POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
MERCADO VS MANZANO HELD:
GR NO. 135083
AREVALO
DOCTRINE:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individual’s volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV,
Section 5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged
that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec.
40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until
after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but
suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to intervene
in the case for disqualification. 31August: COMELEC en banc reversed
decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for
vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of
the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship
when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998
Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the
reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of
Makati.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano can be considered as a Filipino citizen
1 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Yes. by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship.To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.His declarations will be taken upon the
faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country
such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition. With respect to dual allegiance,
Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
MARIA JANETTE TECSON VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434, March 3 2004
DOCTRINE:
Since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was
in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not
he is legitimate or illegitimate
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in
G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based
the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
2 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Yes. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
CO vs. HRET & ONG
G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991
CRUZ, CHANINE
DOCTRINE:
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born
of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed in equal footing. They
the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially
the same similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the
amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after
the effectivity of that Constitution.
FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The
petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging
that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Ong is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the
father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose"
to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have
elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with
a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which
he could possibly have chosen.
Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Section 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying
not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987
but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to
correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. To
make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
3 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
alien father were placed in equal footing. They were both considered as
natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-
born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result
members. It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is,
in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally
all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
There is no dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at
the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not
the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes
material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the
respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came
of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious.
He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
DISSENTING: (Padilla, J.) The records show that private respondent was
born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen,
and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern
Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen
(not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese
citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935
Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth
on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines
were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of
the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. Following the basic
definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to
the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese
citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth,
private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
BENGZON III vs. HRET & CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
DOCTRINE: stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. As respondent
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives. The petition is hereby dismissed.
FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in
view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member
of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." Cruz
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935Constitution.On November 5, 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."On March 17, 1994,
Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the
House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship?
HELD:
Yes. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. In Cruz's case, he lost his
Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
DISSENTING: (SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.) Under the April 7, 1900
Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine
Commission, considered as our first colonial charter or fundamental law,
we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much
less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a
loose or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise
of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status
to achieve with the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could
be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine. This liberal
policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law or
the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the
Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those
naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later
was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a
privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually
continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands. Even at the time of its
conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was
conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship.
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at
birth, having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was
automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his
citizenship after losing it.
HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition
of a natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers
to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to
wit:
"SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;

4 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect (Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. In his complaint affidavit filed
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law." before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting
made false assertions in his COC during the 2001 and 2004 elections,
Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are stating the following items: that he is a natural born/Filipino Citizen, the
only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001 in the Philippines and in
respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born the Constituency where he seek to be elected; that he is ELIGIBLE for the
Filipino citizen. office he seeks to be elected.

I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution
defines natural-born citizens as "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering
service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."
Respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again
become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American
citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship.
CORDORA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009
CRUZ, CHRISTINE
DOCTRINE:
It is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to
file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance
contained therein.
FACTS:
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public
office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements. To disprove Tambunting's claim, Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines
on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute the claim,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he
was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further
denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of
citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting's father
petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambunting's citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A.
No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since
birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino
language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting
maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was
shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of residency stated in
Tambunting's certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting
contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora's
complaint because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordora's reliance on the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not
sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen. The

5 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
COMELEC Law Department. considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
NB: Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a have renounced Philippine citizenship.
separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En
Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of
candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. an individual's volition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tambunting meets the citizenship and residency
requirement for local public office
HELD:
YES. The court agrees with Commissioner Sarmiento's observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances
of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo
the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing
of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that
Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for
public office.
In Mercado v. Manzano, dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective local position. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with
dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual's
active participation in the naturalization process. Under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to
retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an
implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Section 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective
public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 (this is also known as the twin
requirement). In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence,
the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of Add’l info: Cordora's reasoning as to Tambunting's residency fails
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency,
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows is not dependent upon citizenship.
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any Petition is dismissed.
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is ROSELLER DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009
dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in DOCTRINE:
the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who

6 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law
provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance AND for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.|
FACTS:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz
were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the 2007
elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a
petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American.
However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval of his
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine
citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent Dela Cruz won as
vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities
and massive cheating.
COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying
petitioner on the ground that herein petitioner should have renounced his
American citizenship before he can run for any public elective position.
This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken by respondent
was for the purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the
same time, mean that respondent has renounced his American citizenship.
Thus, at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was, and still is, a dual
citizen, possessing both Philippine and American citizenship. For this
reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run for the abovementioned
elective position.|
Hence, De Guzman filed a MFR but it was dismissed by the COMELEC En
Banc for having been rendered moot in view of private respondent's
victory. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the
7 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from
running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American
citizenship, and in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being
moot.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his
American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
HELD:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure
to renounce his American citizenship.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines".
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who
lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American
citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on 2006.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does
not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are
not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements. To wit, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine That she is not opposed to organized government nor affiliated with any
elections.| group of persons or associations that uphold teachings and doctrines
against organized governments;
In the instant case, petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; That she is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva violence;
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. That she is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy;
That the nation which she is a subject of is not at war with the Philippines;
Additional info: as to won the issue is moot::: An issue becomes moot That she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to
when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
thereof would be without practical use and value. In this case, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China;
pendency of petitioner's election protest assailing the results of the That she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed filing of her petition up to the time of her naturalization.
assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner's
citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue remained The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that respondent failed to
relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
protest. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in lucrative trade. The RTC denied the motion and granted respondent’s
dismissing petitioner's motion for reconsideration solely on the ground that petition. The OSG or its representative failed to appear in subsequent
the same was rendered moot because he lost to private respondent. hearings, particularly during the ex-parte hearing where respondent
presented her evidence.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS The OSG then appealed to the CA, now alleging that Azucena failed to
GR No. 183110 October 7, 2013 comply with the income requirement under CA 473, because as an alien,
DUMALANTA she cannot engage in retail trade. Her business is also not a lucrative
trade. The OSG also alleged that the ex-parte proceedings that took place
DOCTRINE: in the lower court were not in the nature of public hearings.

The State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one
of its citizens, could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity
of allegiance among the members of the family. Under existing laws, an
alien may acquire Philippine citizenship either thru judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under RA 9139. A third
option, called derivative naturalization, is available to alien women married
to Filipino husbands. This third option is found under Section 15 of CA 473.
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, respondent Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She alleged the
following in her petition:
That she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
That she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the period of her stay in the Philippines;
That she has mingled socially with Filipinos and has evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the culture;
That she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
ISSUE:
WON the lower courts erred in granting Azucena’s naturalization?
HELD:
NO. Azucena has sufficiently proven that she complied with the
requirements of the law on lucrative trade and income. It was established
that she worked as a teacher in several schools, had five children with her
husband, and that she and her husband managed to send all of their
children to college. Their children have all finished their studies and are
now all professionals, three of whom were working abroad. Azucena and
her husband also sufficiently proved that they established and operated a
retail business of milling and distributing rice, corn and copra. She even
filed a joint annual tax return over their business, and that she and her
husband even brought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur.
While it was on record that Azucena filed before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation an application for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration and that it was denied, the reason for the

8 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
denial was that it was not sufficiently established that her husband was a
Filipino citizen, because only their marriage certificate was submitted as
evidence. Her application was not denied because of non-compliance with
the lucrative trade and income requirements. Therefore Azucena filed for
judicial naturalization. In her second attempt to be naturalized as a Filipino based on the standard provided in this section.
citizen, it was sufficiently established that her husband was indeed a
Filipino citizen. Since the same issue raised before the CA were brought to
the Supreme Court, the high tribunal decided it had no reason disturb the
findings of the lower courts.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET. AL. VS. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, ET.AL.
GR No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
DOCTRINE:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city, but is a natural and logical consequence of such
conversion.
FACTS:
Prior to the enactment of RA 7675, otherwise known as “An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong”, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged only to one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
then incumbent representative of the district, sponsored the bill, which
was eventually enacted as RA 7675, signed into law by President Ramos
on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994 where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion. The turn-out of the plebiscite was only
14.41% but 18, 621 voted “yes”, whereas 7, 911 voted “no.”. Based on
such results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come to the Supreme Court alleging that RA 7675 is
unconstitutional for violating the one-subject-one-bill rule, and that the
law violates Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the 1987 Constitution
which provide:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
9 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
ISSUES:
WON RA 7675 violate the one-subject-one-bill rule?
WON RA 7675 contravene Secs. 5(1) and 5(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution?
HELD:
NO. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city complies
with the mandate of the Constitution that a city with a population of at
least 250,000 or each province shall have at least one representative. This
mandate necessitated the creation of a new congressional district for
Mandaluyong. Such creation is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of the conversion into a highly urbanized city, but is actually a
natural and logical consequence of it. The one-subject-one-bill rule must
be interpreted so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
NO. While there is no mention of any census to show that Mandaluyong
and San Juan have attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into to legislative districts, this is not
enough to invalidate RA 7675. The law enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, including due consideration of the members of Congress
as to whether or not the minimum requirements for the establishments of
separate legislative districts have been complied with.
RA 7675 also does not violate Section 5(1) of Article VI, because the
present limit of 250 members for the House of Representatives is actually
flexible. The words “unless provided by law” illustrates that that the
present composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself
mandates through legislative enactment. Such increase is therefore not
unconstitutional.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
Mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the information that she
had been a resident of said district [OF TOLOSA, LEYTE] for 7 months.
Montejo, the incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
COMELEC alleging that Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement on the evidence of declarations made by her in the Voter
Registration Recordand in her Certificate of Candidacy. Marcos,
subsequently, filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" due to an honest
misinterpretation, but the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte denied
the correction because it was filed out of time. On appeal, the Second
Division of the COMELECT found the Petition for Disqualification
meritorious. COMELEC en banc also denied Marcos’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Thereafter, COMELEC issued second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of Marcos be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes, which eventually happened (70,471
votes vs 36,833 votes in favor of Marcos). [WHILE NOT STATED, HER
NAME WAS INCLUDED I THE BALLOTS PENDING FINAL DETERMINATION
OF THE CASE FILED BY MONTEJO.]
ISSUE:
WON Marcos was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte.
HELD:
Yes. Domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention
of returning there permanently. Moreover, the essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences
in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice.
In our election/political law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile. Thus, the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond
10 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
election law, it actually means only "domicile."
In addition, it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In the cast at bar, it
stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest
mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing
the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events
are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to
make her eligible to run in the First District, Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City.
Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted
down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would
reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (item
7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election (item 8). Having been forced by Montejo
to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of Marcos’s
claimed domicile, it appears that Marcos had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item
7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
It must be stressed, likewise, that absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of
origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with
the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by Montejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC). BANAT filed its petition
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Marcos, for there is a clearly established distinction between The Panganiban formula, hereinafter referred to as the Veterans Formula
the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption
that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of
law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence"
in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where
the two concepts are well delineated. Insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned — affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife —
the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence."
When petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
NB. Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
And as to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the ONE seat. This is in consonance with the first clause of Section 11(b) of
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
(BANAT) BARANGAY ASS'N. FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 179271, 179295, APRIL 21, 2009
[CAVEAT: NOT MY DIGEST. ANG SAKIT SA ULO NG CASE; MAY NUMBERS.
AYOKO MAGPANGGAP.]
DOCTRINE:
The SC ABANDONED the Panganiban formula adopted in the case of
Veterans v. COMELEC (aka Veterans Formula) WITH RESPECT TO THE
COMPUTATION OF ADDITONAL SEATS of QUALIFIED PARTIES UNDER THE
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM and adopted a new formula.
11 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
FACTS:
The 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.
In June 2007, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, before the COMELEC
because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the latter is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats.
(VF) provides separate formulas for the (1) determination of meeting the
2% [of the total party-list votes cast] threshold for 1 guaranteed seat and
(2) determination of the number of additional seats to be given to the
FIRST party-list which received more than 2% of the votes and (3)
determination of the number of additional seats to be given to the Second
as provided for by RA 7941 (Party List System Act).
The FIRST formula (w/n the 2% threshold is met) is as follows:
Number of votes of each party/ Total votes for the party-list
system = Percentage of votes garnered by the Party
If the percentage garnered is at least 2%, then the party is guaranteed
R.A. No. 7941 which states that “parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each.” This clause guarantees a seat
to the two-percenters.
The SECOND formula (how to determine the additional seats if the
percentage is more than 2% for the FIRST party) is as follows:
No. of votes of FIRST1 party/ Total No. For Party List System =
Proportion of Votes of FIRST party relative to total votes for
the
Party List System
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two
percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if
1
First party is the party garnering the highest number of votes among all party-candidates and
accordingly, has the highest percentage as against the total number of votes cast for the party
list.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second PARTIES i.e. 2nd party and so on, a different formula is used (THIRD
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. formula), to wit:
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off
is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party Additional Seats for parties concerned = [No. Of votes of
list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a concerned party/ No. Of votes of FIRST party] x No. Of additional
total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding seats allocated to FIRST party
off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then
the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the
proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is
entitled to any additional seat. multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of
the other qualified parties as well.
PROPORTION OF VOTES ADDITIONAL SEATS
RECEIVED BY FIRST PARTY The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of
Equal to or at least 6% 2 additional seats the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled
Equal to or greater than 4% but 1 additional seat to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most
less than 6% of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
Less than 4% No additional seat rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by
The Court in Veterans adopted this 6% bench mark, because the first the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two
Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate
for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of
Representatives. seats reserved under the Party-List System (Three seat Cap Rule), as well
as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
However, the SECOND formula cannot be used to determine the candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As (FIRST Formula).
explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of “additional seats” under the
For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative. This is the MAIN
the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say, ISSUE in this case (to be discussed in a while).
twenty percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second
party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, And because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal interpretation of the term “proportional representation,” this Court is
number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; party-list organizations.
and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those
of the first party. Note that the Court in Veterans laid down 4 inviolable parameters
in the Philippine-Style Party-List System, to wit:
Note that the SECOND formula is for the additional seats of the FIRST
party only. As for the additional seats of the succeeding QUALIFIED

12 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
(1) The 20% allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
(2) The 2% threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” wisdom of the legislature.
to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
(3) The 3-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one “qualifying” and two additional seat; and
(4) Proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number
of votes.
There are 5 issues involved in this case which basically involve the 4
inviolable parameters stated above. They will be discussed accordingly.
ISSUE 1: Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a
ceiling? –Ceiling. Hence, such is only permissive.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the “House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of Representatives
shall be composed of district representatives and party-list entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the
number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the
ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives.
We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives
from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
No. Of seats available to party-list representatives = [No. Of seats
available to legislative districts / 0.80] x .20
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A.7941 mandates the filling-up of
the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be
13 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x.”
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to
the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner
of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE 2: Is the 2% threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for additional seats constitutional - NO
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of
allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A.
7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which
provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x In determining
the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
The Court determined that only 17 party-list candidates received at least
2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates (total
votes cast for the party list = 15, 950,900). The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
“entitled to one seat each,” or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of
seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that “those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.” This is
where petitioners’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans
interprets the clause “in proportion to their total number of votes” to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is
contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
This Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are
50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A
party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats Total no. Of Seats allocated for Party list representatives = 55 (ISSUE 1)
to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
The Court therefore strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 as it presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives. In other words, the SECOND AND THIRD
FORMULAS provided for under the Veterans formula are hereby
abandoned.
ISSUE 3: How shall the party-list representative seats be
allocated? – See procedure below.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
ISSUE 4: How should the second round of seat allocation, i.e
additional seats, be computed? (This is the main issue).
Total no. Of votes cast for the Party-list = 15, 950,900
No. Of seats guaranteed to those who met the 2% threshold (FIRST
ROUND) = 17
No. Of seats available for SECOND ROUND = 38 [55-17=38]
1. Get the percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the no. of votes garnered by
each party by the total no. of votes cast for party-list candidates
[hereinafter PERCENTAGE].
Votes garnered by the party x total no. of votes cast = PERCENTAGE
(%)
2. Multiply the PERCENTAGE by the remaining available seats,
which is 38 to get the party’s share in the remaining additional
seats.
% x 38 = party’s ADDITIONAL seat
(The whole integer, i.e. if product is 2.79, the whole integer is 2, is the
additional share of the party. DO NOT ROUND UP.)
3. Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed.
4. Finally, apply the 3-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. For example, Party A is
guaranteed 1 seat already under the FIRST ROUND and has 2 additional
seats under the SECOND ROUND =3 seats.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
In the May 2007 Elections, the Court applied the said formula which
resulted in 36 winning party-list organizations and ALL the 55 party-list
seats are filled up.
ISSUE 5: Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? - YES
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure in ISSUE 4.
ISSUE 6: Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? NO
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. They wanted to
open up the system, and would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why they put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50[55] allocated under the party list
system.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings.
In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a
political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political the disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
15 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
Under Section 9 of R.A. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity” as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee
represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
ISSUE 6-A: Since the Constitution and RA 7941 do not prohibit the
participation of major political parties, can they be subsequently
barred from participating in the party-list elections? - YES
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections
joined Chief Justice Puno in his separate opinion.
PUNO, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
The Court effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. Inasmuch
as he agrees with the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits
the party-list system , Chief Justice Puno regrets that his interpretation of
Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of
the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not
in direct congruence with the others, hence this dissent.
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought
party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented, and not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled
through then Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly
registered political party, organization or group may participate, the role of
the Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress through the “Filipino-
style” party-
list elections.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Today, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory achieved by the
marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong Bayani. In permitting
the major political parties to participate in the party-list system, Justice
Carpio relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
However, more than the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,
the people have expressed their intention in the text of the Constitution
which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people
that matters in interpreting the Constitution.
If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system
electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized,
frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list
system.
NACHURA, Separate Opinion:
To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 11 of which sets, among others,
the inviolable parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition,
must obtain at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system in order to claim one seat in the House of Representatives. This
is referred to as the threshold vote, or the minimum vote requirement.
Here lies the crux of its unconstitutionality.
Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the
House of Representatives which may be occupied by party-list
representatives can never exceed fifty (50) because [100% / 2% = 50]. In
other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list
representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district
representatives.
By virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of seats that
the political parties, organizations or coalitions registered under the party- with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections.
list system could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50 even if
100 [400 district seats x 80%] party-list seats are available.
Accordingly, this stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A.
7941. A legal provision that poses an insurmountable barrier to the full
implementation and realization of the constitutional provision on the party-
list system should be declared void. Even if the 20% allocation is not
required to be filled up, and R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the
precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a
condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach,
totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending
condition as an affront to the fundamental law.
16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
[He then presents a formula which I DO NOT get but which effectively
lowers the threshold to 1%]. This 1%, is the more logical and equitable
formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the
composition of the House of Representatives; it would open opportunities
for the broadest people’s representation in the House of Representatives;
and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Gloria
DOCTRINE:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more
law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy.
FACTS:
In the 2001 elections, the numerous petitions received by the Comelec
and processes observed in the disposition of such petitions hindered the
early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were
promulgated only on 10 February 2001. Before the February 12, 2001
deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together
Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed
March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote: "We
carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-
partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window. It will be noted
that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional
representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections. However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we
must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on
the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace
of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition
before this Court on April 16, 2001. In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political parties." On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General,
like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA
No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." In its Resolution
dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to
file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for
the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, Comments on the second
Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court,
the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
HELD:
Yes. The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded
to the Comelec. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX
(C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-
list system. During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,
Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-
list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." Commissioner
Monsod stated that “The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if
we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts.
So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have
five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics,
the purpose and objectives of the party-list system." For its part, Section 2
of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office." Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even
the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. The import of the open
party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a
student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory
even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list
system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress. This Court, therefore, cannot allow
the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be
snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list
system.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766, April 20, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. The disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees,
under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941.
FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations
assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations. This Court resolved to consolidate the 54
petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 20 November 2012,
27 November 2012, 4 December 2012, 11 December 2012, and 19
February 2013. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-
List System Act) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. In a
Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-
list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB,
AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able
to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513,
the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
HELD:
No. Since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
18 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list
system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. Comm. Monsod, the main
sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system
exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the
party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. The
common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that
they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can
garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that
winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-
list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not
compete in legislative district elections.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only
to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections those that did not satisfy the two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may
have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy
for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have
been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution,
apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic
or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under
the new parameters prescribed by this Court. WHEREFORE, all the present
54 petitions are GRANTED.
SERENO, J. concurring and dissenting:
The party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice. I believe that the "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and
underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it
allows national and regional parties or organizations to invade what is and
should be constitutionally and statutorily protected space. What the
ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list system under the 1987
Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere political
plurality, but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.
LEONEN, J concurred, and dissented but only as to the lack of grave abuse
of discretion as ruled by the Court.
REYES, J. concurring and dissenting:
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized
and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the
last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
LIGOT VS. MATHAY
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
GOMEZ
DOCTRINE:
“That the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members
of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of
19 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase."
FACTS:
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering
a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.A.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), R.A. No. 4134 "fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect
on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December
30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00
during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision
in Philconsa vs. Mathay.
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections
and his term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for
retirement under C.A. No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the
last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in
case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of
elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant
in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity,
using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of
Congress. Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the
warrant.
Thereafter, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to
return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his
retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's
adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement
gratuity.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied. Hence the present
petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the
Auditor General.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to the increased salary of P32,000 despite the
constitutional prohibition
HELD:
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December
30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of all
members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase
(such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68
that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring
on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00
per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the
Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a
scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly."
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape
notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government
service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely
because of the constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount
in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason
that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the
service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his
retirement."
SAMPAYAN VS. DAZA
G.R. NO. 103903. SEPTEMBER 11, 1992
DOCTRINE:
20 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualification of its members.
FACTS:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional
District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking
to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the
same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of
his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration,
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before the SC that on April 2,
1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent
Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084) and that the
instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
Thereafter respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the
fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he
was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as
evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.
Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the
COMELEC (SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the
COMELEC would become moot should this Court find that his permanent
resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-immigrant visa,
asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss SPC No. 92-084.
ISSUE:
WON Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD:
The SC voted to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is
already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by
petitioners dated April 6, 1992[8]that they seek to unseat respondent from
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly,
jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the
House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since
petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the
appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the election or
a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days
after Daza's proclamation.Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be
issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of
prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
Fourth, as a de factopublic officer, respondent cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts
are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer,
he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
156 SCRA 549; G.R. No. L-79974. December 17, 1987
LAZARO
FACTS:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:
WON the confirmation of Mison's appointment by the Commission on
Appointments is necessary.
HELD:
No. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups are:
21 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. On the other
hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on
the part of the legislature.
Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the
other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
"middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and
other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in
the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
As may be seen from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by
the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers
may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the
appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the
purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of
the first sentence in Sec., 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we
must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of
what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to
the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes
"heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on
the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus"
from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs as provided under the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines. During the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, said law has to be
read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to
make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC
227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
MATILLANO MARIA VICTORIA Z.
DOCTRINE:
(KEYWORD TO RECALL THE CASE: FRANKING PRIVILEGE): A conference
committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even
where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
22 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee.
FACTS:
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank
mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the
Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming
from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from
the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
postmaster’s conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail
from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said
law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely
impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending
of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it
disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the
franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and
their widows among others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment in the bill may be settled through a
conference committee?
HELD:
YES. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House
and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was
never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the
second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
THESE ARGUMENT ARE UNACCEPTABLE.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two privilege all at once from all the other departments.
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new COMELEC VS. JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a G.R. NO. 151992. SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its MUÑEZ
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of DOCTRINE:
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81). Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual
obligations, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in
question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the FACTS:
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the
both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of appropriation of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete,
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of permanent and updated list of voters."
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be Resolution No. 00-0315 approving in principle the Voters' Registration and
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). The VRIS Project
the bill). 8The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. The
as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9where we idea is to have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant's
explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion
the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and of registration, compared and matched with other entries to eliminate
explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws double entries. A tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant voter's
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade identification card will then be issued to each registrant as a visual record
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to of the registration.
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill bid for the supply and installation of information technology equipment
that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. Private respondent Photokina
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted,
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the
We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus,
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy. on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
ADDITIONAL ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal 3252 approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn,
protection before the law? The SC ruled that there is a violation of the immediately accepted the same. The parties then proceeded to formalize
equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D. Sta.
as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by
judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Congress for the COMELEC's modernization project was only One (1)
Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of

23 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of
the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to
the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no
avail.
Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public
statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been "scrapped,
dropped, junked, or set aside." He further announced his plan to "re-
engineer" the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing
his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the "Triple E indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution
Vision."
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus,
prohibition and damages (with prayer for temporary restraining order,
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction)
against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners.
ISSUE:
WON a successful bidder may compel a government agency to formalize a
contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project.
HELD:
No. No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to
enforce the performance of contractual obligations.
The authority of public officers to enter into government contracts is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of
their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They
must exercise a high degree of caution so that the Government may not
be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. In fine, we rule that
PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA's bid is beyond the amount
appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is
not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing
the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction
and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405,
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot
be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of
public funds is concerned.
24 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." Thus, in the execution of government
contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require
the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations
made by law for each fiscal year. Complementary to the foregoing
constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and administrative
issuances that are designed to effectuate the above mandate in a detailed
manner. It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that
the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are
of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions
as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract. Using this as
our premise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA's contention that there is
already a perfected contract. While we held in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation that "the
effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is
to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder," however,
such statement would be inconsequential in a government where the
acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise
is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate
the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the
purpose for which the contract was attempted to be made. This is a
dangerous precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal
requirements as early as the bidding stage. The first step of a Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids comply with
the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid "passed" only if it complies with
all the requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the
approved budget for the contract." Extant on the record is the fact that the
VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the
amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760,
the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under
the Certification of Available Funds (CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was
available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost
of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter
into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the
amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case, the BAC
should have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have withdrawn
the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is
null and void.
We are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has
no other recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48
of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and "the officers
entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the
transaction had been wholly between private parties." So when the
contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in baseless and malicious.
excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government
is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon
were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes
personal liability thereunder. Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is
unenforceable as to the Government.
BENGZON ET AL. vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
DOCTRINE:
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
MURILLO
DOCTRINE:
The power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is limited to inquiries in
aid of legislation and not to inquiries involving private transactions for
other purposes.
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the government, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor
General, filed with the Sandiganbayan a case for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez. It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife,
together with the Marcoses, unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves
at the expense of the Filipino people. Further, it was alleged that they
obtained, with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa –
Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell
Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
On 13 September 1988, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered
a privilege speech before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL
Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies
(FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa," alleging that Lopa also took over various GOCCs
which is in violation of the law. He therefore called upon "the Senate to
look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with
regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC). Thereafter, the SBRC
started investigating on the matter and subpoenaed petitioners and Lopa.
25 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Lopa, however, refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly
prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused to
testify, invoking his right to due process. Lopa, however, sent a letter to
Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are
which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC
rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena
them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before
the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear
and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE:
W/N the SBRC’s inquiry is validly in aid of legislation, and thus, within the
scope of its power
HELD:
NO. The inquiry of the SBRC cannot be given due course.
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15
The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5
of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the
Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of
Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence,
the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation,”
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress.
The aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of the Anti-Graft
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [6]: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature. (FYI. Mr. Ricardo Lopa died
during the pendency of this case, but for the sake of espousing this
doctrine, the court underscored the limitations on SBRC’s power.)

26 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO