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Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

1.
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.

TUASON, J.:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that
court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial
is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to


the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by
counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that
she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained.
"In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right
to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the
corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for
the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R.
No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of
the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall
the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that
they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's
order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while
section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting
the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they
had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of
arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be
an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went
farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the
justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel
the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with


costs against the petitioner.
2
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

2. and Detention under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was issued


EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. against the vessel by the BOC District Collector of the Port of Manila.[10]
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 177188 For the same reasons, the Legaspi District Collector rendered a
December 4, 2008 Decision on 27 June 2002 in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also
DECISION known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo, for violating Section 2530 (a),
(f) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.[11]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, Atlantic Pacific Corporation, Inc.
Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner El Greco Ship Manning and (Atlantic Pacific), filed with the Manila District Collector, in Seizure
Management Corporation (El Greco), seeking to reverse and set aside the Identification No. 2001-208, a Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash
Decision[1] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated 14 March Warrant of Seizure Detention with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Release
2007 in C.T.A. EB No. 162. In its assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc affirmed of M/V Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that M/V Neptune Breeze was a
the Decision[2]dated 17 October 2005 of the CTA Second Division in foreign registered vessel owned by Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V
CTA Case No. 6618, ordering the forfeiture of the vessel M/V Criston, also Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.[12]
known as M/V Neptune Breeze, for having been involved in the smuggling
of 35,000 bags of imported rice. Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector
issued an Order[13] dated 11 March 2002 quashing the Warrant of Seizure
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows: and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 for lack of probable cause that the said vessel
On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of
the Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment of 35,000 bags of imported the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for
rice, consigned to Antonio Chua, Jr. (Chua) and Carlos Carillo (Carillo), allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. According to the decretal part of
payable upon its delivery to Albay. Glucer Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer the Manila District Collectors Order:
Shipping) is the operator of M/V Criston.[3]
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority
Upon the directive of then Commissioner Titus Villanueva of the Bureau of vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and decreed
Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification that the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued
No. 06-2001, was issued by the Legaspi District Collector, on 23 September thereof be Quashed for want of factual or legal basis,
2001 for the 35,000 bags of imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the and that the vessel M/V Neptune Brreze be released
ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from to [El Greco] after clearance with the Commissioner
the Philippine Coast Guard. Since the earlier Warrant covered only the of Customs, proper identification and compliance
cargo, but not M/V Criston which transported it, a subsequent Warrant of with existing rules and regulations pertinent in the
Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued on premises.
18 October 2001 particularly for the said vessel. The BOC District Collector
of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced proceedings for the forfeiture
of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A and On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio Bernardo,
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, respectively.[4] the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the District Collector of
the Port of Manila was reversed after finding that M/V Neptune Breeze and
To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees Chua and Carillo M/V Criston were one and the same and that the Legaspi District Collector
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for had already acquired prior jurisdiction over the vessel. The Decision
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and dated 15 January 2003 of the BOC Commissioner, contained in his
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) assailing the authority of the Legaspi 2nd Indorsement[14] to the Manila District Collector, decreed:
District Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and Detention and
praying for a permanent injunction against the implementation of the said Respectfully returned to the District Collector, POM,
Warrants. Their Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. T-2170.[5] the within case folders in POM S. I. No. 2001-208, EL
GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT
After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance and CORPORATION, Claimant/Intervenor, with the
considering the extreme urgency of the matter involved, the RTC issued a information that the Decision of that Port in the
72-hour TRO conditioned upon the filing by Chua and Carillo of a bond in aforesaid case is hereby REVERSED in view of the
the amount of P31,450,000.00, representing the value of the goods. After following reasons:
Chua and Carillo posted the required bond, the 35,000 bags of rice were
released to them.[6] 1. Subject vessel MV NEPTUNE BREEZE and MV
CRISTON are one and the same as shown by the
The Legaspi District Collector held in abeyance the proceedings for the vessels documents retrieved by the elements of
forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06- the Philippine Coast Guard from MV CRISTON
2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-Apending the resolution by the during the search conducted on board thereof
RTC of Civil Case No. T-2170. When the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss when the same was apprehended in Tabaco,
Civil Case No. T-2170 filed by the BOC, the Legaspi District Collector set the Albay, indicating therein the name of the vessel
hearing of Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. MV NEPTUNE BREEZE, the name of the master of
06-2001-A. A notice of the scheduled hearing of the aforementioned the vessel a certain YUSHAWU AWUDU,
seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear at the etc. These facts were corroborated by the
hearing so set. After a second notice of hearing was ignored by Glucer footage of ABS-CBN taken on board the vessel
Shipping, the prosecutor was allowed to present his witnesses.[7] when the same was subjected to search.

In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at 2. Hence, prior jurisdiction over the said vessel
the Port of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC, the Province of Albay was was already acquired by
hit by typhoon Manang. In order to avert any damage which could be the Port of Legaspi when the said Port issued
caused by the typhoon, the vessel was allowed to proceed to another WSD S.I. No. 06-2001-A and therefore, the
anchorage area to temporarily seek shelter. After typhoon Manang had Decision of the latter Port forfeiting the subject
passed through Albay province, M/V Criston, however, failed to return to vessel supercedes the Decision of that Port
the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found.[8] ordering its release.

Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard coordinated with the
Philippine Air Force to find the missing vessel. On 8 November 2001, the Seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 15 January 2003 of
BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the waters the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review with the CTA
of Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze.[9] which was lodged before its Second Division as CTACase No. 6618. El Greco
averred that the BOC Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in
Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the absence of proof
Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of call, a Warrant of Seizure that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same
vessel.[15] According to El Greco, it was highly improbable that M/V Criston
3
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

was merely assuming the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade
liability since these were distinct and separate vessels as evidenced by their The primordial issue to be determined by this Court is whether
Certificates of Registry. While M/V Neptune Breeze was registered in St. M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston which had been
Vincent and the Grenadines[16] as shown in its Certificate of Registry No. detained at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, for carrying smuggled imported rice
7298/N, M/V Criston was registered in the Philippines. Additionally, El and had fled the custody of the customs authorities to evade its liabilities.
Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District
Collector already became final and executory for failure of the BOC El Greco insists that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston are
Commissioner to act thereon within a period of 30 days in accordance with not the same vessel. In support of its position, El Greco again presents the
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. foreign registration of its vessel as opposed to the local registration of M/V
Criston.
On 17 October 2005, the CTA Second Division rendered a
Decision[17] in CTA Case No. 6618 sustaining the 15 January 2003 Decision of The CTA En Banc, however, affirming the findings of the CTA
the BOC Commissioner ordering the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Second Division, as well as the Legaspi District Collector, concluded
Breeze. Referring to the crime laboratory report submitted by the otherwise.
Philippine National Police (PNP) stating that the serial numbers of the
engines and the generators of both M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this matter.
were identical, the CTA Second Division concluded that both vessels were
indeed one and the same vessel. The CTA Second Division further ruled that Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are
nothing in the provisions of Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on appeal if not supported
could buttress El Grecos contention that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of by substantial evidence.[23] Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
the Manila District Collector already became final and executory. The evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
dispositive portion of the Decision of the CTA Second Division reads: conclusion.[24]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the A review of the records of the present case unveils the
present Petition for Review is overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that more than
hereby DISMISSED. The Decision in the meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune
2nd Indorsement dated January 15, 2003 of then Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V Criston, which left the anchorage area
Commissioner Bernardo is hereby AFFIRMED.[18] at Legaspi, Albay, without the consent of the customs authorities therein
while under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of imported rice.

In a Resolution[19] dated 7 February 2006, the CTA Second The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial
Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration of El Greco for failure to numbers of the engines and generators of the two vessels are identical. El
present issues that had not been previously threshed out in its earlier Greco failed to rebut this piece of evidence that decisively identified M/V
Decision. Neptune Breeze as the same as M/V Criston. We take judicial notice that
along with gross tonnage, net tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel,
Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En the serial numbers of its engine and generator are the necessary
Banc through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 162, this time information identifying a vessel. In much the same way, the identity of a
lamenting that it was being deprived of its property without due process of land motor vehicle is established by its unique motor and chassis
law. El Greco asserted that the CTA Second Division violated its numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable that two totally different vessels
constitutional right to due process when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V would have engines and generators bearing the very same serial numbers;
Neptune Breeze on the basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi and the only logical conclusion is that they must be one and the same vessel.
District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El Greco was not notified and in Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District Collector
which it was not able to participate.[20] that all the documents submitted by M/V Criston were spurious, including
its supposed registration in the Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002,
In its Decision[21] promulgated on 14 March 2007, the CTA En Marina Administrator Oscar M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was not
Banc declared that the CTA Second Division did not commit any error in its registered with the Marina.
disquisition, and dismissed the Petition of El Greco in C.T.A. EB No. 162 for
lack of merit. According to the CTA En Banc, the appreciation and Finally, Customs Guard Adolfo Capistrano testified that the
calibration of evidence on appeal (from the ruling of the BOC) lies within features of M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were similar; while Coast
the sound discretion of its Division, and the latters findings and conclusions Guard Commander Cirilo Ortiz narrated that he found documents inside
cannot be set aside unless it has been sufficiently shown that they are not M/V Criston bearing the name M/V Neptune Breeze. These testimonies
supported by evidence on record. The CTA En Banc thus disposed: further fortified the conclusion reached by the Legaspi District Collector
that M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were one and the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision We also take note that the purported operator of M/V Criston,
promulgated on October 17, 2005 and Resolution Glucer Shipping, was a total no-show at the hearings held in Seizure
dated February 7, 2006 of the Second Division of this Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A before
Court, are hereby AFFIRMED.[22] the Legaspi District Collector. Despite being sent several notices of hearing
to its supposed address, Glucer Shipping still failed to appear in the said
proceedings. It becomes highly unfathomable for an owner to ignore
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CTA, El proceedings for the seizure of its vessel, risking the loss of a property of
Greco already sought recourse before this Court via this Petition for Review enormous value.
on Certiorari, raising the following issues:
From the foregoing, we can only deduce that there is actually no
I. Glucer Shipping and no M/V Criston. M/V Criston appears to be a mere
WHETHER OR NOT EL GRECO WAS DENIED OF ITS fictional identity assumed by M/V Neptune Breeze so it may conduct its
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. smuggling activities with little risk of being identified and held liable
therefor.

II. We cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El


Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V Criston in light of
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V the substantial evidence on record to the contrary.The foreign registration
CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL. of M/V Neptune Breeze proves only that it was registered in a foreign
country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions consistently
reached by the Legaspi District Collector, the CTA Second Division and the
III. CTA en banc, and presently by this Court, that M/V Neptune Breeze was the
very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE IS M/V Criston.
QUALIFIED TO BE THE SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE
UNDER SECTION 2531 OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its
CODE. vessel, as a consequence of its being used in smuggling activities, by
decrying denial of due process.
4
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

similarly used, together with its equipage


In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, and appurtenances including the beast,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and steam or other motive power drawing or
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its propelling the same. The mere
strict judicial sense.[25] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity conveyance of contraband or smuggled
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to articles by such beast or vehicle shall be
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action sufficient cause for the outright seizure
or ruling complained of.[26] and confiscation of such beast or vehicle,
but the forfeiture shall not be effected if
Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings in it is established that the owner of the
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A means of conveyance used as aforesaid, is
before the Legaspi District Collector, it had ample opportunity to present its engaged as common carrier and not
side of the controversy in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 before the chartered or leased, or his agent in charge
Manila District Collector. To recall, full proceedings were held before the thereof at the time has no knowledge of
Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208. Even the the unlawful act.
evidence presented by El Greco in the latter proceedings fails to
persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District
Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was the foreign registration The penalty of forfeiture is imposed on any vessel engaged in
of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which El smuggling, provided that the following conditions are present:
Greco submitted to this Court. Even when taken into consideration and
weighed against each other, the considerably sparse evidence of El Greco (1) The vessel is used unlawfully in the importation or
in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 could not successfully refute the exportation of articles into or from the Philippines;
substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V (2) The articles are imported to or exported from any Philippine
Criston. port or place, except a port of entry; or

Moreover, the claim of El Greco that it was denied due process (3) If the vessel has a capacity of less than 30 tons and is used in
flounders in light of its ample opportunity to rebut the findings of the the importation of articles into any Philippine port or place other than a
Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and No. 06- port of the Sulu Sea, where importation in such vessel may be authorized
2001-A before the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618 and the by the Commissioner, with the approval of the department head."[27]
CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 162, and now before this Court in the Petition
at bar. Unfortunately, El Greco was unable to make full use to its advantage There is no question that M/V Neptune Breeze, then known
of these repeated opportunities by offering all possible evidence in support as M/V Criston, was carrying 35,000 bags of imported rice without the
of its case. For example, evidence that could establish that M/V Neptune necessary papers showing that they were entered lawfully through a
Breeze was somewhere else at the time when M/V Criston was being held Philippine port after the payment of appropriate taxes and duties
by customs authority at the Port of Legaspi, Albay, would have been helpful thereon. This gives rise to the presumption that such importation was
to El Grecos cause and very easy to secure, but is glaringly absent herein. illegal. Consequently, the rice subject of the importation, as well as the
vessel M/V Neptune Breeze used in importation are subject to
After having established that M/V Neptune Breeze is one and forfeiture. The burden is on El Greco, as the owner of M/V Neptune
the same as M/V Criston, we come to another crucial issue in the case at Breeze, to show that its conveyance of the rice was actually
bar, that is, whether the order of forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze is legal. Unfortunately, its claim that the cargo was not of foreign origin
valid. but was merely loaded at North Harbor, Manila, was belied by the
following evidence - the Incoming Journal of the Philippine Coast
The pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code read: Guard, Certification issued by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) Port State Control Center of Manila, and the
SEC. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff letter dated 4 October 2001 issued by the Sub-Port of North Harbor
and Customs Law. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, Collector Edward de la Cuesta, confirming that there was no such
cargo, articles and other objects shall, under the loading of rice or calling of vessel occurring at North Harbor, Manila. It
following conditions, be subject to forfeiture: is, therefore, uncontroverted that the 35,000 bags of imported rice
were smuggled into the Philippines using M/V Neptune Breeze.
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo,
which shall be used unlawfully in the We cannot give credence to the argument of El Greco that the
importation or exportation of articles or Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector, finding no
in conveying and/or transporting probable cause that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V Criston, has
contraband or smuggled articles in already become final and executory, thus, irreversible, pursuant to Section
commercial quantities into or from any 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. According to said provision:
Philippine port or place. The mere
carrying or holding on board of SEC. 2313. Review of Commissioner. The
contraband or smuggled articles in person aggrieved by the decision or action of the
commercial quantities shall subject such Collector in any matter presented upon protest or by
vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any other craft his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen
to forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, or (15) days after notification in writing by the Collector
aircraft or any other craft is not used as of his action or decision, file a written notice to the
duly authorized common carrier and as Collector with a copy furnished to the Commissioner
such a carrier it is not chartered or leased; of his intention to appeal the action or decision of the
Collector to the Commissioner. Thereupon the
xxxx Collector shall forthwith transmit all the records of
the proceedings to the Commissioner, who shall
f. Any article, the importation or exportation of approve, modify or reverse the action or decision of
which is effected or attempted contrary the Collector and take such steps and make such
to law, or any article of prohibited orders as may be necessary to give effect to his
importation or exportation, and all other decision: Provided, That when an appeal is filed
articles which, in the opinion of the beyond the period herein prescribed, the same shall
Collector, have been used, are or were be deemed dismissed.
intended to be used as instruments in the
importation or exportation of the former; If in any seizure proceedings, the Collector
renders a decision adverse to the Government, such
xxxx decision shall be automatically reviewed by the
Commissioner and the records of the case elevated
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the within five (5) days from the promulgation of the
transport of articles subject to forfeiture decision of the Collector. The Commissioner shall
under the tariff and customs laws, with its render a decision on the automatic appeal within
equipage or trappings, and any vehicle thirty (30) days from receipts of the records of the
5
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

case. If the Collectors decision is reversed by the


Commissioner, the decision of the Commissioner
shall be final and executory. However, if the
Collectors decision is affirmed, or if within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the record of the case by the
Commissioner no decision is rendered or the
decision involves imported articles whose published
value is five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) or
more, such decision shall be deemed automatically
appealed to the Secretary of Finance and the
records of the proceedings shall be elevated within
five (5) days from the promulgation of the decision of
the Commissioner or of the Collector under appeal,
as the case may be: Provided, further, That if the
decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector
under appeal as the case may be, is affirmed by the
Secretary of Finance or if within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the records of the proceedings by the
Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered, the
decision of the Secretary of Finance, or of the
Commissioner, or of the Collector under appeal, as
the case may be, shall become final and executory.

In any seizure proceeding, the release of


imported articles shall not be allowed unless and
until a decision of the Collector has been confirmed
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs.
(Emphasis ours.)

There is nothing in Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code


to support the position of El Greco. As the CTA en banc explained, in case
the BOC Commissioner fails to decide on the automatic appeal of the
Collectors Decision within 30 days from receipt of the records thereof, the
case shall again be deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of
Finance. Also working against El Greco is the fact that jurisdiction over M/V
Neptune Breeze, otherwise known as M/V Criston, was first acquired by the
Legaspi District Collector; thus, the Manila District Collector cannot validly
acquire jurisdiction over the same vessel. Judgment rendered without
jurisdiction is null and void, and void judgment cannot be the source of any
right whatsoever.[28]

Finally, we strongly condemn the ploy used by M/V Neptune


Breeze, assuming a different identity to smuggle goods into the country in
a brazen attempt to defraud the government and the Filipino public and
deprive them of much needed monetary resources. We further laud the
efforts of the Commissioner of the Customs Bureau and the other executive
officials in his department to curb the proliferation of smuggling syndicates
in the country which deserves no less than our full support.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition


is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 October 2005 and Resolution dated 7
February 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 172
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
6
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

3. comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as


against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters.14
G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013
Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead of recounting
the ballots in the pilot precincts constituting 20% of the protested precincts,
GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI and VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M.
the COMELEC First Division should order the technical examination of the
SAHALl, Petitioners,
said election paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the
vs.
subject of both election protests filed by them.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MA TBA and
JILKASI J. USMAN,Respondents.
On March 5, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order15 which
granted the said ex-parte motion filed by Matba and Usman. Thus, the
RESOLUTION
COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election
REYES, J.: paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on
the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court filed by Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and Ruby M. Sahali (Ruby), On March 9, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First
assailing the Order1 dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77. Reconsideration (Of the Order Dated March 5, 2012)16. They asserted that
the March 5, 2012 Order issued by the COMELEC First Division, insofar as it
During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin directed the technical examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of
H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position Voters, should be reversed on account of the following: first, the said Order
of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent was issued without due process since the COMELEC First Division did not
Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor.2 allow them to oppose the said ex-parte motion; second, the COMELEC First
Division cannot just order a technical examination in the absence of
published rules on the matter; and third, the COMELEC First Division could
On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed not just examine the said election paraphernalia without violating the
petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice- Precautionary Protection Order issued by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
governor, respectively, of the province of Tawi-Tawi. In the statement of in the protest case between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar Binay.
votes issued by the PBOC, petitioner Sadikul garnered a total of 59,417 as
against private respondent Matba’s 56,013,3 while petitioner Ruby
prevailed over private respondent Usman, with votes of 61,005 and 45,127, On March 15, 2012, Matba and Usman filed with the COMELEC First Division
respectively.4 their counter-manifestation17 to the said manifestation and motion for
reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. They asserted therein that
Sadikul and Ruby were not deprived of due process when the COMELEC First
Alleging that the said elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi were attended Division issued its March 15, 2012 Order. They averred that their respective
by massive and wide-scale irregularities, Matba filed an Election Protest Ad election protests and the Preliminary Conference Orders issued by the
Cautelam5 with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 COMELEC First Division all indicated that they would move for the technical
clustered precincts that functioned in the province of Tawi-Tawi. The said examination of the said election paraphernalia. Nonetheless, they pointed
election protest filed by Matba was raffled to the First Division of the out that Sadikul and Ruby failed to express any objection to their intended
COMELEC and was docketed as EPC No. 2010-76. motion for technical examination of the said election paraphernalia.

Usman also filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam6 with the COMELEC, Further, Matba and Usman claimed that said motion for technical
contesting the results in 39 out of the 282 clustered precincts in the examination is not a contentious motion since the intended technical
Province of Tawi-Tawi. Usman’s election protest was likewise raffled to the examination would not prejudice the rights of Sadikul and Ruby considering
First Division of the COMELEC and was docketed as EPC No. 2010-77. The that the same only included the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters,
respective election protests filed by private respondents Matba and Usman and not the ballots.
prayed, inter alia, for the technical examination of the ballots, Election Day
Computerized Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration Record (VRR),
and the Book of Voters in all the protested precincts of the province of Tawi- On March 23, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby then filed with the COMELEC First
Tawi.7 Division their Reply18 to the counter-manifestation filed by Matba and
Usman. In turn, Matba and Usman filed with the COMELEC First Division
their Rejoinder19 on March 30, 2012. On May 3, 2012, the COMELEC First
After Sadikul filed his Answer8 with counter-protest, a preliminary Division issued the herein assailed Order20which denied the said motion for
conference was conducted by the COMELEC in EPC No. 2010-76. On reconsideration of the March 5, 2012 Order filed by Sadikul and Ruby. The
November 24, 2011, the COMELEC issued a Preliminary Conference COMELEC First Division maintained that Sadikul and Ruby were not
Order9 in EPC No. 2010-76. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued an deprived of due process. It pointed out that the intention of Matba and
Order10 dated November 23, 2011 which directed the retrieval and delivery Usman to ask for the technical examination of the said election documents
of the 39 ballot boxes containing the ballots in the 39 protested clustered had always been apparent from the filing of their separate election
precincts as well as the election paraphernalia therein. protests, preliminary conference briefs and their intention to offer as
evidence all election documents and paraphernalia such as the EDCVL, VRRs
Meanwhile, in EPC No. 2010-77, the COMELEC, after Ruby’s filing of her and Book of Voters on the protested precincts.
Answer11 with counter-protest, conducted a preliminary conference on
January 4, 2012. On January 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued its Preliminary Further, the COMELEC First Division opined that the insinuation asserted by
Conference Order12 in the said case. Sadikul and Ruby that there are no published rules governing the technical
examination of election paraphernalia is untenable. It pointed out that the
On January 17, 2012, the COMELEC resolved to consolidate EPC No. 2010- technical examination of election paraphernalia is governed by Section 1,
76 and EPC No. 2010-77. Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804. As to the Precautionary
Protection Order issued in the protest case between Manuel Roxas and
Jejomar Binay, the COMELEC First Division averred that it would request a
On February 9, 2012, the retrieval and delivery of the ballot boxes and other clearance from the Presidential Electoral Tribunal for the conduct of said
election documents from the 39 protested precincts were completed. On technical examination.
February 20, 2012, the COMELEC First Division ordered the recount of the
contested ballots, directing the creation of five recount committees for the
said purpose.13 Hence, petitioners Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition with this Court
essentially asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when: first, it
On February 24, 2012, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte did not give them the opportunity to oppose the motion for technical
Motion (Re: Order Dated 20 February 2012), requesting that they be examination filed by Matba and Usman; and second, it ordered the
allowed to secure photocopies of the contested ballots. Further, they technical examination of the said election paraphernalia despite the lack of
moved for a technical examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of sanction and published rules governing such examination.
Voters for the contested precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by
7
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

The petition is denied. certiorari assailing an interlocutory order may be allowed when a Division
of the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. Thus:
The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an
interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. "A party
aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the
an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no final
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the
course."21 elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en banc. No less
than the Constitution requires that the election cases must be heard and
decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions
Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases
shall be decided by the commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated
falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only
July 26, 1995, November 15 1995 and February 28, 1996 and the other
extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to
orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are
interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof. Section 7, Article IX of the
issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders
Constitution mandates:
because they merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission
of Espinosa’s answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally
Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission en banc. x x x
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
xxxx
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis ours)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
confirms that the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over
In Ambil, Jr. v.COMELEC,22 this Court elucidated on the import of the said
which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:
provision in this wise:

"Section 2. The Commission en banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc in


We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and
cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other cases
quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution
where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote
of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory
of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to
order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari,
an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission en banc." In the instant case, it does not appear that the
Commission on Elections.
subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where a division is
be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First
under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en
in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown
above, can not be the proper forum which the matter concerning the
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the
controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in section 2,
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved
must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is
before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.26(Citations
mandatory. x x x.23 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied) omitted and emphasis ours)

Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May 3, 2012 issued by the First Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action
Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued
examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
for the petitioners is to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under
the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter
aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is
motion for reconsideration.24 not authorized to act or (3) the members of the Division unanimously vote
to refer to the COMELEC en banc.27

The petitioners, citing the case of Kho v. COMELEC,25 nevertheless insist


that this Court may take cognizance of the instant Petition for Certiorari The exception in Kho does not apply in the instant case since the COMELEC
since the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the said First Division is authorized to act on the ex-parte motion for the technical
interlocutory orders issued by the COMELEC First Division can be reviewed. examination of the said election paraphernalia. The COMELEC First Division
has already acquired jurisdiction over the election protests filed by Matba
and Usman. Concomitant with such acquisition of jurisdiction is the
The petitioners’ reliance on Kho is misplaced. In Kho, the issue was whether authority of the COMELEC First Division to rule on the issues raised by the
a Division of the COMELEC may admit an answer with counter-protest parties and all incidents arising therefrom, including the authority to act on
which was filed beyond the reglementary period. This Court held that the the ex-parte motion for technical examination of said election
COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the paraphernalia.
answer with counter-protest that was belatedly filed.

In Kho, the COMELEC First Division did not acquire jurisdiction on the
On the propriety of a filing a Petition for Certiorari with this Court sans any answer with counter-protest since it was filed beyond the reglementary
motion for reconsideration having been filed with the COMELEC en banc, it period and, consequently, did not have any authority to act on the issues
was held therein that, as an exception, direct resort to this Court via raised therein and all incidents arising therefrom. Thus:
8
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

It is worthy to note that as early as in the case of Arrieta vs. Rodriguez, this 9, 2012. Indeed, the petitioners’ objections to the technical examination of
Court had firmly settled the rule that the counter-protest must be filed the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the
within the period provided by law, otherwise, the forum loses its COMELEC First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a motion
jurisdiction to entertain the belatedly filed counter-protest. In the case at for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s March 5, 2012 Order,
bar, there is no question that the answer with counter-protest of Espinosa the petitioners’ claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.
was filed outside the reglementary period provided for by law. As such, the
COMELEC First Division has no jurisdictional authority to entertain the
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily
belated answer with counter-protest much less pass upon and decide the
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
issues raised therein. It follows therefore that the order of July 26, 1995
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
which pertains to the admission of the answer with counter-protest of
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
Espinosa as well as the other consequent orders implementing the order of
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
admission issued by the COMELEC First Division are void for having been
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
issued without jurisdiction. Even if petitioner Kho did not file a motion for
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995 admitting the answer with
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
counter-protest, the jurisdictional infirmity, brought about by the late filing
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.32
of the answer to the protest, persist and can not be cured by the omission
on the part of the protestee-petitioner to seek a reconsideration of the
order dated July 26, 1995.28 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours) Anent the issue on the technical examination of election paraphernalia, the
petitioners contend that the COMELEC First Division cannot order a
technical examination of the said election paraphernalia since there is as
Even if this Court is to disregard the procedural lapse committed by the
yet no published rule therefor. They assert that Section 1, Rule 18 of
petitioners and rule on the issues raised, the instant petition would still be
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, the rule relied upon by the COMELEC First
denied.
Division in ordering a technical examination, is vague as it failed to provide
the documents that should be subjected to technical examination in
The petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the election protest cases.
COMELEC granted the motion for technical examination filed by Matba and
Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said motion.
At the core of the petitioners’ assertion is the power of the COMELEC First
Division to order the technical examination of the said election
This Court does not agree. paraphernalia. This Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 1, Rule 18
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct
of technical examination of election paraphernalia as it merely provides for
It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound
the procedure to be followed in the presentation and reception of evidence
to notify and direct a party therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by
in election protest cases.
the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems
it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt
of a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC’s directive to do Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, in part, reads:
so. On this score, Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No.
880429 clearly provides that:
Sec. 1. Presentation and reception of evidence; order of hearing. - The
reception of evidence on all matters or issues raised in the protest and
Sec. 3. No hearings on motions. – Motions shall not be set for hearing unless counter-protests shall be presented and offered in a hearing upon
the Commission directs otherwise. Oral argument in support thereof shall completion of (a) the recount of ballots, or re-tabulation of election
be allowed only upon the discretion of the Commission. The adverse party documents, or (b) the technical examination, if warranted.
may file opposition five days from receipt of the motion, upon the
expiration of which such motion is deemed submitted for resolution. The
xxxx
Commission shall resolve the motion within five days. (Emphasis ours)

While Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not


If the party concerned, despite receipt of a copy of the motion that was filed
explicitly provide for the rule on the technical examination of election
with the COMELEC, did not file an opposition to the said motion, the motion
paraphernalia, it does not mean, however, that the COMELEC First Division
would be deemed submitted for resolution upon the expiration of the
does not have the power to order the conduct of such technical
period to file an opposition thereto.
examination.

It should be stressed that one of the factors that should be considered in


The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical examination
election protests is expediency. Proceedings in election protests are special
of the said election paraphernalia does not mean that the COMELEC First
and expeditious and the early resolution of such cases should not be
Division is barred from issuing an order for the conduct thereof. The power
hampered by any unnecessary observance of procedural rules.30 "The
of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination election
proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. All of these are because
paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its "exclusive original
the term of elective office is likewise short. There is the personal stake of
jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns and
the contestants which generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials".33
interest. Title to public elective office must not be left long under cloud.
Efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus
understandable that pitfalls which may retard the determination of election Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve
contests should be avoided."31 election protests carries with it the grant of all other powers necessary,
proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power
expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the
Here, the petitioners did not file an opposition to the said motion for
constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election protests includes the
technical examination that was filed by Matba and Usman on February 24,
authority to order a technical examination of relevant election
2012. It was only after the COMELEC First Division issued its March 5, 2012
paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether
Order that the petitioners decided to register their opposition to the
fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.
intended technical examination, albeit in the form of a motion for
reconsideration of the said Order. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim,
Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 gave them the There is no gainsaying that the COMELEC is mandated by law to resolve
opportunity to raise their objections to the said motion for technical election cases expeditiously and promptly. "For in this specie of
examination. However, for reasons known only to them, petitioners did not controversies involving the determination of the true will of the electorate,
file any opposition to the said motion. Accordingly, it is the petitioners time indeed is of paramount importance  second to none perhaps, except
themselves and not the COMELEC First Division who should be faulted for for the genuine will of the majority. To be sure, an election controversy
their predicament. which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s
choice, as gleaned from the medium of the ballot, should be resolved with
utmost dispatch, precedence and regard to due process."34
Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied to the
petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First Division’s March 5, 2012
Order. The petitioners were able to present their opposition to the said Concomitant to the COMELEC’s duty to expeditiously resolve election cases
motion for technical examination in their manifestation and motion for is the authority to resort to every reasonable and efficient means available
reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division on March to it to settle the controversy. The COMELEC is thus enjoined, "not only to
9
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

maintain its sense of urgency in resolving these cases, but also to explore
every reasonable and feasible means of ascertaining which candidate was
duly elected."35 Thus, this Court has declared:

An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public


interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the
people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was
the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest
therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public
concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real
choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to
ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected
by the people.36 (Emphasis ours)

Here, the technical examination ordered by the COMELEC First Division, by


comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as
against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters, is a
reasonable, efficient and expeditious means of determining the truth or
falsity of the allegations of fraud and irregularities in the canvass of the
votes in the province of Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the COMELEC First Division
did not commit any abuse of discretion when it allowed the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is


DENIED. The assailed Order dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division
of the Commission on Elections in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
10
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

4. For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year.
He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time
vs.
(later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet
DECISION
her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone.
ABAD, J.: When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized
his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against
station.
women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked
woman, not her, but with her face on it. Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked
him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text
The Indictment
messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish,
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated
9262 in an information that reads: from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent
the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province
whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the
mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and
former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in
said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not
picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for
distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1 Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
The Facts and the Case After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish)
recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears
and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts
suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim
towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had
during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the
taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish
verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision
broke up with him.
dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a
was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on
decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her
Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008.
cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent
Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his
messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his The Issues Presented
text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a
message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on
with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
The subordinate issues are:
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her
face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between
Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of
through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was
rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the
obscene picture presented in the case.
cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages.
Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, The Court’s Rulings
Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and
act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual
arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
or dating relationship. Thus:
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the
police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!" SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act
testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person. or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had
of liberty.
been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained
how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a xxxx
cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence
against women and these include any form of harassment that
11
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress.
woman. Thus: He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. –
The crime of violence against women and their children is But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
committed through any of the following acts: testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent
the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in
xxxx
the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
xxxx delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from
the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to
crime of violence against women through harassment are: keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want
to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
the offended woman;
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act
based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s
or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the
psychological distress to her. naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head
and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography
that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e)
trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture.
provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties
What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the
are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have
course of the relationship. Thus:
given her a nightmare.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically
seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not
(Underscoring supplied.)
need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used,
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with
love to" as in "He romanced her."
whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9 confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those
messages.
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an
the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone
defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and
that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things
intercourse taking place between those involved. on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
relationship of mutual trust and love.
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of to have already waived such ground for objection.14
misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15
romantic relation as continuous.10
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should
every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly
ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of
R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which resolution dated April 25, 2008.
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to
SO ORDERED.
protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced
12
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Center), Mildred Regidor (Liaison Officer of Grand Ace Commercial), Estrella


5. dela Cerna (Liaison Officer of JRK Automotive Supply), and Vevencia
Pedroza (Liaison Officer of Winstar Motor Sales) against the respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45 November 20, 2013
These new complaints were consolidated with the complaints already then
PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the pending.
Visayas, Petitioner,
In their complaints, the new complainants commonly alleged that they had
vs.
to pay ₱2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before they could be issued
MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and
confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu. Alingasa would give her
PORFERIO I. MENDOZA,Respondents.
collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. When they protested, Erederos
DECISION and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They
were also told that the confirmation certificates processed during the
BRION, J.:
previous administration would no longer be honored under Mendoza s
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation certificates
decision2 dated November 22 2005 and the resolution3dated April 21 2006 to process the registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO.
of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149 83150 and 83576.
In his counter-affidavit, Mendoza vehemently denied the accusations. He
The CA decision reversed and set aside the joint decision4 dated January 9 alleged that the confirmation certificates actual distribution and processing
2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (Deputy Ombudsman), were assigned to Alingasa; the processing entails the payment of ₱40.00 per
Primo C. Miro in OMB-V-A-02-0414-H finding respondents Marilyn confirmation certificate, as administrative fee; payment is only made when
Mendoza Vda. de Erederos Catalina Alingasa and Porferio I Mendoza guilty the confirmation certificates are filled up and submitted for processing with
of the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct. The Deputy Ombudsman the LTO, not upon issuance; and he did not give any instructions to impose
also found Oscar Peque guilty of Simple Misconduct. additional fees for their distribution.
The Factual Antecedents He also alleged that the case against him was instigated by Assistant
Secretary Roberto T. Lastimosa of the LTO Head Office so that a certain Atty.
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present case are as
Manuel I way could replace him as Regional Director of the L TO Cebu.8
follows:
Mendoza additionally submitted the affidavits of desistance of Carmelotes
Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land Transportation
and Dela Cerna. Carmelotes testified that she has no evidence to support
Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos, Mendoza's niece and secretary,
her allegations against Mendoza. Dela Cerna, on the other hand, stated that
Alingasa, LTO clerk, and Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO
she was merely told to sign a document which turned out to be an affidavit-
Cebu, were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct before the
complaint against the respondents. Subsequently, however, Dela Cerna
Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely: Maricar G Huete
executed a second affidavit, retracting her previous statements and
(Liaison Officer of GCY Parts), Ernesto R Cantillas (Liaison Officer of Isuzu
narrating how she was threatened by Peque to sign an affidavit of
Cebu, Inc.), Leonardo Villaraso (General Manager of TBS Trading), and
desistance (1st affidavit).
Romeo C. Climaco (Corporate Secretary of Penta Star).5 They were likewise
charged with criminal complaints for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Erederos and Alingasa commonly contended that they did not collect,
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." demand and receive any money from the complainants as payment for the
confirmation certificates.
The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies
in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of confirmation certificates, an Erederos stated that the case against her was initiated by Huete because
indispensable requirement in the processing of documents for the she found several discrepancies in the documents she had processed.
registration of motor vehicle with the LTO. According to her, the present case was Huete s ploy to avoid any liability.
Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the For their part, Alingasa stressed that her act of maintaining a control book
confirmation certificates, supposed to be issued by the LTO free of charge. for the releases of the confirmation certificate pads negates her liability,
This scheme allegedly existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as while Peque denied any participation in the distribution and sale of the
Regional Director of LTO Cebu. They observed that: confirmation certificates.
(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the amount of On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on
₱2,500.00 per pad without official receipt; the administrative aspect of the cases filed against the respondents, and a
joint resolution on the criminal aspect of the cases.
(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to Erederos who
would, in turn, remit all the collections to Mendoza;6 The Deputy Ombudsman s Ruling
(3) The official receipt for the processing of the confirmation In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza, Erederos and
certificates issued to the private complainants acknowledged Alingasa guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal
only the amount of ₱40.00 which they paid for each engine, from the service. Peque, on the other hand, was only found guilty of simple
chassis or new vehicle, as MR. (Miscellaneous Receipt-LTO Form misconduct and was meted the penalty of reprimand.
67);
The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants allegations that
(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from the ₱2,500.00 Alingasa collected ₱2,500.00 for the issuance of confirmation certificates
required to be paid for each pad; and, thereafter, remitted the collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He
relied largely on the affidavits supporting the respondents guilt. He found
(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for the individual
the affidavits and the NBI/Progress report strong enough to establish the
stock/sales reports evaluation of Erederos;7and
respondents guilt. The Deputy Ombudsman also explained that while the
(6) The confirmation certificates processed during the previous distribution of confirmation certificates to authorized car dealers is not
administration were no longer honored; thus, the private prohibited, the demand and the collection of payment during their
complainants were constrained to reprocess the same by distribution are anomalous.
purchasing new ones.
The respondents separately moved for reconsideration, but the Deputy
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also revealed that the Ombudsman denied their motions on March 5, 2004.9
confirmation certificates were given to the representatives of car dealers,
The respondents separately appealed to the CA to challenge the rulings
who were authorized to supply the needed data therein. In the Requisition
against them.
and Issue Voucher, it was Roque who received the forms. On August 19,
2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desi stance on the ground that he The CA’s Ruling
was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.
On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents petition and
On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the respondents reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s joint decision in the administrative
to file their respective counter-affidavits. The respondents complied with aspect. The CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman s finding of grave
the order and made the required submission. misconduct was not supported by substantial evidence because the
affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored, were not
On December 12, 2002, the case was called for preliminary conference. At
corroborated by any other documentary evidence. Additionally, the affiants
the conference, the respondents, thru their counsels, manifested their
did not appear during the scheduled hearings. The CA also found that the
intention to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on
affiants failed to categorically specify that the respondents personally
record after the submission of their memoranda/position papers.
demanded from them the payment of ₱2,500.00 -an allegation that the
In the interim, additional administrative and criminal complaints for the appellate court deemed material in establishing their personal knowledge.
same charges were filed by Rova Carmelotes (Liaison Officer of ZC Trading Without this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA held that the
13
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

statements in the affidavits were hearsay and, thus, should not be given any reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed
evidentiary weight. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: by the CA.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the consolidated petitions This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute
are GRANTED and accordingly the assailed Joint Decision dated January 9, one. Despite the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may
2004 (administrative aspect of the cases filed by the private respondents) is resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. reverse the administrative agency s findings if not supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-
Consequently, the administrative charges against petitioners are
judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman)
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be
With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated January 9, 2004 binding upon the courts.14
(criminal aspect) issued by the public respondent, this Court has no
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the
jurisdiction to review the same.10
conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges
The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not
the CA denied the motion in its resolution of April 21, 2006. The denial led equivalent to proof.15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s findings were found
to the filing of the present petition. wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this
Court.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition
The Deputy Ombudsman posits that the evidence adduced by the
complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof. He argues that the a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
complainants personal knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of their
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary
narration; hence, their affidavits could not have been hearsay. Their
to emphasize that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to
affidavits read:
questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the following by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to
anomalies concerning the processing of vehicle registration, x x x, as analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
follows: proceedings below. As held in Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac,16 a re-examination of
factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari
a. That in order to secure the forms of Confirmation of
to wit:
Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present price of
₱2,500.00 per pad from Catalina Alingasa, an L TO personnel, It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done
who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza Vda. through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
de Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts. xxx The
Porferio Mendoza; Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province
b. That Confirmation Certificates processed during previous
of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
administration would not be honored and under such situations,
they would require that the same be reprocessed which means There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what
that we have to buy and use the new forms supplied by the the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand,
present administration.11 exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts.17 Unless the case falls under any of the recognized
The Deputy Ombudsman also argues that his joint decision was not solely
exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions.18
based on the complainants affidavits since he also took into account the
NBI/Progress report, which uncovered the alleged anomalies. He posits that b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
these pieces of evidence, taken together, more than satisfy the required
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on
quantum of proof to hold the respondents administratively liable for grave
certiorari are those of the CA, and not directly those of the trial court or the
misconduct.
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the
The Case for the Respondents first instance.19 It is imperative that we refrain from conducting further
scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this
In their respective comments, the respondents separately argue that the
Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses
complainants statements in their affidavits lack material details and
Agueda and Maria Altamirano etc. et al.20 our review is limited only to the
particulars, particularly on the time, the date, and the specific transactions.
errors of law committed by the appellate court, to wit:
They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which contained general
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the
averments, and the NBI/Progress report that was based on the same
review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme
affidavits, failed to meet the quantum of proof required to hold them
Court is not obliged to review all over again the evidence which the parties
administratively liable.
adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of
For his part, Mendoza argues that since the affidavits failed to categorically exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the CA and the trial court
state that the complainants personally witnessed the transfer of money are conflicting or contradictory.
from Alingasa to Erederos and eventually to him, his participation in the
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,21 this Court laid down the guidelines for the
anomalous scheme has not been sufficiently shown; hence, he should not
judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the
have been found liable.
exercise of their quasi-judicial powers, as follows:
The Issue
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
error in dismissing the administrative charge against the respondents. scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds
The Court's Ruling
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
We deny the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the
the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Ombudsman on the ground that government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long
they were not supported by substantial evidence. as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute
of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.12 Their factual findings
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction
are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the
can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error
courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters
of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-
falling under their jurisdiction.
examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if
This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive
VII,13 where we held that: When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive. concerned. [emphases ours]
This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman
The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety of the CA s
and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of
reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman s decision that found the respondents
discretion. Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no
14
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

guilty of grave misconduct. While this issue may be one of law, its resolution not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from
also requires us to resolve the underlying issue of whether or not others."29 Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence exists to hold the respondents liable for the charge of substantial evidence.30
grave misconduct. The latter question is one of fact, but a review is
The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege any specific
warranted considering the conflicting findings of fact of the Deputy
act of the respondents. All that the affidavits allege is a description of the
Ombudsman and of the CA. Accordingly, we now focus on and assess the
allegedly anomalous scheme and the arrangement whereby payments were
findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA for their merits.
to be made to Alingasa. There is no averment relating to any "personal
The Deputy Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence demand" for the amount of ₱2,500.00.
The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants
based on the affidavits submitted by the complainants and the have personal knowledge of Erederos' and Mendoza's participation in the
NBI/Progress report. In giving credence to the affidavits, the Deputy anomalous act. At most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts
Ombudsman ruled that the complainants have amply established their of Alingasa who is the recipient of all payments for the processing of
accusations by substantial evidence. confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is affected by the
complainants' failure to specify Alingasa's act of personally demanding
The CA’s appreciation of evidence
₱2,500.00 -a crucial element in determining her guilt or innocence of the
The CA, on the other hand, reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s findings and grave misconduct charged.
ruled that no substantial evidence exists to support the latter’s decision as
With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit31 that Alingasa and
the affidavits upon which said decision was based are hearsay evidence. It
Erederos categorically told them that it was Mendoza who instructed them
found that the affidavits lack the important element of personal knowledge
to collect the ₱2,500.00 for the confirmation certificates, we once again
and were not supported by corroborating evidence.
draw a distinction between utterances or testimonies that are merely
We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman are hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those that are considered as
not supported by substantial evidence on record. legal hearsay.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative cases Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were made;
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is this class of extrajudicial utterances or statements is offered not s an
more than a mere scintilla of evidence.22 The standard of substantial assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only as to the fact
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on of the utterance made. The latter class, on the other hand, consists of the
the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains to
misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, extrajudicial utterances and statements that are offered as evidence of the
as is required in an ordinary civil case,23 or evidence beyond reasonable truth of the fact asserted.
doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the
a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first class, i.e.
Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 198924 provides that: the fact that the statement was made, is not covered by the hearsay rule,
while the second class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in the statement,
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by
is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's allegation belongs to the first class;
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
hence, it is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
statement. The following discussion, made m Patula v. People of the
more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable. [emphasis
Philippines32 is particularly instructive:
ours]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance
The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants to establish the
is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the
respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1) their complaint-affidavits and
assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
the (2) NBl/Progress report. As correctly found by the CA, these pieces of
be received s evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the
evidence do not meet the quantum of proof required in administrative
test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered,
cases.
not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to
The Evidence Against Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For
example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
i. Private complainants affidavits
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal knowledge of the admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely
participation of Mendoza and Erederos in the allegedly anomalous act. to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is
These affidavits indicate that the complainants have commonly noticed and hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
witnessed the anomalous sale transaction concerning the confirmation between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege that to secure rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement,
the confirmation certificates, an amount of ₱2,500.00 would be paid to to which the hearsay rule applies. [citations omitted]
Alingasa, an L TO personnel, "who will remit her collections to a certain
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible under the
Marilyn Mendoza vda. Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional
hearsay evidence rule
Director, Porferio Mendoza."25 While the payment to Alingasa might be
considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged remittance to We additionally note that the affidavits were never identified by the
Erederos and Mendoza -on its face - is hearsay. complainants. All the allegations contained therein were likewise
uncorroborated by evidence, other than the NBI/Progress report.
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of he witness In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,33 we had the occasion to rule on
the implications of the affiants' failure to appear during the preliminary
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that
investigation and to identify their respective sworn statements, to wit:
he knows of his own Rersonal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from
his own perception.26 A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the
read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence extant in the record of
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary conference required under Republic
or heard.27 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows Act No. 6770 was dispensed with after the nominal complainant, then BID
himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on July 29, 1996
testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
affidavits.28 documents on record while the petitioner agreed to simply file his
memorandum. Consequently, the only basis for the questioned resolution
The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the
of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service
transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in
was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his
their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the
alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.
collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that they saw
or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the complainants A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject
alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by the respective
the anomalous act complained of does not take their statements out of the affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident
coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear during the
15
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or
despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to disregard certain fundamental
dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge evidentiary rules
against the petitioner "was not supported by any evidence." Hence, Beck's
While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the
affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the
Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should
cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the
have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the
decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon
first instance. (emphasis supplied)
must, at the very least, be substantial. that:
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements, and considering
In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis,36 we ruled that:
the seriousness of the charges filed, their affidavits must not be accepted
at face value and should be treated as inadmissible under the hearsay While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are
evidence rule. not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases,
this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard
ii. NBI/Progress report
certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at
With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the complainants as least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not
corroborating evidence, the same should not be given any weight. Contrary only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
to the Ombudsman's assertions, the report cannot help its case under the the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
circumstances of this case as it is insufficient to serve as substantial basis. scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
The pertinent portion of this report reads: as adequate to support a conclusion.
04. P/Sinsp. JESUS KABIGTING and Senior TRO ALFONSO ALIANZA visited Conclusion
JAGNA District Office at Jagna, Bohol wherein they were able to conduct
With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the NBI/Progress report
interview with MR. RODOLFO SANTOS, Officer-In-Charge who has assumed
being hearsay evidence, the only question that remains is whether the
his new post only in February 2002. During the conduct of the interview,
respondents conduct, based on the evidence on record, amounted to grave
Mr. SANTOS revealed that the anomalous Dos-por-Dos transactions have
misconduct, warranting their dismissal in office.
been prevented and eliminated when the previous District Manager in the
person of Mr. LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR, who was transferred to Tagbilaran Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
District Office allegedly on a floating status and under the direct control and action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
supervision of its District Manager, Mr. GA VINO PADEN, Mr. SANTOS officer.37 The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional
allegations of the existence of "Dos-por-Dos" transactions were supported elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to
by the records/documents gathered of which the signatures of Mr. OLAIVAR disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence;
affixed thereof. Copies are hereto attached marked as Annexes D-D-6. otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
xxxx
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. HUETE, a resident of Lahug, benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
Cebu City and liaison Officer of GCY Parts, Kabancalan Mandaue City and others.38
Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS a resident of Basak, Mandaue City and liaison
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to establish the
Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among others
elements of grave misconduct.1âwphi1 To reiterate, no substantial
and both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1."
evidence exists to show that Erederos and Mendoza received collected
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy payments from Alingasa Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly
the same at the present cost of ₱2,500.00 per pad from CATALINA anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the
ALINGASA, an LTO Personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain complainants and the NBI/Progress report, which are both hearsay.
MARILYN MENDOZA V da De EREDEROS, a niece and secretary of the
With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial evidence showing
Regional Director, PORFERIO MENDOZA.34
that she personally demanded the payment of ₱2,500.00 – a crucial factor
This quoted portion shows that it was based on complainant Huete's and in the wrongdoing alleged – we find that the elements of misconduct,
Cantillas' affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay because the material facts simple or grave, to be wanting and unproven.
recited were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the assailed
conducted the investigation. As held in Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phil.) Inc., et
decision dated November 22, 2005 and the resolution dated April 21, 2006
al.,35 reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers or other
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 83149, 83150 and 83576.
public officials are hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: The first question before Us refers to SO ORDERED.
the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police
and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. xxx.
xxxx
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer
in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here.
Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts,
however, acquired by them through official information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule;
the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through
official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to
any duty to do so. [emphases ours]
The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the
performance of their duties not on the basis of their own personal
observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the
complainants affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot
rely on it.
16
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

6. ₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00


as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of
G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014 earning capacity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of
vs. Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO the accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident
SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants. premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several
accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed
DECISION
from the CA to this Court.10
ABAD, J.:
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in
Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could
Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary
with murder before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
06-0854.1 circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than
one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented
Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:
Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver
identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but,
of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto
having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown
Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the
them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their
police station because of the questionable documents he
mobile car for further questioning.2
showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which
behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who
Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve were also taxicab drivers.
himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the
two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one
cab to go to the police station where he was about to be taken
suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone
for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide.
fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man matter and claim his taxi.
whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of
from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his
the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting.
gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take
a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On 4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also
they had with them had fled. referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las
linked the other accused.
Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito)
immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that 5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators
accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and
robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3
Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3 6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi
driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 subsequent death.
caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the
crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding 7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were
the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in
Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4 illegal activities.

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in 8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession
accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with of mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded to the
the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating
between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5 circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms
qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of
of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was receiving police pay of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
expense, ₱16,000.00 for the interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not
purchase of the cemetery lot.6 among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
testify in the case,7 the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were
entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in
evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on
identified. Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the
possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with
17
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of
arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for
acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that
may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate,
a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the
investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to
and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided
strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform


to current jurisprudence.18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants
Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y
Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE
with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of
them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary
damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional ₱50,000.00 for
civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
18
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

7. corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in


December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to
confirm if Jose knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by
[ GR No. 190846, Feb 03, 2016 ] Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was
aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale.
TOMAS P. TAN v. JOSE G. HOSANA + Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's confirmation.[23]

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a
DECISION partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that
the consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the
actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on
BRION, J.: taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and
had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money.[24]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] challenging the August 28,
2009 decision[2] and November 17, 2009 resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645. The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,[25] the RTC decided in favor of Jose
The Facts and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that
the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
(Milagros) on January 14, 1979.[4] During their marriage, Jose and Milagros
bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229.[5] the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages.[26]

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by The CA Ruling
Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.[6] The Deed of Sale stated Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00.[7] After the sale, TCT
No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of In a decision dated August 28, 2009,[27] the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that
Tomas.[8] the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the
judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages;
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the
Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust
Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City.[9] The complaint was filed enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that
complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, established this claim.[28]
without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the
SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the
Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.[10] ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase
price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported by the
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas
value.[11] Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was
sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC.[29]
subject lot was authentic and in order.[12]Furthermore, he alleged that the
SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a
the title.[13] resolution dated November 17, 2009.[30]

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and


moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses, for litigation, in the event The Petition
that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose.[14]
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to ruling which ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of
Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.[15] On the other hand, it dismissed the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00.[31]
Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal
party.[16] Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including
the consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was declared
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.[17] null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove
the actual consideration of the sale;[32] third, his testimony establishing the
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was
Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from uncontroverted;[33] and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually
Milagros' son.[18] When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.[34]
angry because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property
because she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning
was then in Japan, of the sale.[19] the purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for failing to immediately
raise this question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the writing are deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other
Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the agreement itself.[35]
discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been
transferred to Tomas.[20]
The Issues
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was
forged.[21] Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for
for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original the amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas
of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the sale.
certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten
letter.[22]

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as


19
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

OUR RULING
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition. restoration of what has been given is in order."[52] This principle springs
from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every person who
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution
not the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts.[36] of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on
"the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,"[37] except in the following cases: While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced
since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution of
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the the contract.
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of Court.[53]The
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the entire content or a
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply specific provision/term in the document.
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to
by the evidence on record.[38] ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual
payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions. enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and
effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e.,
subject property is a factual question that the CA had already resolved in the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to
the negative.[39] The CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
subject property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any
convincing evidence to establish his claim. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law of these rules.[54] There is no provision in the Rules of
We uphold the CA's finding. Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules
only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the for its admissibility.[55]
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.[40]Moreover, the
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.[41] introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of
fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the
weight of the credible evidence."[42] Preponderance of evidence is a phrase safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical
that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or
is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
offered in opposition thereto.[43] consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of payment, discarding them or ignoring them.[56]
without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare
allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive
given weight and credence. provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the
spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of
of proving it;[44] the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.[45] A mere allegation is the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before
not evidence,[46] and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his the courts.
or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil
cases is preponderance of evidence. An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the
court to determine the presence of the essential elements of the sale,
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its including the consideration paid.
admissibility as evidence.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the the actual consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by
reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the the court. Tomas is incorrect.
Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration as evidence.[57] Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose of
stated in the deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable amount because a proving its execution and the regularity of the sale.[58]
null and void document cannot be used as evidence.
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument. the; lower courts to consider the terms written therein to determine
whether all the essential elements[59] for a valid contract of sale are
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was
beginning.[47] This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by declared null and void does not prevent the court from relying on
positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount
without the other spouse's written consent.[48] A void contract is paid by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects.[49] It cannot
be validated either by ratification or prescription.[50] When, however, any Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual
of the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare consideration of the sale is not necessary since it is necessarily included in
its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given determining the regular execution of the sale.
under it.[51]
20
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima


facie evidence of the amount paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima


facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein.[60]

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face.
Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.[61]

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale


constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the
transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory
evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual
consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law
requiring the consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property.
There is, however, no question on the presence of the consideration of
the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of
sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence
of the actual consideration paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to


Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of
P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial
evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart
from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is self-
serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient


evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount
which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the


loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience."[62] The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code.[63]

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or


Milagros received under the void contract which presumably benefitted
their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of


P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and
given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in
his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in
the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The


decision dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17,
2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
21
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

8. participation in the execution ofthe document. Moreover, the


Tolentino vs. Mendoza cited in de Jesus vs. Sanches-Malit acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the
A.C. No. 6470 July 8, 2014 principal’s place of residence.
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her
vs.
Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.
for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of
SERENO, CJ: documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De
attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned
THE FACTS OF THE CASE Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the
Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9)
In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar
an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent
had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their
that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a respective Position Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not
result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of tackle the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local ParteMotion.
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also
notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial
sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement,
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he
complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was
February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and
not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period Rule 18.038of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
within which it could not be alienated. recommended that she besuspended from the practice of law for six
months.9
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant
subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22
by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), May 2008, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.10
attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion
corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent.2
for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained
Resolution requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint without observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3 Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13Moreover, the
Urgent Ex ParteMotion of complainant was actually a supplemental
In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was
pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to
before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the
question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should
loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a
have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due
similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase "absolute and
course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be
registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a
considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record;
cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject
absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems;
public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the
timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences
local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner.
of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation;
in which complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner,
remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as owner of the The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and March 2012, deniedrespondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market
Angelica Y. Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice
stall.
Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the disbarment Complaint against respondent.15
document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave
THE COURT’S RULING
the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent
a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign and the parties’ submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the
it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. findings of the IBP.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence
and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction.
by complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable
present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it.
argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent
Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject
therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate
of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those
Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject
documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by
Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily
gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
before respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the former’s "evidence is admissible when it isrelevant to the issue and is not excluded
22
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth lease agreement is not a rarityin respondent’s practice as a notary public.
certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has
whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993. action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be
signed in his or her presence.26
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides
for sanctions against persons violating the ruleon confidentiality of birth A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally
violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule
seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from that she shall do no falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court
explained that: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to
interference by any department of government and its agencies. accomplish the desired end.31 The blatmt disregard by respondent of her
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the commissioned as a notary public.
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of
obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately.
Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence
public.
of the birth certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore,
admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of
resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18 respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP
correctly consideredin evidence the other notarized documents submitted No costs.
by complainant as additional evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant
constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name
denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something
to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter
as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a
supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the
latter notarizedincomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally
barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court
finds that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a
notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized.
The Court has repeatedlystressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public
interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled tofull faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished.21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not
the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended
the provisions of the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by
complainant sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her
file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have
given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said
23
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

9. EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form


RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on
G.R. No. 177407 which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of
February 9, 2011 the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the
NACHURA, J.: same examination which is the document appended as
Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by
x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the
Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of document which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certified
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document
for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both documents
turn, assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of Medicine are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same
(BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882. as that which are written on Exhibit D.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents
[Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits
are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not
properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It
was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha
non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It
1999. reads:

On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo
(as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner]
incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and
participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are
Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza. may serve in the resolution of this case.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for
incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. SO ORDERED.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order
Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also basically on the same reasons stated in his comment/objections to the
named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary formal offer of exhibits.
evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are
her Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose of proving that The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order
her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence
she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows: being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides
the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x
dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 x x.[3]
as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin,
IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to,
City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders
[Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are which admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary
handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 to the
Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board
in answer to this complaint; WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER
REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004
Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex 3 SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY
this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint. RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of
the results of the examination. We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
24
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the


proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the
exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms
be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20,
finally disposes of the case.[5] At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any 1999, filed in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents contain
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These
and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against
the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in
that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the BOM did not locations at the time of her operation.
exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible. exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at
the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence judicial notice.[11]
by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly
identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for
incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.[12] Thus, they likewise
exhibits are inadmissible evidence. provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such
as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
We disagree. discretionary.[13] Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of living things
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas
strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human
BOM.[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
the rules of evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may appear to Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that: inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting 1. Best Evidence Rule
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if contents of a document, no evidence shall be
they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on admissible other than the original document itself,
the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later except in the following cases:
to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
them.[8] cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility
of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of (b) When the original is in the custody or under the
evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of control of the party against whom the evidence is
Appeals[9] teaches: offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts
be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative or other documents which cannot be examined in
value of evidence refers to the question of whether court without great loss of time and the fact sought
or not it proves an issue. to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas
exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical (d) When the original is a public record in the custody
license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the
shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney
The Rules of Court shall only apply in these of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the
errors in the admission of evidence which do not RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall
not vitiate the proceedings.[10] Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the
anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point,
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the
prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed
under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court: In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the
exhibits, is allowed.[15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because [it]
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
may be contradicted and overcome by other building.[16] Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM
evidence: properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the
BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
(y) That things have happened according to the of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life. SO ORDERED.
25
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

10. the opportunity to comment thereon – a mere verbally


requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the
conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal has been permanently
G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008
scrapped.

ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,


67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving,
vs.
especially without the Notes of the Meeting Between President
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to
NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INVESTMENT
support its allegations or other proof of the supposed decision
COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents can
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO
certainly do better than that.4
MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P.
SALES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE, BIDS AND AWARDS FOR Petitioner Suplico further argues that:
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed by
DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the
79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Petition have been rendered moot (which is vehemently
LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL OTHER OPERATING UNITS OF THE DOTC
denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched
FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ZTE
jurisprudence, may still take cognizance thereof.5
CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS ACTING
IN THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
Petitioner Suplico cites this Court’s rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,6 Rufino v.
Endriga,7 and Alunan III v. Mirasol8that despite their mootness, the Court
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to
the Court’s symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by
G.R. No. 179317 formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and
rules.
AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., and NATHANIEL SAUZ, Petitioners,
vs. On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317, also filed their comment expressing their
SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND sentiments, thus:
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO
FORMOSO III, Respondents.
3. First of all, the present administration has never been known
for candor. The present administration has a very nasty habit of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.

G.R. No. 179613 4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring
themselves to feel even a bit reassured that the government, in
the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not
GALELEO P. ANGELES, VICENTE C. ANGELES, JOB FLORANTE L. CASTILLO,
backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the now infamous NBN-
TRINI ANNE G. NIEVA, ROY ALLAN T. ARELLANO, CARLO MAGNO M.
ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant since what was
REONAL, ETHEL B. REGADIO, RAENAN B. MALIG, AND VINALYN M. POTOT,
attached to the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion was a mere one
TOGETHER WITH LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY,
(1) page written communication sent by the Department of
TRANSPARENCY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG,
(LATIGO), Petitioners,
allegedly relaying that the Philippine Government has decided
vs.
not to continue with the NBN project "x x x due to several
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),
reasons and constraints."
represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, and ZHONG XING
EQUIPMENT (ZTE) COMPANY, LTD., AND ANY AND ALL PERSONS ACTING
ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents. Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which among
others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter
RESOLUTION
into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case
despite its apparent mootness.
REYES, R.T., J.:
On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents’ reply
Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion1 dated October 26, to petitioners’ comments on its manifestation and motion.
2007 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which states:
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating their
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must
Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the Legal Service of the Department be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE National resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
Broadband Network Project (see attachment2). That said, there is no more or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.9
justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE,
public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that
DISMISSED.
would prejudice the government or public interest. Explaining the nature of
the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress that it
On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSG’s manifestation and remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent10 for the
motion and required petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 agreement to become effective have not yet been complied with.
to comment.
Respondents further oppose petitioners’ claim of the right to information,
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his which they contend is not an absolute right. They contend that the matters
Consolidated Reply and Opposition,3opposing the aforequoted OSG raised concern executive policy, a political question which the judicial
Manifestation and Motion, arguing that: branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.

66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Appended to it is the Highlights from the Notes of Meeting between
Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao, held
2007 Manifestation and Motion – thus depriving petitioners of in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of
26
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Meeting, the Philippine Government conveyed its decision not to continue 2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule
with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due to several 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court;
constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintao’s
expression of understanding of the Philippine Government decision.
3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national
broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the
We resolve to grant the motion. ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to
preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the
Constitution, to law and to public policy;
Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual 4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent
prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are: provisions of law regarding procurement of government
infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract
to undertake the construction of the national broadband
G.R. No. 178830
network.13 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:


On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO14 in G.R. No. 178830,
enjoining the parties from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as
paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, issue prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:
forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives and
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution
any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing,
in the above-entitled case, to wit:
entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing
the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;
"G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development
Authority, represented by NEDA Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA
2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith
Investment Coordination Committee, Department of Transportation and
produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel a
Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro
certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the
Mendoza, including the Commission on Information and Communications
NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;
Technology, headed by its Chairman, Ramon P. Sales, The
Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule Communications Technology Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant
49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the revised Rules of Court; Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical Working Group
and, for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications
4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and
Deal, and compel public respondents to forthwith comply with ARESCOM, Inc.—Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved,
government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN without giving due course to the petition, to
contract.11 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
G.R. No. 179317
(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and
WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz continuing until further orders from this Court, enjoining the (i) National
respectfully pray as follows: Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications,
Commission on Information and Communications Technology, (iv)
A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
upon the posting of a bond in such amount as the Honorable Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group
Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of for ICT, and all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and
preliminary injunction be issued directing the Department of Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam
Transportation and Communication, the Commission on Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
Information and Communications Technology, all other their behalf from ‘pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds,
government agencies and instrumentalities, their officers, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project’ as prayed
employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their behalf for."
to desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for
Mandamus from entering into any other agreements and from
commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further
connection with the National Broadband Network Project; orders from this Court, You, Respondents (i) National Economic and
Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee, (iii)
Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on
B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and, Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications
Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology
C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other
rendered directing respondents to allow herein petitioners Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications
access to all agreements entered into with the Government of Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii)
China, the ZTE Corporation, and/or other entities, government ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are hereby
instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the National ENJOINED from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds,
Broadband Network Project.12 (Emphasis supplied) and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed
for.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. 179613
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished
certified true copies of the "contract or agreement covering the NBN
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to: project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation." It appears that during one of
the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply
1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith contract16 were readily made available to petitioners.17Evidently, the said
produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel a prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the
NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation; When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity
during the meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China, informed China’s
27
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and
continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due the SEC en banc. However, before the matter was finally resolved,
to several reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had
principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul, set aside, and enjoin the thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the
implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot. resolution of whether the implementation of said agreements should be
enjoined became no longer necessary.
Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made by
officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine Government’s Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited
decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, Republic Telecommunications. There We held, thus:
inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this
official act of the President of the Philippines.
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals’
Decision nullifying the orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD, has been
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides: rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the
correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will
be indulging in a theoretical exercise that has no practical worth in view of
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial
the supervening event.
notice, without introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied) or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where
the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take
value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the
above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing
facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN writ of injunction to prevent the concerned parties from pushing through
Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc. is no
in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court must take longer interested in pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial
judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence. relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 We took judicial notice of the
announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of of Appeals’ Decision had the effect of overruling the Court’s Resolution
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5. dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the appellate
court.
In Estrada v. Desierto,19 the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving
the factual ingredient of the petition. A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion,
which falls beyond the realm of judicial review. The exercise of the power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Courts have
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve
the official duty of the executive officials20 of informing this Court of the
hypothetical or feigned problems.
government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also
presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary.
Other than petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although
finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the
the present instance. instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the
Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and
rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.
legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political stability
indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on
issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction
will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of may be issued to prevent the implementation of the assailed contracts calls
judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the
petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the
further discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary
previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents. injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this petition do not call
for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any
statutory provision.22
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of
mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the
Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the
no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to foregoing considerations and brush aside mootness, the Court cannot
render any ruling or make any pronouncement. completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the
three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires
reception of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that this may not be
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang
done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated often
Husgado.
enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.

In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,21 the lone issue


Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na
tackled by the Court of Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities
hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and
upholding, respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,23 correctly pointed out
enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between Qualcomm, that since petitioner Suplico filed his petition directly with this Court,
Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a determination of
implementation of the agreements was restrained through the assailed pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these
orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by factual issues, to wit:
the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying
28
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them
the Philippine and Chinese governments over the NBN Project; due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires
reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought
before the Supreme Court.
(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the DOTC, and ZTE
International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
executive agreement; Order issued on September 11, 2007 is DISSOLVED.

(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually SO ORDERED.
been executed;

(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN


Project be completed under a Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Scheme;

(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements


for an unsolicited proposal under the BOT Law;

(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked


public finds for disbursement under the ZTE Supply Contract;
and

(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied


under the ZTE Supply Contract is more extensive than that under
the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.24

Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830
and 179613 require prior determination of facts before pertinent legal
issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.

In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the
ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and compel public respondents to forthwith
comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.

In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside
the award of the contract for the national broadband network to
respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as
the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is
contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy. They also ask the
Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent
provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure
projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the
construction of the national broadband network.

It is simply impossible for this Court "to annul and set aside the award of
the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal" without any evidence to support a prior
factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to such
annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for
this factual matter to be threshed out.

Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order
"public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law
regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for
the NBN contract."25 It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court
to summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent
provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure
projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular
violations committed by specific government officials of the executive
branch. For the Court to do so would amount to a breach of the norms of
comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error cannot
be corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the
Court cannot just presume that the executive did not comply with
procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into this trap, it
would plainly commit grave error itself.

Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na


tumalima sa batas sa pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang
pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag dito.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot


be the basis of Our decision which requires a judicial finding of facts.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband
Network Project should be declared null and void. The foregoing threefold
reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed colleague.
29
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

11. with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the masters
[G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001] bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver
PHILIPPINES, respondent. with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition
DECISION (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license
to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted
PARDO, J.: the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three
decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming with modification the decision separate inventories of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The
of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon
by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the
correccional,as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day search.
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45
Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the
Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police
of P. D. No. 1866, as follows: officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was
carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house
without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of
officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under his custody After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of
and control, the following, to wit: conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.
D. No. 1866 as charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)

Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act


c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
No. 8294, and pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of six
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45 (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years
of prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22 Pesos (P15,000.00).[5]

f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16) On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assailing the decision for being contrary to facts and the law.[6]

g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56 On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court as set out in the
opening paragraph of this decision.[7]
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
Contrary to law.[2] motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.[8] He contended that the
certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine
National Police stating that the person named therein had not been issued
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded a firearm license referred to a certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay
not guilty.[3] Trial ensued. Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe,
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.

On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant reconsideration for lack of merit.[9]
Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the
necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the Hence, this appeal.[10]
PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was
the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. illegal as the search warrant was issued in violation of the
On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Constitution[11] and consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He
Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records also submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and
in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver
kind and caliber. Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal.
applied for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were
appellant. either planted by the police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned
in the search warrant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil
Fernandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, We find the petition impressed with merit.
authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe,
We define the issues as follows:
Norzagaray, Bulacan.[4] On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock in the
morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol
warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police and ammunition seized in his bedroom; and
officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the
of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-
introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or
out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and were illegally seized.
that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
30
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change
Appeals and the trial courts.[12] However, this case comes within the of address, and/or qualification.
exceptions.[13] The findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be
disturbed by the Court unless these findings are not supported by
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees,
evidence.[14] In this case, the findings of the lower courts even directly
within six (6) months from your birth month. Renewal of
contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court held
your license can be made within your birth month or
that the copy of the license presented was blurred, and that in any event,
month preceding your birth month. Late renewal shall be
the court could rely on the certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr.
penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives
first day to the last day of this month) followed by an
Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente Vic del Rosario of
additional 25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5)
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm
months compounded monthly.
holder of any kind and caliber.[15] As against this, petitioner submitted that
he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is
Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and
barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan.[16] In fact, the trial court erred d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without
grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial appropriate permit and/or carrying firearm/s in prohibited
jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions submission that there was only places.
barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a
typographical error.[17] Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral
PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license. The court is turpitude or for any offense where the penalty carries an
duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt or imprisonment of more than six (6) months or fine of at
innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the least P1,000.00.
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the
absence of a firearm license.[18] However, such certification referred to f. Dismissal for cause from the service.
another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly
issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed
computerized copy of License No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right
1993, expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives thumbmark.
Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr.
Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.[19] On the dorsal side of the printed 3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is
computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of computerized punishable by permanent disqualification and forfeiture
license is extended until renewed license is printed dated January 17, 1995, of the firearm in favor of the government.
signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch,
FEO.[20] Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license 4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should
fees for the extension of the license for the next two-year period.[21] surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit. For
those within Metro Manila, surrender should be made
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid with FEO, Camp Crame.
firearm license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his
house on June 15, 1996.[22] As required, petitioner presented the license to 5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they
the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique should be deposited with the nearest PNP Unit and
of the Criminal Investigation Division Group, PNP.[23] As a senior police ownership should be relinquished in writing so that
officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness firearms may be disposed of in accordance with law.
and authenticity of the computerized printed license presented. He must
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be
know the computerized license printed form. The stamp is clearly visible. He
made in case of a resident of Metro Manila direct to the
could decipher the words and the signature of the authorized signing official
Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to secure
of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to the same
recommendation letter to the nearest PNP Provincial
national police organization.
Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF,
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented FEO for issuance of the permit. License must be
because, according to him, it was expired. However, assuming that the presented before an authority to purchase ammo could
license presented was expired during the period January 1995 to January be obtained.[26]
1997, still, possession of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for
with serial No. 70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The firearm
the automatic renewal of the firearm license for the next two years upon
was kept at home, not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the
expiration of the license in January 1995, as evidenced by official receipt
time of the seizure of the firearm in question, possession of firearm with
No. 7615186, dated January 17, 1995.[27] The license would be renewed, as
an expired license was not considered unlawful, provided that the license
it was, because petitioner still possessed the required
had not been cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that
qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the
possession of a firearm with an expired license was unlawful took effect
renewed computerized license was printed. In fact, a renewed license was
only on July 7, 1997.[24] It could not be given retroactive effect.[25]
issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year period.[28]
According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to
license was automatically applied for upon payment of the license fees for
petitioner, on January 25, 1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued
the renewal period. The expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It
to him a permit to carry firearm outside residence valid until January 25,
served as temporary authority to possess the firearm until the renewed
1996, for the firearm in question.[29] The Chief, Philippine National Police
license was issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the gun at home
would not issue a permit to carry firearm outside residence unless
pending renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a printed
petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to
computerized license. He was not obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed
carry firearm outside residence was valid for only one year, and expired on
at the dorsal side of the computerized license is a notice reading:
January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the regular firearm license was
renewed and subsisting within the two-year term up to January 1997. A
IMPORTANT Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that the party to
whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this question.[30] Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and
license whenever demanded by proper authority. Explosives Division, PNP renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt
pistol in question.[31]
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit
upon revocation or termination of this license. Under Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the
any of the following instances, your license shall be interregnum between January 17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed
revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to license on January 17, 1997.
confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the
government. trial court did not accept with alacrity the certification dated June 25, 1996,
31
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque,[32] Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt caliber .45 Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
with serial number 70G23792, covered by computerized license issued
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January 1997.[33] Reinforcing the
aforementioned certification, petitioner submitted another certification Q: What did he say next?
dated August 27, 1999, stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay
Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license No. RL- A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me
C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with Serial Number 70G23792, for the because I am a police officer, sir.
years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995, and the
extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.[34] Had Q: What was your comment to what he said?
the lower courts given full probative value to these official issuances,
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not
petitioner would have been correctly acquitted, thus sparing this Court of
conform with officials like you and then he laughed and laughed,
valuable time and effort.
sir.[43]
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has
The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a
the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the
matter of judicial notice that a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a
subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
private individual.[44] This ruling has no basis either in law or in
it does not have the license or permit to possess the same.[35] The essence
jurisprudence.[45]
of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or
constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search
conviction for illegal possession. After possession is established by the warrant was illegal.
prosecution, it would only be a matter of course to determine whether the
accused has a license to possess the firearm.[36] Possession of any firearm With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that
becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor is not first the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners
obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and every warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioners house. Section
ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
negative fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential absent which such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not only to meaning of said constitutional provision.[46] Supporting jurisprudence thus
allege but also to prove beyond reasonable doubt.[37] To convict an accused outlined the following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence
for illegal possession of firearms and explosives under P. D. 1866, as of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
viz.: (a)the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
(b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the searched and persons or things to be seized.[47] Seizure is limited to those
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize.[48] Evidence
subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress that the essence of the crime seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted
penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license or permit and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the
to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
itself is not prohibited by law.[38] Illegal possession of firearm is a crime any purpose in any proceeding.[49]
punished by special law, a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved.[39] To support a conviction, however, there In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain
must be possession coupled with intent to possess (animus possidendi) the view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
firearm.[40] petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the
search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.[50] The seizure without the
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the
of police officer Jerito A. Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption Constitution.[51] True that as an exception, the police may seize without
of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
officers.[41] This is a flagrant error because his testimony is directly inadvertently found in plain view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence
contradictory to the official records of the Firearms and Explosives Division, in plain view applies only where the police officer is not searching for
PNP, which must prevail. Morever, the presumption of regularity can not evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
prevail over the Constitutional presumption of innocence.[42] Right from the incriminating object.[52] Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is
start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that petitioner possessed a valid justified when there is:
license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp.
Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged him with illegal (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the testimony of in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
petitioner: their official duties;

Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
your cal. .45 pistol and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in who had the right to be where they are;
your kitchen? (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
firearm, give him ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me further search.[53]
to tell who among the people in our barangay have unlicensed
firearm, sir. Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not
belonging to him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos? was in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir. license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the
existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. In People v. de
Q: And what did you answer him? Gracia,[54] we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of
convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
I will not give him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze possess. While mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to
something from me. convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown
that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked
accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No.
from you?
1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or
32
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the


same.[55] That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence
of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.

The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the
bedroom of petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized
items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,[56] the
plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently
comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.

With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding
policemen also seized in the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was
absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios were not contraband per
se. The National Telecommunications Commission may license two-way
radios at its discretion.[57] The burden is on the prosecution to show that the
two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication
Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way
radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not
mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a
plain violation of a citizens right.Worse, the petitioner was not charged with
illegal possession of the two-way radios.

Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly


illegal. The possession of such radios is not even included in the charge of
illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended)
alleged in the Information.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court


of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.

The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the


charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96,
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.

Costs de oficio.

The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to


petitioner his caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the
five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition,
and the two 2-way radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine
National Police, or his duly authorized representative shall show to this
Court proof of compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live
ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are
confiscated in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.
33
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

12. the keys to her car; she remembered him to be about 5’6" to 5’7" in height,
G.R. No. 128720 January 23, 2002 with dark features, chubby and heavily built.3
S/SGT. ELMER T. VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any participation in the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The trial court summed up his defense as follows:

DECISION
Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on his identity as one of the
perpetrators of the robbery ‘hold-up’ in question…Claiming innocence, he
QUISUMBING, J.: presented evidence showing that he was at some other place during the
occurrence of the robbery. His alleged presence at the Pacita Complex at
San Pedro, Laguna, being a member of the narcotic operatives engaged in a
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
surveillance of a suspected drug pusher, was corroborated by no less than
October 31, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318, which affirmed the judgment of
the team leader Captain, now Major Christopher Laxa. Major Christopher
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in Criminal Case No.
Laxa was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was physically
86163, convicting him of robbery, thus:
present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex, San Pedro
Laguna, at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 19, 1990 and, that
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused S/Sgt. Elmer he did not leave the area from the time of their arrival at around 1:00
Vergara GUILTY beyond peradventure of doubt of the crime of Robbery o’clock in the morning until 11:30 o’clock in the evening.…4
defined and penalized under Art. 294, No. (5), in relation to Art. 295, of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and disregarded
Four (4) years of prision correcional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and
petitioner’s alibi. On March 29, 1995, it convicted Vergara not of robbery in
Twenty-One (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the
band as charged in the information, however, but of robbery as defined and
offended party in the sum of P106,000.00; to suffer all the accessory
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As explained by the
penalties appurtenant thereto; and, to pay the Costs.
trial court:

SO ORDERED.1
Under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code a robbery shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band when more than three armed
The facts of the case are as follows: malefactors (underline supplied) take part in its commission. The
prosecution’s evidence demonstrates that only three (3) in the group were
On March 19, 1991, an information charging S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C armed, although there was another member inside the car at the time of
Nicasio Custodio y Abrera, PC and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in the commission. However, there is no indication that the person inside the
band was filed by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor’s Office with the RTC of car was armed. Conceding in gratia argumenti, therefore, that the group of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The information reads: the accused Elmer Vergara was composed of more than three (3)
malefactors, the evidence disclosed that only three (3) were armed, and
hence, the crime cannot be considered to have been committed by a band
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990, in the Municipality of and does not come within the purview of Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of Code, which requires more than three (3) armed malefactors to constitute
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and the crime of robbery committed by a band.5
confederating together with John Doe, whose true identity and present
whereabout is still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another,
armed with high powered handguns, with intent of gain, by means of In convicting petitioner for robbery, the trial court stated:
violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one Catherine F.
Manalo, an employee of J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., who was then Both the defenses of negative identification and alibi are unavailing.
aboard a private car, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously Contrary to these protestations, complainant Catherine Manalo had a vivid
take, steal and divest from Catherine F. Manalo the payroll money recollection of the identity of S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara as the person who
amounting to ₱89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo Construction Company, accosted her on the left side of the car or at the driver’s seat and who poked
Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued at ₱17,000 a gun at her neck and was also the one who took the key from the ignition.
belonging to Catherine F. Manalo, to the damage and prejudice of J & E It was a clear day, 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, and the probability of a
Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and Catherine F. Manalo in the poor recollection is nil. Catherine Manalo was able to see Sgt. Elmer Vergara
aforementioned amounts of ₱89,000.00 and ₱17, 000.00 respectively. while on board the Gallant (sic) Sigma Car when it was trailing her car and
also at the time it was passing her car until her path was blocked and the
Contrary to law.2 three (3) armed malefactors disembarked. She had sufficient time to
recollect the faces of the persons who approached the car and their
respective positions. There is no reason to doubt her unerring testimony
Although all the suspects were brought into police custody, petitioner’s co- that she was able to positively remember and then later on identified the
accused managed to extricate themselves from police control and remain robbers. Between the positive declaration of Catherine Manalo and the
at large. Only petitioner was left to face the charges. On May 21, 1993, he denial of accused Elmer Vergara, the former deserves more credence,
was arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded "not notwithstanding minor inaccuracies as to the height and weight and styling
guilty" to the charges. Following the pre-trial conference on August 20, of the hair of accused Elmer Vergara.
1993, trial on the merits ensued.

xxx
The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private
complainant who testified in court. As found by the court a quo:
Conceding the fact that accused Elmer Vergara was in San Pedro, Laguna, it
is not physically impossible for him to have gone to Pasig, Metro Manila,
xxx considering that he had an available means of transportation. The distance
between San Pedro, Laguna where the accused claimed he was at the time
On October 27, 1990, during the police line-up at the San Juan Police the robbery took place, and Pasig, Metro Manila, where the crime was
Station…she positively identified herein accused Elmer Vergara as the committed, is less than an hour drive by car and can easily be reached by
armed man who pointed the gun at her after he approached the left side of one who, like the accused Elmer Vergara, had a car available to him.6
the car and wearing an army fatigue uniform with black hat and who got
her car keys, thereafter, she executed another statement implicating Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated the case to the Court of
accused Elmer Vergara as one of the four armed men who robbe[d] her. Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18318, on the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner committed the crime charged against him. The appeal was
On March 16, 1994, during the hearing of the case, she (Catherine F. anchored on two grounds: (1) the alleged dubious identification of Vergara
Manalo) again pointed to accused Elmer Vergara to be one of the by the private complainant, and (2) failure of the trial court to appreciate
robbery/hold-up gang members (HULIDAP), who took the payroll money of Vergara’s alibi that he was on an intelligence mission in San Pedro, Laguna
the J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., and her gold necklace, his at the time the alleged robbery, specially in view of the corroboration of his
participation being that of the person who pointed the gun at her and got alibi by his commanding officer.
34
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Finding no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, the perpetrators of the robbery twice, without any presumptions or
the Court of Appeals affirmed Vergara’s conviction. The appellate court suggestion from the police at the line-up or the court at the trial.
said:
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to contradict his alibi. He
In the case at bench (sic), the prosecution had proven the identity of submits that the prosecution failed to prove that he had a car available to
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the testimonies of him, or that he drove one from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig, Metro Manila.
prosecution witnesses Villanueva and Manalo. Appellant failed to Petitioner further insists that the trial court’s finding that the place where
controvert the testimony of prosecution witness Villanueva that accused- the crime was committed is less than an hour’s drive by car and can easily
appellant was pointed to by witness Manalo out of nine (9) persons. Thus, be reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car available to him, is
the trial court had no reason to consider the identification made by witness erroneous and unsupported by the evidence on record.
Manalo in the police station as one that stemmed from a suggestive
identification procedure used by the police.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro,
Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila, because it is capable of unquestionable
The trial court was correct in regarding the difference in height as a minor demonstration, and nowadays is already of public knowledge, especially to
matter. What is vital is that the witness recognized accused in the line-up commuters.11 We find no error in the trial court’s finding that it was not
and reiterated her identification of accused-appellant in open court. In the impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi
absence of ill-motive on her part to testify falsely against accused-appellant, that he was engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same
the trial court is correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of afternoon of October 19, 1990.
witness Manalo.7
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. He must further
the appellate court in its resolution of March 26, 1997. demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.12 It is essential
that credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner now submits to this Court the
be at the scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable
following sole assignment of error:
alibi.13Petitioner failed to meet this test. While petitioner could have been
working as intelligence agent in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 –21,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE 1990, contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT CATHERINE MANALO been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime.
THAN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND HIS WITNESS AND
CONSEQUENTLY FURTHER ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
Petitioner’s insistence that he had no vehicle available to him is not
CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8
supported by the testimony of his own commanding officer who testified in
petitioner’s defense, to wit:
The issue of whether or not the guilt of the accused had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt hinges, in our view, on the credibility of witnesses
FISCAL: CROSS EXAMINATION:
presented by the prosecution and the defense. Crucial in this regard is the
identification made by the complaining witness, Catherine Manalo, of the
petitioner, Sgt. Elmer T. Vergara, as one of the malefactors. Q: Mr. Witness, what mode of transportation did you take in going to
Laguna in (sic) October 19, 1990.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the contradictions in Catherine Manalo’s
testimony are not mere minor inconsistencies. According to petitioner, A: We used cars.
while private complainant below described him as around 5’6"-5’7" tall,
weighing about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military haircut; in truth, he is
Q: What vehicle?
only 5’3-1/2" tall, tips the scale at less than 150 lbs., and had long hair at
the time of the incident. Given these discrepancies, petitioner insists that
private complainant below must have been referring to another person and A: Toyota Corona ’78 model and a Galant, old model.
not to him.
Q: And in what particular vehicle did you yourself used?
Basically, petitioner’s contention raises questions of facts, which
traditionally fall within the province of the trial court and the Court of A: Toyota Corona and another car as a back-up vehicle.
Appeals. After reviewing the records of this case, we find no reason to
disturb the assessment of the trial court of all the pieces of evidence
submitted before it, particularly as its findings and conclusions had been xxx
affirmed by the appellate court.
Q: Who arrived ahead, your car or the car of the accused?
In this case, petitioner has been convicted on the basis of the positive
identification made by private complainant below. As the Court of Appeals A: We arrived together because we traveled not far with each other, we
stressed, petitioner was categorically identified by the private complainant maintained the distance of three to five meters, ma’m.
not just once, but twice, as one of the armed men who robbed her. The first
time was during the police line-up of nine (9) persons on October 27, 1990
and the second time was during her testimony in open court. The records Q: How many were you?
show that private complainant had no motive to falsely testify against
petitioner. We agree with the lower courts that the discrepancies in the A: Normally, up to nine members of the team, but in that operation I think,
private complainant’s description are not decisive. Her description was seven or six members, ma’m.
based on visual estimates, which cannot be expected to be perfect. What is
decisive is that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as one
xxx
of the robbers, not just once but twice, by private complainant, Catherine
Manalo. Her recollection of his description might suffer from imperfection
regarding his height, weight and personal appearance. But we note less. Q: Who were the companions of Vergara where he was riding?
Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant for seeing
the faces and features of their attackers, and remembering them.9 That A: It was Sgt. San Jose who was driving the car, together with Sgt. Magno
some variance as to petitioner’s height and weight might exist in her and Sgt. Rubi.
recollection, in comparison to his statistical measurement does not destroy
her credibility. That the trial court found this variance inconsequential does
not render its findings on the credibility of witnesses erroneous. Such Q: How about you, who were your companions?
findings are accorded great respect and will be sustained by the appellate
courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied A: I was with the other car, with a civilian driver, and I cannot recall anymore
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the whom I was with at the time.14
decision or affect the result of the case.10 Here, the important thing is that
complaining witness Catherine Manalo identified the petitioner as one of
35
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Nor was his commanding officer’s corroborative testimony of much help in Q: And in what particular place in Laguna was this suppose(d) surveillance
sustaining petitioner’s alibi, as shown by the following: that you will conduct?

FISCAL: A: I cannot recall the name of the street but I know the place, but the street
name and the exact number I cannot recall.
What is your basis that Vergara was with you at about 3:00 in the afternoon
of October 19, 1990? xxx

A: What do you mean basis? His physical presence in the area is my basis, Q: What place?
ma’m, that he was there.
A: I cannot recall.
Q: Do you keep an attendance record or attendance book of the members
of the team?
Q: What is the number?

A: We do not normally do it once we left for an operation, we believe it is


A: I cannot recall.
not necessary to account every minute every hour of the operation, so long
as we are in the area, target area and every body (sic) is posted on our
designated position, as soon as the signal is already given then that’s the Q: Who was the subject?
time we will respond or arrest the guy, but I can say that Sgt. Vergara never
left the place until the 21st of October, he was there in Pacita Complex, A: It was a certain alias German, ma’m.
ma’m.

xxx
Q: In other cases where you conducted surveillance do you maintain a
logbook?
COURT:

A: The log book is filled up only, I mean we do the logging prior and after
the operation, that’s the time we placed the preparations or extent of our Is a certain Nicasio Custodio y Abrera a member of your team?
operation, that’s the time we entered this in the log book and when we
returned from the operation, we also registered about the result of the A: I think during that time.
operation.
xxx
xxx
COURT:
Q: You do not likewise keep a call or make a roll call or keep attendance
record?
On October 19, 1990, will you recall if he was with you?

A: It is automatic ma’m, everytime, during the operation we see to it that


all the persons were in the area at the time we registered ourselves in the A: I cannot recall, your honor.16
logbook.
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of time and place
Q: In your team, who in particular is assigned to keep track of the be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must
attendance? not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.17 1âwphi1
A: Being the team leader, I am the one in charge to keep the movements of
every members (sic) of the team, but when I left on 19th October
proceeding to Makati, I specifically gave instructions to maintain the In the light of private complainant’s positive identification of petitioner as
operation and see to it that they have new informations (sic) or new the perpetrator of the crime, the latter’s defense of bare denial and alibi
development of the case they have to call me by radio so that I can come must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative
back in the area, that was the instruction to the assistant team leader testimony.18Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
whenever I left the area. of positive identification of the accused.19 Further, an alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the petitioner by a credible witness who
has no motive to testify falsely.20
Q: So I understand that you do not go with the members of the team during
the whole period or duration of the surveillance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
A: Sometimes, ma’m, there are instances. In that particular instance I left the petitioner.
my men at about 1130 in the evening of 19th October, I left my team and
back again in the early morning of 20 October.15
SO ORDERED.

There were far too many glaring lapses in the testimony of petitioner’s
corroborative witness for petitioner’s alibi to be given much weight, thus:

Q: And what was that particular mission in San Pedro, Laguna on October
19, 1990?

A: We were supposed to conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of our


informant, an errand boy of the subject pusher.

Q: Do you know the name of that informant?

A: I cannot recall.

xxx
36
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

13. Nonetheless, while we do not discount


ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so
DIVISION) and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES hold that the exercise of his correlative powers to
G.R. No. 161602 both investigate and initiate the proper action for
July 13, 2010 the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of
ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were
ABAD, J.: amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said date,
the Ombudsman is without authority
to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We,
This case is about the Ombudsmans authority to conduct however, uphold his authority to investigate cases
preliminary investigation in a forfeiture case where the petitioner allegedly for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten
amassed ill-gotten wealth before February 25, 1986. and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before
the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general
The Facts and the Case investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic
Act No. 6770.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired And, although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the
property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil
Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as well as against Case 0167 in line with the Courts ruling in the above-cited Republic and
Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and other cases that followed.
Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) 1379.[1] The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes claim that
they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They
the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a speedy disposition of admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last
their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c) known residence at the time it was conducted.[11] The Republic categorically
prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On September 11, 2002 insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 Romualdezes.[12]
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA revolution of
preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings.[2] They claim that February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against
since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the them. While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of the
Ombudsman should have first conducted a previous inquiry similar to Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in
preliminary investigations in criminal cases before the filing of the case 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things shall have
pursuant to Section 2 of the law.[3] stabilized.[13] The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the peoples
ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled the return
In its Comment[4] on the motion, the Republic pointed out that to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the
the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena
investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820[5] and issued on January 22, 1992 a served on them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny
resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter to the Office of having received.
the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the
On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a investigation of the Romualdezes cases when they did not show up despite
resolution,[6] denying the Romualdezes March 31, 2003 motion. It also notice being sent to them at their last known residence.As the Court held in
denied by resolution on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for a case:
reconsideration.[7] Thus, the Romualdezes filed the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayans rulings The New Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of
preliminary investigation is conducted in their case. the proceedings [in the preliminary investigation]
the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to
The Question Presented reach him were made, and an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of the complainant is
The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91- block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to
0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases. thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding
themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.[14]
The Ruling of the Court
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the
The Romualdezes point out that the Office of the Ombudsman conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since its authority
to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before that date.[8] Since
the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their
case as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to conduct SO ORDERED.
the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the absence of a prior
valid preliminary investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167
cannot continue.

In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the


Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their absence. The
spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that
investigation took place. They were thus denied their right to be heard in
that investigation.

But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out,


quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Ombudsman has under its
general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases
where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February 25,
1986. Thus:
37
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

14. As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364 and No. C-32979,
G.R. No. 160684 which were registered in the name Madulid, Sr., which in tum stemmed
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, from TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460.
vs.
HI-GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through
TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368 to
the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF METRO
No. 1374.
MANILA, DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY , and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486, which
was subdivided into smaller lots.
PEREZ, J.:
TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261.
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo
Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which measures 1,660.26 TCT No. 5261 stemmed from TCT No. 4211.
hectares, stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and Malabon,
covered by five (5) mother titles or Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the mother title.
the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on,
smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different
persons. Several subsequent subdivisions, consolidations, and one Version of CLT
expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to
the name "Land of caveat Emptor"1 one of these disputed lots was lot 26, CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue ofa Deed of
the property subject of this litigation. Absolute Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988,
executed by the former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision2 and
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770 dated 18 June CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious
2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively, which annulled petitioner CLT based on the following:
Realty Development Corporation's (CLT) TCT No. T-177013 and affirmed Hi-
Grade Feeds Corporation's (Hi-Grade) TCTs No. 237450 and No. T-146941.
1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to have been
derived from OCT No. 994;
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CL T and Hi-
Grade, which prompted CL T to file a case for Annulment of Transfer
Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the 2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing and in due
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil form, on file with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City,
Case No. C-15463 against Hi-Grade. contains dilapidated pages and no longer contains the pages
where Lot No. 26 and some other lots are supposedly inscribed.

Version of Hi-Grade
3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No. 994, it can
be seen that the technical descriptions of the lots and the
Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land certificate itself are entirely written in the English language. On
covered by TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941, derived from TCT No. 4211 of the other hand, the technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal, registered under the names No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 are still inscribed in the
of Alejandro Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio ), which is a Spanish language.
derivative title of OCT No. 994, the mother title.4
4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the mother
Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-Grade, it is averred title of TCT No. 4211, i.e., 8-27 September, 4-21 October and 17-
that TCT No. 4211 was registered under the names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 18 November 1911, are not indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No.
9 September 1918. Later, Lot 26 was sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), 5261, and No. 35486. Rather, an entirely different date, 22
which resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 4211 and its replacement by December 1917, is indicated at the end of the Spanish technical
TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of Gonzalez.5 descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
35486.
Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. 35486, registered under the name of his surviving spouse Rufina Narciso 5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No. 4211, No.
Vda. De Gonzalez. The land covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into 5261, and No. 35486 is not identified by a lot number and there
seven (7) lots under subdivision plan Psd-21154. By virtue of Psd-21154, TCT is no reference or mention of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate in
No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new titles were issued, TCTs No. the technical description of said titles.
1368 to No. 1374, registered under the children of Gonzalez.
6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCTs
In 194 7, the Government expropriated the seven lots.6 By virtue of the No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 covering the subdivision of
expropriation, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 were cancelled and replaced by Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.
TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842. Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated
Subdivision Plan Psd (LRC) Pcd-1828, the Government consolidated the
titles and then further subdivided the property into 77 lots. 7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered by TCT
No. 35486 (formerly covered by TCT No. 4211, then TCT No.
5261), could not be traced at the official depository of plans,
One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under which is the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). According to the
TCTs No. 23027 to No. 23028, which was further subdivided into Lot-A and EDPS Listings of the Records Management Division of the LMB,
17-B, pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-276839. One of the properties in there is no record of Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS listings indicate
dispute is Lot 17-B, which was later on registered in the name of Jose those records which were surveyed after the Second World War.
Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979, which was later on sold It appears, from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154 was
to Hi-Grade. done after the war on 15, 21, 29 September and 5-6 October
1946.
Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation and subdivision
of the Maysilo Estate into 77 lots, is Lot No. 52, which was registered in the 8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No. 1368 to No.
name of Inocencio Alvarez (Alvarez) under TCT No. 7363. Soon after, Alvarez 1374 show that the tie points deviated from the mother lot's tie
sold Lot No. 52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No. 7363 was cancelled and TCT No. 7364 point, which is the Bureau of Lands Location Monument
was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr. sold the lot to Hi-Grade. ("BLLM") No. 1, Caloocan. Instead, different location
This is another one of the properties in dispute. monuments of the adjoining Piedad Estate were used. The tie
point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad Estate; while TCTs
No. 1369 and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8, Piedad Estate; and TCTs
No. 1371, No. 1372, No. 1373, and No. 1374 used B.M. No. 7,
38
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Piedad Estate. The changing tie points resulted in the shifting of Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated the case to the
the position of the seven lots in relation to the mother lot, using Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a
their technical descriptions inscribed on the face of the titles. Motion to Admit and Take Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate
Thus, when plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the
boundary of the mother lot. The same is true when the lots
Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and
described on the titles of Hi-Grade are plotted on the basis of
Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate
their technical descriptions inscribed on the titles.
Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in a
Resolution9 dated 31 August 1998. Included in the Resolution, however, is
9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities, inconsistencies, and a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes judicial notice of the
irregularities indicating that it is a falsified document Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings and
representing a fictitious title and is, therefore, null and void. The Conclusions therein. .10
fact was confirmed by an examination by the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, which
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
concluded that TCT No. 4211 was prepared only sometime in the
Republic and in representation of the Administrator of the Land
1940s and not in 1918, as it is made to appear on the face of the
Registration Authority, filed a Petition for Intervention dated 25 August
document. Thus, the series of titles from where Hi-Grade's titles
1998. The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as it is pursuant
were derived, starting from TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of registration
35486, and up to and including the titles of HiGrade, are also
and to protect the Assurance Fund, in connection with which it can initiate
necessarily null and void.
necessary actions for the annulment of titles irregularly and fraudulently
issued. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG motion. The Court of Appeals
During trial, CL T presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramon Velazquez resolved the issue on intervention in the appealed Decision dated 18 June
(Velazquez), Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Records Section, Records 2003. According to the Court of Appeals, due to the magnitude and
Management Division of the LMB, who testified that the LMB does not have significance that will affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens system,
a copy of Psd 21154; (2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr. (Vasquez), Deputy Register the State has sufficient interest in the case.
of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified the various titles relevant to the
case; (3) Juanita Bustalino (Bustalino), a licensed Geodetic Engineer, who
Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled
testified that CL T engaged his services to survey the subject property and
as baseless the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of CL T's witnesses,
discovered that there was an overlap between CLT's and HiGrade's titles;
Vasquez and Bustalino, on the alleged patent infirmities and defects in TCT
(4) Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, one of the counsel of CLT; and (5) Aida
No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and Bustalino never
R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist of the Forensic Division, National
testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the
Bureau of Investigation, who examined the titles as an expert witness.
registration procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and
Bustalino are incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land
On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid, registration at that time. Reversing the Decision of the RTC, the Decision of
counsel for and stockholder of Hi-Grade, and son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, the Court of Appeals reads:
Jose Madulid, Sr., who testified that his family has been occupying the
subject properties under the concept of an owner for more than twenty-
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
seven (27) years, until the properties were transferred to HiGrade.
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING CLT's complaint a quo and
upholding the validity of TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941 of appellant Hi-
The Ruling of the RTC Grade Feeds Corporation.

After trial, the RTC7 ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's Appellant CL T is further ordered to surrender its owner's duplicate copy of
title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from TCT No. T-177013 to the Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City who is hereby
patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the directed to effect its cancellation.
subject properties, it is not considered as a conclusive proof of ownership.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC dated 27 December 1995
The other incidents are resolved as above indicated.
reads:

No pronouncements as to costs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff CL T REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORP. and against defendants HI-GRADE FEEDS CORP. et. SO ORDERED.11
al., ordering
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition to the
1. TCT Nos. 237450 and 146941 in the name of the defendant factual issues raised in the trial court, the Petition raised the following
null and void and accordingly ordering their cancellation; arguments:

2. defendant to vacate the portion of Lot No. 26 presently I. The Court of Appeals went beyond the issues resolved by the
occupied by it and turn over possession of the same to the trial court and formulated its own issue regarding the date when
plaintiff; and OCT No. 994 was originally registered which it resolved on the
basis of extraneous purported evidence not presented before
the trial court in the instant case, in violation of petitioner CLT
3. defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Realty' process of law.

SO ORDERED.8
II. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily, arbitrarily and blindly
disregarded the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court
Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on arrived at after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented
the grounds of newly discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in by the parties and established on record and substituted and
the court's appreciation of evidence and factual findings based on the supplanted the same with its own conclusions based on
decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT v. Sta. Nino extraneous evidence not presented and admitted in evidence
Kapitbahayan Association. " The R TC denied the motion for utter lack of before the trial court.
merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sta. Nino is
not a newly-discovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to
III. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
produce such evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence. HiGrade' s
despite the fact that respondent Hi-Grade has failed to present
reliance in the aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the court in
evidence to refute the established fact that the alleged titles
Sta. Nino already reconsidered its decision and upheld the validity of CL T's
from where its alleged titles are derived from, i.e., the alleged
title.
TCT Nos. 4211, 5261, 35486 and 1368 to 1374, contain patent
and inherent technical defects and infirmities which render
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals them spurious, void and ineffective.
39
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

IV. The Court of Appeals unjustly made a wholesale rendition in taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of
its questioned decision despite the pendency of important presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court
prejudicial motions or incidents which it thereby either procee dm. gs sue h as cross-exami.n ati.o n.15
peremptorily resolved or rendered moot and academic, thus,
violating petitioner CL T Realty's right to due process of law.
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be
taken judicial notice of.
V. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on evidence
and surrendered the independence of the judiciary by giving full
CL T posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of
faith and credence to the findings and conclusions contained in
separation of powers when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This
the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 by taking judicial notice
contention is baseless. We adoft the pronouncements of this Court
of the same, which report was rendered pursuant to
in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:16
proceedings initia conducted without notice to petitioner CL T
Realty and thus in gross violation of its right to due process, and
was based on documents that were never authenticated. To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports
regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a
Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
VI. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the allegation
declaring as follows:
raised in the Republic's petitioner for intervention although the
State has no legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation
of the instant case and may not validly intervene in the instant Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the
case since the matter in litigation are admittedly privately findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
owned lands which will not revert to the Republic. are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by
the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports
cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
VII. The Court of Appeals blindly ignored the fact and worse,
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level
failed and refused to rule on the issue that respondent Hi-Grade
as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they
is guilty of forum-shopping for which reason the latter's appeal
were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the
before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed.12
courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented
in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly
Issues the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.17(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be
took judicial notice of the Senate Report examined and evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals
II. explained quite pointedly why the taking of judicial notice of the Senate
Report does not violate the republican principle. Thus:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
admitted the Office of the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court
III. is altogether a different matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of
Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 191 7, government on a justiciable matter which is properly before this Court for
is the valid title? adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the Senate committees
may be the appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of
Our Ruling the validity of a Torrens title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the
First, the incidental matters. latter has the competence to make such a determination and once final, the
same binds not only the parties but all agencies of government.18
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was
took judicial notice of the Senate Report CL T avers that taking judicial conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to
notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and CLT's determine the decision on the case.
right to due process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should not
be given any probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, considering that the Senate Report is II.
unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence. Contrary to the
mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report admitted the Office of the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
was not put to proof and CL T was deprived of the opportunity to conduct
a cross-examination on the Senate Report. And it is also contended that the
The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or fake titles
right of CL T to due process was violated because the proceedings in the
covering the infamous Maysilo Estate poses a serious threat to the integrity
Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the admission in
of the Torrens system and the Assurance Fund. The Republic asserts that
evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored principle of
because it is bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of the Torrens
separation of powers as it is an encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive
system and Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in the present
to the courts.
case. In granting the intervention, the Court of Appeals ruled that
considering the magnitude and significance of the issues spawned by the
CL T misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well Maysilo Estate, enough to affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens
within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on system, the Republic is allowed to intervene.
Evidence provides:
CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's intervention is
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial baseless. According to CL T, the Republic has no legal interest in the
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial properties as the subject properties are not public lands and as such, will
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of not revert to the Republic. Further, there is no threat or claim against the
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the Assurance Fund. Anchoring on Presidential Decree No. 478 and
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Administrative Code of 1987, CL T claims that the only action which the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial Office of the Solicitor General may file on behalf of the Republic in
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, connection with registered lands is an action for the reversion to the
and the geographical divisions. (la) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon, as
well as lands held in violation of the Constitution.19
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to This time, we agree with CLT.
them;13 it is the duty of the court to assume something as a matter of fact
without need of further evidentiary support.14 Otherwise stated, by the
40
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in Sections
CA,20 CLT argues that the Petition for Intervention was time-barred for 41and42 of the Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:
having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court
Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the
clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already been
clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court to the
submitted for decision, when judgment has been rendered, or when
register of deeds for the province, or provinces or city in which the land lies,
judgment has already became final and executory. And, intervention is only
and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called
allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.
the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order,
shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of
Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and
power to suspend its own rules and procedure in lieu of substantial justice shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x
and for compelling reasons,21 the attendant circumstances are not availing
in the present case.
Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An registration book, "original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree
indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect
plaintiffs or defendants.22 Here, even without the Republic as participant, a upon the date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates
final determination of the issues can be attained. relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled "Transfer
from number" (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the
same land), and also the words "Originally registered" (date, volume, and
Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held in Carino v.
page of registration). (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Ofilada23 that it may be allowed only before or during trial. The term trial is
used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the introduction of evidence
by both parties. The period of trial terminates when the judgment begins. Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree
As this case was already in its appeal stage when intervention was sought, registering OCT No. 994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while on
it could no longer be allowed. the other hand, OCT No. 994 was received for transcription by the Register
of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date which should be reckoned as
the date of registration of the title is the date when the mother title was
CL T further avers that because there was no claim against the Assurance
received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly found by the Court of
Fund, intervention is improper. Section 95 of P.D. 1529 provides for the
Appeals:
grounds when a party can claim against the Assurance Fund:

For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CL T no less
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without
and marked as its Exhibit "D'', shows on its face that the date April 19, 191
negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any
7 refers to the issuance of the decree of registration by the Honorable
estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under
Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 191 7 pertains to the date when the
the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original registration of
same decree was "Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of
land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
Deeds.26
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in
the registration book, and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or
otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from bringing an action Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of
for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages
to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
The derivative title, TCT No. 4211

Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing party may file a
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, CL T failed to prove by
claim against the Assurance Fund as the present case involves the operation
preponderance of evidence, the alleged defects and infirmities in TCT No.
of the Torrens system. However, the action to claim against the Assurance
4211, the title from whence Hi-Grade's titles were derived.
Fund may be dealt with in a separate proceeding.

CLT failed to prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the registration
Now, the merits of this case.
procedures at the time it was prepared. Contrary to the findings of the trial
court, the Court cannot give credence to the testimony of CL T's witnesses,
Parenthetically, although the general rule is that the factual findings of the Vasquez27 and Bustalino.28 Vasquez is the Deputy Register of Deeds of
trial court are accorded respect and are not generally disturbed on appeal, Caloocan City, while Bustalino is a Geodetic Engineer. For their testimonies
the aforesaid rule does not apply in the case at bar, as the findings of the to matter, CL T must first establish their competence as regards the
trial court and the appellate court are contradictory.24 registration rules in land registration in 1918, at the time TCT No. 4211 was
prepared. CL T failed to discharge such burden.
We shall now discuss the bottom issues.
On CLT's allegation that the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) has no
records of Psd 21154, we note that CL T did not prove that the LMB indeed
III.
has no such records. CL T's witness, Velasquez, merely testified that

Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917,
he cannot ascertain whether or not Psd 21154 was burned or lost during
is the valid title?
the world war.29 Just as important, while Psd 21154 could not be located, it
was not only testified to that it may have been lost or burned during the
The mother title, OCT 994 world war; a blue print copy of the same is being kept in the vault of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
The arguments of the parties come from apparently the same document.
Notably, however, the parties' OCTs No. 994 contain different dates of As regards the findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist on the age of TCT No.
registration, namely: 4211, the Court of Appeals correctly found that such findings are
inconclusive because the Chemist did not conclusively state that TCT No.
CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917 4211 could not have been prepared in 1918.30 Also, the Chemist, in her
cross-examination, admitted that she did not know who supplied her copies
of the TCTs and that she has not seen any standard document dated 1918.31
Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917

On the matter regarding the discrepancy between the dates of survey and
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title issuance, tie points, and language used in TCT No. 4211 and OCT No. 994,
covering the same property. The date of registration is reckoned from the CL T's contention must fail for the obvious reason that the basis of CLT's
time of the title's transcription in the record book of the Registry of allegation is the non-existent mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
Deeds.25Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title refers to the
41
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Thus, as OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 has been established as null and
void, it cannot serve as precedent for ascertaining the genuineness ofTCT
No. 4211.

What matters most in this case is that CL T questioned the title of HiGrade
for the purpose of having CL T's own title upheld. Instead of establishing the
genuineness of its own title, CLT attacked Hi-Grade's titles.

However, CL T failed to establish the chain of titles linking its TCT No. T-
177013 to the mother title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the
"circumstances under which its predecessor-in-interest acquired the whole
of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. Ironically, it is even by CL T's presentation
of OCT No. 994 and of the succession of titles previous to those held by
appellant Hi-Grade that the latter's titles [was] established as genuine
derivative titles of OCT No. 994."32

Indeed, CL T's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the alleged weakness of the evidence of Hi-
Grade.1avvphi1 As already shown, such allegation was proven wrong by
documents on records.

As opposed to CLT's evidence on the alleged infirmities in HiGrade's titles,


Hi-Grade presented muniments of title, tax declarations or realty tax
payments, on the subject properties.33 While tax declarations and receipts
are inconclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land, they
are prima facie proof of ownership or possession and may become the basis
of a claim for ownership when it is coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property.34 In the case at bar, Hi-Grade is the actual possessor of the
subject property.35

To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles linking its titles,
TCTs No. 237450 and T-14691, to the derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the
mother title, OCT No. 994.36 As borne by the records, TCT No. 4211 was
registered as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9 September 1918.37 On
the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-17994,38 was registered also as a
derivative title of OCT No. 994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the
reference of both parties is OCT No. 994, but with different dates: CLT's OCT
No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917, while Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May
1917.

This factual issue of which OCT No. 994 is genuine is not a novel matter. This
Court, in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice,39 citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation,40 exhaustively passed upon and ruled
that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was dated 3 May 1917, not 19 April
1917.

In the recent case of Syjuco v. Republic of the Philippines,41 this Court,


reiterated the rulings in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice42 and Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, that the true and valid
OCT No. 994 was registered on 3 May 1917, not on 19 April 1917, and that
any title that traces its source from OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 191 7, is
deemed void and inexistent.43

As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its source to a void title,
is also void. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. Nemo potest plus
Juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. All titles that trace its source to
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, are therefore void, for such mother title
is inexistent.44 CLT so traces its title to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 191 7, the
title of CL T is void.45

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and


Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT
Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila, District III " dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October
2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
42
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

15. Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was
DIGEST appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration
Avelina A. Magno; Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB, administrator-appellant, vs.
Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador Guzman, Belcesar
Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado, Graciano Lucero, Ariteo
Thomas Jamir, Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala, At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the
Winifredo Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, facts, convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up
and Avelina A. Magno, appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc., a modus operandi to settle money matters (a settlement with records the
movant-appellee Court never saw)—which, however, went awry, with more and more heirs
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J. from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas!
*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Much much
was clueless as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings. later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to
(!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78 assignment of errors! We’ll probably read the case all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon
again in Spec Pro. Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other
heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her
capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances).
Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century
For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to
and died leaving substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus
which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as
died 5 years before the husband, providing in her will that while her estate offices, which were among the estate’s properties.
would go to him, upon his death, the remainder should pass to her siblings.
(They were childless.) The court held that this testamentary provision, while
probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code, is not actually a
substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though the
passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to PCIB’s Claims
depend on a resolutory condition (the husband’s death). Case was
remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper application Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the
of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between Philippines and Texas law), order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic
and the proper distribution of Linnie’s, Charles’, and their conjugal estates. validity of its testamentary provisions.

Facts:  Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.


Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas,  Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person
USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict
for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix,
her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine
Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to law) should govern the testamentary dispositions and
her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers successional rights over movables, and the law of the situs of the
and sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the
sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place. Philippines) as regards immovables.
 Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in
the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed
 Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community
Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to
estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally
continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and between them. Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of
to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal
transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of
administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal
Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, partnership.
Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order  The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate,
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be
(Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or
included. emoluments accruing after her death. “All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges)
and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire."
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was  Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as
August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least
question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly
spouse, he answered: affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is
entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of
“None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying legitime. (Article 886)
debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the  Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane
surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75%
property and interests of the deceased in their Community percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way
estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and
determined and paid.” income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of
Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
 In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate,
Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He
operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his
estate, which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and
employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for
43
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his
death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets
were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
assets.
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
 As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a
the estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s estate at will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
the time of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default
referred to “all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles death. The substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets. Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs
 There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
(1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that
four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do
C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as
a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event
heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so.
None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore,
the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of
the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void. Manresa even said, “when another heir is designated to Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of
inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to
have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the Charles during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the
testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
testator.” restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any
 The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal
rights to ¼ of the conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim impediment to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the
against the estate of Charles. legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the
 It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
claiming to be merely in continuation of the Hodges’ businesses, descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
and which corresponding deeds of sale were confirmed by the
probate court, are null and void and should be subject to
reconveyance.
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIB’s claims
Avelina’s Claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of Linnie’s estate. While he may have
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her used language like “herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of
capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.) probated… there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining herein account to be given notice,” he would’ve
 Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over
all her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very
title over the same estate, to her relatives. motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even
 After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of moved to include Roy’s name included in the probate court’s order, lest
the will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written Roy’s heirs think that they had been omitted.
declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct. Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wife’s
 Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his
Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has death, more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never considered the
been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’ whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing
same amount of rents, emoluments and income. the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so
much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his
Issue:
lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void? – NO
desire, as intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming that he did
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? – REMAND!
pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the
basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent
Reasoning:
with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that
under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the
1. To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s testamentary applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole
substitution, when viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate
correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnie’s will provides neither for a simple to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever
or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue
substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the
authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles’
testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter
intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes
to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed abroad, though they have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone referred to several times by the parties.
else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as
PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in settling Linnie’s estate,
inoperative and invalid. and his sole administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests,
making it difficult to properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB,
44
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be just and
proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the
after said estates have been segregated from each other. proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such
exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes"
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges
Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the
Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and
Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the sisters;
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally
succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB
being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership
Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her
automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her
original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends
will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also
that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnie’s brothers constructions of Linnie’s will should be adhered to by the trial court in its
and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two
conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina estates in question.
further maintained that, in any event, Charles had renounced his rights
under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents Disposition
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and
significance of which PCIB questioned. of Charles’ alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnie’s will. Avelina
remains to be the administrator of Linnie’s estate. The said estate consists
of ¼ of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of
Linnie’s death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his
submitted by the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the
an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and
(Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB
therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters and Avelina should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently
should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings from each other, as administrators.
thereafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating
and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance
with her duly probated will.

Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership


properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application
of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not
inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in
regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the
other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory
to or inconsistent with them.

The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court
below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for
more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from
Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of


the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is
imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made
by Charles after Linnie’s death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates
without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether
his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of
his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after
the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was
as follows:

(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties,


whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be
considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges'
inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May
27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales
or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which
include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of
any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;
45
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

16. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this
___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.
G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009
(sgd.) (sgd.)
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
vs.
LESSOR LESSEE
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.

DECISION (sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
NACHURA, J.: LESSEE

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1(1) reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 04- (sgd.) (sgd.)
0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the 1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case
No. 2001-315.3 Republic of the Philippines)
City of Manila)s.s.
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua
(Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally
at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, appeared the following persons:
Parañaque City.
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on 2/1/99;
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Parañaque City on 11/11/99;
damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this
Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv p h ! 1 instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2)
instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free
The contract of lease reads: and voluntarily acts and deeds.

CONTRACT OF LEASE IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and
Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila,
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: Philippines.
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR, Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4
- and -

OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already
age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Parañaque City, and occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a
hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES. letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to
vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s
WITNESSETH demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that
lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy; by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read:
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor,
of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the following terms 1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two
and conditions, to wit: million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip
for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY
Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran
THOUSAND (₱60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to P[arañ]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms
unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of 6 yrs. Contract.
ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;
₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
contract to the LESSOR; FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric
consumptions in the said premises; (sgd.)
____________________
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the Ferdinand Chua
cubicles without a written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, 2. Received cash
however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall ₱500,000.00
return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses; From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary Rosalie Chua
conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of flammable or 12/10/99
____________________
combustible materials. Received by
3. Received cash
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it ₱70,000.00 from
falls due or violate any of the above conditions shall be enough Moshiera Latip
ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, (sgd.)
if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals 12-11-99 ____________________
for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in Received by:6
favor of the LESSOR. Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered
for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December
_____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005. the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted
Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still
46
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at
payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to
building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles. occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA
disposed of the case:
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished,
Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby
other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Parañaque City Branch 274 dated
had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January
Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
SO ORDERED.9
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons
claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be
subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building ejected from the leased cubicles.
situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the
Baclaran, Parañaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY
ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of
[Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the
(₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to
lessor.
December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to We disagree.
December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every
succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking
of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial
ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
(₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) per
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
[Rosalie’s] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
this suit.
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
SO ORDERED.7 and the geographical divisions.
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice
Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the functions.
signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of
Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease
contracts. negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material


The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2)
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice
lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this
down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period. assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
[MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the matters which are "commonly" known.
former –
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages; be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages; accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
appearance as and for attorney’s fees; and
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
(4) costs of suit. understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.11
SO ORDERED.8
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 which
RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract cited State Prosecutors:
of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized,
remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice
47
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latip’s admission that they
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready brisk sales during the holiday season.
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questionable. On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts
amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial
be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non- Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
knowledge.1avvphi1 different from those which the parties intended to agree.
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took adequate to render it effectual.
judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor
in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease.
knowledge" or notoriously known. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was
payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity,
allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:
₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before 1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos)
the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,]
lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on Baclaran P[arañ]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs.
evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, Contract.
specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form
of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed ₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
by the parties.
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, (sgd.)
to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to ____________________
be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules Ferdinand Chua
of Court – What need not be proved. 2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the From Moshiera Latip
practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State (sgd.)
Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power Rosalie Chua
to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable 12/10/99
____________________
doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice Received by
to be promptly resolved in the negative. 3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from Moshiera Latip
the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence (sgd.)
signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing 12-11-99 ____________________
payment of ₱2,570,000.00. Received by:14
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were
of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of
executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had
the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in varying
been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount
amounts. The first receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2)
of ₱2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:
cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were
of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00
building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained
Baclaran, Parañaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered
is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by
2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000,
of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another a full year after the commencement of the lease.
agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip
the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution
can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for
of the latter is unclear.13
unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the
We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of
agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which ₱2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this
is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
likewise did not sign the other two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
₱70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie.
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The
Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane
petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent
Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s consent. The
Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already
findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
received by her as advance rentals. No costs. SO ORDERED.
48
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

17. face continuous danger to their detriment and


NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SANGGUNIANG prejudice;
BARANGAY, BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAAQUE CITY, ROBERTO
GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS PUNONG BARANGAY and MEMBERS OF 13. When the residents bought their
THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY residential properties, they also paid proportionately
G.R. No. 156686 for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They
July 27, 2011 have therefore an existing equity on these roads. To
open the roads to public use is a violation of the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and
healthful environment;
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court against the Decision[1] dated October 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV 14. Aside from the availability of a better
No. 65559 and the Resolution[2] dated January 17, 2003, both of the Court route to be opened, there are other ways to ease
of Appeals. traffic flow. The continuous presence of traffic
enforcers on all identified traffic choke points will
The facts are as follows: prevent snarls which impede smooth travel. The
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations
BSV Sangguniang Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096[3] on should be done;
October 13, 1998, entitled Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners
Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and 15. There are a lot of undisciplined drivers
Pedestrian Traffic, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: of tricycles, jeepneys, trucks and delivery [vans],
which contribute to the traffic congestion. The
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is barangay should require these drivers to observe
hereby resolved by the Sangguniang Barangay in road courtesy and obedience to traffic rules[.][9]
session assembled that

1. Pursuant to its power and Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued
authority under the Local Government Code of 1991 a Temporary Restraining Order[10] (TRO) in Civil Case No. 98-0420 on
(Rep. Act No. 7160), the New Sun Valley October 30, 1998. Said Order provides:
Homeowners Association (NSVHA) is hereby directed
to open Rosemallow and Aster Sts. to vehicular Acting on the Application for Writ of
(private cars only) and pedestrian traffic at all hours Preliminary Injunction/ Permanent Injunction with
daily except from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. at which time the Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
said streets may be closed for the sake of the security Order, filed by plaintiff and considering that there is
of the residents therein. extreme urgency, such that unless the same is issued,
plaintiff would suffer grave injustice and/or
2. The Barangay government irreparable injury, let a Temporary Restraining Order
take steps to address the security concerns of the issue directing the Sangguniang Barangay as
residents of the area concerned, including the represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra
possible assignment of a barangay tanod or traffic to cease and desist from the implementation of
enforcer therein, within the limits of the authority Resolution No. 98-096 or otherwise maintain the
and financial capability of the Barangay. status quo until further Orders of this Court.

3. This Resolution shall become This Temporary Restraining Order shall be


executory within 72 hours upon receipt hereof by the effective for seventy two (72) hours from issuance
Association or any of its members.[4] hereof, unless extended by another Order of this
Court.

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), Let this case be set for special raffle and
represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition[5] for a Writ of conference on November 3, 1998 at 10:30 in the
Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of morning.
TRO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 98-0420. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation
of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would cause grave injustice and irreparable On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order[11] stating
injury as [the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly that, by agreement of the parties, the status quo shall be maintained for
residential purposes;[6] that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners seventeen (17) more days, and that the case was set for hearing on the
envisioned would provide them privacy and a peaceful neighborhood, free prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on November 20,
from the hassles of public places;[7] and that the passage of the Resolution 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
would destroy the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that
contrary to what was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition[12] on November 13,
of the subdivision would not in any manner ease the traffic congestion in 1998, at about 11:10 a.m., wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang
the area, and that there were alternative routes available. According to Barangay had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster
NSVHAI, the opening of the proposed route to all kinds of vehicles would Streets (the subject roads). NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended
result in contributing to the traffic build-up on Doa Soledad Avenue, and Petition its Position Paper[13] dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its
that instead of easing the traffic flow, it would generate a heavier volume objection to the opening of the subject roads for public use and argued that
of vehicles in an already congested choke point. NSVHAI went on to state a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject
that a deterioration of the peace and order condition inside the subdivision roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an
would be inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in the act.[14]
residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the
subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to
of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would Dismiss[15] likewise on November 13, 1998. The copy provided by petitioner
take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in question.[8] to the Court indicates the time of receipt by NSVHAI as 11:00 a.m.[16]
NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by submitting the
following arguments to the RTC: The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as scheduled,
and thereafter submitted the matter for decision.[17] On the same date, the
12. The road network inside the RTC issued the following Order[18]:
subdivision and drainage system is not designed to
withstand the entry of a heavy volume of vehicles Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a
especially delivery vans and trucks. Thus, destruction writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner, it
of the roads and drainage system will result. The appearing that petitioner may suffer grave injustice
safety, health and well-being of the residents will or irreparable injury, let a writ of preliminary
injunction issue prohibiting the Sangguniang
Barangay represented by Punong Barangay Roberto
49
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Guevarra from implementing Resolution no. 98-096 2. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby
until further orders from this Court. Granted for failure of the plaintiff to
exhaust the administrative
Petitioner is directed to file a bond in the remedies under Sections 32 and 57
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) of the Local Government Code.
PESOS (sic) to answer for damages to defendants in
the event the Court finds petitioner is not entitled to WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby ordered
said injunction. Dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby lifted.[21]
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998
a Motion for Reconsideration and to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction (with
Memorandum of Authorities).[19] NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] of the above-
quoted Order but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in
NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge on an Order[23] dated September 21, 1999.
December 10, 1998, moving to declare the above motion of the
BSV Sangguniang Barangay as a mere scrap of paper for being filed out of NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and the case
time and for failure to serve a copy thereof to the counsel of petitioner. was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65559. NSVHAI alleged that despite the
lack of the required hearing [24] and without any order requiring it to submit
The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in an Order[20] dated its Comment/Opposition to the BSV Sangguniang Barangays Motion to
August 17, 1999, stating as follows: Dismiss or that of submitting said Motion for resolution, Judge Bautista-
Ricafort issued an Order which, to NSVHAIs complete surprise, granted the
Defendant Barangay Sun Valley moves to Motion. NSVHAI argued that the RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of,
dismiss the instant case on the grounds that the and thereafter ruling on, said Motion and refusing to exercise jurisdiction
complaint states no cause of action and the court has over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 98-0420. Petitioner likewise argued
no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In summary, that the RTC committed serious errors which, if not corrected, would cause
defendant alleges that the subject streets Aster and grave or irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation of law.[25]
Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are owned
by the local government. Such streets have long been The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in his
part of the public domain and beyond the commerce capacity as Punong Barangay, and members of the Sangguniang
of man. In support of this, defendant cited the case Barangay (hereinafter, respondents), in their Appellees Brief, argued as
of White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA follows:
765 wherein it was held that road lots of subdivisions
constitute a part of the mandatory open space I
reserved for public use; ownership of which is
automatically vested in the Republic of the THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
Philippines although it is still registered in the name DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES MOTION TO DISMISS DUE
of the developer/owner, its donation to the TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND JURISPRUDENCE
government is a mere formality. The power or OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLANTS
authority to close or open the said streets is vested in FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
the local government units and not on homeowners AS NOTED BY THE COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE
associations, pursuant to Section 21 of the local MOTION TO DISMISS WAS EVER FILED BY
Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows: APPELLANT.
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local
government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, II
permanently or temporarily close or open any local
road, alley, park, or square falling within its THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION
jurisdiction x x x. In view thereof, Resolution No. 98- ASSAILING ITS SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY
096 was passed by the Sangguniang Barangay. Hence RESOLUTION NO. 98-096, CONSISTING OF A
there is no right whatsoever on the part of Plaintiff DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE
NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law. Further, ORGANIZATION WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, IS
defendant contends that petitioner failed to exhaust JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE COMPETENCE
administrative remedies as ordained in Sections 32 AND WISE DISCRETION OF THE BARANGAY OVER A
and 57 of the Local Government Code giving the city LOCAL TRAFFIC PROBLEM.
mayor the supervisory power, and the power of
review by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively. III

No opposition to the motion to dismiss THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SERIOUS
was filed by the Plaintiff. ERROR, PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND
BY THE COURT A QUO. IT IS APPELLANT THAT HAS
Same defendant seeks to reconsider the COMMITTED THE ERROR OF NOT EXHAUSTING
order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. HENCE, NO GRAVE OR
injunction alleging that there is a pending motion to IRREPARABLE INJURY CAN BE CAUSED TO APPELLANT
dismiss and Plaintiff has not been able to establish an FOR IT HAS NO RIGHT TO PROTECT.[26]
actually existing right.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was
thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte motion to simply a directive to petitioner, a private aggrupation of some self-seeking
expunge the motion for reconsideration on the homeowners,[27] and was just a measure of internal policy among residents;
ground that its counsel has not been furnished with that the opening of roads for traffic reasons was within the sole
a copy of the motion for reconsideration, but the competence of the barangay to determine;[28] and the Mayor could have
record shows that Maria Cortez (plaintiffs chosen, as it was within his power to do so, to cause the demolition of the
representative) has received a copy of said motion. gates, which were illegally built by petitioner and therefore were
obstructions on the road, even without
After considering the arguments of the a Barangay resolution. Respondents likewise claimed that the BSVs action
parties in their respective pleadings, this court could be considered a political question, which should be essentially
hereby resolves as follows: withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and constitutional law doctrine
provides that the courts would not interfere with political issues unless
1. The Motion for Reconsideration and grave abuse of discretion is shown, of which there was none on the part of
the Urgent Ex-parte Motion to the Barangay. Respondents argued that petitioner did not have any actual
Expunge (motion for legal right entitled to the protection of the law.[29]
reconsideration) are Denied being
devoid of merit; and Respondents attached to their Appellees Brief six documents,
labeled as Annexes 2 to 7, all stamped Certified True Copy by a certain
50
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Roman E. Loreto, Legal Officer II of Legal Department.[30] The detailed


information contained in each of the documents that comprise respondents
Annexes 2 to 7 is copied below: 6. Certification[36] dated October 26, 1998 issued by Ma. Riza
Pureza Manalese, Legal Researcher, Office of the Municipal
1. 1st Indorsement[31] from the Office of the Mayor of Paraaque Attorney, Paraaque City, which reads:
dated May 20, 1988, signed by Luzviminda A. Concepcion,
Administrative Officer II, stating as follows: This is to certify that based on the available records
Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. of this Office, road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision have
Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of this municipality the already been donated to the Municipality of
herein attached Original Copies of Transfer Paranaque as evidenced by TCT NO. 133552,
Certificate of Title for Sun Valley Open Space and 119836, and 122443.
Road Lots with TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443
for your appropriate actions. This certification is being issued upon the request
of MR. WILLIAM UY.
2. Letter[32] dated December 27, 1990 from Francisco B. Jose, Jr.,
Municipal Attorney of Paraaque, addressed to the Municipal
Council Secretary, which reads: The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002
This has reference to your request dated denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC dated August 17,
December 18, 1990 relative to the letter of inquiry of 1999 and September 21, 1999. The Court of Appeals likewise denied
the Barangay Captain of Barangay Sun Valley dated NSVHAIs Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution promulgated
December 13, 1990. on January 17, 2003, stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for
Reconsideration, it found no sufficient reason to deviate from its findings
We wish to inform you that based on the and conclusion reached in its decision.
available records of our office the open space and
road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision is already owned Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, petitioner) went to this Court.
by the Municipal Government of Paraaque as
evidenced by TCT NOS. 133552, 119836, and 122443. Arguments of Petitioner
Copies of which are hereto attached for your ready
reference. Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of Appeals was
based on facts that [were] outside of the original Petition and Amended
Considering that the Municipality of Petition and on supposed findings of facts that are not even evidence
Paraaque is the registered owner of the road lots of offered before the court a quo.[37] Petitioner likewise alleges that the facts
Sun Valley Subdivision, we are of the opinion that the used by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the case were contrary to the
roads become public in use and ownership, and records of Civil Case No. 98-0420.
therefore, use of the roads by persons other than
residents of the Subdivision can no longer be Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:
curtailed. However, should the Municipal
Government decides to delegate its right to regulate A
the use of the said roads to the Sun Valley
Homeowners Association or Sun Valley Barangay In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420,
Council, such right may be exercise[d] by said the Honorable Court of Appeals sanctioned the
association or council. departure of the Regional Trial Court from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings

3. Certification[33] dated October 8, 1990 issued by Francisco B. B


Jose, Jr. under the letterhead of the Office of the Municipal
Attorney of Paraaque, which reads: Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution
This is to certify that based on the available records promulgated January 17, 2003 and the Decision
of this Office, the open space and road lots of Sun promulgated October 16, 2002 by the Former
Valley Subdivision has been donated and now owned 4th Division and the 4th Division of the Court of
by the Municipality of Paranaque, as evidenced by Appeals sustaining the validity of dismissal of Civil
TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443 copies of Case No. 98-0420 is not in accord with law or with the
which are hereto attached. applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme
Court
This certification is being issued upon the request of
Mr. Mario Cortez, President of Sun Valley C
Homeowners Association.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, with
due respect, departed from the accepted and usual
4. Certification[34] dated June 13, 1994, again signed by Francisco course of judicial proceedings by making findings of
B. Jose, Jr., of the Office of the Municipal Attorney, providing as fact not supported by evidence of record[38]
follows:
This is to certify that based on the available records
of this Office, the only road lots in Sun Valley Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents Motion to
Subdivision titled in the name of the Municipality of Dismiss was set on November 20, 1998, without indication as to time and
Paraaque are those covered by Transfer Certificates that during the hearing on such date, counsel for respondents moved that
of Title Nos. 133552 and 122443. their Motion to Dismiss be heard over the objection of counsel for
petitioner, who explained that there was an urgency in ruling on the prayer
This certification is being issued upon the request of for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in view of the expiration
Coun. Manuel T. De Guia. of the temporary restraining order (TRO).[39]

Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)


5. Certification[35] dated March 2, 1995 issued by Rodolfo O. Alora, from the November 20, 1998 hearing before the RTC in the following
OIC, Asst. Municipal Legal Officer, which reads: manner:

This is to certify that based on the available records Atty. Herrera:


of this Office, the open space within Sun Valley
Subdivision has already been donated to the Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a motion
Municipality as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of petitioning to dismiss this instant case, which should
Title No. 119836, copy of which is hereto attached. be resolved first before hearing this case.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Nuez:


Atty. Rex G. Rico.
51
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Your Honor, please, with due respect to Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang
the opposing counsel, the hearing today is supposed Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution to open
to be on the presentation of petitioners evidence in the subject roads, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals should not
support of its prayer for preliminary injunction. In have relied on respondents claim of ownership, as this led to the erroneous
connection with the amended complaint, I guess it is conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner insists
a matter of right to amend its pleading. What that the supposed titles to the subject roads were never submitted to the
happened here, the amended petition was filed RTC, and the respondents merely attached certifications that the ownership
before this Honorable Court on November 13 at of the subject roads was already vested in the City Government of Paraaque
11:10 a.m. but I think the motion to dismiss was City as Annexes to their Appellees Brief before the Court of Appeals. Those
filed by the respondent on November 13 at 11:20 annexes, according to petitioner, were not formally offered as evidence.[49]
a.m.. Therefore, it is the right of the petitioner
insofar as the case is concerned. Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420 clearly
show that there was no proof or evidence on record to support the findings
And therefore, this Court should proceed of the Court of Appeals. This is because, allegedly, the dismissal of said case
with the hearing on the preliminary injunction was due to the grant of a motion to dismiss, and the case did not go to trial
instead of entertaining this matter. The temporary to receive evidence.[50] Petitioner avers that a motion to dismiss
restraining order will expire today and we have the hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.[51] In
right to be heard. adopting the annexes as basis for its findings of fact, the Court of Appeals
allegedly disregarded the rules on Evidence.
Court:
Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this
We will proceed first with the Court of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
hearing (referring to the scheduled hearing of the injunction:
prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction). (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-
November 20, 1998) (Underscoring and explanation 096 is repugnant to the proprietary rights of the
petitioners.)[40] affected homeowners who are members of
petitioner NSVHAI, such rights undoubtedly
Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the prayer for protected by the Constitution.
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and no hearing was conducted on
the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner reiterates its earlier claim that it did not As there is no proof otherwise (except the
receive an order requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to the baseless findings of fact by the Honorable Court of
Motion to Dismiss or informing it that said Motion had been submitted for Appeals) that the streets encompassed by the
resolution.[41] concerned subdivision, Sun Valley Subdivision, are all
private properties. As such, the residents of Sun
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 arose from Valley Subdivision have all the right to regulate the
the grant of respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner claims that it filed roads and open spaces within their territorial
its Amended Petition on November 13, 1998 at 11:10 a.m., or before jurisdiction.
respondents served any responsive pleading, or before they had filed their
Motion to Dismiss on the same date at about 11:20 a.m.[42] Petitioner avers This Honorable Supreme Court can take
that the filing of said Amended Petition was a matter of right under Section judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as
2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and had the effect of robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in
superseding the original petition dated October 28, 1998. Petitioner Philippine society. Residents have invested their
concludes that the Motion to Dismiss was therefore directed against a non- lifetimes savings in private subdivision since
existing Petition.[43] subdivision living afford them privacy, exclusivity and
foremost of all, safety. Living in a subdivision has a
Petitioner argues that the RTCs ruling on the Motion to Dismiss is contrary premium and such premium translates into a
to procedural law because no hearing was conducted on said Motion to comparatively more expensive lot because of the
Dismiss; that said motion violated Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of safety, among others, that subdivision lifestyle
Civil Procedure for failing to set the time of hearing thereof; and that offers.
instead of being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a mere
scrap of worthless paper.[44] But, with the enactment and intended
implementation of Sangguniang Barangay Resolution
Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before the RTC on No. 98-096 to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets for
November 20, 1998, both parties manifested that the Motion to Dismiss public use, it is indubitable that, instead of promoting
was never set for hearing, and that when Judge Bautista-Ricafort said, We the safety of resident of Sun Valley Subdivision,
will proceed first with the hearing,[45] she was referring to the scheduled respondents are endangering the life and property of
hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary the residents of the said subdivision as they will now
injunction. Petitioner claims that it is crystal clear that it was deprived due be exposed to criminal and lawless elements.
process when a ruling was had on the Motion to Dismiss despite the clear
absence of a hearing. Petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals was It is respectfully submitted that
manifestly mistaken when it ruled that due process was observed in the Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 has a
issuance of the assailed Orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort, despite the lack place only in an authoritarian government where
of opportunity to submit a comment or opposition to the Motion to Dismiss proprietary rights and privacy are alien concepts. Lest
and the lack of issuance of an order submitting said motion for it be forgotten, ours is a democratic society and
resolution. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner befitting
ruling of the RTC that violated both substantial and procedural law. [46] of a despotic government.

Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of the
Appeals, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the Amended Petition, rights and interest of the residents of Sun Valley
and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not Subdivision and in order to ensure that public officials
applicable. This is because, according to petitioner, such doctrine requires will not abuse governmental powers and use them in
that were a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must an oppressive and arbitrary manner, invokes the
first be sought from the administrative agencies prior to bringing an action judicial power of this Honorable Supreme Court and
before courts of justice.[47] Petitioner claims that when it filed Civil Case No. pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
98-08420, it did not have the luxury of time to elevate the matter to the and, after hearing, be declared permanent. [52]
higher authorities under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government
Code. Petitioner alleges that the tenor of BSV Resolution No. 98-096
necessitated the immediate filing of the injunction case on October 29, A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes
1998, to forestall the prejudicial effect of said resolution that was to take revealed to the Court the following, which were not discussed in the body
effect two days later. Thus, petitioner claims that it had no other plain, of the petition:
speedy, and adequate remedy except to file the case.[48]
52
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

1. A letter[53] dated January 25, 2003 signed by Sonia G. the Court of Appeals, which lately denied the NSVHA
Sison, President of NSVHAI, to Mayor Joey P. Marquez, the pertinent Motion for Reconsideration x x x.
portions of which provide: xxxx

We admit that we erred in not going to you directly The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
because at that time, the NSVHA received the letter- now the subject of an appeal taken by the NSVHA to
order of Brgy. Capt. Guevara two days before the the Supreme Court. In deference to the high Court,
effectivity of the order. Aside from this, there was a you would do well to reconsider your order to the
long holiday (long weekend prior to November 1). Barangay and not pre-empt the high Court on its
Thus, the Board of Governors had no other recourse decision. x x x.
but to seek a TRO and thereafter a permanent
injunction.
Arguments of Respondents
We now would like to seek your assistance
concerning this urgent problem. For your Respondents filed their Comment[56] on July 17, 2003. They
information there are already two (2) gates in and manifest that the petition is substantially a reproduction of petitioners brief
out of Sun Valley Subdivision. filed with the Court of Appeals, and consists of almost identical issues which
have already been ventilated and decided upon by the said court.
Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association is
mandated to protect the interest of the homeowners Respondents claim that the hearing held on November 20, 1998,
and residents especially in so far as it affects the as found by the Court of Appeals, covered both the injunction and dismissal
security, comfort and the general welfare of the incidents, and that the motion to dismiss on issues of jurisdiction was a
homeowners. prejudicial matter. Respondents confirm that the RTC said it will proceed
first with the hearing, but the lower court did not specify if the hearing was
Thank you and because of the urgency of the matter, going to take up the prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction or the
we anticipate your prompt and favorable action. motion to dismiss. Respondents further claim that by the end of the
(Emphasis ours.) hearing, after Atty. Florencio R. Herreras manifestation on the donated
public roads, counsels for both parties were asked by the court if they were
submitting, and both of them answered in the affirmative. [57] Respondents
2. A letter[54] signed by Paraaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated aver that petitioners reply to its charge of misleading the Court was an
January 27, 2003, addressed to Mr. Roberto Guevara, Office of admission that counsel had tampered without authority with the TSN, and
the Barangay Captain, Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in part: that the phrase referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction[58] was said counsels own mere
This refers to your intended implementation of footnote.
Barangay Sun Valley Resolution No. 98-096 entitled,
A RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW SUN VALLEY Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in favor
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION TO OPEN of Paraaque over all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was an official act
ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO VEHICULAR by the land registration office of the City of Paraaque, and was perfectly
AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC. within the judicial notice of the Courts, pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court.[59] Respondents likewise allege that the gates were
In this regard and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. earlier built illegally on the roads by the Association, and while petitioner
32 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests may lend a helping hand to the barangay, it cannot control the latters
upon the city mayor the right to exercise general discretion as to the wisdom of its traffic policies within the barangay. They
supervision over component barangays, to ensure maintain that petitioner had no business putting up road blocks in the first
that said barangays act within the scope of their place; that this matter is purely a local government determination; and that
prescribed powers and functions, you are hereby it is even doubtful if courts would encroach upon this autonomous
directed to defer your implementation of the subject determination for local constituents of the Barangay in deference to the
ordinance based on the following grounds: doctrine of separation of powers.

1. The roads subject of your resolution is a Respondents claim that since the subject matter of the case is a
municipal road and not a barangay road; directive of the Barangay to the petitioner, the requirement for an
ordinance would not be necessary, as there was no legislative
2. The opening or closure of any local road determination in the Barangay resolution regarding what class of roads to
may be undertaken by a local government open or what to close by way of general policy. [60]
unit pursuant to an ordinance and not
through a mere resolution as provided Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution was
under Sec. 21 of the Local Government internal and temporary, passed to solve a traffic problem. They propose a
Code of 1991; reason why petitioner allegedly wants to control the subject roads, as
follows:
3. There is no more need to order the
opening of the aforementioned roads in The directive of the Barangay is certainly
view of the fact that Gelia and State Ave., a declaration of an intention expressed by resolution
have already been opened by the on complaints of residents for a convenient outlet of
subdivision to the general public to cars and pedestrians during certain hours of the [day]
accommodate vehicular and pedestrian or night. This need not be the subject of an
traffic in the area; ordinance. It is addressed to a special group of
residents, and not to the general community. It refers
4. There is a need to conduct public to particular roads and at certain hours only, not to
hearings, as in fact we shall be conducting all the roads and at all hours.
public hearings, on the matter to enable
us to arrive at an intelligent resolution of Hence, the Barangay Resolutions (sic) is
the issues involved. but temporary in character, being a solution to a
momentary traffic problem then visualized by the
Barangay and encouraged by the MMDA. There is no
3. A letter[55] dated January 31, 2003 addressed to Mayor Joey legal question involved that is of any concern to the
Marquez, signed by counsel for respondents, wherein the latter NSVHA. The prevailing reason why the NSVHA desires
wrote: to control the roads is the monetary consideration it
gains by its unilateral requirement of car stickers and
We regret to observe that all the reasons of substantial fees exacted from delivery vans and
that you have cited in your letter as grounds for your trucks for bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And
order of non-implementation of the Barangay yet, the residents who, never gave their consent to
Resolution have been passed upon and decided by this activities (sic), are busy people and have merely
53
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

tolerated this for a long time now. This tolerance did We do not agree. Although the Motion to
not of course give legality to the illegal act. x x x.[61] Dismiss was filed on the same day, but after, the
Amended Petition was filed, the same cannot be
considered as directed merely against the original
As regards petitioners argument that the BSV Sangguniang petition which Appellant already considers as non-
Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution, existing. The records will show that Appellants
respondents present their counter-argument as follows: Amended Petition contained no material
amendments to the original petition. Both allege the
Hence, even assuming for the sake of same factual circumstances or events that constitute
argument that a legal question exists on whether it the Appellants cause of action anent the Appellees
be a resolution or ordinance that should contain the alleged violation of Appellants propriety rights over
Barangay directive, such an issue is of no moment as the subdivision roads in question. Corollarily, the
plaintiff-appellant failed to exhaust the necessary allegations in Appellees Motion to Dismiss, as well as
administrative remedies before resorting to court the grounds therefore predicated on lack of cause of
action, as found by the trial court and the Court of action and jurisdiction, could very well be considered
Appeals. Section 32, R.A. 7160 (Local Government as likewise addressed to Appellants Amended
Code of 1991) provides for a remedy from Barangay Petition.
actions to the Mayor under the latters power of
general supervision.[62] xxxx

It bears stressing that due process simply


With regard to the Mayors involvement in this case, respondents means giving every contending party the opportunity
have this to say: to be heard and the court to consider every piece of
evidence presented in their favor (Batangas Laguna
The Mayors act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley Tayabas Bus Company versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R.
affairs stemmed out of a long-standing political feud Nos. 137934 & 137936[)]. In the instant case,
of the Mayor with the Punong Barangay. Its general Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due
supervision did not extend to pure Barangay matters, process. As borne by the records, while Appellees
which the Barangay would be x x x in a better position Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for the hearing
to determine. of the motion, the day set therefore was the same
date set for the hearing of Appellants prayer for the
Furthermore, the general supervision of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that is,
the Mayor is limited to the overseeing authority that November 20, 1998, with the precise purpose of
the Barangays act within the scope of their presenting evidence in support of the motion to
prescribed powers and functions. Sadly, there is dismiss on the same said scheduled hearing date and
nothing in this Mayors letter x x x that would as much time when Appellant and its counsel would be
as show a deviation by the Barangay Sun Valley from present. Moreover, Appellants predication of lack of
any prescribed powers or function. The Mayors due hearing is belied by the fact that the hearing held
directive to the Barangay is of doubtful legality. on November 20, 1999 took up not only the matter
of whether or not to grant the injunction, but also
It was mainly the mounting traffic tackled the jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees
problem progressively experienced through the Motion to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in
years that prompted the Barangay to resolve to open both incidents. [67]
Rosemallow and Aster Streets in accordance with its
power under Section 21 of R.A. 7160 to temporarily
open or close any local road falling within its We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of
jurisdiction. This Resolution x x x was decided upon Appeals. Petitioners recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096
after the Barangay Council made the necessary should have been with the Mayor of Paraaque City, as clearly stated in
investigation and conducted hearings in consultation Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:
with affected residents. In order to maintain some Section 32. City and Municipal
kind of cordial relationship with the NSVHA, the Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The
Barangay by its resolution, opted to give the NSVHA city or municipality, through the city or municipal
the chance to open the roads, which it earlier closed mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision
by means of arbitrarily putting up steel gates without over component barangays to ensure that said
any apparent authority.[63] barangays act within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.

Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the


appellate court have ruled that only a local government unit (LGU), in this We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception
case the Barangay, can open or close roads, whether they be public or to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have
private, in accordance with Section 21 of the Local Government emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case,
Code. Respondents contend that Metropolitan Manila Development wherein we held:
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[64]wherein the Court discussed
the power of LGUs to open and close roads, is substantially in point.[65] The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
After the submission of the parties respective judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts
memoranda,[66] this case was submitted for decision. must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within
The issues before us are: the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to the obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for
protection of the law that would entitle it to the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
Resolution No. 98-096; and from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.[68]
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays
The Ruling of the Court actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and
functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local
The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioners claims as to the government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court
validity of the dismissal in this wise: committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local
54
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant
to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case Rule 129
because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the
burden of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over the subject SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when
roads. This, petitioner failed to do. mandatory.A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations territorial extent of states, their political history,
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Parties forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
of the defense offered by their opponent.[69] the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
Petitioner dared to question the barangays ownership over the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
subject roads when it should have been the one to adduce evidence to Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy.Petitioner did not submit and the geographical divisions.(1a)
an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by
respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged to the
then Municipality of Paraaque and were already being used by the public, The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial
limiting their use exclusively to the subdivisions homeowners, and knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its
collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the gates that petition for injunctive relief in any way.
they themselves had built. It is petitioners authority to put up the road
blocks in the first place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled
of ownership. to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as
On the other hand, the local government units power to close provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.
and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government
Code, Section 21 of which provides: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals DECISION dated October 16, 2002
Section 21. Closure and Opening of and its RESOLUTION dated January 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 are
Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to both AFFIRMED.
an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling SO ORDERED.
within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in
case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an
adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.

We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this


regard, as follows:

Contrary, however, to Appellants


position, the above-quoted provision, which requires
the passage of an ordinance by a local government
unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no
applicability to the instant case since the subdivision
road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in
the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets have
already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision
to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name
of, the City Government of Paraaque since the year
1964 (Annexes 2 to 7 of Appellees Brief). This fact has
not even been denied by the Appellant in the
proceedings below nor in the present recourse.
Having been already donated or turned over to the
City Government of Paraaque, the road lots in
question have since then taken the nature of public
roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of
man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or
claims of herein Appellant. Accordingly, the
Appellant was not in the lawful exercise of its
predicated rights when it built obstructing structures
closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic
for the use of the general Public. Consequently,
Appellees act of passing the disputed barangay
resolution, the implementation of which is sought to
be restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not
the opening of a private road but may be considered
merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to
cause the opening of a public road which should
rightfully be open for use to the general public.[70]

Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests


of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish
the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles
petitioner to the remedy prayed for. It even wants this Court to take judicial
knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are
becoming daily fares in Philippine society.[71] This is absurd. The Rules of
Court provide which matters constitute judicial notice, to wit:
55
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

18. of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to


A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting
vs. Grave Misconduct;
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring
Manila, respondent.
first the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid
Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending
PER CURIAM:
cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a of its right to due process;
magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has complied with
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to
his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to
dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate
the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the
action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of
trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having
traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the
started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit:
learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play,
to the legal profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case
have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be
without even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for
accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For,
accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.
service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law
from beginning to end. 2 Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent
3 judge filed his comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to
In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T.
await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law
Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged
on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01,
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without
3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92- erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules
101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and
complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the
against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was
Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
265, as amended, . . .; embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of
failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the
newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily
announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge;
Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on
that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only
August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by
to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No.
the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival
1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of
at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central
CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under
Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy
Department on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative
newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not
effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can
supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices
it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even
to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more more for the lower courts?"
jurisdiction;"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have
of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a
date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the
Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB
announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my
liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not
prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases
the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the
and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that
persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent
violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is
issued on the matter; contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking
intention to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present
judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere
perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign
newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of
exchange controls.
foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of
dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of
respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall be
required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the
disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and
People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and
thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court
How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something for speedy disposition of cases.
which has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although
of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis
the saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific
56
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without giving an
that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the
Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President has
involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in
cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion
order that the enactment can become effective and binding.
to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against
Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if
general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
he were the advocate of the accused.
Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353,
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange
to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the
recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin.
revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular
and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen
Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no position
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows: to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which
the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in
relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as xxx xxx xxx
amended.
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade foreign
these cases; apparently the other accused in some of these exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision
cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the that with respect to violations of former regulations that are
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be
commenced as against Mrs. Marcos. governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of
action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on
over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited
August 10, 1992 that the government has lifted all foreign
the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given
exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank
opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the
Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at
same, his resolution would have been the result of
such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11,
deliberation, not speculation.
1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court
has to give full confidence and credit to the reported I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
without introduction of proof, the announcement published in negative. 10
at least the two newspapers cited above which are reputable
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
and of national circulation.
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial
without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law notoriety. 13
repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed
of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited
disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken
accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law
only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to
the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may
violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction. noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with
knowledge of every person. 18
the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T.
Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA- Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of
G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay
Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of
to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took
preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when
of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice
and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is
simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take
court held that:
judicial notice of a fact.
57
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of
proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding of the case,
same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
was issued. intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the
law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992,
law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of
further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and
men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a
disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard
are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not
Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the
which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly
violations of which are the subject of pending actions or considered in the present case.
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
govern.
qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be
provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws
dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on
Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were,
basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to
a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious. give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to
first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly
premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good
provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has
faith.
been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation
repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
govern." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment
room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process
had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as
when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is
early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and
supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence
discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
of Circular No. 1353.
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more to due process of
carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily perceived law. 26
and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which
clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former
respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
provides:
hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused.
365, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto, with the Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual
exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever
regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due
or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent
violations of which are the subject of pending actions or was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's
investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his
regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could
govern. have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and
should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although
non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which
were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present
Circular No. 960. his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a
and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no
inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very
suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the
judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but
outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation
should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
highly dubious.
fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should
possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could
enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had
a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the
impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said
favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay
His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of
judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21 Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
58
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said
the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this Circular No. 960.
point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in
error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
force when I dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present
court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has
prosecution which represents the sovereign people already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . . government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but
instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on
to due process is thereby violated.
foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No.
of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of 960.
their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
lifting of all foreign exchange regulations. The President has within
issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines,
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction .
. . . 30 No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's
announcement of August 10, published the following day, nor
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never
made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply
submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition
to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after
for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy
my Order, and the third day after report of said order was
invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the
published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in
order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore,
the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign
considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of
exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R.
influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions
Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of
on how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although
former President Marcos "have become moot and academic"
undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report
he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman
duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He
the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary
a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases
or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, pending in court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs.
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of Abaya, said."
the legal precept. 31
I will elaborate on two points:
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10
judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible
announcement (published in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in
justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even
the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied
equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The
on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude
explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further
and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the
depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992,
unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
a few hours after the President had made another announcement
illustration and emphasis:
as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is
issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It
Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not
paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and far-
publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls,
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign
a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
exchange controls" was announced by the President of the embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for
Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign the consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis
exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public
Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday knowledge.
LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
xxx xxx xxx
transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only
the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that
Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and
"the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how the qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
"partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked." Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of
Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on
nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would
foreign exchange transactions, there was no need to await the
want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted
purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules
thereto.
affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will
conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the
rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the
there is no need to await publication. It would have been different accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for
if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent
under which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the
return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken
59
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure.


Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government
service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused
charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the
motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is
ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and
the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively,
and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this
Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate
proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was
dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal
possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice or
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court
found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being
almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and
unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court
finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from
rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or
proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
60
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

19. (c) To provisionally take over in the public


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.Marco II as cited in Rep. of the Phils vs. interest or to prevent its disposal or
Marcos-Manotoc dissipation, business enterprises and
properties taken over by the government
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS- of the Marcos Administration or by
MANOTOC, FERDINAND BONGBONG R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. entities or persons close to former
ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG President Marcos, until the transactions
CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES leading to such acquisition by the latter
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO can be disposed of by the appropriate
G. R. No. 171701 authorities.
February 8, 2012
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or
SERENO, J.: threatened commission of facts by any
person or entity that may render moot
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise
the Philippines assailing the Resolutions[1] issued by the Sandiganbayan in make ineffectual the efforts of the
connection with an alleged portion of the Marcoses supposed ill-gotten Commission to carry out its tasks under
wealth. this order.

This case involves P200 billion of the Marcoses alleged (e) To administer oaths, and issue
accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also includes the alleged use of the media subpoena requiring the attendance and
networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos familys personal benefit; testimony of witnesses and/or the
the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal production of such books, papers,
acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. contracts, records, statement of accounts
(Pantranco). and other documents as may be material
to the investigation conducted by the
Commission.
The Facts (f) To hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties, following the same procedures
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first and penalties provided in the Rules of
executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Court.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of
Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was given the following mandate:
any office, agency or instrumentality of
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task the government.
of assisting the President in regard to the following
(h) To promulgate such rules and
matters:
regulations as may be necessary to carry
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth out the purpose of this order.
accumulated by former President
Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
One of the civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan to recover the
family, relatives, subordinates and close
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now subject of
associates, whether located in the
this Petition.
Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and
enterprises and entities owned or assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for
controlled by them, during his Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against
administration, directly or through Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his
nominees, by taking undue advantage of death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc,
their public office and/or using their Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio
powers, authority, influence, connections Araneta III.
or relationship.
On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft add Constante Rubio as defendant.
and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time
time. to include as defendants Nemesio G. Co and herein respondents Yeung
Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun Fan.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure
that the above practices shall not be For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its
repeated in any manner under the new Complaint, adding to its growing list of defendants Imelda Cojuangco, the
government, and the institution of estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc.[2]
adequate measures to prevent the
occurrence of corruption. The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 2 September 1998.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and
authority: The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein
respondents are the following:[3]
(a) To conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and 29. Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-
carry out the purposes of this order. Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic)
Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with Defendants
placed under its control or possession any Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among
building or office wherein any ill-gotten others, in confiscating and/or unlawfully
wealth or properties may be found, and appropriating funds and other property, and in
any records pertaining thereto, in order to concealing the same as described above. In addition,
prevent their destruction, concealment or each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue
disappearance which would frustrate or advantage of their relationship with Defendants
hamper the investigation or otherwise Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by
prevent the Commission from reason of the above-described active collaboration,
accomplishing its task. unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of
stocks in corporations, illegal payments such as
61
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative,
improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits. to solidarily return to Plaintiff such funds and other
Defendant Araneta in particular made use of Asialand property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad
Development Corporation which is included in Annex faith, have unjustly enriched themselves or, in
A hereof as corporate vehicle to benefit in the default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of
manner stated above. such funds and the value of the other property
including those which may have been wasted, and/or
lost estimated at ₱200 billion with interest thereon
from the date of unlawful acquisition until full
31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung
payment thereof.
Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan are
the controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun Fashion 35. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING
Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through
Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as fronts or The Commission, acting pursuant to the
dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of provisions of the applicable law, believe that
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful
family, particularly of Defendant Imelda (Imee) concert with one another, and with the active
Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign collaboration of third persons, subject of separate
exchange[4] by importing denim fabrics from only one suits, acquired funds, assets and property during the
supplier a Hong Kong based corporation which was incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly
also owned and controlled by defendant Hong Kong out of proportion to their salaries, to their other
investors, at prices much higher than those being lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
paid by other users of similar materials to the grave property. Consequently, they are required to show to
and irreparable damage of Plaintiff. the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they
have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and
Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its property which are in excess of their legal net
Complaint:[5] income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that
the Defendants are under obligation to account to
Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests
32. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF in funds, properties and assets of whatever kind and
PUBLIC TRUST A public office is a public trust. By wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or
committing all the acts described above, Defendants lawful income from legitimately acquired property.
repeatedly breached public trust and the law, making
36. Fifth Cause of Action LIABILITY FOR
them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other
DAMAGES
property acquired by Defendants following, or as a
result of, their breach of public trust, some of which (a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth
are mentioned or described above, estimated to above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered
amount to ₱200 billion are deemed to have been actual damages in an amount representing the
acquired for the benefit of Plaintiff and are, pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result of
therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor the Defendants unlawful acts, the approximate value
of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, and interest of which, from the time of their wrongful
Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or acquisition, are estimated at ₱200 billion plus
reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus expenses which Plaintiff has been compelled to
impressed with constructive trust for the benefit of incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to
Plaintiff and the Filipino people. recover Defendants ill-gotten wealth all over the
world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at
₱250 million. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and
33. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an
RIGHT AND POWER amount reasonably estimated at ₱200 Billion Pesos
and to reimburse expenses for recovery of
(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the Defendants ill-gotten wealth estimated to cost ₱250
unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of million or in such amount as are proven during the
right and power which caused untold misery, trial.
sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants
violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the (b) As a result of Defendants acts
Civil Code of the Philippines; described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had
painfully endured and suffered moral damages for
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, more than twenty long years, anguish, fright,
Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
interest in funds and other property and concealed and moral shock as well as besmirched reputation
such title, funds and interest through the use of and social humiliation before the international
relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or community.
dummies. Defendants are, therefore, solidarily liable
to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and (c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino
other property unlawfully acquired by them people are entitled to temperate damages for their
estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or sufferings which, by their very nature are incapable
alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, solidarily, by way of of pecuniary estimation, but which this Honorable
indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent Court may determine in the exercise of its sound
to the amount of such funds or the value of other discretion.
property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above
interest thereon from the date of unlawful
described unlawful acts, have violated and invaded
acquisition until full payment thereof.
the inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino
34. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST people to a fair and decent way of life befitting a
ENRICHMENT Nation with rich natural and human resources. This
basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff and the
Defendants illegally accumulated funds Filipino people should be recognized and vindicated
and other property whose estimated value is ₱200 by awarding nominal damages in an amount to be
billion in violation of the laws of the Philippines and determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of
in breach of their official functions and fiduciary its sound discretion.
obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly
enriched themselves to the grave and irreparable (e) By way of example and correction for
damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have the public good and in order to ensure that
an obligation at law, independently of breach of trust Defendants unlawful, malicious, immoral and
62
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

wanton acts are not repeated, said Defendants are of the witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint
solidarily liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages. any specific involvement of the Marcos children.

Moreover, the court held that the evidence, in particular,


exhibits P,[8] Q,[9] R,[10] S,[11] and T,[12] were considered hearsay, because
In the meantime, the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO their originals were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by
(PEA-PTGWO), a union of Pantranco employees, moved to intervene before the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that
the Sandiganbayan. The former alleged that the trust funds in the account petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the
of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco) amounting to ₱55 million originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of
rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all
judgment the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits also
favor of the employees and against Pantranco. Thus, PEA-PTGWO contested sought to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil
the allegation of petitioner that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten Apparel.
because, otherwise, these assets would be returned to the government and
not to the employees. Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the
Marcos spouses was not enough reason to hold the former liable.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its
evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected to the In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta
offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the best III, the court similarly held that there was no testimonial or documentary
evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were evidence that supported petitioners allegations against the couple. Again,
unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for its petitioner failed to present the original documents that supposedly
failure to present the originals. supported the allegations against them. Instead, it merely presented
photocopies of documents that sought to prove how the Marcoses used the
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Potencianos[13] as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus company
Resolution[6] admitting the pieces of evidence while expressing some Pantranco.
reservation, to wit:
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court
WHEREFORE, taking note of the found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to
objections of accused Marcoses and the reply demonstrate how their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
thereto by the plaintiff, all the documentary exhibits Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar
formally offered by the prosecution are hereby salting; or to show that they themselves were dummies of the Marcoses.
admitted in evidence; however, their evidentiary Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this
value shall be left to the determination of the Court. allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies, and that the
affiants had not been presented as witnesses.

Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-


SO ORDERED.
PTGWO. While the court held that there was no evidence to show that
Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless held that there
was a need to first determine the ownership of the disputed funds before
Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong they could be ordered released to the rightful owner.
Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III; Yeung
Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO On 20 December 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Partial
subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. Reconsideration, insisting that there was a preponderance of evidence to
show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III had
On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out
Resolution,[7] which granted all the Demurrers to Evidence except the one that respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and
filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The dispositive portion reads: were thus obliged to render an accounting and to return the ill-gotten
wealth.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendant Imelda R. Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established
Marcos is hereby DENIED. The Demurrer to Evidence that the Yeungs were dummies of the Marcoses, and that the Pantranco
filed by defendants Maria Imelda Marcos Manotoc, assets were part of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos Araneta,
Gregorio Maria Araneta III, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Finally, petitioner questioned the courts ruling that the evidence
Chun Fan, Yeung Chun Ho, and intervenor PEA- previously admitted was later held to be inadmissible in evidence against
PTGWO, are hereby GRANTED. The sequestration respondents, thus, depriving the former of due process.
orders on the properties in the name of defendant
Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the
Gregorio Maria Araneta III, are accordingly ordered
motion on respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.
lifted.
But upon realizing the oversight, it immediately did so and filed the
SO ORDERED. corresponding Manifestation and Motion before the court. Nonetheless,
this inadvertence prompted Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos,
Jr. to file their Motion for Entry of Judgment.
The Sandiganbayan denied Imelda R. Marcos Demurrer primarily On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed
because she had categorically admitted that she and her husband owned Resolution,[14] denying petitioners Motion. The court pointed out its
properties enumerated in the Complaint, while stating that these reservation in its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that it
properties had been lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence would still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence.
presented by petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her, Furthermore, it said that even if it included the testimonies of petitioners
considering that the value of the properties involved was grossly witnesses, these were not substantial to hold respondents liable. Thus, the
disproportionate to the Marcos spouses lawful income. Thus, this admission court said:
and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and
administratrix of the Marcos estate were the primary reasons why the court WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient
held that she was responsible for accounting for the funds and properties reason to set aside the resolution dated December 6,
alleged to be ill-gotten. 2005, the plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The
Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose plaintiffs Motion and Manifestation dated January
deposition was taken in Hong Kong, referred to her as one directly involved 18, 2006 is GRANTED in the interest of justice.
in amassing ill-gotten wealth. The court also considered the compromise The Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by defendants
agreement between petitioner and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed Imee Marcos and Bongbong Marcos is DENIED.
that he had performed several business transactions upon the instructions
of the Marcos spouses.

With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong SO ORDERED.


Marcos, Jr., the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal
activities was never established. In fact, they were never mentioned by any
63
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Hence, this Petition. The Marcos Siblings and

Gregorio Araneta III

Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Closely analyzing petitioners Complaint and the present Petition
Reconsideration filed before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:[15] for Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings are being sued in two
capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E.
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE Marcos.[16]
FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA
(IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND With regard to the first allegation, as contained in paragraph 29
(BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR., of its Third Amended Complaint quoted above, petitioner accused the
CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in, and/or
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD benefitted from their parents alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR particular, as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused
CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND OTHER supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of similar
MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from
POWER AND INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY the sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee
AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL Marcos had a substantial interest.
TREASURY.
Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having
conspired with her husband, respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being
President Marcos conduit to Pantranco, thereby paving the way for the
II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN Presidents ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section 4,
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution.[17]
RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO
ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings,
ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER petitioner primarily relied on the Sworn Statement[18] and the
PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY Deposition[19] of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos, Rolando
ACQUIRING BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH C. Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various dates.
ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO
THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee
PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION Marcos-Manotoc in De Soleil Apparel and the media networks, petitioner
AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES. relied on the Affidavits of Ramon S. Monzon,[20] Yeung Kwok Ying,[21] and
Rodolfo V. Puno;[22] and the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken
III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND during the PCGG hearing held on 8 June 1987.[23]
IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS
OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND As to spouses Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Araneta III,
ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN petitioner submitted the Articles of Incorporation of Northern Express
ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED Transport, Inc.;[24] the Memorandum of Agreement[25]and the Purchase
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES. Agreement[26] between Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, Inc. (BLTBCo.); the Confidential Memorandum regarding the sale
of the Pantranco assets;[27] the Affidavit[28] and the letter to the PCGG[29] of
Dolores A. Potenciano, owner of BLTBCo.; the Affidavit[30] and the
IV. THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE Memorandum[31] of Eduardo Fajardo, who was then the Senior Vice-
PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG President of the Account Management Group of the Philippine National
CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND Bank (PNB), which was in turn the creditor for the Pantranco sale; and the
YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES Affidavit of Florencio P. Lucio, who was the Senior Account Specialist of the
FOR THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE National Investment and Development Corporation.[32]
CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A
CONDUIT IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rules
WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE third exception, that is, these documents are public records in the custody
SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING of a public officer or are recorded in a public office. It is its theory that since
THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the
conditions for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts
that the documents were offered to prove not only the truth of the recitals
of the documents, but also of other external or collateral facts.[33]
V. THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY
INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH RESPECT The Courts Ruling
TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE AMPLE
EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS
INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF THE Petitioner failed to observe the
MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS
best evidence rule.
BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN
MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS
RIGHTFULLY BELONG. It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint.
For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the
Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the
Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYANS RULING WHICH
evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is
REJECTED PEITITONERS DOCUMENTARY
constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to
EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING
Evidence filed by respondents.
INADMISSIBLE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS
ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WAS the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to
RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT DEPRIVED submit the original documents that could prove petitioners allegations.
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec.
3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which
mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. The origin
of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early as the
18th century in Omychund v. Barker,[34] wherein the Court of Chancery said:
There is some merit in petitioners contention.
64
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

The judges and sages of the law have laid Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria
it down that there is but one general rule of Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had
evidence, the best that the nature of the case will been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of
admit. the Commissions investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were
submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, [i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them,
The rule is, that if the writings have
they must be proved by those witnesses. Witnesses can testify only to those
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved
facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from
by those witnesses.
their own perception.[35] Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
The first ground judges have gone upon in obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict documents themselves.
necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these
case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all are
Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged
establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy
before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay
may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by
evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by
witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is a
the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing
thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for
the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or
evidence.
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[36]
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the
court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG,
testimony of the witnesses who had executed them. while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the
course of the PCGGs exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short
documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states: of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.[37]
Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. ─ When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
recorded in a public office, its contents may be
Further, again contrary to the theory of
proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer
the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the
in custody thereof.
aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule
130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court.
Under paragraph (d), when the original document is
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide: a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, presentation of the
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose
original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier
of their presentation in evidence, documents are
observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by
either public or private.
the plaintiff were not necessarily public documents.
Public documents are: The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the
proceedings purportedly before the PCGG, the
(a) The written official acts, or records plaintiffs exhibit Q, may be a public document, but
of the official acts of the what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere
sovereign authority, official photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide
bodies and tribunals, and public that when the original document is in the custody of
officers, whether of the a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
Philippines, or of a foreign contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
country; the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit Q was
not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the
(b) Documents acknowledged before a stenographer who supposedly took down the
notary public except last wills and proceedings.
testaments; and
The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits
(c) Public records, kept in the cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a)
Philippines, of private documents and (b) of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule
required by law to be entered provides that when the original documents has been
therein. lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
All other writings are private.
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
SECTION 20. Proof of private document. Before any part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
private document offered as authentic is received in of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Thus, in
proved either: order that secondary evidence may be admissible,
there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1)
(a) By anyone who saw the document due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or
executed or written; or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of to produce the original. None of these requirements
the signature or were complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit
handwriting of the maker. Q, exhibits P, R, S, and T were all photocopies. P, R,
Any other private document need only be and T were affidavits of persons who did not testify
identified as that which it is claimed to be. before the Court. Exhibit S is a letter which is clearly
a private document. Not only does it not fall within
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere
the course of its investigations does not make them per se public records photocopy. As We previously emphasized, even if
referred to in the quoted rule. originals of these affidavits were presented, they
would still be considered hearsay evidence if the
affiants do not testify and identify them.[38]
65
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the
follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging
Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. to the State.
Marcos and participated in the first couples alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned. Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs
instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs. death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through
To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays the decedents death.[44] In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from
that the Marcos respondents be made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute
ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition; (2) render a their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the
complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of property distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,[45] we said:
legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal
and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at P200 Article 440 of the Civil Code provides
billion and additional actual damages to reimburse expenses for the that the possession of hereditary property is
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at P250 million or in deemed to be transmitted to the heir without
such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages interruption from the instant of the death of the
amounting to P50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted. And
as attorneys fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the amount of P1 billion; and (7) pay person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided
treble judicial costs.[39] owner of the whole estate left with respect to the
part or portion which might be adjudicated to him,
It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional a community of ownership being thus formed
circumstances, given the nature and the extent of the properties involved among the coowners of the estate while it remains
in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that the undivided. (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil.
Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil
the accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the court is charged with the task part in the common property, and the effect of such
of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos estate that constitute the assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the
alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing portion which may be allotted him in the partition
the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the
of these properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where
proper. some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the
others, sold a property left by their deceased father,
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the
this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice
death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be
Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but
duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right
that the effect thereof was limited to the share
to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
which may be allotted to the vendors upon the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he
partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)
continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
legal representative of his estate.[40] On that note, we take judicial notice of
the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,[41] we upheld the grant by the Lastly, petitioners prayer in its Third Amended Complaint
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand directly refers to herein respondents, to wit:
R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will
and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. 1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD
CAUSES OF ACTION To return and reconvey to
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by
to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or protect the estate or Defendants during their incumbency as public
those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or officers, which funds and other property are
ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other
pending before the Sandiganbayan. lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property which Defendants have failed to establish
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them,
as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final alternatively, to solidarily pay Plaintiff the value
determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an thereof with interest thereon from the date of
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their acquisition until full payment.
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are
indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the 2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF
relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.[42] ACTION to individually render to this Honorable
Court a complete accounting and inventory, subject
In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning to evaluation of Court-appointed assessors, of all
the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos that is, the accounting and the recovery funds and other property legally or beneficially held
of ill-gotten wealth the present case must be maintained against Imelda and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and
Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand Bongbong R. Marcos, Jr., as beneficial interest in such funds and other property.
executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of (Emphasis supplied)
Court. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover
from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents,
enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly
executors. protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth,
though their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth
may not have been proven.
We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained
against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of
the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex A to the Third Amended Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.[43] It is only Ho And Yeung Chun Fan
during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there
could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten
or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, It is worthy to note that respondents draw our attention
while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill- to American Inter-Fashion Corporation v. Office of the President[46] in which
gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill- they contend that this Court considered the allegation of dollar salting as
gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. baseless. The cited case, however, finds no application herein as the former
66
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

merely ruled that Glorious Sun was denied due process when it was not However, despite having the expansive resources of
furnished by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) any basis for government, the members of the prosecution did not even bother to
the cancellation of the export quota because of allegations of dollar provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present the original
salting. That Decision did not prevent petitioner from adducing evidence to documents or the witnesses to support the governments claims. Even
support its allegation in Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan worse was presenting in evidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG
under a different cause of action. proceedings instead of the original, or a certified true copy of the original,
which the prosecutors themselves should have had in their custody. Such
Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung manner of legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are
Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan in the case at bar were also proved to be constrained to call attention to this apparently serious failure to follow a
baseless. Again, petitioner failed to illustrate how respondents herein acted most basic rule in law, given the special circumstances surrounding this
as dummies of the Marcoses in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court notes case.
that the Complaint against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used
Glorious Sun the garment company in which the Yeungs are controlling The public prosecutors should employ and use all government
stockholders for illegal dollar salting through the companys importation of resources and powers efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
denim fabrics from only one supplier at prices much higher than those being particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and revenues. They should
paid by other users of similar materials. Notably, no mention of De Soleil perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
Apparel was made. professionalism, intelligence and skill.[48]

To prove its allegations, petitioner submitted the controverted The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and
Exhibits P, Q, R, S, and T. As earlier discussed in detail, these pieces of secure justice for those seeking its aid.[49] In order to do this, lawyers are
evidence were mere photocopies of the originals and were unauthenticated required to observe and adhere to the highest ethical and professional
by the persons who executed them; thus, they have no probative value. standards. The legal profession is so imbued with public interest that its
Even the allegations of petitioner itself in its Petition for Review are bereft practitioners are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as
of any factual basis for holding that these documents undoubtedly show well.
respondents participation in the alleged dollar salting. The pertinent
portion of the Petition reads: The public prosecutors, aside from being representatives of the
government and the state, are, first and foremost, officers of the court.
To illustrate, the Affidavit dated May 29, They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider it their duty to assist
1987 executed by Mr. Ramon Monzon which was in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[50] Lawyers owe fidelity
submitted as Exhibit P, showed that respondent to the cause of the client and should be mindful of the trust and confidence
Imee Marcos-Manotoc owns and controls IBC-13, reposed in them.[51]Hence, should serve with competence and diligence.[52]
BBC-2 and (R)PN-9, and has interest in the De Soleil
Apparel. The testimony of Mr. Ramon Monzon during We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn
the hearing on June 8, 1987 before the Presidential the dismissal of the lower courts in instances when it is shown that the
Commission on Good Government as shown in the prosecution has deprived the parties their due process of law. In Merciales
Transcript of Stenographic Notes also affirmed his v. Court of Appeals,[53] we reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the
declarations in the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987. The criminal case for rape with homicide. In that case, it was very apparent that
Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated June 8, 1987 the public prosecutor violated the due process rights of the private
was presented as Exhibit Q. Moreover, the Affidavit complainant owing to its blatant disregard of procedural rules and the
dated March 21, 1986 of Yeung Kwok Ying which was failure to present available crucial evidence, which would tend to prove the
presented as Exhibit R disclosed that Imee Marcos- guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that
Manotoc is the owner of 67% equity of De Soleil the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and,
Apparel. The letter dated July 17, 1984 signed by instead, just passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case.
seven (7) incorporators of De Soleil Apparel,
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly
addressed to Hongkong investors which was
to determine whether the prosecution and the trial court gravely abused
presented as Exhibit S confirmed that the signatories
their discretion in the proceedings of the case, thus resulting in the denial
hold or own 67% equity of the corporation in behalf
of the offended partys due process. Meanwhile, the present case merely
of the beneficial owners previously disclosed to the
alleges that there was an error in the Sandiganbayans consideration of the
addressees. In addition to the foregoing documents,
probative value of evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the
petitioner presented the Affidavit of Rodolfo V. Puno,
prosecution and the trial court were found to be equally guilty of serious
Chairman of the Garments and Textile Export Group
nonfeasance, which prompted us to remand the case to the trial court for
(GTEB) as Exhibit T wherein he categorically declared
further proceedings and reception of evidence. Merciales is thus
that the majority of De Soleil Apparel was actually
inapplicable to the case at bar.
owned by respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc.[47]
Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the
failure of the prosecution to adhere to something as basic as the best
The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality of effort given
matter that warrants a consideration by the Court. Straight from the horses to the governments cause. Thus, we highly encourage the Office of the
mouth, these documents are only meant to show the ownership and President, the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigation
interest of Imee Marcos Manotoc in De Soleil and not how respondent and consequent action on this matter.
supposedly participated in dollar salting or in the accumulation of ill-gotten
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
wealth.
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6
PEA-PTGWO December 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For the reasons stated
herein, respondents Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case No.
a consequence of the prosecutions failure to establish that the assets of 0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier. Thus, we find no error in the
assailed Order of the Sandiganbayan. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
President so that it may look into the circumstances of this case and
A Final Note determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the
As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been manner by which this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.
recognized as an evidentiary standard since the 18th century. For three
centuries, it has been practiced as one of the most basic rules in law. It is SO ORDERED.
difficult to conceive that one could have finished law school and passed the
bar examinations without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply
disturbing that the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) the
very agencies sworn to protect the interest of the state and its people could
conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To emphasize, the
PCGG is a highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, while the OSG is the principal legal defender of the government.
The lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the best in
the legal profession.
67
Evidence
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20. -Hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock position with bleeding-


G.R. No. 200792 November 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
-Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight resistance-
vs.
NEIL B. COLORADO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION -Uterus small-

REYES, J.: -(+) bleeding-

For the Court's review is the Decision1 dated August 19,2011 of the Court of x x x x7
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03767, which affirmed with modification
the Decision2 dated June 19, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 8-390 of the Regional Colorado testified for his defense. He denied having raped AAA, arguing
Trial Court ( RTC), Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 finding herein accused- that he was not living with AAA in their parents’ house in December 2002.
appellant Neil B. Colorado (Colorado) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Allegedly, he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmeña, Dasol.
crime of rape. Colorado claimed that on the night of the alleged incident, he was fishing
with his brother-in-law, and that they returned to Osmeña, Dasol in the
The Facts morning of the following day.

Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape in an The Ruling of the RTC
Information that reads:
On June 19, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision finding Colorado guilty
That sometime in December, 2002 in the evening in Sitio x x x, Brgy. Iliw- beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentencing him
Iliw, Burgos, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the brother of the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as civil
AAA,3 inside their house, by means of force, threats and intimidation did indemnity. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with AAA, a twelve (12) years (sic) old girl, against her will and consent, to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused NEIL B.
her damage and prejudice.4 COLORADO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. In view
of the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 9346 prohibiting the imposition of
Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment. During the pre-trial, the death penalty – this Court sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
parties stipulated on the following: (1) the existence of the Medico Legal RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Certificate and the Birth Certificate of AAA; (2) that Colorado is a full-blood
brother of AAA; and (3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the same Further, accused shall indemnify [AAA] the amount of Php 50,000.00 as
roof.5 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. moral damages and Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity. (People vs. Ambray,
303 SCRA 709).
Records indicate that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. She was the
second to the youngest in a family of twelve siblings. Colorado was an older SO ORDERED.8
brother who lived with her, their parents and two other brothers, BBB and
CCC, in Burgos, Pangasinan.
Feeling aggrieved, Colorado appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA,
reiterating in his appeal the defenses of denial and alibi. He further sought
AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a his acquittal by arguing that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAA’s
wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa, Dasol, Pangasinan, leaving examining doctor, and considered by the trial court in determining his
behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When culpability, could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual
their parents had not yet arrived in the evening, Colorado committed the aggressions committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto
dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time, while AAA.
Colorado was already twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held
her two hands, even threatened her with a knife and covered her mouth
with a handkerchief. He then removed AAA’s shorts and panty, inserted his The Ruling of the CA
penis into the young girl’s vagina, then made a push and pull movement.
AAA tried to resist her brother’s sexual aggression, but miserably failed The CA affirmed Colorado’s conviction, but modified his civil liability. The
despite her efforts because of her brother’s greater strength. Colorado later decretal portion of its Decision dated August 19, 2011 reads:
left AAA, who put back her shorts and underwear, but remained awake
because of fear and trauma with what she had gone through.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan (Branch 70), dated 19 June 2008, is AFFIRMED with the
On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the MODIFICATION that, in addition to the civil indemnity of Seventy-Five
presence of their two other brothers who were then sleeping inside the Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), appellant is ordered to pay the victim moral
room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances, Colorado still damages of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) instead of Fifty
threatened AAA with a knife, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and to pay exemplary damages of Thirty
penis into his sister’s vagina, then performed the push and pull movement. Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone
what he had done. AAA then did not dare reveal these incidents to anybody,
until she had the courage to report them to their mother. SO ORDERED.9

Also in her testimony before the trial court, AAA disclosed that she had been Hence, this appeal. Both Colorado and the Office of the Solicitor General, as
raped by Colorado when she was just nine (9) years old. She also revealed counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, dispensed with the
having been ravished on different dates by another brother, DDD, and a filing with the Court of supplemental briefs, and adopted instead their
brother-in-law. respective briefs with the CA.

A Medico-Legal Certificate6 prepared by Dr. Ma. Teresa Sanchez (Dr. This Court’s Ruling
Sanchez), Medical Officer III of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital
who examined AAA on January 10, 2003, contained the following findings: The appeal lacks merit.

=INTERNAL EXAM FINDINGS: Colorado was charged with the crime of rape, qualified by the victim’s
minority and her relationship to her ravisher, as defined and penalized
-Nonparous Introitus- under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as follows:
68
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed: AAA testified directly and categorically how she was raped by the accused
Neil Colorado who is her full-blood brother sometime in the night of
December 2002.
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
That while AAA was sleeping with her older brother BBB and her younger
brother CCC, accused went near her and held her two (2) hands, covered
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
her mouth with handkerchief. Thereafter, accused removed her short pants
and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After removing his
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise penis, accused went back to sleep.
unconscious;
AAA however could no longer sleep because she was already afraid that the
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of accused will return which the accused did. For the second time, accused
authority; and raped AAA. Accused covered her mouth with a handkerchief, inserted his
penis into her vagina and accused did the push and pull movement.
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned xxxx
above be present.
When AAA declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
xxxx would be necessary to show that rape did take place (PP. vs. Maglantay, 304
SCRA 272), for as long as the testimony of AAA is free from serious or major
Art. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x. incongruence and unbridled by suspicion or doubt. The testimony of AAA is
simple, candid, straightforward and consistent on material points detailing
every single bestial act of her brother in ravishing her. Moreover, AAA on
xxxx several occasions (August 1, 2006 and September 19, 2006) was on the
verge of crying and in fact shed tears during her direct examination. Crying
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience (PP. vs.
Agustin, 365 SCRA 167; PP vs. Garcia, supra). Though a medical certificate is
not necessary to prove the commission of rape (PP. vs. Bares, 355 SCRA
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is 435), but when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s
a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or findings of penetration (Exh. "A") or hymenal laceration as when the hymen
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the is no longer intact, there is sufficient foundation to find the existence of the
parent of the victim; essential requisite of carnal knowledge (PP. vs. Montejo, 355 SCRA 210; PP.
vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253). Further, no young and decent woman in her right
xxxx mind especially of tender age as that of AAA who is fifteen (15) years old
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if
Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled on the concurrence of the following
she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong
elements of qualified rape, as defined in the aforequoted provisions of the
committed against her. (PP. vs. Albior, 352 SCRA 35; PP. vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA
RPC: (1) that the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
194)14 (Emphasis ours)
(2) that the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian or relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (3) that the offender has carnal These observations were affirmed by the CA on appeal, as it held:
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or
when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of A conscientious review of the records shows that AAA’s testimonies in this
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.10 case bear the marks of truthfulness, spontaneity and sincerity. She was
crying while answering questions about the rape incident. Obviously, the
The age of the victim at the time of the crime’s commission is undisputed. process called to her mind not only the mere details of the sexual abuse but
During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the existence of AAA’s Certificate the lingering hurt and pain that come with it. Her tears were unimpeachable
of Live Birth,11 a "certified true/xerox copy" of which forms part of the testaments to the truth of her allegations.
records and provides that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. AAA was then
only 12 years old in December 2002, a significant fact that was sufficiently xxxx
alleged in the Information. In People v. Pruna,12 we held that the best
evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. During cross-examination, AAA remained steadfast, unwavering and
spontaneous. Significantly also, her testimony is supported by the medical
evidence on record, which showed that she had a laceration in her hymen
As to the second element, there is no dispute that Colorado is a full-blood and was thus in a non-virgin state.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
brother of AAA, as this was also among the parties’ stipulated facts during
the case’s pre-trial.
The Court finds no cogent reasons to overturn these findings. Indeed, it was
established that Colorado succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
The grounds now being raised by Colorado to justify his exoneration delve victim, employing force, threat and intimidation that allowed him to
mainly on the alleged absence of the crime’s third element. He denies AAA’s consummate his bestial act. AAA had positively identified Colorado as her
claim that he had ravished her, raising the defense of alibi and the alleged rapist. Such identification of Colorado could not have been difficult for AAA
doubt and suspicion that should be ascribed to AAA’s accusations. On this considering that Colorado was a brother who lived with her in their parents’
matter, settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the house. Even the failure of AAA to identify the exact date of the crime’s
credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a commission is inconsequential to Colorado’s conviction. In rape cases, the
trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. We have repeatedly date of commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is
recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility material is its occurrence,16 a fact that was sufficiently established given
of witnesses and their testimonies, because of its unique opportunity to AAA’s and her testimony’s credibility.
observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. Contrary to Colorado’s contention, AAA’s claim that two other siblings were
The rule finds even more stringent application where the said findings are sleeping in the same room where she was raped did not render her
sustained by the CA. Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally statements incredible. Time and again, we have taken into consideration
bound by the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.13 how rapists are not deterred by the presence of people nearby, such as the
members of their own family inside the same room, with the likelihood of
being discovered, since lust respects no time, locale or circumstance.17
We then take due consideration of the trial court’s findings of fact, its
assessment of AAA’s credibility, her testimony and the manner by which her
statements were relayed, as discussed in the RTC’s Decision convicting As against AAA’s credible testimony, Colorado’s defenses lack
Colorado and which reads in part: persuasion.1âwphi1 While Colorado denied in his testimony that he lived
69
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

with AAA, such fact was already admitted by the parties during the pre-trial.
His defense that he was in Osmeña, Dasol at the time of the crime’s
commission was even uncorroborated by any other witness. By
jurisprudence, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere
denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome
the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant
and his involvement in the crime attributed to him.18Moreover, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the appellant
was at a different place at the time the crime was committed; and second,
it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of
its commission.19 The defense failed to establish these requisites. On the
contrary, Colorado testified that from Osmeña, where he claimed to have
lived with an older sister, he could normally reach his parents’ house by a
three-hour walk. There were also other means of transportation in these
two places,20 which then could have allowed Colorado to travel the distance
over a shorter period of time.

Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchez’s medico-legal


certificate, arguing that AAA’s hymenal lacerations could have resulted
from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and
their brother-in-law. Such contention, however, deserves no consideration,
given that results of an offended party’s medical examination are merely
corroborative in character. As explained by the Court in People v.
Balonzo,21 a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of
rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character
and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on
the basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.22 Furthermore,
laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable
physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the
consummation of the crime of rape. In the context that is used in the RPC,
"carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse,
does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the
hymen be ruptured.23 Thus, even granting that AAA’s lacerations were not
caused by Colorado, the latter could still be declared guilty of rape, after it
was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim.

Given the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's
conviction of Colorado. The crime is qualified by the victim's minority and
her relationship to Colorado, yet the appellate court correctly explained
that the imposable penalty is reclusion pe1petua, in lieu of death, taking
into account the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 that prohibit the
imposition of death penalty in criminal cases. We however clarify that
Colorado shall be ineligible for parole, a requirement under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9346 that was not mentioned in the assailed CA decision and which,
must then be rectified by this Decision.24 The civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages, as modified and awarded by the CA,
conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated August 19, 2011
of the Com1 of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03767 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Neil B. Colorado is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion pe1petua, without eligibility for parole. The
accused is likewise ordered to pay legal interest on all damages awarded at
the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
satisfied.

SO ORDERED.
70
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

21. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy4 for the same
G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012 position.
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare Aurelio a
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.
nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy
DECISION
for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and
to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: petitioner’s surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very
strong candidate for the said position having been elected as member of
the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket of the NPC and obtained
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the
the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In
emerging concerns is the application of the law on nuisance candidates
contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with no prior political
under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of
experience as an elective official and no political party membership. Being
candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen
a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of
candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name
income but since the 2007 elections petitioner’s opponents have been
on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual
prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow
elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further
candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cited Aurelio’s miserable showing in the previous local elections when he
was still included or printed in the official ballots on election day,should the
ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May
votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in
2007) and barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November
favor of the bona fide candidate?
2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that
these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide
The Case intention and capability to run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus
preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule
65 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his
(petitioner) assails COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.
votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his
appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May
name was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates8 and Official
10, 2010 elections.
Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for
Vice-Mayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete,
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs: appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as follows:

1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary


VICE-MAYOR
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
Vote for not more than 1
issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of
Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor of the O 1. DELA CRUZ, O 2. DELA CRUZ, O 3. PACETE, John
Municipality of Bugasong; Aurelio N. Casimira Lloyd M.
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be
rendered granting the instant Petition and: Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte
Omnibus Motion10 praying, among other things, that COMELEC issue an
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s name from the Official List of
Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other
cast in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections.
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz; She also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can no longer be deleted
in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order
directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.
Dela Cruz be counted and tallied in favor of Petitioner
Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116; and On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 884411 listing
the names of disqualified candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as
follows:
(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province
of Antique where the Petitioner’s Election Protest is
pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as
Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who follows:
obtained the highest number of votes after the votes
in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is 1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the
counted and tallied to the votes garnered by certified list of candidates; and
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into upon.12 (Emphasis supplied)
office of Private Respondent if Petitioner is proclaimed as the
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique. On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections
proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio’s name remained in the official ballots.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2


During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes
Factual Antecedents cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC
refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following results of the
member of the Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November voting:
28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy3 for the position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the
ticket of the National People’s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. TOTAL RANK
71
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
the automated election system where the counting of votes is delegated to
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2 the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation
controversies, including complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1 and allegations of misreading the names of the candidates written, were
flaws which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the
purpose of our election laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete conditions as it is applicable to all persons of the same class even in
was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.14 succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance candidates
without distinction.

On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
Province of Antique an election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For
favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent public office is not a property right and no one has a vested right to any
Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation public office.
as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly
Petitioner’s Arguments claim the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211
(24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution
No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Court’s
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when read together
(39) votes over petitioner’s 6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she would with Section 72, are understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a
have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless
properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."
petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against
the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a directive to consider the
votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting the same in favor Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC
of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the caused the publication of Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general
COMELEC’s First Division gravely abused its discretion. circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part of
COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in
Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the official
Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply
to equal protection of the laws because there is no substantial difference forewarned about the status of Aurelio’s candidacy and the consequences
between the previous manual elections and the automated elections that will obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and
conducted in 2010 to justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued Aurelio bear different first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner
in 2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate who was and her political party engaged in a massive voter education during the
declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment where such nuisance campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that she was given the
candidate has the same name with that of the bona fide candidate. corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the voters should be
Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling
4116 properly recognized the substantial distinctions between and among up the same, they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial
(a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose names are Affidavits of those who voted for petitioner attesting to the fact of
similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who mistakenly shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, which
do not have similar names with those of the bona fide candidates, and (d) was attached to the petition, petitioner in effect would want this Court to
candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. sit in judgment as trier of facts.
As a result of the failure of the COMELEC’s First Division to make these
important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that applies to
disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates Ruling of the Court
whose certificates of candidacy had been cancelled or denied course,
petitioner’s right to due process was clearly violated, and only made The petition is meritorious.
possible the very evil that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not
to consider the votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but count
them in favor of the bona fide candidate. The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under
Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court is whether or not the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
Respondents’ Arguments of jurisdiction.17 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the
its exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority in the conduct of Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.18
elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party assailing it must discharge the burden of COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
clearly and convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law as elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be
the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this case, petitioner miserably interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.19 In this case, Resolution No. 8844
violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law without any issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence on
basis. the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate,
especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames
On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is as those of bona fide candidates.
a substantial distinction between a manual election where Resolution No.
4116 applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844. Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but on COMELEC when it issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72,
automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which changed Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in automated elections now contain Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
the full names of the official candidates so that when a voter shaded an
oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and
voted for that candidate, regardless of whether said candidate was later SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and
declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names of the candidates are the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of
clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these were violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
the voter’s intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to
the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under Section 211, disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
72
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
assumption of office. disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition
for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless xxxx
there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election
inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
xxxx grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
not invalidate the ballot.
a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court, under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
construing the above provisions, stated: disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative considered a candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)
policy that is contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared
winner. Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69
as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to
We disagree. disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule
provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be
considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate
second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes
other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as
provides as follows: he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC.
But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or
xxxx denied due course be considered stray?

When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of
cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been resolutions or decisions in special action cases, provides:
declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray.
The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en
disqualification by conviction in a final judgment. banc or division, particularly on special actions (disqualification cases).

Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a special action cases refer to the following:
final judgment; the law lists other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us
why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those
convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent (a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
with the other provisions of the election code.21 (Emphasis supplied; italics
not ours) (b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for (c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
disqualification, the votes cast for the disqualified candidate should result
in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated by
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the OEC.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality
We disagree.
of decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases)
the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification
cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on
candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material
disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days
representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a
from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances xxx
or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates,
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving
fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public
officials performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending
and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate,
Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona
fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for
votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for
disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due
the bona fide candidate.
course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified
or repealed. (Emphasis supplied)25
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different
remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
73
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate appreciation of ballotsapply only to elections where the names of
declared as such under a final judgment was applied by this Court in candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
Bautista v. COMELEC26 where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin
Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still The Court is not persuaded.
appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local
rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it
elections, political rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated
denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days
decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of
after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor
potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try
separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose
to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of
of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These
their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance
separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable
candidates persist.31
despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance surnames of candidates for the same position and putting the electoral
candidate was not yet final on electionday, this Court also considered those process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new
factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the
votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC
could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections,
voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just
COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor. from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot.
Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots
intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. still carry their names?
Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper
releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for
COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.27 a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly
where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a
Tribunal,28 this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under
4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify
count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a
decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections. nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on
grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance
candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly
confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published
frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’
exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for
after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate,
through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system
number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside
the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct
which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more the same.1âwphi1
than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes
after the recount.29 Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent
with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be
2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of
should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.32 Indeed, as our
COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the
resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates
petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez: and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented
by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws
is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed
of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing for, accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1,
field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates listed therein,
significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the who were declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is
the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes cast for
manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been
the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes,
election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. making her total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private
respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system
to be implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-
confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10,
point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant 2010 elections.
circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following
the precedent in Bautista. x x x30 This Decision is immediately executory.

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought Commission on Elections.
about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots,
manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial No pronouncement as to costs.
distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the
SO ORDERED.
rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance
candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines
that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on
74
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

22. and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010 probationary employment in deciding the present case.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF
PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment
vs.
Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs,
practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host
DECISION country."

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws
are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency
which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially
Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist
determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
The petition fails.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period
of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
Contract No. 2. responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign
principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
such foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent,
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
probationary period.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment


As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she
agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely
returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Maguad8 explains:
Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI
as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered
(Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not
coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end,
respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment
held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very
months unexpired portion of her contract. purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the
for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow
they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal
Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability
such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary
dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one- liability inutile.
year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners
further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary
ATCI.
employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into,
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Resolution. Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to
such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of substantiated.
the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with
it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the
agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their
and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
agreement or contract of employment. customs, public order or public policy.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of
Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
and damages awarded to overseas workers.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
certiorari was filed. Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because termination of the employment of Gran.
respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law
75
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
presumed to know only domestic or forum law. arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on
the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
supplied) performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
underscoring supplied)

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and SO ORDERED.
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a


document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA


between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which
provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1)
year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the
grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs
Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8)
months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently


prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee
under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the
pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of
the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not
prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and
that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus
the subject certifications read:

xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to


English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for
review and certification and the same was/were found to be in order. This
Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same
is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims,
viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the


contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
76
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

23. Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also
RESOLUTION
insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been
filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance
SERENO, J.: of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a
better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have
first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
matter.
Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration
of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held
that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed
The facts are as follows:
a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since
the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed
obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled
he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. in this wise:

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be:
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should
of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless
228. of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition
for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is
an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a
232. subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a
similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless
The two cases were subsequently consolidated. both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner
was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same
manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of
litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same the petitioner must perforce fail.
estate was already pending.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render


On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A. specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that provides:
petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959. xxx xxx xxx

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for
court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or
a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a
bigamy. judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial
court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the
validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never
disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to
been married to Eusebio Bristol.
deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to
make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and of administration by the trial court is in place.
granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio
xxx xxx xxx
Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without
expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy
case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
administration.4
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
77
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she authenticated by the seal of his office.
was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her
marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be
crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance
is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion. must be demonstrated.

Hence, this Petition. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner
subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that,
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of
of Sydney, Australia.
the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner
and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested
party in the estate of Orlando. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is
not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim.
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
Burden of Proving Australian Law
absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise
of sound discretion.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
valid according to their national law.
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he validating it falls squarely upon him.
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
inherit" from him.
of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this to establish the fact of divorce.
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to wit: administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
78
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a


public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in


California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY


GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated
20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of
Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
79
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

24. as long as private respondent refuses to reimburse petitioners of the value


G.R. No. 159328 October 5, 2011 of the improvements they have introduced on the lot in question, they
Heirs of ANTONIO FERAREN, represented by ANTONIO FERAREN, JR., (petitioners) may not be compelled to vacate the same.
JUSTINA FERAREN-TABORA, LEAH FERAREN-HONASAN, ELIZABETH
MARIE CLAIRE FERAREN-ARRASTIA, MA. TERESA FERAREN-GONZALES,
On appeal, the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, in its Decision dated
JOHANNA MICHELYNNE FERAREN YABUT, SCHELMA ANTONETTE
January 28, 2002, affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC.
FERAREN-MENDOZA and JUAN MIGUEL FERAREN YABUT, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former 12th Division) and CECILIA Private respondent then filed a petition for review with the CA.
TADIAR, Respondents.
DECISION On May 21, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PERALTA, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by the
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union in Civil Case No. 3463
Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the May 21, 2003 and the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union in the
Decision1 and the July 17, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in same case are both REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
CA-G.R. SP No. 71372. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the rendered:
Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 2 in Civil Case No. 34633 and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San 1. Declaring the respondents not entitled to reimbursement for
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 6617,4 while the the cost of their residential house built on the land owned by the
questioned CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. petitioner; and

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: 2. Directing the respondents to vacate the premises and restore
possession thereof to the petitioner.
On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar (Celia) filed with
the MTC of San Fernando, La Union a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer SO ORDERED.9
against herein petitioners Heirs of Antonio Feraren. In said Complaint, Celia
alleged that she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200 square
meter parcel of land located in the poblacion of San Fernando City in La The CA based its Decision on its finding that the subject residential house
Union; that on September 21, 1960, the said lot was sold by their father to was built during the time petitioners' parents were lessees of the lot in
the spouses Antonio and Justina Feraren (Spouses Feraren) on pacto de question.
retro; it was stipulated that the right to repurchase may be exercised within
ten years; on August 31, 1970, Celia and her co-heirs re-acquired the subject Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by
property; thereafter, the lot was leased on a month-to-month basis to the the CA via its Resolution dated July 17, 2003.
Spouses Feraren who have constructed a residential house thereon; that
sometime in March 1992, Celia and her co-heirs informed the Spouses
Feraren of their intention to terminate their lease contract; the Spouses Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them their house or buy the subject lot,
which offers were declined by Celia and her co-heirs and, instead, allowed I
the Spouses Feraren to continue renting the property; after the death of
Antonio in 1995, herein petitioners requested Celia and her co-heirs to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
extend the lease until June 30, 1997 and even volunteered to temporarily
PETITIONERS ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWER THAT THEIR RESIDENTIAL
vacate the said property; Celia and her co-heirs agreed and they did not
HOUSE WAS CONSTRUCTED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE LEASE
even increase the rentals; nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with
CONTRACT AND NOT DURING THE 10-YEAR PERIOD WHEN THE LOT WHERE
their commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to stay within the
IT STOOD WAS SOLD UNDER PACTO DE RETRO TO THE PETITIONERS'
premises of the subject property and refused to vacate the same
PARENTS AS SHOWN BY UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE.
notwithstanding repeated demands from Celia and her co-heirs.5

II
In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-square-meter
portion of the lot being claimed by private respondent is their property;
even before the Spouses Feraren entered into a contract of sale with pacto THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE D E C I S I O NS OF THE
de retrowith the father of Celia, the former were already in possession of REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN
the remaining portion of the subject property on the strength of a lease FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION.10
contract executed in their favor by the latter in 1949; their construction of
a residential house on the subject property was by virtue of a right granted Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house presently standing
under the said contract of lease; petitioners were very much willing to on the subject parcel of land is different from the house built on the same
vacate the disputed lot but only upon payment of the value of all the lot in 1949. Petitioners insist on their claim that the house built at the time
improvements that they have legally introduced as builders in good faith on that their parents were lessees of the subject property in 1949 was
the said lot, which includes the house presently standing thereon as well as demolished to give way to the construction of the present house which was
the concrete fence surrounding the said house; in the alternative, they erected sometime in the late 1960's when the said lot was then owned by
offered to buy the parcel of land subject of the complaint.6 their parents by virtue of the pacto de retro sale executed in the latter's
favor on September 21, 1960.
For failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, the MTC, in its
Order7 dated November 3, 2000, directed them to submit their position The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
papers and other evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
the said Order.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the present petition
are essentially questions of fact. It is fundamental that a petition for review
Private respondent did not file a position paper. on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall,
as a general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-
On the other hand, petitioners filed their Position Paper8 on March 15, bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and
2001. Petitioners alleged therein that their parents are builders in good considered by the tribunals below.11 However, there are recognized
faith having built their house on the lot in question during the time that they exceptions to this rule, to wit:
were the owners of the disputed lot.
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
On June 15, 2001, the MTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint conjectures;
for unlawful detainer. The trial court gave credence to petitioners' (b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
contention that their parents built the house in controversy on the subject impossible;
lot while they were the owners of the said lot. As such, the MTC held that (c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
80
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; Hence, the MTC erred in admitting petitioners' position paper and taking
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting; the same into consideration in rendering its judgment.
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioners'
and the appellee;
statement in their Answer, that their parents built the subject residential
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
house as lessees under the authority given to them by private respondent's
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
father in their contract of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial admission.
evidence on which they are based;
Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,21 petitioners may not
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
contradict this judicial admission unless they are able to show that it was
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
house was built during the time that their parents were the owners of the
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed lot is a direct contradiction of their judicial admission in their
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
Answer. However, petitioners failed to prove that such admission was made
a different conclusion.12
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence, they
may not contradict the same.
In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are contrary to
those made by the CA. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC that the
Aside from the abovementioned admission made by petitioners in their
subject house which is presently standing on the disputed parcel of land
Answer, there is nothing in the said Answer which claims that the subject
was built at the time that the ownership of the said lot was in the name of
house was constructed when petitioners' parents were the owners of the
petitioners' parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that the
disputed lot. Neither was there any allegation nor even a hint that a house
abovementioned house was constructed when petitioners' parents were in
was first built on the lot in question in 1949 and that the same was
possession of the lot in question as lessees. Thus, this Court's review of such
demolished in the late 1960s to give way to the construction of the house
findings is warranted.
which is presently standing on the disputed lot.1avvphi1

A careful review of the records and the evidence presented in the instant
Thus, it appears from all indications that petitioners' claims and allegations
case shows that the CA did not commit error in finding that the house in
in their Position Paper contradicting their admission in their Answer are
question was built at the time petitioners' parents possessed the subject lot
mere afterthought subsequent to realizing that they could not recover the
as lessees.
full value of the house based on their acknowledgment that the same was
erected at the time that their parents were lessees of the disputed parcel
Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' Position Paper and the of land.
affidavits of its witnesses should not have been considered by the trial
courts since these were filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period
At this juncture, it would not be amiss to reiterate that the rights of a lessee,
required under Section 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of
like petitioners in the present case, are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.13Petitioners do not dispute the
Code, which reads:
appellate court's finding that they submitted their position paper and
affidavits more than three months after the deadline set by the
abovementioned rules. In this regard, this Court, in Teraña v. De Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
Sagun,14 held as follows: suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form
or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that
x x x By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary
time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
Procedure] is to "achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination" of
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon
cases. To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit[s] certain
the property leased than is necessary.
motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion for
extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If the
extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we believe With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no
Effectively, we would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to
directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
Corporation v. Florentino [G.R. No. 134222, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA
197], albeit on the issue of late filing of an answer in a summary proceeding, Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of
we stated that "[t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory the value of the improvements that the lessee made in good faith, which
measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress." are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, and which have not
altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee
The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.22
due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with
compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private respondent prayed
property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP provides for the demolition of petitioners' residential house constructed on the
for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful subject lot. It is, thus, clear that private respondent does not want to
possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to appropriate the improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to
resolve the ejectment case quickly. x x x15 reimburse to them one-half of the value of their house. The sole right of
petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove the improvements without
As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a motion asking causing any more damage upon the property leased than is necessary.
the trial court to admit their position paper which was belatedly filed.
Indeed, the record is barren of any evidence to show that petitioners, at WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
least, tried to offer any explanation or justification for such delay. They Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
simply ignored the Rules. This Court has previously held that technical rules
may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the
deserving.16 Moreover, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience SO ORDERED.
of the litigants.17 These rules are established to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.18 They are not to be trifled
with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking "substantial
justice."19 In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that,
while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business.20 In the instant case, petitioners' complete
disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure only shows that they are not deserving of their relaxation.
81
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

25. 1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126, this Court directed, among
[ GR No. 183446, Nov 13, 2012 ] others, the PCGG to accept the cash deposit offered by Bulletin for
REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI Cojuangco's shares, subject to the foregoing alternative conditions.[6]

On 29 July 1987, in the meantime, the Republic instituted a complaint for


PEREZ, J.: reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against
President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Yap, Cojuangco, Zalamea and Atty.
In this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Manuel Montecillo (Montecillo). Docketed as Civil Case No. 0022 before
Civil Procedure, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) the Sandiganbayan, the complaint essentially alleged that Yap acted as the
primarily assails the 17 January 2008 Resolution[1] issued by public Marcos Spouses' dummy, nominee or agent in the appropriation and
respondent Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Civil Case No. 0022,[2] the concealment of shares of stock of domestic corporations like
dispositive portion of which states: Bulletin. Cojuangco and Zalamea were likewise alleged to have acted as
the Marcos Spouses' dummies, nominees or agents in illegally acquiring
Bulletin shares to prevent their disclosure and recovery. In the amended
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Republic's motion for execution is GRANTED [IN complaint the Republic filed on 10 March 1988, Cojuangco was joined as
PART]. The Court hereby ORDERS: an actor instead of a mere collaborator of Zalamea who was later dropped
as defendant from the case in view of his assignment of his 121,178 Bulletin
(a) PHILTRUST BANK to deliver to plaintiff Republic of the Philippines the shares in favor of the Republic as aforesaid. The Republic went on to amend
proceeds from the sale of the 198,052.5 Bulletin shares sold by defendant its complaint for a second time on 17 October 1990, to implead as
HMHMI to Bulletin Publishing Corporation that is now under Philtrust defendant respondent Estate of Hans Menzi (the Estate), through its
Bank Time Deposit Certificate No. 136301, in the amount of Executor, Montecillo.[7]
P19,390,156.68, plus interest earned;
On 2 April 1992 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[8] lifting the writ of
(b) Defendant Estate of Hans Menzi, through its executor Manuel G. sequestration issued by the PCGG. This was questioned by the Republic
Montecillo, to surrender for cancellation the original eight (8) Bulletin through a petition for certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No.
Certificates of Stock in his possession, i.e., Certificates Nos. 312, 292, 314, 107377. In a Resolution dated 16 July 1996, the Court reversed and set
131, 132, 293, and 313, which are part of the 212,425.5 Bulletin shares aside the assailed resolution and referred the case back to the
subject of the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 79126 dated April 15, Sandiganbayan "for resolution of the preliminary question of whether there
1988; and is prima facie factual basis for PCGG's sequestration order."[9] It was
pursuant to the foregoing resolution that the Sandiganbayan went on to
(c) Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, with respect to the 46,626 Bulletin conduct hearings on the matter and, later, to issue the Resolution dated 13
shares in the name of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and pursuant to Alternative April 1998, discounting the factual bases for PCGG's sequestration order
'A' provided for in the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, and granting the Estate's motion to lift the writ of sequestration over the
1988, in G.R. No. 79126, to execute the necessary documents in order to shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of
effect the transfer of the ownership over these shares to the Bulletin HMHMI.[10] Dissatisfied with the Resolution and the Sandiganbayan's 26
Publishing Corporation in accordance with the agreement it entered into August 1998 denial of its motion for reconsideration,[11] the Republic filed
with the latter on June 9, 1998. the petition for certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 135789.[12]

Defendants Estate of Hans Menzi and HMHMI's motion is GRANTED. The On 31 January 2002, the Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 135789,
Court hereby ORDERS PHILTRUST BANK: dismissing the Republic's petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
had the authority to resolve all incidents relative to cases involving ill-gotten
To pay the Estate of Hans Menzi, through its Executor, Manuel G. wealth and that the court's appellate jurisdiction over the graft court's
Montecillo and Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc., the amount decisions or final orders is limited to questions of law.[13] On 4 March 2002,
of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY SIX Philtrust Bank (Philtrust) filed a motion to intervene in G.R. No. 135789,
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN PESOS and 76/100 interests alleging that the writ of sequestration, which was the subject matter of the
thereon from said date of February 28, 2002, until the whole amount is case, covered the following time deposits maintained with it by HMHMI, to
paid. wit:

SO ORDERED.[3] Time Deposit Certificate Date of Certificate Original Deposit


136301 3/03/86 P19,390,156.68
162828 4/18/88 24,102,443.85
162829 4/18/88 5,826,683.26
The Facts

On 22 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government In addition to its being allowed to intervene in the case, Philtrust prayed for
(PCGG) issued a Writ of Sequestration over the shares of former President the consignation of the proceeds and interests of the foregoing TDCs as well
Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Yap (Yap) and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) as its release from its obligation pertaining thereto.[14] Alongside the
in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), together with those of their Republic's motion for reconsideration of the 31 January 2002 Decision in
nominees or agents, among them, Ceasar Zalamea (Zalamea) and Jose G.R. No. 135789, Philtrust's motions were, however, denied for lack of merit
Campos (Campos). On 12 February 1987, the PCGG also issued a Writ of in the 20 November 2002 Resolution the Court issued in the case.[15] The
Sequestration and Freeze Order over the shares of the U.S. Automotive Co., motions subsequently filed by the Republic as well as the Estate and
Inc. (US Automotive) and its officers in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway) HMHMI for the deposit of the Philtrust-tendered sums with, respectively, a
as well as the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of government bank or their own account were noted without action in the
Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI), the corporation Court's Resolution dated 22 January 2003.[16]
organized by Menzi, Campos, Cojuangco, Zalamea and Rolando Gapud, to
serve as holding company for their shares of stock in Liwayway, Menzi and In the meantime, the following issues were identified for resolution at the
Company, Inc., Menzi Agricultural, Inc., Menzi Development Corporation pre-trial conducted in Civil Case No. 0022, to wit: (a) whether or not Menzi's
and M and M Consolidated, Inc. The Writs of Sequestration issued against sale of his 154,470 Bulletin shares in favor of US Automotive was valid and
the Liwayway and Bulletin shares as well as the PCGG's then declared intent legal; and, (b) whether or not the Bulletin shares registered in the names of
to vote the sequestered shares in Bulletin were challenged by Liwayway, US Yap, Cojuangco, Zalamea, Menzi, his Estate or HMHMI were ill-
Automotive and Bulletin in the petitions for certiorari, prohibition gotten.[17] After a protracted litigation, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
and mandamus docketed before this Court as G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126.[4] Decision dated 14 March 2002,[18] the decretal portion of which states:
Following Campos' lead in waiving his rights over 46,620 Bulletin shares in
favor of the Republic, Zalamea also waived his rights over 121,178 Bulletin WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
shares in favor of the Republic on 15 October 1987. PCGG then sold the
shares of Zalamea and Campos in favor of Bulletin, which thereafter
appears to have offered a cash deposit in the sum of P8,174,470.32 for
Cojuangco's remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares.[5] Together with the 1. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are the ill-gotten
interests thereon, the amount was proposed to either: (a) standby as full wealth of the defendant Marcos spouses:
payment of Cojuangco's shares upon a final judgment declaring the
Republic the owner of said shares; or, (b) be returned to Bulletin upon a
final judgment declaring Cojuangco as true owner thereof. In the 15 April
82
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

A. The 46,626 Bulletin shares [part of the 214 block] in March 2002 Decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) as
the name of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., the proven owner thereof, the Estate validly sold the 154 block of Bulletin
subject of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated shares to US Automotive, with the indorsement and delivery of the stock
April 15, 1988 in G.R. No. 79126. certificate covering the same; and, (b) the evidence on record shows that
the 198 block of Bulletin shares as well as the 46,626 shares registered in
the name of Cojuangco which formed part of the 214 block of Bulletin
shares were ill-gotten.[20] Subsequent to the 24 January 2006 denial of its
Pursuant to alternative "A" mentioned therein, plaintiff Republic
motion for partial reconsideration of the foregoing decision,[21] the Estate,
of the Philippines through the PCGG is hereby declared the legal
alongside HMHMI, filed a Joint Manifestation dated 28 February 2006. The
owner of these shares, and is further directed to execute, in
Joint Manifestation called the Court's attention to the fact, among others,
accordance with the Agreement which is entered into with
that the motion for the release of the proceeds of the TDCs they filed in G.R.
Bulletin Publishing Corporation on June 9, 1988, the necessary
No. 135789 was merely noted without action, on the ground that the
documents in order to effect transfer of ownership over these
matter would be better ventilated and addressed in the consolidated
shares to the Bulletin Publishing Corporation.
cases. In view of the fact that the issues pertaining to the TDCs were not
addressed in the Court's 23 November 2005 Decision,[22] the Estate and
HMHMI sought the grant of the following reliefs:

B. The 198,052.5 Bulletin shares [198 block] in the


names of: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:

1. The Clerk of Court be instructed to cause the delivery of the three (3)
Certificates of Time Deposit with the attached allonge, on file with the
docket of G.R. No. 135789 to the Philtrust Bank or to its counsel of record;
No. of Shares
Jose Y. Campos 90,866.5 2. An order be issued requiring the Philtrust Bank to pay to herein
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. 90,877 Joint Movants the proceeds of the sale in 1984 of 154,472 Bulletin shares
Cesar C. Zalamea 16,309 to the U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. deposited with the Philtrust Bank admitted
Total 198,052.5 to be due as of February 28, 2002 and the proceeds of the sale of Menzi
shares in the Liwayway Publishing, Inc. to the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation, both covered by Certificates of Time Deposits admitted to be
which they transferred to HM Holdings and Management, Inc. due as of February 28, 2002, plus legal interest thereon from March 1, 2002
on August 17, 1983, and which the latter sold to Bulletin until paid.
Publishing Corporation on February 21, 1986. The proceeds from
this sale are frozen pursuant to PCGG's Writ of Sequestration 3. It is further prayed that such other reliefs be granted as to this Honorable
dated February 12, 1987, and this writ is the subject of the Court may seem just and equitable.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 31, 2002 in G.R.
No.135789.
The Joint Manifestation filed by the Estate and HMHMI was not, however,
Accordingly, the proceeds from the sale of these 198,052.5 acted upon by this Court which went on to issue an Entry of Judgment
Bulletin shares, under Philtrust Bank Time Deposit Certificate certifying the finality of the 23 November 2005 Decision in G.R. Nos.
No. 136301 dated March 3, 1986 in the amount of 152578, 154487 and 154518.[24] On 29 November 2006, the Republic filed
P19,390,156.68 plus interest earned, in the amount of its motion for the execution of the Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002 Decision
P104,967,112.62 as of February 28, 2002, per Philtrust Bank's and prayed for Philtrust's delivery of the sums covered by the decision as
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Consign the Proceeds of well as the PCGG's 12 February 1987 Freeze Order which included the sums
Time Deposits of HMHMI, filed on February 28, 2002 with the covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829.[25] Claiming that only the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135789, are hereby declared forfeited proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared forfeited in favor of the
in favor of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines. Republic in the decision sought to be executed, the Estate and HMHMI also
filed their motion for execution dated 5 December 2006, praying that
Philtrust be ordered to render an accounting of TDC Nos. 162828 and
162829 and, thereafter, to deliver in their favor the principal thereof,
2. Ordering the defendant Estate of Hans M. Menzi through its together with the stipulated and legal interests they have, in the meantime,
Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo, to surrender for cancellation earned.[26]
the original eight Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession,
which were presented in court as Exhibits 1 to 3 and 21 to 25 On 16 January 2007, the Republic filed its Comment on the motion for
(Certificate Nos. 312, 292, 314, 131, 132, 291, 293, 313, execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, arguing that said movants' claim
respectively), which are part of the 214,424.5 Bulletin shares of entitlement to the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was bereft
subject of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, of any basis. Calling attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation
1988 in G.R. No. 79126. that the Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. No. 135789, the Republic
maintained that said TDCs could not have covered the proceeds of the sale
3. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are not the ill-gotten of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive since the same had been
wealth of the defendant Marcos spouses: already received by the Estate and, per the testimony elicited from
Montecillo, were deposited with the Equitable Bank and used to pay estate
a. The 154,472 Bulletin shares [154 block] sold by the late Hans taxes due the Estate.[27] On 25 January 2007, the Estate and HMHMI also
M. Menzi to U.S. Automotive Co., Inc., the sale thereof being filed their Manifestation with Comment, asserting that only the proceeds of
valid and legal; TDC No. 136301 were declared ill-gotten in the decision sought to be
executed; hence, it necessarily followed that all the other sequestered
b. The 2,617 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant Emilio T. HMHMI assets including the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were
Yap which he owns in his own right; and not ill-gotten.[28]

c. The 1 Bulletin share in the name of the Estate of Hans M. On 26 January 2007, Yap filed his comment on the motions for execution
Menzi which it owns in its own right. filed by the Republic as well as the Estate and HMHMI. Maintaining that
the Republic had yet to effect the transfer of ownership of the 46,626
4. Dismissing, for lack of sufficient evidence, plaintiff's claim shares in favor of Bulletin pursuant to the 14 March 2002 Decision in Civil
for damages, and defendants' respective counterclaims. Case No. 0022, Yap also averred that the Estate had not yet surrendered for
cancellation the original Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession which
SO ORDERED.[19] formed part of the 214 block of Bulletin shares subject of this Court's 15
April 1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and 79126. Likewise claiming that
TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were not covered by the decision sought to
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Republic, Cojuangco and the be executed, Yap insisted that the Estate had already received the proceeds
Estate filed the petitions for review on certiorari which were respectively of TDC No. 130052 covering the sale of the 154 block of Bulletin shares to
docketed and consolidated before this Court as G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 US Automotive.[29] In support of this assertion, Yap submitted copies of TDC
and 154518. In the 23 November 2005 Decision rendered in said No. 130052 in the sum of P24,969,200.09, Montecillo's offer of surrender
consolidated cases, however, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's 14 of said TDC in exchange for full payment of said principal and the interests
83
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

thereon, as well as the manager checks and vouchers purportedly decision that has long attained finality.[35]
evidencing Philtrust's payment thereof in April 1989.[30]
In compliance with the Sandiganbayan's 17 January 2008 Resolution, on the
In its 21 February 2007 Reply to Yap's Comment on its Motion for Execution, other hand, Philtrust filed a manifestation, alleging that, upon the
on the other hand, the Estate disavowed receiving payment of the proceeds Republic's surrender of the original of TDC No. 136301, it was ready to
of TDC No. 130052 on the ground that, at the time of the supposed payment release three manager's checks in the aggregate sum of P162,245,963.71
in April 1989, the assets of HMHMI which consisted of TDC Nos. 136301, representing the principal and interests for said TDC.[36] With respect to the
162828 and 162829 had already been frozen. Contending that its continued proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829, however, Philtrust invoked
possession of the original of TDC No. 130052 was ineluctable proof of the Article 1256 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and filed a motion to consign
non-payment of the proceeds thereof, the Estate argued that Philtrust's the six manager's checks it issued to cover said TDCs' principals and
attempt to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos. 136301, 162828 and 162829 interests in the aggregate sum of P199,391,416.51. Against Philtrust's
with this Court in G.R. No. 135789 was an admission that its liability therefor allegation that it had the original copies of TDC No. 130052, Montecillo's
remained valid, subsisting and enforceable. While conceding that the letter and the check vouchers evidencing the payment Yap earlier asserted
delivery of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was not covered in his comment on their motion for execution,[37] the Estate and HMHMI
in the decision sought to be executed, the Estate asserted that the filed their comment, contending that said documents were irrelevant and
Sandiganbayan's 18 April 1995 Resolution invalidating the PCGG's Freeze inappropriate to the resolution of the pending motions and incidents. Aside
Order of HMHMI's assets was affirmed by this Court in the 31 January 2002 from the fact that Philtrust was not a party to the action, the Estate and
Decision in G.R. No. 135789.[31] HMHMI argued that the bank had already recognized them as the payees
of the subject TDCs in the motion to intervene it earlier filed in G.R. No.
On 17 January 2008, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution, 135789.[38]
partially granting the Republic's motion for execution by ordering Philtrust's
delivery of the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 and the Estate's surrender of While the Republic interposed no objection thereto,[39] Philtrust's motion
the original 8 Bulletin certificates of stock which were part of the 212,425.5 for consignation was opposed by Montecillo, in view of the fact that the
shares subject of this Court's 15 April 1988 Decision in G.R. Nos. 77422 and Sandiganbayan's 17 January 2008 Resolution had already directed the
79126. In accordance with the same decision, the Republic was additionally payment of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the
ordered to effect the transfer of Cojuangco's 46,626 shares in favor of Estate and HMHMI.[40] On 22 May 2008, the Sandiganbayan issued the
Bulletin, subject to Alternative "A" stated therein. Likewise granting the second assailed Resolution, denying the Republic's motion for partial
motion for execution filed by the Estate and HMHMI, the Sandiganbayan reconsideration for lack of merit, on the ground that the argument raised in
directed Philtrust to pay in their favor the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and support thereof had already been weighed and passed upon in its
162829. Brushing aside the documents attached to Yap's comment for lack Resolution of 17 January 2008. Absent any finding that the proceeds of the
of proper authentication and non-presentation at the trial of the case on subject TDCs were ill-gotten, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the lifting of the
the merits,[32] the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: sequestration or freeze order over the same confirmed the legality of the
provenance thereof.[41]

x x x. While it is appropriate to order Philtrust Bank to deliver all amounts


covered by this Court's March 14, 2002 [D]ecision, the same cannot be said The Issue
of those covered by the February 12, 1987 sequestration order of the
PCGG. The records of this case reveal that the said sequestration was On 21 July 2008, the Republic filed the petition at bench[42] which it
already lifted by this Court on April 13, 1998. This was affirmed by the subsequently amended, in view of Philtrust's 9 July 2009 release of the
Supreme Court on January 31, 2002. Plaintiff Republic's motion for proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI
reconsideration was denied on the ground that it had been mooted by the at the instance of respondents Sandiganbayan Sheriffs Reynaldo
Sandiganbayan's decision of March 14, 2002 that declared certain shares as Melquiades and Albert dela Cruz. In urging the nullification of the assailed
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Resolutions dated 17 January 2008 and 22 May 2008,[43] the Republic argues
that:
As correctly argued by defendants Estate and HMHMI, the issue of the
propriety of the sequestration order was already subsumed in the said
Sandiganbayan decision. While it is true that neither the Sandiganbayan THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
decision nor the Supreme Court's of November 23, 2005, affirming this DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
Court's verdict categorically declared the proceeds of CTD Nos. 162828 and ORDERING PHILTRUST BANK TO PAY THE ESTATE OF HANS MENZI,
162829 as not ill-gotten, the only logical and, to stress, legal conclusion is THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR[,] MANUEL G. MONTECILLO[,] AND HANS MENZI
that said assets came to exist as a result of a legitimate activity or enterprise HOLDINGS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
and, therefore, not ill-gotten at all. Putting it differently, the lifting of the FIFTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE
sequestration or freeze order confirmed the legitimacy of these assets. HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN AND 76/100 (P156,826,937.76) PESOS,
REPRESENTING THE PROCEEDS OF THE TIME DEPOSIT CERTIFICATE NOS.
The presumption of law, albeit disputable, include[s] regularity and fairness 162828 AND 162829 AND ALL ACCRUED LEGAL INTEREST THEREON.[44]
of private transactions; adherence to the ordinary course of business; and
compliance with pertinent laws. The prosecution had the burden to
introduce evidence to overturn said legal presumptions and to prove that On 2 September 2008, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring the Estate
the assets under consideration originated from some illicit source if only to and HMHMI as well as the Sandiganbayan and respondent Sheriffs to file
sustain the government's claim therefor. This Court and the Supreme Court their comment on the amended petition. In said resolution, the Court also
found the prosecution miserably failed to do so, and their respective granted the Republic's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
rulings, having attained final and executory status, are now, under well- injunction for the return and re-deposit of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828
established jurisprudence, "immutable and unalterable." Hence, the assets and 162829 which had, in the meantime, been released by Philtrust to the
could not possibly be legally awarded to the State. It is but just then that Estate and HMHMI.[45]
the funds covered by CTD Nos. 162828 and 162829 be returned to HMHMI
under whose name they were deposited. There subsists no rational, legal
or equitable basis to further withhold said assets from the evident owner The Court's Ruling
thereof.[33]
We find the petition bereft of merit.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing disposition, the Republic filed its motion for In seeking the reversal of the assailed resolutions, the Republic argues that
partial reconsideration, insisting that the sums covered by TDC Nos. 162828 the Estate and HMHMI's claim of entitlement to the proceeds of TDC Nos.
and 162829 could not have referred to the proceeds of the sale of the 154 162828 and 162829 is bereft of factual and legal bases. In support thereof,
block of Bulletin shares which, at the trial of the case on the merits, the Republic once again calls attention to the 28 February 2006 Joint
Montecillo admitted to have deposited with the Equitable Bank and used to Manifestation filed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518 in which the
pay the estate taxes due from the Estate. The Republic argued that this Estate and HMHMI supposedly asserted that the proceeds of the subject
Court's affirmance of the lifting of the writ of sequestration ordered by the TDCs were those of "the sale in 1984 of 154,472 Bulletin shares to the U.S.
Sandiganbayan was not fatal to its cause and could not be construed as Automotive Co., Inc. deposited with the Philtrust Bank admitted to be due
justification for the release of the proceeds of the TDCs to the Estate and as of February 28, 2002." It is argued that the falsity of this claim is evident
HMHMI.[34] Maintaining that the Republic's motion for partial from: (a) Montecillo's testimony on record that the proceeds of said sale
reconsideration was pro-forma, the Estate and HMHMI also filed their were deposited with Equitable Bank and used to pay the estate taxes due
opposition, on the ground that a forfeiture of the proceeds of the subject from the Estate; and (b) Yap's 19 January 2007 Comment on the motions
TDCs in favor of the former would be tantamount to an alteration of a for execution filed a quo which showed that the proceeds of the same sale
84
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

were deposited with Philtrust under TDC No. 130052 which had, in turn, You are saying that the deposit of this purchase price of 154,476
been already paid in April 1989. The Republic ultimately argues that the shares of Hans Menzi to U.S. Automotive was deposited at Equitable
lifting of the writ of sequestration over HMHMI's assets does not Bank and was also subject of sequestration?
automatically mean that the Estate and HMHMI are entitled to the a. No sir, it was use[d] to pay the estate tax.[49]
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 since the provenance thereof has
yet to be actually litigated before and submitted for judgment by the Having been made by their executor during the trial of the case on the
Sandiganbayan.[46] merits, these declarations are binding, at least insofar as the Estate is
concerned. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
At the outset, it bears pointing out that the 28 February 2006 Joint Evidence, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
Manifestation the Estate and HMHMI filed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. It may be made:
154518 prayed that Philtrust be required to pay them not only the proceeds (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either
of the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to the US Automotive but also "the by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of
proceeds of the sale of Menzi shares in the Liwayway Publishing, Inc. to the judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[50] When made in the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation, both covered by the Certificates of Time same case in which it is offered,[51] "no evidence is needed to prove the
Deposits admitted to be due as of February 28, 2002, plus legal interest same and it cannot be contradicted unless it is shown to have been made
thereon from March 1, 2002 until paid."[47] This Court's 23 November 2005 through palpable mistake or when no such admission was made."[52] The
Decision in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518 affirmed the validity of admission becomes conclusive on him, and all proofs submitted contrary
the sale of said 154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive in the following thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection
wise: is interposed by the adverse party or not.[53] Absent any showing in the
record that the above-quoted declarations were made by Montecillo
through palpable mistake, the Republic correctly argues that they are
x x x. Atty. Montecillo's authority to negotiate the transfer and execute the binding upon the Estate which, for said reason, is precluded from claiming
necessary documents for the sale of the 154 block is found in the General that the funds deposited under TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 came from
Power of Attorney executed by Menzi on May 23, 1984 which specifically the 1984 sale of Bulletin shares to US Automotive.
authorizes Atty. Montecillo "[T]o sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over
upon such consideration and under such terms and conditions as he may At any rate, it further appears that part of the proceeds of the sale of the
deem proper, any and all stocks or shares of stock, now standing or which subject Bulletin shares to US Automotive which had been deposited with
may thereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all company or Philtrust, had also been maintained by the Estate under TDC No. 130052
corporation, and for that purpose to make, sign and execute all necessary and not TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. In his Comment on the motions for
instruments, contracts, documents or acts of assignment or transfer." execution filed a quo by the Republic as well as the Estate and HMHMI, Yap
claimed as much and submitted copies of: (a) TDC No. 130052; (b)
Atty. Montecillo's authority to accept payment of the purchase price for the Montecillo's 6 March 1989 letter offering the surrender of said TDC in
154 block sold to US Automotive after Menzi's death springs from the exchange for the full payment of its principal and interest; and (c) the 7 April
latter's Last will and Testament and the Order of the probate court 1989 manager's checks issued by Philtrust in payment of the TDC's
confirming the sale and authorizing Atty. Montecillo to accept payment P24,969,200.09 principal and P1,776,788.90 interest, the receipt of which
therefor. Hence, before and after Menzi's death, Atty. Montecillo was was duly acknowledged by Montecillo.[54] Yap's claim, as well as the
vested with ample authority to effect the sale of the 154 block to US existence of the foregoing documents was significantly affirmed by Philtrust
Automotive. in its 17 March 2008 motion to consign the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828
and 162829.[55] Considering that TDC No. 130052 was issued in its
That the 154 block was not included in the inventory is plausibly explained name,[56] the Estate was clearly out on a limb in claiming that the payment
by the fact that at the time the inventory of the assets of Menzi's estate was of the proceeds thereof in 1989 was not possible since supposedly, at the
taken, the sale of the 154 block had already been consummated. Besides, time, HMHMI's assets had already been frozen pursuant to the writ of
the non-inclusion of the proceeds of the sale in the inventory does not sequestration issued by the PCGG.[57]
affect the validity of the legality of the sale itself.[48]
While they could not have come from the proceeds of the 1984 sale of
154,472 Bulletin shares to US Automotive, there is, on the other hand,
Despite the validity of the sale, however, the Republic correctly argues that ample showing in the record that the deposits under TDC Nos. 162828 and
the funds deposited under TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 could not have 162829 were sourced from sale by the Estate and HMHMI of their Liwayway
been sourced from the 1984 sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares to US shares. In the amended petition at bench, the Republic very distinctly
Automotive, considering that the evidence on record indicates that the asserted that the funds covered by the subject TDCs are actually the
proceeds thereof had not been deposited with Philtrust and had already proceeds from the sale of shares of stock of Liwayway and not of
been expended for the estate taxes due from the Estate. No less than its Bulletin.[58] Aside from the proceeds of the sale of 154,472 Bulletin shares
Executor, Montecillo, made the following admissions during the trial of the to US Automotive, as earlier noted, the Estate and HMHMI had, in turn,
case on the merits: prayed for the payment of the proceeds of the Estate's sale of Menzi's
shares in Liwayway in the Joint Manifestation they filed in G.R. Nos. 152578,
154487 and 154518.[59] In his 17 July 2006 Comment on the foregoing Joint
ATTY. JASO: Manifestation, Yap likewise maintained that TDC No. 162828 covers the
And also Atty. Montecillo you sold to U.S. Automotive the 154,472 proceeds of the sale by HMHMI of its shares in Liwayway in favor of US
q.
shares of the Bulletin am I correct? Automotive and that TDC No. 162829 covers about half of the proceeds of
Of the Bulletin, it is owned by Hans M. Menzi and registered in his the Estate's sale of its Liwayway shares in favor of Liwayway itself.[60] With
a.
name. Menzi's sale of his Bulletin shares to US Automative already discounted as
Showing to you a document which is a Re[ceipt] dated May 15, 1985, the origin of the funds deposited under the subject TDCs, this confluence of
q. can you tell the Honorable Court if you had issued that document the parties' assertions and/or admissions lends credence to the Republic's
before? position that they were sourced from the sale by the Estate and HMHMI of
Yes is this Exhibit 1, Yap in the preliminary hearing dated May 15, their Liwayway shares.
a.
1985 I signed for the estate as its executor.
AJ DE LEON: The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that no grave abuse of
xxxx discretion is imputable against the Sandiganbayan for denying the
W[ere] the proceeds of that also deposited in the Phil[t]rust account Republic's motion for execution, insofar as it related to the delivery in its
q.
you just mentioned? favor of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. By the Republic's
a. No Your Honor that is an estate. own admission, after all, the validity of the transfer and/or legality of
q. No the proceed[s] of the sale of 154,000? ownership of Liwayway shares was not litigated in Civil Case No.
No Your Honor that was sold in 1985. The account with Phil[t]rust 0022[61] since the issues identified for resolution at the pre-trial of the case
a.
was opened in 1986. only included the ownership and transfer of the Bulletin shares therein
The purchase price of 154,476 shares of Hans Menzi sold to U.S. identified.[62] Not having been litigated upon, factual and legal issues
q.
Automotive where was it deposited? concerning said Liwayway shares were, therefore, understandably not
As I remember correctly, it was deposited to Equitable Bank determined in the 14 March 2002 Decision subsequently rendered in the
a. Corporation because that was the depository bank of the [E]state, case by the Sandiganbayan and, for that matter, in the 23 November 2005
Your Honor. Decision this Court rendered in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and
xxxx 154518. Unsuccessful in seeking the release of said funds in G.R. No.
AJ DE LEON: 135789 after this Court rendered the 31 January 2002 Decision affirming
the Sandiganbayan's dissolution of the writ of sequestration issued by the
PCGG,[63] the Estate and HMHMI had, in fact, revived the issue of their
85
Evidence
Full text; Atty. Cañamo

entitlement to the proceeds of the subject TDCs when they filed their 28 23 November 2005 Decision this Court subsequently rendered in G.R. Nos.
February 2006 Joint Manifestation in said consolidated cases. 152578, 154487 and 154518. With the issuance of an entry of judgment in
said consolidated cases,[79] it further appears that the Court no longer acted
Considering the finality of this Court's 23 November 2005 Decision affirming on the 28 February 2006 Joint Manifestation filed by the Estate and HMHMI,
the Sandiganbayan's 14 March 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 0022, we find for the purpose of seeking the release of the proceeds of, among others,
that the Estate and HMHMI correctly argue against the disposition of the TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829.[80] Be that as it may, however, it cannot be
proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Republic by means gainsaid that, by the time the Republic commenced the petition at bench
of the writ of execution the latter sought a quo. Having been sourced from on 21 July 2008, more than five years had already elapsed since the decision
the disposition of said Liwayway shares, the proceeds of the subject TDCs in G.R. No. 135789 attained finality on 13 December 2002.[81]
cannot be released in favor of the Republic without varying the decision
sought to be executed which, as admitted, did not make any determination Given the finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the
regarding the validity of the ownership of the same shares and/or the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the Republic to allege and prove the
legality of the transfer thereof. It is a matter of settled legal principle that illegality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of the
a writ of execution must adhere to every essential particular of the transfers thereof, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be
judgment sought to be executed.[64] The writ cannot vary or go beyond the faulted for ordering the release of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of
terms of the judgment and must conform to the dispositive portion the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in the form of a
thereof.[65] Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution provisional remedy, sequestration is merely "intended to prevent the
which varies the tenor of the judgment or, for that matter, exceeds the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties and,
terms thereof is a nullity.[66] thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial determination
in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-
Even more fundamentally, the award of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 gotten."[82] While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not
and 162829 sought by the Republic would be tantamount to an alteration necessarily be fatal to the main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the
of the decisions rendered by the Sandiganbayan and this Court, which have sequestered property is not ill-gotten,[83] it cannot be over-emphasized that
already attained finality. Except for clerical errors and in cases of void there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would
judgments and nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any justify the Republic's continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that
party,[67] nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes matter, the prolonged withholding of the proceeds thereof from the Estate
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.[68] It cannot, and HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of a resort
therefore, be gainsaid that such a judgment may no longer be modified in to other ancillary remedies since the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived sequestration cases demands that it should also have the authority to
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the preserve the subject matter of the cases or put the same in custodia
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the legis,[84] this is unavailing to the Republic since, by its own admission, the
highest court of the land.[69] The reason is grounded on the fundamental Liwayway shares were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022.
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some Like the remedies of "freeze order" and "provisional takeover" with which
definite date fixed by law.[70] "Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, the PCGG has been equipped, sequestration is not meant to deprive the
thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same
of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling in the sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these
justiciable controversies with finality."[71] can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by
law.[85] These remedies "are severe, radical measures taken against
Gauged from the procedural antecedents of the case, however, the above- apparent, ostensible owners of property, or parties against whom, at the
discussed principles do not apply to the Sandiganbayan's grant of the worst, there are merely prima facieindications of having amassed 'ill-gotten
release of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the wealth,' indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts
Estate and HMHMI. While it is true that the latter filed a motion for in accordance with the judicial procedures of the land."[86] Considering that
execution ostensibly seeking the enforcement of the 14 March 2002 sequestration is not meant to create a permanent situation as regards the
Decision rendered in the case, the release of the proceeds of the subject property subject thereof and subsists only until ownership is finally
TDCs in their favor is clearly justified by the earlier lifting of the writ of judicially determined,[87] it stands to reason that, upon its dissolution, the
sequestration issued by the PCGG over the shares of stock, assets, property sequestered should likewise be returned to its owner/s. Indeed,
properties, records and documents of HMHMI. In compliance with this sequestration cannot be allowed interminably and forever, if it is to adhere
Court's 16 July 1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 107377 requiring the to constitutional due process.[88]
determination of the factual basis for the same writ of sequestration,[72] the
record shows that the Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the matter WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
and, based on the evidence presented, issued a Resolution dated 13 April Sandiganbayan's assailed Resolutions dated 17 January 2008 and 22 May
1998, lifting the writ of sequestration thus issued for lack of factual 2008 are, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto. The 2 September 2008 writ of
basis.[73] Together with the 21 August 1998 Resolution denying the preliminary mandatory injunction issued in the case is likewise DISSOLVED.
Republic's motion for reconsideration thereof, the lifting of the writ of
sequestration ordered by the Sandiganbayan was affirmed in the 31 January SO ORDERED.
2002 Decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 135789.[74]

Over the years, the Estate and HMHMI had, of course, unsuccessfully
prayed for the release of the proceeds of the subject TDCs in their
favor. Pursuant to the 24 March 2003 Resolution issued in G.R. No. 135789,
HMHMI's motion for the release of the checks Philtrust issued for the
principals of and interests on TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 was noted
without action on the ground that the matter "should be ventilated and
addressed in G.R. Nos. 152578, 154487 and 154518.[75] Acting on the Urgent
Motion and Manifestation to the same effect filed by the Estate and
HMHMI in the same case, the Court issued an extended Resolution dated 6
October 2003, reiterating its earlier action on the ground that the resolution
of said consolidated cases was "intimately related to the propriety of any
disbursement of the funds in the hands of Philtrust Bank."[76] The 3
November 2003 Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution/Delivery of
Properties Subject of Sequestration which the Estate filed with the
Sandiganbayan[77] was, on the other hand, noted without action in said
court's Resolution dated 9 March 2004 on the ground of loss of jurisdiction,
in view of the pendency of said appeal before this Court.[78]

Despite this Court's 31 January 2002 affirmance of the lifting of the writ of
execution of the PCGG's sequestration order, the record shows that the
Republic made no move towards the inclusion in Civil Case No. 0022 of the
issues pertaining to the legality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares
and/or the validity of the transfers thereof. Not having been addressed in
the 14 March 2002 Decision rendered in the case, said issues were,
consequently, not likewise tackled when said decision was affirmed in the

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