The Threat of Violence and Social Change

Author(s): H. L. Nieburg
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 865-873
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952789
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 THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

H. L. NIEBURG
Case Institute of Technology

The threat of violence, and the occasional
outbreak of real violence-which gives the
threat credibility-are essential elements in
peaceful social change not only in international,
but also in national communities.' Individuals
and groups, no less than nations, exploit the
threat as an everyday matter. This induces
flexibility and stability in democratic institu-
tions.
I refer not only to the police power of the
state and the recognized right of self-defense,
but also to private individual or group violence,
whether purposive or futile, deliberate or des-
perate. Violence and the threat of violence, far
from being meaningful only in international
politics, are underlying, tacit, recognized, and
omnipresent facts of domestic life, in the sha-
dow of which democratic politics are carried on.
They instil dynamism into the structure and
growth of thle law, the settlement of disputes,
the processes of accomodating interests, and
they induce general respect for the verdict of
the polls.
An effort by the state to obtain an absolute
monopoly over violence, threatened or used in
behalf of private interests, leads inexorably-as
in a prison-to complete totalitarian repression
of all activities and associations which may,
however remotely, create a basis of anti-state
action. A democratic system preserves the right
of organized action by private groups, risking
their implicit capability of violence. By inter-
veninlg at tlic earliest possible point in private
activities, the totalitarian state increases the
likelihood that potential violence will have to be
demonstrated before it is socially effective. On
the other hand, by permitting a pluralistic
basis for action, the democratic state permits
potential violence to have a social effect with
only a token demonstration, thus assuring
greater opportunities for peaceful political and
possibility of a violent revolution once each
generation is a powerful solvent of political
rigidity, making such revolutions unnecessary.
The argument of this essay is that the risk of
violence is necessary and useful in preserving
national societies.2 This specifically includes
sporadic, uncontrolled, "irrational" violence in
all its forms. It is true that domestic violence,
no less than international violence, may become
a self-generating vortex which destroys all
values, inducing anarchy and chaos. Efforts to
prevent this by extreme measures, however,
only succeed in making totalitarian societies
that are more liable to such collapses. Democ-
racies assume the risk of such catastrophes,
and thereby make them less likely.
Violence has two inextricable aspects: its
actual use (political demonstrations, self-
immolation, suicide, crimes of passion, prop-
erty, or politics, etc.), and its potential (threat-
ened) use. The actual outbreak or demonstra-
tion of violence must occur from time to time in
order to give plausibility to its threatened
outbreak, and thereby to gain efficacy for the
threat as an instrument of social and political
change. The two aspects, demonstration and
threat, therefore cannot be separated. If the
capability of actual demonstration is not
present, the threat will have little effect in
inducing a willingness to bargain politically. In
fact, such a threat may instead provoke "pre-
emptive" counter-violence.
The "rational" goal of the threat of violence
is an accomodation of interests, not the provo-
cation of actual violence. Similarly, the "ra-
tional" goal of actual violence is demonstration
of the will and capability of action, establishing
a measure of the credibility of future threats,
2 The role of violence in political organizations
is vividly demonstrated by a recent event among

social change. A democratic system has greater
viability an(d stability; it is not forced, like thebull elk, Teddy, had his magnificent antlers sawed
totalitarian, to create an infinite deterrent to
all non-state (and thus potentially anti-state)
activities. The early Jeffersonians recognized
this essential element of social change when
they guaranteed the private right to keep and
bear arms, in the Second Amendment. The
1 "Violence" is defined as direct or indirect ac-
tion applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons
or property.
a group of elks at the Bronx Zoo. A 4-year old
off to one-inch stumps. Hle had reigned as undis-
puted boss of a herd of six cow elks and one
younger bull. But the breeding season was on,
and lie was becoming "a bit of a martinet." With
his antlers off, he gets a new perspective on his
authority and becomes a tolerable leader. A
younger bull may try to take over as paramount
leader of the herd, but if he does, the veterinarian
will saw off his antlers, too. New York Times,
September 26, 1962, p. 35.

865

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866 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
riot the exhaustion of that capability in unlim-
ited conflict.3 An investigation of the function
of violence begins with an outline of concepts.
I. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND CONSENSUS
Wfe assume that all human relationships,
both individual and institutional, are involved
inl a dynamic process of consensus and competi-
tion. These are opposites only as conceptual
poles of a continuum. In real relationships, it is
often difficult to distinguish objectively be-
tween the two. The distinction is sharp only
subjectively, for the participant, and his per-
ception of consensus or competition may
change from moment to moment, depending on
his political role anrd the objective circum-
stances.4 A political role is defined in terms of
the many political systems in which the indi-
vidual objectively or subjectively (by identifi-
cation of interests) plays a part. A political
system contains a hierarchy of authority and
values. Each system has a complex structure of
leadership and influence but, because of the
nature of its task (maximizing and allocating
certain values), policy and decision-making
power is usually vested in one or a few roles at
the top of the pyramid of authority (the elite).
Formal and informal political systems exist at
all levels of group life (children's play groups,
families, lodges, gangs, work groups, nation-
states, international alignments, etc.), inter-
penetrating each other among and between
levels. Each isolated system has an interde-
pendent structure of roles, involving loyalty to
certain values, symbols, leaders, and patterns
of behavior according to system norms. The
discrete individual, part of many different
systems, must structure his own hierarchy of
commitment to meet the simultaneous de-
mands made upon him by many different roles.
Within the individual, the conflicting de-
mands of these roles create tension. Similarly,
within each system conflicting values between
members are constantly adjusted as roles
change, maintaining a state of tension. And
political systems as wholes have an objective,
3 By "rational" here is meant: having a con-
ceptual link to a given end, a logical or symbolic
mieans-ends relationship which can hee demon-
strate(l to others or, if not demonstrable, is ac-
cepted l)y others (but not necessarily all) as prov- in the sub-system of the family group, we tend
en.
4 Essentially, the p)ercep)tion hy an individual (until the system breaks down completely).
of his relationship to others within a framework of
hostility or cooperation is the subjective basis of Cold War can be viewed in terms of the large
"ideology," using the term as Karl Mannheim
does in "Sociology of Knowledge," Ideology and
Utopia (New York, 1957), pp. 265-66.
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dynamic interrelationship, structured into the
hierarchy of macro-systems. Within the latter,
each sub-system has a role much like that of the
individual in smaller constellations. Each sub-
system may be part of several macro-systems,
imposing conflicting demands upon it. Conse-
quently, within macro-systems there is main-
tained a state of constant tension between
sub-systems.
This objective tension, existing on all levels,
is perceived subjectively in terms both of com-
petition and consensus, depending on the com-
parative degrees of collaboration and conflict
which exist in the situation at any given mo-
ment.
So any two or more systems may appear as
hostile at any given time. From the viewpoint
of the participants, the conceptual framework
of competition overrides underlying consensus.
Decisions and policies of the rival elites then
are rationalized in terms of hostility to the
values and leaders of the other system. How-
ever, if events transpire to place a higher value
on a hostile tactical situation involving the
macro-system of which both smaller systems
are a part, their relationship will be trans-
formed quickly to a conceptual framework of
consensus which will override and mute the
unresolved competitive elements. Such an
event may also bring about internal leadership
changes in both sub-systems, if their elites were
too firmly wedded to the requirements of the
now-irrelevant competitive situation.
Objectively, tension is always present among
all roles and systems; that is, elements of both
competition and consensus go together. The
subjective emphasis which each pole of the
continuum receives depends on the value which
the tactical situation places on acts and atti-
tudes of hostility or collaboration among the
various systems at various times. Degrees of
hostility and collaboration are structured by a
hierarchy of values within and among all roles
and systems all the time. All are involved in a
dynamic process.
Conflict, in functional terms, is the means of
discovering or reaching consensus, of creating
agreed terms of collaboration. Because of our
personal roles in the macro-system of nation-
states, we tend to view the Cold War in terms
of competition. Similarly, because of our roles
to view family problems in terms of consensus
One can reverse these conceptual fields. The
areas of consensus that exist between the two
power-blocs. For example, the wish to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons to each other's
 THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 867
allies; the wish to avoid giving each other's
allies the power of precipitating general war
between the main antagonists; the common
interest in reducing accidental provocations;
the common interest in establishing some
norms of predictability in each other's behav-
ior; etc. Conflict can therefore be considered
merely as the means of perfecting these areas of
consensus. IIi the same way, one can view the
family situation negatively in terms of compe-
tition and hostility. As in an O'Neill drama, one
would dwell on all the things that divide the
family members and interpret all actions in
terms of maneuvers to subdue each other's will.
Consensus then becomes a residual category
hors de combat, and therefore of no importance.
One might dwell upon the collaborative aspects
of international affairs or the disruptive aspects
of family affairs. A policy-maker should do
both in the former area, just as a psychiatrist
does both in the latter. The collaborative view
of the Cold War should not, however, induce
euphoria about the nature of the relationship
(as it unfortunately does for some), since so
many crimes of violence occur in families, and
so many murders involve lovers or ex-lovers.5
In performing this exercise, the relativistic
nature of the concepts of consensus and compe-
tition becomes evident. It is impossible to reach
any consensus without competition and every
consensus, no matter how stable, is still only
provisional, since it represents for all its mem-
b(ers a submerging of other values. All collabo-
rating individuals, groups, or nations con-
stantly try to exploit favorable opportunities to
improve their roles or to impose a larger part of
their own value structures upon a larger politi-
cal system. In an important sense, all individ-
uals, groups, or nations desire to "rule the
world," but are constrained to collaborate with
others on less desirable terms because of the
objective limits of their own power or the cost
of the exertion required.
The commitment required to produce a
credible threat of violence, sufficient to induce
peaceable accommodation, is one of a very high
order. Not all individuals nor all political sys-
tems are capable of credibly using the threat of
violence in order to induce greater deference by
others to their values. People generally recog-
nise the kinds of values which can and cannot
elicit the high degree of commitment required
to make the threat credible.
5 See E. Frankel, "One Thousand Murderers,"
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.
29 (1938-39), pp. 687-88, cited in Marshall B.
Clinard, Sociology of Deviant Behavior (New York,
1957), p. 216.
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By and large, all violence has a rational as-
pect, for somebody, if not for the perpetrator.
Acts of violence can consequently be rational-
ized (i.e., put to rational use), whether they are
directed against others or against oneself. This
is true because people who may be anxious to
apply the threat of violence to achieve a social
or political bargaining position are nevertheless
usually reluctant also to pay the costs or take
the risks of an actual demonstration of that
threat. Incoherent acts of violence can be ex-
ploited by elites as a means of improving their
roles or imposing a larger part of their values
upon a greater political system. The more
obvious the logical connection between such an
act and the ends sought by the elite, the easier
it is to assimilate the act and claim it as a dem-
onstration of the potential violence available
to the elite if its demands are ignored. The
rapidity with which insurgent movements
create martyrs from the demise of hapless
bystanders, and the reluctance of governments
to give martyrs to the opposition, are evidence
of this.
II. NATIONS, LAWS, AND BALLOTS
The nation is a highly organized, formal
political system, whose structure is well defined
by law and custom, reinforced by sanctions
legally imposed by the near-monopoly violence
(police power) of the state. The central problem
of lawful societies is to develop principles,
procedures, institutions and expectations that
create conditions of continuity and predicta-
bility in the lives of its members. The legal
system is an abstract model of the society,
designed to crystallize relationships of the
status quo, maintain their continuity in the
midst of political and social change, and provide
lawful methods of resisting or accommodat-
ing change. Law itself tends to maintain the
status quo and, with the instruments of state
power, to resist change. But relationships in
organized societies change anyway. The process
for codifying changed conditions and relation-
ships is called "politics." Political systems
legitimize certain kinds of potential violence
within controlled limits; it then becomes force.6
However, law almost never serves the interests
of all equally. Rather, it protects some against
6 The distinction between "violence" and
"force" (one uncontrolled, the other controlled),
was common in pre-Lasswellian literature. They
are often difficult to distinguish objectively.
Assessments of controllability may be almost
entirely ideological. I prefer to use "force" to
designate the objective capabilities, i.e., the
concrete means or instruments for violence.
868 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

others or gives advantages to some over others. in our offices anyway making decisions!" Gov-
By placing the force of the state behind the in- ernments fall when their capabilities for dealing
terests of some, law serves to neutralize the po- with threatened violence fail. The emerging
tential violence behind the demands of others. political system which proves itself capable of
I n a sense, it thus raises the threshold of vio- raising a higher threshold of violence (than the
lence required to make social protests against established government can or will surmount
the law efficacious. This guarantees that the with its force) becomes de facto the highest
law cannot be changed easily or quickly by any authority, and de jure the new government.
group, thus giving it greater permanence and Laws are not merely the rules of a game of
stability. economic and political competition. They are
Pressures for political and social change must also a means of winning the game, if some of the
therefore be substantial before the threat of players can, as in fact they do, write the laws.
violence and the fear of the breakdown of law The ideal system may be one in which the rules
and order rise above the threshold set by the are written with perfect dispassion, so that
force held by the state. While the threat and they accord no special advantages to anyone.
fear remain below the threshold, the status quo This ideal is never realized. The process of
often responds to challenges against the law by politics which underlies the making and un-
more severe enforcement, augmented police making of laws is not dispassionate. Indeed, it
and enlarged prisons. But when the threat and is one of the most passionate of human affairs.
fear come near or cross the threshold, a general No matter how scrupulously fair may be the
tendency toward non-enforcement of the law original constitution and the representation of
sets in. The status quo interests begin to share governing institutions, the tensions of political
with the disaffected groups a desire to evade systems soon intrude historical hierarchies of
and to change the law. advantage. Whoever enjoys early advantages
Private demonstrations of force are illegal in in the game soon enjoys that and more by law,
all domestic societies. Toleration is accorded to with the heightened threshold of the force
threats of potential violence, however, to the available at the beckoning of the state to
extent that the laws and institutions are demo- vouchsafe them. In this manner the law tends
cratic. In all systems, the state, to deserve its always to become to some extent the instru-
name, must apply adequate force to control ment of the status quo, resisting change.
outbreaks of actual violence by private sources In democratic societies, however, the law
-or tolerate some more or less recognized "off- also guarantees the right of voluntary associa-
limits" areas for outlawry.7 If the instrumental- tion, among other political liberties, and re-
ities of state power are not equal to broad strains (by a constitutional distribution of
private threats, indeed, the government in authority) arbitrary use of the police power.
power ceases to rule. Vigilantism or the private These permit opponents of the status quo to
threat of violence has then in fact become the establish and maintain a base of political action
last resort of authority in the system. Why do that may become formidable. It may then be
governments sometimes fall when there is a difficult for the regime to find legal pretexts for
general strike, or a street demonstration? Why controlling this base while its potential for anti-
don't they ignore outbreaks with which they state violence is still within the state's control
cannot cope? And say: "All right, go ahead and capability. Once its potential equals or grows
strike, fight each other for control of the streets,
greater than that of the state, repression is no
snake-dance down the avenue. We will sit here longer a realistic policy. Changing the law, or
treating it as a dead letter, gains precedence
I There are many areas outside the effective- over enforcing it, even for status quo leaders
if not the nominal-jurisdiction of formal govern- who wish to preserve what control remains over
mental authority, as, for example, "off-limit" informal political systems in which they are the
slum areas where police seldom penetrate, or the elite. Once this process of peaceful political
AMafia areas of Sicily. Such areas represent politi-
change has been successfully set in motion,
cal sub-systems which possess a high degree of both the emerging and the declining political
sovereignty, tolerated, for one reason or another, elites have a high interest in maintaining a
by the general government. Within such areas, general freedom to threaten violence without
the de facto authority is often the elite able to initiating or provoking it, either on the part of
maintain the highest threshold of potential vio- the state or by other groups. For the status quo
lence, not the formal government. In such areas, elites, there is more to be gained in preserving
an unwritten law usually makes it a severely the continuity of the laws than in initiating and
punished offense to call upon the authority of provoking the demonstration of violence at an
the general government. unpredictable level. For the insurgent elites,

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 THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 869

there is usually more to be gained choice

in between the two. They call for inter-
preserving
the continuity of the laws than in appealing to national law and world government to elimi-
the uncertain results of violence. nate war. This point of view reveals a blissful
In democratic systems, the ballot becomes ignorance of the functions of violence in domes-
the non-provocative symbol by which the elites tic legal systems. A viable system based on law
may measure their capabilities for threatening protects the conditions of group action which
direct action. In a real sense, voting is an ap- make threats of violence tolerable. Law always
proximation of picking sides before a street rests on force, a legitimate monopoly in the
fight. Once the sides are picked, the leaders are hands of the state, and it can be changed by the
able to gauge their bargaining strengths and threat of private violence. The threat of vio-
make the best possible deal for themselves and lence and the fear of the breakdown of law and
their cohorts. The appeal to actual battle not order cast their shadows ahead; they operate to
only is unnecessary, but also, for the weaker moderate demands and positions, thereby
side (the only side with an interest in challeng- setting into peaceful motion the informal politi-
ing the results of the count), it does not promisecal processes of negotiation, concession, com-
to change the results, and may in fact under- promise, and agreement. Although there is no
mine the authority of the polls as a method for centralized monopoly of force in the interna-
reversing one's future position. tional forum, the processes of mediation and
The threat of violence implicit in counting negotiation function in much the same way.
heads is an ambiguous measure of the power The credible threat of violence in the hands of
available to the political systems into which nations has a similarly stabilizing effect, pro-
people group themselves at election time. The viding statesmen are attentive to the mainte-
extent of voter commitment in these systems is nance of their national capability for demon-
uncertain and probably, in most cases, unequal strating violence, and providing their ambitions
to demands for supporting action. There are are commensurate to the bargaining position
very few national elections in the United Stateswhich their armaments achieve. More compre-
--although many elsewhere-in which the hensive legal codes and a world government
results prefigure a plausible threat of civil war may not improve the stability of the world
as the means by which the defeated candidates community in any case, since the possibility of
can gain concessions and appointments from civil conflict exists in all political systems. Civil
the winning side. In general, democratic politi-wars are frequently bloodier and more unfor-
cal leaders share a common interest in resolvinggiving than wars between sovereign nations.
disputes without invoking real violence. Nei- In international politics also, the threat of
ther side can be confident that the loyalty of its violence tends to create stability and maintain
voters will stand the test of a demonstration of peace. Here the threat is more directly respon-
strength. Voting is a very imperfect register of sive to policy controls. The nation-state has
loyalty, but rather conveys a miscellany of greater continuity than the informal political
emotions, difficult to penetrate or to order systems that coalesce and dissolve in the course
rationally. Strenuous efforts are made by de- of domestic social change. The threat of force
feated candidates to restrain a show of violence can be asserted much more deliberately and can
by their own followers. Public concessions of be demonstrated under full control, as in "good
defeat, homiletic congratulations, and avowals will" Navy visits, army 'maneuvers near a
of support for the winner, are designed to com- sensitive border, partial mobilization, etc.
municate to their backers the finality of the Because of the greater continuity of these
verdict at the polls, which is subject to revision, macro-systems, the national leaders must
not by a demonstration of violence, but by strive to maintain the prestige of a nation's
renewed peaceful efforts in the next election. might and will. If the reputation of a nation's
In 1960, after the close result of the Ken- military power is allowed to tarnish, future
nedy-Nixon election, what dangers could have bargaining power will be weakened. The coun-
been unleashed if Nixon had publicly repudi- try may feel obliged to re-establish that pres-
ated the poll and openly supported minority tige by invoking a test of arms, as a means of
efforts to hold recounts in California and Illi- inducing greater respect for its position from
nois? In a situation of this kind, it is clear how other nations. Strong nations prefer to demon-
close to the surface lies the threat of violence strate their military power peaceably in order
implicit in the voting process. that their prestige will afford them the bargain-
ing power they deserve without a test of arms.
III. THlE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS
Because the threat of international violence
Many people blithely argue for law as a is a conscious instrument of national policy, it
substitute for violence, as though there was a generally lacks the random character of domes-

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870 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

tic violence. This means that if the armaments they are willing to recruit members of their
of nations fall out of balance, if the prestige of elites from the potentially disaffected groups
nations is no longer commensurate with their which they rule. Even a totalitarian state must
ambitions, if the will to take the risks of limited
purvey some concept of fairness and flexibility,
military conflicts is lacking, if domestic political
an ability to change in response to the changing
considerations distort the national response to internal and external demands put upon it.
external threat, then the time becomes ripe for Indeed, to the extent that a totalitarian regime
the outbreak of violence that may escalate out permits the threat of violence to be raised
of control. against it in the form of political pressure, it
In general, the dangers of escalating inter- loses some of its totalitarian quality. The dy-
national conflict induce greater, not lesser, re- namics of totalitarianism, however, generally
straint on the part of national leaders in their make this kind of evolution difficult, if not
relations with each other. Attempts to achieve impossible. Dictatorships of one or a few raise
infinite security-and consequent irresponsi- the level of official terror to offset or deter the
lility-for the nation are as self-defeating as threat of violence from below. Terror and
similar attempts for a domestic regime. counter-terror may escalate until the whole
The functioning of consensus and competi- system collapses in an orgy of violence. The
tion between nations is not fundamentally prospects for raising anything but another such
different from that of domestic politics. The dictatorship out of such wreckage would seem
most striking difference is that in domestic remote, except that people tire of violence and
politics the level of centralized force available presently respond to it with passivity. Dicta-
to the state creates a high threshold of stabilitytors are sometimes suspected of seeking an
against the threats brought to bear within the escape from this iron logic by provoking inter-
system by private groups. In the international national wars which unite the country behind
forum, the closest approximation to such a the leader, postponing issues of internal dissen-
threshold is the array of decentralized forces sion.
available to the great powers. An aggressive The threat to carry political dissent outside
power interested in modifying the status quo peaceable channels can distract the government
must cross the threshold of its own threat of from the pursuit of other values, can impose
force in order to induce other powers to choose upon it as its first and major responsibility the
between concessions to its demands or the costs re-establishment of domestic peace and order,
and risks of an arms race. To the extent that and can lure it into shortsighted measures to
the Itatus quo powers are able and willing to pay suppress violence, measures that may instead
the costs and take the risks, their own threshold widen the base of opposition and increase the
can be raised, depriving the challenger of any occasions for anti-government protests.
political advantages from his investment. The mere threat of private violence directed
When all of the great powers are attentive to against the government has a very great influ-
the equations of potential violence, no nation ence upon government actions. By causing
can hope to gain conclusive political advan- reallocations of the resources of the society into
tages from an arms race. This situation makes the essentially negative goals of internal secur-
possible international agreements or a tacit ity, the opposition may succeed in defeating or
consensus for stabilizing arms and bringing crippling the positive goals whose accomplish-
about political settlements. Diplomatic cere- ment might legitimize and strengthen govern-
monials, like the ceremonials of personal rela- ment authority. To avoid this predicament,
tions which we call "manners," serve to mini- even totalitarian governments occasionally go
mize the dangers of provocation and threat in out of their way to appease their critics. The
the day-to-day relations between nations. alternative to reform is ruthless suppression not
only of the sources of the threat, but also of
IV. THE DOMESTIC PROCESS
every symptom of united social action. Bowling
Underneath the norms of legal and institu- clubs, assemblies of three or more people on
tional behavior in national societies lies the street corners-there is no rational way to
great beast, the people's capability for out- identify the first links of the chain which leads
raged, uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence. to social action. All must be broken up. The
This is common to totalitarian as well as demo- hopeless search for infinite security begins in
(ratic societies. and is a major restraint againstthis way; its logical end is the downfall of the
completely arbitrary government. Even totali- regime. With this choice before it, it is easy to
tarian regimes can hope for stability only if see why even a dictatorial regime may prefer
they reflect in some degree the changing cur- social and political reform to the threat of
rents of political interest of the people and if violence. This is why so many kings and tsars,

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 THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 871

rather than destroying their rivals and oppo- them less dangerous to the body politic. MAIost
nents, often sent them instead on enforced followers in social movements will follow re-
vacations and educational tours abroad. sponsible leadership through the gives-and-
In democratic societies this sharp dilemma is takes of compromise, because they share the
avoided far short of infinite deterrence. The general fear of unlimited violence and counter-
institutional distribution of authority-consti- violence, with its unpredictable results and the
tutionalism-precludes unilateral attempts to defeat of all rational goals. Accomodations can
centralize all the police powers in the hands of be reached, even if only provisionally, which
one agent. Also the law proscribes the overt preserve the general consensus in maintaining
threat of private violence and the existence of the form and continuity of society and law.
paramilitary forces, although it tolerates and
V. SOME CONCRETE EXAMPLES
protects the implied threat of violent outbreaks
if political accomodation fails. Violence is Let us turn to some concrete examples of how
demonstrated, not in organized forms, but violence works its effects in practice.
rather in sporadic outbursts. Disgruntled elites A classical case of its actual demonstration
who possess a clear capability for causing a against the legality of existing authority is the
planned demonstration-who have, that is, founding of the state of Israel in 1949. The
organized groups with a deep sense of moral Irgun, an underground terror organization,
outrage and injustice-avoid incriminating created conditions in Palestine which made
themselves and provoking counter-action further British occupation impractical. There is
against themselves. Instead they carry out some doubt whether the British government
"peaceable demonstrations" designed to reveal would have honored their commitment to the
their numbers and the intensity of their com- Jewish Agency or honored it when they did,
mitment. These may have the bonus effects of had it not been for the Irgun's role. Yet the
provoking violent action against them, causing Jewish Agency, the responsible and moderate
government intervention, or causing their more leadership, negotiated the partition of Palestine
inflammable followers to ignite into unplanned and played the major role in the founding of the
outbursts of violence. Such potentials are new state, all the while disavowing the terrorist
implicit in the situation. acts and methods of the Irgun. Before the
The leaders of the agitators then are placed launching of Irgunist terror, the British govern-
in a position of minimum risk and maximum ment stalled the Jewish Agency and accorded it
effectiveness, that of playing the role of "re- little respect.
sponsible leader." They can bargain with More instructive are cases of domestic vio-
formal authorities and with all the other mem- lence where the actual demonstration is mini-
bers of the society in this way: "You must mal and where the implicit threat is all, as in
accept our just complaints and you must deal the current campaign for Negro rights. Until
with us; otherwise, we will not be able to con- the last decade, little sustained pressure was
trol our people. Unspeakable things may hap- exerted to improve the Southern Negro's
pen. We do not desire this to happen, but it is position by governmental action. Even with
up to you to help us prevent it." While playing the growth of Negro voting power in the big
this role, the reformist leaders may not be cities of the North, Washington authorities
unhappy to have their prophesies partially have generally shown great respect for the im-
fulfilled by sporadic outbreaks. Events which plicit capabilities of violence of well-organized
demonstrate violence (and thus induce other white supremacists. Partly because of the
elites to make concessions) do not have to be power of the White South in the Congress, in
planned. Once the emotions of a real social Democratic National Conventions, and in the
movement are churned up, the problem is to Electoral College, presidents have acted with
keep the events from happening. restraint in protecting the rights of Southern
The irresponsible elements may be disowned, Negroes. So long as the possibility of violence
but the bargaining power of the responsible was asymmetrical, the Whites well-organized
leaders is enhanced. In the bargaining process, and armed, the Negroes apathetic, intimidated,
the moderate leaders often accept concessions and disorganized, Negro attempts to register to
which fall short of those demanded by some of vote, to protest lynchings and other injustices,
their more extremist followers. Opportunists orcould easily be tranquillized by the County
"realists" often inherit the benefits wrought bySheriffs, the local police, and the KKK. In the
the blood of martyrs. This is a healthy mode of last decade, Negroes have been in the throes of
exploiting the demonstration of violence with- a new self-consciousness, confidence, organiza-
out condoning it, enabling compromises to be tion, and leadership. The Black Muslims, the
reached which isolate the extremists and render Committee on Racial Equality, the NAACP,

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872 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

etc. have now demonstrated that the Southern conduct their immemorial campaign against
Negro is capable of social action and of organ- compulsory public education. They set fire to
ized demonstrations of strength. As the capa- their own homes and barns, standing by and
bility grows for effective counter-violence watching the blaze. They also parade naked
against White Citizen Council activities-or, down the center of city streets. The significance
what is more significant, non-violent demon- of these demonstrations is plain. Their religion
strations which invoke violence by the extrem- forbids them to threaten or use violence against
ist Whites-the Negro will gain increasing others. Instead, they symbolically demonstrate
consideration for his demands, increasing sup- their discipline and passionate commitment to
port from "moderate" white leaders, and in- their own way of life by inflicting violence upon
creasing attention and support from the federal their own property. The naked marches pro-
authorities. Just as the existence of the White voke arrests and imprisonment and the house-
Citizens Councils strengthened the hand of burnings force the welfare agencies to provide
southern moderates in trying to restrain civil temporary shelter. Both actions impose on the
rights action from Washington, so the existence government responsibilities it is ill disposed to
of the Black Muslims and CORE now strength- carry out, especially if such demonstrations are
ens the position of the NAACP in seeking con- to continue indefinitely and involve the entire
cessions from Southern Whites and action by Dukhobor settlement. In addition, the demon-
the Justice Department. The threat of uncon- strations invoke public attention and sympathy
trolled violent outbursts, hovering just beneath for the believers. All of this may well give the
the surface, acts as a moderating influence, local authorities an incentive to ignore Dukho-
maintaining the institutions of peaceful proc- bor defiance of school attendence laws. In fact,
ess, inducing status quo groups to a greater this is what has happened during the last 50
readiness to yield some privileges, and restrain-years. Efforts to enforce the law have been
ing the responsible leaders of the insurgent spasmodic and half-hearted, while the law has
Negroes from extremist demands.8 been generally evaded.
The strategy of non-violent social action The relations of suicide and crime to social
(passive resistance or pacifism) does not aban- change form too large a topic for treatment
don the threat of force as an instrument of here.9 Durkheim studied these phenomena as an
social change. Rather, the threat operates indicator or measure of social disorganization.
within a civilized society by its provocative They might also be studied in terms of demon-
effects. By provoking the use of force by others,strating violence as an instrument of political
it forces the government to intervene on the and social change. When teenagers commit
behalf of the non-violent demonstrators, while crimes, their legitimate grievances get more
evoking the sympathies of those less intensely attention. When someone commits suicide,
involved. But as an international ideology, those who sense the circumstances that drove
pacifism or unilateral non-violence may fail to him to it are led to re-examine their own lives,
achieve its objectives. Unless those who pursue and may be strengthened in convictions con-
it succeed in invoking some force in their be- cerning the society in which they live. A suicide
half, they will be destroyed with impunity by by an over-extended installment buyer in
their enemies. Chicago led to efforts to reform state and na-
The Dukhobor Sons of Freedom (of Van- tional laws governing loah-shark interest rates
couver, British Columbia) have adopted a and collection of unpaid installment debts. A
novel tactic of demonstrating violence as they suicide, apart from its real motives, may be
quickly exploited by those with a social cause.
In effect, a suicide resembles a resignation from
8 The recent violence at Oxford, Mississippi,
a government: it challenges values and institu-
involving the registration of Negro James Mere-
tions, evoking from all survivers a sense of the
dith at the State University, is likely to expedite
unresolved tensions which surround them,
Negro integration throughout the South. By pre-
threatening the prospects for their own sur-
cipitating violence (which resulted in two deaths),
vival.'0 Suicides and crimes, however obscure
the White Extremists may have strengthened the
ranks of the Moderates. Fearing a recurrence, 9 See summary of some pertinent research:
white leadership in future situations may be more Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., Suicide
concerned with controlling the firebrands than in and Homicide (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), pp. 69-81.
using them to force concessions from the Justice 10 According to numerous press reports, the
Department. Gunnar Myrdal put his finger on suicide of Marilyn Monroe led within a few days
this when he referred to the "positive" aspect of to a flurry of suicides by women. In the same man-
the riots. "The riots make people think," he ner, it may also have led to many decisions to live,
declared. New York Times, October 4, 1962, p. 10. which were not recorded.

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 THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 873

and ambiguous, threaten the world and thus
change it.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
Several points may be made in conclusion.
Demonstrations of domestic violence serve to
establish the intensity of commitment of mem-
bers of the political system. The more intense
the commitment, the greater the risks the
system will take in challenging the status quo.
Accordingly, the greater will be the bargaining
efficacy of future threats. Social change often
occurs legalistically. Rationalization in terms of
the continuity of abstract legal models is a
useful means of stressing consensus over compe-
tition, ad(ling to the stability of the whole
society. However, it is obvious that a legal
or ideological syllogism is meaningless except
in terms of the emotional force which members
of the society attach to the first principle. The
infinite regress of syllogistic reasoning ends
somewhere with a commitment of self. Such
commitments (cannot be explained or under-
stood by reasoning alone. Efforts to adduce
rational principles for explaining social and
political change are futile unless one grapples
with the often irrational and illogical intensity
of self-commitment which marks social move-
ments.
No system can hope to survive unless it can
live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous
threats of violence which are the basis of social
change. Democracies have shown a greater
ability to do this. Yet democratic forms can
be subverted to become totalitarian in sub-
stance, if the search for infinite security in the
international forum is reflected internally in a
search for infinite deterrence of threats against
the social and political status quo. Major social
changes have major social causes; they are not
the result of isolated conspiracies and plots.
They cannot be arrested by an effort to stamp
out all conspiracies and plots. In healthy
democracies, all political leaders and would-be
leaders are, in effect, conspirators and plotters.
They must be. This kind of activity is the
heart of political democracy.

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