TRUMP—KIM SUMMIT

A historic handshake … but what did the Trump-Kim summit really achieve?
The US-North Korea meeting produced a deal light on detail but has an unconventional approach opened the door to peace?

It says a lot about the world of diplomacy in 2018 that the most expert commentary on Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un’s Singapore
summit came from a tearful former basketball player, Dennis Rodman. Unlike all the other talking heads dissecting the summit,
Rodman has actually met Kim, and spent more time talking to the North Korean leader than anyone in the western world. Almost
everyone else is just guessing.

Rodman’s view was Kim was a “big kid” who wants to “enjoy his life” and ideally visit the US. When Rodman kept a promise to bring
a basketball team to North Korea, Kim told him “this is the first time someone has ever kept their word to me and my country”.If
only the world treated Kim the same way, Rodman said in an emotional CNN interview in which tears streaked down his cheeks,
“the door will open”.In Singapore, Trump was practising the Rodman school of diplomacy, behaving towards the North Korean like a
solicitous uncle.The president adopted hazy North Korean language on denuclearisation, ditching more precise US arms control
terms, defended Kim over the regime’s appalling human rights, and presented him with a gift in the form of a unilateral concession,
the suspension of military exercises. The summit statement is big on hyperbole and short on substance – it reads like it was written
by the North Korean negotiating team,” said Suzanne DiMaggio, a senior fellow at the New America thinktank who has led back-
channel contacts with North Korean officials.If this had been Obama, or any other US leader, Trump would have led the howls of
derision at these acts of appeasement of a mass murderer. But hypocrisy is not so much a character flaw in Trump as a defining
characteristic: actions he denounces in others become admirable when he carries them out himself. “I signed an agreement where
we get everything, everything,” Trump claimed on Friday. In the face of widespread disgust at Trump’s extravagant kowtowing to a
dictator responsible for mass murder, the president claimed it was the price for keeping Americans safe.“You know why, because I
don’t want you to be killed with a nuclear weapon,” he told a reporter. To some extent, Trump is claiming credit for defusing crises
he had helped create, with last year’s “Little Rocket Man” insults and threats to “totally destroy” North Korea.

But the standoff with North Korea goes back decades, and – as has happened during previous periods of diplomacy – the two sides
had pulled back from the brink in advance of the summit.

There have been no North Korean nuclear and long-range missile tests for eight months. Trump claimed he suspended military
exercisesunilaterally for budget reasons, but the move also removes a flashpoint, and may go some way in lifting the fog of paranoia
in Pyongyang.

The first test of the new dialogue should be imminent. The US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, is supposed to meet his North
Korean counterparts in the next week, and it should be apparent soon if Kim intends to keep his promise to Trump that he would
dismantle a missile engine testing site.

Robert Carlin, a former CIA officer who was deeply involved in earlier negotiations with the North Koreans, said Pyongyang could do
away with its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programme altogether.

“They developed an ICBM programme to get our attention, and it worked. It absolutely worked.” Carlin said. “If they can get
something for it, it’s not so hard to give it up.”

Another early step could be a freeze on the production of fissile material, shutting down a five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon which
is the only known source of the regime’s plutonium, and a facility for making tritium, used in making hydrogen bombs.
Donald Trump behaved towards Kim Jong-un like a solicitous uncle in Singapore. Photograph: KCNA/Reuters

North Korea could also shut down its plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities or put them under monitoring.

In this scenario, major nuclear disarmament, actually dismantling weapons, would be put off till later, perhaps years later. That
would involve a North Korean declaration of their arsenal, access for international weapons inspectors to verify that declaration,
following by the disassembly of its weapons and production capacity, which would be shipped out of the country.

The regime would only give up weapons it now sees as a guarantee of survival once it has confidence it would not be attacked,
according to this argument – and that could take years.

“I think it’s important if we can keep up this sensible relationship with the leader, then it’s going to pay dividends,” Carlin said.
“People who say: no, he’s a murderous thug, you shouldn’t be dealing with him – what would they have us do? What’s the
alternative? Clap him in irons the next time we see him? It’s ridiculous.”

Under a proposed timetable put forward by Carlin and a Stanford University physicist, Siegfried Hecker – one of the few westerners
to witness the North Korean programme first hand, it would take six years to reach the disarmament phase, and up to 10 years to
complete it.

For many arms control advocates, this gradual, phased approach is fraught with wider risk. They argue that negotiations with North
Korea that are not directly aimed at the speedy dismantling of its rogue nuclear weapons programme would give it legitimacy and
send the wrong message to other regimes contemplating whether to build their own bomb.

“Trump is legitimising a brutal dictator and the underlying idea that achieving nuclear weapons makes you a legitimate leader. It’s a
sad day for diplomacy and arms control,” said Melissa Hanham, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of
International Studies at Monterey.

From an arms control point of view, the joint statement in Singapore was particularly empty, and significantly less rigorous than a
similar joint declaration in 2005. It incorporates the very vague North Korean pledge of steps “toward complete denuclearisation”, a
stock phrase of the regime that can mean many things, none of them concrete.

Nor is there any timetable or any mention of verification.

These are things the Trump administration had insisted in the run-up to the summit that it would demand of Kim.
When Pompeo was asked about verification the day after the summit, he immediately lost his temper, calling the question
“insulting” and even “silly”. The defensiveness is understandable given how far short the summit fell of its own expectations.

The agreement reached thus far has none of the rigour and substance of Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran, which Trump and
Pompeo reviled. They are, however, committed to maintaining the appearance of success – at the very least until the congressional
midterm elections.

In that time, the US and North Korea are committed to further meetings. Those would be an opportunity for Kim to offer unilateral
concessions of his own, such as the downgrading of the missile program. If Rodman is right, and addressing the leader’s paranoia
and sense of betrayal is the key to “opening the door”, it could lead to a virtuous cycle of disarmament.

If he’s wrong, it will be very hard, if not impossible, to resume the pre-summit level of pressure on Pyongyang. In the absence of
nuclear tests, neither China nor Russia, or even South Korea would support a return to isolation. Trump will have been
comprehensively played.

“Kim will make concrete concessions along the way that further reduce tensions, such as a codification of a testing suspension,
freezing the nuclear and missile programmes and even some rollback,” DiMaggio said.

“But chances are high that Trump’s approach will morph from ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement’ to ‘we can live with
a nuclear North Korea’.”

[ANALYSIS] TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT: NORTH KOREAN LEADER EMERGES A CLEAR WINNER

At first glance, it is easy to call the meeting between US president, Donald Trump, and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-un,
“historic” and “unprecedented”. It was the first meeting between sitting leaders of the two countries, which are still technically in a state
of war.You could also call it a success – preparations and schedules were respected, the media had ample opportunity to take shots of the
two men shaking hands in front of the colourful display of 12 intermingled American and North Korean flags – and they were also privy
to comments by the two leaders, including Kim in one of his very rare appearances in front of the foreign press.

The meeting was also a success from a security and optics points of view: smiles were exchanged, in-depth discussions took place
between cabinet members, nobody went off script and there were no security breaches, thanks to ironclad preparations by their
Singaporean hosts.Now that both leaders are on their way back to their own countries, we are left with many photos of the bromance du
jour, as well as a signed statement – and a plethora of questions. What should we take away from this historic moment? Here are three
key points:

1. ULTIMATELY IT WAS NORTH KOREA’S DAY

Kim has managed to build upon the work of his father and grandfather and secured the highest form of recognition that there i s – a
bilateral meeting with the president of the most powerful country on the planet.And North Korea did not have to pay a cent for it: China
furnished a plane, Singapore footed the US$15 million-plus bill for the summit, and the media distributed images of the North Korean
leader parlaying on equal terms with the US president to the entire world. It’s a resounding success for Kim – and one that is likely to be
exploited back home for political purpose.

2. WHAT IS WRITTEN IN THE AGREEMENT

The joint document signed by both parties shows the craftiness and hardline approach the DPRK has taken to the summit. Though the
agreement commits both parties to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula – removing all nuclear weapons from the region,
including potential American weapons – the DPRK has only reiterated, in writing, its commitment to “work towards” this aim.This is
certainly not the pledge for the unilateral dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programme that the US has always pushed for.

3. WHAT IS NOT WRITTEN IN THE AGREEMENT

The agreement shows a clear miss from the United States, as there are no mentions of CVID (“complete, verifiable, irreversibl e
dismantlement”) of North Korean nuclear capabilities – something that was talked about a great deal in the run-up to the meeting. Given
that Trump and his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and national security adviser, John Bolton, have signalled that they would accept
nothing short of CVID, this is a giant omission. Essentially, this should be read as a refusal from the DPRK to state that they would
denuclearise unilaterally.
4. PUTTING WORDS INTO ACTION

The agreement provides very vague concepts for a new US-DPRK relationship – one that will without a doubt also change the nature of
balance and geopolitics in East Asia and relationships with other regional actors such as South Korea, Russia, China and Japan.

The first concrete action was for the American president to announce he intends to call a halt to the annual war game exercises organised
between the US and South Korea (the most recent exercises nearly derailed the inter-Korea summit a few weeks ago). This is an
important step toward confidence building for both sides of the summit and one that should be praised.

But it is important to note that Trump’s rationale was to scrap the war games, not because they offend and worry the DPRK – but, as he
himself stated to the media, because they cost a lot of money. And money – especially the way Trump thinks the rest of the world takes
advantage of the US – was a theme the US president returned to repeatedly in the post-summit press conference.

Trump also talked about real estate development opportunities in the DPRK. In essence, Trump’s money-focused transactional nature
took only a few hours to surface after his handshake with Kim. But peace has a cost and, given the current US narrative that seeks to
avoid foreign entanglement and is fed up with spending money on international commitments, it will require the United States to manage
its shaky alliances if this is to be a realistic prospect.And as reactions are starting to pour in from world leaders, it is important to
remember that the summit has given the DPRK legitimacy on the world stage, while there was little talk of how this legitimacy was
acquired: essentially by developing nuclear weapons.Kim is a dictator who has purged a number of rivals while starving and oppressing
his own population. Ultimately, Trump has just willingly sat down with a villain and not gained much in the way of concessio ns in return.

An Analysis of the Trump-Kim Summit

By Nikita Kohli
Issue: Courtesy: CLAWS | Date : 16 Jun , 2018

The Singapore summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un is now over. While the massive ups and downs leading up to the meeting had
led to almost the entire world being interested in the summit taking place and feeling like a stakeholder in what would surely be a massive win for
peace and diplomacy. The resultant declarations from the summit, however, have left countries and analysts across t he world wishing for a more
structured outcome, instead of the vague declarations, propaganda-style photo-ops, and a surprising suspension of military exercises by the
United States with South Korea[i].

With most of the analysis on the summit focusing on the lead-up to the summit, and more recently on trying to decide whether it was a success or
a failure and debating the ‘comprehensiveness’ of the signed declaration, there has been a suspicious lack of focus given to the reasons why the
two leaders met in the first place. With decades of antagonisms between them, and more recent name calling of ‘little rocket man’, ‘dotart’[ii],
and statements about who has a bigger nuke button[iii], it seems all too easy to assume that the leaders of one of the most autocratic countries and
the self-proclaimed leader of the free world would meet out of high regard for each other, or even the coaxing of China and/or South Korea.
Trump and Kim have time and time again proved that they are more strategic than they appear.

Looking beyond the surface reinforces that point. Looking first to the probable reasons for Kim Jong-Un to come to the summit, it becomes fair
to assume that economic reasons took priority for him. With the recent economic downturn, the massive investments in military weapon system
developments, the country seems to be slowing running out of capital to back itself on. Kim Jong-Un’s recent China trip[iv] to secure urgent coal
supply, along with recent pictures of empty shelves in the country’s supermarkets indicate to the fact that there is definitely an economic
downturn to the extent that the ruling elites cannot only rely on further support from key leaders to continue their rule. An alliance with the
world’s biggest capitalist market, which is always in need of an extended manufacturing base seems to be the ideal solution. An agreement with
the United States would possibly bring in new investments, bring legitimacy to the regime, and with a progressive bilateral relationship, may even
help remove the sanctions that the country faces with regard to international trade. However, the most important factor in bringing Chairman Kim
to the table is fact that his nuclear and missile arsenal is complete[v]. With his recent range of nuclear and ballistic missile tests extending over a
range of target points, Kim Jong-Un has solidified his position of power from which he can now address the President of one of the wealthiest
countries as almost an equal, without fear of major repercussions from the United States, or a back-stab that the US might militarily attack to gain
advantage in talks.

While economic considerations may be most important for the Supreme Leader of North Korea, the same argument does not apply to Donald
Trump. In his case, it is the audience costs that become most important in making such a decision. Trump, through his tweets and actions has
shown to have gained little credibility as an international leader, often going back on his words. This has, in turn, shown him to be a poor leader,
with little domestic support. So, in getting the leader of one of the most dictatorial countries to talk with him at a table, and the possibility of
getting him to sign a deal to denuclearize, would have a major uptake in the popularity ratings of the President. Not only would the summit be a
major bragging point for him (as it has turned out to be), but it also reflects to the international leaders that he will only do deals that are
beneficial to him and to his country and will no longer pander to the crises of the world and spend on behalf of others. Contrary to multiple
analyses that argue that President Trump has never stuck to his deals, and would most likely abandon this one too, it stands to argue that the
Trump administration will try and ensure that the summit deal would stand the test of time. The 397-word agreement[vi], in a style reflective of
Trump, makes no outlandish promises that would entail the US spending more money, has no set deadlines, no strong mention of human rights
and freedom and liberty, and promises to hold no further military drills with South Korea, something that in the light of a developing friendship
would be seen not only as a hinderance, but also as an unnecessary cost for the Trump administration. Donald Trump, therefore, has had a major
win, and for almost no cost.

The Singapore summit has also been a major victory for three other countries, which have been pivotal in making the summit happen in the first
place – China, Russia, and South Korea. China openly declared itself a part of the summit by bringing Chairman Kim in an Air China plane,
making it clear that the summit would have to take into consideration the interests of China. It also remains highly improbable that the summit
took place without the explicit approval of the country, given that it is the biggest trading partner with both the United States as well as North
Korea, a factor that cannot be left out of any calculation. With the summit taking place near China, one of the leaders being ferried in by it, it
ensured itself a dominant seat on the table (albeit a phantom one). This becomes particularly reflective in the declaration statement of the US
promising to drastically reducing, if not removing, its military presence from the peninsula, which is geographically connected to it.

The second undeclared winner in the scenario is Russia. While not declaring itself a presence in the meeting as China, it undoubtedly had a
background role to play. Given that Russia has continued trading with North Korea, especially in weapon systems, it has long had an interest in
the country. With US military presence reducing in the peninsula, its continued equal relationship with both the Koreas now posits Russia to be a
major power influencer in the region.

While it may initially seem that South Korea has lost in the Singapore summit between Trump and Kim, a deeper look assures us that it is not
true. With President Moon coming into his own recently, the news of no further military drills in the region spell a drastic reduction in the state’s
spending and would allow him to exercise better control over the foreign relations of the country without the US breathing down his neck. At the
same time, his role as being a critical factor in ensuring that the summit takes place gives him a figurative seat in all the discussions that would
happen from here on onwards.

Ultimately, the success of the ‘first’ Trump-Kim summit lies solely with other meetings taking place between the two, and actionable results
following from this and subsequent meetings. At the moment, the foreign policy objectives of all the countries seem to have been met. Yet, we
can sense that the larger game is yet to unfold.