5 6102852376736038933

Special Lecture Notes in
REMEDIAL LAW
By: DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.

After the Dumlaos purchased the property in question through a foreclosure sale, they tolerated the
Eroritas to continue operating the school which already existed at the time of the sale. The owners alleged that the
Eroritas agreed to pay P20,000.00 monthly rental which they denied as they were merely allowed to continue to run
the school without rental out of good will and friendship. A complaint for recovery of possession was filed, by the
Dumlaos alleging that a demand made in February 12, 2004 where judgment was rendered ordering the Eroritas to
vacate. The CA reversed on appeal ruling that the MTC had jurisdiction as the tax declaration did not exceed
P20,000.00, citing Barbosa v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 133564, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 99. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The MTC had jurisdiction.
The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case (Spouses
Flores-Cruz v. Spouses Goli-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 545). Jurisdiction does not depend
on the complaint’s caption (Hilario v. Heirs of Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815). Nor is
jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising
other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction (Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, G.R. No. 121939, October 4, 1999, 316
SCRA 193; Larano v. Calendacion, G.R. No. 158231, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 57; Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao, G.R. No.
195477, January 25, 2016, Brion, J).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time; estoppel to question jurisdiction.
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first
time on appeal (Lopez v. David, G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535). An exception to this rule is the
principle of estoppel by laches (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013,
699 SCRA 16).
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is
analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968). In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time
after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively
participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse
to the movant.
In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63, 75, it was ruled that the failure to assail
jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the
appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to apply. Laches refers to the “negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012, 670 SCRA 343 citing Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007,
514 SCRA 616-617).”
Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active
participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.
Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over accion publiciana is determined by the assessed value of the property.
An action for recovery of possession and damages was filed alleging that there was encroachment on the
property of plaintiff when defendant constructed his perimeter fence. It was filed with the MTC as the alleged
assessed value was P2,000.00. Demands were made for the removal of such encroachment, but to no avail. A
complaint was filed but the defendant denied any encroachment. Judgment was rendered by the MTC in favor of the
plaintiff. On appeal, the RTC ruled that the action has already prescribed. The CA on appeal denied the petition for
review and annulled both decisions ruling that since it is an accion publiciana, the RTC has jurisdiction. Is the CA
ruling correct? Why?
Ans.:No. All cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000, if
outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. (Aliabo v. Carampatan, 407 Phil.
31, 36 [2001]) This pronouncement was based on Republic Act No. 7 691, expanding the jurisdiction of the MTC
(Cabling v. Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016, Sereno, CJ).
Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein, as set forth
in Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of Batas Pambansas Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of
the real property subject of the complaint. In Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development
Corporation, it was said that its jurisdiction would now be determined by the assessed value of the disputed land, or
of the adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation purposes. If the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint, the
action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is not afforded
the means of determining from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action pertains to it or to another court. After all, courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands. (Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 336 [2005], citing Ouano v. PGTT International Investment
Corporation, 434 Phil. 28-37 [2002])
1|ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)-CLEANED/EVSA/crys

Real action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC or RTC.
An action for specific performance with prayer for reconveyance of a property was filed, but the complaint
did not allege the assessed value of the property. But the declaration in the Amended Complaint stated that the
property is valued at P6,000.00 based on the handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicated that the
property was purchased for the price of P6,000.00. Which court has jurisdiction? Why?
Ans.: MTC. The action is one for specific performance. In other words, the aim is to secure the claimed ownership
and title to the property which qualified it as a real action.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein.
Since the action is a real action, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint,
then the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the
Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration or
zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or first level court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of
the value of the property (Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas, et al., G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016, Del Castillo, J).
In determining jurisdiction, the Court can rely on the declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the
property is valued at P6,000,00. The handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property
was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case against respondents,
this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation
of the BIR. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC and Supreme Court Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, provides that –
a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc.
complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS,
PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION
EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL
property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL
VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS
NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT.
shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees to be paid. Since the value of the subject property as stated
in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first
instance; it should have dismissed the case. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court
clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
BARANGAY CONCILIATION
Motion for execution of judgment based on compromise treated as initiatory pleading.

There was a compromise in the barangay. For failure to comply with the terms and conditions, a Motion for
Execution was filed with the MTC, rather than a complaint for execution. It however contained ultimate facts
constituting a cause of action, attaching thereto the compromise whose body was quoted. Is the “Motion for
Execution” proper in form and substance? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in
the body and not the caption.
Thus, the motion for execution filed was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original action that is
compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court that the complaint should allege the
plaintiff’s cause of action and the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.
The motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as a motion/special proceeding.
For this reason, the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the Local Government Code was filed (Sebastian
v. Ng, G.R. No. 164594, April 22, 2015, Brion, J).
The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its execution,
unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the
proper city or municipal court. In this case, it was not repudiated.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party’s
failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.
The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the
date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the “appropriate city or municipal court” as the forum for the
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over
these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue
2 |ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)(CLEANED)/EVSA/crys
involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity. (Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 701, 711).
RULE 2 – Actions
Concept of splitting causes of action.

Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts
or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them (Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005,
464 SCRA 89; citing Nabus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 732). A single cause of
action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more
different actions (Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., Inc., 249 N.W. 467 [1933]). Thus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of action, viz.:
“Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.—If two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)” (Chu, et al. v. Cunanan, et al., G.R. No.
156185, September 5, 2011).
Reason for the rule against splitting of causes of action.

Parties are not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was
sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA
336; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89). Their splitting violated the policy
against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their
contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of the second case on the ground of bar by res judicata (Chu, et al.
v. Cunanan, et al., G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011, Bersamin, J).
RULE 3 – PARTIES
Marine mammals granted personality to sue.

A novel case was recently decided by the Supreme Court where a suit was filed by resident marine
mammals, like whales, dolphins, etc. inorder to prevent the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. One of
the basic questions is whether they have the capacity to sue or otherwise known in constitutional law as locus
standi.
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for
the exploration, development and production of petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claimed" that they have the legal standing to file this
action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also
asserted their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in
their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propounded that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had
signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed
in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine. (See: Oposa case).
They also contended that the Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary
jurisdiction. (See: Oposa case).
Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.
They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural
persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged their claim of legal standing on the
ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents
argued that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited
or injured by the decision in this case.
Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action.
Ruling in favor of the petitioners, the Supreme Court
Held: Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for
maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large
fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes,
whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for
example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher,
deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound,
or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a
meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be
able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate
objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997
Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It
further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, E.G. Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented by Human Beings Gloria Ramos & Rose Liza
Eismia-Osorio, etc. v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015 & companion cases, Leonardo-De
Castro, J).
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed
the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation
of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait,
E.G. Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented by Human Beings
Gloria Ramos & Rose Liza Eismia-Osorio, etc. v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015 &
companion cases, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Indispensable parties in partition action.

Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in
the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo,
Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr.
leaving children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b)
for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Santiago allegedly bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a property
left by Conrado, Sr.. He filed a complaint for partition but did not implead Mateo’s children. Is the action proper
without impleading such persons? Explain.
Ans.: No, because they are indispensable parties. The absence of the indispensable parties in the instant complaint
for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. (Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 486 Phil. 366,
379-380 (2004), citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA, 450 Phil. 532, 541 (2003); further citation omitted).
Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235, 265
(2004).
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties (Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750,
March 11, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Effect of failure to implead indispensable parties.

It is an error to order the dismissal of the complaint on account failure to implead all the indispensable
parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 345, the
Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to
implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added
on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint
for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. x x x
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for
the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the
merits (Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Action for damages for breach of contract of carriage survives the party and can be proceeded by the heirs
through substitution.
During the pendency of an action for damages due to the sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient, the plaintiff
died. Thereafter the heirs upon motion, were substituted as plaintiffs.
The defendant contended that the complaint for damages was purely personal and cannot be transferred to
his heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed because the death of the plaintiff abates a
personal action. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs
(Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, etc., G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016, Bersamin, J).
Purpose of substitution of parties.

Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. (Sarsaba v. Vda. de
Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 429) It protects the right of due process belonging to any party,
that in the event of death the deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. (Sumaljag v. Diosdidit, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008,
555 SCRA 53, 59-60.
When substitution is proper.

The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action survives the death of the
litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the following actions that survive the death of a party,
namely: (1) recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the
estate; and (3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) all claims for money against the deceased, arising from
contract, express or implied. (These should be filed in the testate or intestate proceeding as claims against the
estate).
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees and gives ground for an action for damages. The passenger's claim against the petitioner involved his
personal injury caused by the breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint
survived his death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution (Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v.
Sesante, etc., G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016, Bersamin, J).
Real parties in interest.
May individual stockholders of a corporation recover damages for wrongful attachment of properties of a
corporation? Explain.
Ans.: No, because they are not the real parties in interest. The personality of a corporation is distinct and separate
from the personalities of its stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not themselves the real parties in interest to
claim and recover compensation for damages arising from the wrongful attachment of its assets. Only the
corporation is the real party in interest for that purpose. (Stronghold Ins. Co. Inc. v. Cuenca, et al., G.R. No. 173297,
March 6, 2013, Bersamin, J)
Ground for MTD if party is not the real party in interest.

Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of
action (Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 29341, Aug. 21, 1989, 176 SCRA 579, 588-589). The reason for this is that the
courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action (Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No.
161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348, 358). Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real
party in interest is not present or impleaded (Stronghold Ins. Co., Inc. v. Cuenca, et al., G.R. No. 173297, March 6,
2013, Bersamin, J).
What are the purposes of the requirement for real party in interest to prosecute or defend a case? Explain.
Ans.: The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at law are:
(a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that
the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d)
to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. Indeed, considering that
all civil actions must be based on a cause of action, defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another, the former as the defendant must be allowed to insist upon being opposed by the real party in interest so
that he is protected from further suits regarding the same claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the
defendant because “the defendant can insist upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata
protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to the end.”
The rule on real party in interest ensures, therefore, that the party with the legal right to sue brings the
action, and this interest ends when a judgment involving the nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant from a
subsequent identical action. Such a rule is intended to bring before the court the party rightfully interested in the
litigation so that only real controversies will be presented and the judgment, when entered, will be binding and
conclusive and the defendant will be saved from further harassment and vexation at the hands of other claimants to
the same demand (Stronghold Ins. Co., Inc. v. Cuenca, et al., G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, Bersamin, J).
No need for exact or absolute identity.

But the real party in interest need not be the person who ultimately will benefit from the successful
prosecution of the action. Hence, to aid itself in the proper identification of the real party in interest, the court
should first ascertain the nature of the substantive right being asserted, and then must determine whether the party
asserting that right is recognized as the real party in interest under the rules of procedure. Truly, that a party stands
to gain from the litigation is not necessarily controlling.
It is fundamental that the courts are established in order to afford reliefs to persons whose rights or
property interests have been invaded or violated, or are threatened with invasion by others’ conduct or acts, and to
give relief only at the instance of such persons. The jurisdiction of a court of law or equity may not be invoked by or
for an individual whose rights have not been breached (Stronghold Ins. Co., Inc. v. Cuenca, et al., G.R. No. 173297,
March 6, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Transferee pendente lite; real party in interest.

During the pendency of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Susano Rodriguez, the wife sold her
inheritance wherein she agreed to sell all her rights, interests and participation in said estate. Prior to the sale, she
filed a motion for the payment of allowances which was denied by the RTC but which the CA reversed where the
judgment became final and executory. Hence, the buyer of her share authorized the counsel of the seller to appear
and represent him in all the proceedings. A motion was filed with the RTC for the payment of the allowance where
the Estate paid. The wife questioned the order approving the partial Deed of Partition of the Estate and demanded
that the amount received by the Law Office be returned which the RTC granted. The Law Office contended that it has
remitted to the buyer of the share of the wife what it received and hence, it should be excused from reimbursing said
amount. It was denied and the CA affirmed such order, hence, the Law Office filed a special civil action for certiorari
which the SC contending that while it is not a party in the intestate proceedings it is however an “aggrieved party”
which can file a petition for certiorari as it was deprived of the right to due process when it was ordered to
reimburse. It merely received the allowance in favor of the buyer of the share of the widow. The Estate maintained
that the Law Office had no standing to file the petition. Does the Law Office have a standing? Why?
Ans.: Yes. The general rule is that a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court cannot maintain an action
for certiorari in the CA or the Supreme Court to have the order or decision of the trial court reviewed. Under normal
circumstances, the CA would have been correct in dismissing a petition for certiorari filed by a non-party. The
peculiar facts of this case, however, call for a less stringent application of the rule.
The facts show that SRMO became involved in its own capacity only when the RTC ordered it to return the
money that it received on behalf of its client. The order of reimbursement was directed to SRMO in its personal
capacity-not in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo. This directive is unusual because the order for
reimbursement would typically have been addressed to the parties of the case; the counsel's role and duty would be
to ensure that his client complies with the court's order. The underlying premise of the RTC's order of
reimbursement is that, logically, SRMO kept or appropriated the money: But the premise itself is untenable because
SRMO never claimed the amount for its own account. In fact, it is uncontroverted that the Law Office only facilitated
the transfer of the amount to the buyer.
Under the law of agency, an agent is not personally liable for the obligations of the principal unless he
performs acts outside the scope of his authority or he expressly binds himself to be personally liable. Otherwise, the
principal is solely liable. Here, there was no showing that it bound itself personally for the buyer's obligations. It also
acted within the bounds of the authority issued by the buyer, as the transferee pendente lite of the widow's interest,
to receive the payment (See also: Rep. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008).
RULE 4 – VENUE
Venue of personal action is the place of principal office of corporation.

After the foreclosure of a property, there was a deficiency. The foreclosure was done in Manila where the
property was located but the action for collection of the deficiency was filed in Makati City where the principal office
of the plaintiff-mortgagee is located. Is Makati the proper venue? Why
Ans.: Yes. Makati is the proper venue because it is where the principal office of the plaintiff is located.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants
of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why
the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal
actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of
some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury
to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a
transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein (BPI Savings Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July 22,
2015, Bersamin, J).
Venue is procedural.
In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not
seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus
expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action
may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue.
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Two (2) options if defendant does not file an answer in a case governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
In Fairland Knitcraft Corp. v. Po, G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016, Mendoza, J, despite service of summons
in an unlawful detainer, the defendant did not file an answer. In such a case, there are two (2) options of the MTC,
where it may render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. (Sec. 6)
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either
motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes
his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation
except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. (Don
Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882 [1999] citing Bayog v. Natino, 327 Phil. 1019
[1996]).
RULE 8- MANNER OF ALLEGATIONS
How to contest genuineness and due execution of actionable document.

There was a complaint for sum of money based on a promissory note. The answer of the defendants denied
under oath in their answer but did not state specifically the denial of the genuineness and due execution of the PN. It
merely alleged that although they signed blank forms of PNs they were informed that their loan application was
denied. Was there sufficient compliance with the requirement of under oath and specific denial of the genuineness
and due execution of the PNs? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set
forth in the pleading. The said instrument or document is called an actionable document and Section 8 of Rule 8
provides the proper method for the adverse party to deny its genuineness and due execution.
To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document: (1) there must be a specific denial in
the responsive pleading of the adverse party; (2) the said pleading must be under oath; and (3) the adverse party
must set forth what he claims to be the facts. Failure to comply with the prescribed procedure results in the
admission of the genuineness and due execution of the actionable document.
The answer above readily shows that petitioners did not spell out the words "specifically deny the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes." Nevertheless, when the answer is read as whole, it can be
deduced that petitioners specifically denied the paragraphs of the complaint regarding the promissory notes. More
importantly, petitioners were able to set forth what they claim to be the facts, which is a crucial element under
Section 8 of Rule 8. In particular, they alleged that although Ramon Sy and Richard Sy signed blank forms of
promissory notes and disclosure statements, they were later informed that their loans were not approved. Such
disapproval led them to seek loans elsewhere, through Lao and Chua, but definitely not with the bank anymore (Sps.
Sy, et al. v. Westmont Bank, et al., G.R. No. 201074, October 10, 2016, Mendoza, J).
Mere statement “specifically deny” allegations, not sufficient.

A complaint for sum of money was filed based on a promissory note. When the obligation became due and
demandable, there was no payment despite demands. Answering the complaint, the defendants alleged that they
“specifically deny” the allegations in the complaint that they executed the loan agreement, the PN “for being self-
serving and pure conclusion intended to suit the respondent’s purposes.” Judgment was rendered against
defendants which was sustained by the CA on appeal saying that there was admission of the genuineness and due
execution of the loan documents. Is the CA’s judgment correct? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. The mere statement that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations of the Complaint “for being self-
serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated
otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use of the word “specifically. Neither does it become so
by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-
serving” or are intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.”
The defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false
or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by
fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an
admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground
not affecting either (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier
case of Songco v. Sellner).
To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant “sets forth what he claims to be
the facts,” which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case.
Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial under oath” requirement under Section
8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent (Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc., et
al. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 187487, June 29, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Meaning of admission of genuineness and due execution of document.

The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority;
that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon
it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or
that the signatures were unauthorized.”
Accordingly, with petitioners’ admission of the genuineness and due execution of the loan documents, the
competence of respondent’s witness to testify in order to authenticate the same is therefore of no moment. As the
Court similarly pointed out in Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, “[w]hile Section [20],51 Rule 132 of the [Rules]
requires that private documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in
evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need
for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of respondent’s implied
admission thereof (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier
case of Songco v. Sellner).”
Defendant can present evidence of non-liability.

The Court clarified that while the “[f]ailure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment,
statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his answer or
reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true
agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing
(Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier case of Songco v.
Sellner).”
RULE 9 – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Defense not raised in the pleading is waived.

A contract of loan was procured by Spouses Roxas to finance a real estate business from PTC. It was
superseded by another contract, this time Dominguez substituting the construction company as the contractor.
Spouses Roxas did not finish the housing project due to financial difficulties resulting in non-payment of the loans. In
the meantime, Dominguez sued PTC for breach of contract. Spouses Roxas likewise filed a complaint against
Dominguez and the insurance company. Sps. Roxas filed an answer to Dominguez complaint with cross-claim
against PTC. PTC filed an answer with a counterclaim against Sps. Roxas for unpaid loan obligation. Judgment was
rendered against Sps. Roxas but denied PTC’s counterclaim for insufficiency of evidence without prejudice to the
filing of a complaint against Sps. Roxas. PTC in the meantime filed a foreclosure proceeding against Sps. Roxas who
filed a Petition for Injunction to restrain the foreclosure which was granted. This prompted Sps. Roxas to file a
motion for execution to enforce the judgment against PTC as the judgment in the case filed against Roxas and the
latter’s cross-claim has become final and executory. PTC interposed for the first time the defense of compensation to
offset the judgment debt due to the Spouses Roxas. Is the invocation of compensation correct? Why?
Ans.: No. PTC should have raised the argument of compensation at the trial stage. Sec. 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
provides that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived; except the failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be
disposed of as provided in section 5 of Rule 10 in the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever
it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the action.
Although legal compensation takes place by operation of law, it must be alleged and proved as a defense by
the debtor who claims its benefits. Only after it is proved will its effects retroact to the moment when all the
requisites under Article 1279 of the Civil Code have concurred (Phil,. Trust Co. v. Sps,. Roxas, G.R. No. 171897,
October 14, 2015, Jardeleza, J,).
Defenses not alleged in a MTD are deemed waived; exceptions.
In an action for reconveyance of property based on implied trust, the defense of prescription was not raised
in a Motion to Dismiss as the action was brought after 10 years from registration of the property. The CA on
appeal considered prescription to bar the claim for reconveyance. It was contended that it was an error for
the CA to consider prescription since it was not raised in the MTD. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. Prescription of actions for the reconveyance of real property based on implied trust is 10 years. The
contention that prescription cannot be considered against them is not correct.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim.
Under the Rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, except that the
objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by laches (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 34-35).
Policy of the rule on default.

The policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried on the merits. As a consequence, the courts
have generally looked upon a default judgment with disfavor because it is in violation of the right of a defending
party to be heard. As the Court has said in Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil. 446, 449-450 (I 913):
A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its
existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join
issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A
judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon
which the defendant asks that it be set aside(Monarco Import Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
192477, July 27, 2016, Bersamin, J).
RULE 10 – AMENDED PLEADING
Substantial amendment in pleadings.

Aguinaldo claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land covered by a title. He discovered that Mojica
fraudulently obtained a title over said parcel of land, hence, he filed a complaint for nullification of the title. However
before he discovered the title of Mojica, the latter had already mortgaged the same to Citystate and for his failure to
pay the obligation, Citystate foreclosed the mortgage and became the highest bidder and consolidated its title.
Aguinaldo filed a complaint to annul the title. After both parties presented evidence, Aguinaldo filed a Motion to
Amend the complaint alleging that during the pendency of the case, Citystate was able to secure a writ of possession;
Aguinaldo was evicted and that Citystate sold the property to Syndica. In the amended complaint, he impleaded
Syndica asserting the foregoing facts and that the amendments were necessary to afford complete relief to the
parties. The trial court denied the Motion on the ground that the amendments substantially altered the cause of
action and would only delay the resolution of the case. The CA reversed the order and admitted the amended
pleading. Is the CA’s resolution correct? Why?
Ans.: Yes. Substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court, but such leave of court may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made for delay. (Sec. 3, Rule 10, Rules of Court). This is a departure from
the old rule which prohibited substantial amendments.
In Spouses Valenzuela v. CA, 416 Phil. 289 [2001], the Court explained the wisdom behind the departure
from the old provision of Section 3 of Rule 10 under the 1964 Rules of Court, thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former
rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered”
was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially
alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote
the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding (Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 200018, April 6,
2015, Reyes, J).”
RULE 14 – SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Summons upon a partnership does not bind a partner.

There was a breach of contract where the seller of transreceivers that were defective was not able to
replace the same or refund the amount paid. A suit was filed against the corporation that sold it which was later on
discovered to be a partnership. Summons was served upon the partnership and after trial, judgment was rendered
against it. Appeal not having been made, the judgment became final and executory. The sheriff levied upon a vehicle
belonging to Guy, a partner but he moved to lift the levy because he was not the judgment debtor. The motion was
denied, holding that as a registered partnership, Guy should be treated as a general partner and may be held jointly
and severally with the partnership. This was affirmed by the CA which ruled that Guy cannot feign ignorance of the
existence of the summons and that summons be not served upon all partners. It is sufficient that it be served on the
managing partner, and being such, he is bound by the service of summons upon the partnership based on Article
1821, NCC. Is Guy bound by the summons? Why?
Ans.: No. Guy is not bound by the service of summons upon the partnership. This is especially so that summons was
not served upon the general manager.

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam – the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is
an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
rem. (Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198) Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the
service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an
exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. (Cathay Metal Corp. v.
Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 482, 504)
The partnership was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated
authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in
Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. It is not correct to say that
it was immaterial whether the summons to the partnership was served on the theory that it was a corporation
(Michael Guy v. Atty. Glenn Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016, Mendoza, J).
Substituted service of summons; its requisistes.
There was a complaint for damages because of an alleged libelous article published at Abante Tonite.
Summonses were issued, but despite efforts to serve personally upon the defendants, the same cannot be
served as they were always out of their offices, alleging gathering news. Hence, after two (2) attempts made
by the sheriff to serve summons personally, he served the summonses by substituted service. Motion to
dismiss was filed by the defendants on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over them,
but it was denied. Petition was filed with the CA questioning the resolution but it was dismissed ruling there
was proper substituted service of summons. Under the circumstances, did the trial court acquire
jurisdiction over the defendants? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. There were two (2) attempts on the part of the sheriff to serve summons personally upon the defendants,
but to no avail, hence, he served it by substitute service. He was not required or expected to serve summons
personally by all means and at all times considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service
should he be unable to effect personal service within a reasonable time (Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759,
June 5, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Jurisdiction is an element of due process.

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam — the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action —
is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi
in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action. The
purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process (Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA
98, 104; Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Action in personam distinguished from action in rem or quasi in rem; service of summons in such actions.
The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an action in
rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005,
448 SCRA 663, 673-674, thusly:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and
purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although
it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him
to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding
in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to
be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment
against the prop[er]ty to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As
far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights
and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in
rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or
cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon
the parties who joined in the action.
Courts cannot try cases against non-resident defendants; reason; exception.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and/or
the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made
upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the
defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an
action in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court
(Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Requirements of substituted service to be followed strictly; reason.

The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. This is because substituted
service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which
statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the
impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the
defendant either expressly or impliedly (Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, Bersamin, J).
RULE 17 – DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Dismissal for failure to prosecute; final order.

What is the nature and effect of a dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length
of time? Explain.
Ans.: It is a final, not interlocutory order, hence, appealable. Under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, an
action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to
comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the Court. (De Knecht v. CA, 352 Phil. 833, 849 [1998]).
The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable
with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the
part of the plaintiff to prosecute. (Shimitsu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 688 Phil. 385, 398 [2012]
citing Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 497, 505-506 [2000] and Gapoy v. Adil, 171
Phil. 653, 658 [1978]; Roasters Phils., Inc. v. Gaviola, et al., G.R. No. 191874, September 2, 2015, Perez, J).
Denial of MTD is interlocutory; remedy.
An action for specific performance was filed seeking to recover a parcel of land. A motion to dismiss was
filed on the ground of improper venue and that the proper recourse was to file a motion for execution of the
judgment based on compromise agreement. The MTD was denied by the RTC. A special civil action for
certiorari was directly filed with the SC questioning the order of denial of the MTD. Is the petition proper?
Why?
Ans.: No. It is settled that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a
petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not
terminating the proceedings in which it is issued. To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not
only delays the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts (Atienza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85455, June 2, 1994, 232 SCRA 737, 744; Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City, Br. XIII, G.R. No. 79119, November 22, 1990,
191 SCRA 610; Prudential Bank and Trust Co. v. Macadaez, 105 Phil. 791 [1959]; People v. Court of Appeals, L-
51635, December 14, 1982, 119 SCRA 162, 173).
But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without jurisdiction, or
with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is because
as to such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Rule 65
of the Rules of Court; Bañez, Jr. v. Hon. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237,
Bersamin, J).
The petition for certiorari was filed directly with the SC. Is it proper? Why?
Ans.: No. The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to
the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The
Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why the Court
stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753, 766:
xxx. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes
in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should
be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement
must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe (Bañez, Jr. v. Hon. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 159508,
August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237, Bersamin, J).
RULE 18 – PRE-TRIAL
Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Once again, the SC in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Fadcor, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 197970, January 25, 2016,
Peralta, J, had the occasion to rule on the effects of failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. It went on to say that
when respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due notice, they have already acquired the risk of not
being able to dispute the evidence presented ex parte. In The Philippine American Life and General Insurance
Company v. Joseph Enario, 645 Phil. 166 [2010], the Court ruled that, “[t]he legal ramification of defendant's failure
to appear for pre-trial is still detrimental to him while beneficial to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is given the privilege to
present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
Written interrogatories; purpose.

In Phil. Health Insurance Corp. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, G.R. No. 193158, November 11, 2015, Peralta,
J, PHIC filed a complaint with its Legal Sector – Prosecution Department against OLLH for having filed two (2) claims
involving the same patient, for the same diagnosis and covering the same period of confinement. After the filing of
answer, OLLH sent written interrogatories as well as a motion for inspection and copying of the original transmittal
letter or other claims attached to the complaint which was denied by the Senior Arbiter on the ground that the
proceedings are summary in nature and that the motion for production and inspection as well as written
interrogatories cannot be filed under the rules of the PHIC, hence, the same are merely designed to delay the
proceedings. MR was filed but it was denied, hence, it was elevated to the CA which reversed the ruling holding that
there was good cause for the resort to the modes of discovery to be able to intelligently prepare a position paper. Is
the ruling correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any facts or matter
that are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the pending action (See RULES OF COURT,
Rule 25, Sec. 1, in relation to Rule 23, Sec. 1). Like other modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the purpose of
written interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case
(Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products, Phils., Inc., 358 Phil. 849, 861 [1998]). On the other hand, the provision on
production and inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC
Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it
(Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Grandville 3 Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700, April 10,
2013, 695 SCRA 714, 723). It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced, inspected and/or
copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action (See Solidbank
Corp. v. Gateway Electronics Corp., et al., 576 Phil. 250, 262 [2008]).
In this case, the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and received on July 28, 2009
sought to elicit facts that could already be seen from the allegations as well as attachments of the Complaint and the
Verified Answer. Thus, the interrogatories were frivolous and need not be answered. Aside from this, the PHIC
Arbitration Department correctly observed that the written interrogatories were mistakenly addressed to the
President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently answer, either based on his job description or first-hand
experience, issues that arose from and related to the filing and processing of claims.
RULE 33 – DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Nature and effect of demurrer to evidence.

Once again, in Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corp., et al., G.R. No. 191849, September 23, 2015, Perez, J, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. (Celino v. Heirs of Alejo Santiago, 479 Phil. 617, 623 (2004)).
Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.––After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to
show that he is entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a determination. (Uy
v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 784 (2009)).
A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally entails a calibration of the evidence to determine
whether the material allegations of the complaint were sufficiently backed by evidence. It was repeatedly stressed
that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not
of fact.
RULE 34 – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Judgment on the pleadings may be rendered if answer does not tender an issue.
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party’s answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court
to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party’s pleading in another case
supposedly tendered an issue of fact (Fernando Medical Ent., Inc. v. Wesleyan University Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 207970,
January 20, 2016, Bersamin, J).
Denial thru no knowledge sufficient to form a belief.

The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint “for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken
during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines.” Was the manner of
denial effective as a specific denial? Why?
Ans.: No. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to
know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that
denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to
it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective (J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga
Industries, Inc., G.R. No. L-25137, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 807, 809-812) or sham denials. (Manufacturer’s Bank &
Trust Co. v. Diversified Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 33695, May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 357, 364)
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and affirmative
defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no
consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the
petitioner’s claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the complaint (Fernando Medical Ent., Inc. v.
Wesleyan University Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016, Bersamin, J).
RULE 37 – MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/NEW TRIAL
New trial cannot be granted if the evidence was available at the time of the trial but was not presented.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change
the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence
before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. (De Villa v. Director, New Bilibid Prisons, 485 Phil. 368-289
[2004]) “A new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented
due to its negligence (Senit v. People, G.R. No. 192914, January 11, 2016).
Second motion for reconsideration; effect; judgment becomes final and executory.
The filing of a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended (Rule 52, Section 2) and the prevailing 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA
(IRCA). Being a prohibited pleading, a second motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does not
toll the running of the period to appeal. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No.
164314, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 451, 468, citing Land Bank o/ the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities,
Inc., G.R. No. 175163, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 396, 405)
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. PJCOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 164314, September 26, 2008, 566
SCRA 451, the Court explained why the period to appeal should not be reckoned from the denial of a second motion
for reconsideration:
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or
order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby
courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first
place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the
disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the
period of finality or judgments by virtue or filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only
illogical but also unjust to the winning party.
The same principle is likewise applicable by analogy in the determination of the correct
period to appeal. Reckoning the period from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration
will result in the same absurd situation where the courts will be obliged to issue orders or
resolutions denying a prohibited pleading in the first place (Dinglasan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 145420, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 253, 265; Heirs of Gamaliel Albano v. Sps. Ravanes, G.R.
No. 183645, July 20, 2016, Jardeleza, J).
RULE 39 – JUDGMENTS
Execution of judgment; period of 5 & 10 years.
A compromise was entered into involving parcels of land which was approved and a judgment based on
compromise was entered. Later on the plaintiffs commenced an action to recover possession and ownership
of the real properties. The judgment was not executed within the period of 5 years. Are the parties entitled
to be heard of their claims or defenses? Explain.
Ans.: Yes, they are entitled to be heard on their respective claims like in any other independent action. Although
commenced ostensibly for the recovery of possession and ownership of real property, the case was really an action
to revive the judgment by compromise because the ultimate outcome would be no other than to order the execution
of the judgment by compromise. There is no substantial difference between an action expressly called one for
revival of judgment and an action for recovery of property under a right adjudged under and evidenced by a final
judgment (Hizon v. Escocio, 103 Phil. 1106 [1958]). In addition, the parties themselves have treated the complaint
for recovery as one for revival. Accordingly, the parties should be fully heard on their respective claims like in any
other independent action (Bañez, Jr. v. Hon. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237,
Bersamin, J).
Effect of defense of prescription.

The petitioner’s defense of prescription to bar the action for recovery presents another evidentiary concern.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires, indeed, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought before it is
barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action (Article 1144 of the Civil Code). It
is clear, however, that such a defense could not be determined in the hearing of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
considering that the complaint did not show on its face that the period to bring the action to revive had already
lapsed. An allegation of prescription, as the Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, G.R. No. 143188,
February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 627, 637 “can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its
face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed, [o]therwise, the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to
dismiss.”
At any rate, the mere lapse of the period per se did not render the judgment stale within the context of the
law on prescription, for events that effectively suspended the running of the period of limitation might have
intervened. In other words, the Estate of Gomez was not precluded from showing such events, if any. The Court
recognized this possibility of suspension in Lancita v. Magbanua, G.R. No. L-15467, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 42, 46:
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to
the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be
issued without scire facias (Bañez, Jr. v. Hon. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012,
Bersamin, J).
Judgment is conclusive only upon the parties.
Dare Adventure Farm Corp. acquired a property from Goc-ongs. Later on, it found out that a joint affidavit
was executed by the sellers declaring that they owned said property and that they mortgaged it with the
Spouses Ng. When they failed to pay, there was a complaint for collection of sum of money or in the
alternative, foreclose the mortgage. For failure to file an answer, the defendants were declared in default
and judgment was rendered declaring the plaintiffs as owners of the property. Dare Adventure Farm Corp.
filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA which dismissed the same. Is the remedy proper?
Why?
Ans.: No. it is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and those who
are successors in interest by title after the commencement of the action in court. The principle that a person cannot
be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. In this case, the corporation was not a party, hence, it cannot be
prejudiced by the judgment (Dare Adventure Farm Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012,
Bersamin, J).
In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344, it was said that a person not impleaded
and given the opportunity to take part in the proceedings is not bound by the decision declaring as null and void a
title from which his title to the property had been derived. The effect of a judgment could not be extended to non-
parties by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them, for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding
to which he was a stranger.

State the nature of a petition for annulment of a judgment.
Ans.: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in
character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the
safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and
unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely
because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Arceo, G.R.
No. 158270, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85, 94; Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350
SCRA 568, 578; Dare Adventure Farm Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, Bersamin, J).
What is the proper remedy of Dare Adventure Corp.? Explain.

Ans.: The proper recourse is either an action for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. The
petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of title, a common law remedy
designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. The action for
quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In the action, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not only to put
things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable, respect and not disturb
the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and
even abuse the property (Heirs of Enrique Toring v. Heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga, G.R. No. 163610, September 27,
2010, 631 SCRA 278, 293-294).
The other proper remedy is an action for reconveyance of property. According to Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong,
G.R. No. L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196, 201, the remedy belongs to the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, and such landowner demands the reconveyance of
the property in the proper court of justice. If the property has meanwhile passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the landowner may seek damages. In either situation, the landowner respects the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review provided the one-year period from the land coming under the
operation of the Torrens System of land registration already passed (Dare Adventure Farm Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
161122, September 24, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Recognition of a foreign judgment.

There was a judgment rendered by a court in the USA holding petitioner liable for damages, but despite
demand to pay, the petitioner failed to comply, hence, a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment was filed
which was granted by the RTC of Makati. Before the SC petitioner contended that it was not accorded by the Court of
Appeals the right to refute the foreign judgment pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court because the
appellate court gave the effect of res judicata to the said foreign judgment. The Court of Appeals copied wholesale or
verbatim the respondent’s brief without addressing the body of evidence adduced by petitioner showing that it had
reasonable grounds to implead respondent.
It asserted that the U.S. District Court committed a clear mistake of law and fact in its issuance of the Order
dated March 13, 1990, thus, said Order is unenforceable in this jurisdiction. Is the petition proper? Why?
Ans.: No. It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that vary in different
countries. (St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. v. Grand International Airways, Inc., 535 Phil. 757, 762 [2006]) In the
Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment
or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought
upon for its enforcement. (See Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II (Ninth Revised Edition),
p. 524; citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 93 Phil. 1035 [1953]) An action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact (BPI-
Securities Corp. v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015).
Distinction between foreign judgment in actions in rem and personam.

The Court expounded in Mijares on the application of the aforequoted provision:
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the
thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in
both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus,
the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a
foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions,
if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the
party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity (BPI-Securities Corp. v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015).
5-year; 10-year period to execute judgment; effect if execution was not implemented.
A decision in an unlawful detainer case became final and executory on July 28, 2000. The plaintiffs filed a
motion for execution on August 8, 2000, but the judgment was not implemented. Can he file another motion for
execution after the lapse of 5 years when the judgment became final and executory. Can he file another motion after
the lapse of the 5-year period? Why?
Ans.: No. As mandated by Section 6, Rule 39, if the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion
after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. (Rubio
v. Alabata, G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 554, 559-560) In the case at bar, the Decision, despite the
timely motion to execute the same, was not implemented by the court. The failure to implement the Decision
impelled Bajao to again file another motion to execute. However, the course of action to execute the Decision is not
accordance with Section 6, Rule 39. The correct remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment in a regular
court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. Actions for revival of judgment are governed
by Article 1144[3], Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the proper remedy is to file a complaint for revival of judgment (Quilo, et al. v. Bajao, G.R. No.
186199, September 7, 2016, Perez, J).
Requirements of res judicata.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements
are present, namely: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration (Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Matilde Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013,
Bersamin, J).
No need for absolute identity of partes.

In all the five cases, an identity of parties existed because the parties were the same, or there was privity
among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of
interest sufficed for res judicata to apply (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135101, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 747,
753). Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior
and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient (Dapar v. Biascan,
G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 199). As such, the fact that a previous case was filed in the
name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.
The subject matter of all the actions, was the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one
hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of
Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.
A judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was successful, would amount to res
judicata in relation to the last action for partition (Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Matilde Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13,
2013, Bersamin, J).

Reason for the doctrine of res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on
the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation ― interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed
twice for one and the same cause ― nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject
the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness (Allied Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108089, January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 252, 257-258).
Notes: When the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly
applies (Heirs of Maximino Derla vs. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de Hipolito, 648 SCRA 638 [2011]).
The doctrine of res judicata is provided in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Prudential Bank vs.
Mauricio, 663 SCRA 367 [2012]).
Immutability of judgment; reason.
If a judgment has become final and executory, may it be amended substantially? Explain.
Ans.: No. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. The reason
is that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere; and it is essential for the effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the winning party should not be deprived of the
fruits of the verdict (FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, 644 SCRA 50
[2011]).
Exceptions to the rule.

The only exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable (Sofio v. Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No.
157810, February 15, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, May 10, 1995, 244 SCRA 72, which the petitioners cited to
buttress their plea for the grant of their motion to recall entry of judgment, is not pertinent.
A judgment nunc pro tunc has been defined and characterized thuswise:
“The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record,
the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it
show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a
judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor
to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. (Wilmerding vs.
Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)”
Based on such definition and characterization, the petitioners’ situation did not fall within the scope of a
nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not mere clarification, but the complete
reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the reinstatement of the DARAB decision (Sofio v. Valenzuela, et al.,
G.R. No. 157810, February 15, 2012, Bersamin, J).
An application for free patent was filed by Pascual, but it was denied due to the opposition of Almazan-
Villamor. After the judgment became final and executory, a motion for execution was filed which was
granted placing Almazan-Villamor in the premises. It was questioned as the phrase “placing the winning
party in the premises” is not found in the judgment. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the judgment to be
executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment
sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award (Tumibay
v. Soro, G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 169, 175-176).
Admittedly, the phrase “placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in the premises of the land in
question” was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the decision. But the absence of that phrase did not
render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full consonance with the decision sought to be
executed. A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto (Jaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129660, November 22, 2001,
370 SCRA 221, 228).
The denial of Pascual’s free patent application was based on the recognition of Almazan-Villamor’s
ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was the directive for Pascual to refrain from
entering the property, and from possessing the subject property declared to be owned by Almazan-Villamor. Upon
the final finding of the ownership in the judgment in favor of Almazan-Villamor, the delivery of the possession of the
property was deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of Pascual to the possession had
been based also on ownership (De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 547,
560; Pascual v. Daquioag, et al., G.R. No. 162063, March 31, 2014, Bersamin, J).
APPEAL
Mode of appeal from RTC to CA, etc.

Appeals from the RTC to the CA in the exercise of the RTC’s original jurisdiction pursuant to Secs. 3 and 4 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners file a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their
notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the period
allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the
appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time,
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case. On the
other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period as required by
Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground
to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,14 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements
was the only way by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.
In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of
the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or
lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for
review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of
right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court,
exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or
final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the
superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or
not.
The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that
taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately
undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case;
the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This requirement of
transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary 9 Heirs
of Arturo Garcia I v. Mun. of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Neypes principle does not apply to administrative cases.

The Supreme Court, pursuant to its rule-making power has the authority to lay down rules. Sometimes such
rules even depart from the literal provisions of the Rules of Court. In fact, it is continuing power conferred upon it by
the Constitution. The purpose of such rules is speedy disposition of cases and to afford the parties all opportunities
to have their cases decided on the merits and not through technicalities.
One such rule is Domingo Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 469 SCRA 633 providing for a fresh 15-day
period to appeal from the time a party is furnished with a copy of the resolution denying a Motion for
Reconsideration. Before such rule, a party had only the balance of the period of appeal from the time he received a
copy of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The question however, is whether the “fresh 15-day period is applicable in administrative cases.” In San
Lorenzo Ruiz Builders & Dev. Corp., Inc., et al. v. Maria Cristina Banya, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015, the Supreme
Court said, No.
It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
whether the “fresh period rule” applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to
the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. It was held that the “fresh period rule” only covers
judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The “fresh period rule” in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the “fresh period rule”
shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule
41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42
(appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 57 – ATTACHMENTS
Discharge of attachment; meaning of the words “deposit” and “amount.”

In an attempt to discharge attachment on properties of a defendant, petitioner Bank contended that it has
the option to deposit real property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond to secure any contingent claim over its property
in the event the plaintiff would prevail. It was argued that Sec. 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term deposit, thus, it
cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that “[a]n order of attachment may be issued either
ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount
equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value
of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs.”
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that “[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with
all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant’s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or
gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the
order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs (Luzon Dev. Bank, et al. v.
Erlinda Krishman, G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015, Peralta, J).”
Requisites for the issuance of preliminary injunction; merits should not be prejudged.
There was an application for Emission Testing authority, but the existing entity that was conducting
emission tests objected to prevent cut throat or ruinous competition. It was however contended that there are
53,647 vehicles in Iloilo City, yet the existing one can cater to only 15,000 motor vehicles. There was a petition for
injunction to prevent the City from acting upon the application contending that it has the capability to serve all the
registered motor vehicles. A writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Is the order correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court set the guidelines for when the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is justified, namely: (a) when the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or (b) when the commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or (c) when a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial. (Rivas v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 190 SCRA 295
[1990]; Government Service and Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 [1989]; and Ortigas v. Co. Ltd. Partnership
v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 165 [1988]). In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ would be a virtual acceptance
of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. (See Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals,
supra). There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of
proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove (Searth
Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31,1992, 207 SCRA 622, 629-630).
Injunction cannot divest one of ownership.

In a case, claiming that they were prevented from entering into properties by the security guards employed
to secure the same, they filed a complaint for Damages with prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The
defendants contended that plaintiffs do not own the properties and that the issue of ownership is still pending. The
RTC granted the petition but it was reversed by the CA holding that WPI and TRO are not allowed where the
claimants title has not been clearly established. It further held that a WPI is intended to preserved the status quo
ante or the last actual, peaceful and uncontested status prior to the controversy and that an injunctive relief cannot
transfer possession pending litigation. Is the CA’s decision correct? Why?
Ans.: Yes. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper (Sps. Plaza
v. lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014, 718 SCRA 19, 31). Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper
remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other
party where such right is being disputed (See Almeida v. CA, 489 Phil. 648, 672 (2005); Raspado v. CA, G.R. No.
104782, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 650, 653; and Merville Park Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Velez, 273 Phil. 406,
412 [1991]). After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual,
peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy (Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samul, 491 Phil.
458, 472 [2005]).
Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one
party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed, as in this case. Preliminary
injunction is a preservative remedy. Therefore, it should not create new relations between the parties, but must only
maintain the status quo until the merits of the case is fully heard (See Los Banos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, 433 Phil.
930, 945 [2002]; Sps. Laus, et al. v. Optimum Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 208343, February 3, 2016, Perlas-
Bernabe, J).
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI
NLRC decision appealable to CA, by way of special civil action for certiorari.
How may a decision of the NLRC be appealed and in what court? Explain.
Ans.: It should be appealed by way of a petition for certiorari in the CA.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998,
295 SCRA 494, 503-504, it was clarified that parties seeking the review of decisions of the NLRC should file a
petition for certiorari in the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the NLRC. Thereafter, the remedy of the aggrieved party from the CA decision is an appeal via petition
for review on certiorari (Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 488; People v. Salafranca,
G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Certiorari is the remedy against judgment of acquittal; no double jeopardy.

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but
also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved
party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy, (People of the Philippines, et al. and AAA
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015) in violation of the general rule that the prosecution
cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case.
This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from
appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated (Morillo v. People, et al., G.R. No.
198270, December 9, 2015, Peralta, J).
What is the proper recourse from a decision of the Comelec? Explain.

Ans.: It depends upon the nature of the decision.
If the decision is an exercise of its administrative function, it may be brought to the SC via Rule 65 if there is
a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
If the decision is in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, then, it can be brought to the SC via Rule 64.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate
rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is generally
identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the
former, the period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in
the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed (See Pates v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 481, 485-486).
Is there a need to file MR before going to the SC? Explain.

Ans.: The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent
the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case (Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 24, 37, citing Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520
SCRA 346, 358-359; Causing v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Exceptions to the rule.

The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question,
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of
the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public
interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable
herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases
(Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Causing v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014,
Bersamin, J).
Accused were charged with and convicted of the three (3) counts of murder. If one did not appeal, but others
appealed and the SC judgment downgraded the case to homicide. State the effect of the downgrading of the
offense insofar as the accused who did not appeal is concerned. Explain.
Ans.: Said judgment shall inure to the benefit of the one who did not appeal.
He cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed (and
the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his
withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth
pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair,
considering that the Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
The rule is based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147524, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 385, it was said that the benefits of this
provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not (People v. Valdez, et al., G.R. No.
175602, February 13, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Notes: The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter (People vs.
Olivo, 594 SCRA 77 [2009]; People vs. Brillantes, 671 SCRA 388 [2012]).
ELECTION – MANDAMUS
State the reason for the filing of the petition for mandamus. Explain.
Ans: The Petition for Mandamus sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and
Resolution of the Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter’s
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court was called upon to
determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the
inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-à-vis the factual and legal milieu of this
case. The administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or
judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize
Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of
the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC’S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executor
(Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Belmonte, et al., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016).
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-
General to enter said Representative’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives (Codilla, Sr. v.
De Venecia).
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are
not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered therein nor
argue that the doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the public respondents,
such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
are all legally bound by the Court’s judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly
cancelled Reyes’s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her
Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have
our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a
party to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judicata is intolerable
for it will defeat this proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final judgment that Reyes was
ineligible for the subject position (Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Belmonte, et al., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016,
Leonardo-Del Castillo, J).
Mandamus is not the remedy to compel restoration of a cadet’s rights.
May a petition for mandamus be issued to compel the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia’s rights and entitlements
as a full-pledged graduating cadet? In answering the question in the Negative, the SC
Ans.: No. These matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond
the province of the Court to decide. (University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280,
October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 356). The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission
officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief.
Borrowing the words of Garcia, the SC said that there are standards that must be met. There are policies to be
pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1CL
Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. (Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 59, at 942).
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. (University of the Philippines Board of Regents
v. Ligot-Telan, supra note 64, at 361-362). For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be
mandated. (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591,
597; Cudia, et al. v. The Superintendent of the PMA, et al., G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, Peralta, J).
RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER
The only issue in ejectment cases is possession; nature of decision on ownership.

In ejectment cases, the only issue is the physical and material possession of the property involved, the
resolution being independent of any claim of ownership made by any of the litigants. The question of ownership is,
at best, merely provisionally decided, but only for the sole purpose of determining which party has the better right
to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, the judgment in the ejectment case could only determine who
between the petitioner and the respondents had a better right to possess Structure No. 86-313. It did not, as it could
not, decide that the petitioner was entitled to the award of the lot, or that the respondents could not be considered
as qualified beneficiaries of the ZIP (Blas v Galapon, G.R. No. 159710, September 30, 2009, Bersamin, J).
In ejectment suit, decision on the issue of ownership is provisional.
Several heirs inherited a parcel of land from their father. One of the heirs, Eliseo sold an undivided share to
Atty. Amante in 1990. In 1992, the co-owners executed an extrajudicial partition and the portion sold was
assigned to Atty. Amante. One of the heirs demanded the vacation of the portion being occupied by Amante,
but he refused to vacate hence, a suit for ejectment was filed which was dismissed by the RTC and CA where
the CA held that Amante was either a co-owner or assignee with the right of possession over the disputed
property.
In dismissing the ejectment case, it ruled that the question of ownership was raised. Rule on the
petition. Explain.
Ans.: The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed
to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved
(Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 165, 170). The sole question for resolution in the case
is the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the
trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the
question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of possession (Pengson v. Ocampo, Jr., G.R. No.
131968, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 420, 425). The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional,
and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property (Barrientos v.
Rapal, supra, at p. 171).
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property, the CA properly ruled on
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between them had the better right to possess the
disputed property (Quijano v. Amante, G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014, Bersamin, J).
No trial de novo in appeals from MTC decision to RTC; ordering resurvey relocation is equivalent to trial de
novo.
After the relocation survey of certain properties adjacent to one another, encroachment by one on the other
parcel of land was discovered. Demands were made to vacate but to no avail, hence, a complaint before the barangay
was filed. No settlement having been entered into, a complaint for ejectment was filed, but the MTC dismissed the
case due to lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the RTC ordered the conduct of the relocation and verification survey in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and decided the case on the basis of the result as there was really encroachment. Was
the act of the RTC correct? Why?
Held: No. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.
(Abellera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127480, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 485, 491). Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides that the judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey
“in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to
its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
(Manalang, et al. v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Boundary dispute is an accion reinvindicatoria.

A boundary dispute does not make out a case for unlawful detainer, but an action reinvindicatoria.
A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant
formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to
hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the
plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto (Manalang, et al. v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995, January 12,
2015, Bersamin, J).
Judgment in unlawful detainer is immediately executory.

Ejectment cases are governed by Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure. Its summary nature
is designed to restore physical possession of a real property to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims in an expeditious and inexpensive
manner. True to its summary nature, the court’s jurisdiction is limited to the issue of physical or de facto possession;
hence, adjudications made on questions of ownership are provisional. To abate losing litigants’ attempt to defer and
circumvent summary ejectment proceedings, the rules mandate that decisions involving ejectment cases are
immediately executory. Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal
that may be taken therefrom.
Therefore, the decision ordering defendants to vacate the subject property pursuant to the ejectment
proceedings must be immediately executed. Especially so without any substantial defense to oppose the ejectment
order, the petitioners should yield possession to respondent. Hence, petitioners’ ploy that would obliterate the
objective of summary ejectment proceedings must fail. The order to vacate is immediately executory (Quilo, et al. v.
Bajao, G.R. No. 186199, September 7, 2016, Perez, J).
HABEAS CORPUS
Appeal in habeas corpus.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of
its members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court
or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of
the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to
decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court “acquire[s] the power and
authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]” Therefore, the decision on the petition is a
decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court (In Re: Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Datu Marklang Salibo v. Warden, QC. Jail Annex, et al., G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J).
It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether
the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was
filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated “does not thereby become
merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect.” The decision on the petition
for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
Nature and purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Called the “great writ of liberty[,]” the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard for personal liberty.”
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.” “Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient” ((In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datu Marklang Salibo v. Warden, QC. Jail Annex, et al., G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J).
Writ need not be related to a crime.
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the
efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of
citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus
being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that
the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of
1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently
settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves
in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.
An application for habeas corpus was filed before the Court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans
being held in the reservation. Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the
other Mangyans, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a
Return of the Writ.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban. “[T]o exterminate vice,” Mayor Justo
Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these

brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and
deported to Davao without their consent.
As to the legality of his acts, the Court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had
deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile. It said that the women, “despite their
being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]” The women had the right “to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality.”
Writ distinguished from decision on petition.

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is
the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the
other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of
the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance “on [its]
face [is] devoid of merit[.]”Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of
invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended.
RULE 108 – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Correction of substantial changes in civil registry; appropriated adversary proceedings.

A petition for correction of entry in a Certificate of Live Birth was filed by Felipe Almojuela who alleged that
he has been using the said name for 60 years. His record of birth however showed that he was registered as “Felipe
Condeno.” The RTC granted the petition ruling that it would avoid confusion in his personal undertakings and that
the Almojuela family would not be prejudiced especially so that he has been accepted and acknowledged by his half-
siblings. The CA reversed the decision since he failed to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings who
stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for. It was further ruled that the correction sought was not merely
clerical in nature but necessarily involved a determination of his filiation. This is especially so that there was no
showing that he was recognized by his putative father, hence, he cannot use the surname Almojuela. Before the SC,
he contended that the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Is the
petition proper? Why?
Ans.: No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. (See Republic v. Mercadera, 652 Phil. 195, 210-211 [2010])
An adversary proceeding is defined as one "having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it." (Republic v. Uy, 716 Phil. 254, 261 [2013])
The Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the
petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry
should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest
that would be affected thereby.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule I 08 of the Rules of
Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations renders the
entire proceedings therein null and void. In Republic v. CA, 325 Phil. 361 [1996], the Court held that the proceedings
of the trial court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil
registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry (Felipe Almojuela v. Republic, G.R. No.
211724, August 24, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Note: In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a substantial correction or change
of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who
have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby be made respondents for the reason that they are
indispensable parties. Thus, the Court nullified the order to effect the necessary changes for respondent's failure to
strictly comply with the foregoing procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Citing Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic, 250 phil. 300 [1988], the Court held therein:
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have
been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well,
together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights.
This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
Venue is a question of jurisdiction in criminal cases.

Accused was charged with the crime of falsification of private document alleging that while still a Regional
Sales Manager of DKT Phils., Inc., she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred expenses in the
amount of P1,810.00 instead of the actual amount of P810.00 at Garden Café, Jagna, Bohol and claimed
reimbursement for it. She filed a MTQ on the ground that the MTC of Jagna, Bohol has no jurisdiction as none of the
elements of the crime were committed in such place. She contended that the allegation in the complaint-affidavit
that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Café in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of
issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was also impossible for her to have committed the
crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement under the Weekly Travel Expense Report was
prepared and submitted in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued in Jagna, Bohol. She further insisted that
at the time of the issuance of the subject receipt, the element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of
falsification of private document to speak of. She explained that any damage that private respondent could have
suffered would only occur when it paid the request for reimbursement, but not before that date, much less at time of
the issuance of the said receipt. Are the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. (Foz, Jr., et al v. People, 618 Phil 120 (2009)).
In Foz, Jr. v. People, it was ruled:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction. (Macasaet v. People, 492 Phil. 355, 370 (2005); and Uy v. People, G.R. No.
119000, July 28 , 1997, 276 SCRA 367).
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified,
to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is
put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. (U.S. v. Baretto, 36 Phil 204, 207 (1917); Lopez v. Paras,
124 Phil. 1211, 1216 (1966)).
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information and not by the result of proof (People v. Galano, G.R. No. L-42925, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 193;
People v. Delfin, G.R. Nos. L-15230 and L-15979-81, July 31, 1961, 25 SCRA 911, 920), the Court holds that Navaja's
case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol (Navaja
v. Hon. Manuel A. de Castro, G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015, Peralta, J).
Effect if qualifying circumstances are not alleged in the information.

If an indictment for rape, there was an allegation of relationship of parentage of accused and the victim, but
there was no allegation of minority, accused can only be convicted of simple rape; not qualified rape.
The circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur to qualify the
crime of rape (People v. Malana, G.R. No. 185716, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 676, 695), but only her
relationship to the accused was alleged and proved. The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance
of such qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them
(People v. Bragat, G.R. No. 134490, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 425, 437). This conforms to Section 8 and Section
9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provide that the complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the stature, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statue but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment
(Section 8 and 9, Rules 110, Rules of Court; People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Meaning of the term “aggravating circumstances.”

The term “aggravating circumstance” is strictly construed when the appreciation of the modifying
circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death (now reclusion perpetua). Consequently,
the qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established during trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of
the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver
offense of qualified rape, although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the
information (People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 325, 333; People v. Dadulla,
G.R. No. 172231, February 9, 2011, Bersamin, J). The exception is when the date and time are ingredients of the
offenses charged (People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Effect of failure to allege exact date of commission of offense.
The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the
informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime,
for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Precision
as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of
the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is
sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to
the date of its actual commission (Rule 110, Sec. 11, Rules of Court; People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015,
Bersamin, J).
Right to due process.

In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires that the accused
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; hence, any accused not clearly charged in the
complaint or information for the offense could not be convicted of it, for to convict him so would be to violate his
constitutional right. In view of his innocence being presumed, he should likewise be presumed not to know anything
about the crime he was being charged of committing. The information must then aver the facts and circumstances
bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.
However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with
exactitude unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged (People v. Nuyok, G.R. No.
195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Mere averment of use of gun in killing the victim does not per se mean treachery.
The allegation in the information that accused with intent to kill, qualified by treachery without specifying
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder cannot qualify
the offense to murder. The use of the word treachery is a conclusion of law and not an averment of fact.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details
of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him
to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice (People v. Valdez, et al., G.R. No.
175602, January 18, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Right to be informed of the nature of accusation.

It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testify about the incident on December 24, 2002
because the date alleged was not vague or covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to
prepare his defense which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is worthy to note that the records are
bereft of any objection by the accused-appellant about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of
arraignment, during the formal offer of exhibits and at the time the prosecution put the victim on the witness stand
to establish the rape committed on December 24, 2002. In People v. Gianan, 394 Phil. 822, 835 (2000), citing People
v. Garcia, 346 Phil. 475 (1997). See also People v. Lizada, the Court held that an accused-appellant’s failure to raise a
timely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of
his right to object (Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480, 497 [2006]).
Sufficiency of allegations in the information; mere allegation of hazing is not sufficient.

The indictment in a hazing case merely stated that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim. There was no allegation of the elements like: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a
prerequisite for a person’s admission or entry into an organization. A Motion to Quash was filed by the accused
alleging that the information did not charge an offense, but the prosecutor contended otherwise and insisted that it
alleged and charged an offense. Rule on the Motion. Explain.
Ans.: The Motion should be granted because the ultimate facts alleged did not constitute the crime of hazing. The
indictment merely stated that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no
allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term (U.S. v. Lim
San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910) (cited in Consigna v. People, G.R. Nos. 175750-51, 2 April 2014; People v. Valdez, G.R. No.
175602, 18 January 2012, 663 SCRA 272; Matrido v. People, 613 Phil. 203 (2009); Batulanon v. People, 533 Phil. 336
(2006); Andaya v. People, supra note 28; Burgos v. SB, 459 Phil. 794 [2003]; People v. Banihit. 393 Phil. 465 [2000];
Oca v. Jimenez, 115 Phil. 420 [1962]) – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense given by
the statute” and “the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.” The Special Prosecutor’s belated
argument that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite
for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in
the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
of accomplice to hazing (People v. Bayabos, et al., G.R. No. 171222; People v. Aris, et al., G.R. No. 174786, February 18,
2015, Sereno, J).
RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS
Extinction of the penal action does not necessarily extinguish the civil liability.
Once more, in Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J, the SC ruled that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is required. (Lim
v. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, GR. No. 175851, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 628, 639-640) Thus, an accused
acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. (Tabaniag
v.People, 607 Phil. 429, 445 [2009]; See also: PNB v. Pablo Raymundo, G.R. No. 208672, December 16, 2016, Peralta,
J)
In upholding the civil liability of petitioner, the CA did not dwell into the purported admission of petitioner
anent her receipt of GCs in the amount of P32,000.00 as found by the RTC. Instead, the CA hinged its ruling on the
acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, the documentary evidence that respondent had duly
identified and formally offered in the course of these proceedings.
For her part, petitioner denied having entered into the subject transaction with respondent, claiming that
she: (a) had not transacted with respondent as to other goods, except GCs and POCs; (b) was made to sign two (2)
one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank prior to the issuance of the GCs and POCs, and (c) was not able
to retrieve the same after paying her obligation to respondent.
In agreeing with the CA, the SC
Held: Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in
blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying her obligations, is
a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."
Respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as
petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise, or to return the same to respondent in case
such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment
receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged
receipt from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return
the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.
Acquittal of accused in estafa case; no crime of estafa committed; effect on civil liability.
In a case, the SC made some clarifications on the liability of one who was charged with the crime of estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and acquitted with a finding that the elements of the crime were not
proven. The SC said:
Our law states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This civil liability ex
delicto may be recovered through a civil action which, under our Rules of Court, is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. While they are actions mandatorily fused, they are, in truth, separate actions whose existence are
not dependent on each other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case for failure to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto. It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising from a different source of
obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has
no authority to award damages.
In this case, William Mandy, President of Mandy Commodities Corp., Inc. delivered several checks to Gloria
Dy in the total amount of P21,706,281.00 with the instruction to use the checks to pay the loan of MCCI to Asia Trust
Bank, but Dy did not deliver the payments to the bank. Criminal cases for estafa were filed against Dy, but the RTC of
Manila acquitted her and found that the two (2) parties entered into a loan agreement. Hence, it held that the
prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of estafa – misappropriation or conversion.
However, it ordered her to pay Mandy the amount of P21,706,281.00. Appeal was filed to the CA which affirmed the
decision of the RTC. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the SC arguing that since she was acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime committed.
As there was not crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded.
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation though estafa under
Article 315, RPC. In general, the elements of estafa are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence; or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. The
element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable. (People v. Singson, G.R. No. 75920, November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA
534, 538) Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it
criminalizes this kind of fraud.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or
conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case,
applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or
omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable
doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This
means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point
of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without
sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists (Gloria Dy v. People, et al., G.R.
No. 189081, August 10, 2016, Jardeleza, J).
Civil liability arising from crime.

Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and civil liabilities. A crime is a liability
against the state. It is prosecuted by and for the state. Acts considered criminal are penalized by law as a means to
protect the society from dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability involves a penalty affecting a person's
liberty, acts are only treated criminal when the law clearly says so. On the other hand, civil liabilities take a less
public and more private nature. Civil liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a
right or prevent or redress a wrong. (Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 1 par. [a]) They do not carry with them the
imposition of imprisonment as a penalty. Instead, civil liabilities are compensated in the form of damages.
Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil component. Thus, while an act
considered criminal is a breach of law against the State, our legal system allows for the recovery of civil damages
where there is a private person injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that
our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. This is the concept of civil
liability ex delicto.
This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or omissions punished by law as a separate
source of obligation. (Civil Code, Art. 1157) This is reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which refers to the
filing of a separate civil action to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense. (Civil Code, Art. 30)
The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil liability in Article 104 which states that it includes restitution,
reparation of damage caused and indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should affect the corresponding civil action depends
on the varying kinds of acquittal. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 387,
the Court explained –
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different
rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the
question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
In Dayap v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 134, it was further said –
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and ( c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him.
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if mandatorily instituted
with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is based on the presence of reasonable doubt.
In these instances, while the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the
civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. This means
that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it
nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of
obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a
preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Hearsary evidence as basis of probable cause.

Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. (De Chavez v. Ombudsman, 543 Phil. 600, 620 [2007]). In the recent case of
Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible
in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay, viz.:
Justice Brion’s pronouncement in Unilever that “the determination of probable cause does
not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or
veracity of testimonies presented” correctly recognizes the doctrine in the United States that the
determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as
long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States v. Ventresca, the
United States Supreme Court held:
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of “probable cause,” this
Court has long held that “the term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation,” x x x and that a finding of “probable cause”
may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. x x x As
the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States x x x, “There is a large difference
between two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between
the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta
and modes of proof required to establish them.” Thus, hearsay may be the bases
for issuance of the warrant “so long as there … [is] a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay.” x x x And, in Aguilar, we recognized that “an affidavit
may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant,” so long as the magistrate is “informed
of some of the underlying circumstances” supporting the affiant’s
conclusions and his belief that any informant involved “whose identity need
not be disclosed…” was “credible” or his information “reliable.” x x x. (United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-108 [1965]).
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Dismissal without prejudice of a criminal case; motion to revive is sufficient; no need for another preliminary
investigation.
A criminal case which was dismissed without prejudice may be revived by filing of a motion to revive the
information is sufficient to revive such case. This is distinguished from the revival of a civil case which has been
dismissed without prejudice where there is a new complaint to be filed if there is revival. In the criminal case, there
is no need for a new preliminary investigation.
An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed.
Criminal cases which have been dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order
of dismissal become final, or thereafter, by filing a new information for the offense. The view that a new complaint
for preliminary investigation had to be filed before the charges against her could be revived is not correct.
On the argument that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled that the same is only
required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence only in the following
instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies
or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from
the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal.
Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this case, there is no need to conduct another preliminary
investigation (Ceson v. Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez, in her capacity as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194339-41, April 20,
2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
RULE 114 – BAIL
Bail granted due to humanitarian reasons.

Senator Enrile was charged with the crime of plunder before the Sandiganbayan in relation to the purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
After the Warrant of Arrest was issued, he voluntarily surrendered. He filed a petition to fix bail alleging as one of
the grounds his age of over 70 and physical condition which must be seriously considered. The Sandiganbayan
denied the petition, hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court questioning the denial of his
petition. His state of health was never raised in the Supreme Court in the petition for certiorari. At the
Sandiganbayan, however, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) classified Enrile
as a geriatric patient who was found to be suffering from some sickness whose condition, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risks to his life and considering his advanced age and ill health, required special medical attention.

His confinement, the doctor said was not recommended because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital.
The Sandiganbayan did not recognize the testimony of the doctor when it denied the petition to fix bail. Is
the denial order correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
In Dela Rama v. The People’s Court, the Supreme Court held that:
“This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
“Unless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of
the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x (77 Phil. 461 [October 2, 1946] (in
which the pending criminal case against the petitioner was for treason) (Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015,
Bersamin, J).”
Reason for the grant of bail.

Granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of
the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. (Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134
SCRA 466, where the Court observed: To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require
a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about
ready to render a decision in the case. Such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending trial. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of
the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. (Angara v. Fedman Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282,
January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17; Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015,
Bersamin, J).
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Provisional dismissal of case; can be revived; no double jeopardy.

Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165), but during the trial, the witness
of the prosecution failed to appear, thus, the court issued an order dismissing the information provisionally with the
express consent of the accused. There was a motion to re-open the case explaining that the reason for the witness’
failure to appear was due to the sudden death of his father-in-law which was granted. Accused questioned the order
contending that the provisional dismissal amounted to his acquittal. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be
revived by the State within the period provided under the 2 nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice
to the offended party. In no uncertain terms the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived
at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should
not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court
would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence. There was nothing in the records
showing the accused’s opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional
dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the
periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no
violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar
provided under the law.
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the
prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public
prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused’s motion for reconsideration when she filed her
Comment/Objection thereto (Saldariega v. Hon. Elvie Panganiban, et al., G.R. No. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015,
Peralta, J).
RULE 116 – BILL OF PARTICULARS
Bill of particulars in a criminal case; purpose.

The basic question in a case involving Senator Juan Ponce Enrile is whether an accused in a criminal case
may file a Motion for Bill of Particulars. This is so because to some, it is only in a civil case that such motion may be
resorted to. The 1964 Rules did not provide for a remedy of bill of particulars in criminal cases. It was merely
incorporated in Section 10 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court under the 1985 Rules and Sec. 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Previous rulings of the SC did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide. Hence, in U.S. v.
Schneer, 7 Phil. 523 [1907]; U.S. v. Cernias, 10 Phil. 682 [1908]; People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 746 [1946], the SC
ruled specifically that there was no rule on bill of particulars until finally the SC in the exercise of its rule-making
power put into the Rules the remedy of bill of particulars which is the further specification of the charges or claims
in an action which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder. He filed a motion for bill of particulars but the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground that the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial, hence, he filed a petition for certiorari with the SC contending that despite the ambiguity and
insufficiency of the information filed against him, the SB denied his motion. He contended that there was a serious
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He was left
to speculate on what his specific participations in the crime of plunder. He contended that the information should
have stated the details of the particular acts that constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led
to the charge of plunder. Paragraph (1) of the Information alleged that he repeatedly received from Napoles and her
representatives, kickbacks and other commissions before, during and/or after project identification of projects
funded by his PDAF (Juan Ponce Enrile v. People, et al., G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, Brion, J).
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”?
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”?
Who committed those acts?
Ans.: Yes. Sen. Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars.
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by
means of a combination or series of overt acts. Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount
of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth –
whether through a combination or series of overts acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important
element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public treasury under Section
1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government
under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 351 [2001]).
The prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly
committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point of ambiguity
for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his defense.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence,
even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very
clear from the congressional deliberations.
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various
overt acts that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts that should not
only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is
specifically charged with and why he stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the
charges(Juan Ponce Enrile v. People, et al., G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, Brion, J).
Basic purpose of Bill of Particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the
crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the
allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.
In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 349, 361).
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the alternative, if
no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal.
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
Accused was convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment. Will it put him in double jeopardy if he is
prosecuted for the crime of estafa? Why?
Ans.: No. The conviction of the accused for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not preclude her personal
liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double
jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation (People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 208686, July 1, 2015, 761 SCRA 332). In contrast, the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale requires different elements. Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting
and convicting the accused-appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other
not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements being different (People v.
Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016, Bersamin, J).
ARREST & SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT
State the effect if there is a arrest, search without warrant. Explain.

Ans.: The arrest and search without warrant as a rule is not valid.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
So sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that
no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz.:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion
is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding (People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012, Bersamin,
J).
Belocura argued that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating
bricks of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution because he was
then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting
policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for anything. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No, because he was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code).
To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an
eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it “proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption.” Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a
crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was
apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore,
and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for
weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be
used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his control, like
the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting
policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of
the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal (Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538
SCRA 611; People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012, Bersamin, J).
JUDGMENT
Promulgation of judgment; effect if accused fails to appear; loses right to appeal.

If accused failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment, he loses his right to appeal his conviction.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)
days from notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be done in absentia. The
accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which
to appeal, otherwise, the decision becomes final. The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a)
the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules of Court the permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail
himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason

for his absence. Should the trial court find that his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from
the judgment of conviction.
Under Section 6, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment is mandatory
because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or offense. He was charged with and actually
found guilty of estafa, and meted the indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the medical certificate issued by a doctor.
Yet, he did not thereby establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause because the purported issuer
himself directly impugned the credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have
examined the petitioner (Salvador v. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015, Bersamin, J).
NEW TRIAL (CRIMINAL CASE)
Res gestae statement, not a newly discovered evidence; requisites.

The accused appealed to the CA, where he filed a motion for new trial on the ground of a newly discovered
evidence consisting of a statement of the victim in the police blotter, a res gestae statement. Is the contention
correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The res gestae statement of the victim did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt. The concept of newly-discovered evidence is applicable only when a
litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal,
particularly one before the Supreme Court. The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of newly-discovered
evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The Court would be compelled, despite its not
being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for purposes of its appellate adjudication.
Newly-discovered evidence must satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. (Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 96027-28, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 24, 33)
The proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first two requisites were not
present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced
the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged
res gestae declaration of the victim and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to
substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility (Ladines v. People, et al., G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016,
Bersamin, J).
RULE 119 – JUDGMENT

Demurrer to Evidence
Demurrer to evidence; dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; effect.

Once more, in Asistio v. People, et al., G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015, Peralta, J, the SC had the occasion to
say that if there is demurrer to evidence in a criminal case and it is granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
same does not amount to acquittal.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, it was stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer,
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, it was explained that the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to
do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.
The accused-appellee was of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is an acquittal. It
should be emphasized that “acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the
case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court
is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance,
etc.”
PROBATION
Probation, when available.

Accused was indicted for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III, RA 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation & Discriminatory Act. He was convicted and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence from
10 years to 17 years, 4 months, and one day. On appeal, he alleged that the trial court should not have given much
faith and credence to the testimony of the witness. In short, his appeal was anchored on his claim of innocence or
lack of evidence to support his conviction. The penalty was reduced after finding that he committed a lesser offense
of acts of lasciviousness. He applied for probation. Is he qualified? Explain.
Ans.: For him to be entitled to probation, he should have buttressed the appeal on the ground that the imposition of
the penalty was erroneous or that he is guilty merely of a lesser offense, which he did not but even professed
innocence.
In order that an accused may still be allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a notice of appeal, it
must be categorically stated that such appeal must be limited to the following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty imposed by the lower court, which
when corrected would entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the accused was convicted and that the
accused should only be liable to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime for which he
was originally convicted and the proper penalty imposable is within the probationable period.
In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime committed by the accused is more
than six years; hence, the sentence disqualified the accused from applying for probation. The accused should then be
allowed to file an appeal under the afore-stated grounds to seek a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed by
the trial court. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed, and
the penalty finally imposed is within the probationable period, the accused should still be allowed to apply for
probation. (See: RA 10707)
In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated above, the accused should first file a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court anchored on the above-stated grounds and manifest his
intent to apply for probation if the motion is granted. The motion for reconsideration will give the trial court an
opportunity to review and rectify any errors in its judgment, while the manifestation of the accused will
immediately show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does not intend to appeal from it, but he
only seeks a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be modified
within the probationable limit, he will immediately apply for probation. Without such motion for reconsideration,
the notice of appeal should be denied outright.
The notice of appeal should contain the following averments:
(1) that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the trial court;
(2) that the appeal is only for reviewing the penalty imposed by the lower court or the conviction should
only be for a lesser crime necessarily included in the crime charged in the information; and
(3) that the accused-appellant is not seeking acquittal of the conviction.
When probation not granted.

Probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the
probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is
an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a
lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is
within the probationable period.
Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting
an application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused.
EVIDENCE
Judicial admissions; effect.

A party litigant contended that what was admitted and written on the pre-trial order was only the existence
of the first shipment invoice but not its contents and due execution. It invoked admission of existence but renounced
any knowledge of the contents written on it. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section 4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. (SCC
Chemicals Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 514, 522-523 [2001].
It is inconceivable that a shipping company with maritime experience and resource that it will admit the
existence of a maritime document like an invoice even if it has no knowledge of its contents or without having any
copy thereof.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases
is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby,
defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, 520 Phil. 982 [2006], it was emphasized that:
“Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their
counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of
the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed
to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage (Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., et al., G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015, Perez, J).”
Admissibility of text messages.
Petitioner questioned the ruling of the lower court in admitting as evidence text messages sent by BBB and
his girlfriend to AAA. It was contended that the same were never authenticated. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 506 Phil. 423; 469 SCRA 439 [2005], it was held that any
question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such
issue admits authorship of the subject messages.
BBB argued that the text messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA are inadmissible, since they
were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effecitively admitted in the pleadings filed with the Court and the CA
that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted
authorship of the message which AAA adduced as evidence (BBB v. AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015).
Admissibility of out-of-court identification of accused.

Is an out-of-court identification of an accused admissible in evidence even if there are irregularities in the
conduct of the same? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where the court consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856 [2003])
Even granting for the sake of argument that there were irregularities in the out-of-court identification of
accused these were rendered moot by the subsequent identification of accused by the same witnesses in open court.
(People v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 196852, September 28, 2015)
Witness is a child; cannot be sole reason for disqualification.

The credibility of a 5-year old witness was at issue, his testimony pointing to the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime of homicide where his mother was killed. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness,
experience, or observation to others can be witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social
status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the
disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law are not grounds for disqualifications.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut
this presumption, the burden of substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244,
June 22, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Circumstantial evidence is resorted to in complex crime of rape with homicide.

If there is no direct evidence to prove a crime, circumstantial evidence may be presented especially in cases
of rape with homicide. Hence, in People v. Brioniola, G.R. No. 211027, June 29, 2015, Villarama, J, the SC once again
said that it is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must
be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, it was held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove
because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more
difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify.
Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as
amended, sets forth the requirements of conviction, viz:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Statement likewise admissible as part of res gestae.
The witness’ statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test
of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.” In this case, his statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by the accused and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, he had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence,
his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified the accused as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of victim,
perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the prosecution (People v. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015,
Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Dying declaration; effect if a relative testifies on the dying declaration of deceased.

Accused was charged with the crime of murder. Immediately after the shooting incident, the daughter of the
deceased ran towards her father and saw the accused waving a gun. She held her father’s head and asked the
identity of the person who shot him. At the brink of death and with a voice she could hardly hear, her father uttered
the name “Toti.” She saw the accused and his brothers pointing guns to the people who were scampering away. Her
testimony was questioned as inadmissible because of her relationship with the deceased. Is the contention correct?
Why?
Ans.: The assertion of the accused that the witnesses were biased since they were related to the victim deserves
scant consideration. Mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness’ credibility. On the
contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it
would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real
culprit. Further, the accused’s defense of denial failed to cast doubt on the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses and this defense, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over such positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime (People v. Villarez, G.R. No. 211160, September 2, 2015, Carpio, J).
How do you consider the communication made by the victim to his uncle on their way to the hospital?
Explain.
Ans.: The circumstances qualified the utterance of the victim as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule
(People v. Loste, G.R. No. 94785, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA 614, 621, citing People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, February
26, 1991, 194 SCRA 432, 339-340).
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d)
that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim
(People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2, 2010, 626 SCRA 267, 278; see also People v. Garma, G.R. No.
110872, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 517, 522; People v. Elizaga, No. L-78794, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516, 520;
People v. Lanza, No. L-31782, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 613, 625; People v. Saliling, No. L-27874, February 27,
1976, 69 SCRA 427, 438; People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, Bersamin, J).
When is a declaration part of the res gestae? Explain.

Ans.: A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (People v. Peralta,
G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 218, 224; People v. Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226-28, October 14,
1994, 237 SCRA 587, 600; People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, Bersamin, J).
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave
the identity of the assailant to his uncle, the victim was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by
accused. The victim was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of accused as the assailant. His utterance about accused having stabbed him was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
accused as the perpetrator.
Give the concept of the term res gestae and the test of its admissibility.
Ans.: The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae refers to
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The
rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony (People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, Bersamin, J).
When the rape victim went to take her afternoon nap, the only person inside the house aside from her was
the accused. About an hour into her sleep, she woke up only to find herself already stripped naked; she
immediately felt her body aching and her vaginal region hurting; the accused was still inside the house and
he was remoseful in unilaterally asking for her forgiveness even spontaneously explaining the he did not
intend to do that to her. She immediately denounced the incident to her aunt following the discovery of the
rape. What is the nature of her act of denunciation to her aunt and to her mother? Explain.
Ans.: The victim’s denunciation of accused as her rapist to her aunt and her own mother with the use of the words
hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega without any appreciable length of time having intervened following her discovery
of the rape was part of the res gestae (that is, rape). Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that statements
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae (People v. Lupac, G.R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012, Bersamin, J).
After a shooting incident, the victim uttered to his mother that he has just been shot by the group of Berting.
What is the nature of the statement? Explain.
Ans: Such statement is a true part of the res gestae.
The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (People v. Villarico, et al., G.R. No. 158362,
April 4, 2011, Bersamin, J).”
Relationship of victim & witness.

The familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred. That a
witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the persons involved in the attack on
the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and
bringing the malefactor before the law (People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 84332-33, May 8, 1996, 256 SCRA 611
(holding that where the identification made by the wife of the victim was held to be reliable because she had known
the accused for a long time and was familiar with him, considering her being positive that it was the accused who
had shot her husband although she saw only the back part and the body contour of the assailant. At the time she saw
him, the accused was only four meters away, and there was sufficient illumination from a lamp post six meters away
from the house of the victim and his wife); People v. Jacolo, G.R. No. 94470, December 16, 1992, 216 SCRA 631
(holding that where the conditions of visibility were favorable and the witness did not appear to be biased against
the man on the dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted, more so
where the witnesses were the victims, or near-relatives of the victims, because these people usually strove to
remember the faces of the assailants) (People v. Villarico, et al., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, Bersamin, J;
Maturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2008, 487 SCRA 273).
Parol evidence, when admissible.

The Republic purchased a property for the purpose of using it as National Government Center (NGC) Project
to bring together various national government offices in one venue for greater efficiency. This was done during
martial law, hence, they could not resist thus, they entered into the negotiated sale. The Republic did not pursue the
project. Hence, they filed a complaint to annul the sale alleging fraud, intimidation, force and undue influence.
During the trial, they testified as alleged, but did not present the alleged Deed of Sale to show that the sale was
attended by the alleged conditions. They further testified that the sale was subject to the condition that their
remaining properties will benefit from the increase in land value due to the NGC Project and that the Government
will return the properties to them should the NGC Project not materialize, but did not present such document to
prove it. Is parol evidence is not admissible? Explain.
Ans.: No. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a written contract is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon by the parties and no evidence of these terms is admissible other than the contents of the contract. The
parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of a written agreement by testimony showing that the parties
orally agreed on other terms before the signing of the document (Ortañez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107372,
January 23, 1997, 266 SCRA 561-562). However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the
terms of a written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings either: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the parties' true
intent and agreement; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by
the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The issue must be squarely
presented (Ortañez v. CA).
Notably, they failed to present copies of the deeds of sale to show that the sale was attended by the alleged
conditions. Pursuant to the parol evidence rule, no evidence of contractual terms is admissible other than the
contract itself. On this level alone, the respondents failed to discharge their burden (Republic, et al. v. Gonzalo
Roque, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 203610, October 10, 2016, Brion, J).
The respondents failed to put in issue in their pleadings the sale contract's failure to express the parties'
agreement. In Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107372, January 23, 1997, the respondents alleged the existence
of oral conditions which were not reflected in the deeds of sale. A witness testified in court that the sale was subject
to the oral conditions. Parol evidence was inadmissible because, among others, the respondents failed to expressly
plead that the deeds of sale did not reflect the parties' intentions. Instead, they merely alleged that the sale was
subject to four conditions which they tried to prove during trial. This cannot be done because they failed to put in
issue in their pleadings any exception to the parol evidence rule.
A review of the complaint reveals that respondents failed to put in issue in their complaint that the deeds of
sale do not express the parties' true intent. Hence, the failure of the deeds of sale to reflect the parties' agreement
was not squarely presented as an issue for the court to hear evidence on it. Therefore, the exceptions to the parol
evidence rule cannot apply.
Effect of failure to raise ambiguity of the contract.

An exception to the parol evidence rule applies when the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in
terms that the parties' contractual intention cannot be understood from a mere reading of the agreement.
Hence, the court may receive extrinsic evidence to enable the court to address the ambiguity (Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 387).
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the contract's meaning, it cannot serve to incorporate into
the contract additional conditions which are not mentioned at all in the contract unless there is fraud or mistake.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict, or defeat
the operation of a valid contract. Hence, parol evidence is inadmissible to modify the terms of the agreement if the
complaint fails to allege any mistake or imperfection in the written agreement.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE RULE
An action for quieting of title was filed alleging that the original title of the parcel of land on file with the
ROD which their parents owned and which they inherited contained an annotation of a sale with right to
repurchase which did not exist. They prayed that the entry be cancelled. The defendant contended that her
parents sold the property to her with right to repurchase but they never exercised the right to repurchase,
hence, she became the owner of the property. Despite the non-presentation of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. It ruled that the contents be proved by
secondary evidence upon proof of its due execution or existence or the cause of its unavailability being
without bad faith. It found that the defendant was able to establish the execution and existence of the deed.
The RTC ruled that the original copy was lost and it cannot be retrieved from the lawyer due to his ailment
and that earnest efforts have been exerted to produce it. The CA reversed the RTC decision ordering that the
secondary evidence should not have been admitted because the defendant failed to prove the existence of
the original of the deed and to establish its loss. Have the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
been complied with? Explain.
Ans.: No. The best evidence rule is not applicable. The principal issue is whether the deed had really existed. The
terms of the contract are not in issue. At the trial, a question was asked as to who signed and executed the deed, but
the RTC sustained the objection which was wrong because the question sought to establish its execution, not the
terms. But even if the terms of the deed were not in issue, the RTC still applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case
and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence were complied without
being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. In the end, it found that the defendant had
complied with the requisites for the introduction of secondary evidence and gave full credence to the testimony of
the witness explaining the non-production of the original. Considering the non-applicability of the best evidence
rule, the lower courts should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the existence and execution of
the deed as a fact in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence (Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of
Maximo Alvarez, et al., G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, Bersamin, J).
Xerox copy of document, when admissible.

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry; A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable (Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Lagman, 653 SCRA 765 [2011]).
A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production
of the original instrument, and when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been
lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one (Ibid.).
Best Evidence Rule.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part
of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed (Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R.
No. 150905, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 577, 584-585, citing De Vera v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 83377, February 9,
1993, 218 SCRA 602, 606).
What is the primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule? Explain.

Ans.: The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court (Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, (American Casebook Series), Second
Edition, 1982, p. 1007), considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is
of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills
and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral
testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the
case of attempts at describing other situations generally (McCormick on Evidence (Hornbook Series), Third Edition
1984, § 233, p. 707). The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the
best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat
(Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines (Rules 128-134), Third Edition 1996, p. 56). Lastly, the rule
protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings.
When best evidence rule applies.

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue
relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in
issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original (Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of
Maximo Alvarez, et al., G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, Bersamin, J).
PRESENTATION OF INFORMANT IN BUY BUST OPERATION
State the effect of the non-presentation of the informant in a buy bust operation? Explain.
Ans.: The presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution
of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need
to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality
of the informant’s identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement (People v. Naquita,
G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 445-446). Only when the testimony of the informant is considered
absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.
Here, however, the informant’s testimony as a witness against the accused would only be corroborative of the
sufficient testimony as the poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was unnecessary (People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 186418,
October 16, 2009; People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013, Bersamin, J).
When confidential informant should be presented.

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur-buyer himself.
It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested the accused on the basis of the prearranged signal from
the poseur-buyer. The prearranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had
been consummated between the poseur-buyer and the accused. However, the State did not present the confidential
informant/poseur-buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and accused had
taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had
directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between accused and the poseur-buyer due to their being positioned at a
distance from the poseur-buyer and accused at the moment of the supposed transaction.
In another case, the court is aware of the considerations why confidential informants are usually not
presented by the prosecution. There is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police (People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295 [1999], citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995]). Foremost is the desire to
protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known
(People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004).
In People v. Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for the prosecution to present the
confidential informer as the poseur-buyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who sold to him one
deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu.” The trial court then properly relied on the testimonies of the
police officers despite the decision of the prosecution not to present the informer (People v. Andaya, G.R. No.
183700, October 13, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Admissibility of telephone conversation.

It is essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation be first
authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed
by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all
too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly
recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed (29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1403). The identity of the
caller could also be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context
and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive
characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller (United States v. Orozco-
Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 [9th Cir. Cal. 1990]).
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to
one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the
fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-
to-face conversations except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must
ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation,
to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere
statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity,
in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible.
However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently
identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district
court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has
been met (State v. Williamson, 210 Kan. 501 (Kan 1972); People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943,
September 4, 2013, Bersamin, J).
DOCUMENTS
During the trial in a case for collection of sum of money, the warehouse assistant testified on the statement
of account. The defendants contended that she could not testify on it because she was not an accountant or
bookkeeper or auditor or a person who had knowledge in accounting. Her testimony was limited to stating
that she prepared the statement of account but did not affirm the correctness or veracity of the contents of
the document, hence, it is hearsay and without evidentiary value as proof of their total liability. Is the
contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. The statement of account being a private document, authentication pursuant to the rules on evidence is a
condition for its admissibility (Borayuga v. Adventist University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011,
655 SCRA 640, 657). The witness admittedly the person who had prepared the document, was competent to testify
on the due execution and authenticity of the statement of account. Such authentication was done in accordance with
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, whose Section 20 states:
Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be (Dela Cruz v.
Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 158649, February 18, 2013, Bersamin, J).
The petitioners disputed the contents of the statement of account by invoking Section 43, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business. Rule on the contention.
Ans.: The invocation of the rule is misplaced, because the rule speaks of a situation where the person who made the
entries is dead or unable to testify, which was not the situation here. Regardless, entries made in the course of
business enjoy the presumption of regularity. If properly authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of the status of
the account. In Land Bank v. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 184971, April 19, 2010, 618
SCRA 451, 458-459, the Court has explained that such entries are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision; and that if the entries
are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited; hence, in actual experience, the whole of the business
world function in reliance of such kind of records (Dela Cruz v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 158649, February 18,
2013, Bersamin, J).
Presumption
In a case subject of preliminary investigation, METROBANK urged the application of the presumption of
authorship against the accused based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure
the loan; and posited that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is
absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged
document. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans: No. A presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State (Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No.
164575, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 429, 438). The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary (Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257,
January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 342-342; Salonga v. Paño, G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438, 450).
As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment
thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and
demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only
determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court (Alonzo v.
Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 329, 337).
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing
the information in the face of the controverting explanation by accused showing how he came to possess the
spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave
(Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012, Bersamin, J).

CHAIN OF CUSTODY
The marking by the arresting officer of the drugs, being the starting point in the custodial link, should be made
immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as
practicable under the obtaining circumstances.
The manner and timing of the marking of the seized drugs or related items in accordance with the foregoing
statutory rules are crucial in proving the chain of custody. The marking by the arresting officer of the drugs, being
the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as
close to the time and place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances. This immediate marking
is essential because the succeeding handlers of the drugs would use the markings as their reference to the seizure,
and because it further serves to segregate the marked seized drugs from all other evidence from the time and point
of seizure until the drugs are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings. The deliberate taking of these
identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of the evidence. Verily, the
preservation of the chain of custody vis-à-vis the drugs ensures the integrity of the evidence incriminating the
accused, and fulfills the element of relevancy as a requisite for the admissibility of the evidence (People v. Angngao,
et al., G.R. No. 18996, March 11, 2015, Bersamin, J).
HEARSAY
Evidence must be offered; effect if not; exceptions.

There was an action for judicial partition of a property claiming that the same became the subject of co-
ownership after their predecessor-in-interest passed away. The defendants however claimed that the father of the
plaintiffs could have already gotten his share from their predecessors-in-interest. No evidence however was
presented to support such claim. No documentary or testimonial has been offered to substantial the contention. The
appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs are entitled to their share. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Ans.: Yes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered.” This is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. Also, it allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and judgment
strictly and only upon the evidence offered by the parties at trial. Consequently, review by the appellate court is
facilitated for it will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. (Heirs of
Pasag, et. al. v. Spouses Lorenzo, et. al., 550 Phil. 571, 579 (2007), citing Parel v. Prudencio, 521 Phil. 533, 545
(2006); Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 515, 542 (2003); Ong v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 338, 350 (1999);
People of the Philippines v. Alicante, 388 Phil. 233, 260 (200), 21 Id. at 581-582). Hence, strict adherence to this
basic procedural rule is required, lest evidence cannot be assigned any evidentiary weight or value (Mabrobang, et
al. v. Mabrobang, et al., G.R. No. 182805, April 22, 2015, Peralta, J).
Reason for the rule.

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial
but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such
unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant
distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of
the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only
when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which
a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise,
it is excluded and rejected.
Exception.
In certain instances, however, the Court has relaxed the procedural rule and allowed the trial court to
consider evidence not formally offered on the condition that the following requisites are present: (1) the evidence
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case. None of the conditions are present in this case.
GOOD LUCK to ALL

2017 BAR CANDIDATES
We Are Praying For All of You!
From: ABRC Family

5 6102852376736038933

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

5 6102852376736038933

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Special Lecture Notes in

Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.

1|ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)-CLEANED/EVSA/crys

Motion for execution of judgment based on compromise treated as initiatory pleading.

The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Concept of splitting causes of action.

Reason for the rule against splitting of causes of action.

Marine mammals granted personality to sue.

Indispensable parties in partition action.

Effect of failure to implead indispensable parties.

Purpose of substitution of parties.

When substitution is proper.

Real parties in interest.

Ground for MTD if party is not the real party in interest.

No need for exact or absolute identity.

Transferee pendente lite; real party in interest.

Venue of personal action is the place of principal office of corporation.

RULE 8- MANNER OF ALLEGATIONS

How to contest genuineness and due execution of actionable document.

Mere statement “specifically deny” allegations, not sufficient.

Meaning of admission of genuineness and due execution of document.

Defendant can present evidence of non-liability.

RULE 9 – EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Defense not raised in the pleading is waived.

Defenses not alleged in a MTD are deemed waived; exceptions.

Policy of the rule on default.

RULE 10 – AMENDED PLEADING

Substantial amendment in pleadings.

RULE 14 – SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Summons upon a partnership does not bind a partner.

9 |ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)(CLEANED)/EVSA/crys

Substituted service of summons; its requisistes.

Jurisdiction is an element of due process.

Courts cannot try cases against non-resident defendants; reason; exception.

Requirements of substituted service to be followed strictly; reason.

RULE 17 – DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

Dismissal for failure to prosecute; final order.

Denial of MTD is interlocutory; remedy.

Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Written interrogatories; purpose.

RULE 33 – DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Nature and effect of demurrer to evidence.

RULE 34 – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Denial thru no knowledge sufficient to form a belief.

RULE 37 – MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/NEW TRIAL

Execution of judgment; period of 5 & 10 years.

Effect of defense of prescription.

Judgment is conclusive only upon the parties.

14 |ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)(CLEANED)/EVSA/crys

What is the proper remedy of Dare Adventure Corp.? Explain.

Recognition of a foreign judgment.

Distinction between foreign judgment in actions in rem and personam.

Requirements of res judicata.

No need for absolute identity of partes.

16 |ABRC2017. Special Lecture Notes in Remedial Law (segregate)revised(1)(CLEANED)/EVSA/crys

Immutability of judgment; reason.

Exceptions to the rule.

Mode of appeal from RTC to CA, etc.

Neypes principle does not apply to administrative cases.

Discharge of attachment; meaning of the words “deposit” and “amount.”

Injunction cannot divest one of ownership.

Certiorari is the remedy against judgment of acquittal; no double jeopardy.

What is the proper recourse from a decision of the Comelec? Explain.