G.R. No.
L-4963 January 29, 1953 defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,
Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four
children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and,
in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the
court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special
pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-
defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over
the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants
are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new
Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which
the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code),
and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the
new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253,
new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides
that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be
effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may
have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O.
the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in vs.
1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of
the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
vs.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late
in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.
question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while
L-28040
the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect. L-28568
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs. Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.

L-28611
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972 Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO
DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased)
as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs. REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana
Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972 Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-
7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja,
Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the
disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832,
entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No.
7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of
the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive
property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the
community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains
exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special
Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa
Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their
son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died,
on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of
his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly
took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's
death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The
validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said
proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana
Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits;
including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending
determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has
been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to
all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by
his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse
of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de
Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with
finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims,
etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement,
partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the
estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco
de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and
without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the
following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del
Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de
Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of
P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as
his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be
considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal,
respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the
late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend
upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala,
"Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of
that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the
Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of
the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which
shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to
be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and
the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay
directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment
due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00)
and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the
corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves
and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns,
hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and
discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action,
suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have
or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos.
7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case
No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as
the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each
other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising
wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement,
and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce
absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment
under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the
papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in
her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the
corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of
the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon
receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala
property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render
this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement
of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special
Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja
appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case
No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of
disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12
October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by
Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2)
that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid,
it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana
Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision
in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the
view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the
decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed
out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a
decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of
Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still
pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances,
it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement,
Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October
1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of
Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on
the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided
the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a
useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner,
the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at
bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement
between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said
agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to
Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the
estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in
her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is
not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor
in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the
parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them,
Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed,
although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only
because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under
article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness
or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of
Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will
were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the
will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the
case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between
"Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their
individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and
approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution
proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A
expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was intended to
have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such
contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an
agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers
and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all
surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000
(Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the
sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full
payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of
Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed
de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is
consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said
owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this
agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja
was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same
appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left
blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a
proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract
with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed
that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of
P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly
notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory
term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A,
can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to
be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de
Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and
ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to
raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the
estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the
Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the
finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for
the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no
jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A)
because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco
pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de
Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since
what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the
estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court
of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided
hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she
chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article
1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale
thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and
marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the
very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself
definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the
agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the
cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special
Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157),
that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that
"no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de
Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in
the order and motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of
13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by
the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time
after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from
the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the
opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840,
page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly
intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not
preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise
affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc.,
all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in
view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new
settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and
enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a
longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another
settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose
de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R.
No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964
and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for
a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord
can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of
Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120
days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law,
and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the
appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of
the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala
property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the
payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to
her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered
into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon,
L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if
there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values
of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the
present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during
his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private
property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa
Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano,
presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of
the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and
Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion
reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568),
upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the
estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with
the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the
question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its
resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had
been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and
Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as
co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in
1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section
went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and
the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E.
Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay;
containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410.
(Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his
capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife),
seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private
property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de
Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article
160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory,
moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano,
held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the
exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its
possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of
the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-
Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than
two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No.
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and
again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the
proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein
an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala
property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix
of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955,
an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading
"Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are
plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the
Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal
and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of
the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following
evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a
1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo
(Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that
the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of
which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000.
by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the
provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his
brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-
owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check
for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The
witness further testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de
Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement
overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-
appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine
questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of
Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the
original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not
be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of
the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article
148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place,
witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by
Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no
probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had
told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the
statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead
when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since
there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio
how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to
Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's
testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof
(ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y
exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in
question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real
properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m.,
assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which
is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did
the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo"
is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross
examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant
(Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of
the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions
against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative
weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the
legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal
partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that
claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special
proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same
requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those
involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside.
Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a
deed of sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one
undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with
the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was
against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the
pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. — That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and
wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving
spouse and some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy,
alleging among other things, that she needed money for the support of her
children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy
sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A.
Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and
have never been registered up to the date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this court
(Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned above to
Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity
of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn
depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is
immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death
of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it
already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was
null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority
of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it
has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary,
still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no
other cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said
decision, of the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such
action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate
for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the
sale in their favor.
[G.R. No. 114151. September 17, 1998]
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and
LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals which ruled that the trial court, in an action for quieting of
title, did not act in excess of jurisdiction when it issued an order for the
segregation of property, after the finality of its decision.
The facts show that the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos
left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia
and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, Cebu City identified as
Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658. Upon
the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been
divided among their children with each child having a share of 36.50 square
meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square
meters of Gregorios share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriacos share and 12.17
square meters of Abundios share thereby giving her a total area of 97.43
square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square meters. It turned
out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private respondent
in this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square
meters from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio through
Laurencia, 12.17 square meters from Abundio also through Laurencia and
36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square meters
of the Alejandrino property.[2]
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters
of the property) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and
damages against private respondent Nique. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-7038 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9, presided
by Judge Benigno G. Gaviola. In due course, the lower court rendered a
decision on November 27, 1990 disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff, dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiff against defendant,
and on the Counterclaim and prayer of defendant in its Answer, the Court
hereby declares defendant as the owner in fee simple of the share of plaintiff
Laurencia Alejandrino and the shares of Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio, all
surnamed Alejandrino, of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 2798 and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658 which 4 shares totals an
area of 146 square meters more or less; and the Court further Orders plaintiff
to:
1. Vacate the premises subject of the complaint and surrender the property
to defendant to the extent of the 4 shares aforementioned;
2. Pay the defendant the amount of P15,000.00 as litigation and necessary
expenses; the sum of P10,000.00 as reimbursement for attorneys fees; the
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. Plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. CV
No. 33433 but later withdrew the same.[4] On April 13, 1992, the Court of
Appeals considered the appeal withdrawn in accordance with Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.[5]
Meanwhile, herein petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino filed on May 5, 1992
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VII, a complaint for
redemption and recovery of properties with damages against private
respondent Nique that was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11673. Adelino
B. Sitoy, Laurencias counsel in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, filed Civil Case No.
CEB-11673 for petitioner Mauricia.
The amended complaint in the latter case dated May 17, 1992 alleged that
private respondent Nique never notified petitioner Mauricia of the purchase of
121.67 square meters of the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did he give
petitioner Mauricia the preemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the
same lot. As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia manifested her willingness to
deposit with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the acquisition cost of the
portion purchased by private respondent Nique. Petitioner Mauricia also
alleged that she demanded from private respondent the area of around 24.34
square meters that the latter had unduly, baselessly and maliciously claimed
as his own but which, as part of Lot No. 2798, actually belongs to her. The
amended complaint prayed that petitioner Mauricia be allowed to redeem the
area of 121.67 square meters under the redemption price of P29,777.78 and
that private respondent Nique be ordered to execute the necessary
documents for the redemption and the eventual transfer of certificate of title
to her. The amended complaint further prayed for the return to petitioner
Mauricia of the 24.34-square-meter portion of the lot and for damages
amounting to P115,000 and attorneys fees of P30,000.
On August 2, 1993, the lower court granted the motion to admit the amended
complaint and forthwith ordered the defendant therein to file an amended
answer.
In Civil Case No. CEB-7038 in the meantime, private respondent filed a
motion for the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion of the property
that had been declared by the trial court as his own by virtue of purchase. On
May 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order the pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
ORDER
For resolution is a `Motion to Order Segregation of 146 Square Meters In Lot
No. 2798 dated January 15, 1993 filed by defendant and the `Opposition
thereto dated February 2, 1992 by plaintiff. Movant-defendant also filed a
rejoinder dated February 15, 1993 to the Opposition.
After going over the allegations in the motion, the opposition thereto and the
rejoinder as well as the records of the case, particularly the decision
rendered by this Court and the Order dated October 28, 1992, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs and allowing the issuance of a
writ of execution, the Court is inclined to Grant the instant motion.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
In addition thereto, the Court makes the following observation:
1. Plaintiff (oppositor) has a total share of 146 square meters. This is
admitted by her in her complaint (par. 4 thereof). In the decision rendered by
this Court, this share now belongs to defendant movant by way of sale. The
decision of this Court has long become final.
2. The total area of the land is 219 sq. meters (par. 2 of complaint), thus, the
share of Mauricia Alejandrino is only 73 square meters.
3. As early as June 10, 1983, Mauricia Alejandrino and Laurencia Alejandrino
had entered into an 'Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate' whereby they agreed
to divide the land subject of this case with Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146
square meters in the frontage and Mauricia Alejandrino owning 75 square
meters in the back portion (Exh. '16', Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, par.
1) (underscoring supplied), and that the parties assure each other and their
successor in interest that a right of way of two meters is granted to each
party by the other permanently (Exh. '16', par. 2). This partition is signed by
the parties and their witnesses. Although not notarized, it is certainly valid as
between the parties, Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino, being an immediate party,
may not renege on this.
4. Since the share of defendant Licerio P. Nique is specifically known to be
146 square meters, and that its location shall be on the `frontage of the
property while the 73 square meters of Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino shall be at
the back portion, then, the Court cannot see its way clear, why the 146 sq.
meters share of defendant may not be segregated.
5. The contention by oppositor that the `segregation of defendants share of
146 sq. meters from Lot No. 2798 was not decreed in the judgment is a
rather narrow way of looking at the judgment.Paragraph 1 of the dispositive
portion of the judgment by this Court, Orders plaintiff to `vacate the premises
subject of the complaint and surrender the property to defendant to the
extent of the 4 shares aforementioned. The 4 shares of Laurencia
Alejandrino of 146 sq. meters can be segregated because Laurencia and
Maurecia had already executed an extrajudicial partition indicating where
their respective shares shall be located (Exh. `16). To deny the segregation
is to make the decision of this Court just about valueless is not altogether
useless. The matter of allowing the segregation should be read into the
decision.
The bottomline is still that plaintiff Laurencia, despite the fact that the
decision of this Court had long become final; and despite the fact that she
even withdraw (sic) her appeal, she still is enjoying the fruits of the property
to the exclusion of the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the motion. The defendant Licerio
Nique may proceed to segregate his 2146 (sic) sq. meters from Lot NO. 2798
covered by TCT No. 19658, by having the same surveyed by a competent
Geodetic Engineer, at the expense of movant-defendant.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction filed before the Court of Appeals. In due course, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on August
25, 1993.
The Court of Appeals stated that, in issuing the questioned order of May 6,
1993, the respondent court was merely performing its job of seeing to it that
execution of a final judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive
part of the decision. It ratiocinated thus:
x x x. In ordering the segregation of the 146 square meters, respondent
Judge correctly referred to the text of the decision to ascertain which portion
of the land covered by TCT No. 19658 was actually sold by Laurencia
Alejandrino (sister of herein petitioner Mauricia) to private respondent Nique.
The respondent Judge did not err in relying upon Exhibit `16', the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, dated June 10, 1983, mentioned in page 3 of the
Decision. Pertinent portion of Exhibit `16 reads:
`NOW, THEREFORE, the above-named parties-heirs hereby stipulates (sic),
declare and agree as follows:
`1. That the parties have agreed to divide the parcel of land with Laurencia
Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontage and Mauricia
Alejandrino 73 square meters in the back portions;
`2. That the parties mutually and reciprocally assure each other and their
successor of interest (sic) that a right of way of two meters is granted to each
party to the other permanently. (underscoring supplied, Annex `1, Comment,
p. 65, Rollo)
duly signed by herein petitioner and witnessed by private respondent Nique.
It readily reveals that when Laurencia subsequently sold her shares to herein
private respondent, per the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1986
(Exhs. `B and `10), the parties must have referred to the 146 square meters
in the frontage described in said document, Exhibit `16. Laurencia had no
authority to sell more, or, less, than that agreed upon in the extrajudicial
settlement between her and herein petitioner Mauricia. Insofar as the latter is
concerned, she is estopped from claiming that said extrajudicial settlement
was a fatally defective instrument because it was not notarized nor
published. What is important is that private respondent personally knew
about Laurencia and Mauricias agreement because he was a witness to said
agreement and he relied upon it when he purchased the 146 square meters
from Laurencia.
It cannot be validly claimed by petitioner that she was deprived of her
property without due process of law considering that private respondent is
merely segregating the portion of the land actually sold to him by Laurencia
Alejandrino and it does not affect the 73 square meters that properly pertain
to petitioner.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that where there is ambiguity caused
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision the court
may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had
become final, and for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the
parties, the courts finding of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the
body of the decision (Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., et al., versus
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 309). The assailed order, in
effect, clarifies the exact location of the 146 square meters pursuant to
Exhibit `16. Respondent court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence,
writs of certiorari and prohibition do not lie in this case.[7]
Petitioner Mauricia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision. However, on February 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals
denied the same for lack of merit there being no new ground or compelling
reason that justifies a reconsideration of its Decision.[8]
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the decision of
the Court of Appeals, contending that the lower court acted beyond its
jurisdiction in ordering the segregation of the property bought by private
respondent as the same was not decreed in its judgment, which had long
become final and executory. Petitioner argues that partition of the property
cannot be effected because private respondent is also a defendant in Civil
Case No. CEB-11673. She asserts that Exhibit 16, the extrajudicial
settlement of estate referred to in the questioned order of the lower court,
was not discussed in the decision of the lower court and even if it were, she
could not be bound thereby considering that she was not a party litigant in
Civil Case No. CEB-7038. She questions the validity of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement because it was not notarized or published.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent alleges that although
petitioner was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, she is
estopped from questioning the decision in that case and filing the instant
petition because she had knowledge of the existence of said case where res
judicata had set in. He adds that the instant petition was filed in violation of
Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping in that the Petitioner in the instant
petition whose counsel is also the counsel of plaintiff-appellant Laurencia
Alejandrino in CA-G.R. CV No. x x x, had filed a civil action Civil Case No.
CEB-11673 x x x for REDEMPTION & RECOVERY OF PROPERTIES WITH
DAMAGES, which is presently pending before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City. He asserts that the lower court did not exceed its
jurisdiction and/or commit grave abuse of discretion in granting his motion for
segregation of the 146 square meters of the land involved that rightfully
belonged to him in accordance with the decision of the lower court. He
charges counsel for petitioner with exhibiting unethical conduct and practice
in appearing as counsel for petitioner in Civil Case No. CEB-11673 after he
had appeared for complainant Laurencia in CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 or Civil
Case No. CEB-7038.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that needs
determination is whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property,
Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common
by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a
co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.[9] Each co-owner of property which is held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of
his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.[10]
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, [11] the law allows
a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus,
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance,
alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article
1088 that provides:
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling
her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had
not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular
portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object
of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an
alienation of a co-owned property shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership, the Court said:
x x x (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-
indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the
other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the
shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary
rule that `no one can give what he does not have (Nemo dat quod non
habet). Thus, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 745), viz:
`x x x since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners
is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
`The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or
for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it.[12]
The legality of Laurencias alienation of portions of the estate of the
Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in
that case had become final and executory with Laurencias withdrawal of her
appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the
portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent
was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law,
partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs
themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition,
or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.[13]
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for
quieting of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the
property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs
themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to private
respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity
on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-
publication thereof.
On extrajudicial settlement of estate, Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means
of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it
a public document[14] that can bind third parties. However, this formal
requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of the
Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in
the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to put an end to indivision
among (his) co-heirs. Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by
the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to
terminate the co-ownership by selling her share to private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically
divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers
and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate.
The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity
as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document. In this regard, Tolentino subscribes to that
opinion when he states as follows:
x x x. We believe, however, that the public instrument is not essential to the
validity of the partition. This is not one of those contracts in which form is of
the essence. The public instrument is necessary only for the registration of
the contract, but not for its validity. The validity of an oral contract among the
heirs, terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized by the Supreme
Court in a decision x x x (where) that tribunal said: `An agreement among the
heirs that a certain lot should be sold and its proceeds paid to one of them is
a valid oral contract, and the same has the force of law between the parties
from and after the original assent thereto, and no one of them may withdraw
or oppose its execution without the consent of all.
In a still later case, the Supreme Court held that `partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance
for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property by the
heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance. Hence, the court concluded, `it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an oral agreement for distribution of the estate among
themselves.[15]
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia
evidence their intention to partition the property. It delineates what portion of
the property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is immaterial in
view of Mauricias admission that she did execute the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only mentioned the existence
of such document in its decision in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. That document
was formally offered in evidence and the court is deemed to have duly
considered[16] it in deciding the case. The court has in its favor the
presumption of regularity of the performance of its task that has not been
rebutted by petitioner Mauricia. Neither may the fact that the other heirs of
the Alejandrino spouses, named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio
did not participate in the extrajudicial settlement of estate affect its validity. In
her amended complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia
herself admitted having acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of
her brothers.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her rights
over portions she had acquired from her brothers to private respondent
Nique. The sale was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate that private respondent himself witnessed. The
extrajudicial settlement of estate having constituted a partition of the
property, Laurencia validly transferred ownership over the specific front
portion of the property with an area of 146 square meters.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order for
the segregation of the property. In so doing, it was merely reiterating the
partition of the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that
was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The order
may likewise be deemed as a clarification of its decision that had become
final and executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper execution of
the decision be rendered futile.
The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by private
respondent. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other.[17] Because the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is already
final and executory, the existence of res judicata is determinative of whether
or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the principle of res judicata to
apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two
actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action. [18] The
fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical
because petitioner was not impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the
subject matter may be the same property of the Alejandrino spouses, the
causes of action are different. Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is an action for
quieting of title and damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for
redemption and recovery of properties.
It appears moreover, that private respondents argument on forum shopping
is anchored on the fact that counsel for both plaintiffs in those two cases is
one and the same, thereby implying that the same counsel merely wanted to
prevail in the second case after having failed to do so in the first. The records
show, however, that Laurencia executed an affidavit[19] consenting to the
appearance of her counsel in any case that petitioner Mauricia might file
against private respondent. She affirmed in that affidavit that she could be
included even as a defendant in any case that petitioner Mauricia would file
because she fully agree(d) with whatever cause of action Mauricia would
have against private respondent. Such a statement can hardly constitute a
proper basis for a finding of forum shopping, much less evidence of
misconduct on the part of counsel. As noted earlier, the two cases have
different causes of action and the two plaintiffs who would have conflicting
claims under the facts of the case actually presented a united stand against
private respondent. If there is any charge that could be leveled against
counsel, it is his lack of thoroughness in pursuing the action for quieting of
title. As counsel for plaintiff therein, he could have impleaded petitioner
Mauricia knowing fully well her interest in the property involved in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits. However, such an omission is not a sufficient
ground for administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004]
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and
TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA,
SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO,
JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA
PRADO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land
consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19 th Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344
issued on August 15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the
name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado,
Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna,
respondents herein.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently
married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her
first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr.,
executed on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the
former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for
the sum of P10,500.00.[1] On July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.[2]
In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey
duplex with firewall[3] on the northern half portion of the
property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land,
did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora and her husband Wilfredo
declared the property for taxation purposes[4] and paid the corresponding
taxes thereon.[5]Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas cousin, built
a small house on the northern portion of the property.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject
property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura
and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8404.[6]Respondents alleged
that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and
Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that
Narcisas children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned
that the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into
a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half
portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the
same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the
condition annotated at the back of the title;[7] that Narcisa, as natural
guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of
the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00
out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.
In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the
property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first
husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that
the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid
as of April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support
her minor children; that Narcisas claim was barred by laches and
prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not
the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within the
prohibited period.
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo[8] dismissed the complaint. It found that the
sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of
Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling
price for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the
payment of the remaining balance; that the introduction of improvements
thereon by the petitioners was without objection from the respondents; and
that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within four years
after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in
violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.[9]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision[10] was
rendered by the Court of Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners
of the subject property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7
undivided share thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to
the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the
subject property, which is equivalent to 78.8857 square meters. In all other
respects, the same decision stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
dated January 14, 2003.[12] Hence this petition for review on the following
assigned errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
THAT, ASIDE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION
OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE SALE THAT THE
SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT
NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER RESPONDENTS HAD NO
FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY
WERE MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID TCT NO. 71344
ON AUGUST 15, 1963.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS
GUILTY OF LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8,
1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH THE
PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF
THE PROPERTY.
IV
THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY
ENRICH THE RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.[13]
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in
petitions for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.[14] It was thus error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals
grave abuse of discretion. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the
interest of justice, this Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible
error.[15]
The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or
paraphernal? (2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that
the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the land subject of the sale?
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was
entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership to operate.[16]
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she
bought the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation
with her own funds,[17] she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase
and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal
share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr.[18] A verbal assertion that she
bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a
written agreement under the parole evidence rule.[19] The so-called parole
evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or
before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms
were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned.[20]
Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in
favor of Tomas is contained in a notarized[21] document. In Spouses Alfarero,
et al. v. Spouses Sevilla, et al.,[22] it was held that a public document
executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence
of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. Otherwise
stated, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged
or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. In
order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it.[23] Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of
mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support
thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular.[24]
Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit
allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall
between the two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex
was made of strong materials, the roofing being galvanized sheets. While the
deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor
annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of
petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously,
respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners predecessor-in-
interest.
Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00
consideration was paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and
the Deed of Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in
full. Moreover, the presumption is that there was sufficient consideration for a
written contract.[25]
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half
of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other
half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his
widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the
legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-
ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the
property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate
succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa
Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso.[26]Inasmuch
as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the
said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal
share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could
validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to
Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject
property.
Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the
property within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et
al.,[27] it was held that:
xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the
property except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC
for short) within the next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is
manifestly a condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of the
Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right on appellees
herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus disponendi of the
property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It follows that
on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure
sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was
entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The
validity or invalidity of the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus
depended exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as
violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive
the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be
assailed for breach of the condition aforestated.
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and
delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet
been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court.[28] While Narcisa
could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the
same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof
before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by the
parties before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as
well as the Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY
AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of
552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy,
Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;
2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor
of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the
purpose of determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas
Calpatura, Sr. pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon by the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-
YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA
BAILON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO
AFABLE, respondents.
Veronico E. Rubio for petitioners.
Mario G. Fortes for private-respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a
determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such
laches as may effectively bar their present action.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with
notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein
private respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case,
with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio,
Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each
with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being
represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe
went to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then [Decision of
the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 39].
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon
sold a portion of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato
Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the
land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de
Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283
square meters of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and
Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special
power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold
the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It
appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in
the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in
the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936,
then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of
Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed
that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended
that the petitioners were guilty of laches.He later filed a third-party complaint
against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale
to him of the land.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described
in paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6)
respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon;
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having 1/6
share each, of the property described in paragraph III of the complaint, to wit:
a. Sabina Bailon
b. Bernabe Bailon
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order
to terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer
selected by the parties to delineate the specific part of each of the co-
owners.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs
respective shares as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:
a. P5,000.00 as damages;
b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
c. to pay the costs.
[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court insofar as it held that prescription does not he against plaintiffs-
appellees because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the
appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by
prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches,
citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v. Gamponia [100 Phil. 277 (1956)].
Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their
complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of
the equitable doctrine of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect
of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common
without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the
aggrieved co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article
493 of the Civil Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44
Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision,
the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon
which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the
subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent
Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed
parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced
the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v.
Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain
in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action. for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither
recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant
buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the
common property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of
prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code,
'(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-
owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.' [Emphasis supplied.] In Budiong v.
Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241, this Court
has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the
Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner
or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership."
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens
System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will
not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered
owners of the disputed parcel of land.
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who
are not the registered co-owners but merely represented their deceased
mother, the late Nenita Bailon, prescription lies.Respondents bolster their
argument by citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R.No. L-
15757, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that "the imprescriptibility of
a Torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is
registered" and that 'one who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land
cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim the same.'
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies
only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete
strangers. The rational is clear:
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally
unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely
step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code,
Article 777; Old Civil Code, Article 657), the title or right undergoing no
change by its transmission mortis causa [Atus, et al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil.
762, 764].
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G. R. No.
67284, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated
subsequent to the Pasion case reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus:
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes
of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100
Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein
petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co
Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and
third elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights.
However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is
required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of
defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been
afforded an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches
is not concerned with the mere lapse of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma,
G.R. No. L-63048, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].
The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35].
[Emphasis supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights,
such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any
opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the
sale made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners
had entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia
Bailon who was the oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact,
Nicanor Lee, a son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the
plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother was only
the administrator of the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters
were away [TSN, October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao
left Sorsogon in 1942 after she got married, it was only in 1983 that she
returned. Sabina on the other hand, is said to be living in Zamboanga while
Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has not been heard from since then.
Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent derived his
title, made the disputed sales covering the entire property, the herein
petitioners were unaware thereof.
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit
inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions
entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to
Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she
and her co-petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The
appellate court thus erred in holding that 'the petitioners did nothing to show
interest in the land." For the administration of the parcel of land was
entrusted to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof
precisely because the other co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they
reside outside of Sorsogon where the land is situated. Her co-owners also
allowed her to appropriate the entire produce for herself because it was not
even enough for her daily consumption [TSN, October 5, 1983, pp. 17-18].
And since petitioner was the one receiving the produce, it is but natural that
she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if
knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later,
they cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to
the trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by
the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their
consent in 1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute the proper
action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners.
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would
assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private
respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that
the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two
signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to self was
granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as
"unregistered," the truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was
titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was
already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from
his testimony before the court a quo:
COURT:
Q: From whom did you get the certificate of Title?
A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.
Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12) When cross-examined, he
stated:
Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was given to you in the year
1974, was it not?
A: 1975.
Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title was in the name of several
persons, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of several persons, you filed a
case in court for authority to cancel the title to be transferred in your name, is
it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was denied by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon because
there was ordinary one signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was it
not?
A: Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names
the lot subject of the sale was registered should have prompted a searching
inquiry by Afable considering the well- known rule in this jurisdiction that:
... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such
inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622,
January 29, 1988).
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a
genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who
were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his
possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum
degree of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have
bought the lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be
occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein
petitioner Delia Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously
to cure the flaw [TSN, July 27, 1983, p.6]. Later, he even filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was denied as
aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino
Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he
who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial
court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K.
KALAW, respondents.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming
to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the
probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa
City, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare
thus to be my last will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa
City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix
hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable
monument to perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K.
Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814
of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3,
197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the
signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one
and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the
decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit
'C', should be admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions
or additions above-mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of
the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends
that the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the
ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the
Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties
did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be
in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code
is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or
additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the
testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of
Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of
Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since
the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of
her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary
disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2,
1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and
explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order
dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition
for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not
the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made
by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature,
... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an
Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de
4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication
by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after
that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be
given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But
that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only
the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity
of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations
made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the
Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new Civil Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia
que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga palabras
tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo
su firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal
omision solo puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca
al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de
aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo
de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte
esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el
precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y
congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las
adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las
escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro
no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras
enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni
susciten duda alguna acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan
meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia
alguna(l).
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este
ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados
sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo
substancial la express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi
lo advierte la sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un
testamento olografo por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del
guarismo ultimo del año en que fue extendido3(Emphasis ours).
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of
respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Relova, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is
bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the
holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother
Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix
in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously
an educated person would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead
of consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in order
to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be noted that the first
alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the testatrix. Only the second
alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will
replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same
was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as
mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered
will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the
trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting
substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming
Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both
Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate estate.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is
bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the
holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother
Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix
in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously
an educated person would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead
of consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in order
to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be noted that the first
alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the testatrix. Only the second
alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will
replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same
was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as
mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered
will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the
trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting
substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming
Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both
Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate estate.
G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and
ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.
Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the
municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of
seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the
questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding
in Civil Case No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and
entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With
Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an
allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-
named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and
considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of
Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to
attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor
Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of
the late Isabelo Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary
attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent
Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon
filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the
attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were
in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to
come to the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing
the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge was
restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the
municipal court read as follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
— Versus —
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO
NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x ----------------------
-----------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court,
respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long
been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have
(sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other
things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the
possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to
recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;
That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned
property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;
That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary
attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of
P 2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case,
a writ of preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the
defendant to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the
principal against the defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest
from September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness
mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late
Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of
action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a
deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts
or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased
persons. The proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings
in the court of first instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming
without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent
that he committed a very grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded
the provisions of the Rules of Court and decisions of this honorable Court
when he issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment, when there is no
showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient cause of action, that there is
no other security for the claim sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or that
the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is
prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There was no bond to answer for
whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in
the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled
it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed
that the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in
the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the
contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations
are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second
paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (herein
petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts
to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent
paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the
late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the
complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the
collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally
unnumbered, expressly states as a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo
Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of
action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a
legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3)
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with
consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an
action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar
Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs.
Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251,
255). On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides
that the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that
constitute the three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint
states a cause of action; (Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a
motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an
indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty
to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to
show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the
liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that
the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with
consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of
action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case
against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly
belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the
possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late
Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The
ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main
action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due
respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has
nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court
when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with
his evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss
the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon.
Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that
the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his
carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's
motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order the
return of the carabaos said:
... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party
complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in
questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both
parties will not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is
hereby given 10 days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party
complaint. The plaintiff who in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss
pray (sic) for the custody of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff
to put up the additional bond of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be
entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos subject of litigation pending final
termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to
applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested
exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no other should be
considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the complaint states
no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:
As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to
dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged
therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September
29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95
Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964,
10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751,
February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 526, 531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply
because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging
that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the
carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper
procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding
debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as
defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in
accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices
of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts
of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and
effectivity thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to
dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the
allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no
need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the
issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in
issuing the subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory
injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond
filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant.
Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas Cary Welch for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas
Rodriguez y Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February
25, 1924, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres,
one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be
allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the
deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity
because at the time of senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that
undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the
document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that
the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through
fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the
legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial judge appeared, among
others, these findings:
All this evidence taken together with the circumstances that before and at the
time Tomas Rodriguez was caused to sign the supposed will Exhibit A, and
the copies thereof there already existed a final judgment as to his mental
condition wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to
take care of himself and manage his estate shows in a clear and conclusive
manner that at the time of signing the supposed will of Tomas Rodriguez did
not possess such mental capacity as was necessary to be able him to
dispose of his property by the supposed will.
But even supposing as contended by petitioner's counsel that Tomas
Rodriguez was at the time of execution of the will, competent to make a will,
the court is of the opinion that the will cannot be probated for it appears from
the declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee
Luz Lopez presented the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she
told him to sign said Exhibit A because it was a document relative to the
complaint against one Castito, which Exhibit 4, then pending in the justice of
the peace court, and for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was
then under guardianship, due to his being mentally and physically
incapacitated and therefore unable to manage his property and take care of
himself. It must also be taken into account that Tomas Rodriguez was an old
man 76 years of age, and was sick in the hospital when his signature to the
supposed will was obtained. All of this shows that the signature of Tomas
Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained through fraudulent and deceitful
representations of those who were interested in it. (Record on Appeal, p. 23)
From the decision and judgment above-mentioned the proponents have
appealed. Two errors are specified, viz: (1) The court below erred in holding
that at the time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess the
mental capacity necessary to make the same, and (2) the court below erred
in holding that the signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained
through fraudulent and deceitful representations, made by persons interested
in the executions of said will.
The record is voluminous — close to two thousand typewritten pages, with a
varied assortment of exhibits. One brief contains two hundred seventy-four
pages, the other four hundred fifteen pages. The usual oral argument has
been had. The court must scale this mountains of evidence more or less
relevant and of argument intense and prolific to discover the fertile valleys of
fact and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of error — Testamentary Capacity
and Undue Influence — will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt
will be made under each subject first to make findings of fact quite separate
and apart from those of the judge and second to make findings of law and
the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. — For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in
feeble health. His breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to
advancing years and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6).
Ultimately, on August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez designated
Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance
of Manila to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and
pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta
acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was
far from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after
his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The
deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows
that he was able to answer nearly all of the questions propounded
intelligently (Exhibit 5-g). A trial had at which considerable oral testimony for
the petitioner was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was
issued by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to
take care of himself and to manage his property and naming Vicente F.
Lopez as his guardian. (Exhibit 37).
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make such of one incident which
occurred in connection with the guardianship proceedings, it may as well be
mentioned here as later. This episode concerns the effort of deputy sheriff
Joaquin Garcia to make service on Tomas Rodriguez on October 31, 1923.
We will let the witness tell in his own words what happened on the occasions
in question:
I found him lying down on his bed. . . . And when it (the cleaning of his head)
was finished, I again entered his room, and told him that I had an order of the
court which I wanted to read as I did read to him, but after reading the order
he asked me what the order meant; 'I read it to you so that you may appear
before the court, understand,' then I read it again, but he asked what the
order said; in view of that fact I left the order and departed from the house.
(S. R., p. 642.)
To return to our narrative — possibly inspired by the latter portion of the
order of Judge Diaz, Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General
Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his
death. The physician in charge during this period was Dr. Elias Domingo. In
the clinical case record of the hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we
find the following "Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patient's room was placed a placard reading — "No
visitors, except father, mother, sisters, and brothers." (Testimony of head
nurse physician, there were permitted to visit the patient only the following
named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia
Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not
include the names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura.
Indeed the last named persons experienced considerable difficulty in
penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas
Rodriguez in the hospital , Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a
will and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R.,
p. 550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez,
who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of
Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will. In accordance
with this request, Judge Mina conferred with Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital
in December 16th and December 29th. He ascertained the wishes of
Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in rough draft. The attorney expected to
return to the hospital on December 31st to have the will executed but was
unable to do so on account of having to make a trip to the provinces.
Accordingly, the papers were left with Santiago Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge
Mina's testimony which has not been challenged in any way:
ARANETA: Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with
Vicente Lopez?
MAXIMINO MINA: A. Then I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the
usual greeting and other unimportant things, he consulted me or presented
the question as to whether or not D. Tomas could make his will, having
announced his desire to do so. I told him that it seemed that we were not
called upon to decide or give an opinion as to whether or not he can make a
will; it is a question to be submitted to the court, but as he had announced his
desire, it is our duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to do what was
necessary to comply with his wishes: I told him I was to see him; then we
agreed that on the morning next to the following evening that is on the 16th, I
should go to the General Hospital and so I did.
Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you meet D. Tomas? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
OCAMPO: Leading.
ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that
occasion when you saw him there? — A. He told me that.
Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez? — A.
The conversation I had with him that evening — according to my best
recollection — I cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the order. After the
usual greetings, Good evening, D. Tomas, ' Good evening,' How are you,' '
How do you do? Very well, just came here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez
why does he not come. He cannot come because he has many things to do,
and besides it is hard for him and makes him tired, so he told me to come.'
Mina, your tenant, attorney.' Are you an attorney? Yes.' Where do you live? I
live in Quiapo.' Oh, in Quiapo, a good district, it is gay a commercial place
you must have some business there because that is a commercial place.
Unfortunately, I have none, D. Tomas.' Well, you must be have because the
profession alone does not give enough. Where is your office? I work in the
office of Mr. Chicote. That Mr. Chicote must be rich, it seems to me that he
is. The profession gives almost nothing it is better to have properties. I am an
attorney but do not depend upon my profession. I interrupted D. Tomas
saying, since you want to make a will, when and to whom do you want to
leave your fortune? Then he said, To whom else? To my cousin Vicente
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez. Which properties do you want to give to
your cousin and niece? All my properties, Won't you specify the property to
be given to each of them? What for? All my property. Don't you have any
other relatives? Yes, sir I have. Won't you give any to those relatives? What
for? was his answer. Well, do you want to specify said properties, to say
what they are? and he again said, What for? they know them, he is my
attorney-in-fact as to all property. I also said, Well and as legacy won't you
give property to other persons? answers, I think, something, they will know it.
After being asked, Whom do you think, would you want to be your executor?
After hesitating a little, This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also. Then I
asked him, What is your religion? He answered, Roman Apostolic Catholic,
and then he also asked me, and your? Also Roman Apostolic Catholic,
Where have you studied?' 'In the University of Santo Tomas.' 'It is convenient
to preserve the Catholic religion that our descendants have left us. And you,
what did you have anything more to say as to your testamentary
dispositions? No, he answered. Then I remind him, 'You know that Vicente
Lopez has sent me to get these dispositions of yours, and he said, Yes, do
it.' I asked him, When do you want it done? Later on, I will send for you. After
this believing to have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him? — A. Yes.
Q. When? — A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening.
Q. Why did you go to see him? — A. Because as I had not received any
message either from Vicente Lopez or Tomas Rodriguez, as I had received
notices in connection with the few cases I had in the provinces particularly in
Tayabas, which compelled me to be absent from Manila until January 1st at
least, for I might be there for several days, so I went to the General Hospital
of my own accord — since I had not received any messages from them —
with a rough draft which I had prepared in accordance with what he had told
me in our conversation. After the greetings, I told him, Here I am D. Tomas;
this is the rough draft of your will in accordance with your former statements
to me in order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it?' 'Please do me the
favor of reading it. I read it slowly to him in order that he could understand it .
After reading, Is it all right, that is the way,— few words — you see it takes
only a few minutes; now I can execute the will. We can do it takes only a few
minutes.' In view of that statement of his, I called his attention, ' But we don't
have witnesses, D. Tomas.' I looked out through the door to see if I could call
some witnesses but it was late then and it was thought better to do it on the
31st of December. Then we talked about other things, and he again asked.
Where were you born? I told him in Quiapo. Ah, good district, and especially
now that the fiesta of Quiapo is coming near,' and then I interrupted him,
Yes, the fiesta of the Holy Child and of Our Lady of Mount Carmel' because
we also talked about the fiesta of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that
we could not do it because the witnesses were not there and he explained,
Good Christmas present, isn't it?' I did not tell him anything and in view of First I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my body
that I did not deem it necessary to stay there any longer. be buried in accordance with my religion, standing and circumstances.

Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
of the 31st of December — you said that it was agreed that the will be Bueno as my only universal heirs of all my property.
executed on the evening of December 31st? — A. With Santiago Lopez and
Don Tomas. Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my prosecutors.

Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December? — A. What happened is In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single page,
this: In view of that agreement, I fixed up the draft which I had, dating it the in the presence of the witness who sign below.
31st of December, putting everything in order; we agreed that Santiago
(Sgd.) TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
would meet me on 31st day between five and six in the evening or a little
before, but it happened that before the arrival of that date Santiago Lopez (Left marginal signatures:)
came and told me that I need not trouble about going to the General TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
Hospital; because it could not be carried out for the reason that certain ELIAS BONOAN
requisites were lacking. In view of this and bearing always in mind that on the V. L. LEGARDA
following day I had to go to the provinces, I told Santiago Lopez that I would A. DE ASIS
leave the papers with him because I might go to the provinces.
We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don
Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present? — A. Tomas Rodriguez executed this will, consisting of one single typewritten
They are given a Christmas present when Christmas comes or on the page, having signed at the bottom of the will in the presence of us who saw
occasion of Christmas. as witnesses the execution of this will, we signed at the bottom thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the
will or copy of the will which you delivered to Santiago Lopez on December (Sgd.) V. L. LEGARDA
21, 31, 1923? — A. With the exception of the words '3 de enero de 1924' It ELIAS BONOAN
seems to be literally identical. (S. R. pp. 244-249.) A. DE ASIS
(Exhibit A.)
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with
that signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses with the single On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas
exception of the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3, Rodriguez in the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De
1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo
and simple in terminology. and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes of observation.
(Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly
For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English:
also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least
ONLY PAGE they were hovering in the background.

In the City of Manila, Philippines Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely
Rodriguez, of age and resident of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do contradictory accounts. One emanates from the attesting witness, Doctor
freely and voluntarily make this my will and testament in the Spanish Bonoan. The other is the united testimony of all remaining persons who were
language which I know, with the following clauses: there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called at the trial. He testified on
direct examination as to formal matters, such as the identification of the
signatures to the will .On cross-examination, he rather started the proponents
of the will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas Rodriguez to sign
the document it concerned a complaint against Castito and that nobody read
the will to the testator. Doctor Bonoan's testimony along this line is as
follows:
QUESTIONS.
MARCAIDA : Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?
Araneta: I object to the question as being immaterial.
Court: Objection overruled.
Dr. Bonoan: A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me
to be in the hospital at 3 o'clock sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of January.
Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned? — A. Luz Lopez, daughter of
Vicente Lopez.
Q. What day, January 3, 1924? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the
hospital? — A. On the morning of the 3d she called me up by telephone.
Q. On the morning? — A. On the morning.
Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed,
did Luz Lopez talk to you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many days approximately before was it? — A. I cannot tell the day, it
was approximately one week before, — on that occasion when I was called
up by her about the deceased Vicente Lopez.
Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one
week approximately before signing the will? - A. That Tomas Rodriguez
would make a will.
Q. Don't you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made? - A. In the
General Hospital.
Q. Was that document written in the hospital? — A. I have not seen it.
Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the
persons you met in the room where the patients was ? — A. I met one of the
nieces of the deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez and Dna. Luz
Lopez.
Q. Were those the only persons? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January
3d? — A. A quarter to 3.
Q. After you, who came? — A. Antonio de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on
Doctor Calderon arrived with Doctor Elias Domingo and lastly Santiago
Lopez came and then Mr. Legarda.
Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the
General Hospital in what position did you find him?— A. He was lying down.
Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. I did.
Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you? — A. Dna. Nena immediately
answered in advance and introduced me to him saying that I was the brother
of his godson.
Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon,
Herrera, Domingo, De Asis and Legarda greet Tomas Rodriguez?
ARANETA: I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It
has not been the subject of the direct examination.
COURT: Objection overruled.
ARANETA: Exception.
A. No, sir, they joined us.
Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will.? — A. To sign it.
Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the will? — A. Luz Lopez.
Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the
will? — A. She told him to sign the document; the deceased Tomas
Rodriguez before signing the document asked what that was which he was to
sign.
Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas? — A. Luz Lopez
told him to sign it because it concerned a complaint against Castito. D.
Tomas said, 'What is this?" And Luz Lopez answered, 'You sign this
document, uncle Tomas, because this is about the complaint against Castito.
Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it? — A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it
his own hands.
Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet or
seated? — A. Lying down.
Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time
of signing the will, did they read it to him? — A. Nobody read the will to him.
Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will? — A. I have not seen it.
Q. Were you present? — A. Yes, sir. ( S. R. p. 8)
As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all the others
who attended the making of the will, we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who
appears to have assumed the leading role, tell what transpired. He testified in
part:
ARANETA : Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and
A-2?
LEGARDA: A. Santiago Lopez.
Q. Did he show you the same document? — A. First that is to say the first
document he presented to me was a rough draft, a tentative will, and it was
dated December 31st, and I called his attention to the fact that the date was
not December 31, 1923, and that it was necessary to change the date to
January 3, 1924, and it was done.
Q. And it was then, was it not when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you any know where it was written? — A. In the General Hospital.
Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document
which you delivered to Santiago Lopez be written until those three Exhibits A,
A-1, and A-2 were presented to you? — A. About nine or ten minutes
approximately.
Q. The time to make it clean? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you during that time? — A. In the room of D. Tomas
Rodriguez.
Q. Were you talking with him during that time. — A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what things were you talking with him? — A. He was asking me
about my health, that of my family how my family was my girl, whether we
were living in Pasay, he asked me about the steamer Ildefonso, he said that
it was a pity that it had been lost because he knew that my father-in-law was
the owner of the steamer Ildefonso.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When those documents, Exhibit A, A-1, and A-2, that is the original and
two copies of the will signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were written clean, will
you please tell what happened? — A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to
me clean, I approached D. Tomas Rodriguez and told him: Don Tomas, here
is this will which is ready for your signature.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to
him was ready? — A. The first thing he asked was: the witnesses? Then I
called the witnesses — Gentlemen, please come forward, and they came
forward, and I handed the documents to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and
then took his eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw that the electric lamp at
the center was not sufficiently clear, he said: 'There is no more light;' then
somebody came forward bringing an electric lamp.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place? — A.
The eyeglasses were adjusted again and then he began to read, and as he
could not read much for a long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and took
off the eyeglasses, and as I saw that the poor man was tired, I suggested
that it be read to him and he stopped reading and I read the will to him.
Q. What happened after you had read it to him? — A. He said to me, 'Well, it
is all right. It is my wish and my will. Don't you have any pen?' I asked a pen
of those who were there and handed it to D. Tomas.
Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time 'What is that which I am
going to sign?' and Luz Lopez told him: 'It is in connection with the complaint
against Castito?' — A. It is not true, no, sir.
Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to
Tomas Rodriguez? — A. No, Sir, she said nothing.
Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Did nobody tell him to sign? — A. Nobody.
Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez? — A. I
called the witnesses and we signed in the presence of each other and of
Tomas Rodriguez.
Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas
Rodriguez? — A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some
questions.
Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between
Doctor Calderon and D. Tomas after the signing of the will? — A. I remember
that afterwards Doctor Calderon talked to him about business. He asked him
how the business of making loans at 18 per cent. It seems that Tomas
Rodriguez answered: That loan at 18 per cent is illegal, it is usury. (S. R., p.
38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect
and engineer in the Bureau of Public Works and professor of engineering
and architecture in the University of Santo Tomas, suffice it to say that Luz
Lopez de Bueno denied categorically the statements attributed to her by
Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p. 568). In this stand, she is corroborated by Doctor
Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, the attending physicians. On this point,
Doctor Calderon the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of
the College of Medicine in the University of the Philippines, testified:
Mr. ARANETA: Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution
of the will?
Dr. CALDERON: A. Mr. Legarda handled the will to D. Tomas Rodriguez. D.
Tomas asked for his eyeglass, wanted to read and it was extremely hard for
him to do so. Mr. Legarda offered to read the will, it was read to him and he
heard that in that will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we
also saw him sign that will, and he signed not only the original but also the
other copies of the will and we also saw how the witnesses signed the will;
we heard that D. Tomas asked for light at that moment; he heard that D.
Tomas asked for light at that moment; he was at that time in a perfect mental
state. And we remained there after the will was executed. I asked him, 'How
do you feel, how are you? Well I am well, ' he answered. ' How is the
business? There is a crisis at there is one good business, namely, that of
making loans at the rate of 18 per cent, 'and he answered, 'That is usury.;
When a man answers in that way, ' That is usury it shows that he is all right.
Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that was a complaint to be filed
against one Castito? — A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the kind.
Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas
Rodriguez asked what that was which he was to sign and that Luz Lopez
answered, 'That is but a complaint in connection with Castito.' Is that true? —
A. I have not heard anything of the kind.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Was Luz Lopez there? — A. I don't remember having seen her; I am not
sure; D. Santiago Lopez and the three witnesses were there; I don't
remember that Luz Lopez was there.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it?
— A. I don't know; it is a detail which I don't remember well; so that whether
or not he was given a pen or he himself asked for it, I do not remember.
Q. But did he sign without hesitation ? — A. With no hesitation.
Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to
sign? — A. Yes, without anybody having indicated it to him.
Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before
signing? — A. He asked for more lights, as I have said before.
Q. Do you remember that detail? — A. Yes, sir. They first lighted the lamps,
but as the light was not sufficient, he asked for more light.
Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light? — A. Yes, sir. (S. R.
p.993).
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of
Vicente Legarda, corroborated as it is by other witnesses of the highest
standing in the community. The only explanation we can offer relative to the
testimony of Doctor Bonoan is that possibly he may have arrived earlier than
the others with the exception of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de
Bueno may have made some sort of an effort to influence Tomas Rodriguez.
There is however no possible explanation of the statement of Doctor Bonoan
to the effect that no one read the will to Rodriguez when at least five other
persons recollect that Vicente Legarda read it to him and recall the details
connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of
the will which should here be mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924),
Luz Lopez de Bueno signed a document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). This paper reads as follow:
Be it know by these present:
That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno in consideration of the services which at my
instance were and will when necessary be rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in
connection with the execution of the will of my uncle, Don Tomas Rodriguez
and the due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of
remuneratory donation, the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine
currency, as soon as said services shall have been fully rendered and I shall
be in possession of the inheritance which in said will is given to me.
In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and spontaneously
executed by me in Manila, this January 7, 1923.
(Sgd.) LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
(Exhibit 1)
There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is natural between Doctor Bonoan
and Luz Lopez de Bueno relative to the execution of the above document.
We shall not attempt to settle these differences as in the final analysis it will
not affect the decision one way or the other. The most reasonable
supposition is that Luz Lopez de Bueno imprudently endeavored to bring
over Doctor Bonoan to her side of the race by signing and giving to him
Exhibit 1. But the event cannot easily be explained away.
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we
said on February 25, 1924. Not even prior to his demise the two actions in
the Lopez family had prepared themselves for a fight over the estate. The
Luz Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the
physician in charge of the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an
Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the
Philippines, as attending physician; as associated with him for purposes of
investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City
of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity,
Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez
faction had taken equal precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship
proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles Professor and Chief of the Department
of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze,
with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors de
Los Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating
with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the City of Manila.
Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of
such situations, do will contests arise.
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of
their testimony shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from
these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task
to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly
arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do
under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon
committed on the hand and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez
individually and jointly before the date when the will was executed. All of
them, as we have noticed were, present at the signing of the will to note the
reactions of the testator. On the same day that the will was accomplished,
the three doctors signed the following certificate:
The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices in the City of Manila, and
engaged in the practice of their profession do hereby certify:
That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, confined in the to the San Lazaro Hospital or to other places, and would not have left him in
General Hospital, floor No. 3, room No. 361 on three different occasion and the General Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in his
on different days and have found that said patient is suffering from anemia, room alone twice to have interviews with his, he begging a person whom I
hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia and senility. knew since several years ago; at the end of the interviews I became
convinced that there was nothing wrong with him; I had not seen anything
As to his mental state the result of the different tests to which this patient was indicating that he was insane and for this reason I accepted the request of
submitted is that his intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory my companions and joined them; we have been on five different occasions
is weak, which is almost a loss for recent facts, or events which have recently examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly from the physical standpoint but chiefly
occurred, due to his physical condition and old age. from the standpoint of his mental state; I have been there with Messrs.
Herrera and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas Rodriguez and submitting to a
They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on
mental test on the 28, 29, 10 and 31 of December and the 22nd of January,
January 3, 1924, at 1:25 p.m. and have found his mental state in the same
1924 — five consecutive days in which he have been together besides my
condition as was found by the undersigned in their former examination and
particular visits.
that in executing said will the testator and full knowledge of the contents
thereof. Q. Will you place state the result of the observation you made alone before
those made by the three of you jointly? — A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some
In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924.
questions when I went alone there, I asked him were he was living formerly
(Sgd.) FLORENTINO HERRERA and he well remembered that in Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether
Tuberias 1264 he remembered one Calderon who was living in the upper floor of the house
Quiapo and then he told me yes; than I asked him about his tenant by the name of
Antonio Jimenez and he told me yes, — now I remember that he had two
(Sgd.) Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON daughters, Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the
General Hospital house of the gentlemen, Antonio Jimenez already dead — in the upper story
Manila of the house belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him that Antonio Jimenez
was his tenant of the upper story, that is that he was living on the ground
(Sgd.) Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO floor and Antonio Jimenez upstairs and he remembered all of this I also
613 Remedios began to talk of my brother, Felipe Calderon, who he said of course that he
Malate knew; he remembered him because he was his companion and was a
successful attorney. This was when I had an interview with him. Then in
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)
order to observe better and to be sure of my judgment or opinion about the
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we began to speak of
to the mentality of Tomas Rodriguez What follows is possibly the most something which I don't remember now. In fine, we talked of things of interest
significant of the doctor's statements: and as I had finally accepted the request of Drs. Elias Domino and Florentino
Herrera to join then the first and second time that Herrera, Domingo and
Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption: myself went there, no stenographic notes were taken of what happened
there.
A. I was naturally interested in finding out the true mental state of Tomas
Rodriguez and that was the chief reason why I accepted and gave my Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid
cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera because had I two visits to the patient? — A. Yes, sir.
found that Tomas Rodriguez and Florentino Herrera because had I found
that Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should have ordered his transfer
Q. From the result f the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on
those two visits what is your opinion as to his mental capacity? — A. That he
was sick; that he was weak, but I have found absolutely no incoherence in
his ideas; he answered my questions well and as I was observing him there
were times when he did not remember things of the present — because this
must be admitted — but on the other hand he had a wonderful memory of
past events; in talking with him, you would not notice in the conversation any
alteration in his mind nor that man had lost the reasoning power or logic.
Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening
about things of the past? — A. About things of the past, I mean that you talk
to him now about specific matters, and after about five or ten minutes he no
longer remembers what had been talked of.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the first time
when the three of you paid a visit to the patient? — A. I don't remember the
details, but I do remember the questions I put to him. I asked D. Tomas
Rodriguez: You are an old man aged, sick: Yes, I am thinking to make a will.
But why don't you decide? There is no hurry there is time to make a will, 'he
said. Then in case you decide to make a will, to whom are you going to leave
your property? Don't you have any relatives? I have a relative, Vicente
Lopez, my first cousin, and Margarita Lopez my first cousin they are
brothers.' In that case, to whom, do you want to leave your property? Why, I
don't have much, very little, but I am decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez. Why would you not give anything to
Margarita Lopez? No because her husband is very bad, 'to use his exact
language is very bad.'
Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate? — A. Yes, sir, he
told me that he had three estates, — one on Calle Magallanes, another on
Calle Cabildo and the third on Calle Juan Luna and besides he had money in
the Monte de Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From the question made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas
Rodriguez on that occasion, what is your opinion as to his mental capacity?
— A. The following: That the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed
as to things of the present, but is all right with regard to matters or facts of
the past; that his ideas were incoherent; that the thought with logic, argued
even with power and generally in some of the interviews I have arrived at the
conclusion that Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not need
that anybody should make him any suggestion because he answered in such
a way that if you permit me now to show you my stenographic notes, they will
prove to you conclusively that he had an initiative of his own and had no
need of anybody making him any question. (S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas
Rodriguez throughout all the time that Rodriguez in the hospital had
examined him, was likewise certain that Rodriguez possessed sufficient
mentality to make a will. Among other things, Doctor Domingo testified:
ARANETA: Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
Dr. DOMINGO: A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician? — A. On November 28,
until his death.
Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember? — A. I had
been attending him as physician from November 28th although it true that I
had opportunities to see and examine him during the months of October and
November.
Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of
October and November? — A. It was for the purpose of observing his mental
state.
Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the months
of October and November? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did you visit him? — A. I don't remember exactly but I
visited him about five or six times.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of
October and November? — A. I examined him physically and mentally; I am
not going to tell here the physically result but the result of the mental
examination, and that is: General Conduct: In most of the times that I have
seen him I found him lying on his bed, smoking a cigarette and asked for a
bottle of lemonade from time to time; I also observed that he was very careful
when throwing the ash of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall on the
blankets; he also was careful not to throw the stub of the cigarette in any
place to avoid fire; I made more observations as to his general conduct and I
found that sometimes Don Tomas could move within the place although with
certain difficulty. On two occasions I found him seated, once seated at the
table, seated in the chair, and other on a rocking chair. I also examined his
manner of talking and to all questions that I put to him he answered with a
coherence and in a relevant manner, although sometimes he showed
eagerness and certain delay. I based these points of my declaration on the
questions which are usually asked when making a mental examination for
instance I asked him, What is your name, 'and he correctly answered Tomas
Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and he answered 'No;' I asked him
his profession and he answered that formerly he was an attorney but that at
the time I was making the examination he was not practising the profession; I
asked him with what he supported himself and he said that he lived upon his
income, he said verbatim, 'I live on my income.' I also asked him what the
amount of him income was and he answered that it was about P900; I asked
him what the source of this income was and he said that it came from his
property.
Q. Did you ask him about his property? — A. No, at that time.
Q. Proceed. — A. I also observed his emotional status and effectivity. I found
it rather superficial, and he oftentimes got angry due to his physical disease; I
asked him if he had any relatives and he answered correctly saying that he
had. He mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to
his memory. His memory of the past. He very easily remembered past events
and when he described them he did it with such pleasure the he used to
smile afterwards — if it was a fact upon which one must smile, His memory
of recent facts was very much lessened. I say this because on various
occasions and not having known me when he had a better memory, after I
had seen him thrice he remembered my name and he recognized me. Insight
and judgment. I arrived at the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of
himself because he knew that he was sick and could not be moving with
ease, but he believed that he could perform with sufficient ease mental acts;
his judgment was also all right because I asked him this question: 'Supposing
that you could find a bill of P5 in the vestibule of a hotel, what would you do
with it ?' He told me that he would take the bill and give it to the manager in
order that the latter may look for the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found
that he showed a moderated retardation in the flow of his thought, especially
with regard to recent events, but was quite all right as to past events, His
capacity, He believed that he was capable of thinking properly although what
did not permit him to do so was his physical decrepit condition. The
conclusion is that his memory is lost for recent events tho not totally and
diminution of his intellectual vigor. This is in few words the result of my
examination.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los
Angeles, Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the
gurardianship proceedings and had seen the patient of November 6 and 7,
1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and
had visited the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15,
1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January
17, 20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians conducted a joint examination
result, on March 15, 1924, they prepared and signed the following:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single and
residing or being confined in the Philippine General Hospital.
We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and
Samuel Tietze, do hereby certify as follows:
1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and are in
the actual practice of the medical profession in the Philippines.
2. That on January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924, at the Philippine
General Hospital, we three have with care the diligence jointly and personally
examined the person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and previous to
these dated, we have separately and partly jointly observed and examined
said patient on various occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patient's
home, 246 Magallanes St., Manila, on November 6th and 7th , 1923; Dr.
Samuel Tietze, at the patient's home on November 9th and 12th, 1923, and
at the Philippine General Hospital no January 17th, 20th, and 24, 1924; and
as a result of the medical examinations and the history of the case we found
and hereby certify to the following conclusions:
(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or of mental
impairment exceeding to a pathological extent the unusual conditions and
changes found to occur in the involutional period of life.
(b) That he was under the influence of the above condition continuously, at
least from November, 1923, till the date of our joint reexamination, January
27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924; and that he would naturally have
continued without improvement, as these cases of insanity are due to organic
pathological changes of the brain. This form of mental disease is progressive
in its pathological tendency, going on to progressive atropy and degeneration
of the brain, the mental symptoms, of course, running parallel with such
pathological basis.
(c) That on account of such disease and conditions his mind and memory
were so greatly impaired as to make him unable to know or to appreciate
sufficiently the nature, effect, and consequences of the business he was
engaged in; to understand and comprehend the extent and condition of his
properties; to collect and to hold in his mind the particulars and details of his
business transactions and his relations to the persons who were or might
have been the objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the influences
of importunities, threats and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less
resistance, he might had been induced to do what others would not have
done.
3. We have diagnosed this case as senile demential of the simple type,
approaching the deteriorated stage upon the following detailed mental
examination:
(a) Disorder of memory. — There was almost an absolute loss of memory of
recent events, to the extent that things and occurrences seen or observed
only a few minutes previously were completely forgotten. Faces and names
of person introduced to him were not remembered after a short moment even
without leaving his bedside . He showed no comprehension of the elemental
routine required in the management of his properties, i.e.: who were the
lessees of his houses, what rents they were paying, who was the
administrator of his properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the
amount of money deposited in such banks. Regarding his personal relation,
he forgot that Mr. Antonio Ventura is the husband of his nearest woman
cousin; the Mrs. Margarita Lopez was married, saying that the latter was
single or spinster, in spite of the fact that formerly, during the past twenty-five
years, he was aware of their marriage life, He did not know the names of the
sons and daughters of Mr. Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest relatives, even
failing to name Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente Lopez,
and who now appears to be the only living beneficiary of his will. He also
stated that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently visited him in the hospital, though
the latter died on January 7th, 1924. He did not recognized and remember
the name and face of Doctor Domingo, his own physician. However, the
memory for remote events was generally good, which is a characteristic
symptom of senile dementia.
(b) Disorientation of time, place and persons. — He could not name the date
when asked (day or month); could not name the hospital wherein he was
confined; and failed to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo was his
physician.
(c) Disorders of perception. — He was almost completely indifferent to what
was going on about him. He also failed to recognize the true value of objects
shown him, that is he failed to recognized the 'Saturday Evening Post' nor
would he deny that it was a will when presented as such. He also failed to
show normal intellectual perception. Making no effort to correlate facts or to
understand matters discussed in their proper light.
(d) Emotional deterioration. — The patient was not known during his time of
physical incapacity to express in any way or lament the fact that he was
unable to enjoy the happiness that was due him with his wealth. As a matter
of fact, he showed complete indifference. He showed loss of emotional
control by furious outbreaks over trifling matter and actually behaved like a
child; for example, if his food did not arrive immediately of when his cigar was
not lit soon, he would becomes abusive in his language and show marked
emotional outburst. If the servants did not immediately answer his call, he
would break down and cry as a child.
(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. — There was a laxity of the
internal connection of ideas. The patient has shown no insight regarding his
own condition. He did not appreciate the attitude of the parties concerned in
his case; he would on several occasion become suspicious and fail to
comprehend the purpose of our examination. He was inconsistent in his
ideas and failed to grasp the meaning of his own statements. When
questioned whether he would make a will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he
intended to bequeath his money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio
de San Jose. When He was informed, however, that he had made a will on
January 31, 1924, he denied the latter statement, and failed to explain the
former. Although for a long time confined to bed and seriously ill for a long
period, he expressed himself as sound physically and mentally, and in the
false belief that he was fully able to administer his business personally.
His impairment of the intellectual field was further shown by his inability,
despite his knowledge of world affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the
statement made by Doctor Tietze as follows: 'We have here a cheque of
P2,000 from the King of Africa payable to you so that you may deposit it in
the bank. Do you want to accept the cheque?' His answer was as follows:
'Now I cannot give my answer. It may be a surprise.' Such answer given by a
man after long experience in business life, who had handled real estate
property, well versed in the transaction of cheques, certainly shows a
breaking down of the above field. No proper question were asked why the
cheque was given by the King, who the King was, why he was selected by
the King of Africa, or if there is a King of Africa at present. He further shows
doubt in his mental capability by the following questions and answers:
"MARCAIDA: P. ¿Tiene usted actualmente algún asunto en los tribunales de
justicia de Manila? -- R. No recuerdo en este momento.
"P. De tener usted algún asunto propio en los tribunales de justicia de
Manila, ¿a qué abogado confiaría usted la defensa del mismo?--R. Al Sr.
Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
"P. ¿Ha hablado usted y conferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos
días, o sea desde el 25 de octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algún abogado
para que le defendiera algún asunto ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila?--R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombraría al Sr.
Marcaida. (P. 5, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"ARANETA: P. ¿No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como
abogado para que me oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o
incapacitado?--R. Sí, señor, quien ha solicitado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19,
1923.)
"Dr. DOMINGO: P. ¿Don Tomás, me conoce usted? ¿Se acuerda usted que
soy el Doctor Domingo?--R. Sí. (P. 7, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. ¿Quién soy, Don Tomás, usted me conoce?--R. No sé. (P. 6, sten. N.,
Feb. 10, 1924.)
"Dr. ÁNGELES: P. ¿Me conoce usted, D. Tomás?--R. Le conozco de vista.
(P. 6, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Tomás, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor
Ángeles, ¿me conoce usted?--R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿le conoce usted?--R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, ¿le conoce usted?--R. De vista.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿recuerda usted su nombre?--R. No. (P. 10,
sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P.¿Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Señalando al Doctor Burke).--R. De vista;
su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
"P.¿Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores Ángeles, Burke y Tietze).--R. Ya lo
creo.
"Dr. BURKE: P. ¿Qué profesión tenemos? (Señalando a los Sres. Ángeles,
Burke y Tietze).--R. YO creo que son doctores.
"P. ¿Y lso dos? (Señalando a los Doctores Ángeles y Tietze).--R. No. sé.
"P. ¿Y este señor? (Señalando al Doctor Ángeles).--R. No me acuerdo en
este momento. (P. 4. And 5, sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by investigation
of Doctor Angeles:
I. Family History. — His parents were noted to be of nervous temper and
irritable.
II. Personal history. — He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice,
devoting the greater part of his life to collecting antiquities, He was generally
regarded by his neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary habits of life.
He lead a very unhygienic life, making no attempt to clean the filth of dirt that
was around him. He was neglectful in personal habits. On April, 1921, he
suffered an injury to his forehead, from which he became temporarily
unconscious, and was confined in the Philippine General Hospital for
treatment. He frequently complained of attacks of dizziness and headache,
following this injury; suffered form a large hernia; and about two years ago,
he was fined for failure in filing his income tax, from which incident, we have
reason to believe, the onset of his mental condition took place. This incident
itself can most probably be considered as a failure of memory. His condition
became progressively worse up to his death.
4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this
certificate to the best of our knowledge and belief.
Manila, P.I., March 15, 1924.
(Sgd.) SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES
W.B. BURKE, M.D.
SAMUEL TIETZE
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.)
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is
disclosed by the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear
the nurse's remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the
testimony of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in the habit for no reason at all
of calling "Maria, where are my 50 centavos, where is my key." In
explanation of the observation made by the nurses, the nurse Apolonio
Floreza testified.
Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO:
Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say 'with pains
all over the body, and uttered some incoherent words of the same topics
whenever is awakened.' How could you observe that he had pains all over
the body?
APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse: A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I
touched the body of the patient he complained of some pain.
Q. On what part of the body did you touch him? — A. On all the parts of his
body.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not? — A. Slightly.
Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do? — A. He said that it was
aching.
Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered
incoherent words whenever he awakes? — A. As for instance, 'Maria,'
repeating it 'Where are my 50 centavos, where is my key?'
Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria? — A. Only the word Maria.
Q. How long approximately was he talking uttering the name of 'Maria,
Where are my 50 centavos,' and where is my key? — A. For two or three
minutes.
Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name
of Maria he said other words and was talking with somebody? — A. He was
talking to himself.
Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B when was it written by you? A. January 2,
1924.
Q. In the observation correspondingly to January 2, 1924 you say, 'With
pains over the body,' and later on talked too much whenever patient is
awakened.' How did you happen to know the pain which you have noted
here? A. The pains all over the body, I have observed them when giving him
baths.
Q. Besides saying that it ached when you touched the body, do you know
whether he did any extraordinary thing? A. You mean to say acts?
Q. Acts or words? A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said
which he used to say — Maria, the key, 50 centavos.
Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date
January 2, 1924? — A. He used to say Maria where is Maria?
Q. On that date January 2, 1924, did you answer him when he said Maria?
— A. No sir.
Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C you say among other
things with pain all over the body and shouted whenever he is given
injection.' Did you really observe this in the patient? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did he shout?
ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial.
COURT: Overruled.
ARANETA: Exception.
A. In a loud voice.
Q. Besides shouting do you remember whether he said anything? — A . He
repeated the same words I have said before — Maria the 50 centavos the
key.
Q. When did this observation occur which appear on page 8-C? — A. On
January 3, 1924. (S. R. p. 5595.)
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no
dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of
76 years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and
senility. Physically he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors
Calderon, Domingo and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together
with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his
memory however for remote events was generally good. He was given to
irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the
intellectual faculties of the patient are "sound, except that his memory is
weak," and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of the
act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof, Doctors De
Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound
mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type
approaching the deteriorated stage. Without attempting at this stage to pass
in judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of the medical witnesses, or on
other disputed point, insofar as the facts are concerned, a resolution of the
case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
possess sufficient mentality to make a will, or had he passed so far along
in senile dementia as to require the court to find him of unsound? We leave
the facts in this situation to pass on to a discussion of the legal phases of the
case.
B. Law. — The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the
allowance of a will that the testator be of "sound mind" (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the
grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapable of the execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].)
Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following
definition of testamentary capacity: "'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty.'" (Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163,
followed in Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of
the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil
Code, art. 666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts
only later to be rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity,
neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the
memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient
singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own
facts and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of
some practical utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will.
Is the will simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The mere
exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the
offspring of an unsound mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to
take a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist
in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will
concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the
execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.
(Alexander on Willis, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stille's Medical
Jurisprudence, vol. I pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity
that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez
vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under
guardianship at the time he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the
judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this
statement we cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited
section were taken from California, and there the Supreme court has never
held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in
some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is conclusive as to the
existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest
on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C.J.,
647; Gridley vs. Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of the Estate of
Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even where the question of insanity is out in
issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can be said for the
finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not
invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of
providing sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result
of senile dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which
will are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under
the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy," would
have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeare's King
Lear made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation and
doubt.
Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages.
To constitute complete senile dementiathere must be such failure of the mind
as to deprive the testator of intelligent action,. In the first stages of the
diseases, a person may possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N.
S. [1910], p. 89; Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I. pp. 791 et
seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have
gone forth from this court, relating to the testator having a sound and
disposing mind, and which have been brought to our notice by counsel, every
one of them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the
judgment of the trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent
tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally
possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the part of the
court towards the last will and testament of the aged. (See Hernaez vs.
Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C. J., In the matter of the will o f
Butalid [1908] 10 Phil., 27 per Arellano, C. J.; Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909] 14.
Phil., 163, per Carson, J.; Macapinlac vs. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per
Arellano, C.J.; Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, per Trent, J.; Galvez
vs. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J.; Samson vs. Corrales Tan
Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J.; and Jocson vs. Jocson [1922],
46 Phil., 701, per Villamor, J.) Because of their peculiar applicability, we
propose to make particular mention of four of the earlier cases of this court.
In the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez supra the subject of the action was the
will executed by Dona Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought
first upon the ground of the incapacity of the testatrix. She was over 80 years
of age, so ill that three days extreme unction, and two days afterwards she
died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude and gave contradictory
orders," as a result of her senile debility." The chief Justice reached the
conclusion that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the
documents presented "can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was
deprived of her mental faculties." The will was held valid and efficacious.
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested
for the reason that Dominga Butalid at the date of the execution of the
document was not in the date of the execution of the document was not in
the free use of her intellectual powers, she being over 90 years of age, lying
in bed seriously ill, senseless and unable to utter a single word so that she
did not know what she was doing when she executed the will while the
document was claimed to have been executed under the influence and by
the direction of one of the heirs designated in the will. Yet after an
examination of the evidence in the will. Yet after an examination of the
evidence in the will. The Chief Justice rendered judgment reversing the
judgment appealed from and declaring the will presented for legalization to
be valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra the court gave credence to the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that at the time
of the execution of the will the testator was of sound mind and memory.
Based on these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for court, laid
down the following legal principles:
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary known as insanity or idiocy
there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
one hand it had been held that mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will to render a person incapable of
making a will a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will provided
he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he
is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his property' (Lodge vs.
Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del.] 418); that, "To constitute a sound be unbroken or
unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan vs. Maxwell, # N. J.
Eq., 563); that it has not been understood that a testator must possess these
qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . .
.Few indeed would be the wills confirmed it this is correct. Pain, sickness,
debility of body from age or infirmity, would according to its violence or
duration in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the
mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational
faculties common to man' (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and that
Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of
soundness is one of degree' (Boughton vs. Knight. L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L.
P. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that testamentary incapacity
does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an
unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age,
from disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering, or from all these
combined, may render the testator in capable of making a valid will, providing
such weakness really disqualifies for from knowing or appreciating the
nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in (Manatt vs.
Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
In the case of Nagtas vs. Paquio, supra, the record shows that the testator
for some fourteen or fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from
a paralysis of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he had lost the power of speech.
However, he retained the use of his hand and could write fairly well. Through
the medium of signs, he was able to indicate his wishes to his family. The will
was attacked n the ground that the testator lacked mental capacity at the
time of its execution. The will was nevertheless admitted to probate, Mr.
Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announcement the following pertinent
legal doctrines:
* * * There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that
the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body,
induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a
will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard few indeed would be the
number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities,
both medical and legal are universal in the statement that the question of
mental capacity is one of degree and that there are many graduations from
the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased
mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as
any other right which a person may exercise and this right should be nullified
unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner.
In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28,
page 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law that —
'Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression perfect soundness of mind is
not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weakness, disorders or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will.' (See the numerous cases there cited in support
of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswel on Insanity,
section 365 and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill. 466)
as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise
or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarnan on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by
the testator as had, he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the
property he was about to bequeth the manner of distributing it and the object
of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to
enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged
at the time when he executed his will.' (See authorities there cited)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon
the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his
early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years
prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind
and memory were much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile
cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits,
although formerly he was observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in
commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure
of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total or
extend to his immediate family to property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the
will and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in
striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of
recent events, especially of names and repeated questions in conversation;
and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem
bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he
was remarkable for vigor and intelligence are of the opinion that his reason
was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never
heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw
the same contract as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. . . .
The particular difference between all of the Philippine case which are cited
and the case at bar are that in none of the Philippine cases was there any
declaration of incomplicated and in none of them were the facts quite as
complicated as they are here. A case in point where the will was contested,
because the testator was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and
because at the time of the making of the will he was acting under the undue
influence of his brothers and where he had a guardian when he executed his
will, is Ames' Will ([1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr. Justice Moore, delivering the
opinion of the court, in part said:
It is contended by contestant's counsel that on the day said pretended will
purports to have been executed, Lowell was declared incompetent by a court
which had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter and that the decree
therein appointing a guardian of his person and estate raises the distable
presumption that he did not possess sufficient testamentary capacity at the
time to overcome which required evidence so strong as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to his capacity to make a valid will, and the testimony
introduced by the proponent being insufficient for that purpose the court
erred in admitting it to probate.
The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis,
by a court having jurisdiction must necessarily create a presumption of the
mental infirmity of the ward; but such decree does not conclusively show that
the testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship is entirely
destroyed and the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence
proving that such person at the time he executed a will was in fact of sound
and disposing mind and memory: Stone vs. Damon, 12 Mass., 487; Breed
vs. Pratt, 18 Pick, 115: In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W. 236).
The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of the
contents of the books he had read and studied when he was young but that
he could not readily recall to his mind the ordinary incidents of his later life.
The depth and intensity of mental impression always depend upon and are
measured by the degree of attention given to the perception of truth, which
demands reflection; and hence the inability of a person to recollect events
and hence the inability is evidence of mental decay, because it manifest a
want of power on concentration of the mind. The aged live in the past and the
impression retained in their minds are those that were made in their younger
days, because at that period of their lives they were able to exercise will
power by giving attention. While the inability of a person of advanced years
to remember recent events distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of the
human faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile dementia, which is
something more than a mere loss of mental power, resulting from old age
and is not only a feeble condition of the mind but a derangement thereof. . . .
The rule is settled in this state that if a testator at the time he executes his
will understand the business in which he is engaged and has a knowledge of
his property and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his
bounty, he possess sufficient testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old
age, sickness debility of body, or extreme distress.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contented by contestant's counsel that if Lowell at the time he executed
the pretended will, was not wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he was,
in consequence of age ill health, debility of body and infirmity of will power,
Andrew and Joseph having knowledge thereof took advantage of his physical
and mental condition and unduly influenced him to device and bequeth his
property in the manner indicated, attempting thereby to deprive the
contestant of all interest therein except such as was given her by statute. . . .
Assuming that he was easily persuaded and that his brothers and the
persons employed by them to care for him took advantage of his enfeebled
condition and prejudiced his mind against the contestant did such undue
influence render the will therefore executed void? . . . When a will has been
properly executed, it is the duty of the courts to uphold it, if the testator
possessed a sound and disposing mind and memory and was free from
restraint and not acting under undue influence notwithstanding sympathy for
persons legally entitled to the testator's bounty and a sense of innate justice
might suggest a different testamentary disposition.
Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by the
weight of the testimony its decree is affirmed.
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned and
carrying alone one step further the question suggested at the end of the
presentation of the facts on the same subject a resolution of the case comes
down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient
mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried
successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that
date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. — The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence
exercised by the persons benefited in the will in collaboration with others.
The trial judge found this allegation to have been established and made it
one of the bases of his decision. it is now for us to say if the facts justify this
finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator.
The latter subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that
of all his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente
F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F.
Lopez, who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino Mina to
prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have
gathered the witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This
faction of the Lopez family was also a favor through the orders of Doctor
Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived
plan on the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure
his signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this
supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge
Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda
would so demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as
to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an
old man in his age, rather named was acting according to the best of his
ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover,
considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her
husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that
even if the will had been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more
nearly in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar document.
B. LAW. — One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary
or some other person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]).
Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and
as further mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that
which compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the
desire of peace or from other feeling which is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issued of fact and law in this case pertaining to
testamentary capacity: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess
sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried
successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that
date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the
regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testator's mental
condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a physician on the contrary
testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow
the will. The attending physician and three other eminent members of the
medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we
have the professional speculations of three other equally eminent members
of the medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on
those facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical
distress. It was reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account
the evident prejustice of the testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.
With special reference of the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say
this: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended
the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two
conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to
contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its
two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that CELESTINO BALUS, G.R. No. 168970
time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons
Petitioner,
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him While for some
months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he Present:
seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his
income. Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of
his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a
prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was CORONA, J., Chairperson,
nearest in which the instrument distributed the property naming the objects of
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on
giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified. NACHURA,
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, PERALTA, and
may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may
have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a MENDOZA, JJ.
been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his SATURNINO BALUS andLEONARDA BALUS
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms VDA. DE CALUNOD,
Promulgated:
"testamentary capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach
Respondents.
after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing
the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious
consideration which it deserves. January 15, 2010

The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Rodriguez will be admitted to probate without special pronouncement as to
costs in this instance.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ.,

concur.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in
Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died
on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of
3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang,
Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along
line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along
line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-
292. x x x [2]
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of
Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of
Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of
the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a specific
one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters.
The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the
soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12,
1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in
favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
39,484(a.f.)[7] was issued in the name of respondents.Meanwhile, petitioner
continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[8] for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the
disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of
the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all
remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to
execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the
property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed
of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly
Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus
and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan
City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus
and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by
Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements
thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court
is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-
third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents
his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the
respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal
with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision,
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner
to immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the
respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not
redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the
Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND
THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED
TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY
VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE
THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE
PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY
REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST
SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and
respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was
purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even
after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the
title over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still
proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the
intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of
continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a
contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision
whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject
property by redeeming or repurchasing the same from the Bank. This
agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such,
binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of
buying the disputed property from the Bank without notifying him inures to his
benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property,
comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the
sum they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the
time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property
formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim
as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to
the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This
was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court
on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was
issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of
redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued
in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no
question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot
during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well
as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject
property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs
may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited
the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they
became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass
into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at
any given point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete
determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which
gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot
bought by respondents.
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts
are perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents
to continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was
his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and
continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in
the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be
accorded primordial consideration.[16] It is the duty of the courts to place a
practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the
context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to
serve.[17] Such intention is determined from the express terms of their
agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.[18] Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be avoided.[19]
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement
between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their
ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by
the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement
too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about
and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the
estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of
continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his
assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the
chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do so. In
fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-
sell the same to him but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now
claim that it was also his intention to purchase the subject property from the
Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject
property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at
the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the
subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless,
the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the
mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was
already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the authority
to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property;
otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief
and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the
law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to
continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the
provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned
by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion
of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance
of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole
estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In other words, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,[21] an objective which
negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the
dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount
of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May
31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay
the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the
loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.[6] Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706.
On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father
to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned
all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed
the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed
a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez,
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed
as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer [13] and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence,
she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed
with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on
July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that
petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities.
The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that
the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the
joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held
that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS
BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE
ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and
Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit
A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both
heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the
same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the
agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by
the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money
claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate
court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that
the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided
under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition
may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page
2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties
(tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other
properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ
ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT
EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM
OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT
OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to
the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need
for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations
related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any
position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic
will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of
the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active
participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary
civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to
have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of
the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the
value of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the
said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola
and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and
his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by
the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent
Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned.
The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the
named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim
before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving
heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of
the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that
the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.
However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of
the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the
agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not
invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation
of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not
the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c)
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction
to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the
public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may
be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the
same properties embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased,
Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for
the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval
is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no
showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending
before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and
prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid
claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing
the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-
described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive.
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot
be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section
5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may
be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before
the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court
is mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go
after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes
and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may
have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the documentary
evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc.
Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found.
Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during
trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed
to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does
not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the
courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]

This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial
court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the
same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.