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Jurisdiction; Dacion En Pago Implementation
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be
cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the
Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission
and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the
evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission.
SSS vs. ATLANTIC GULF
Atlantic Gulf filed a case for specific performance against the SSS before the RTC in order to
enforce a Deed of Assignment through a dacion en pago to answer to Atlantic Gulf’s liability.
Which body has jurisdiction to entertain a controversy arising from the non-implementation of
a dacion en pago?
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s challenged order, granted private
respondents’ appeal and ordered the trial court to proceed with the civil case with dispatch. From
the averments in their complaint, the appellate court observed that private respondents are
seeking to implement the Deed of Assignment which they had drafted and submitted to SSS
sometime in July 2001, pursuant to SSS’s letter addressed to AG& P dated 23 April 2001 approving
AG&P and SEMIRARA’S delinquencies through dacion en pago, which as of 31 March 2001,
amounted to P29,261,902.45. The appellate court thus held that the subject of the complaint is
no longer the payment of the premium and loan amortization delinquencies, as well as the
penalties appurtenant thereto, but the enforcement of the dacion en pago pursuant to SSS
Resolution No. 270.
The action then is one for specific performance which case law holds is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Weekly Stipends or Excess in Service Surplus; Employee-Employer Relationship
REPUBLIC vs. ASIAPRO
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
considered:
1) Selection and engagement of the workers;
2) Payment of wages by whatever means;
3) Power of dismissal; and
4) Power to control the workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall
consideration.
RA 8282: SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
The most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as
to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish. The
power of control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise
thereof.
It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the
employee; it is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power.
All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.
Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being
expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or commission
basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee
under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
service rendered or to be rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in
the service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-members were in reality
wages, as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed by existing
labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry;
or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of wages. It cannot be doubted then that
those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the
owners-members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperatives client,
Stanfilco.
“Project Employees”
CHUA vs CA
Petitioner contends that the respondents are not regular employees and are thus, not included
in the mandatory coverage of the SSS.
Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his construction projects, although the period of
their employment was allegedly co-terminus with their phase of work.
Even without such admission from petitioner, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties can easily be determined by the application of the "control
test." Suffice it to say that regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or
project, private respondents are subject of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their
employment not falling under the exceptions provided by the law.
This rule is in accord with the Court's ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS to the effect that all
employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS, except
those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act.
Despite the insistence of petitioner that they were project employees, the facts show that as
masons, carpenters and fine graders in petitioner's various construction projects, they performed
work which was usually necessary and desirable to petitioner's business which involves
construction of roads and bridges. It is not enough that an employee is hired for a specific project
or phase of work to be called a project employee.
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There must also be a determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or termination
of the project at the time the employee was engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be
achieved. This second requirement was not met in this case.
Moreover, while it may be true that private respondents were initially hired for specific projects
or undertakings, the repeated re-hiring and continuing need for their services over a long span
of time — the shortest being two years and the longest being eight — have undeniably made
them regular employees.
This Court has held that an employment ceases to be co-terminus with specific projects when the
employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of the employer's business and re-engaged
for many more projects without interruption.
Lastly, in the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner was unable to show
that private respondents were appraised of the project nature of their employment, the specific
projects themselves or any phase thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired.
He failed to show any document such as private respondents' employment contracts and
employment records that would indicate the dates of hiring and termination in relation to the
particular construction project or phases in which they were employed.
Farm Workers, Employee-Employer Relationship
GAPAYAO vs FULO
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. We have consistently
held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees.
Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time.
The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season, they are
temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be
needed.
They are in regular employment because of the nature of their job, and not because of the length
of time they have worked.
The rule, however, is not absolute. In Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane
Workers-Food & General Trade, the Court held that seasonal workers who have worked for one
season only may not be considered regular employees.
Similarly, in Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC, it was held that when seasonal employees are free to contract
their services with other farm owners, then the former are not regular employees.
For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard used is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade or business of the
employer.
RA 8282: SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
Taxi Driver Engaged on Boundary Basis
Even-if the driver is getting income through “boundary,” this does not negate the existence of
employee-employer relationship.
Labor-Only Contracting
Labor-only contracting is prohibited.
Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor merely recruits,
supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for the principal, and the following
elements are present:
1) The contractor does not have substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machines, work premises, among others, and the employees recruited and
placed are performing activities that are usually necessary or desirable to the operation
of the company, or directly related to the main business of the principal within a
definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to
be performed within or outside the premises of the principal; or
2) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work
of the employee
Employment Services Not Covered: Purely Casual
1) Purely casual employment and not for the purpose of occupation or business of the
employer;
2) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an employee if he is
employed when such vessel is outside the Philippines;
3) Service performed in the employ of the Philippine Government or instrumentality or
agency thereof;
4) Service performed in the employ of a foreign government or international organization,
or their wholly-owned instrumentality, unless, there is an agreement with the
Philippine Government for the inclusion of such employee in the SSS
5) Such other services performed by temporary and other employees which may be
excluded by regulation of the Commission. Employees of bona fide independent
contractors shall not be deemed employees of the employer engaging the services of
said contractors.
MANSAL vs GO-CHECO
“In a sawmill, for example, if a power unit running the mill gets out of order and a mechanic is
contracted to fix the engine, the work of the mechanic would be considered as purely casual,
because the reparation of the mill is not the actual work or business of the sawmill but the sawing
of lumber. But the piling up of lumber is work directly connected with the business of a lumber
yard. Lumber must be sorted and piled up in groups according to sizes to facilitate handling and
sale. The piling up of lumber is, therefore, an ordinary part of the work in a lumber yard.”
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“Employer” Maternity Leave Benefit

Section 8. Employer — Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in A daily cash allowance granted to female members who was unable to work due to childbirth or
the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the miscarriage. It is equivalent to 100% of member’s average daily salary credit multiplied by 60 days
services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the for normal delivery or miscarriage, 78 days for caesarian section delivery.
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including
corporations owned or controlled by the Government: Provided, That a self-employed person
Qualifications for entitlement:
shall be both employee and employer at the same time.
a) She has paid at least three (3) monthly contributions in the twelve-month period
immediately preceding the semester of her childbirth or miscarriage
Sickness Benefit – Number of Days that Can be Paid b) She has notified her employer of her pregnancy through her employer, if employed, or
to SSS id separated, voluntary or self-employed.
A daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member is unable to work due to sickness
or injury. The amount is equivalent to 90% of the member’s average daily salary credit.
Deliveries covered: Only for the first four deliveries or miscarriages.
REQUIREMENTS:
Notice Required: As soon as pregnancy is confirmed, member must notify immediately his
1) He is unable to work due to sickness or injury and confined either in a hospital or at
employer or SSS, as the case may be, and probable date of childbirth at least 60 days from the
home for at least 4 days;
date of conception. Employer must in turn notify SSS after receipt of notification. Failure to
2) He has paid at least 3 months of contributions within the 12-month period immediately
observe this rule may result in denial.
before the semester of sickness/injury
3) He has used up all company sick leaves with pay; and
4) He has notified the employer or SSS, if separated, voluntary or self-employed. Can a member apply for sickness benefit if she has been paid maternity benefit?
— Notify employer within 5 calendar days after start of sickness/injury and
No. No member can be entitled to two benefits for the same period.
employer must notify SSS within 5 days after receipt of notification. Notice is
not required it member’s confinement is in hospital or member got sick while
working or within company premises.
Who Determines E-E?
In computing, exclude the semester of sickness. A semester refers to two consecutive quarters
ending in the quarter of sickness. A quarter refers to three consecutive months ending March, The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purpose of
June, September, or December. determining the coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly excluded from the
jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with
For example: SSS member gets sick in October 2006 for 20 days. the duty of settling disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997. (Asiapro case)
a) The semester of sickness would be from July 2006 to December 2006.
b) The 12-month period would be from July 2005 to June 2006 (where the six highest
monthly salary credits will be chosen)
In no case shall the daily sickness benefit be paid longer than one hundred twenty (120) days in
one (1) calendar year, nor shall any unused portion of the one hundred twenty (120) days of
sickness benefit granted under this section be carried forward and added to the total number of
compensable days allowable in the subsequent year

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Effect of Final Judgment at NLRC on Employee-Employer Relationship: Conclusiveness of OTHER BENEFITS:

Judgment
(A) RETIREMENT – It is a cash benefit either in monthly pension or lump sum paid to a member
CO vs. PEOPLE who can no longer work due to old age.
FACTS:

Petitioner was charged criminally by claimed employees for violation of SS Law for non-
remittance of contributions. Prior to the criminal case, a final decision of NLRC held that the
claimed employees were independent contractors and not employees.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of RA 1161, as amended, is premised on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
A final and executory NLRC decision (to the effect that respondent spouses were not the
employees of petitioner) was binding on the criminal case for violation of RA 1161, as amended.
Accordingly, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to grant petitioner's
motion to quash the Information.
Simply said, any conviction for violation of the SSS law based on the erroneous premise of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship would be a transgression of petitioner's
constitutional rights.
Who may qualify?
1) A member who is 60 years old, separated from employment or ceased to be self-
employed, and has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the semester
of retirement
2) A member who us 65 years old whether employed or not and has paid at least 120
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement.
When may underground mineworkers qualify for retirement benefit?
1) Has reached the age of 55 years old and is an underground mineworker for at least
5 years (either continuous or accumulated) prior to the semester of retirement
but whose actual date of retirement is not earlier than March 13, 1998; separated
from employment or in the case of self-employed, has ceased self-employment,
and has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of
retirement
2) Has reached the age of 60 years old whether employed or not and has paid at least
120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement

SSC vs RIZAL POULTRY

(B) DISABILITY –
ISSUE:
Who is qualified? A member who suffers partial or total permanent disability with at least one
Whether res judicata applies so as to preclude the SSC from resolving anew the existence of month contribution paid to the SSS prior to the semester of contingency
employer-employee relationship, which issue was previously determined in the NLRC case?
HELD:
Some partial permanent disabilities:
Res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. The judgment in the NLRC
case pertaining to a finding of an absence of employer-employee relationship between Angeles One thumb One foot
and respondents is conclusive on the SSC case.
One index finger One leg
One middle finger One ear
Contingencies Covered; Benefits Where Employer Advances
One ring finger Both ears
CONTINGENCY — The retirement, death, disability, injury or sickness, and maternity of the
member. One little finger Hearing of one ear

The benefits which the employer advances are sickness benefit and maternity leave benefit. One big toe Hearing of both ears
One hand Sight of one eye
One arm

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Some total permanent disabilities: Compulsory Coverage; When Effective

1) Complete loss of sight of both eyes; Coverage of Employees:
2) Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrists;
a) A private employee who is not over 60 years old.
3) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs;
b) A household helper earning at least P1,000 a month.
4) Brain injury resulting to incurable imbecility or insanity; and
— A household helper is any person who renders domestic or household
5) Such cases as determined and approved by the SSS.
services exclusively to a household employer such as a driver, gardener, cook,
governess and other similar occupations.
 Prescriptive period in filing a disability claim: 10 years from the date of occurrence of c) A Filipino seafarer upon the signing of the standard contract or employment between
disability the seafarer and the manning agency which, together with the foreign ship owner, act
as employers
(C) DEATH – it is a cash benefit either in monthly pension or lump sum paid to the beneficiaries d) An employee of a foreign government, international organization or their wholly-
of a deceased member owned instrumentality based in the Philippines, which entered into an administrative
agreement with the SSS for the coverage of its Filipino workers
Beneficiaries:
Coverage of Employers:
Primary:
a) An employer, or any person who uses the services of another person in business, trade,
1) Legitimate dependent spouse until the person remarries; industry or any undertaking. A social, civil, professional, charitable and other non-profit
2) Dependent legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who are not organization which hire the services of employees are considered “employers”
yet 21 years old b) A foreign government, international organization or its wholly-owned instrumentality
Secondary: such as an embassy in the Philippines, may enter into an administrative agreement with
the SSS for the coverage of its Filipino employees
a) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, dependent parents.
b) In the absence of dependent parents, any other person designated by member in Effective Date of Coverage. — Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first
record. day of his operation and that of the employee on the day of his employment: Provided, That the
compulsory coverage of the self-employed person shall take effect upon his registration with the
SSS
Claims Under Labor Code Vis-À-Vis SSS
ORTEGA vs SSC Appeal from SSC
Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social Security Law for benefits are (b) Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom
not the same as to their nature and purpose. as herein provided, shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of
On the one hand, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code govern compensability of work- notification, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be
related disabilities or when there is loss of income due to work-connected or work-aggravated aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission.
injury or illness. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision
On the other hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law are intended to provide insurance and may be represented by an attorney employed by the Commission, or when requested by the
or protection against the hazards or risks of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter alia, Commission, by the Solicitor General or any public prosecutor.
irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment.
And unlike under the Social Security Law, a disability is total and permanent under the Labor
Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days regardless of whether he loses the use of
any of his body parts.

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(c) Court Review. — The decision of the Commission upon any disputed matter may be reviewed
both upon the law and the facts by the Court of Appeals.
For the purpose of such review the procedure concerning appeals from the Regional Trial Court
shall be followed as far as practicable and consistent with the purposes of this Act.
Appeal from a decision of the Commission must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notification of such decision.
If the decision of the Commission involves only questions of law, the same shall be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. No appeal bond shall be required.
The case shall be heard in a summary manner, and shall take precedence over all cases, except
that in the Supreme Court, criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death has been imposed
by the trial court shall take precedence.
No appeal shall act as a supersede as or a stay of the order of the Commission unless the
Commission itself, or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, shall so order.
Beneficiaries; Primary Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries
of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty
percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided,
further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children
of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated
by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
SSC vs AZOTE
The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different women as his
spouse is already an indication that only one of them can be the legal spouse. As can be gleaned
from the certification issued by the NSO, there is no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in
1982.
Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during
the existence of a previously contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of Edna's claim by
the SSC was correct.
It should be emphasized that the SSC determined Edna's eligibility on the basis of available
statistical data and documents on their database as expressly permitted by Section 4 (b) (7) of
R.A. No. 8282.
RA 8282: SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
Extent of the Required “Dependency”
Section 8 (e). Dependents — The dependents shall be the following:
1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
 Although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage
alone. (SSS vs. Alguas)
 Further, Alguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and
lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or
otherwise, during the pendency of the period.
SIGNEY vs. SSS
FACTS:
Kuya, the one who died here, had three wives (wowz) who claimed his death benefits. The SSC
determined that it was Gina’s (second common law wife) illegitimate children who was entitled
to the benefits.
HELD:
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence.
Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate
child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled
to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.
The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent,” the only requirements are
that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and
20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and
qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a
share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child.
Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only
qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
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SSS vs. DELOS SANTOS
FACTS:
After Gloria (respondent) left Antonio twice, he amended his SSS entries from Mrs. Margarita de
los Santos to Cirila de los Santos 9the second wife); from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los
Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos. Thus, upon the death of Antonio,
Cirilia applied and began receiving his SSS pension benefit.
On the same month, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio's death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch.
Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. In the letter, the
SSS said that she was not qualified due to the fact that she had obtained a divorce against the
member and she had already remarried. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA found that
being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from her husband.
The Court reminded us of the case of Dycaico vs. SSS which declared as unconstitutional the
proviso “as of the date of his retirement” to qualify the term of “primary beneficiaries.” Thus, the
reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be at the time
of his death. Although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased (because the divorce
obtained by respondents was not valid), we find that she is still disqualified to be his primary
beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio. AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased
husband for support is not qualified to be his beneficiary.
SSC vs. FAVILA
Teresa averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS
were given to their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at
age 21. Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante's
pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. The SSS,
however, denied the claim.
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to
death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?
According to the SS Law, it is plain that for a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under
paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as
defined under paragraph (e), that is, one who is dependent upon the member for support. Here,
there is no question that Teresa was Florante's legal wife. What is at point, however, is whether
Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent
spouse" under Section 8 (k) of RA 1161. Aside from Teresa's bare allegation that she was
dependent upon her husband for support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of
dependency by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not
presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent upon
her husband for support at the time of his death.
"dependent" - "one who derives his or her main support from another [or] relying on, or subject
to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without
the will, power or aid of someone else."
RA 8282: SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
Consent of SSS on Filing of Criminal Action
Is the consent of SSS required before any criminal case may be filed?
No, because Section 28 (i) states that a “criminal action arising from a violation of the
provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or the employee concerned either
under this Act or in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code.”
Lack of Criminal Intent and Good Faith as Defenses
TAN vs. BALLENA
“Furthermore, the appellate court held that the defense of the petitioners of good faith and lack
of criminal intent should not have been considered, in as much as the offense charged were
violations of a special law and are therefore characterized as mala prohibita, in which intent to
commit is immaterial.”
Only inquiry is, has the law been violated? Thus, the petitioners’ admission in the instant cases
of their violations of the provisions of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence
of probable cause to prosecute them for the same.
Prescriptive Period
The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be commenced within
twenty (20) years from the time the delinquency is known or the assessment is made by the SSS,
or from the time the benefit accrues, as the case may be.
[Note: Not sure if this is what Sir means about this. LOL]
Is a Director Liable?
GARCIA vs SSC
Section 28 (f) of the SS Law provides the following:
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to
the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.
SSC found Garcia, the sole surviving director of Impact Corporation, petitioner herein, liable for
unremitted SSS contributions. The issue is whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving
director of Impact Corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of Impact
Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties therefore.
Court said yes. Section 28(f) is clear and unambiguous.
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MENDOZA vs PEOPLE Does Novation Serve to Negate the Prosecution of a Criminal Liability Under RA 1161, As
Amended?
1st case:
SSS vs DOJ
The Information against petitioner reads:
FACTS:
That sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The Martels were charged by the Prosecutor’s Office with nonremittance of SSS contributions.
said accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc., At first, they offered a parcel of land. However, later on, they offered computer-related services.
duly registered employer with the Social Security System (SSS), did then and
The Court held that novation was inapplicable in this case.
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS
premium contributions in favor of its employees amounting to P421,151.09 This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to criminal cases in
to the prejudice of his employees. People v. Nery, involving a case for Estafa.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28 of In that case, the Court observed that although novation is not one of the means recognized by
Republic Act No. 8282, as amended the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, it may "prevent the rise of criminal liability
or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction," provided the novation takes
The term "managing head" in Section 28 (f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not to any specific
place before the filing of the Information with the trial court.
organizational or managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioner's reasoning would allow
unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the creative adoption of Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an underlying contract
managerial titles. initially defined the relation of the parties such as the contract in sale on commission in Estafa
cases or the contract in sale of goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
MR:
Further, the party invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect.
RA No. 9903 (Social Security Condonation Law) creates two classifications of employers
delinquent in remitting the SSS contributions of their employees:
1) Those delinquent employers who pay withinthe six (6)-month period (the former
group), and
2) Those delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment period (the latter
group). Waiver of accrued penalties: derived from the last proviso of section 4 of ra no.
9903.
The dispositive portion provides:
The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner's conviction for violation of Section 22(a) and (d), in relation to
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9903, the
petitioner's liability for accrued penalties is considered WAIVED. Considering the circumstances
of the case, the Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

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 POINTERS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION | FINALS RA 8291: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ACT OF 1997

Jurisdiction New Benefits

GSIS has original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising under RA 8291 with (A) Unemployment Benefit
respect to:
The benefit is paid when a permanent employee is involuntarily separated from the service
— Coverage as a result of the abolition of his office or position usually resulting from reorganization.
— Entitlement to benefits
— Collection and payment of contributions
— Any other matter related to any or all of the foregoing which is necessary for their Who is eligible?
determination Permanent employee who has paid 12 monthly contributions.
 Duration of benefit – depends on length of service ranges from 2 mos. to a
Which body of GSIS is vested with Quasi-Judicial Functions? maximum of 6 mos
Board of Trustees.  Equivalent of benefit – 50% of the average monthly compensation
 Options – Those who have more than 15 years service may either avail of
retirement or separation benefits as the case may be.
Who Are Covered? Are Judges Covered?
Compulsory for all employees: (B) Separation Benefit
— Appointive or elective A cash payment of 18 times the basic monthly pension at time of separation and a life
— Whether temporary, casual, permanent or contractual with employee-employer pension to start at the age of 60 will be given to those who separate from the service with
relationship [thus, those under job orders are not covered] at least 15 years of service and are below 60 years of age
— Those who are receiving basic pay or salary but not per diems, honoraria or allowances;
and
— Those who have not reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old Who are eligible?
1) Rendered at least 3 years but less than 15 years
Who are not covered? — cash payment equivalent to 100% of Average Monthly Compensation for
— Employees who have separate retirement schemes under special laws and are every year of service payable upon reaching 60 or upon separation
therefore covered by their respective retirement laws, such as the members of the whichever comes later if not receiving monthly pension from permanent
Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and other similarly situated government total disability
officials;
— Uniformed members of AFP & PNP including BJMP; 2) Rendered at least 15 years & who is below 60 at the time of resignation/separation
— Those who are not receiving basic pay or salary — cash payment equivalent to 15 times the basic Monthly Pension payable
— Contractuals who have no employer and employee relationship with the agencies they upon separation plus monthly pension starting 60
serve

Who Is A Dependent Legitimate Child?

Who are dependents?
a) The legitimate spouse dependent for support;
b) Any legitimate, legitimated and/or legally adopted child, including any illegitimate
child, who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, who has not attained the age of
majority, or being at the age of majority but incapacitated and incapable of self-support
due to a mental or physical defect acquired prior to age of majority; and
c) The parents dependent upon the member for support.

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 POINTERS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION | FINALS
Primary Beneficiaries In Case Of Survivorship
The legitimate spouse, until he/she remarries, and the dependent children.
IRR, Rule II, Sec. 2.5:
Member separated for cause:
 automatically forfeit
 Unless terms of resignation or separation provide otherwise
Member separated not for cause
Shall continue to be member & entitled subject to qualification & other prescription
Entitlement to Personal Contributions
LLEDO vs LLEDO
May a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to recover the
personal contributions he paid to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)?
Neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains any provision specifically dealing with
employees dismissed for cause and the status of their personal contributions. Thus, there is no
inconsistency between Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and Section 4
of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A. No. 8291. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section
11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern cases of employees
dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their personal contributions.
Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to be
liberally construed in favor of the government employees.
The money subject of the instant request consists of personal contributions made by the
employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement.
The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior to reaching retirement
age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him from the outset.
To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue
enrichment.
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of his premiums and
voluntary deposits, if any, with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.
RA 8291: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ACT OF 1997
COA Disallowances
GSIS vs COA
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits,
sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by
the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations
of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused
or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work
except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of
the GSIS.
It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits
under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions.
Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear mandate of
the foregoing provision.
Accordingly, the GSIS interpretation of Section 39 that COA disallowances have become
monetary liabilities of respondents to the GSIS and therefore fall under the exception stated in
the law is wrong. No interpretation of the said provision is necessary given the clear language of
the statute.
A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute
cannot be placed therein by construction.
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then it would be unnecessary to single out
COA disallowances as among those from which benefits under RA 8291 are exempt.
In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the enumeration of exemptions would be a
mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply consider COA disallowances as monetary liabilities
in its favor.
Such a construction would empower the GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly
granted by law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his
indebtedness to the government has been settled in several cases.
In this case, the Court had to distinguish between the COA disallowances that were allowed from
those that were not. Since the disallowance only accrued when the respondents were already
retired, it gave rise to a case of solution indebiti.
Nonetheless, it may be recovered not by deducting on the retirement pay, but on the other assets
of the respondents.
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Prescriptive Period
4 years from date of contingency except life and retirement which do not prescribe.
Sec. 39
GSIS vs NLRC – Security guards’ money claims
The case revolves around the decision of the NLRC holding GSIS solidarily liable for the judgment
rendered in favor of the security guards who were considered their employees because the
contractor was declared a labor-only contractor.
GSIS argues that the enforcement of the decision is impossible because its charter unequivocally
exempts it from execution.
The Court rejected this argument and held that GSIS’s charter should not be used to evade its
liabilities to its employees, even to its indirect employees, as mandated under the Labor Code.
RA 8291: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ACT OF 1997
RA 7699: PORTABILITY LAW
When Applicable?
GAMOGAMO vs PNOC
The Court found baseless petitioner's contention that the principle of tacking of creditable service
was mandated by Republic Act No. 7699.
It held that the totalization of service credits was resorted to only when the retiree did not qualify
for benefits in either or both the Social Security System (SSS) and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). In this case, petitioner was qualified to receive benefits granted by the
GSIS, if such right had not yet been exercised.
In any case, petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated
because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to Section 12 of the Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977, as may be determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to
some benefits from the GSIS, he cannot avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
When is Totalization Resorted to?
A member of GSIS who does not qualify for old age and other benefits by reason of non-
fulfillment of the required period of service may be able to qualify for such benefits by making
use of the period during which he rendered services to a private employer and for which
contributions were paid to SSS.
This is allowed under RA 7699 (approved May 1, 1994)
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Presumption of Compensability
Workmens Compensation Act - This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which
means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed
that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee
need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or
injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.
Theory of Aggravation
All that the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires to entitle claimants to its benefits is a showing
that the nature of the deceased's work and duties did aggravate his illness as in this
case.|||(Belmonte v. Workmen's Compensation Commission)
In the present law, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
claimant must prove either of two things:
 Doctrine of Occupational Disease – that the sickness was the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex “A” of the Rules on Employee’s Compensation
 Theory of Increased Risk – if the sickness was not so listed, that the risk of contracting
the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions
The diseases listed in Annex “A” are presumed to be work-related but not every death resulting
therefrom automatically entitles a claimant to death benefits. Annex “A” requires that, for the
statutory presumption of causal relation to arise, it must be established beforehand that the
listed disease was contracted under certain working conditions.
The following conditions must be satisfied:
1) The employee’s work must involve the risks described therein
2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to the described risk
3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it
4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
Art. 203, Labor Code (Prohibition Against Demand or Charge for Fee)
Under Labor Code:
ART. 203. Prohibition. - No agent, attorney or other person pursuing or in charge of the
preparation or filing of any claim for benefit under this Title shall demand or charge for his
services any fee, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void.
The retention or deduction of any amount from any benefit granted under this Title for the
payment of fees for such services is prohibited. Violation of any provision of this Article shall be
punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year, or both, at the discretion of
the court.
PD442: AS AMENDED / PD 626: EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
Under SSS:
SECTION 17. Fee of Agents, Attorneys, etc. — No agent, attorney or other person in charge of
the preparation, filing or pursuing any claim for benefit under this Act shall demand or charge for
his services any fee, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void.
The retention or deduction of any amount from any benefit granted under this Act for the
payment of fees for such services is prohibited: Provided, however, That any member of the
Philippine Bar who appears as counsel in any case heard by the Commission shall be entitled to
attorney's fees not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the benefits awarded by the Commission,
which fees shall not be payable before the actual payment of the benefits, and any stipulation to
the contrary shall be null and void.
Any violation of the provisions of this Section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five
hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment for
not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Meaning of “Accident”
Unforeseen for which the injured party is not legally responsible.
Ecc Board Resolution No. 12-03-08
Declaring the compensability of death of an employee due to assault when the same occurred in
the course of performance of official functions notwithstanding the fact that the motive was
personal in nature.
This Commission RESOLVES AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to declare the compensability of death
of an employee due to assault notwithstanding the fact the motive is personal in nature if the
same occurred in any of the following situations, in addition to those provided under Item II of
Circular No. 03-709 dated 22 July 2009:
1) The employee was at his assigned/designated workplace, or at a place where his work
requires him to be;
2) The employee was executing an order from the employer regardless of the time and
place of the incident, or in the performance of his official functions; or
3) The employee was "going to or coming from" his workplace, subject to the existing
guidelines of the same.
|||
Ecc Board Resolution No.14-02-15
Compensability of Injuries or death of the soldiers and policemen when responding to a crime
situation when they are not at their assigned post
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Ecc Board Resolution No. 15-04-15
DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES SUSTAINED BY EMPLOYEES AT PLACES OF
RECREATION WITHIN THE EMPLOYERS' PREMISES
Paragraph 6.1 of Board Resolution No. 93-08-0068, dated August 5, 1993, is hereby modified or
amended to read as follows:
"Personal Comfort Doctrine
"6.1. Acts performed by an employee
a) within the time and space limits of his employment to minister to personal
comfort such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger or other physical demands
b) while on the places of recreation within the employer's premises, or
c) to protect himself from extreme temperature in a place within the employer's
premises,
Shall be deemed incidental to his employment and injuries which the employee suffered in
the performance of such acts shall be considered compensable and arising out of and in the
course of employment."
Ecc Board Resolution No. 15-01-20
ADVISORY ON THE DEFINITION OF MISSING PERSONS UNDER EC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 14-07-
20
The following are the series of events which should be considered in the grant of EC benefits:
1) The word "missing" refers to unknown fate or there is no trace of whereabouts of a
worker, employee and uniformed personnel while he/she is in the performance of
his/her duties during calamities or fatal events.
2) The worker, employee or uniformed personnel was not seen or heard from after the
lapse of four years from the occurrence of the incident.
3) The disappearance of the worker, employee or uniformed personnel gives rise to
presumption of death.
4) The death of the worker, employee or uniformed personnel arises out of and in the
course of employment.
Ecc Board Resolution Nos. 10-03-45
CLARIFYING THE RULES ON PRESCRIPTION
According to the case of Buena Obra vs SSS and Mesa vs. SSS, when a claimant filed a claim for
disability or death benefits before the Systems either under the SSS Law or GSIS Law, the claim
for same benefits under the Employee’s Compensation Law should be considered as filed.
The filing of disability or death benefits under either the SSS Law or the GSIS Law within 3 years
from the time the cause of action accrued would stop the running of the prescriptive period
under P.D. 636, as amended.
PD442: AS AMENDED / PD 626: EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
Ecc Board Resolution Nos.11-04-10
SETTING THE RECKONING DATE OF THE THREE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THE EVALUATION
OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY (PTD)
In the case of ECC vs. Sanico, the Supreme Court held that:
1) "Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could
do. It does not mean absolute helplessness;
2) "In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity;
3) "The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the
time the employee lost his earning capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to
his illness and not when the same first became manifest."
This Commission RESOLVES that the prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be
reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning capacity.
Ecc Board Resolution Nos.12-01-02
DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES AND ITS RESULTING DISABILITY OR DEATH
SUSTAINED BY STAY-IN LOCAL EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE QUARTERS FURNISHED BY THE
EMPLOYERS
"Bunkhouse Rule" - ". . . where the employee is required to stay in the premises or in quarters
furnished by the employer, injuries sustained therein are in the course of employment regardless
of the time the same occurred."
This Commission RESOLVES AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to declare the compensability of injuries,
and its resulting disability or death, sustained by stay-in local employees in their quarters
regardless of the time of its occurrence except when the disability or death was occasioned by
the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, or notorious
negligence as provided under Article 172 of P.D. No. 626, as amended.
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Compensability
GSIS vs CA
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation.
Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondents to prove by substantial
evidence that the risk of contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions of
the late Abraham. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The records show that Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that the development of
his ailment was traceable to his working conditions in the Philippine Navy, the now defunct
Philippine Constabulary and the PNP. Further, private respondents' allegation in their petition for
review with the CA that Abraham, as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed
to elements like a virus which could have contributed to his ailment does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence.
The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the
claimant must prove a positive thing.
The application of the rules would mean that absent any proof that the risk of contracting the
ailment was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham, private respondents would
not be entitled to compensation.
Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the present state of science,
the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private respondent claimant was
unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not imposed.
Before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the ailment of
respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided.
However, as the ECC decision noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on
compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk
of contracting is increased by the working conditions." It, therefore, now allows compensation
subject to requirement of proving by sufficient evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment
is increased by the working conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to
comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as
an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed void.
Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the social legislation's
intended beneficial purpose.
PD442: AS AMENDED / PD 626: EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
ALANO vs ECC
The deceased was waiting for a bus to the school where she works as a principal. However, while
waiting, she was bumped by a minivan that resulted to her death.
The petitioner alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her
employment."
The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law
on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act
(Act 3428) and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the
workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer."
We rule in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her
place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required
her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal
about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her
employment required her to be there.
LORENZO vs GSIS
The wife of the deceased died due to Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to Terminal Leukemia.
Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death benefits from
the GSIS.
It was denied on the ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department
(MEUD) found Rosario's ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory Arrest Secondary to
Terminal Leukemia, a non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Sickness, as defined under Article 167 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code of the
Philippines refers to "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found
in the old Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation
scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro case, the new principle being applied is a system based on
social security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased risk." As further declared
therein:
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies —
the Government Service Insurance Syatem and Social Security System —
under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation
for work-connected death or disability.
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GSIS vs CAPACITE Coverage Formula

The deceased was a DAR employee who died of lung cancer. The CA justified the compensability "arising out of" – upon consideration of all circumstances, a causal connection between the
of her disease by saying that Elma had been exposed to voluminous dusty records and other condition under which the work is required to be performed and resulting injury, refers to the
harmful substances that aggravated her respiratory disease. origin or cause of the accident
While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of Employee's Compensation considers lung "in the course of employment" – refers to time, place and circumstances under which the
cancer to be a compensable occupational disease, it likewise provides that the employee should accident takes place.
be employed as a vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker. In this case, however, Elma did not
work in an environment involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic, for her lung cancer to
be considered an occupational disease. There was, therefore, no basis for the CA to simply 24-Hour-Duty Doctrine
categorize her illness as an occupational disease without first establishing the nature of Elma's
work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly state that the given alternative conditions The concept of workplace cannot always be literally to a soldier on active status whom for all
must be satisfied for a disease to be compensable. intents and purposes, is on a 24 hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law
and call of his superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status; this
doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances but only those which,
although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character
Limitation to Compensability
Section 1. Limitation – No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents
when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following: VALERIANO vs ECC
 Intoxication – person’s condition in being under the influence of liquor or prohibited The Court ruled that petitioner's injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and
drugs to the extent that his acts, words or conduct are impaired visibly as to prevent thus not compensable.
him from physically and mentally engaging in the duties of his employment
Petitioner was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the
 Willful Intention to Injure or Kill Himself or Another; or
injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social
 Notorious Negligence – something more than mere or simple negligence; deliberate
function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case.
act to disregard own personal safety
His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing
an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior.
GSIS vs ANGEL
The Court also ruled that the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case,
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors
accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. when he met an accident.
It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting But the more important justification for the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act within
death from the coverage of the State Insurance Fund. his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he
sustained his injuries.
It is unexpected that the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered
away from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and, instead,
focused on the requirement that the death must arise out of or in the course of employment.
Such that, the ECC denied compensability because:
Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of
the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his
alleged involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found
dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his
employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be
extended to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify
causal connection between his death and his employment.

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Can a claim for benefit be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service? ECC vs SANICO
GSIS vs CUANANG Prescription not to be reckoned when PTB became known but from time employee lost his
earning capacity (termination from job due to illness)
In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year after her retirement. Clearly, the period
between her retirement and demise was less than one year.
Indeed, if a death which occurred almost four and one half years after retirement was held to be Defenses Against EC Claims
within the coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case, with more
reason should a death which occurred within one year after retirement be considered as covered 1) Not work connected or not occupational
under the same law. A claim for benefit for such death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of 2) Limitations (intoxication, etc..)
separation from service. 3) No notice was given to the employer under Art. 212 of the Labor Code
4) Prescription
Further, we agree with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that there was substantial
evidence to support respondent's claim. Hence, the degree of proof required under PD 626 was
satisfied, i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support Good luck, bes. 
a conclusion." Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.
In the case at bar, the requisite substantial evidence came from the expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio
A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate in Internal Medicine who issued the Death Certificate.

“Parents” as Beneficiaries
BARTOLOME vs SSS
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.
When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support
or assistance.

Prescriptive Period
Art. 201: 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued.

When did the cause of action accrue?

From the date of the occurrence of the contingency.

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