Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
— We hold
that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is
valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.] to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners, vs. purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents. registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
Ernesto M. Andrade for petitioners. enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
Renato M. Rances for private respondent. formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
SYNOPSIS therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object
the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which
Jacinto Pada was the owner of a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.
denominated as Cadastral Lot. No. 5581. He died intestate and he left six children, namely:
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta as his compulsory heirs. During his 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY. — Neither does the Statute of
lifetime, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son Pastor, continued living legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
children, lived in that house since 1960. But then, sometime in 1951, the heirs of Jacinto entered that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The
into an extrajudicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte, and it was Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter Marie, that Cadastral Lot 5581 was Engr. Paredes and private respondent, respectively.
allocated. When Ananias died, his daughter Juanita succeeded to his right as co-owner of said
property. On June 14, 1978, Juanita sold to Engr. Ernesto Paredes the right of her father in 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCES LEGAL STATUS. — The extrajudicial partition which the heirs
Cadastral Lot No. 5881, and on November 17, 1993, Maria Pada also sold the right of her father of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.
to private respondent Silverio Pada. Private respondent then demanded from petitioner spouses When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed
Verona Pada and Ricardo Kilario to vacate the premises, but they refused. On June 26, 1995, that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive,
private respondent filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte a complaint for unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been
ejectment against petitioner spouses. However, On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amado Pada paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto
executed a Deed of Donation transferring to Verona their respective shares as co-owners of Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which subsequently petitioners used as defense. After trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF DEED OF DONATION OF PROPERTY OWNED BY
as well as the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. OTHER HEIRS AFTER 44 YEARS PRODUCES NO LEGAL EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — The
belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
The Court ruled that the belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, the heirs of Amador donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having disputed
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and
disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was
Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but
Amador Pada was not the subject property but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom,
interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of land in Itum, Sta. Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by the heirs to petitioners of the subject property, was by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it was too late in the day for the heirs of thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
laches had equally set in. Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property
by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be 5. ID.; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners are estopped from
terminated at any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their
proper remedy against them. admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their
possession of the subject property is concerned.
SYLLABUS
6. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSORS BY SHEER TOLERANCE OF OWNERS, BOUND
BY IMPLIED PROMISE TO VACATE THE SAME UPON DEMAND. — Considering that
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; EXTRAJUDICIAL petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they
SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS; NO LAW REQUIRES PARTITION knew that the occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father,
necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT POSSESSORS OR BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH. — They cannot be Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all
Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte,
whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses. cdasia
faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going
to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-
improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as that Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of
the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano,
Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial
DECISION partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered
in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the
following findings:
DE LEON, JR., J p:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his
Court 2 in an ejectment suit 3 filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic]
by its reversal 4 by the Regional Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is
respondent Court of Appeals 7 which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20, 1998, still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Cdpr Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and
Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-
The following facts are undisputed: described residential property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the
basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since 1951,
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and
land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the
of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the
subject of the instant controversy. name of his heirs . . . .
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from "The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as
son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960. signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of
attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.
estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. "Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
described property long before the sale of said property on November 17,
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the
by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as
his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property. co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners
became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of .
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is
as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881. being [sic] lawful." 10
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On "Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held: possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo possession . . . .
have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias,
nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if "Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the
not laches or estoppel. land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee
but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial
heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which
acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject
claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias
the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial
partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action
of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.
was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. 23 When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were
debts existing against the estate which had not been paid. 24 No showing, however, has been
made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why
the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having disputed
FIRST DIVISION fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful Igorot maiden but a prosaic
dispute over a piece of land. Even so, as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor
of the just and deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the heart but of the law.
[G.R. No. L-27421. September 12, 1986.]
The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began he was still
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mangoy; a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the
LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife, by whom
TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF he had no issue but who had two children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the
APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to Salming Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in this case.
Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO,respondents.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" the
SYLLABUS dispositive portion of which declared:
"The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that it WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial court
was not probated. However, when the persons who were named therein reinstated, with costs against the respondents.
as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its
terms probably to save the expenses of probate, and furthermore, carried SO ORDERED.
out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
to be binding between them.
||| (Mang-oy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27421, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 33-42)
"Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir
before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 1144 — The following actions must be brought ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
"Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.
"What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the
land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total
area was more than 35,000 square meters. Under the old Civil Code, it
was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite the
existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code, Art. 808).
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man
Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian
Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the
FIRST DIVISION GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate
[G.R. No. 68282. November 8, 1990.] Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela
Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh.
RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA
2) and the subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2)
BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
declared that the earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her children
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division),
constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals
ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION
thereby reversed the decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of
CHAVEZ, respondents.
Camarines Norte, Branch 1.
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners. Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children,
named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were
Jose L. Lapak for respondents. the plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
SYLLABUS On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,
executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P450.
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PARTITION OF ESTATE EITHER BY ACT INTER
VIVOS OR BY WILL, RESPECTED FOR AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also
LEGITIMATE OF COMPULSORY HEIRS. — Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of
to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of
prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total
is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining
Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a 2/6 shares. LexLib
partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition
by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter
"Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina,
vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
(6) na mga magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang
2. ID.; ID.; PAROL PARTITION, MAY BE SUSTAINED ON TWO GROUNDS. — "In numerous paghihiwatig o particion; ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may
cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa
of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and nasabing pag-aari." (p 14, Rollo.)
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children,
their respective parts in severalty. "A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that
in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio
the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however,
existence of the partition." (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her
3. ID.; ID.; PARTITION INTER VIVOS, VALID WHEN EXECUTED BY THE PROPERTY lifetime.
OWNER. — In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the
favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On
between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their
also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito
respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an
Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
DECISION preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The
court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
64708-R).
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
decision reads: act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
"WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art.
render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter
Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio, and declaring further that the vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition
documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are evidence of a valid partition of the must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children, makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written,
subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime, without pronouncement and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
as to damages and costs." (p. 17, Rollo.) compulsory heirs.
On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others: prLL "In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
"3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
defendants-appellees, was found lately to have executed during her possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT . . . and there is now a pending exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree
petition for probate of said last will and testament before the Municipal it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte; parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
"xxx xxx xxx "A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
"6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession
execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D are in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
valid, nevertheless its validity ceases from the time that she executed the otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition." (Hernandez vs.
Last Will and Testament . . . because the execution of the Last Will Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
invalidates the former act of the said Manuela Buenavista;
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
"7. That the Last Will and Testament . . . which is now pending probate in Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of
the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between
the property — hence, there is a ground for this motion for Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed
reconsideration and/or to suspend the decision — pending final outcome the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to
of the probate of the last will and testament of the late Manuela future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela
Buenavista." (pp 88-89, Rollo.) Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter
vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid. LexLib
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter
vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and ". . . As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now
Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own
Testament was executed on December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one may be
complaint for annulment on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed
and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand contrary thereto." (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine, 34 Phil. 858.)
the several Deeds of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only;
that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, "Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no
when she supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament. allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or
without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of
In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allege: prcd the partition. . . . They cannot attack the partition collaterally . . ." (Ralla
vs. Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
"(1) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)
in declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a partition by
an act inter vivosconsidering that examining the said exhibits will reveal As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and
that it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista; inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself
authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a
simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made
of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine
"(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."
1347 of the New Civil Code." (p. 126, Rollo.)
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chavez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68282, [November 8, 1990], 269 PHIL 218-
225)
SECOND DIVISION 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT LOOK UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. —
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
[G.R. No. 78778. December 3, 1990.] compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 114
JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, respondents. SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the
property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by
Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property.
Rogelio V. Fernandez for petitioners.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT;
Siruelo, Muyco & Associates for B. Buenaseda. CONCLUSIVE UPON THE APPELLATE COURT. — The fact that JUANA failed to identify the
property in question and to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming
Eduardo A. Cagandahan for private respondent. they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the
property in question. Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the
SYLLABUS conclusion that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the
will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property. Such
findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER COURT OF 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
APPEALS CASES; RULE. — Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and DECISION
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function
of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing
that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so PARAS, J p:
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturing Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision * of the respondent
82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno) Albovias et
this rule. al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court, the decretal portion of
which reads: LLphil
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; WHEN THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT. — "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
property in question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
favor of her co-defendants;
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory 2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en transactions involving the same property null and void ab initio;
concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start
the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate 3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject
Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989). In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent parcel of land;
appellate court and the lower court, never categorically claimed ownership over the property in
question, much less his possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not 4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to
have acquired said property by acquisitive prescription. surrender possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
3. ID.; SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF WILL; NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSFER OF 5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff
PROPERTY BY SUCCESSION; EXCEPTION IN CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that no will the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court exemplary damages.
(Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows: "Article 1056. If the testator should
make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel of land
far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly described as
SCRA 33 [1986]). In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is follows: prcd
entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any
showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for
province of Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial Court
Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 7345
Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo (Ibid., p. 4).
Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing an area of two
hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, more or less. Assessed at As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the Court of
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on the one Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition. prLL
hand, and Leonida Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand. CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger I
lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS
Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo, both AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE
surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows: APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID
DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang
bahagi naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng II
Calle Avenida Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari
cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN
namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME
pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16) PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF
THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, one on
the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by the heirs III
in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern portion of which was PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE
adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion was given to JUANA and OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION
Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and Domingo HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE ESTATE
Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and the latter PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid.,
the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). p. 119)
The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the
adjoining property (Ibid.). LLjur IV
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE
owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT
Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p.
turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino 121)
Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974
(Ibid., pp. 16-17). As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p. 105);
while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139). LLpr
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity) claim
that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. The petition is devoid of merit.
Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's finding that
War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive prescription.
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate Estate of Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right or legal title she had
her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will was allowed over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's continued possession of the
by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute ownership (Ibid., p.
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F. 112).
Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). The argument has no factual basis.
It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not said decision has already become
final and executory. Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to
it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh
such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally The contention is without merit. LibLex
devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time
convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule. said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the "Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola in an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the property conveyed to not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of
her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or produce of the
said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from
prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18). LexLib Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida
Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from questioning
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed to raise the same in
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory
The contention is likewise without merit.
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989). compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court, never
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his possession
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said property by
raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Appeals, 114
acquisitive prescription.
SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession to that property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by
of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property, even against the Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property. Cdpr
petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good faith, is a foregone or
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is weak for
settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this wise:
want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that she did
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the discrepancy in the boundary
land in question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
whether by prescription or by some other title. Neither can she claim
The contention is unavailing.
acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only in 1970 after the
death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of ownership The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the discrepancy in
adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of
title over the land in question, she must be deemed to have claimed it in the lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover, the lower court found
bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and other real sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the property in question is the same property
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are conclusive upon this Court
even granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
therefore, in good faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary
for her to acquire the land by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil
Code). But she can claim to have possessed the land only in 1968, the
year the Monterola lots were donated to her. The period, however, was PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint below was filed."
(Rollo, pp. 18-19) SO ORDERED.
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA inherited Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated; hence, said
||| (Coronado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78778, [December 3, 1990], 270 PHIL 36-46)
transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of
Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190), no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
THIRD DIVISION interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she
has signed the deed ofextrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to
[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000.] believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the
assailed document.
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and
DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs. THE 2. ID.; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS WAS A MINISTERIAL
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, ACT WHICH MERELY CREATED A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ITS CONTENTS AGAINST
CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents. ALL THIRD PERSONS. — The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the
date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone
be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the
Imelda A. Herrera for petitioner.
instruments remained completely valid and binding.
Abundio J. Macaranas for private respondents.
3. ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; WHERE THE PRETERITION IS NOT
SYNOPSIS ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH AND FRAUD, THE PARTITION SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED BUT
THE PRETERITED HEIR SHALL BE PAID THE VALUE OF THE SHARE PERTAINING TO
HER. — The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977 a common residence at the Isarog property. deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
Soon, tension appeared to have escalated between petitioner RebeccaViado and respondent however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
February 1, 1988 petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a preterited heir shall be paid the value ofthe share pertaining to her. Again, the
case of partition before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents predicated their claim ofabsolute appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further
ownership over the subject property on the deed of donation executed by the late proceedings to make the proper valuationof the Isarog property and ascertainment of the
Julian Viado covering his 1/2 share in favor of respondent's husband, NiloViado, and a amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived their rights and interests in favor of NiloViado. The trial court found for DECISION
respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but
ordered the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value ofthe property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner VITUG, J p:
Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Dissatisfied
therewith, petitioners filed the petition seeking the reversal of the Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek a
decision of the Court of Appeals. cHDEaC reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered
on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the
The Supreme Court found the appellate court to have ruled correctly. The evidence submitted by
property subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found
petitioners were utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
trial court. LibLex
signatures of the parties to the deed of donation andof the extrajudicial settlement, petitioners
are vague on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. With regard to the During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several
issue of preterition, the Court ruled that the exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon
retardate, from the deed of the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October
Thus, the appellate court acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their
proceedings to make the proper valuation of the property and determination of the amount due children — Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to
to petitioner Delia Viado. Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987.
Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents — his wife Alicia Viado and their
SYLLABUS
two children Cherri Viadoand Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property.
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; FRAUD, FORGERY AND UNDUE Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
INFLUENCE; NOT PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court of Appeals, in sustaining respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between
thecourt a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed
consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viadoemployed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion
fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the
deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).
what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why
Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by
documents — a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement
in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a powerof attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did
petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 registration of the documents was a ministerial act 5 and merely created a constructive
August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title notice of its contents against all third persons. 6 Among the parties, the instruments remained
No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the completely valid and binding. LLphil
heirs of Nilo Viado.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind ofpreterition, however, in the
contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer
Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall
Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments, although executed properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper
on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. prcd
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and adjudged No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs. cdrep
Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification by
ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner
||| (Non v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137287, [February 15, 2000], 382 PHIL 538-544)
Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed ofextrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog
property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their
children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested
from the moment of death of the decedent, 1 remained under a co-ownership regime 2 among
the heirs until partition. 3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. 4
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents
rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title
solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds
heretofore expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the
evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by
petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds ofdonation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are
vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have
petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient
judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The
asseveration ofpetitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement
on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration ofthe property is
FIRST DIVISION The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon
is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that it
[G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.] is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims
she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF was not officious.
APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma, respondents. The two articles provide as follows:
"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
SYLLABUS right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of
the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; DONATION; THE FACT OF ITS IRREVOCABLE CHARACTER the account of the partition."
DOES NOT EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM COLLATION. — We agree with the respondent court
that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated "Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should
di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable inofficious."
does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, * which held that the
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATION; INTENTION TO EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM COLLATION decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.
SHOULD BE EXPRESSED PLAINLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY. — Anything less than Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court ** holding that the
nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.
was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none. The intention to exempt from collation Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the
should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. 4
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough. The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: llcd
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; MAXIMUM PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO DECIDE A "IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi
CASE, MERELY DIRECTORY. — There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella
the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa
Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong ibinibigay,
not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is worth ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa
stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay
the1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi
urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat
need. ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang
DECISION sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not
the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed
by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, 7 the said
provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII,
Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed
with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to
meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It
is so ordered.
||| (De Roma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46903, [July 23, 1987], 236 PHIL 220-225)