ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of
Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took
his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a
resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On
Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest
that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec.
Commission denied Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended
that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral
Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and
the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

*****

Bacani vs Nacoco
Nonsuability doctrine

BACANI VS NACOCO

G.R. No. L-9657 100 Phil 471 November 29, 1956

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs�Appellees,

NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants�Appellants.

Facts:

Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of
the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National
Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the
request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714
pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T.
Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue
of a Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For reimbursement to
take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted
from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government

entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity
within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence,
it is exempted from paying the stenographers� fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

Issues:

Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain

functions of government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.

Discussions:

NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the
stenographers� fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term �Government
of the Republic of the Philippines�. The term �Government� may be defined as �that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them� (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil.,
332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to
what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of
government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant.
The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory
in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the
general interests of society, and are merely optional.

Rulings:

No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come
under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was
organized for the purpose of �adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States� and of providing �Facilities
for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-
products�, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the
government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same
manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity
different from our government.

*****

PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged
overtime services and the petitioner�s failure to pay for said compensation in
accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack
of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay.
Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the
government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of
its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: �The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.�
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve
scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As
such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set
forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just
because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions,
that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct
respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within
the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders
clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order,
financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame.
It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can
hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That
would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an
objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat,
respondent Court must be sustained.

*****

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive

Treasurer
Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The
Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as
relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but
$80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was
in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the
$80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this
order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the
Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of
the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a
recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons
and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a

reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people
thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public
interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro
people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature,
by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where
no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court
ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest
in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

*****

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the
Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the
Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine
government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he
declared that �all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control�
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur�s proclamation,
those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of
a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de
facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority
from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended
or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for �the
existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society,
or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if
they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come
out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
�processes of any other government� and whether or not he intended it to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military
occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur�s
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: �A statute ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.�
Another is that �where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the
court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the
law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.�
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the
dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be
construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase �processes
of any other governments.�
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are
continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him.
The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as
required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, �law once established
continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.� Until, of course, the new sovereign by
legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the
Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan,
as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have
continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue
exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration
of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil
laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be
applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law
of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending
before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets
possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of
paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

*****

People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the
advice of an assistant in the Mayor�s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the
house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on
erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer�s Office for
violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition
and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the
lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of
a foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction
of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City
of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the
US Naval Base.

*****

Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533
75 Phil 875
August 20, 1956

Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al.

Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were
assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese
forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains
and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt.
Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the
"Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow
petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the
offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of
an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held
petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were
operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's
jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be

dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.

*****

MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take
a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration
or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and
a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First
Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and
Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,

native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during
the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in
order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife
of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have
the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have
to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such
is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the
husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962.

*****

Magallona v. Ermita

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as 'regime of
islands�.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country�s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as 'regime of islands� would weaken our claim over
those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a

codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of
our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea
lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages
does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states.
Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its
sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and
in fact, it increased the Phils.� total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils.� continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): 'drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago�.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we�ll breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

*****

Lawyers League for Better Philippines vs Aquino

Legal Standing; De Jure Government

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the �new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.�

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

In order that the citizen�s actions may be allowed a party must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was
the people that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the
Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Rulings:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of

action. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the
finding that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

*****

William Reagan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical
assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960
Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the
same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the
USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale.
The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be
at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed
tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is
exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in �foreign soil� since Clark Air
Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited
that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt
from Philippine taxation.

ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine
income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws
govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is
the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand,
there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan�s
assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country�s
jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in
certain cases � this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is
likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived
from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence
taxable.

*****

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure
by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi
in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution
and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In
fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed
to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws
as having an �associative� relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to
any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that
of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it � which has betrayed itself by its
use of the concept of association � runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government
and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising
that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of
the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a
state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
�autonomous region� in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that �any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,� implying
an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does
not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.

The �suspensive clause� in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed

standards.

Given the limited nature of the President�s authority to propose constitutional

amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most
she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is �the birthright of all Moros and
all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
'Bangsamoros.�� It defines �Bangsamoro people� as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether
mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of �Bangsamoro,� as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,

includes not only �Moros� as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of
choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer
to the �Bangsamoro homeland,� the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to
the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute
does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to
the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants
from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion
of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only
its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
*****

Republic vs Villasor
government funds are not subject to garnishment

REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR

G.R. No. L-30671 54 SCRA 83 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J.
KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
respondents

Facts:

The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the
ruling of The Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds
allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines.

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener

Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against
the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo
P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the
said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength
of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds
duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
the AFP.

Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for

acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issues:

Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.
Discussions:

The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that �the State may not be sued without
its consent�. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is the practical
consideration that the demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert time
and resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding its attention,
to the prejudice of the public welfare.
As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special
deposit, they remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment. An
exception of the rule is a law or ordinance that has been enacted appropriating a
specific amount to pay a valid government obligation.

Rulings:

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic

concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to
be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the
loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-
suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

*****

Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages after being
dismissed from their employment with the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) which was involved in a joint project of the
Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat
Island. The UNRFNRE filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that respondent Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since the UNRFNRE enjoyed
diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. The respondent attached a letter from the
Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledging its immunity from suit, prompting the
Labor Arbiter to issue an order dismissing the complaints. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:

Did the private respondent waive its diplomatic immunity when it engaged in
exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with the petitioners?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that the presence of the
private respondent in the Philippines was not because of a commercial venture but
because of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United
Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. The mission of the UNRFNRE was
not to exploit our natural resources and gain monetarily but to help improve the
quality of life of the people which included that of the petitioners.

*****

SEAFDEC-AQD vs NLRC

FACTS: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast

Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement in 1967 by the
governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the
Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.

Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by

SEAFDEC-AQD. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to Lazaga informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's
failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. Thus SEAFDEC-AQD appealed,
claiming that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case since it is immune from
suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit
against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent.

ISSUES:

1. Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD?

2. Is SEAFDEC-AQD estopped for its failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction at

the first instance?

HELD:

1. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public

respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the
state in whose territory its office is located.

Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by

the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as they are
autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated.
As such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a
species of international personality of their own."

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that
the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would
afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states.

2. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of

jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction
to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by
law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is
the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction
is null and void. (SEAFDEC-AQD vs NLRC, G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992)

*****

CALLADO VS. IRRI

GR No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice

Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on
an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI,
petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer,
explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department
Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7,
1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through
counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article
3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and
privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by
petitioner, not having waived the same.

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its
immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving
the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from
an employer-employee relationship.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. There�s no merit
in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.
Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its
position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter
categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic
immunity.

*****

Del Mar vs Philippine Veterans Administration [G.R. L-27299] June 27, 1973
by Quolete
Facts:

del Mar, the petitioner, was was relieved with honorable discharge with permanent
total physical disability. Philippine Veterans administration granted him pension
but was soon discontinued because he received the same pension under the United
States Veterans Administration.

Issue:

The PVA decided that:

(1) Petitioner is barred from receiving any pension from the Philippine Veterans
Administration.

�The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar�s receipt of a similar pension from
the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving
from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the
monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age.�

(2) The filing of the case is premature.

�the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention�

(3) The case is a suit against the state.

�the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand
partakes of a money claim against the PVA � a mere agency of the Philippine
Government � and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable
without its consent.�

(4) It was discretionary on the part of PVA to discontinue pension.

Held:

(1) When a case is a suit against the state:

�As a general proposition, the rule � well-settled in this jurisdiction � on the

immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions
resulting in �adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property.�

(2) Suits against the state must be dismissed

(3) When a case is not a suit against the state:

�where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply

with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already
appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.�

(4) The case is not premature. Administrative liability is not required.

�Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present controversy � involves a

question solely of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort
to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief.�

(5) The act committed by the PVA, in suspending a provision of law, is against the
constitution.

�� the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive
power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express
language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative.
Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be
strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The
statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is
allowable.�

*****

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286

FACTS:

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions
under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law
violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO)
which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g)

of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private
Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that
�all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of
any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located...�. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it
allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per
day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered
to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer
lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated
May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of
its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and
likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI�s license. As a result, PADPAO
refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings
of PADPAO and consider VMPSI�s application for renewal of its license, even without
a certificate of membership from PADPAO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not VMPSI�s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit
against the State without its consent.

HELD:

Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being
called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties,
without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them
in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court
of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute
an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto.

*****

PNB vs CIR
the test of suability is found in its charter

Facts:

A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had

previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on two grounds:

That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff

to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and
That the funds subject of the garnishment �may be public in character.� In thus
denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of
respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave
abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is
denied for the lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days
from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment� dated May 6, 1970.�

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this
certiorari petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be
stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.

Discussions:

According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government

Agencies:

�An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate
judicial personality. If the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found
in its charter.�

From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed
out by him: �It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a
partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its
prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and
takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is
to be transacted.

Rulings:

No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The
premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in
the sense that the People�s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned
entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.

As stated in �National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial

Relations�, a government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of
its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of
law governing private corporations.

*****

GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-55273-83 December
19, 1981
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a
sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent
corporation.

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and
contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety
functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter
includes the power to be sued for tort.

HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,

distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision
that it can sue and be sued in any court.

*****

Malong v. PNR

Facts:
The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it
was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near
the door of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view
of the proximity of All Saints Day.
The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling
P136,370.
Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It
ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the
Constitution).
The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440
R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only questions of
law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or
the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of
any inferior court, from ordinary appeal � i.e., by notice of appeal, record on
appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41� to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45
Issue/s:
WON PNR is immune from suit.
WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity when it
organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation
WON the State acted differently when it organized the PNR as successor of the
Manila Railroad Company

Held: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity
when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself
from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National
Railways.

Ratio:
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-
corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs, Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.)
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to
act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State
Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons
engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation
(Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244, cited in Manila
Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388).
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the
sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and
contracts with individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the
courts, the rights and obligation of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon
the same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons. Both stand
upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor
and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549).
Justice Abad Santos (Separate Opinion) : All corporations organized by the
government are its instrumentality by the very reason of their creation. But that
fact alone does not invest them with immunity from suit.

*****

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

*****

Department of Agriculture vs NLRC

Doctrine of non-suability

Facts:

The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed
and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan
Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed
a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as
for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable
with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant
security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to
quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming
jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability
of the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.

Issues:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:

Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be �sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act
3083 stands as the general law waiving the State�s immunity from suit, subject to
its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that 'no execution shall
issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing
money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

Rulings:

No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances.
The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government �consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.�

In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that
it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims
of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.

*****

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286

FACTS:

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions
under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law
violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO)
which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g)

of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private
Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that
�all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of
any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located...�. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it
allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per
day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered
to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer
lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated
May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of
its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and
likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI�s license. As a result, PADPAO
refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings
of PADPAO and consider VMPSI�s application for renewal of its license, even without
a certificate of membership from PADPAO.
ISSUE:

Whether or not VMPSI�s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit
against the State without its consent.

HELD:

Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being
called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties,
without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them
in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court
of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute
an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto.

*****

Shauf v. CA

Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base
Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal
employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler
(civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged
discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser
for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be
automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180
days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she�s
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo�s was
about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo�s appointment was extended thus,
Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo�s stay was
extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint
that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a
joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable
regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil
Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages
+ 20% of such amount as attorney�s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the
defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in
performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction
over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District
Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the
CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus
this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the
rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized
acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed
Forces

Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are
hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a
State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he
violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is
not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine
of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary,
irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling
that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be
held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of
her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in
1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter
hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human
behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service
eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark
Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she
applied for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even
consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to
CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is
a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the
acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of
petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of
the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her
remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for
civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American
law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as
a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus,
nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be
ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private
respondents on that score.

*****

Republic vs. Sandoval

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform

program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of
12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11
creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.
Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for
damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the
incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to
the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and,
therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly
were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond
the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can
commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the
atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their
authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

*****
Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

The facts of the case took place in the 1910�s. E. Merritt was a constructor who
was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle
Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was
hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he
could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at
least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver
of the ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action
in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of
the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment
of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and
a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. �The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the
fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest.�

*****

REPUBLIC v. AMANTE P. PURISIMA

The jurisdictional issue raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf

of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and oft-reiterated doctrine of the non-
suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the
collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.[1]Such a motion
to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading case of Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service,[2] where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.[3]
There is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional
infirmity against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated
October 4, 1972.[4] What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified
with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution:
"The State may not be sued without its consent."[5]

The merit of the petition for certiorari and prohibition is thus obvious.

1. There is pertinence to this excerpt from Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd.
v. Republic of the Philippines:[6] "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in
this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a
logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes,
negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the
source, of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all. Even
if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the
general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that
calls for its continued applicability. Why it must continue to be so, even if the
matter be viewed sociologically, was set forth in Providence Washington Insurance
Co. v. Republic thus: 'Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to
court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such
an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.' "[7] It only remains to be
added that under the present Constitution which, as noted, expressly reaffirmed
such a doctrine, the following decisions had been rendered: Del Mar v. The
Philippine Veterans Administration;[8] Republic v. Villasor;[9] Sayson v. Singson;
[10] and Director of the Bureau of Printing v. Francisco.[11]

2. Equally so, the next paragraph in the above opinion from the Switzerland General
Insurance Company decision is likewise relevant: "Nor is injustice thereby caused
private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims
by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them
subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus
correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision:
'Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it
has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the
fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state
activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private
claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal.
In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what
principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict
must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
funda�mental postulate of constitutional law.'"[12]

3. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the
private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn
Adminis�tration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of
contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.[13] The
consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly
enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel
for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. At any rate,
Justice Sanchez, in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations,[14] was quite
categorical as to its "not [being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence. On the contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly
'under the Office of the President of the Philippines.'"[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4,
1972 denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration
nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is likewise granted
restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his
sala except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of juris�diction.
The temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made
permanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this
case. Costs against Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

*****

USA vs Ruiz
Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

Facts:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the
proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to
the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from
the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name
of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so
they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by
William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award
for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in
repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a
suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issues:

Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Discussions:

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the
rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of
State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
states in western Europe.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.
Only when it enters into business contracts.

*****

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. 518 SCRA 240 (2007)

Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in
his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to
the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the
acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order
providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at
ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner
Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth)
submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited drug products, including the antibiotic -Penicillin G Benzathine.
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million
units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH
regarding Pharmawealth's request for inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine
contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondent's Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories' (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a
complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional
Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court -nullify the award of the
Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners
DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for
the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff
company and -adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and
severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of
Appeals (CA) denied DOH's petition for review which affirmed the order issued
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official
capacity will prosper.

HELD:
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned
was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts
done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial
liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave
abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial
review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is
guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official
concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate
suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail
despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes
of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed
against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state
immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a
charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not
in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained
of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present
case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of -illegally abusing their official positions to
make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract
[which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth
of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing
principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot
hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

*****

Ildefonso Santiago vs Republic of the Philippines

In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the

Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should
construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by
December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said
lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted
Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation.
The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.

HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by
virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a
beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau of
Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such,
therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard.
Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to
equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

*****

Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping

waiver of sovereign immunity
Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan

Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the
vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he
executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For
various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping
Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale
cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the
defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet
restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping
Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a
writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment
and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful
possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by
Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff �s rights under the

contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the
Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property,
Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession
thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of
the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be
foreclosed.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have
divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of
the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and
processes.
Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for
affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The
immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in
an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might
have against the state.

*****

RCBC v Pacifico de Castro and PVTA G.R. No. L-34548 November 29, 1988

The funds of the PVTA can be garnished since �funds of public corporation which can
sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a
special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by
PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under
the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial
processes such as execution and garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a specie
of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to
him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee
[the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer
issuing the writ and �the law exempts from liability the person having in his
possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to
the defendant, �, if such property be delivered or transferred, �, to the clerk,
sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is pending.

Facts: Badoc Planters, Inc. filed an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco
deliveries against PVTA. Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering
the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as �BADOC�) within 48 hours the aggregate amount of
P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court
on the very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff
Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General
Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as RCBC). However, PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Judge
set aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and
ordering petitioner and BADOC �to restore, jointly and severally, the account of
PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before.

Issues:

1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;

2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to
reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued
pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.

1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;

Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the
attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law.
Hence, it possesses the power �to sue and be sued� and �to acquire and hold such
assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by
the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such
operations.� Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia
tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco
manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to
contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its
purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the
Philippines or with any foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h),
R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.]

From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality
distinct and separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly,
this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished
since �funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment. Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked
specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in connection with its
proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law, it follows that
said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as
execution and garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for
reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger
to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is
obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and
�the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or under his
control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, �, if
such property be delivered or transferred, �, to the clerk, sheriff, or other
officer of the court in which the action is pending.

2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to
reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff

No. The bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since
it was not even a party to the case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it
had neither the personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of
respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no
standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in favor of
the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. RCBC cannot
therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC.
Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and
Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a
subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered
to restore the account of the PVTA.

*****

Municipality of Makati vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private

respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed
the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay
this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to
private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied
with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB
could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under
the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition
for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution?

2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are
necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a
money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality,
are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati
has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding
to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with
no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable
reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject
property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal
obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession
of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since
the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal
to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in
fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-
99, October 1, 1990)

*****

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CA- Easement and Just Compensation

When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal
easement may be constituted and thus no just compensation is required. It would be
otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
easement of a right of way.

FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan
was issued in the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814.
The land was granted subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the
title:

"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any

corporation, association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for
educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject
finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and
prescribed by law especially those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113
and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by

absolute sale.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala,
Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and
fillings thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a
portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.

RULING: No.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title
to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land
Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further
to such conditions contained in the original title as may be subsisting."

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that
the land is subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110,
111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This reservation,
unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period
and thus is a subsisting condition.

Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width
for public highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and
telephone lines, and similar works..."

We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This
is well within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to
complain.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by
law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal
easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.
The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property,
in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of a right of way.

*****

Villacicencio Vs Lukban

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation
to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that
the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these
officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On
the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized
by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore,
the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice
of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have
been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given
the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished

*****

Kuroda v. Jalandoni Digest

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and
other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission
was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and

hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the
following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case
hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal

jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68

was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of
Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is
in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or
civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses
in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to
the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly
based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted
even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party

of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes
which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules
as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the
provision of this special law.

*****

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter
of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner
Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at
the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs
as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police
power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is
nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also
intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures
calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that
the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the
driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it�s installed
when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers
to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn�t violate
any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesn�t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO.
It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for
installation of ewd�s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the
decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled
legal doctrines.

*****

Ichong vs Hernandez
Conflict with fundamental law; Police power

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled �An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.� The main
provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in

the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action
to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime
Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted

principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in

good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must
be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle
and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause �does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced�; and, that the equal protection clause �is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.�

*****

GONZALES VS HECHANOVA

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or
any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized
by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any
other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates
that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that
the government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail
and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may
properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may,
under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.

*****

In RE: Garcia

FACTS: Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified
petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of
Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of �Bachillerato Superior�
in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the �Insitututo de Cervantes�
for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the
law course, graduating there as �Licenciado en derecho�. Thereafter he was allowed
to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine
Bar

RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty
was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of
the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the
Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved
only to the Congress of the Philippines.

*****