense which is unavailable to him. His appeal may therefore be
considered frivolous and made solely for delay. Under these circumstances, we are justified in
ordering its dismissal.
80. Cetus development v. CA
G.R. No.77668-52 8-7-1989

FACTS:
The private respondents, Ederlina Navalta et al were the lessees of the premises located
at No. 512 Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, originally owned by the Susana Realty. The
payments of the rentals were paid by the lessees to a collector of the Susana Realty who went
to the premises monthly. Sometime in March, 1984, the Susana Realty sold the leased premises
to the petitioner, Cetus Development, Inc. From April to June, 1984, the respondents continued
to pay their monthly rentals to a collector sent by the petitioner. In the succeeding months of
July, August and September 1984, the respondents failed to pay their monthly individual rentals
as no collector came. On October 9, 1984, the petitioner sent a letter to each of the private
respondents demanding that they vacate the subject premises and to pay the back rentals for
the months of July, August and September, 1984, within fifteen days from the receipt thereof.
Immediately upon the receipt of the said demand letters on October 10, 1984, the private
respondents paid their respective arrearages in rent which were accepted by the petitioner
subject to the unilateral condition that the acceptance was without prejudice to the filing of an
ejectment suit. Subsequent monthly rental payments were likewise accepted by the petitioner
under the same condition. The petitioner filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
complaints for ejectment due to failure of the respondents to vacate the premises. The
Metropolitan Trial Court-Manila dismissed the six cases ruling that all the rentals had been paid
so the plaintiff eject the defendants from the leased premises, because at the time these cases
were instituted, there are no rentals in arrears. The petitioner appealed to the RTC-Manila
which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. In due time, a petition for review of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court was filed by the petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Said petition
was dismissed on January 30, 1987, for lack of merit. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a cause of action when the complaints for unlawful detainer were
filed considering the fact that upon demand by petitioner from private respondents for
payment of their back rentals, the latter immediately tendered payment which was accepted by
petitioner

HELD:
The Court hold that the demand required and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 in
the Rules of Court is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an unlawful
detainer suit for failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of lease. It partakes of an
extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting to judicial action so much so that
when there is full compliance with the demand, there arises no necessity for court action.
As to whether this demand is merely a demand to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the
lease or also a demand to vacate, the answer can be gleaned from said Section 2. This section
presupposes the existence of a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it speaks of “failure to
pay rent due or comply with the conditions of the lease.” The existence of said cause of
action gives the lessor the right under Article 1659 of the New Civil Code to ask for the
rescission of the contract of lease and indemnification for damages, or only the latter,
allowing the contract to remain in force. Accordingly, if the option chosen is for specific
performance, then the demand referred to is obviously to pay rent or to comply with the
conditions of the lease violated. However, if rescission is the option chosen, the demand must
be for the lessee to pay rents or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate.
Accordingly, the rule that has been followed in our jurisprudence where rescission is clearly the
option taken, is that both demands to pay rent and to vacate are necessary to make a lessee a
deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. Thus, for the purpose of bringing an
ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or
comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply
and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in case of lands
and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action
for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in
order that said cause of action may be pursued.
It is very clear that in the case at bar, no cause of action for ejectment has accrued. There was
no failure yet on the part of private respondents to pay rents for three consecutive months. As
the terms of the individual verbal leases which were on a month-to-month basis were not
alleged and proved, the general rule on necessity of demand applies, to wit: there is default in
the fulfillment of an obligation when the creditor demands payment at the maturity of the
obligation or at anytime thereafter. Petitioner has not shown that its case falls on any of the
following exceptions where demand is not required: (a) when the obligation or the law so
declares; (b) when from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it can be inferred that
time is of the essence of the contract; and (c) when demand would be useless, as when the
obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
The demand required in Article 1169 of the Civil Code may be in any form, provided that it can
be proved. The proof of this demand lies upon the creditor. Without such demand, oral or
written, the effects of default do not arise. This demand is different from the demand required
under Section 2, Rule 70, which is merely a jurisdictional requirement before an existing cause
of action may be pursued. The facts on record fail to show proof that petitioner demanded the
payment of the rentals when the obligation matured. Coupled with the fact that no collector
was sent as previously done in the past, the private respondents cannot be held guilty of mora
solvendi or delay in the payment of rentals. Thus, when petitioner first demanded the payment
of the 3-month arrearages and private respondents lost no time in making tender and payment,
which petitioner accepted, no cause of action for ejectment accrued. Hence, its demand to
vacate was premature as it was an exercise of a non-existing right to rescind.
81. Viray vs. IAC G.R. No.81015 - July 4 1991

FACTS: This case is about a written lease agreement which concerns residential premises at
Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Said lease was executed by the owner of the place, Benjamin de
Asis, and Rustico Victor, as lessee. The agreement included stipulations regarding (a) fixing the
term of the lease and (b) governing the lessors right of repossession. In 1983, Victor and his
wife left for Ontario, Canada and did not return to the Philippines until 1985. They left the
apartment in the care of their son, Ramon.
Believing that the Victor spouses had abandoned the apartment and the place being
occupied by Ramon Victor, an unauthorized stranger , De Asis brought suit in the MTC in1984 to
evict the latter. But the spouses returned in 1985, and on their representation that they did not
mean to give up the apartment.
Rustico Victor did not re-occupy the apartment but continued to leave it in the care of
his son, Ramon. Thereafter, Ramon left for Canada. He asked his brother, Roldan, to look after
the place. But Roldan Victor did not actually move into the apartment; all he did was to install a
padlock at the main door, visit the place once a week, and sleep there occasionally
When De Asis learned of this state, he went to the place to see for himself if it was true.
He saw there was nobody in the apartment. De Asis then caused the cutting off of the electrical
and water service connections and posted to the apartment a notice of termination of the
lease, on the ground of abandonment and failure to pay rentals in accordance with the
contract. He could not serve the notice of termination directly on the lessee since he did not
know where the latter was.
De Asis returned to the apartment and posted a notice, announcing that he would
repossess the place after five (5) days in order to secure it from fire, repair it to preserve its
value. He also wrote to the local barangay captain requesting his presence at the premises he
intended to open and repossess the apartment. Thereafter, he made repairs on the apartment
and then leased it to Cresencio C. Viray.
An action of forcible entry was instituted in the MTC against De Asis and his new lessee,
Viray. The action resulted in a judgment rendered against the defendants. The MTC ruled that
Rustico Victor could not be deemed to have abandoned the premises, and even if he had, the
apartment could not be repossessed without Judicial action. They appealed to the Regional
Trial Court, without success. They then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Their appeal met the
same fate, their petition for review was dismissed and the Regional Trial Court's decision
affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Asis had the legal and contractual right to repossess the premises
without and independently of prior judicial authority.
RULING : The Court ruled that it is indisputable that the parties' written agreement created a
lease on a month-to-month basis. Such a lease, therefore, must be construed, by established
doctrine. The giving of notice of termination authorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which pertinently provides that a demand by a landlord for payment of rent or comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises may inter alia be made "by posting
such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon.
The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico Victor and his sons
became obliged to surrender the leased apartment to the lessor. They did not. They stayed
away from the place and did not show up during the repossession undertaken by the lessor,
announced in advance through the posting of another notice on the door of the apartment.
Victor bring a forcible entry suit against De Asis on the theory that the stipulation in the
lease contract authorizing repossession by the lessor without court action was void as contrary
to public policy. The Court also ruled that the stipulation is in the nature of a resolutory
condition, for upon the exercise by the Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased
property, the contract is deemed terminated. There is considerable authority in American law
upholding the validity of stipulations authorizing the use of all necessary force or reasonable
force in making re-entry upon the expiration of the lease.
Since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously terminated the month-to-month
lease by notice, and had therefore acquired an affirmative right of action to judicially eject the
lessee after giving notice to vacate, the existence of such an affirmative right of action
constitutes a valid defense against, and is fatal to any action by the tenant who has been
ousted otherwise than judicially to recover possession. Petition for review on certiorari must be
accorded correspondingly granted to the petitioners. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In their lease contracts, respondents and intervenors agreed to
comply with regulations which may be promulgated by petitioner even after their contracts
have been executed.
 82. Co keng kian v. Ca G.R. No.75676 - August 29, 1990

FACTS: In 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by
private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the written
contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times Building,
petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding
receipt of several letters of demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises,
turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent. The inferior
court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. The court
held that since none of the demand letters was served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of
such demand upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the
premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. If none was made, the case came within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for reconsideration by
petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its
decision, the Appellate Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier
sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. Motion for reconsideration having been denied.
In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the lower courts to task for
taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule 70, and declaring that the service of demand
letters to vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3) modes enumerated therein. We
agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case indicate personal service on the lessee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the MTC in an action for
ejectment, may be served by registered mail.
RULING: Yes, The court ruled that the notice to vacate the leased premises, required by the
Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be
commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial compliance
with the modes of service enumerated under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature because they involve a disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as
possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays.
It is not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has
personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a
messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila
Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc.
was the new owner of the subject building. A demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him
to leave the premises but petitioner refused to receive the letter. The second demand elicited
the same reaction; and on final demand, it was sent to petitioner by registered mail which he
again refused. And even on the supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by
petitioner, this could only be due to petitioner's blatant attempts at evasion which compelled
the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an unfair situation
where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted delay
resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid
demand.
Therefore, the petition is denied for lack of merit and decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
 83. Jakihaca v. Aquino G.R. No.83982 - January 12, 1990

Facts: In 1986, petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents-spouses
Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the MTC of San Mateo, Rizal, on
account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses which they have allegedly illegally
constructed without the knowledge and consent and against the will of the former on a
residential land despite verbal demand. It was referred to the Barangay Captain for conciliation
processes. But due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before the Barangay Lupon,
the Lupon issued a certification to file action. Served with summons, the defendants, filed an
answer alleging among others, that there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the
defendants and the former owner of the land which they planted to fruit bearing trees and
devoted the same primarily to rice and corn products. Therefore, they cannot be ejected under
the Land Reform Law from this land which they had occupied and cultivated for more than ten
(10) years with the consent of the former owner Gloria Gener. A year after, the respondent
trial court found that the private respondents are not agricultural tenant-farmers of the land in
question. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the lower court acted without jurisdiction
as the complaint shows nothing when the verbal demand to remove the houses on the lot of
the petitioner was made on the private respondents. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not ejectment case filed by petitioner is with jurisdiction.

RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. An allegation in an original complaint for illegal
detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore
the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous
demand. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at
any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. Nowhere in the
answer of respondents contain an allegation attacking the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court based on the issue on demand.

Another reason for the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as
alleged by the respondents in their answer to the complaint filed with the MTC, was the court
has no jurisdiction to try the case as they are tenants-farmers and that as such they cannot be
ejected from their farm holdings without a certification by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Petitioners, attached the report of Mr. Maines of the Agrarian that there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that the subject land is devoted to the production of rice and corn; that
the occupants are not sharing with the present landowner, that the subject land is not
tenanted, not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, Hence, considering the report of
said office, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal was
proper. Petition is GRANTED and decision of lower courts is SET ASIDE.
 84. Aquino v. Aure G.R. No.153567 - February 18, 2008

Facts: Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In their Complaint,. Aure
and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from a Deed of Sale. Aquino
countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any
legal right over the subject property. METC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay
conciliation process, among other grounds. The METC observed that Aure and Aquino
are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to
settle the case amicably at the barangay. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the METC and RTC
Decisions and remanding the case to the METC for further proceedings and final determination
of the substantive rights of the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceeding is a

jurisdictional defect that warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

RULING: No. Petition is denied. Decision of lower courts is affirmed. The court ruled that there
is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted civil case. In fact, no allegation of such
barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint before the
METC. It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation,
previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is much the same effect
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The complaint becomes afflicted with
the vice of pre-maturity and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination.
The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a juridical requirement so that non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired
over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court,
after acquiring jurisdiction, may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The new rule on Summary procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of
the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does
not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment
suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
85. [G.R. No. L-78343. May 21, 1988.]

HEIRS OF RICARDO OLIVAS vs. THE HON. FLORENTINO A. FLOR (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal), JOSE A. MATAWARAN
Facts:
On 16 May 1986, petitioners filed a complaint for Forcible Entry before the Municipal Trial
Court of Morong, Rizal (MTC, for short), alleging that private respondent, through stealth and
strategy, unlawfully took possession of the disputed property and ousted petitioners from their
possession thereof. The MTC issued summons stating that the Rule on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases shall apply. Paragraph 4 of the complaint is admitted insofar as the fact that
defendant did complain to the Barangay Chairman regarding the repeated attempts of plaintiff
to unlawfully grab possession of the property owned by defendant and his other brothers and
sisters.crvirtua1aw library

Issue:

Whether or not the MTC Decision is violative of the Rule on Summary Procedure, and that
Respondent RTC erred in affirming the MTC’s dismissal of the case.cralawnad

Held :

The Court resolved to give due course to the Petition finding merit in the foregoing
submissions. Compliance by the MTC with the Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases
was wanting. For example, "a preliminary conference during which the Court must clarify and
define the issues of the case, which must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the Order to be
issued immediately after such preliminary conference" (Section 6), was not followed. Neither
was Section 7 thereof which further requires that within ten (10) days from receipt of the said
order, "the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual
issues defined therein, together with a brief statement of their positions setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them."crryIn the guise of a position paper, private respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss. While this is, indeed, a prohibited pleading (Sec. 15[a], Rule on Summary
Procedure) it should be noted that the Motion was filed after an Answer had already been
submitted within the reglementary period. In essence, therefore, it is not the pleading
prohibited by the Rule on Summary Procedure. What the Rule proscribes is a Motion to
Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an Answer and cause undue delay.
Nonetheless, private respondent’s Answer (paragraph 3, supra) left no room for doubt that
the parties were acquainted with the identity of the disputed property. It would be sheer
technicality, destructive of the ends of substantial justice, were the case to be dismissed on the
ground of lack of particularity of the disputed property. In fact, if the Rule on Summary
Procedure had been followed, such additional data as were needed to define the issues of the
case could have been threshed out in the preliminary conference. It is true that the Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the dismissal of a case outright due to failure to state a cause of
action. However, such dismissal is a permissible upon the filing of the complaint from a
consideration by the Court of the allegations thereof. In this case, the proceedings had gone far
afield. The outright dismissal was not ordered upon the filing of the complaint. On the contrary,
the MTC made a determination that the case falls under summary procedure, issued summons
stating that fact, and subsequently even issued a Temporary Restraining Order.
86. [G.R. No. 80739 August 20, 1992]

GRACIA R. JOVEN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she mortgaged in favor
of the Development Bank of the Philippines. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were sold at public auction to DBP as the
biggest bidder After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made
by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private
respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985. On January 30, 1986,
Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative, Fernando Lasala, the other
private respondent. Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure and
named as defendants were DBP and the private respondents. Later, when her application for
preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc complaint against the private respondents for forcible entry
with a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case and
that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises for occupying
the same without judicial authorization.

Held:

The petition has merit. The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground that a question of
ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observations from
Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court. This ruling is
embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal courts with exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; Provided, that when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
should be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.The Municipal Circuit Trial Court
did not err in holding that the motion for reconsideration was not covered by the prohibition
under Section 15 (c). The motion prohibited by this section is that which seeks reconsideration
of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. The decision
dismissing the petitioner's ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the
merits. Review thereof could therefore be sought by the petitioner through her motion for
reconsideration and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect of suspending the
running of the period to appeal. In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of
the redemption period without the petitioner having redeemed the lands, DBP executed an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it filed with the
Register of deeds a final deed of sale or a sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-
redemption. The circumstance that the properties are still in the name of the petitioner shows
that DBP has also not yet obtained a new certificate of title in its name. And neither does it
appear that DBP, on the basis of its purchase of the lands at the foreclosure sale, ever secured a
writ of possession to authorize its entry into the said lands. Not having done any of these, DBP
had as yet not acquired any perfected right of possession that it could transfer to the private
respondents. And as the petitioner continued in actual possession of the subject premises, she
could undoubtedly maintain an action for forcible entry against the private respondents when,
not being armed with a court order or a writ of possession, they simply entered and took
possession of the subject lands. The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or
material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand,
violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches
of the peace and criminal disorder which might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy.
Another purpose is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the
possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in the courts
to assert their claims. While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two
actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment suit,
the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale whereas the issue
in the ejectment case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the
private respondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the
relief prayed for is recovery of ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration
of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the
ejectment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the regional trial court.
87. [G.R. No. 79119. November 22, 1990.]

VICTORINO E. DAY vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, BRANCH XIII,
Presided by Hon. Judge Carlito A. Eisma, and GO CHU, Respondents.

Facts:virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2667 and situated at Tomas Claudio St., Zamboanga City. Private
respondent Go Chu is the owner of a building constructed on the said lot occupying an area of
101 square meters.chanrPrivate respondent was asked by petitioner to peacefully vacate and
remove that portion of the former’s building standing on the latter’s lot. Due to private
respondent’s refusal to vacate the premises, on April 17, 1982, petitioner instituted a
formal complaint against respondent. The dispute was continuously discussed by the parties
through 1982, 1983, and 1984. On October 16, 1984, petitioner agreed to accept P1,000.00
from private respondent as rental for the use of his lot from 1979 to December 1984. As
petitioner had received the P1,000.00 as compensation for respondent’s use of his land,
respondent claimed the existence of a lease contract between them. Respondent Go
Chu, however, failed to prove the existence of a formal or even verbal contract of lease.

Issue:

Whether or not B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case to apply for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Held:

The Court agrees with petitioner that Section 33 of B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful
detainer action to apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. With the advent of B.P. 129, Art.
539 of the New Civil Code, Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Sec. 3, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court have been substantially modified. B.P. 129 provides: "provided the main action is
within its jurisdiction, an inferior court can appoint a receiver and it has jurisdiction to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction in either forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases.” Under the
present law, an inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases. The
applicability of prior conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. 1508, section 6 of which it is
clear from the foregoing that prior conciliation proceedings as mandated by P.D. 1508 were
inapplicable to the petitioner’s suit before the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City,
the action being for ejectment with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. P.D. 1508 provides that an action "coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction," etc. does not require conciliation proceedings as a pre-condition for
filing an action in court. The case of petitioner being an exception to the requirement of prior
conciliation by P.D. 1508, it was not necessary for petitioner to first secure the necessary
certification to file action from the proper barangay court. Even assuming that petitioner’s
complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court did not fall within the exceptions
enumerated in Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508, the lower court in its decision ruled that the April 1982
certification to file action issued by the proper Barangay Court was sufficient compliance with
P.D. 1508. In the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against private respondent, the lower court
undoubtedly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of then
defendant (now private respondent) by the filing of the complaint and service of summons
upon then defendant (now private respondent) and the filing by the latter of his answer. Thus,
it cannot be said that the lower court had no jurisdiction to render the decision set aside by
respondent court. Assuming that the lower court committed a mistake on the merits of the
case, it was in the exercise of such jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is at most one of judgment
and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the object of a petition for certiorari. The proper
remedy in such case was appeal.
88. G.R. No. 133882 September 5, 2006

ANGELA DELA ROSA and CORAZON MEDINA

vs.
ORFELINA D. ROLDAN, LORNA SAN DIEGO, FLORDELIZA D. CATACUTAN, NORMA Y.
LACUESTA, and ARSENIO DULAY

Facts:

The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado were the owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Tarlac, Tarlac, both covered by respective titles; the 261-square-meter lot was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7225, while the 772 sq. m. was covered by TCT
No. 7226. Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale over the properties in
favor of the spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa. Gideon dela Rosa, one of
Asuncion's brothers, was one of the instrumental witnesses in the deed. To pay for the
property, the spouses Dulay, who were members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), secured a P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate mortgage over the two lots as
security therefor. On September 16, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 29040 and
29041 in the names of the spouses Dulay. The spouses Dulay forthwith took possession of the
lots, except a 500-square-meter portion which was then occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his
wife Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina stood. The spouses Dulay
declared the property for taxation purposes in their names and paid the realty taxes therefor.
Sometime in 1982, the spouses Dulay made demands on Gideon, Angela and Corazon to vacate
the premises, as their three daughters would be constructing their respective houses thereon.
Gideon, Angela and Corazon refused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against them with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Tarlac.

Issue:

Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents.

Held:

The Court agrees with the decision of the CA that the action of respondents against petitioners
was one for unlawful detainer, and that the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. Indeed,
petitioners claimed ownership over one-half of the property in their answer to the complaint
and alleged that respondents were merely trustees thereof for their benefit as trustors; and,
during the pre-trial, respondents admitted having filed their complaint for recovery of
possession of real property (accion publiciana) against petitioners before the CFI of Tarlac.
However, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdiction over the complaint for
unlawful detainer of respondents. It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of
an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and
all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the action
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss,
for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. Jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action
and the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by defendant in an answer
or motion to dismiss. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the law in effect when respondents filed their complaint against
petitioners, provides that "Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer; provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the questions of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues of
possession." As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs below,
alleged that they were the owners of parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041,
hence, entitled to the possession of the property; petitioners (defendants therein) and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the said parcels of land since 1957 without paying any
rent; their possession over the property continued even after the spouses Dulay purchased the
property; and that their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay
and, after Asuncion died on June 26, 1995, by respondents; petitioners promised to vacate the
premises when respondents needed the property; demands were made by respondents on
October 2, 1995 for petitioners to vacate the property but the latter refused, prompting an
action to be filed in the Office of the Pangkat.

It is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue to be litigated by
the parties – whether or not unlawful detainer is proper in the premises considering
defendants' claim of ownership from 1982; otherwise stated, whether petitioners' occupation
of the land in dispute was by mere tolerance of respondents. As framed by the MTC, the issue
before it was basically one of physical or material possession of the property, although
petitioners raised ownership as an issue. Thus, the MTC erred when it declared that, since
defendants claimed ownership over the property, it was divested of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the case on its merits. It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer
cases, the only issue for resolution, independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant,
is: who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the property involved? The mere
fact that defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not
deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where
defendant raises the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve
the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as it may be the subject of
separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the issue. Hence, the bare fact that
petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the
property as trustors of a constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did not
divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the same on its
merits. Petitioners were well aware that the issue of ownership over the property had to be
resolved in a proper action for the purpose, separate from and independent of Civil Case. It is
for this reason that petitioner Angela filed a complaint for recovery of ownership,
reconveyance, cancellation of title and damages against respondents wherein she prayed that
respondents, as defendants, be ordered to convey to her one-half portion of the property. The
Court agrees with the contention of petitioners that for an action for unlawful detainer based
on possession by mere tolerance to prosper, the possession of the property by defendant must
be legal from the very beginning. In this case, petitioners' possession of the property was
tolerated by the former owners, the spouses Rivera, and by the spouses Dulay after they
purchased the property. After all, Angela was the granddaughter of Consolacion Rivera, the
sister of Adriano Rivera, and Gideon was the brother of Asuncion. However, when the spouses
Dulay needed the property for their children's use and requested petitioners to vacate the
property, the latter refused. From then on, petitioners' possession of the property became
deforciant. A person who occupies the land of another on the latter's tolerance, without any
contract between them, is necessarily barred by an implied provision that he will vacate the
same upon demand.
89. ANGEL P. PERAN vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF SORSOGON
G.R. No. L-57259 October 13, 1983

FACTS:

This is a case where an unregistered land owned by Jose Evasco who executed a
“Repatricion Extrajudicial for the partition of his properties among his five heirs.
The heirs received their own shares. However, one of them died whose children was listed as
Encarfnacio, who is the principal private respondent.
Petitioner acquired the land by purchase from Jose Enriquez who declared the property in his
own name. The sale was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds' Office of the province of
Sorsogon.

In January 1979, petitioner asked private respondents and her common-law husband Ramon
Espera to remove a house erected and vacate the premises. Respondents refused, and a
confrontation between the parties but to no avail. Then, here petitioner filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer contending that respondents are mere squatters; that they
had prevented plaintiff from entering the property and deprived him of possession; and that
they were tolerating persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual erosion of the land to
his extreme prejudice.

Respondents answered denying the material allegations of the Complaint, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent court was in error when for purposes of determining the
jurisdiction of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, to try Civil Case No. 1227,
for Illegal Detainer;

(a) it reckoned the counting of one-year period within which to file the action from the sale of
the property in question by Alejandro Evasco to Jose Torella on December 31, 1972 and not
from the date of demand made by the petitioner upon the respondents; and

(b) by assuming that "prior possession in whatever character is protected by law.

HELD:

A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from
the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. 13 The one-year-period of limitation
commences from the time of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the
same is counted from the last letter of demand. 14 Demand may either be personal or in
writing. 15 The demand to vacate having been made by petitioner in January 1979, and the
ejectment suit having been instituted on February 8, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of
Bulusan-Barcelona acted well within its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.
Possession by tolerance is lawful but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the
owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. 9 A possessor by tolerance is
necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 10It is not necessary that there be a
formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a
possessor by tolerance. 11 Neither is prior physical possession of the property by petitioner an
indispensable requisite. 12 The ruling of respondent Court, therefore, which “since the only
issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action is the physical possession of real
property—possession de facto and n t possession de jure—whoever has prior
possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law,” is erroneous under the
factual milieu
90. JOVITO P. DIZON vs. AGAPITA CONCINA
G.R. No. L-23756 December 27, 1969

FACTS:

This is a suit for forcible entry which the complaint filed avers that on defendants,
confederating together and helping one another, by means of force, strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered the southwestern portion of the property just described, having an area of
75 acres, more or less, ejecting therefrom plaintiff's encargado and depriving plaintiff of the
possession which the judgment of the trial went to plaintiff. Then responded filed his
amendment which repeats the description of the land. However, the defendant moved for the
dismissal of the action, in the words of counsel, "for lack of jurisdiction because the land
litigated before this Honorable Court by virtue of the amended complaint has not been litigated
in the inferior court", and that there was "a change of theory and cause of action." They
directed their criticism against paragraph 3 of the amended complaint just adverted to.

Issue: Whether or not such amendment changed the subject matter over which as an appellate
court it had no jurisdiction?

Held:
The court a quo explained that “Misconception is right here apparent. To be
observed is that in the original complaint the technical description of plaintiff's land6
shows that on the southwest its boundary is Rangas River. To coincide with this in a
general way is that defendants' answer in the inferior court and their original answer in the
Court of First Instance state that their two parcels of land, as they were originally described,
place the boundary to the north of their properties as the same Rangas River. And, in their
amended answer, the two parcels of land (this time consolidated into one) claimed to be
owned by defendants were described by the latter as being bounded on the north by Rangas
River (before), but by Jovito P. Dizon (now). But in paragraph 5 thereof, they do aver that the
course of the river suddenly changed by traversing the northern portion of their lands,
segregating each portion from the rest; but that, as alleged in paragraph 6, the old river bed
had become dry, and defendants had taken possession of the same, and never abandoned such
possession of the segregated northern portion; and that if plaintiff referred to the consolidated
land, the northern portion of their land separated as well as the old river bed, then plaintiff, in
the words of the amended answer, "has no right whatsoever over the same."

Even on the assumption that there was an apparent conflict in the description of the disputed
land as set forth in the two complaints, such a situation would not change the case from a
forcible entry suit into a different action.7 The case must be tried and the identity of the land
alleged in the complaint established, to determine whether or not plaintiff's rights have been
violated.

Hence, the court dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiff for the reimbursement in
favor of the defendant.
91. CASE TITLE: MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116665 March 20, 1996
FACTS:

Petitioner Azcuna Jr. leased 3 building units (C,E, and F) of private respondent
Barcelona’s family. In the lease contract, the lessor has the right to charge the lessee
P1,000.00/day as damages, in case lessee fails to pay or vacate. When lease expired
without renewal and petitioner failed to surrender the units despite demands, private
respondent filed an ejectment case.
MTC, RTC and CA ordered petitioner to, among others, vacate the premises known as Units C, E
and F. Defendant is likewise ordered to pay the following:
“1. The sum of P25,000.00 monthly as rental for continued use by defendant of the three
(3) units of leased premises in question starting July 1, 1993 less the amount that have been
deposited or given by the defendant to the plaintiff up to such time the defendant and all
persons claiming rights under him finally vacate the aforesaid premises;
“2. The further sum of P3,000.00 per day, by way of damages for his failure to turn over
peacefully the three (3) commercial spaces to the plaintiff from July 1, 1993 until such
time the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him vacate the premises;
“3. The further sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and,
“4. The cost of this suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner appeals that the awarding of P3,000.00/day as damages
can only be claimed in ordinary action, not in ejectment?

HELD:
YES. In ejectment cases, damages recovered are those equivalent to reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. This also includes damage previously
agreed to by lessee in the lease contract and imposed by lessor by way of damages. Additional
damages and charges other than fair rental value of property and liquidated damages cannot
be claimed in ejectment.
92. DANILO DUMO and SUPREMA DUMO,
G.R. No. 141962 January 25, 2006

FACTS:
Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang,
La Union. Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against
spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same resort.
Although a decision has been rendered against the defendants in the case against spouses
Saldana, the the same was not enforced.
Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real
property, and in open defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, all defendants acting
for the interest of Espinas took it upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat,
to enter the property.
Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and visibly
outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers,
and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, and took over the premises
It was alleged that the defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by
the "judge" to do just that – to forcibly enter and take over the premises. While inside the
premises, they demolished and totally tore down all the improvements.
Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. The MTC
rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of possession over
the subject property.
Respondents appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and set aside
the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled that as regards damages, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the leased property.
Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found
that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and agreed with the ruling of the
RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is
the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property
concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be recovered is
the fair rental value for use of the property.

HELD:
No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and
exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that
can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property.
The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of
rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff
could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have
no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost
earnings over beach resort could have been considered as compensation for their loss
of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the respondents,
records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.
93. De Laureano v. Adil
G.R. No.l-43345
7-29-1976

FACTS:

Josefina Laureano is the registered owner of 2 Lots in Iloilo City. Said lots were leased to Ong Cu
for a 15 year period which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974. Upon Ong Cu’s failure to
vacate the lots and remove his improvements, Mrs. Laureano filed an ejectment suit
against him in Oct. 1974. In Sept. 1975, Court ordered Ong Cu to vacate the lots, to
restore their possession to Mrs. Laureano, to remove his buildings and other improvements
thereon and to pay P12,428 monthly compensation from the expiration of the lease until he
vacates them. Ong Cu appealed to CFI Iloilo but instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on
the findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the city court ex parte to approve his
supersedeas bond in the sum of P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at P1,200 a
month. The city court granted that ex parte motion. Thereafter, the record was elevated to the
Court of First Instance. Mrs. Laureano filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore her to the possession of the said lots, alleging that Ong CU’s
appeal was frivolous and dilatory. She also asked for immediate execution of the city
court's judgment on the ground that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and
that he had failed to deposit the sum of P12,428 monthly as reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the lots adjudged by the city court. Ong Cu opposed the two motions. The
lower court upheld the city court's order fixing the supersedeas bond and the amount to be
deposited by Ong Cu. Court ruled that the writ could not be granted because it had already
sanctioned Ong Cu's supersedeas bond, the purpose of which was to stay execution pending
appeal.

ISSUES: WON the lower Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for
execution and mandatory injunction

RULING: YES. Judgments in ejectment cases are immediately executory. The purpose of the
supersedeas bond is to secure payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed
judgment. Hence, the bond is not necessary if the defendant deposits in court the amount of
back rentals fixed in the judgment.

In the instant case, the city court found that Ong Cu’s lease expired and that the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the two lots is P4/sqm or P12,428 monthly. To stay
execution, Ong Cu should have filed, and the city court should have required, a supersedeas
bond in the total amount of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots for
the period of 13 months, at the rate fixed in the court’s decision which is P12,428. This is in
accordance to Section 8 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The city court therefore erred in issuing
ex parte an order granting Ong Cu’s motion fixing the amount of the sueprsedeas bond at
P22,000 and the monthly deposit at P1,200(rental stipulated in the lease contract). Ong
Cu’s supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he did not deposit the compensation
for the use and occupation of the two lots which was fixed in the city court’s judgment.
His supersedeas bond and his deposits were not sufficient to stay execution.

However, Mrs. Laureano is not entitled to immediate execution as a matter of right because a
supersedeas bond was filed as well as deposits of monthly rentals- they were just inadequate
and not in accordance to the court’s judgment. She would be entitled to immediate
execution if defendant did not file any sueprsedeas bond or make any monthly deposit.
The only exceptions to mandatory execution in case of no bond/deposit are the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or execusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting
the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events
which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make
the execution inequitable.
Ong Cu should be given a 30 day period from notice within which to file a new supersedeas
bond in the sum of P161,564 (13 months) and to deposit P12,428 beginning October, 1975 less
the amounts already deposited by him. Execution should issue if he fails to file a new
supersedeas bond and to make up for the deficiency in his monthly deposits.

The lower court discerned an absurdity or incongruency in allowing a defendant in an

ejectment case to stay execution of the inferior court’s decision, by filing a supersedeas
bond and making monthly deposits, and at the same time granting a mandatory injunction to
restore possession on the theory that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous and mandatory.

The absurdity is more apparent than real. The execution in an ejectment case has two aspects:
(a) possession and (b) the rentals or reasonable value of the use of the premises. The
mandatory injunction refers to the possession of the premises in litigation. On the other hand,
the supersedeas bond and the monthly deposits are primarily designed to insure that the
plaintiff would be paid the back rentals or the compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises should the inferior court’s decision in his favor be affirmed on appeal.

Hence, if no bond was filed or no monthly deposit was made, the plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the premises. To allow the defendant to continue his possession without any
security for the rentals would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not be able to recover the
back rentals when the judgment in his favor becomes final and executory. In that event, his
claim for rentals would be illusory or ineffectual.
If the mandatory injunction is granted, defendant’s possession would cease but the
supersedeas bond and the deposits already made would subsist as security for the accrued
pecuniary liability of the defendant to the plaintiff. The execution as to the rentals or
compensation for the use of the premises would be stayed. It results that the lower court
gravely abused its discretion in not granting the writ of mandatory injunction.
94. Sunflower neighborhood assoc v. CA
G.R. No.136274
9-3-2003
FACTS:

Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of
Macaria Maglaqui, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other
persons4 who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville,
United Parañ aque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual
transfer certificates of title5 registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondent’s
mother. The MetC eventually decided in favor of private respondent. The writ, however, was
not immediately implemented because the case was transferred to another Branch of the same
court.

Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-
G) subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower
Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. Sunflower argued that its
members should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties to the original
unlawful detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive them of
due process.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case,
may be ejected from the land subject of this case.

RULING: It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the
judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be
heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is:
(a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to
frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the
family, relative or privy of the defendant.
95. Cruzcosa v. Concepcion
G.R. No.l-11146
4-22-1957

FACTS:

On April 28, 1949, respondent Efren Mendoza filed in the Municipal Court of Manila two
separate complaints for ejectment against Catalino Cruzcosa and Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr. (C. C.
Nos. 7515 and 10693), claiming to be the owner of Lot No. 115, Block No. 3068 of the Cadastral
Survey of the City of Manila, located in Velasquez, Tondo; that defendants are occupying the
same at a monthly rental of P24; and that defendants had failed to pay the rentals since July,
1948 and he (plaintiff) needed the premises for his own use. After joinder of issues and trial,
judgement was rendered for plaintiffs in both cases. Defendant Catalino Cruzcosa in C. C. No.
7514 moved to reconsider the judgment against him on the ground that he was not the real
party in interest because the building on the lot in question belonged not to him but to his
children of the first marriage, Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr., Remedios Cruzcosa, and Virginia Cruzcosa.
Reconsideration in C. C. No. 7514 was, however, and the denied and the defendants in both
cases appealed to the Court of First Instance (C. C. Nos. 10693 and 13205).

In the Court of First Instance, defendant Catalino Cruzcosa filed a motion to dismiss on the
same ground set for thin his motion for reconsideration in the inferior court, namely, that the
building on the lot in question was not his property but the property of his children Catalino
Cruzcosa, Jr., Remedios Cruzcosa, and Virginia Cruzcosa, and that therefore, he was not the real
party in interest; but said motion to dismiss was denied. Both defendants appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the house in question to be the property of
appellant Cruzcosa, Jr. and his two sisters, Virginia and Remedios Cruzcosa, but that it was with
their father Catalino Cruzcosa that plaintiff Efren Mendoza had a lease agreement, and so
affirmed by the judgement of the trial court insofar as it ordered the ejectment of defendants
from the premises if they failed to vacate the same with in the time specified by the appellate
court.

Upon there turn of the records to the court a quo, plaintiff Efren Mendoza filed a motion to
execute the judgment and pursuant thereto, the court issued then a writ of execution. Later,
the plaintiff moved for the demolition of defendants house on the lot in question, which
defendants opposed mainly on the argument that said house did not belong exclusively to
defendant Cruzcosa, Jr., but was owned by him jointly with his sisters Virginia and Remedios
Cruzcosa, who had not been made parties in the entire proceedings and who could not be
deprived of their property without due process of law. Notwithstanding defendants' opposition
to the motion for demolition, the court granted the same and on July 18, 1956 ordered the
Sheriff of Manila to demolish the house in question if defendants did not remove it from
plaintiff property within twenty days. Complaining about this order of demolition, Marieta
Virginia Cruzcosa and Remedios Cruzcosa filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction; and upon a bond of P1,000, we granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for.
ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction shall
prosper

RULING: Yes. Petitioners were conclusively found by the Court of Appeals to be co-owners of
the building in question. Having an interest therein, they should have been made parties to the
ejectment proceedings to give them a chance to protect their rights, and not having been made
parties thereto, they are not bound and cannot be affected by the judgment rendered therein
against their co-owner Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr. To execute, then, said judgment against their
interests in the house in question would be to divest of their property without due process of
law.

Respondent Efren Mendoza argues that petitioners are guilty of laches and are estopped from
enjoining the order of demolition against their property because they had been are of the
ejectment proceedings all along and had failed to intervene therein to protect their rights.
Respondent forgets that neither the Municipal Court nor the Court of First Instance acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners since they were never at any time made parties to
the proceedings; and it is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred only by law and can not be
acquired through, or waived by, any actor omission of the parties. Besides, petitioners had no
duty to intervene in the proceedings, intervention in an action not being compulsory or
mandatory but only optional and permissive (Rule 13, secs. 1 to 3, Rules of Court); they had the
right to rely on their legal and constitutional rights not to be deprived of their property without
previous hearing. And what is more, there is no proof that petitioners had knowledge, previous
to the order of demolition, of the pendency of respondent's ejectment actions, so that their
failure to intervene therein can not in any case have the effect either of waiver or estoppel.

The records show that respondent had been aware of petitioner's joint interests in the house in
question even when his actions were still pending in the inferior court, because defendant
Catalino Cruzcosa had always maintained that the owners of said house were his children
Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr. and herein petitioners. Having notice of petitioners' interest in said house,
it was respondent Mendoza's duty to amend his complaint; and now that his judgement has
already become final and executory, he can not insist on the destruction of the house in
question, to the injury and damage of the interests of petitioners, who have not been even
heard.
96. Salting v. Velez
G.R. No.181930
1-10-2011

FACTS:

On October 7, 2003, respondents John Velez and Clarissa Velez filed a complaint for ejectment
against petitioner Milagros Salting involving a property covered by (TCT) No. 38079. On March
28, 2006, respondents obtained a favorable decision when the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
ordered petitioner to vacate the subject parcel of land and to pay attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. The decision became final and executory, after which respondents filed a motion
for execution which was opposed by petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), for Annulment
of Sale of the Property covered by TCT with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondents, and Heirs of Villamena.
Petitioner claimed that she purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced
by a notarized document known as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents
were able to obtain title to the subject property through the fraudulent acts of the heirs of
Villamena. Finally, she averred that the decision in Civil Case had not attained finality as she
was not properly informed of the MeTC decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued,
restraining respondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC
decision. She further sought the declaration of nullity of the sale by the heirs of Villamena to
respondents involving the subject parcel of land, and, consequently, the cancellation of the title
to the property in the name of respondents.

Finding that petitioner would suffer grave and irreparable damage if respondents would not be
enjoined from executing the MeTC decision while respondents would not suffer any prejudice,
the RTC, in an Order, granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for. Aggrieved,
respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against
the execution of a judgment for ejectment.

The CA resolved the issue in the affirmative. The CA noted that the principal action in Civil Case
is the annulment of the deed of sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena,
while the subject of the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction is the execution of the final
judgment in a separate proceeding for ejectment. The appellate court concluded that petitioner
had no clear and unmistakable right to possession over the subject parcel of land in view of the
MeTC decision. Hence, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC, the CA opined that petitioner was
not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. The CA thus set aside the Order of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the writ of Preliminary Injunction shall issue

RULING:
No. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a
right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial
and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The applicant’s right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the
applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.

A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is
not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by
the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed are violative of said right.

In this case, the enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from her
residence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no legal right that
merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Her right to
possess the property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to
respondents in the ejectment case in the MeTC decision which has become final and executory.
97. G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA vs. MARIA COPRADA

FACTS:
In 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla (Victoria) filed an
ejectment case against respondent Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in M.H. Del Pilar St., Barangay San Miguel,
Majayjay, Laguna, containing an area of 253 square meters and covered by a TCT.

In 1945, respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her family to
use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the
premises should petitioners need to use the same. Respondent and her family were allowed to
construct their residential house.

Time came when petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land,
but the latter refused. A demand letter dated August 22, 1996 was sent, giving respondent until
November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises. However, respondent still ignored said
demand, which prompted petitioners to bring a complaint before the barangay authorities. No
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action in Court was issued for an
ejectment case against the respondent before the MCTC.

Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject land. However,
she averred that in 1945, it was Emiliana Coprada (petitioner Victoria Sordevilla’s mother and
original owner of the subject land) and not the petitioners who gave permission to her
late husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot. Emiliana allowed her nephew Brigido
and his family to occupy the lot as their permanent abode, because of her love and affection for
her nephew, and also, due to the fact that the said lot is virtually a wasteland. Thereafter,
Brigido and his family cleared the area and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When Emiliana
died, the ownership of the property was inherited by her only child, petitioner Victoria
Sordevilla. Sometime in the early 1960’s, petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for sale for
P2,000.00 to respondent, who readily agreed. The purchase price was paid in installments and
was fully paid in 1962. Due to their close relationship, the agreement was never reduced to
writing. Respondent further maintained that since the execution of the oral sale of the subject
lot, she has been the one paying the realty taxes due on the property.

Respondent stated that petitioners’ claim is barred by laches. Even granting, without
admitting, that respondent’s claim of ownership over the property is improper because
petitioners are the registered owners thereof, respondent argued that she is a builder in good
faith, because she was able to build the structure on the subject lot with the prior permission of
the owner.

MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint holding that laches had already set in.
However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the MCTC’s judgment. Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC. On their petition
for review, CA reverses the ruling of the RTC and affirmed MCTC’s.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject
property.

HELD:

Yes. An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: “Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.”

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between
them. However, defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

Respondent first acquired possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 until
the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 1997, the nature of that possession has never
changed. Petitioners allowed the respondent to possess the property with the knowledge that
the respondent will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate was
communicated by the petitioners to the respondent, petitioners are not required to do any act
to recover the subject land, precisely because they knew of the nature of the respondent’s
possession, i.e., possession by mere tolerance. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are
guilty of failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time.

Further, after the petitioners gave a demand letter to the respondent giving the latter until
November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises, which respondent failed to heed, they
immediately filed a complaint before the barangay authorities and, thereafter, lodged an
ejectment case before the MCTC on February 24, 1997.

Since respondent’s occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance or permission of

the petitioners, without any contract between them, respondent is bound by an implied
promise that she will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against her.
98. G.R. No. 112050, June 15, 1994
QUINTIN F. FELIZARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS & NEMESIO B. JOSE

FACTS:
Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot located at No.
63-20th St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioner Quintin Felizardo. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the Municipal Trial
Court of Olongapo City.

On February 27, 1992, summons was issued directing the petitioner to file an answer and
informing him that the Rule on Summary Procedure would be applied. In his answer, the
petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent’s allegations to support his prayer
for a preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the
requirements of P.D. 1508 for prior barangay conciliation.

At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the petitioner questioned the
jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the private respondent’s cause of action for
non-compliance with the said decree.

On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner.

On September 17, 1992, upon motion of the private respondent, the court issued an order
for the execution of its decision.

On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a
petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. That court also issued a temporary restraining order
against the enforcement of the writ of execution.

On October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari with injunction
was not the proper remedy of the petitioner, appeal being then still available to him. The
dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari before the RTC was proper.

HELD:

No. It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only where the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
When the trial court continued to act on the ejectment case despite lack of prior barangay
conciliation, the same raised a procedural question that could not be reviewed in a special civil
action for certiorari but only in an ordinary appeal. Whether or not the court acted correctly in
proceeding with the case even without the prior barangay proceeding is a procedural question
that could not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only in an ordinary appeal.
A similar observation is made on its declaration that it was incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove that the private respondent’s allegations in support of the prayer for preliminary
injunction was false and that compensation or set-off was not a proper defense. These
conclusions would at most constitute errors of judgment reviewable only on appeal and not
errors of jurisdiction reviewable by certiorari.

The judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if in favor of the plaintiff, must
be executed immediately to prevent further damage to him arising from loss of possession.
Nevertheless, the defendant is not entirely without recourse. Under the Rules of Court, he may
stay such immediate execution by a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas bond; and c)
periodically depositing with the appellate court the rentals falling due during the pendency of
the appeal.

These remedies are expressly provided for in Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules of Court,
reading in part as follows: If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter
the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract,
if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. x x x

Although an order for the execution of the judgment in favor of the private respondent had
already been issued and Felizardo’s ejectment from the leased property was imminent, he
could still prevent the implementation of the said order by availing himself of the above
remedies. But he did not.
99. G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas on a land owned in
common by the Locsins, Solinap, and Jarantilla wherein they executed a contract of lease that
contains a reservation of the rights of the lessor to sell, mortgage, or encumber the property
with the purchaser respecting the contract of lease. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
upon expiration of the term and the purchaser in the MTC against the lessees filed an unlawful
detainer case. The lessees in turn filed a case in the RTC to enforce their preemptive rights
andto recover their deposits. A motion to dismiss was filed with the RTC but was denied. A
petition for certiorari was filed and the CA held that the pendency of a case in the RTC did not
warrant the suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Star Group’s unlawful detainer suits in the Municipal Trial Court
against petitioner lessees for the reason that their leases had expired, should be abated
by the actions filed in the Regional Trial Court by said petitioner lessees based on the
contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption or prior purchase of the leased
premises.

HELD:
No. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC based on the
tenant’s claim that his right of preemption was violated.

The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the Regional Trial
Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case
in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding,
or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved. This is specially true in the cases at bar where the
petitioners-lessees’ claims—that the lessors (and the buyer of the leased premises) had
violated their leasehold rights because (a) they (the lessees) were not accorded the right
of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect their leases, and (c) the lessees were
denied the option to renew their leases upon the expiration thereof—constituted their
causes of action in the suits commenced by them in the Regional Trial Court.

The precedents invoked by the petitioners do not represent current and prevailing doctrine;
they might at most be deemed exceptions justifying the general rule. Moreover, the facts in the
rulings invoked by them are quite readily distinguishable from the numerous precedents
upholding said general rule.

It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, “the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,”
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve “the issue of ownership x x only
to determine the issue of possession.”
100. CARMEN CAÑIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997

FACTS:
[ Carmen Cañiza (94 years old) was declared incompetent by judgment of the
Regional Trial in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. ]

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. It was
alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question. That out of
kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and
Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and
medical treatment”; that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that “by the
defendants’ act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question,
they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they **
(were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing
much money as her house could not be rented by others.” Also alleged was that the
complaint was “filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated
February 3, 1990.”

The defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza’s house since the 1960’s; that
in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by
which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ejectment case against the Estradas was proper.

HELD:
Yes. Cañiza’s act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Common
sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of
liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the
Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand.

More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different from that of a tenant
whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case
there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of
the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave.

The Estradas’ possession of the house stemmed from the owner’s express permission.
That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is
immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza
had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance
did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that
they might in the future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best
inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.

It may be pointed out in relation to the Estrada’s defenses in the ejectment action, that
as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve “the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue of
possession.”
101. BENEDICTO VS. CA G.R. No. 157604 October 19, 2005

FACTS:
Benedicto is the owner of a lot in Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with Chua
wherein Chua would be paying a monthly rent of 7,000 pesos. Chua paid Benedicto 28,000
pesos representing deposit for one month and advance rent for 3 months. Thereafter, Chua
failed to pay rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter after fruitless amicable
settlement at the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa. Benedicto then filed a case for unlawful
detainer and damages against Chua. The MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of Benedicto. Chua then
appealed to the CA through a petition for review with prayer for temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. The CA issued the TRO enjoining the RTC of Bacolod from enforcing its
decision. Benedicto questions the order of the CA through this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately
executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases?

RULING:
NO. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the issuing of such writ may be
allowed.

A preliminary injunction may be granted even if it is not prayed for so long as the requisites
therefor are present, more so if is prayed for. The writ does not dispose of the main case
without trial and the impugned judgment is not yet fully executed.

Even if RTC judgments are immediately executory in unlawful detainer cases, preliminary
injunction may still be granted. There need only be a clear showing that there exists a right to
be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate that said right.
102. DEHESA VS. MACALALAG G.R. No. L-29096 February 23, 1978

FACTS:
The Spouses Dehesa were asked to vacate a Nipa House and restore its possession to the
Spouses Rampola along with the payment of 340 pesos as back rentals. The Dehesas appealed
to the CFI while the Rampolas filed a motion for the execution of judgment of the Municipal
Court because of the failure of the Dehesas to deposit in court the current rentals. Since the
motion for execution was granted, the Dehesas filed this instant petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment in the ejectment case may be executed?

RULING:
YES. The judgment in the ejectment case may be executed.
It is incumbent upon the Dehesas to deposit in court the monthly rental of 20 pesos, which was
found by the Municipal Court to be due under the lease contract. While it was not indicated in
the judgment, the same should have been indicated by the lower court. However, the omission
did not preclude the CFI from ordering the execution of the Municipal Court’s judgment for
failure of the Dehesas to deposit the current monthly rates.

If the Dehesas fail to make the monthly deposit of current rentals, it is generally mandatory for
the CFI to order execution of the appealed judgment. Its duty to do so is ministerial and
imperative.
103. DY VS. CA G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991

FACTS:
Roxas filed a complaint for ejectment against Dy in MTC Makati. The MTC ruled in favor of
Roxas and the RTC affirmed the same judgment. The records of the same case were promptly
remanded to the MTC. An ex-parte motion for immediate execution was filed by Roxas in the
MTC and it was granted on the same day. The next day, the sheriff of the MTC, assisted by
several policemen and other persons, ejected Dy from the premises by throwing out all their
belongings to the street and turning over possession of the premises to Roxas. Dy then filed in
the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction alleging that they have not been furnished with a copy of the decision of the trial
court when its immediate execution was effected. The CA dismissed the petition but Dy
appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immediate execution of the judgment was proper?

RULING:
NO. The immediate execution of the judgment was not proper.

Under Section 1, Rule 39, “execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that finally
disposes the action or proceeding.” A copy of such final order or judgment shall be
served personally or by registered mail on the parties. There must be proof of service.

Even if the judgment is immediately executory in ejectment cases, the Rules on Summary
Procedure make it clear that a judgment or order of the RTC which disposes of the action or
proceeding must be served on the losing party before the same may be considered immediately
executory. While an ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of execution may be filed in the proper
court, such motion must be supported by a proof of service of the judgment or order on the
losing party.
104. SIY VS. NLRC G.R. No. 158971 August 25, 2005

FACTS:
Embang filed an illegal dismissal case against Phil-Agri Trading Center (Phil-Angri). Phil-Agri’s
owner is Mariano Siy (Siy) whose counsel is Atty. Federico Quevedo (Atty. Quevedo).
Embang won her illegal dismissal case against Phil-Agri and her counsel filed a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution before the labor arbiter. Atty. Quevedo later entered his
appearance for Siy and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution. He alleged that
Embang rejected various offers of reinstatement from Phil-Agri. The labor arbiter found that
Embang was never offered any reinstatement, the labor arbiter granted the motion for writ of
execution and directed that the same writ be issued. Atty. Quevedo decided to file an Appeal
with the NLRC hence, this petition of Embang to cite him in contempt of court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quevedo is guilty of contempt of court?

RULING:
YES. Atty. Quevedo is guilty of indirect contempt.

The order granting the writ of execution was not appealable but Atty. Quevedo still did so and
upon the denial of the same appeal, he filed a motion for clarification or partial
reconsideration. His obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgments makes him
in contempt of court.

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but
also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice.

Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done at a
distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct, or embarrass the court and justice. Atty.
Quevedo is sanctioned for indirect contempt. The decision of the labor arbiter remains
unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo’s delaying tactics, a sly maneuver on
behalf of his client.

Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The
prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to
respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. Atty. Quevedo failed to respect the
court’s verdict and comply with it when he continued to question the issuance of the writ of
execution making him guilty of indirect contempt.
105. In Re; the matter to declare in contempt of court Hon. Simeon Datumanong
GR. No. 150274

Facts:
Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH
Cordillera Administrative Region, filed this present petition to cite the former Secretary Simeon
A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in contempt of court
for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 dismissing him from the service.
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents,
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct
prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the
anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the
government. The case was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-0430. On March 28, 1994, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty
of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties
pursuant to Section 23 of THE Revised Administrative Code of 1987. On March 2, 2000, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as
charged and dismissed them from the service while the other two respondents were
exonerated from administrative liability for lack of evidence. While the appeal was still pending
Sec. Datumanong executed the said Memorandum Order. Petitioner contends that in issuing
the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Secretary
Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion
and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court, thereby directly or
indirectly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice, and pre-empting
the Courts sole right to make a decision in accord with the evidence and law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is meritorious.

HELD:
Petition lacks merit.

The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly
is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve
the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of
justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply
with court orders. This contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. It
should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice.
 After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the
issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have
been dismissed immediately after the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered its decision on March 28, 1994. It was only after the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on March 2, 2000affirming the dismissal that Secretary Datumanong
issued the memorandum and after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order was
issued by the Court.
106. Perkins v. Director of Prisons
GR. No. 39679

Facts:
The petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, was adjudged guilty of contempt by the Court of
First Instance of Manila for disobedience of a final judgment thereof, dated August 4, 1930,
requiring the petitioner (a) to render an accounting to her husband, Eugene Arthur Perkins, of
all the conjugal property in her possession or under her control; (b) to convey, transfer, and
deliver to her husband all such conjugal property as might result from said accounting; and (c)
to execute in favor of her husband all such deeds and documents as might be necessary in
order that her husband’s title thereto might legally appear. The court ordered that the
petitioner be imprisoned until she comply with the orders of the court contained in said
judgment. On appeal, the order of commitment for contempt was affirmed by this court.
The petitioner now claims, in effect, that her imprisonment under said order of commitment
for contempt was unlawful, and that she is, therefore, entitled to be discharged by a writ
of habeas corpus.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to be discharged by a writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:
NO.
The general rule is that when the court has jurisdiction by law of the offense charged
and of the party who is so charged, its judgments, orders or decrees are not subject to
collateral attacks by habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the
function of a writ of error. In Gutierrez Repide v. Peterson (3 Phil., 276), this court held that an
order made by a court within the limits of its jurisdiction, even if erroneous, will not be set
aside on habeas corpus. The court is now brought to consider the question of whether the
petitioner has purged herself of contempt. It is claimed that she has already complied with the
order of the court of First Instance of Manila requiring her to render an accounting to her
husband of all the conjugal property in her possession or under her control. There is nothing in
the record to substantiate this claim. The court noticed her statement, made under oath, to the
effect that "there is no conjugal property in her possession or under her control and that,
therefore, there is now no conjugal property in her possession for delivery to the said
defendant," meaning her husband. This is clearly not a compliance with the order for
accounting. Compliance with that order must now be predicated on the findings made by the
court in the order adjudging the petitioner guilty of contempt. In order to purge herself of
contempt, the petitioner must render a full and complete accounting to her husband of the
conjugal properties mentioned in the order above quoted, and perform such other acts as are
required under the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila of August 4, 1930.
107. Negros Oriental II Electric Coop. Inc. v. Sanguniang Panlungsod ng Dumaguete
GR. No. 72492

FACTS:

An attempt by the respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Dumaguete to punish non-members for legislative contempt was halted by this
special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order questioning the very existence of the power in that local legislative body or in any of its
committees. Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition)
sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac,
Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the
Committee's investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the
same Committee on the latter date, (Annex "D", Petition) directing said petitioners to show
cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at
said investigation.The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in
connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities" (Id.) in the City
of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of
business. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the
petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city (Comment, Rollo, p. 50). Respondent
Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities and Franchises
and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the subpoena and the
Order complained of. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Legislative or Sanguniang Panlungsod possess the power to cite a
person contempt.

RULING:

No. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-
preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The
contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the
legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same
thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. There is no express
provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt.
 Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members
for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory
grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power
partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither
can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory
basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the
fundamental law did not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted
essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be
deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an
exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local
autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power
in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e.
compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally
construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly
presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have
reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people,
through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers
with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation. There
being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for
contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the
respondent Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained
of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires.
108. People v. Godoy

GR. Nos. 115908-09

FACTS:
Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics teacher and a married man raped
her first on January 21, 1994 in her cousin’s boarding. As Godoy was about to rape her, a
knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy
came by their house and asked the permission of her parents if she can join him in soliciting
funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms. Palawan National High School. Mia’s parents allowed
her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where
she was repeatedly raped again. After three days, they transferred to Edward’s subdivision
where she was kept in a lodging house and was again raped.
During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was
later released by Godoy after certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to
settle the case. It was after Mia’s return that her parents accompanied her to a medico-
legal which found lacerations in her vagina including that “she just had sexual
intercourse.” She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn
statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex and that they indeed
stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers
and that Mia had consented to their having sex. To support this claim that they were
lovers he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him by Mia’s cousin, Lorna, in
the provincial jail while he was detained. There Mia explained that it was her parents who
forced her to testify against him.
The delivery of the letters was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial
jail guard on duty on the supposed dates of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had
visited Godoy on said dates. Several witnesses were also presented including two former
teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia. Other
witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner
that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the accused?
Whether or not in rape cases, the complainant’s claim of having been threatened
can be taken as a matter of judicial notice?

RULING:
The basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of
the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient
doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this
evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
No, the prosecution failed to prove guilt of Godoy. The trial court made no serious effort
to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in
spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party
must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of
complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there
would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other
portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which
unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the
actual truth could have been readily exposed.

The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.

Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for
the crime of rape, namely; a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind
that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the
party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how
she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into
giving in to his enumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said
that it is not aware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened
appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge. But it had not been
duly corroborated by other evidence not proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
Likewise, complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and
intimidation. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts
adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution’s theory on the use of
force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon
closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge
of rapewas so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January
21, 1994.
While the “sweetheart theory” does not often gain favor with this court, such is not
always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the
victim’s parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the
relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take
the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgel for
them than for the woman to admit her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal,
is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant’s claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by highly
credible testimonies of several witnesses for the defense.
 The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant’s mother
wanted to save the face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and
in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion and escape wagging tongues of their
small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
109. Siy v. NLRC and Embang
August 25, 2005

FACTS:
Herein private respondent Elena Embang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of holiday pay and holiday premium pay against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading
Center. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. On appeal, the Third Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with
modification. Aggrieved that the NLRC refused to reconsider its resolution, the petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of petition for certiorari. The CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC)
questioning the CA’s decision (dismissing his petition) and resolution (denying his motion
for reconsideration). The SC, finding no reversible error on the part of the appellate court,
denied the petition in its resolution. The SC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
with finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s counsel filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered
his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution. Atty.
Quevedo alleged that Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her by
petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the date
of the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

A protracted exchange of pleadings and motions between the parties ensued. Finding that his
office was never informed by petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on
their part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued an order dated
July 30, 2004 granting the motion (issuance for writ of execution) and directing that a writ of
execution be issued.

Atty. Quevedo, then, filed an appeal with the NLRC insisting that the labor arbiter committed
grave abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages should be
computed until September 29, 2000 (date of the promulgation of the LA’s decision) only and
that no backwages should accrue thereafter because of Embangs refusal to be
reinstated.

Embang’s counsel moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the appeal was not
perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center did not post the required cash
or surety bond. Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite
Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the execution of the
decision but only sought the consideration of Embangs refusal to be reinstated in any writ of
execution that may be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embangs part constituted a
supervening event that justified the filing of an appeal ― notwithstanding the finality of the
decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the proper remedy to question the July 30,
2004 order of the labor arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quevedo should be held in contempt of court

HELD:
Yes. For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold Atty.
Quevedo in contempt of court.

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but also
conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before
the same. Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done
at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.

Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is committed by a
person who commits the following acts, among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order or judgment of a court; any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt; and any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice.

Atty. Quevedos act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously intended to defeat
the implementation of a final and executory decision. Elementary is the rule that an order
granting a motion for a writ of execution is not appealable. Thus, Atty. Quevedos deceptively
innocent appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of
procedure resulting in the obstruction of justice.

By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the fruits of her hard
earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying the hands of justice and preventing it from
taking its due course. His conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final and executory
decision. By appealing an order which he knew to be unappealable, he abused court processes
and hindered the dispensation of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of
the Court, clearly constituting indirect contempt.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for which a FINE of P30,000 is imposed upon him, payable in full within five days
from receipt of this resolution.
110. Cruz v. Gongoyon
September 28, 2011

FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint filed by petitioner Cruz against his neighbor,
Benjamin Mina, Jr. in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. In the said case,
petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the basketball goal which was
permanently attached to the second floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley
which serves as the public’s only right of way. Mina was declared in default hence
petitioner Cruz presented his evidence ex-parte.

After trial, Judge Gingoyon ruled the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case
on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
Decision and requested that respondent court to hear his motion.

Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,
and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should
not be punished for contempt. On the day of the hearing, petitioner Cruz, however, did not
appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an order in open court to give petitioner
another 10 days to show cause. In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, petitioner
maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the
same were based on the circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation
that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: where then did this court
gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of
interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent
plaintiffs evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of
his Decision dated October 21, 2005.

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct
contempt of court. An Order of Arrest was issued against the petitioner on even date.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest but it was
denied by the respondent court for petitioner’s failure to attach the alleged duly filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless
petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy
provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain and in a Resolution the Supreme Court directed the
incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment
on the petition inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or
disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their personal capacities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court
Whether or not the abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-
Parte Motion

HELD:
The Court found the petition to be unmeritorious.

Whether or not the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court
(NO)

Contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt. A
pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, constitutes direct contempt.

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant
off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the
Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent
court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the
dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and
authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately
affects the administration of justice.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a
valid defense in cases of contempt. Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the
language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial
office should always be observed and enforced.

Whether or not the abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-
Parte Motion (NO)

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari
or prohibition as provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court properly denied petitioners Ex-Parte
Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. It was only after filing
the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to
the respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of
filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte
Motion was filed and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to
the remedy prayed for. Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep
its authority in denying petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The RTC Order finding
petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to
PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
111. Ang v. Castro
May 15, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner Ang, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, lodged with this
Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge Castro for ignorance of the law,
gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion,
grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties
in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case.

Upon learning of the administrative case filed against him by petitioner, respondent judge
Castro ordered petitioner to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous
attitude towards the court and towards him.

Respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5)
days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice, to appear on the
scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him.

Petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the contempt charge but
the same was denied by the respondent judge. Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before
the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City a criminal complaint for libel against herein
petitioner for using malicious, insolent and contemptuous language against him in his letter-
complaint filed before this Court.

Hence, instant petition.

The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining (1) the respondent
judge from carrying out the warrant of arrest issued and (2) the respondent fiscal from
conducting the preliminary investigation for libel lodged by respondent judge against
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Ang was guilty of contempt of court

HELD:
No. Upon a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court found that the alleged
malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence or so near respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in
the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential
Assistant on legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed
by petitioner against him.
Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court provide that
indirect contempts should be punished after charge and hearing when a person is found guilty
of (b) disobedience of or resistance to a lawful court order or (d) any improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language
against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not
direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading
containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all,
constitutes indirect contempt and, if found guilty he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.

Disposition: ACCORDINGLY, the petition with respect to the action against respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro of the RTC, Branch LXXXIV, Quezon City is granted and said respondent judge is
hereby ordered to elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate Appellate
Court at once for disposition in accordance with the terms hereof.

Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case.

The temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge Jose
P. Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q-35466 is
made permanent.
112. Lipata v. Tutaan
September 23, 1983

FACTS:
This is a contempt incident against Luzviminda V. Lipata for not obeying an alias writ of
execution. Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan in his decision ordered Luzviminda (married to Leonardo G.
Lipata) and her stepmother to deliver to the alleged vendees, the spouses Jocelyn O. Agcaoili
and Jose L. Agcaoili, the subject two-storey house, (the issue of improper venue was not raised)
and to pay the latter rental fees and damages and attorney’s fees.

That decision became final and executory. Judge Tutaan dismissed the appeal of Luzviminda
and her stepmother because their record on appeal was filed late. Their two petitions for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the disallowance of their appeal, were
dismissed.

In a 2nd indorsement to Deputy Court Administrator Arturo B. Buena, Judge Tutaan justified his
decision and the writ of execution.

In an unverified motion, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda and her stepmother be
cited or declared in contempt of court and committed to prison until they complied with the
decision of Judge Tutaan. The motion was set for hearing.

On August 2, 1982, Judge Tutaan adjudged Luzviminda in contempt of court for failing to
comply with the writ of execution. Patrolman Valle arrested Luzviminda but released allegedly
upon her oral request for an extension. She was later re-arrested and confined in jail.

Luzviminda then filed her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court and a
mandatory restraining order was issued to enjoin the enforcement of the order of August 2,
1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not herein petitioner Luzviminda was guilty of contempt of court

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court hold that the contempt order is void. It is not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. It is not contempt of court for a judgment debtor to disobey the writ of execution. It was
the sheriff’s duty to enforce the writ. He did not perform his duty, as ordained in Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which which requires him to deliver the property to the party entitled thereto.
Thus, "a person cannot be punished for contempt because of his alleged disobedience of an
order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the
sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of property held by the
defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant." The delivery of the real property
pertains to the sheriff alone to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments.
"Courts should be slow in jailing people for noncompliance with their orders. Only in cases of
clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised." The power to punish
for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on
the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge’s contempt order is reversed and set aside. The
temporary restraining order is made permanent. Costs against private respondents.
113. SEVERITA MEDINA,
vs.
PIO GARCES, MAXIMINA OYOD DE GARCES, GREGORIO OYOD, FERNANDO GARCES,
SALVADOR CAMPEROSO, PEDRO ESPANA, LEOPOLDO BARBON, SEVERO HERAY, PASITO
PASILAN, PONCIANO MEMES, ANTONIO PARADIRO, JOSE CANETE, ERNESTO SUBRANO,
ANTONIO OBENGUE, DEMETRIO RESPONDE and VALERIANA ALEPATO, respondents; PIO
GARCES, and MAXIMINA OYOD DE GARCES

G.R. No. L-25923

FACTS:

Severita Medina was awarded by the Court of Appeals and was given possession by the sheriff
of Lot 228A where sugar canes was planted. Pio Garces and Maximina Oyod de Garces was also
ordered to remove the house that was built in the said lot but respondents was not able to
comply and instead harvested the sugar canes that was planted on the said lot.

Medina filed a Contempt case agains Pio Garces and Maximina Oyod de Garces. On
respondents defense they alleged that they could not ascertain its "true legal and technical
descriptions and boundaries."

ISSUE: Whether or not Pio Garces and Maximina Oyod de Garces are guilty of Contempt?

HELD:

Yes, Pio Garces and Maximina Oyod de Garces are guilty of Contempt since the lot was
relocated by order of this Court, by a duly licensed surveyor thus the defense of respondents
cannot be meritorious. By executing acts of ownership and disturbing the possession of
petitioner of the lot in question and causing the cutting of the sugar cane planted therein as
well as for failure to remove the house contructed thereon as required by the trial judge
respondents-appellants Pio Garces and Maximina Oyod de Garces were found "guilty of
Contempt of Court under the provisions of Section 3 in connection with Section 6, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.

In Aragon v. Aragon the court cited "Likewise, when by virtue of a judgment in order rendered
by a contempt court in partition proceedings, a litigant has been placed in possession of real
property, the act of the adverse party, who was evicted thereform, of reentering it and
gathering it and gathering fruits therefrom, constituted contempt. And there is no limit as to
the time which re-entry or attempted re-entry constitutes contempt. The fact that the same act
may also be a violation of the Revised Penal Code does not necessarily take it out of the
sanction of Rule 71 of he Rules of Court.
114. BERNARDO PATAGAN and CARMELITA PATAGAN,
vs.
HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, Judge, Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo,
Third Judicial District, Branch III, and EDUARDO BALAGTAS, SR.,

G.R. No. L-55730 April 8, 1988

FACTS:

Eduardo Balagtas Jr. filed to the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sale of a lot in Olongapo
town site sometime on January 1962.

On February 1964 petitioners Bernardo Patagan and Carmelita Patagan also filed a
Miscellaneous Sale of the same lot in Olongapo town site to the Bureau of Lands thus a conflict
arised between the two parties.

The Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands ruled in favor of Balagtas and decreed that
Bernardo Patagan’s Miscellaneous Sale be rejected and cancelled and that the construction
done by Patagan be demolished.

On 1967 Eduardo Balagtas Jr. died and Eduardo Balagtas Sr. (Father) was the one who filed an
action to recover possession of the lot from Patagan docketed as Civil Case No. 1055-0.

On Patagan’s reply they contended that the land in controversy was different from the
land allocated to Eduardo Balagtas Jr. and that they had occupied the said land for
more than 10 years thus they acquire prescriptive title thereto.

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Eduardo Balagtas Sr. and the court ordered said
Patagan to vacate the land aforesaid, remove his improvements thereon, and deliver the
possession thereof to Balagtas Sr. multiple times.

Patagan refuse to vacate such land and to remove the 2 houses he own to the said land thus
the court issued a writ of demolition. When the houses was demolished Palatagan again enterd
the said land and constructed their shanty thereon.

Trial Cour now holds Patagan guilty of indirect contempt and was imprisoned.

ISSUE: Whther or not Bernardo Patagan can be held guilty of indirect contempt?

HELD: Yes. The erroneous assumption that the remedy of contempt is intended solely to
protect the interest of the party adversely affected by the contemptuous act complained of.
What the rule provides is that a person guilty of 'Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ
process, order, judgment or command of court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters upon such property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession" may be punishable for contempt (Section 3, par. 1 (b), Rule 71, Rules
of Court). Therefore, contempt of court is an act constituting a defiance of the authority of the
court. It matters not if any party litigant is adversely affected.

In the case at bar, it appears that petitioners had been effectively ejected from the land in
question pursuant to the writ of demolition issued by the court. Their re-entry is clearly a
defiance of the authority of the court. As it is, the decision sought to be enforced had long
become final and executory. And unless and until the said decision is annulled or set aside in a
proper proceeding, the same must be given effect.

What was ordered in Civil Case No. 1055-0 was merely the return of the possession of the
subject parcel of land to private respondent. As to who has a better right to
the ownership thereof is a question to be determined by the Bureau of Lands in appropriate
proceedings filed before it, the subject parcel of land being admittedly public land.
115. HIDULFO D. NAZARENO,
vs.
HONORABLE ROQUE M. BARNES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Baganga, Davao Oriental,

G.R. No. L-59072 April 25, 1984

FACTS:

Hidulfo Nazareno sent a letter to President Ferdinand Marcos in connection the reorganization
of the Judiciary. In the said letter, Nazareno charges Judge Barned with Ignorance of the law,
Acts of Harassment, Incurring Indeptedness to the Community, Using Undue Influence and
Habitual Absenteeism seeking that there should be no new appointment given to Judge Barnes.

When Judge Barnes get a hold of the copy of such letter, he instituted before his branch a
charge of Indirect Contempt of Court denominated as Criminal Case No. 436 alleging that the
cases that Nazareno stated in his letter showing Ignorance of the law of the said Judge was still
pending resolution before his court and that such allegations contained in the letter
undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the Court, and tending directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct, unlawfully interfere with or influence the decision in the
controversy or degrade and embarrass the administration of justice.

On the basis of the aforsaid charge, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the petitioner and
was put on trial right after his arrest by Judge Barnes with the him as the presiding judge of the
said case. Judge Barnes then held Nazareno guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced him to 6
months imprisonment and payment of P1,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hidulfo Nazareno is guilty of Contempt?

HELD: No. Contempt proceeding agains the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature thereof
being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. The written charge may partake the nature of (1) an Order requiring the
respondent (not accused) to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition for contempt
by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither of the two modes of
commencing an indirect contempt proceeding was resorted to nor availed of in the instant
case. What was filed against the herein petitioner was to all intents and legal purposes an
information in a criminal case.

Contempt, however, is not a criminal offense within the meaning of Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, and need not be instituted by means of an information. The institution of charges by
the prosecuting official is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a
charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel.
His Honor's remedy, however, if any exists, against such an onslaught or attack on his character
and reputation is a criminal action for defamations and not a citation for contempt since the
power to punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on vindictive
principle. £

A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or

offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be
flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with
the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be
exercise for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
116. FRANCISCO A. FUENTES, JOHNNY DAYANG and SILVERIO DELA TORRE, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR LEVISTE, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, and CIRILO
BACANTO,

G.R. No. L-47363 October 28, 1982

FACTS:

Civil Case no. 72 was decided by the court Capiz where Fuentes was the petitioner and Emilio
Bacanto was the defendant. The civil case was about the illegal detainer of Emilio Bacanto
where in the court ruled in favor of Fuentes and asked Bacanto to pay a sum of money. Bacanto
failed to pay thus the court issued a writ of execution levying all rights and titles of Bacanto
over 5 parcels of land. The lots were sold by the Sheriff to Fuentes as the higher bidder and
after the redemption period expired the sheriff executed the final deed of sale. When the
sheriff went to deliver the physical possession of the said lands to Fuentes Emilio Bacanto and
his brother-in- law, Antonio Edaño, as well as his children Salvador, Herminio and Cirilo
Bacanto, refused to vacate or remove their houses from the premises. One Arnaldo
Vasquez who claimed to be lessee on four of the lots also refused to vacate the area
occupied by him.

Fuentes then filed "Special Civil Action No. V-3909 (for Contempt of Court)" before the
respondent court against Emilio Bacanto, Salvador Bacanto, Herminio Bacanto, Cirilo Bacanto,
Antonio Edaño and Arnaldo Vasquez alleging that Emilio Bacanto and others constitute
a blatant and open defiance of and unlawful interference with the writ of execution duly
issued by the Municipal Court, that they disturb the peaceful and lawful possession and
enjoyment of the land by Fuentes and that they Directly impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice, which acts constitute a clear case of criminal contempt, as defined by
and clearly punishable under Rule 71, Sections 3 and 6 of the New Rules of Court, which acts of
defendants, if not forthwith stopped and punished, will expose our Courts of justice to open
ridicule and disrespect

Respondent Cirilio Bacanto then recieved summons and he then filed for an extension of time
to file an answer but on the date of the pre-trial all the defendants failed to appear. Upon
motion of plaintiff Francisco A. Fuentes, all the defendants were declared in default. The
plaintiff was directed to present his evidence before a commissioner.

After 9 months, Cirillio Bacanto filed a motion to dismiss contending that he cannot be charged
with contempt because he was not an original party of Civil Case no. 72. The only party in the
Civil case was Francisco Fuentes and Emilio Bacanto thus only Emilio Bacanto can be charged
with contempt when they refuse to vacate where the court ruled in favor of Cirillio Bacanto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cirillio Bacanto can be guilty of contempt?

HELD: No, A contempt charge partakes of the nature of a criminal prosecution and should
follow procedure similar to criminal prosecutions

Under Rule 71, a respondent in a contempt charge is not required to file a formal answer
similar to that in ordinary civil actions. Instead, the court must set the contempt charge for
hearing on a fixed date, on which date the respondent must make his "appearance to answer
the charge" (Sec. 5). If he shall fail to appear on the date fixed for the hearing (and thus fail to
answer or offer his testimony), the court may order his arrest (Sec. 8). The court does not
declare him in default. This procedure is analogous to what follows the non-appearance of an
accused in a criminal case during arraignment to enter his plea.

Despite the error of the trial court on dismissing the case against Cirillio Bacanto on the grounds
that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction on his person, Cirillio Bacanto cannot be held liable
for contempt because it was an error for the petitioner to file a petition for contempt of court
as a relief for the Bacanto’s to vacate the premises. A refusal to obey the implementation of a
writ of execution in an ejectment case is not contempt of court. The proper recourse of the
petitioners, was to apply for a special order of the court for demolition and removal of the
judgment debtor's house, with due notice to the judgment debtor so that the sheriff can effect
the delivery of the said parcels of land to Fuentes, and not the institution of the contempt
charge against the judgment debtor if they refuse to vacate.
117. MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO
G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007
Facts: Kunack and Barin employed the legal services of
“De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices” where herein
petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate to appeal to the NLRC a
decision made by the Labor Arbiter, where they got a favorable ruling. However,
the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. After the promulgation of the
Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their
respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release
Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter.
The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel
for EHSI, Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in
the absence and without the knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer.
After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go,
through counsel, filed, on 29 July 2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July
2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion,
respondent Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made
to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go
without the knowledge of his counsel.
Acting on the motions, the appellate court issued a Resolution on 19 November
2003 annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of
jurisdiction. It also denied for lack of merit EHSI, Kunack and Barins Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. In the same resolution, petitioner
Atty. Regalado was ordered to explain why she should not be cited for contempt
of court for violating Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Atty. Regalado submitted a Compliance and explained that she never took part in
the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the illegal dismissal case with
respondent Go which led to the execution of a compromise agreement by the
parties on 16 July 2003. EHSI, Kunack and Barin, through a Mr. Ragay, a
former EHSI employee and a close ally of respondent Go, were the ones who
negotiated the settlement; that she never met personally respondent Go, not
until 16 July 2003, when the latter appeared before the Labor Arbiter for the
execution of the Release Waiver and Quitclaim. Petitioner
Atty. Regalado claimed that she was in fact apprehensive to release the money
to respondent Go because the latter cannot present any valid identification card
to prove his identity. It was only upon the assurance of Labor Arbiter that
Antonio S. Go and the person representing himself as such were one and the
same, that the execution of the agreement was consummated.
The CA ruled that Atty. Regalado was guilty of indirect contempt.
Atty. Regalado filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied. He
then filed a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of indirect contempt against Atty. Regalado is valid.
HELD: No. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon
compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
requirements as outlined must be complied with. In cases where the court did
not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition
which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in
the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, must be filed.
In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by
respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was not filed
by a verified petition which is required by the Rules of Court. Therefore, the
proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect
contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close
its eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules
that we, ourselves, had promulgated.
118. Capitol hills golf and country club v. Go
GR No. 182738 February 24,2014

Facts: Manuel O. Sanchez , a stockholder of Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. filed
a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21,
2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Capitol Hills Golf
& Country Club, Inc. filed an Answer with Counterclaims and, thereafter, a
Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses.
Later, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents,
which the court granted in an Order. Capitol Hills filed a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently filed a Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration, attaching therewith an alleged certification issued by the
National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of cause of
action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1996, as amended, has
not been duly published in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Pending
resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed on January 21,
2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the September 10, 2002
Order on the production of documents.
The Motion for Deferment was denied by the court. However, on the date of
inspection, Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the
Corporation, was alleged to be out of town and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr.
purported to have shown no willingness to comply with the directive.
Respondent then moved for the issuance of an order for immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the Order
dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May 24, 2004
Order. Respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of execution suffered the
same fate when the trial court denied it on February 10, 2005. The
inspection was again moved until January 11, 2007. During the January 11, 2007
inspection, the only document produced by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty.
Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer
Book of the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the
corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders,
including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders’ meetings, and that
they needed more time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March
2002, which was in the bodega of the Corporation.
Respondent decided to file a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that
an order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29
of the Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra–Corporate Controversies under Republic Act
No. 8799. The court granted the motion and ordered Capitol Hills to strictly
comply with the order and failure to comply will result in the court citing of
contempt with a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay.
 Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals, and also denied on Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner now argues
that threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there
should be willfulness or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in
disregard of the authority of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the threat to cite contempt made by the RTC is valid.

HELD:
Yes. A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a
court or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for
indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that,
in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non–suited or as in default,
the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to
comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the
Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an
order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are
just.
119. Desa enterprise inc. V SEC

GR No.L-45430 September 30, l982

Facts:
Emilio Pantoja asked the SEC for the revocation of the certificate of registration
of the Desa Enterprises, Inc., upon the ground that his signature, as well as that
of his wife, in the articles of incorporation of said corporation, was obtained by
Dionisio Chua Kang Hay, one of the incorporators of said corporation, by means
of fraud and false representation.
SEC Commissioner appointed auditors to examine and audit the books of
account of the corporation, further decreed that "in order to maintain a status
quo, no sale, transfer, disposition of, or encumbrance upon the assets of the said
corporation, including the ice plant, machineries, equipments and other
implements connected with the operation of such ice plant shall be made without
the written consent of both of the parties and copy of any such agreement and
consent of both of the parties and a copy of any such agreement and consent
submitted to this Commission. The PC Company based at Balico, Nasugbu,
Batangas, stopped the operations of the Lian Ince Plant pending settlement of
the dispute.
Desa Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Angelina A. Baderrama,
entered into a contract of lease with Luis Lopez. Then the Chief of Staff and
Deputy Zone Commander of the II PC Zone verbally ordered the immediate
resumption of the operations of the Lian Ice Plant under the management of Luis
Lopez.
SEC Associate Commissioner Julio issued an order to the PC Zone command TO
REFRAIN from intereferring with and/or operating the ice plant, machineries and
equipments located at Lian, Batangas, thereby maintaining the unmolested
status of the said ice plant and machineries preceding the filing of the instant
petition on July 20, 1976 until further orders of this Commission.
On November 29, 1976, Emilio Pantoja filed an urgent manifestation with the
SEC that the Lian Ice Plant had resumed commercial operations in utter and
wanton violation and disregard of the Commission's order. The SEC asked the
members to explain why they should not be cited in contempt.
Luis Lopez questions the authority of SEC to cite them in contempt when they
are not a party to the case filed by Pantoja.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Luis Lopez, not a party to the case, may be cited in contempt.

Held:
Yes. The fact that the petitioners may not be parties in SEC Case No. 1201
does not preclude the SEC from citing them for contempt. The rule is settled that
"persons who are not parties in a proceeding may he declared guilty of contempt
for wilful violation of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty of
conspiracy with any of the parties in violating the court's order."

Besides, under Section l(b) of Republic Act No. 1143, the SEC has power to
penalize any violation of or non-compliance with any terms or conditions of any
certificate, license, or permit issued by the Commission, or of any order,
decision, ruling or regulation thereof.
120. Santiago v. Anunciacion

G.R. No. 89318 April 3, 1990

Facts:

ATTY. Santiago was counsel for Rene Peralta, the accused in a criminal case of
kidnapping, and in the said case, he moved for investigation on the ground
that the victim had come forward to claim that "she was not kidnapped and that
she went voluntarily with RENE PERALTA, her boyfriend and father of the child
she is carrying.

At the same time, a charge of disobedience was made by the mother of the
victim and a warrant of arrest was issued. When the victim arrived at the
courthouse (Quezon City), she was "intercepted" by alleged CIS agents and
Quezon City policemen to serve a warrant of arrest in connection with the
"disobedience" charge. The petitioner allegedly requested the peace officers
aforesaid to defer service of the warrant until after had testified in court. They
apparently agreed to present her to Judge Velasco in open court and later in his
chamber where the Judge interviewed her and her mother.

Thereafter, an accusation of indirect contempt was brought against the

petitioner before the respondent-judge, for obstructing the implementation of
the warrant of arrest. Atty. Santiago filed a motion to dismiss, which the
respondent judge considered as an answer. Atty. Ferry entered his appearance
as private prosecutor which was objected by Atty. Santiago, "in the absence of
any damage claim for which the intervention of the offended party is
warranted."

ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance of the private prosecutor in question is proper
and warranted.

HELD:

No. In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution of the case by
a private prosecutor. In this instance, the kind of contempt (indirect) for which
the petitioner is sought to be held liable provides for no indemnity because the
alleged "obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the
respondent court in particular, which involves no private party, Thus, the
appearance of Atty. Eleazar Ferry was unwarranted. It should have been the
Public Prosecutor who should appear before the trial and not a private
prosecutor.
121 CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION, vs. UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC. and
TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

FACTS: Respondent Universal Rubber applied for the registration of the trademark “Universal
Converse and Device” used on its rubber shoes and rubber slippers. Petitioner
Converse filed its opposition on grounds that the trademark sought to be registered is
confusingly similar to the word “Converse” which is part of its corporate name “Converse
Rubber Corporation” and will likely deceive purchasers and cause irreparable injury to
its reputation and goodwill in the Philippines. Respondent averred that petitioner is a
company organized under US laws not licensed to do business in the Philippines and not doing
business on its own in the Philippines. The Director Patents gave due course to respondent’s
application. MR was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business and is not actually
doing business on its own may maintain an action, suit or proceeding.

HELD: YES.
It is unfortunate that respondent Director of Patents has concluded that since the petitioner is
not licensed to do business in the country and is actually not doing business on its own in the
Philippines, it has no name to protect in the forum and thus, it is futile for it to establish that
“CONVERSE” as part of its corporate name identifies its rubber shoes. That a foreign
corporation has a right to maintain an action in the forum even if it is not licensed to do
business and is not actually doing business on its own therein has been enunciated many times
by this Court. In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, this Court, reiterating Western
Equipment and Supply Co. vs. Reyes, stated that:
a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is
unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the
Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a
legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants
thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign
corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a
foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation
is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.
122. THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, vs. GLOBE ASSURANCE CO., INC., RAMON E. SAURA,

FACTS: The insurance commissioner filed a petition to furnish respondent, as president of

respondent company, for contempt for his failure to deliver to its office all the properties and
records of respondent company. it was "filed by the petitioner, the Insurance Commissioner,
against Ramon E. Saura, president of the respondent Globe Assurance Co., Inc., for failure of
the latter to deliver to the former all the properties and records of said respondent corporation.
It appears that in [the appealed order], this Court gave said Ramon E. Saura, upon petition of
his counsel, sixty (60) days within which to submit or turnover said properties and records to
the petitioner and because of his failure to do so, the petitioner now asks that he be punished
for contempt."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for contempt is valid

HELD: the Supreme Court affirmed the order complained of there being no evidence that
respondent is in actual custody of the books, papers, titles and other documents belonging to
respondent company, the production of which is being required of him. To oblige respondent
to produce things not in his possession and to punish him for contempt for his failure to do so
would be unfair and unjust especially where petitioner and his authorized agents had the
opportunity to take possession of said books, records and documents at an earlier date when
their disappearance would have been averted The Court notes that when the petitioner,
through his authorized agents, examined the records and transactions of the respondent
corporation, all of its books, records and documents were intact in its office and the court
wonders why petitioner or his authorized agents did not take immediate possession of said
books, records and documents. The claim of the petitioner that he could not have legally done
so until after the decision of this Court authorizing said petitioner to liquidate the business and
affairs of Respondent Corporation shall have become final, especially when said decision of the
Court was appealed to the Supreme Court is not plausible. Had the petitioner immediately
taken possession of said books, records and documents, their disappearance would have been
averted. But the Court feels that Ramon E. Saura cannot be punished for contempt for his
failure to produce all the records, books and documents of the respondent corporation for it
has not been shown that the same are in his possession
123. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR.

FACTS: Respondent herein voluntarily offered to sell his land to the government through the
Department of Agrarian Reform. After summary administrative proceedings, the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) set the just compensation of the land and
ordered the petitioner bank to pay the said amount to the herein respondent. Respondent filed
a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD when the petitioner failed to comply with the writ of
execution. PARAD granted the motion for contempt, and later on directed the issuance of an
arrest order against petitioner's manager. Petitioner filed a petition for injunction of the arrest
order, which was approved by the trial court. After the respondent's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the court, it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The appellate court nullified the order of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for contempt is valid

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the present petition. According to the Court, quasi-judicial
agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt can only do so by initiating
them in the proper Regional Trial Court. In this case, it was the PARAD that cited petitioner's
manager with indirect contempt. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an
unverified motion for contempt filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid There are
only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified
petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.

Quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt
pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper
Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect
contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the
present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with
the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Hence, the
contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court
clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not
complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it
was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of
arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings
that stemmed from respondent's "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD
dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
124.FEDERICO S. ROBOSA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS:
The NLRC issued a TRO and directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease
and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing memorandum ter
minating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals h
ave been effected.Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRC’s resolution. They
instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s petition for preliminary inju
nction. Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction.The respondents m
oved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the respon
sible CTMI officers in contempt of court.Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and i
ssued a resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed hearing the ma
in case on the merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.

HELD:
Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offendin
g party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amo
unt depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labo
r Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in
the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does
not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the tr
ial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powe
rs. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is em
powered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt.
Robosa, et al., therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against t
he respondents before the NLRC.