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CIVIL PROCEDURE I

DIGESTED CASES
III. VENUE

1. REPUBLIC VS GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC


2. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC VS SCHONFELD
3. SPOUSES FELIPE VS FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC
4. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION VS LIM
5. PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD VS. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
6. MARCOS-ARANATE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
7. UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC VS. CRUZ
8. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., VS SPOUSES BENEDICTO
9. GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
10. OPPEN VS COMPAS
11. ANG VS SPOUSES ALAN
12. SPOUSES RENATO VS LANTION
13. LEGASPI VS REPUBLIC
14. AUCTION IN MALINTA INC., VS LUYABEN
15. PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT AND DEV'T CORP VS UNION BANK
16. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PEOPLE
17. PBCOM VS. LIM AND CALDERON
18. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM
19. UNION BANK VS MAUNLAD HOMES, INC
20. DOLOT VS PAJE
(1)
REPUBLIC vs GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION
SERVICES, INC
G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for


civil forfeiture of assets with urgent plea for issuance of TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against the bank deposits maintained by
Glasgow Credit and Collection Servicesin Citystate Savings Bank,
Inc.. Acting on the plea for the issuance of a TRO, the RTC Manila
issued a 72-hour TRO, and the case was raffled for hearing. The
summons intended for Glasgow remained unserved, as it could no
longer be found at its last address, and left no forwarding address.
Subsequently, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s Motion to
Dismiss by Way of Special Appearance, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction over its person as summons had not been duly served
upon it, among others. The Republic opposed such motion,
contending that the action is quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of
improper venue as it should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint was correctly dismissed due to improper
venue.

HELD:
The Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. The order dismissing the
Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI
has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal.
Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the
Republic’s complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that
the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the
instant case." Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial
Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides
that a petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court
of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or
to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that
where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed
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in the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any
portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located,
at the option of the petitioner. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil
forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to
an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located.
Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is
situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR).
Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in
any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of
the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil
forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.

(2)

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC VS


SCHONFELD
G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007
CALLEJO, SR, J:

FACTS:

Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon


Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International in
the Philippines, to consult in services for water and sanitation in the
Philippines. Pacific Consultants transmitted a Letter of Employment to
respondent, who accepted the same while making a few minor
modifications. Contract states that in case of any question or dispute
arising between parties, the proper venue for such action would be
the Court of Arbitration in London. Respondent was issued an Alien
Employment Permit by the Department of Labor and Employment,
which permit was applied for by PPI, and went on to serve for over a
year. Upon notice of termination from Pacific, respondent filed with the
Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Pacific argued that the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case, as respondent was an
alien, and that according to the contract of employment, the London
Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan where
Pacific Consultants held office, or even in Canada, which was
respondent’s home state. The Labor Arbiter, as well as the NLRC
gave due course to the petition to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants
and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not a clause in a contract can validly limit the venue of an


action.

HELD:

In the instant case, no restrictive words like were stated in the contract.
It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive
venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment
contract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that while
they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule
4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement
or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They
are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties
were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly
and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them. Pacific
Consultants contend that Schonfeld should have filed his Complaint
in his place of permanent residence, or where Pacific Consultant holds
its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was
signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible
venues where Schonfeld could have filed his complaint, however,
Pacific Consultants itself admitted that the provision on venue in the
employment contract is indeed merely permissive.

(3)
SPOUSES FELIPE VS FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC
G.R. No. 150470 August 6, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:

Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the developer of the


Manila Southwoods golf course and residential subdivision project
which partly covers lands located in Bian, Laguna. Its partner in the
joint venture, La Paz Housing and Development Corporation (La Paz),
provided the aforementioned properties which are registered in its
name. The project involves the "construction and development of,
among others, a highway interchange linking nearby communities to
the South Expressway and world class tourism-generating cultural
theme and water parks."

A certain Felipe Layos filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages


with Application for Preliminary Injunction against Fil-Estate Realty

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Corporation, (FERC) et al. with the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna and docketed as Civil Case No. B-3973.

On 25 June 1993, Felipe Layos along with his wife and other
individuals filed another case for Injunction and Damages with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. B-4133, this time against the
correct party, FEGDI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC of San Pedro Laguna is the proper venue for the
reconstitution of the Title.

HELD:

The principal parties in both cases are the Spouses Layos, on one
hand, and La Paz and FEGDI, on the other. The Spouses Layos and
La Paz both claim title to the subject property, while FEGDI is the
partner of La Paz in a joint venture to develop the said property. There
may be other parties named in both cases, but these parties only
derive their rights from the principal parties.

The pronouncement of invalidity of OCT No. 239 by this Court in G.R.


No. 120958 is conclusive upon the San Pedro RTC in LRC Case No.
B-1758, precluding it from re-litigating the same issue and ending up
with a contrary ruling. Since the Court already settled in G.R. No.
120958 that OCT No. 239 is fake and a forgery, it would have been a
senseless and futile endeavor for the San Pedro RTC to continue with
the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. B-1758, for there is
actually no valid certificate to reconstitute. The court cannot, and
should not, reconstitute a spurious certificate of title and allow the
continuous illegal proliferation and perpetuation thereof. Republic Act
No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of
Torrens certificates of title that are missing but not fictitious titles or
titles, which are existing.

Resultantly, the San Pedro RTC is left with no other option but to order
the dismissal of LRC Case No. B-1758.

The RTC, acting on a petition for reconstitution, is of limited


jurisdiction. Lands already covered by valid titles in the name of
registered owners other than the petitioners cannot be a proper
subject of reconstitution proceedings, thus:

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon

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the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties
without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of
Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of annulment and/or
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely
by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence
that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have
no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered
by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered
owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles
covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as
anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land
to two different holders thereof.

It should be pointed out that the validity of the title to the subject
property herein had already been squarely put in issue in Civil Case
No. B-4194, the quieting of title case, instituted by the Spouses Layos
before the Bian RTC, and resolved definitively and with finality when
appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, in favor
of La Paz. It is a ruling irrefragably beyond the jurisdiction of the San
Pedro RTC to overturn or contradict in LRC Case No. B-1784, the
reconstitution case.

The prayer of the Spouses Layos to have LRC Case No. B-1784
remanded to the San Pedro RTC for trial, if granted, would only be
farcical. Should the San Pedro RTC subsequently grant the
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 after the trial, it would only be an empty
victory for the Spouses Layos, for a reconstituted certificate of title,
like the original certificate, by itself does not vest ownership of the land
or estate covered thereby.[56] The valid title to the subject property
would still be that of La Paz, as determined by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, over which the reconstituted certificate of title
of the Spouses Layos cannot prevail. The reconstituted OCT No. 239
would be a mere piece of paper with actually no title to evidence
ownership.

(4)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION VS LIM
G.R. No. 154338 October 5, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the


totaling more than P800 thousand pesos. After tendering partial
payments, Lim refused to settle his obligation despite repeated

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demands from Universal Robina. This prompted the latter to file with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint against Lim for a
sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing the complaint motuproprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an
amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper
venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The
trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended complaint.
Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to
file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon
motion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the
former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still
unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order directing
Universal Robina to file memorandum of authorities on whether it can
file a complaint in Quezon City. Still undecided concerning the venue
of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not improper venue is a proper ground for dismissal.

HELD:

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined
in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
Rules of Court explicitly provide that improper venue not impleaded in
the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a
court may not dismiss an action motuproprio on the ground of
improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may
dismiss an action motuproprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial
court may not motuproprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus: Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely
the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.

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(5)
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD VS. DAKILA TRADING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172242 August 14, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation under Singapore. Respondent is a


corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, for selling &
leasing laboratory instruments. Respondent entered into an
agreement with the Perkin.

Elmer Instruments Asia PTE LTD appointed respondent as sole


distributor of its product under a Distribution Agreement. However the
PEIA unilaterally terminated the distribution agreement. The
respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages. The Regional Trial Court denied the respondents prayer.
Petitioner appealed, but the Court Of Appeals affirms the Regional
Trial Court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is a proper venue for respondent’s civil case.

HELD:

It is proper venue for civil case base on Distribution Agreement it was


stipulated that if dispute arises it will be resolved either in Singapore
or in the Philippines.

(6)
MARCOS-ARANATE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008
VELASCO, JR, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now


deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto Group) organized
Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity
Corporation (UEC). As Irene Marcos Araneta would later allege, both
corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement
7 |Page
whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of
his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC
with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for
the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares.

Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma.


Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings,
but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige. March 2000 Marcos-
Araneta instituted 2 similar complaints in RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte
for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership
against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO). 1st case covered UEC shares (vs
Benedicto, his daughter and 20 other defendants) and 2nd case
sought recovery of 65% of FEMII shares (vs Benedicto and other
defendants). Francisca Benedicto-Paulino moved to dismiss the 1st
case. Benedicto moved to dismiss the 2nd case on similar grounds
(improper venue, among others) the cases were consolidated.
Evidence of Benedicto for motion to dismiss: Joint Affidavit of 3
persons attesting to being employed as household staff at the Marcos’
Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not
maintain residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion
twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national
elections; and that she was staying at her husband’s house in Makati
City.

Evidence of Marcos-Araneta: her PhP 5 community tax certificate


(CTC) issued on “11/07/99” in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her
claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte. Benedicto died and was
substituted by wife Julita, and Francisca. RTC dismissed the 2
complaints: complaints partly constituted “real action,” and that Irene
did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was
improperly laid. M-A filed mfr. Pending resolution of mfr, M-A filed
motion to admit amended complaints which she attached. The
amended complaints contained 3 other persons, all from Ilocos Norte
(Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin )as additional
plaintiffs and allegedly new trustees of M-A, and had the same cause
of action but sought reconveyance only of FEMII shares. RTC denied
mfr. However, it later admitted the amended complaints: (1) The
inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac, Ilocos
Norte resident, in the amended complaint setting out the same cause
of action cured the defect of improper venue. (2) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule
3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing of the amended
complaint in question in the place of residence of any of Irene’s co-
plaintiffs. Julita and Francisca moved to dismiss but was denied. J and
F’s mfr was also denied. J&F filed an Answer in fear of being declared
in default. On the same day, J & F went to CA via petition for certiorari
seeking to nullify RTC orders (admitting M-A’s amended complaint,
denying J&F’s motion to dismiss amended complaint, and denying

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mfr) CA set aside RTC orders and dismissed the amended complaints
of M-A. M-A went to SC under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether J&F waive improper venue (Petitioners maintain that Julita


and Francisca were effectively precluded from raising the matter of
improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings.

HELD:

NO. Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on


the ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative
defense, he is deemed to have waived his right to object to improper
venue. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the
earliest time possible, meaning “within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint,” the matter of improper venue. They would
thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection on venue first, in their
answer to the amended complaints and then in their petition for
certiorari before the CA.

(7)
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC VS. CRUZ
G.R. No. 171456 August 9, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Uniwide Holdings (UHI), whose principal office is in Paranaque Cirty,


entered into a Franchise Agreement, granting Cruz, a 5 year franchise
to use the “Uniwide Family Store System” for the establishment of a
Uniwide Store along Marcos Highway, Marikina City. Art 10.2 of said
agreement, called for Cruz, as franchisee to pay UHI a monthly
service fee of 50k or 3% of the gross monthly purchases, whichever’s
higher, payable w/in 5 days after the end of each month w/o need for
formal demand. In case of delay, under Art 10.3, Cruz will be liable for
interest at 3% per month. Cruz later purchased goods from UHI’s
affiliates First Paragon Corp (FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse
Club, Inc (USWCI).

On August 2002, the 2 affiliates executed Deeds of Assignment in


favor of UHI assigning all their rights over Cruz’s accounts payable to
them. As of 8/13/2002, Cruz has outstanding obligations w/ UHI, FPC,
and USWCI totaling about 1.3m – drawing UHI to send him a demand
letter for settlement within 5 days, despite this, the balances remained
unpaid. UHI files a complaint for collection of sum of money before the
RTC of Paranaque on the following causes of action. First the monthly
service fee pursuant to the franchise agreement w/c Cruz failed to pay,
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UHI suffered damages in the amount of about 1.3m w/c Cruz is liable
for. Second, as assignee of the receivable of FPC, which Cruz failed
to pay despite demand, UHI suffered damages in the amount of about
64.5k. Third, as assignee of the receivable of USWCI, which Cruz
failed to pay despite demand, UHI suffered damages in the amount of
about 1.58m. Fourth, because of the indebtedness, UHI was
constrained to file this complaint and incur expenses which are
estimated to be 250k which Cruz should be answerable for
Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on ground of improper venue invoking
Art 27.5 of the franchise agreement: Venue Stipulation – the
franchisee consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving any other venue.

RTC grants the motion to dismiss, hence this present petition with UHI
contending that nowhere in the agreement is there mention of FPC
and USWCI, and neither are parties thereto, hence, and they cannot
be bound to the stipulation on “exclusive venue”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is


dismissible on the ground of improper venue where only one of the
causes of action arises from a contract with exclusive venue
stipulation?

HELD:

No. The petition is granted. General Rule on venue of personal


actions: Sec 2, Rule 5 of the ROC – Venue of personal actions – All
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or were the defendant or any of the
principal defendant resides at the election of the plaintiff. This is
qualified by Sec 4 of the same rule w/c allows parties, before the filing
of an action to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue. The
forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action
doesn’t however, preclude parties from bringing a case to other
venues. Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the
same parties, one of which does not arise out of the contract where
the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint may be
brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action
is w/in the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.

(8)
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., VS SPOUSES BENEDICTO
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

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FACTS:

The City of Manila filed a complaint for expropriation of five parcels of


land located in Tondo, Manila, owned by the respondents before the
RTC of Manila. Two of the five parcels of lands were under a First
Real Estate Mortgage Contract to Citytrust Banking Coroporaiton,
predecessor in interest of the petitioner. After the RTC rendered
judgment expropriating the lots, the petitioner filed its Motion to
Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request
to Release, which the RTC denied. The petitioner then extrajudicially
foreclosed the two lots, and after the public auction, the amount of
P18,522,155.42 remained as judgment deficiency, which the
petitioners sought to recover from the respondents by filing a
complaint before the RTC of Makati City (Civil Case No. 03-450). The
respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, lack of
cause of cause of action and that plaintiff’s claim had been
abandoned, waived or extinguished. The petitioners opposed the
motion. While the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, the respondents
filed their reply to the petitioner’s comment to the motion to dismiss,
raising for the first time the issue of improper venue. They aver that
the action to recover deficiency judgment should be filed in the RTC
of Manila which ruled on the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, being a supplementary action to the latter. The RTC denied
the respondents’ motion for reconsideration; on the issue of improper
venue, it held that even if the venue was improperly laid, the
respondents failed to allege it in their motion to dismiss; an action
cannot be dismissed on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss
eve if said ground is provided in Rule 16.

On petition for certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that “a suit
for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in
the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to
enforce the mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon
an obligation of the mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency which is
created by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of
deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.”. Thus the action should have
been filed before the RTC of Manila.

The petitioner sought recourse with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether venue was improperly laid. i.e. The action to recover


deficiency judgment should be filed before the court which ruled on
the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

HELD:

11 | P a g e
We grant the petition for review on certiorari. It is basic that the venue
of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature
have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence.
According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action.

The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court


having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also
referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares
all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those
brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement
of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.

We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not


jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict
their access to the courts.7 In other words, unless the defendant
seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its
being the improper venue.

(9)
GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Elise, then represented by her mother Ma. Lourdes, a natural child of


Eliso, who died without a will on December 12, 1992, filed a Petition
for Letter of Administration of the estate of Eliseo before the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pinas City. She also impugned the validity of his
father’s marriage to Amelia. According to her, the marriage was
12 | P a g e
bigamous because at the time of his marriage to Amelia, there was a
prior and valid subsisting marriage of Eliseo to one Filipito Sandico.
The petition was opposed by Amelia and her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, who alleged that venue was improperly laid, as Eliseo died
in Capas, Tarlac as shown by his Death Certificate, the petition should
have been filed there as it was his residence at the time of his death.
They also sought to discredit the factual and legal basis for any grant
of letters of administration in favour of Elise.

The RTC ruled that Elise, who by that time have already attained legal
age, should be granted letters of administration over the estate of
Eliseo. It brushed aside Amelia’s objections over the venue of the
petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA denied Amelia’s
petition, ruling that venue was properly laid as it was shown that Eliseo
resided and established residence at Las Pinas City from 1975 up to
his death in 1992.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue was improperly laid?

HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC
of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent


is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.

The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place


of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute
or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
13 | P a g e
where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and


“domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot


be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It
is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.”

(10)
OPPEN VS COMPAS
G.R. No. 203969 October 21, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 098648-CV, TCT Nos. S-100612 and S-100613,


previously registered with the Philippine Merchant Marine School, was
levied pursuant to a decision thereto approving the compromise
agreement between Manufacturers Building Inc and PMMSI. In
another civil case, (Civil Case No. 116548), Ernesto Open Inc, by
virtue of a writ of execution, annotated its lien on TCT No. S-100612;
the property was later sold at a public auction where EOI emerged as
the highest bidder. After the period of redemption lapsed, EOI caused
the transfer of the title in its name, and a new title, TCT No. 95712 was
issued in EOI’s name. Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 098648-CV, an
alias writ of execution was issued in favour of MBI, and the two titles
were sold in a public auction where Alberto Compas emerged as the
highest bidder. The certificate of sale was annotated in both titles on
November 11, 2002. For failure to redeem the property by PMMSI, a
Final Deed of Sale was issued in favour of Alberto.

14 | P a g e
On September 28, 2005, Alberto filed a petition for cancellation of TCT
Nos. S-100612 and S-100613 before the RTC of Las Pinas
City. When he learned that TCT No. 95712 had been issued in lieu of
TCT No. S-100612, Alberto filed his Motion to Admit Amended
Petition. EOI filed two motions to dismiss the Amended Petition of
Alberto, the first grounded on alleged failure to state a cause of action,
which was denied by the RTC on the ground that Alberto can enforce
his lien on the property under EOI’s name.

The second motion to dismiss argued that under Section 108 of


Presidential Decree No. 1529, the court that issued the original
registration had jurisdiction, hence it should have been filed with that
court. The RTC disagreed, holding that Section 108 of PD 1529 was
inapplicable and it can exercise jurisdiction on the case. EOI elevated
the case to the Court of Appeal via petition for certiorari. The CA
however sided with the RTC, that Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 was the
applicable provision in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction.
It explained that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 was inapplicable
because the proceedings contemplated therein were summary in
nature and relief under the said provision could be granted only when
there was unanimity among the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case can be dismissed because of improper


venue.

HELD:

The principal issue in this case is whether the RTC has jurisdiction to
hear the amended petition of EOI. Petitioner EOI contends that, by
virtue of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, it is the court where the original
registration was filed and issued which has jurisdiction over the
petition because it is a petition after the original registration. Thus, the
amended petition of Compas should have been filed with the court
which heard the proceedings for original registration docketed as LRC
No. N-1238.

The Court’s Ruling is that it is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts
is conferred by law.⁠5 The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land
registration cases is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It
expressly provides:

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.


Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

15 | P a g e
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders,
and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days
from the filing or issuance thereof.

From a perusal of the above-quoted provision, it is apparent that


courts of first instance, now the RTC, have exclusive jurisdiction over
registration proceedings, including petitions filed after the original
registration of title.

A closer scrutiny of Section 2 and Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 will
show that the former pertains to the grant of jurisdiction to regional
trial courts while the latter refers to the venue where the action is to
be instituted. EOI’s second motion to dismiss was supposed to be on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It, however, alleges that the petition
should not have been filed with the RTC of Las Piñas under LRC Case
No. LP-05-0089, but with the RTC where the original title was filed and
issued under LRC No. N-1238. Based on the allegations thereof, it
appeared that the second motion was invoking the ground of improper
venue.
Granting it to be so, the second motion to dismiss was rightfully denied
as EOI waived the ground of improper venue after it had filed its first
motion to dismiss pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule. Section 8 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a motion attacking
a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding shall include all objections
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.
In Spouses de Guzman v. Spouses Ochoa,⁠9 a second motion to
dismiss on the ground of defective verification was denied pursuant to
the Omnibus Motion Rule. The Court held:

Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion


as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion
to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is
the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other
omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the
time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, “all objections
not so included shall be deemed waived.” As inferred from the
provision, only the following defenses Under Section 1, Rule 9, are
excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; [b] there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior

16 | P a g e
judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription.

Similar to the above-cited case, EOI erroneously filed a second motion


to dismiss raising improper venue as basis—one which is susceptible
of being waived—after the first motion to dismiss was denied. EOI only
insisted that the proper venue was the RTC where the original case in
which the decree or registration was entered and not with the RTC
Las Piñas after its first motion to dismiss alleging the failure to state a
cause of action was filed and denied. Consequently, the ground of
improper venue was deemed waived and could no longer be
questioned by EOI because the issue on venue was not raised in its
prior motion to dismiss.

(11)
ANG VS SPOUSES ALAN
G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

The spouses Ang owe the other spouses Ang the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Dollars (US300,00.00). The Lender (Ang, the
lenders) reside in the United States, so when The Borrower (Ang, the
borrowers) failed to pay despite being sent a demand a demand letter,
The Lenders executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating
The Attorney as their duly designated representative to file the case
for collection of money against The Borrowers, who reside in Bacolod
City.

Because The Attorney, holds office in Quezon City, he filed the


collection case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.The
Borrowers filed a motion to dismiss, saying that venue was improperly
laid, as they, The Borrowers, were residents of Bacolod City, while
The Lenders were residents of the United States. As The Lenders
were not residents of the Philippines, the venue should be in Bacolod
City, where the The Borrowers live.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denied the Motion to Dismiss,
holding that since the representative holds office in Quezon City, the
case should be filed in Quezon City. Despite filing a motion for
reconsideration, the RTC denied t again. The Borrowers elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, who sided with them, citing the rules on
venue in civil action, and said that The Attorney, being a mere
representative, is not the real party in interest. The Lender is the real
party in interest, therefore, the matter of venue should be a choice
17 | P a g e
between the residence of The Lender or The Borrower. Since The
Lender is not a resider of the Philippines, there is no other choice but
to file the case in Bacolod City, since it is where The Borrower reside.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED


REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT
VENUE WAS NOT PROPERLY LAID.

HELD:

No. The petition is denied. The petitioners’ complaint for collection of


sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file
it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the
action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.

However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the


complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the place
where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet
Commercial Co., Ltd., this Court held that there can be no election as
to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no
residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be
filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.

(12)
SPOUSES RENATO VS LANTION
G G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from Planters
Development Bank (PDB) and executed mortgages and promissory
notes to cover the loans. The Lantins defaulted on their loans so PDB
foreclosed on the properties to partially satisfy the Lantin’s debt.

Subsequently, the Lantinn filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity


and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance.
Discharge of mortgage, accounting, permanent injunction, and

18 | P a g e
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas against
PDB.

According to the Lantins, the REM only covered the peso loans which
they have already paid off, and not the dollar loans. PDB filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of improper venue since according to their
agreement the venue of any suit should be Metro Manila. Judge(Jane
Aurora) Lantion dismissed the complaint because of improper venue.
Lantins asked for a reconsideration which was denied. Lantins claim
that since they are assailing the validity of the loan documents, then
the venue stipulated stating at Metro Manila should be the venue of
any suit is also in question. They also argue that the venue stipulated
in covered by Section 4(b) of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive
venue stipulation under Sec. 4 (b) of the Rules.

HELD:
Under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties,
before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action
however is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation
is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Under the agreement, it is clear that the Lantins and PDB agreed that
any suit arising from the contract should be brought exclusively in the
proper Makati Court (or to any court that PDB wants to), as the Lantins
had waived the right to choose the venue of the action. The Lantins
only assailed of the coverage of the loan agreement and the validity
of the loan agreement itself, since the issues of whether these also
cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan documents, the
stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.

Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders


dated May 15, 2003 and September 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in Civil Case No. 2002-0555 are
AFFIRMED.

(13)
LEGASPI VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 160653, July 23, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

19 | P a g e
FACTS:

Jesusito D. Legaspi, as owner and manager of J.D. Legaspi


Construction (petitioner), entered into a Construction Agreement with
the Social Security System (respondent) in June 1997 for the
construction of a four-story building in Baguio City which will serve as
respondent's branch office. The contract price was P88,348,533.74.
Unfortunately in 1997, the Philippine peso collapsed as against the
U.S. Dollar making the cost of imported materials which petitioner was
contracted to use and install on the project shot up, and petitioner
incurred expenses more than the original contract price. Petitioner had
several meetings with respondent's representatives during which he
informed them of his difficulty in meeting his obligations under the
contract due to the devaluation of peso. After several failed meetings,
petitioner sent a letter to respondent requesting an adjustment in the
contract price, which was denied by respondent. This constrained
petitioner to file a complaint for payment of sum of money plus
damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 00-1354.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
venue was improperly laid and petitioner had no cause of action. On
the ground of improper venue, it was respondent's argument that the
Construction Agreement provided that all actions may be brought
before the proper court in Quezon City and that petitioner waived any
other venue. This was denied by the RTC prompting Respondent to
file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was
granted and the RTC was ordered to dismiss the case. Hence this
petition filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA plainly erred and acted contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence in ordering the dismissal of civil case before the
court a quo considering that venue is properly laid.

HELD:

As a general rule, venue of personal actions is governed by Section


2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec.2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on
an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written
stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
20 | P a g e
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in
that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting
the matter.
Undoubtedly, Mr. Legaspi's action refers to a dispute arising out of
and relating to the provisions of the Agreement. Therefore, the venue
stipulation will have to be applied.

(14)
AUCTION IN MALINTA INC., VS LUYABEN
G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

The facts show that on October 24, 2001, respondent, a resident of


Magsaysay, Tabuk, Kalinga, filed with the Kalinga RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioner Auction in Malinta, Inc., a
corporation with business address at Malinta, Valenzuela City, and
engaged in public auction of heavy equipments, trucks, and assorted
machineries. Respondent alleged that in an auction conducted by
petitioner on May 29, 2001, he was declared the highest bidder for a
wheel loader T.C.M. 75B, series no. 3309. On June 7, 2001,
respondent tendered the payment for the said item but petitioner could
no longer produce the loader. It offered a replacement but failed to
deliver the same up to the filing of the complaint. Hence, respondent
instituted this case to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages
plus attorney's fees.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.


It argued that the correct venue is the RTC of Valenzuela City
pursuant to the stipulation in the Bidders Application and Registration
Bidding Agreement which states that: All Court litigation procedures
shall be conducted in the appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila.

In a Resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Kalinga RTC held that


the clear intention of the parties was to limit the venue to the proper
court of Valenzuela City and thus dismissed respondent's complaint
on the ground of improper venue. Petition was filed and granted by
the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition filed by

ISSUE:

21 | P a g e
Whether the stipulation in the parties' Bidders Application and
Registration Bidding Agreement effectively limited the venue of the
instant case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City.

HELD:

The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in the instant


case for damages filed by respondent, is embodied in Section 2, Rule
4 of the Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec.2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The quoted rule, however, finds no application where the parties,


before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. But the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is
not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues.
It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively" and "waiving for
this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation
of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly declared that venue in the


instant case was properly laid with the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga. Petition is denied.

(15)
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT AND DEV'T CORP VS UNION BANK
G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013
SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that


restructuring agreement is null and void because the borrower has not
complied with the condition precedent of the bank. It is also
unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union bank.
Paglaum was a party only to the real estate mortgages and not in the
restructuring agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu City, and
the assumption of the RTC's jurisdiction was without basis.

22 | P a g e
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was improper venue.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative. Issues raised for the first time in a
motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed waived,
because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.7
Nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration
or modification of our 18 June 2012 Decision.

Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual


determination that is not within the province of this Court.8 These
questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the
proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence
in support of these claims. Anent Union Bank's last contention, there
is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit the issue, being a mere
rehash of what we have already resolved in our Decision.

(16)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012
BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping.

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2)


complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, and Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March
15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, and Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under
oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
23 | P a g e
ISSUE:

What the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the
trial court.

HELD:

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over


criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other
words, the venues of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in SyTiong is


more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for
the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of
the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to
his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through
false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If
in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement
is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of
the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the
acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

(17)
PBCOM VS. LIM AND CALDERON
GR. No. 158138, April 12, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:

24 | P a g e
FACTS:

PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the RTC of Manila


for the collection of a deficiency. Petitioner alleged therein that
respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety
agreement in favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc that were
extended or may be extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner
granted a renewal of said loan upon respondent’s request. It was
expressly stipulated threrein that the venue for any legal action that
may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, “to the
exclusion of all other courts…” Respondents allegedly failed to pay
said obligation upon maturity. Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real
estate mortgage executed by respondents, leaving a deficiency
balance.

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of


improper venue, invoking the stipulation contained in the last
paragraph of the promissory note with respect to the
restrictive/exclusive venue.

The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner


had separate causes of action arising from the promissory
note and the continuing surety agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4,
Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x
x venue was properly laid in Manila. An MR of said order was likewise
denied.

On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged debt was based on


the Promissory Note, which had provided an exclusionary stipulation
on venue “to the exclusion of all other courts.” The parties’ Surety
Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an accessory contract that
should have been interpreted in consonance with the Promissory
Note. Hence, this Petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action against the sureties is covered by the


restriction on venue stipulated in the Promissory Note.

HELD:

The Court in the affirmative; Since the cases pertaining to both causes
of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue,
petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically provides
otherwise, or when — before the filing of the action — the contracting
parties agree in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not
25 | P a g e
jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to
venue does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless
qualifying or restrictive words are used in the agreement.

In enforcing a surety contract, the “complementary-contracts-


construed-together” doctrine finds application. According to this
principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety and
together with the principal agreement. This principle is used in
construing contractual stipulations in order to arrive at their true
meaning; certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to
control. This no-segregation principle is based on Article 1374 of the
Civil Code, which we quote: “Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.”

The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case.


Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can be enforced only in
conjunction with the PN. The latter documents the debt that is sought
to be collected in the action against the sureties. The circumstances
that related to the issuance of the PN and the SA are so intertwined
that neither one could be separated from the other. It makes no sense
to argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations
in the PN.

(18)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM
G.R. No. 154338, October 5, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the


totaling more than P800 thousand pesos. After tendering partial
payments, Lim refused to settle his obligation despite repeated
demands from Universal Robina. This prompted the latter to file with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint against Lim for a
sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an
amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper
venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The
trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended complaint.
Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to
file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon
motion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the
former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still
unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order directing
Universal Robina to file memorandum of authorities on whether it can
26 | P a g e
file a complaint in Quezon City. Still undecided concerning the venue
of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not improper venue is a proper ground for dismissal.

HELD:

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined
in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
Rules of Court explicitly provide that improper venue not impleaded in
the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a
court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of
improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may
dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial
court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus: Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely
the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.

(19)
UNION BANK VS MAUNLAD HOMES, INC
G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:

FACTS:
Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful
detainer action which was filed in Makati City while the contested
property is located in Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes claimed that the unlawful detainer
action should have been filed with the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city where the real property involved is situated. Union
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Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint with the
MeTC of Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract which
states that "the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in
connection with this Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City

ISSUE:

Whether the Bank rightfully filed the complaint?

HELD:

Yes. While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that


ejectment actions shall be filed in "the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is situated,"
Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply
"where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the
action on the exclusive venue thereof." Precisely, in this case, the
parties provided for a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge
Mosqueda, etc., et al., the Court upheld the validity of a stipulation in
a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions other than that
stated in the Rules of Court. Since the unlawful detainer action is
connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint
with the MeTC of Makati City.

(20)
DOLOT VS PAJE
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
REYES, J.:

FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers
of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon, against Global Summit Mines Dev't Corp, for its mining
operation.

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of


Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. In the
Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

n dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order
dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial
Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the environmental courts "to try
and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within
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their respective territorial jurisdictions." Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the
neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and
Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and
decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal
court

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal is proper?

HELD:
No. The error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the
RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically
states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed
with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." In this case, it appears
that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been
filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the outright
dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.
Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature
where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.

Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in


which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to
the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their
access to the courts.Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal
of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is
patently incorrect.

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