17. G.R. No.

197329 September 8, 2014

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the June 17, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82231 which denied the herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the
February 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Fifth Judicial Region,
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. IR-2678.

Factual Antecedents

Civil Case No. IR-2243

Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. IR-2243 with
the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar’s 1,020-square
meter lot – covered by Tax Declaration No. 30573 and situated in San Jose (Baras),Nabua,
Camarines Sur – which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line. In an August 29,
1990 Order,4 the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly,
NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line,denominated as Tower No. 83.

However, on July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order5 dismissing Civil Case No. IR-2243
without prejudice for failure to prosecute, as follows:

In the Order dated 14 August 1991, Atty. Raymundo Nagrampa was designated as the
representative of his clients in the Committee of Appraisers to appraise the reasonable value of the
land together with the Court’s and plaintiffs’ representatives, namely, the Branch Clerk of Court and
Mr. Lorenzo Orense, respectively for the purpose of fixing the amount with which the plaintiff may be
compensated for the land in question.

After almost three (3) years since the said order was issued, the Committee has not met nor
deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their
claims despite so long a time.

Hence, this case is hereby dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute within a reasonable
period of time.

SO ORDERED.6

It appears that the above July 12, 1994 Order was notassailed by appeal or otherwise; nor did NPC
commence any other expropriation proceeding.

Civil Case No. IR-2678

On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint,7 docketed as Civil
Case No. IR-2678, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which
NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil
Case No. IR-2243. The Complaint contained the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, considering the above premises, it is most respectfully prayed for the Honorable
Court to:

1. Order the defendant to compensate the plaintiff of [sic] the lot they are now occupying in
accordance with the current market value existing in the place;

2. Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral and actual damages and unrealized profits in
the amount of not less than ₱150,000.00;

3. Order the defendant to pay the exemplary damages of [sic] the amount of ₱10,000.00 and
to pay the cost of suit;

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises.8

As agreed by the parties during pre-trial, a panel ofcommissioners – composed of one

representative each from the parties, and a third from the court – was constituted for the purpose of
determining the value of the subject lot.

After conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. Atty.
Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents, recommended a valuation within the range
of ₱1,000.00 to ₱1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did notset
an amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market prices of
agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina,
proposed a ₱1,100.00 per square meter valuation.9

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision10 pegging the value of the subject lot at
₱1,000.00 per square meter, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant National

Power Corporation to pay plaintiffs the total sum of ₱1,020,000.00, representing the value of
plaintiffs’ land expropriated by the defendant. All other claims in the complaint and in the answer with
counterclaim are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

NPC filed an appeal with the CA claiming that pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Court,12 just compensation for the lot should have been computed based on its value at the time of
the taking or the filing of the expropriation case (Civil Case No. IR-2243) in 1990, and prayed thatthe
case be remanded to the lower court for further reception ofevidence based on said Section 4, Rule
67 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

On June 17, 2011, the CArendered the assailed Decision containing the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision [dated]
21 February 2003 renderedby the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 34
in Civil Case No. IR-2678 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.13

The CA held that in the resolution of Civil Case No. IR-2678, the principles and rules of procedure in
eminent domain cases – under Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court – cannot apply; thus, the rule that
just compensation shall be computed from the time of the taking or filing of the expropriation case is
inapplicable, since the case is not one for expropriation. Instead, Civil Case No. IR-2678 should be
treated as a simple case for the recovery of damages. Finally, the CA held that the trial court
properly exercised its judicial function of ascertaining the fair market value of the property asjust
compensation.

NPC thus instituted the instant Petition.

Issues

The Petition raises the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A

QUO’S DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2003 IN CIVIL CASE NO. IR-2678 WHICH FIXED THE
AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY OF
RESPONDENTS AT ₱1,000.00PER SQUARE METER IN CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 4,
RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY MUST BE DETERMINED EITHER AS
OF THE DATE OF THE TAKING OFTHE PROPERTY OR THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT,
WHICHEVER COMES FIRST.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT REMANDING THE CASE
TO THE COURT A QUOFOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY INACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4,
RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.14

Petitioner’s Arguments

In its Petition and Reply,15 NPC insists that Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should
apply to Civil Case No. IR-2678; therefore, just compensation should be based not on 1995 market
values, but on those prevailing on the date of taking or the filing of the expropriation casein 1990;
that the dismissal without prejudice of the expropriation case did not necessarily nullify the
proceedings in said case – specifically, the August 29, 1990 Order of expropriation/writ of
condemnation, which became final and executory for failure of any of the parties to appeal the same
– which proceedingsfor expropriation may continue through the present Civil CaseNo. IR-2678 for
compensation and damages filed by respondents; and that the cited National Power Corporation v.
Court of Appeals16 case does not apply since the factual milieu is different, and it does not appear
that the lot was damaged by NPC’s entry therein.
NPC thus prays that the assailed CA disposition be set aside and that the case be remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings todetermine the proper amount of just compensation in accordance
with Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

Respondents’ Arguments

Praying that the Petition be denied for lack of merit, the respondents in their Comment17 plainly echo
the assailed CA Decision, adding that the trial court’s basis for arriving at the proper amount of just
compensation was correct as the market value of adjacent properties were taken into account.
Respondents add that by agreeing to have the valuation determined by a panel of commissioners,
NPC is bound by whatever findings such panel makes, and it may not raise the issue that valuation
should be computed from the time of taking or filing of the expropriation case in 1990.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

NPC insists that Section 4, Rule 67 ofthe 1964 Rules of Court should have been observed in fixing
the amount of just compensation for the subject lot; that the value of the lot at the time of NPC’s
taking thereof or filing of Civil Case No. IR-2243 in 1990 should have been the basis for computing
just compensation and not the prevailing market value at the time of the filing or pendency of Civil
Case No. IR-2678 in 1995. NPC thus prays that Civil CaseNo. IR-2678 be remanded to the trial
court for determination of just compensation applying Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

We agree with NPC’s contention.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,18 we held that:

Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the
owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before
the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should befixed as of the time of the taking of
said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint
should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved
coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.

The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of expropriation,
the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.’ However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appealsthat Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of
complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is
filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no
action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation,
the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule
67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable x x x.

Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an expropriation case docketed as Civil Case No.
IR-2243. However, in an Order dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed by the
RTC for failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994, respondents filed Civil
Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the
dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no expropriation suit
was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed "to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation." Nevertheless, just compensation for
the property must be based on its value at the timeof the taking of said property, not at the time of
the filing ofthe complaint. Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value ofthe property at the
time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for
compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995.

In this case, the RTC formed a panel of commissioners in determining the just compensation of the
property. Although this is not required considering our pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,19 nonetheless, its constitution is not improper.20 "The appointment was done mainly to aid
the trial court in determining just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the
trial court is not bound by the commissioner’s recommended valuation of the subject property. The
court has the discretion on whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or to substitute itsown
estimate of the value as gathered from the records."21

In this case, records show that respondents’ representative recommended a valuation of ₱1,000.00
to ₱1,500.00 per square meter; while the court’s representative recommended a value of ₱1,100.00
per square meter.Notably, NPC’s representative did not give any value; he merely opined that the
subject property should be classified as agricultural and not residential land and valued at the
prevailing market values. Significantly, the values recommended by the commissioners were those
values prevailing in 1994 and 1995, or during the time the complaint for compensation and damages
was filed. Considering that these are not the relevant values at the timeNPC took possession of the
property in 1990, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have disregarded the same. Unfortunately, it
adopted these values. Onthis score alone, we find a need to remand this case to the RTC for further
proceedings.

Moreover, we note that the RTC simply adopted the above values without citing its basis
therefor. The pertinent portions of the trial court’s Decision read:
1avv phi1

Pursuant to the said Order of May 3, 1995, the Court formed a Commission chaired by Mr. Esteban
D. Colarina, an employee in Branch 34 of this Court; Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos representing the
plaintiffs; and Mr. Lorenzo C. Orense representing the defendant NAPOCOR. These gentlemen took
the required oath and functioned as a committee, submitting however their respective individual
Commissioner’s Report. x x x

On July 11, 1995, Atty. Pornillos recommended that the land be valued at ₱1,000.00 to ₱1,500.00
per square meter (page 58). On July 13, 1995, Mr. Esteban D. Colarina submitted his report
recommending ₱1,100.00 as the fair market value of the property per square meter. Attached to said
report was the affidavit of Mr. Nicasio V. Diño, then the Assistant CityAssessor of Iriga City pegging
the value of the said land at ₱1,500.00 to ₱1,800.00 per square meter. On August 3, 1995, Mr.
Lorenzo Orense of the NAPOCOR submitted his Commissioner’s Report wherein he recommended
that the valuation of the land be based on its agricultural value, without however naming a price.

On the basis of past proceedings, the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda. Only1âwphi1

the defendant NAPOCOR filed a memorandum wherein it undertook to pay plaintiffs the value of
their land, although praying that the Court consider the land as agricultural. NAPOCOR admits that
plaintiffs[’] property, per Tax Declaration No. 30573 has been classified as residential, but assails
said classification with arguments which are mere speculations.
In the light of all the postures taken by both parties which, in effect, results in a failure to agree on
how the land should be valued, this Court shall fall back on the Order of May 3, 1995 wherein the
report of the Court’s representative shall be taken as a factor in determining x x x the value of the
land, including other matters germane thereto and others that may be of judicial notice.

In view of the above consideration, this Court hereby fixes the fair market value of the land in
question at ₱1,000.00 per square meter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant National

Power Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the total sum of ₱1,020,000.00, representing the value of
plaintiffs’ land expropriated by the defendant. All other claims in the complaint and in the answer with
counterclaim are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.22

Indeed, the trial court merely recited the values fixed by each commissioner. Although it stated in
general terms that it considered other factors germane thereto and of judicial notice, it failed to
specify what these factors were. It did not even clarify whether it considered the values
recommended by the two commissioners. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,23 we remanded the case
to the trial court and directed it to reconvene the panel of commissioners after it was shown that its
valuation of just compensation has no basis, viz:

However, we agree with the appellate court that the trial court's decision is not clear as to its basis
for ascertaining just compensation. The trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in the
reports of the City Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67.
But whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or x x x
made its own independent valuation based on the records, [is] obscure in the decision. The trial
court simply gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property owner without laying
down its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based
on competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper
determination of just compensation is in order. In National Power Corporation v. Bongbong, we held
that although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial court's discretion, it should
not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based on established
rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its
judgment on speculations and surmises.24

Finally, we hold that based on prevailing jurisprudence, respondents are entitled to "legal interest on
the price of the land from the time of the taking up to the time of full payment"25 by the NPC.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 17, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 82231 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Iriga City, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 34 which is directed to re-convene the
commissioners or appoint new commissioners to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the
just compensation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.
 18. G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014

SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO, Petitioners,

vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 25, 2010 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, entitled "Lazaro M Tabina, Petitioner, versus Spouses
Mauricio Tabina and Leonila dela Cruz-Tabina, Respondents," as well as its March 18, 2011
Resolution3 denying reconsideration of the assailed judgment.

Factual Antecedents

Proclamation No. 5184 (Proc. 518) e)(cluded from the operation of Proc. 4235 – which established the
military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Pateros and Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City – certain portions in said reservation
known and identified as BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo,
Pembo, and Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the sameopen for disposition in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) No. 274,6 and RA 7307 in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141.8

Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona
fideoccupants/residents of said BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied such areas on or before January 7,
1986.

In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the military – and his
brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the military – occupied a 353-square meter lot
in Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence within the lot, while respondent continued to
reside in Novaliches, Quezon City.9The lot was later subdivided into two portions, denominated as
Lots 2 and 3, Block 255, Zone 12, Group 10, Sampaguita Extension, Pembo, Makati City.

Lot 2 – containing an area of 184 squaremeters – was applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by
Mauricio, while Lot 3 – containing an area of 169 square meters – was applied for by respondent.
Respondent was later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit10 to
occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to occupy an area of only 150 square meters.

In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate11 to such effect was issued by the
Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau).

On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s wife, Leonila
dela Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC). Docketedas Civil Case
No. 85043 and assigned to Branch 64, the ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is
the true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of
circumventing the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the
purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s stay
in the premises is merelyby tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent
structures on the land; and that petitioners refused to vacate the premises upon respondent’s formal
demand. Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to pay the
former rentals, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.12

Petitioners counteredin their Answer13 that respondent had no right to eject them; that the parties’
trueagreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent’s Lot 3, and for this,
respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800.00; that respondent failed to honor the
agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there was a pending Protest filed with the Regional Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region.

Protests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3.
In a June 13, 2006 Decision, respondent’s Protest – docketed as Case No. 2004-821 and entitled
"Lazaro M. Tabino, Protestant, versus Mauricio Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino, Protestees" – was
resolved as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Protest should be as it is hereby "DENIED" for lack
ofmerit. The MiscellaneousSales Application filed by Mauricio Tabino over Lot 2, Block 255, Zone
12, Group 190, Sampaguita St., Pembo, Makati should now be given due course by this Office. x x
x14

The DENR held in Case No. 2004-821 that respondent is not qualified to acquire Lot 2 under Proc.
518 since he was already awarded a home lot in Fort Bonifacio, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, Fort
Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig. Moreover, he failed to provethat Mauricio was not a bona
fideresident/occupant of Lot 2; on the contrary, it has been shown that Mauricio, and not respondent,
has been in actual possession and occupation of the lot.

In an August 28, 2007 Order,15 the above disposition was reiterated after respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On the other hand, petitioners’ Protest,docketed as Case No. 2005-939 and entitled "Leonila Tabino
and Adrian Tabino, Protestants, versus Lazaro Tabino and Rafael Tabino, Respondents", was
resolved in an August 28, 2007 Order,16 which decreed thus –

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Protest lodged before this Office on 21 January 2005 by
Leonila Tabino and Adrian Tabino as against the Application of Lazaro/Rafael Tabino over Lot 3,
Blk. 255, Zone 12, Pembo, Makati City is, as it is hereby "GRANTED". As a consequence, the MSA
(Unnumbered) of Rafael H. Tabino is hereby CANCELLED and DROPPED from the records of the
Office. Thus, the Order dated July 16, 2004 re: Cancellation Order No. 04-032 should be, as it is
hereby SET ASIDE. After the finality of this Decision, Claimant-Protestant Adrian Tabino may now
file his land application over the subject lot.

SO ORDERED.17

The ruling in Case No. 2005-939 is similar to the pronouncement in Case No. 2004-821: that
respondent was disqualified from acquiring any more lots within Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Proc.
518, since he was previously awarded a home lot therein, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, PEMBO,Fort
Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig; that respondent is not a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 3, as he
and his family actually resided in Novaliches, Quezon City; and that Mauricio has been in actual
possession and occupation of Lot 3 since 1985.
 Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On April 4, 2008, a Decision18 was rendered in Civil Case No. 85043, as follows:

The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover possession of the subject property is the
question on who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. In ejectment
cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession,
in the sense contemplated in civil law.

It is undisputed that the revocable permit extended to the plaintiff was to occupy a parcel of land
withan area of 150 square meters. Suffice it to say that beyond the 150 square meterswould be
contrary to the permit extended to the plaintiff to occupy the lot. Plaintiff therefore, would violate the
provisions of the revocable permit if he goes beyond whatwas specified therein or up to 150 square
meters. When the land was declared open pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and
Republic Act No. 730 both parties applied in their respective name pursuant to the size of the land
which they are permitted. Since then defendants have been in possession of the subject property up
to the present pursuant to the permit to occupy the subject land. Furthermore, defendants had
acquired the property in their own name, a valid claim to establish possession.

Plaintiff’s contention thatdefendants’ stay on the premises is by mere tolerance is devoid of merit.
Well-established is the rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision or order is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. The order dated August 28, 2007 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources affirming its previous decision in Case No. 2004-821 dated
June13, 2006 clearly stating therein that defendants are awardees of Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12,
Sampaguita Street, Pembo, Makati City, are accorded with respect and finality. Truly, defendants
are rightful possessors of the subject property.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint as well as defendants’ counterclaim are
herebyordered Dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Respondent appealed before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC),20 but in a February 19, 2009
Decision21 the RTC affirmed the MeTC in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 64, Makati
City dated April 4, 2008 in Civil Case No. 85043 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC agreed with the MeTC in ruling that respondent is not entitled to possession of the
disputed premises on account of the DENR findings in Case Nos. 2005-939 and 2004-821 that
petitioners are registeredclaimants and bona fideresidents thereof, and have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fideclaim of ownership,while
respondent was permitted to occupy an area of only 150 square meters and not more; petitioner
would be in direct violation of his permit ifhe were to occupy more than the allowed area stated in
said permit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed his Petition for Review23 with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision and insisting that
he had a better right of possession since he was the bona fideoccupant of the disputed lot and
Mauricio was merely his caretaker. He added that in 1994, Mauricio executed an Affidavit24 (1994
affidavit) acknowledging that respondent was the true owner of Lot 2 and that he was merely allowed
by the latter to occupy the same and introduce improvements thereon; this operated as an
admission against interest which may be used against petitioners. Finally, respondent argued that
the decision in the DENR Protest is not yet final and executory on account of his pending appeal;
thus, the courts may not rely on the findings contained therein. On August 25, 2010, the CA issued
the assailed Decision, which held thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed
decisions ofthe RTC and the MeTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ejectment suit
filed by the petitioner against the respondents over Lot Nos. 2 and 3 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
respondents are ordered to vacate the subject premises.

SO ORDERED.25

In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994 affidavit – which petitioners do not dispute –
should be taken as an admission by Mauricio that he was merely appointed by respondent as the
caretaker of Lot 2, and that respondent is the true possessor and owner thereof. This being the
case, petitioners occupy the premises by mere tolerance of respondent, and are boundto the implied
promise that they shall vacate the sameupon demand. The CAadded that while respondent was
authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this was irrelevant since the only issue that must be
resolvedin an unlawful detainer case is actual physical or material possession, independent of any
claim of ownership; since respondent has satisfactorily shown by preponderant evidence that he was
in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3, he is entitled to recover the same from petitioners.

The CA also held that while respondent’s application for Lot 2 was denied by the DENR in its June
13, 2006 Decision– since he was already an awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the issue
of possession was not touched upon. For this reason, the DENR Decision has no bearing on the
unlawful detainer case. Additionally, the DENR rulings are still the subject of appeals, and thus could
not have conclusive effect.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in a March 18, 2011 Resolution, the CA stood its ground.
Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. CAN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN RESOLVING CONFLICTING

CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION BETWEEN
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF LOT BE NULLIFIED
BY THE COURT UNDER AN EJECTMENT CASE?
 2. HAS THE COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE
ON REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT
HAVING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST EXHAUSTED?

3. HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATEDTHE RULE AGAINST FORUM- SHOPPING IN FILING

EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION CASES BEFORE THE DENR WHICH
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, IN EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, HAS
FIRST ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME PARTIES, SAME SUBJECT
MATTER AND SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW?26

Petitioners’ Arguments

In their Petition and Reply,27 petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and the
reinstatement of the MeTC’s April 4, 2008 Decision, arguing that the ejectment case constituted an
attack on the DENR rulings in Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 – which disqualified respondent
from acquiring Lots 2 and 3 on the ground that he was already an awardee of a lot within Fort
Bonifacio; that Mauricio has been in actual possession and occupation of Lots 2 and 3 since 1985;
and that respondent is not a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 2 or 3 – which is not allowed, as it
encroached on the administrative authority of the DENR. They argue that respondent should not
have resorted to the ejectment case; instead, he should have exhausted all administrativeremedies
made available to him through the DENR. Petitioners add that respondent is guilty of forum-
shopping in filing the ejectment case without awaiting resolution of the pending DENR Protests,
which necessarily touched upon the issue of possession.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent argues in his Comment28 that petitioners are estopped from claiming that the ejectment
case indirectlyattacked the DENR rulings and that it constituted forum-shopping, since these issues
were not raised by petitioners in their pleadings below; thatthe courts are not divested of jurisdiction
over the ejectment case, since the only issue involved therein is possession and not who is entitled
to a miscellaneous sales application covering the disputed lot – which the DENR is tasked to
determine; and thatas a consequence of Mauricio’s 1994 affidavit, petitioners are estopped from
questioning respondent’s possession.

Our Ruling

The Court partially grants the Petition.

Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and forum-shopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Besides, these issues are being
raised for the first time at this stage of the proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant Petition
pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC Decision;as such, they cannot be allowed to simultaneously
attack and adopt the proceedings or actions taken by the lower courts.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the
premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 –
respondent’s claim of possession and his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If
the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of the
DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing structures thereon would have to be
demolished. If petitioners’ position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the
courts, then it would mean that respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject
lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice would
have occurred as a consequence of the demolition of petitioners’ residence and other permanent
improvements on the disputed lots.

Indeed, DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 have found their way to the CA, and the
pronouncementsof the latter do not exactly favor respondent. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 125056,
entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino, Petitioner, versus Mauricio M. Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino,
Respondents," the CA dismissed respondent’s Petition for Review of the DENR Secretary’s
affirmance of the DENR NCR Regional Executive Director’s June 13, 2006 Decision in Case No.
2004-821. In its January 13, 2014 Decision,29 the CA’s 6th Division held as follows:

The DENR Secretary, acting through the OIC, Assistant Secretary for Legal Services, denied the
appeal on the basis that upon findings of the Regional Executive Director, Mauricio has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications based on the disposition of Public Lands. The DENR
further ruled that upon ocular inspection made, it was ascertained that 1) per records, Mauricio is a
survey claimant of Lot 2, Block 255, Psd-a3-0054204 with an area of 184 sq.m. situated in Pembo,
Makati City; 2) that the land is residential in nature, a house stands erected in said area where
Mauricio and his family reside; 3) that a portion of the said area is being utilized as a carinderiaand a
sari-sari store as their family’s business; 4) thatMauricio is occupying the area since 1985 up to the
present; 5) that Lazaro Tabino (petitioner) is actually residing in Quezon City; and, 6) the Yvonne
Josephine Tabino, petitioner Lazaro Tabino and Rafael Tabino are bonafideresidents of Quezon City
for noless than twenty years, per Certification of Barangay Chairman Almario Francisco on 2
September 2004 of Barangay San Agustin, Novaliches, Quezon City. Further, the DENR held that
the above findings were never refuted by the petitioner.

On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to
factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledgeand expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. Echoing the explanation of the private respondent DENR,
citing the case of Ortua vs. Encarnacion, the findings of facts of the Director of Land (now the
Regional Director) is conclusive in the absence of any showing that such decision was rendered in
consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or
effect ofevidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence,
so long as there is some evidence upon which the findings in question could be made.

Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession having been ruled upon by the Court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, it is well to note that in the case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was explained
that the Bureau of Lands determines the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands, but it
does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders or breaches of the peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition
and alienation and any power to decide disputes over possession is but in aid of making the proper
awards.

xxxx

In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme Court held that, "Under the Public Land Act, the
Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary ultimately have the authority to dispose of and
manage public lands. And while the DENR’s jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the
authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession, the DENR’s decision would prevail
with regard to the respective rights of public land claimants. Regular courts would have no
jurisdiction to inquire intothe validity of the award of the public land."
Under the circumstances, the Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of public respondent DENR
in its disposition of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

In the second case decided by the CA – CA-G.R. SP No. 126100 entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino and
Rafael H. Tabino, Petitioners, versus Leonila C. Tabino and Adrian C. Tabino, Respondents" relative
to the disposition in DENR Case No. 2005-939, the appellate court’s 9th Division held in a June 28,
2013 Decision30 that –

We agree with the respondents and dismiss the petition for petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial system. The
thrust of the ruleis that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) withinthe competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so. Strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable
number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.

Thus, the party with an administrative remedy must not only commence with the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter
itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one
of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, but none of
these apply in this case. Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael should have first appealed to the Office
1âwphi1

ofthe President, which has the power to review the orders or acts of the DENR Secretary, being his
subordinate, before coming to Us through a petition for review. x x x

xxxx

FOR THESE REASONS, WeDISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,31 this Court made the following pronouncement:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda.
de Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag, we ordered the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein
would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience,
and expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage
wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.32

On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño,33 which Samonte refers to, states:

x x x Where the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible
entry, and the right ofthe plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which
the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a
petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public
policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior
possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior
claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.34

More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag35 dictates, thus –

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the
regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations
of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the
municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent.36

In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot in good conscience order the
petitioners to vacate the premises at this point. The better alternative would be to await the outcome
of these Protests, before any action is taken in the ejectment case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed August 25, 2010 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957 is MODIFIED, in that the directive for petitioners to
vacate the suqject premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the proceedings in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 85043, are ordered
SUSPENDED until the proceedings in DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 are concluded. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 19. G.R. No. 186589 July 18, 2014

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and LORNA CILLAN-SILVERIO, Petitioners,

vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt; the respondent to the charge
may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. and Lorna Cillan-
Silverio, Petitioners, versus Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Respondent."

Factual Antecedents

In an October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order3 issued by Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in
Spec. Proc. M-2629 entitled "In re: Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz S. Silverio, Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr., Petitioner, versus Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Heir-Administrator Designate,Edmundo S.
Silverio, Heir-Movant, and Ligaya S. Silverio, represented by her Legal Guardian Nestor Dela
Merced II, Heir-Intervenor," it was decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant
the following:

(1) Partially reconsidering Nos. 1 and 5 of its Order dated December 12, 2005, thus
upholding the granting of Letters of Administration to Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. anent the Estate
of Beatriz S.Silverio in lieu of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., who is removed as Administrator for
gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court;

(2) Allowing Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. to immediately take his oath as Administrator and
exercise his duties and functions under his Administrator’s Bond Utassco No. JCL(1)-001-
1001, if still valid, or upon posting a new Administrator’s Bond of PH₱1,000,000.00;

(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2)
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 137154 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd., Makati City
covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to partially settle
the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to
undertake the proper procedure of transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate;
and

(4) To apply the proceeds of the salementioned in Number 3 above to the payment of the
taxes, interests, penalties and other charges, if any, and to distribute the residue among the
heirs Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by
Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. Silverio-Dee in
accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo Sr.) is the surviving spouse of the decedent Beatriz S.
Silverio, with whomhe has children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr. (Ricardo Jr.); Edmundo; Ligaya;
and Nelia Silverio-Dee (Nelia). Lorna Cillan-Silverio (Lorna) is Ricardo Sr.’s second wife. The subject
matter of Spec. Proc. M-2629 is the decedent’s intestate estate (the estate), which includes, among
others, shares of stock in Pilipinas Development Corporation (PDC) and a residential house in
Urdaneta Village (house atUrdaneta Village).

Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA – docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 971965 – questioning
the trial court’s October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.’s appointment as the new
administrator. The CA later issued two Resolutions, which granted Nelia’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to wit:

1. A July 4, 2007 Resolution,6 with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Private Respondents’ motion(s) for the reconsideration of
Our February 5, 2007 Resolution are DENIED. The Petitioner’s application for a writ of injunction is
hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue upon posting of the bond in the amount of two
million pesos (Ph₱2,000,000.00) enjoining the Respondents from enforcing the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Orderissued in Sp. Proc. M-2629; and, allowing Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr. to continue as
administrator, pending resolution of the instant petition.

It appearing that the required pleadings have already been filed and no other pleading may be
forthcoming per the Judicial Records Division’s verification report of June 19, 2007, the main petition
may be considered submitted for resolution.

SO ORDERED.7

2. A February 29, 2008 Resolution,8 which decreed:

WHEREFORE, the ten million[-]peso (Ph₱10,000,000.00) bond posted by the Petitioner under PSIC
Bond No. JCL (8) 00207102119 is APPROVED. Accordingly, by this WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, the Respondents, their agents or anybody acting in their behalf, are ENJOINED from
executing, enforcing or implementing any writ of execution, order, or resolution for the enforcement
ofthe October 31, 2006 Omnibus Orderissued by the Respondent Court in Sp. Proc. M-2629 thereby
allowing Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr. to continue as administrator during the pendency of this case.

The Petitioner’s motion seeking the reconsideration of Our January 3, 2008 Resolution increasing
the amount ofthe bond from two (2) million to ten (10) million pesos, having been rendered mootand
academic by her subsequent submission of a bond in the increased amount, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.9

On September 3, 2007, Ricardo Jr. filed with this Court an "Appeal under Rule 45 and/or
Certiorariunder Sec. 1, Rule 65" with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 178676,10 seeking among others a
reversal of the CA’s July 4, 2007 Resolution and the issuance of injunctive relief.
Respondentcontended therein that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion inissuing the July 4,
2007 Resolution and in granting injunctive relief against him.

On June 13, 2008, Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent two letters, one each to petitioners. Ricardo Jr.
demanded in the first letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the rights of a
stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting withthird persons
for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. In the second letter, Ricardo
Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta Village.11 Ruling of the Court of
Appeals

On June 25, 2008, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect Contempt,12 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 104060, seeking that herein respondent Ricardo Jr. be declared in indirect contempt of
court and punished accordingly. They charged that respondent’s June 13, 2008 demand letters
violate and defy the CA’s July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196,
which enjoined respondent’s appointment as administrator pursuant to the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order; allowed petitioner Ricardo Sr. to continue as administrator of the estate; and
enjoinedRicardo Jr. and his co-respondents in Spec. Proc. M-2629 from executing, enforcing or
implementing any writ of execution, order, or resolution for the enforcement of the Omnibus Order.
Petitioners likewise charged that –

14. [Last] June 20, 2008 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, respondent Silverio Jr., accompanied by his
two lawyers: Attys. Efren Vincent M. Dizon and Charlie Mendoza and some John Does, without the
benefit of a final court order or writ of execution and without the assistance of a sheriff, attempted to
enforce the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 which was appealed to
the Court of Appeals by way of Notice of Appeal, by trying to forcibly evict against their will, the
occupants of one of the residence(s) of his petitioner father Silverio Sr. at #21 Cruzada, Urdaneta
Village, Makati City, covered by the Testate Intestate Case appealed to this Honorable Court which
issued the aforementioned injunction. In the process, respondent Silverio Jr. created quite a
commotion and public disturbance inside the subdivision. Only [with] the timely intervention of the
officers of the homeowners association, barangay officials, some policemen and this representation
was respondent Silverio Jr. prevailed upon topeacefully leave the place.

15. Such acts of respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. in trying to eject his father from his residence
without the benefit of a final court order/writ of execution, [are] not only x x x illegal and show
disrespect for elders, but also smack a lot of bad taste in contravention [of] our established customs
and tradition[s].13

Petitioners argued further that PDC and the house at Urdaneta Village are assets of the estate
placed under Ricardo Sr.’s charge as administrator through the July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008
Resolutions, which characterize respondent’s acts as undue interferencewith Ricardo Sr.’s
administratorship; moreover, respondent’s acts contravene Philippine customs and traditions. Thus,
respondent’s acts constitute indirect contempt as defined and punished under Rule 71, Section 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure14 (1997 Rules).

On February 25, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which held thus –

After a careful evaluation of the evidentiary records, this Court finds it inappropriate to make a ruling
on whether or not the Respondent has committed certain acts, supra., violative of Revised Rule 71
of the Rules.

Records show that on 3 September 2007, the Respondent has interposed an appeal from the CA
Resolution dated 4 July 2007, supra., before the Supreme Court questioning in essence said
resolution as having been granted to the Petitioners with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction, hence, allegedly null and void.

Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing development, this Court is compelled to restrain itself from
resolving the issuesin the instant petition.

Otherwise put, it is imperative that We instantly pull the plug and let the High Tribunal settle the
controversy surrounding the propriety in the issuance of CA Resolution dated 4 July 2007, supra.,
from which order the Respondent has allegedly committed acts indefiance thereof.

As laid down by the High Tribunal in Manila Electric Company v. Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. et
al., thus:

…it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance toits
status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
integrated judicial system of the nation." "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings"…

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.15

On this account, petitioners filed the present Petition.

Issue

In the Petition, it issubmitted that –

THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL BEFORE THE [SUPREME COURT] ON THE VALIDITY OF AN

INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE [LATTER]
FROM ADJUDICATING THE QUESTION OFWHETHER X X X SUPERVENING ACTS
COMMITTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE CONSTITUTE
INDIRECT CONTEMPT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF
COURTS. THUS, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT INVOKED THE PRINCIPLE OF
RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF COURTS IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR INDIRECT
CONTEMPT.16

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners, in praying that the assailed Decision be set aside and that the Court declare respondent
guilty of indirectcontempt, maintain that the July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008 CAResolutions in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 are valid and standing orders that must be obeyed unless and until they are
reversed or set aside, and despite the pendency of the petition in G.R.No. 178676; respondent is
bound by what is decreed in the July 4, 2007 Resolution, and without injunctive relief from this Court,
any act performed incontravention thereof constitutes indirect contempt. Petitionersthus conclude
that in refusing to take cognizance of their petition for indirect contempt, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
104060 committed error.

Finally, petitioners urge this Court to take the initiative in finding respondent guilty of indirect
contempt for issuing the June 13, 2008 letters and for attempting to evict them from their Urdaneta
Village home on June 20, 2008, which acts they believe amount to a defiance and disobedience of
the CA’s dispositions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.

Respondent’s Arguments

Arguing for the denial of the Petition, respondent in his Comment17 submits that the mere act of
writing and sending the June 13, 2008 letters to petitioners does not make him liable for indirect
contempt of court, as they "do not deal directly or indirectly with any of the enjoined acts
enumeratedin the 31 October 2006" Omnibus Order. Respondent adds that petitioners have not
shown that petitioner Ricardo Sr. has filed an administrator’s bond and has taken his administrator’s
oath; because ifhe has not, then it may notbe said that respondent acted in defiance of the appellate
court’s Resolutions since he continued to act as the administrator on the strength of the October 31,
2006 Omnibus Order in Spec. Proc. M-2629. Finally, respondent submits that he may not be found
guilty of indirect contempt in the absence of proof that he physically carried out the demands
contained in his June 13, 2008 letters; though he admits that he wrote the letters, he nonetheless
claims that hedid nothing more beyond sending them.

Our Ruling

The Petition is granted in part.

The pendency of a special civil action for certiorariinstituted in relation to a pending case does not
staythe proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear:

The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interruptthe course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorariwith a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners are
thus correct in arguing that the pendency of G.R. No. 178676 did not interrupt the course of CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196, in the absence of a temporary restraining order orwrit of preliminary injunction issued
in the former case. This is because "an original action for certiorariis an independent action and is
neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of."18The CA
therefore committed error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, or petitioners’ indirect contempt
petition, on the ground of pendency of G.R. No. 178676. It need not wait for this Court to resolve
1âwphi1

G.R. No. 178676 before the petitioners’ contempt charge may be heard.

However, at this point, this Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to resolve the merits of their petition
for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should properly try the same. Aside from the fact that the CA is
the court against which the alleged contempt was committed, a hearing is required in resolving a
charge for indirect contempt. The respondent in an indirect contempt charge may not be convicted
1âwphi1

on the basis ofwritten pleadings alone.19

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically [outline] the procedural requisites before
the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must
be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearingand
the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty
will respondent be punished accordingly. The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed
in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged tobe heard by himself or counsel. What is
most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against
him and to be heard in his defenses. This is due process, which must be observed at all times.

xxxx

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. To be sure, since an

indirectcontempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely
on the basis of written pleadings. A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of
the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue summons on the respondent.
While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions,
the court must set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent
must make his appearance to answer the charge. x x x20 (Emphasis supplied)

To be sure, there are more pressing matters that require the attention of this Court; petitioners'
complaint for indirect contempt could very well be resolved by the appellate court. WHEREFORE,
the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The February 25, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104060 is SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to take cognizance of
petitioners' June 25, 2008 Petition for Indirect Contempt.

SO ORDERED.

20. G.R. No. 163999 July 9, 2014

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
MILLARD R. OCAMPO, CIPRIANO REY R. HIPOLITO, ERIC F. MERJILLA AND JOSE R.
CARANDANG,Respondents,

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy; thus, a party who seeks to avail of it
must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision3 dated February 18, 2004 and the Resolution4 dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990.

Factual Antecedents

In February 1996, petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), through its
Quality Control Investigation Division (QCID), conducted an investigation on 1he alleged illegal
International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City.5 ISR is a method of routing and
completing an international long distance call using lines, cables, antennas, and/or airwave or
frequency that directly connect to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country of
destination of the call.6 Likened to a jumper,7 the unauthorized routing of international long distance
calls by-passes petitioner’s International Gateway Facilities (IGF) with the use of ISR access
numbers, making international long distance calls appear as local calls, and thereby, depriving
petitioner of substantial revenues.8

After confirming that some PLDT subscribers wereindeed operating ISR businesses in Makati City,
under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring System9 (EMS), petitioner
requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apprehend the said
subscribers.10 Acting on said request, Atty. Oscar L. Embido (Embido), the supervising agent
assigned to the Anti-Organized Crime Divisionof the NBI, conducted surveillance on the offices of
INFILNET and EMS.11 To verify his findings, he went to San Francisco, USA, and made international
calls to the Philippines using a borrowed subscriber’s card.12 Petitioner monitored the calls and
discovered that these calls by-passed its IGF.13 Atty. Embido then returned to the Philippines and
applied for search warrants with Branch 2314 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.15

On September 17, 1996, the Manila RTC issued two search warrants: (a) Search Warrant No. 96-
651 directed at the office of INFILNET; and (b) Search Warrant No. 96-652 directed at the officeof
EMS, both located in Makati City.16

On the same day, NBI agents conducted simultaneous raids during which electronic gadgets,
documents,assorted office supplies, several pieces of computer equipment, and some personal
belongings of the employees of INFILNET and EMS were seized.17

On September 19, 1996, an Information for the crime of simple theft was filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 60, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1590, against respondents Millard R.
Ocampo, CiprianoRey R. Hipolito, Eric F. Merjilla, and Jose R. Carandang.18 Respondents posted
bail the following day.19

On October 4, 1996, respondents filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Suppress or Exclude or
Return Inadmissible Evidence Unlawfully Obtained,20 assailing the validity of the Search Warrantson
the ground thatthe searches conducted were not in accordance with the established constitutional
rules and statutory guidelines.21

On February 21, 1997, the Makati RTC denied the Motion ruling that it is the issuing court, in this
case, the Manila RTC, which has the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Search
Warrants.22 Respondents moved for reconsideration but the same was unavailing,23 prompting them
to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari,24docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 47265.25

On July 13, 1998, the CA rendered a Decision26 dismissing the Petition as it found no fault on the
part ofthe Makati RTC in refusing to rule on the Motion to Suppress Evidence under the Principle of
Non-Interference ofa co-equal court.27 However, in order toavoid any conflict, the CA ordered the
search warrant cases consolidated with the criminal case for theft.28 Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

(1) The instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit; and

(2) The [RTC] of Manila, Branch 23, is hereby ORDERED to forward the records of the case
to the [RTC] of Makati Branch 60, for proper consolidation thereof.
SO ORDERED.29

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City

On May 24, 2002, respondents applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecumagainst certain
personsallegedly in possession of documents relating to PAMTEL, a foreign
telecommunicationscompany with tie-ups to INFILNET and EMS.30

Finding the documents irrelevant and immaterial to the resolution of the case, the RTC issued an
Order31 dated July 11, 2002, denying the application for subpoena duces tecum.32 Respondents
soughtreconsideration33 but the RTC denied the same in its Order34 dated October 10, 2002.
Respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 2002.35

On November 29, 2002, the RTC proceeded to hear the Motion to Suppress, which was revived
pursuant tothe CA’s Decision dated July 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47265.36 But since respondents
failed toappear and present evidence to substantiate their Motion, the RTC denied the Motion in
open court and issued the corresponding Order37 to that effect.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari,38 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 74990, assailing the Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002, and November 29,
2002.

On February 18, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision39 finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in issuing the assailed Orders.40 In reversing the denial of the Motion toSuppress, the CA
explained thatcontrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no intention on the part of respondents
to delay the resolution of the Motion.41In fact, the delays were notsolely attributable to them
considering that both parties were trying to arrive at a compromise agreement.42 As to the application
for subpoena duces tecum, the CA said that the RTC should have granted it because respondents
needed the documents to support their Motion to Suppress.43 Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is given due course. The assailed Orders
dated November 29, 2002 and July 11, 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public
respondent Presiding Judge is hereby ordered to grant [respondents’] application for subpoena
duces tecum and to continue with the hearing on [respondents’] Motion to Suppress and Exclude
Inadmissible Evidence Seized by the reception of evidence from both parties in support of or in
opposition to said motion.

SO ORDERED.44

Petitioner moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its Resolution46 dated June11,
2004.

Issues

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorariraising the following errors:

A. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED INREVERSING THE FIRST AND SECOND RTC ORDERS,
WHICH DENIED RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA CONSIDERING THAT:
 1. SAID ORDERS HAVE LONG BEEN FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PERIOD FOR
FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ASSAILING THESE ORDERS HAS ALREADY
LAPSED. THUS, THE [CA] SHOULD NOT HAVE DISTURBED THE FIRST AND SECOND
RTC ORDERS.

2. THE RTC-MAKATI PROPERLY DENIED THE APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA AS

THERE WAS NO PROPER GROUND FOR GRANTING THE SAME.

B. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED INREVERSING THE THIRD RTC ORDER, WHICH DENIED THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS, CONSIDERING THAT:

1. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE

THIRD RTC ORDER WITHOUT CITING ANY JUSTIFIABLE REASON BEFORE FILING A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING SAID ORDER.

2. DESPITE SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES GRANTED TO THEM BY, AND REPEATED

WARNINGS FROM, THE RTC-MAKATI, RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

3. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS ARE THE SAME ISSUES IN A
MOTION TO QUASH WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON BY THE RTC-
MANILA, A COURT OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION.

4. IN ANY CASE, THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS HAS NO MERIT AND WAS PROPERLY
DENIED BY THE RTC-MAKATI.47

Stripped of the non-essentials, the core issue is whether the CA erred in giving due course to the
Petition for Certiorari, and in subsequently granting the same despite evident procedural lapses.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner assails the propriety of the CA’s reversal of the Orders of the RTC, positing that in filing
the Petition for Certiorari, respondents failed to observe procedural rules. First, no motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress,
was filed prior to the filing of the Petition for Certiorari.48 Second, more than60-days had lapsed from
the time respondents were notified of the denialof their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated July 11, 2002, which denied their application for subpoenaduces tecum.49 Third, respondents
failed to indicate the date they received the Orders dated July11, 2002 and October 10,
2002.50 Given the foregoing procedural infirmities, petitioner contends the CA should not have
entertained the Petition for Certiorarimuch more granted affirmative relief.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, insist that their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated November 29, 2002 is not fatal as the rule is subject to exceptions.51 In this case,
respondents no longer filed a motion for reconsideration as they already moved inopen court for a
reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress butthe RTC flatly denied the same.52 As to
the alleged non-compliance with the 60-day period, respondents brush aside the issue arguing that
technical rules cannot prevent the CA fromgiving due course to a Petition for Certiorari, which it
considers to be meritorious.53
 Our Ruling

The Petition has merit.

Assailed in the Petition for Certiorarifiled before the CAare three Orders, to wit:

1) The Order dated July 11, 2002, denying respondents’ application for subpoena duces
tecum;

2) The Order dated October 10, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated July 11, 2002; and

3) The Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress.

We shall first discuss the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.

The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice of the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.

Section 4,54 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for certiorari should be
instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from the notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution being assailed. The 60-
day period, however, is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay, which would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.55 Thus, strict compliance of this
rule is mandatory and imperative.56 But like all rules, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed "for the
most persuasive of reasons," which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality.57

In this case, respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated July 11, 2002, denying their application for subpoena duces tecum, on October 18,
2002.58 Accordingly, they had until December 17, 2002 within which to file a Petition for Certiorariwith
the CA. Records, however, show that it was only on January 20, 2003 that respondents filed their
Petition for Certiorarito assail the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.59 Instead of
admitting that more than 60 days had lapsed, respondents kept silent about it in their Petition for
Certiorari. When petitioner brought up the issue,respondents’ reply60 was unresponsive. Infact, they
did not even confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-day period. Siding with respondent, the CA
opted not to discuss the issue and resolved to reverse the Order dated July 11, 2002 on the ground
that the granting of the subpoena duces tecum was necessary in order for respondents to
substantiate their Motion to Suppress.

The CA’s reasoning, however, even if true, doesnot excuse respondents from complying with the 60-
day period rule, especially since they have not offered any plausible justification for their non-
compliance. In fact, their adamant refusal to admit the obvious truth as well as their deliberate
attempt to hide this procedural lapse cannot be ignored. Leniency is given only to those deserving of
it. In this case, respondents are not entitled to any because they intentionally omitted to indicate in
their Petition for Certiorarithe date they were notified of the Order dated October 10, 2002 in order to
mislead the CA. Besides, relaxing the rule would not only be unfair and unjust but would also be
prejudicial to petitioner, who had every right to believe that the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and
October 10, 2002 had attained finality and may no longer be altered, modified, or reversed. As we
have said, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the most persuasive reasons and only in
meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality.Such is not the
situation in this case.
1âwphi1
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in
reversing the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002, as they may no longer be disturbed,
after having attained finality.

In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari should have been
dismissed.

Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the
institution of a petition for certiorari.61 Although this rule is subject to certain exceptions,62 none of
which is present in this case.

Respondents admit that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November
29, 2002 prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they alleged that their
counselverbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress, which the
RTC flatly denied in open court. Such allegation, however, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,63 is not
supported by the evidence as the Order dated November 29, 2002 made no mention of such fact.64 It
is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have moved for a reconsideration of the said Order
considering that, as stated in the Order, he appeared only after the hearings were over.65 Besides,
the lower court should first be informed of its supposed error and be allowed to correct or rectify the
same through a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case, which could only be
done by filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order.66 This respondents failed todo. Thus,
in the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and
in reversing the Order dated November 29, 2002.

In closing, we must emphasize thatwhile litigation isnot a game of technicalities, this does not mean
that procedural rules may be ignored at will or that their non-observance may be dismissed simply
because it may prejudice a party’s substantial rights.67 Mere invocations of substantial justice and
liberality are not enough for the court tosuspend procedural rules.68 Again, except only for the most
compelling or persuasive reasons, procedural rules must be followed to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.69

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2004 and the
Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002 and November 29, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 96-1590, are hereby REINSTATED.

21. G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.)/

OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B. ALTARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her deceased husband
GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Resolution 1 dated
November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 for allegedly having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA,
through the said Resolution, entertained private respondent's Petition for Certiorari2 despite having
been filed 15 days late and allowed her to correct the technical infirmities therein. Also assailed is
the CA's February 10, 2010 Resolution3 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer
to Dismiss4 and giving private respondent another chance to cure the remaining deficiencies of the
petition.

Factual Antecedents

This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund
of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin (private
respondent) against petitioner Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies,
Inc./Oceanic Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by its general manager, Capt. Nicanor B.
Altares (petitioner), filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA). Private respondent is the widow of seafarer
Guillermo M. Mendigorin (Guillermo) who was employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and
eventually, as second engineer in the latter’s vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of
colon cancer during the term of the employment contract between him and Thenamaris.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ultimately, the LA promulgated his Decision5 dated January 29, 2008 in favor of private respondent.
Thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant
[herein private respondent] and finding respondents [herein petitioners] liable to pay jointly and
severally: (a) death benefits amounting to US $50,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment; (b) reimbursement of medical expenses amounting to ₱102,759.74; [(c)] moral and
exemplary damages amounting to ₱100,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 respectively; and (d) attorney’s fees
in the [amount of] ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

All other claims are DENIED.6

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

On appeal, the NLRC reversed7 the LA’s Decision.

Private respondent moved for reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated June 29, 2009, however, her
motion was denied for lack of merit.

Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC on July 8,
2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on September 8, 2009, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Certiorari10 before the CA. Private respondent alleged that she had until
September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within
which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was then saddled and occupied with
equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to file the petition on time, especially since
the case involves voluminous documents necessary in the preparation thereof. Accordingly, private
respondent asked for an extension of 15 days from September 7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009,
within which to file the petition.
On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari11 before the CA.

Action of the Court of Appeals

In a Resolution12 dated November 20, 2009, the CA noted that private respondent’s Petition for
Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest
of substantial justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed private respondent to cure the
technical flaws in her petition. Thus:

The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari filed on September
22, 2009, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late.

A perusal of the instant petition reveals the following procedural infirmities, namely:

(1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping does not conform with the
requirements under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, as a
Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered competent evidence of an affiant’s
identity; and

(2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission, no other copies of pertinent and relevant pleadings/documents are
attached therewith, such as petitioner’s Complaint, respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal,
petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Appeal, if any, all of which may aid this Court in
judiciously resolving the issues raised in the petition.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court, in line with the rule that cases should be determined on the merits, after
full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses have been given, rather than
on technicality or some procedural imperfections, resolved to DIRECT petitioner to submit anew a
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which complies with the requirements of the rules,
and clear and legible copies of the aforementioned pleadings/documents, within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss,14 strongly opposing private
respondent’s Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited
pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,15 petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-
7-12-SC16 effectively rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari non-extendible after
it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now
stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration.17

Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable, private
respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper as it was filed beyond
the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari.

Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent’s motion for extension is a prohibited
pleading, as well as one filed outside of the reglementary period, then private respondent’s Petition
for Certiorari is a mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever. Consequently, the
Decision of the NLRC has become final and executory and is beyond the ambit of judicial review.
In the meantime, private respondent submitted her Compliance18 with the CA’s Resolution of
November 20, 2009. Nevertheless, she still failed to attach thereto copies of her Complaint filed
before the LA and Memorandum filed with the NLRC.

In a Resolution19 dated February 10, 2010, the CA denied petitioners’ motion and, instead, gave
private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its November 20, 2009 Resolution by
submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days from notice thereof.

Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.

Entry of Judgment20 was already issued by the NLRC on August 13, 2009. Per NLRC Rules, the
June 29, 2009 Resolution became final and executory on July 18, 2009 and was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgment.

Issues

1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT NOTED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT FOR HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD REQUIRED BY SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.

2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN, IN NOTING THE VERY LATE PETITION FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT,
IT GROSSLY IGNORED THIS HONORABLE COURT’S VERY RECENT RULING IN
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND
GERALDINE ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, 2009), WHICH DISALLOWED ANY
MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65.21(Underscoring and emphasis in the original)

Our Ruling

There is merit in the petition.

In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.22 we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict
on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for
certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna
Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,23 is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in
accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC24 where no provision for the
filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of
Rule 6525 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding 15 days.26 Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,27 the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound
discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to
extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the
intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that ‘no extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are
allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion."28
Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day
period rule, thus:

[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
1âwphi1

invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.

In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on
July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for
extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However,
the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a
motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended;
otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the
assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.31

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking
liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules.32 Here, the reason
offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s
counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again,
we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it
is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."33

Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright.

Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on the timeliness of private
respondent’s motion for extension. Instead, it directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari as seen by
its statement "[t]he Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x, albeit the same was
filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement is an indirect
acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for extension was indeed filed late. Yet it
opted to still entertain and "note" the Petition for Certiorari, justifying its action as being "in the
interest of justice."

We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension should
have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of
petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."

In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,34 which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for certiorari,
we recognized that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to
impart stability in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merits. This is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were given the
chance to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the
competing parties and always be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather,
promote the administration of justice. Concomitant thereto:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due
process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. x x x35

Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation of the rules, the CA’s
resolution would have only been acceptable had private respondent shown respect for the rules by
submitting a petition for certiorari which is sufficient in form. In contrast, what private respondent filed
was a petition plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed petitioner to cure the
deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given, albeit undeservingly, one last
chance to submit the still lacking copies of the pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA.

More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of the fact that the June
29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC denying private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration had
already become final and executory as of July 18, 2009.36 Thus, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, except to order its dismissal. In Labao, we held that:

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondent’s
failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution.

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a
judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision
on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the
merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts
of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.37

In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended underserved and unwarranted
liberality to private respondent. "There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as
when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism
xx x."38 Such is present here as shown by the CA's obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite the
late filing of the motion for extension and the flimsy excuse for the extension sought, the late filing of
the petition and the numerous infirmities attending the same, and private respondent's continued
defiance of its directive. These circumstances serve to highlight private respondent's propensity to
disregard the very rules that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to follow.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari
filed by private respondent Amanda C. Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

22. G.R. No.173861 July 14, 2014

JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT, Petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO; (Pampanga) represented
by its Presiding Judge HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA and ALLIED DOMECQ
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction1 filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit (petitioners) seek to nullify and set aside
two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, to wit:
Order dated October 12, 20052 denying their Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence3 and Order dated
July 14, 20064 denying their Motion for Reconsideration5thereto.

Factual Antecedents

During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening of June 22, 2001, petitioners
werearrested at the corner of Gueco St. and MacArthur Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for
delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit FundadorBrandy. On the strength of the
Joint Affidavit6 of the police operatives, petitioners were formally charged in an Information7 dated
July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the IntellectualProperty Code of the Philippines. After they were arraigned and
had pleaded not guilty to the charge on May 31, 2005,8 petitioners filed on June 17, 2005 a Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence9 based on inadmissibility of evidence. They contended that the evidence
the prosecution intended to present were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit
productswere seized, they were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence
of the arresting officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful arrest.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 12, 2005, the RTC issued the first assailed Order10 denying the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence. Observing that the motion was anchored on petitioners’ alleged illegal
arrest, it cited jurisprudence11wherein it was held that any objection to an arrest must be made before
an accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashal of the information
before the arraignment, an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Notwithstanding this reference, the RTC based its denial of the subject motion on its examination of
the Joint Affidavit of the arresting officers. According to the said court, since it appears from the said
affidavit that the search and seizure was incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the accused who
were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence obtained during such search and seizure is
admissible in evidence.

Not satisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which the RTC denied in its assailed
Order13 of July 14, 2006.

Issue

Hence, the present recourse under Rule65 of the Rules ofCourt, anchored on the sole ground of:

WHETHER X X X THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42 OF THE CITY OF SAN

FERNANDO, PAMPANGA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PETITIONERS TO
SET THE CASE FOR SUPPRESSION HEARING.14

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners failed to allege that there is

no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

It is to be stressed that in every special civil action underRule 65, a party seeking the writ whether for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary
remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. "[H]e must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate x x x."15As held in Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources:16

x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorarito allege with certainty in his verified
petition facts showing that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law," because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari.
"Being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy
and adequate remedy." "Where the existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner must allegefacts showing that
any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed
himself of such remedy. A petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the
rules may be dismissed.17

Pursuant to the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorariis dismissible for failure to allege that
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw as to
justify resort to certiorari.

Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005

Order to be erroneous, the mistake is an
error in judgment which is beyond the
ambit of certiorari.

In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,18 the Court held that:

The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneousjudgment will be a void judgment.

When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the
application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may becorrected only
by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination
is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on
procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in
nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial
court on the merits of the case.19

Here, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioners.
As such, any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is
correctibleby appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error ofjudgment and
not of jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based
on its assessment that the evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded isadmissible, was done in
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the
mistake is clearly not anerror of jurisdiction but of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.

No grave abuse of discretion.

Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorariis proper, the Petition must still be dismissed for
their failure toshow that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalentto an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be sopatent and gross as to amountto an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."20

In this case, petitionersmiserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion. In 1a\^ /phi1

fact, we note that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper timeto file
a motion to suppress/exclude evidence.21 They even conceded that this is a pure question of law.22

In any case, our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did not abuse, much more, gravely
abuse its discretion. The RTC thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted by the parties, to wit:
Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence; Opposition (to the Motion to Suppress Evidence); Reply;
Rejoinder; and SurRejoinder; as well as the Joint affidavit submitted by the arresting officers. Only
after a careful analysis of the submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment.

Petitioners violated the principle

of hierarchy of courts.

It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct recourse to this
Court. This is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for certiorariassailing the
interlocutory orders of the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly with the
Supreme Court. It was held in Rayos v. City of Manila23 that:
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction. However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of
choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, the Court
held:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court
with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against fiq;t level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket.24

Clearly, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may only be allowed if there are special
and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition which, however, are not
obtaining in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

23. G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015

DARAGA PRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION-

AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the Commission on Audit (COA)
must be accorded great respect and finality.1

This Petition for Certiorari2 assails the Decision3 dated September 29, 2010 of the respondent COA, which
denied petitioner Daraga Press, Lie's (DPI) money claim in the amount of P63,638,032.00. Likewise assailed
is the Resolution4 dated December 29, 2011 of the respondent COA, denying petitioner DPI's Motion for
Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

On November 15, 2007, pursuant to Section 196 of Republic Act No. 9401,7 then Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. requested the respondent COA to validate and
evaluate the request of then Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Nur
Misuari for the release of funds to cover the region's alleged unpaid obligation to petitioner DPI for textbooks
delivered in 1998.8

In response to the request, the respondent COA issued Local Government Sector (LGS) Office Order No.
2007-058 dated December 7, 2007, creating a team of auditors to validate and evaluate the alleged unpaid
obligation.9

On April 29, 2008, Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo of the LGS issued a Memorandum10expressing
serious doubts on the validity of the obligation as the actual receipt of the subject textbooks could not be
ascertained.11

On September 22, 2008, petitioner DPI filed with the respondent COA a money claim12 for the payment of
textbooks it allegedly delivered on July 3, 1998 to the respondent Department of Education (DepEd)-ARMM,
formerly the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)-ARMM.13

Pursuant to a directive of the Commission Proper, the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO), Legal
Services Sector (LSS) conducted further validation of petitioner DPI's money claim, which yielded the same
result.14 The findings of the FAIO complemented and corroborated the initial observations/findings of the
audit team created under LGS Office Order No. 2007-058 dated December 7, 2007.15

Ruling of the Commission on Audit

Based on the Memorandum dated April 29, 2008 and the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001,16 the respondent
COA rendered the assailed Decision dated September 29, 2010. It denied the money claim because it found
no convincing proof that the subject textbooks were delivered.17 It noted that there was no showing that the
Supply Officer actually inspected and received the said delivery;18 that there was a violation of the rules on
internal control on segregation of duties and responsibilities as the receipt/acceptance/inspection of the
alleged deliveries was done by the DECS-ARMM Regional Secretary, who was also the one who approved the
Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV)19 and recommended the approval of the Purchase Order (PO);20 and
that the audited Final Trial Balances21of DECS-ARMM and the audited Financial Statements22 of petitioner
DPI did not reflect any transaction in the amount of P63,638,032.00.23 The respondent COA also pointed out
discrepancies, inconsistencies, and inaccuracies in the documents submitted, to wit: chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

1. There were three (3) copies of [Purchase Orders] PO No. 075-PTB issued, which were all dated June 15,
1998 addressed to [petitioner] DPI. The first one with the amount of P63,638,750.00 was received undated
by White Orchids Printing and Publishing with an unidentified signature, while the other two (2) POs, which
bear the amount of P63,63 8,975.00 and P63,638,032.00, were received undated by [petitioner] DPI. The
POs did not indicate the mode of procurement and the place and date of delivery;

2. There were two (2) sets of [Sales Invoice] SI Nos. 5806 and 5808 and two (2) sets of Pelivery Receipt]
(DR) Nos. 5206 and 5207, all dated July 3, 1998, bearing similar serial numbers but with different
signatories on the received portion thereof, which indicates possible falsification of public documents;

3. Two (2) Certifications, which were purportedly issued by Sulpicio Lines, differed as to the date of delivery
and receipt, casting doubt on the authenticity of the delivery of textbooks;

4. Five (5) contradicting reports on receipt and acceptance of deliveries and three (3) sets of Inspection
Reports by the Regional Secretary of ARMM, indicate doubtful invoices and [DRs]; and

5. The figures in the PO, DR, Memorandum Receipts, and Certification and Affidavit of Supply Officer
differ.24
c ralawlawl ibra ry

These discrepancies, inconsistencies and inaccuracies, as well as the lack of appropriation for the purchase
of the subject textbooks considering that the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)25 for the amount of
P63,638,750.00,26 upon which petitioner DPI anchored its claim, pertained to the payment of personal
services (payment of salaries of teachers), not for the purchase of textbooks,27led the respondent COA to
conclude that there was no substantial evidence to grant the money claim.28 And since the actual delivery of
the subject textbooks was not established, the respondent COA likewise ruled that the equitable principle of
quantum meruit could not be applied.29

Aggrieved, petitioner DPI moved for reconsideration but the respondent COA denied the same in its
Resolution dated December 29, 2011. chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
 Issue

Hence, petitioner DPI filed the instant Petition raising the issue of whether the respondent COA committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim.30

Petitioner DPI's Arguments

Petitioner DPI ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent COA in denying the money
claim solely on sheer doubt.31 Petitioner DPI claims there were funds available for the procurement of the
subject textbooks but were inadvertently reverted to the National Treasury because the said amount was
twice obligated under Personal Service.32 And although there were typographical errors and minor
inconsistencies in the documents submitted, petitioner DPI contends that it was still able to prove its
entitlement to the money claim. It insists that the letters and certifications33 from former ARMM Governors
and high-ranking officials of the DepEd Central Office, as well as the Certification34 issued by COA Auditor
Dagaranao Saripada, all validate its money claim.35 And if ever there was a breach on standard government
procedure, petitioner DPI asserts that it could still recover the reasonable value of the subject textbooks
conformably with the principle of quantum meruit.36

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the respondent COA committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim as the denial is supported by the evidence on
record.37 They maintain that there is no credible evidence to show that the subject textbooks were delivered
and that without any proof of delivery, there is no basis for petitioner DPI to recover even under the
principle of quantum meruit.38

Our Ruling

The Petition must fail.

Decisions and resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.39 Grave abuse of discretion exists when there
is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim, and despotism.40

The respondent COA committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim.

In this case, petitioner DPI imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent COA in doubting
and disregarding petitioner DPI's documentary evidence and in adopting the findings and recommendations
contained in the Memorandum dated April 29, 2008 and the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001. A careful
reading of the assailed decision and resolution, however, negates any capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
exercise of judgment of the respondent COA as the denial of petitioner DPI's money claim is supported by
the evidence on record.

There are inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the documents.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner DPI, there is sufficient reason for the respondent COA to doubt and
disregard the documentary evidence presented by petitioner DPI as the FAIO found inconsistencies,
discrepancies, and inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the POs, DRs, Sis, and other documents.
Pertinent portions of the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001 are quoted below: cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

2) Various inconsistencies/inaccuracies were noted in the verification of documents submitted/attached to

the claim showing different dates, amounts, and signatories, casting doubt on the authenticity of the
documents and the transaction.

a) Three (3) copies of POs were issued with the same number but with three different amounts, received
undated by [petitioner] DPI and White Orchids Printing, indicating the absence of safeguards against
irregularities in the handling or substitution of vital documents like PO.

There were three copies of PO No. 075-PTB issued, all dated June 15, 1998 addressed to [petitioner DPI],
one with a total amount of P63,638,750 x x x was received undated by White Orchids Printing and
Publishing with an unidentified signature while the other two copies with two different amounts of
P63,638,975 x x x and P63,638,032 x x x were received also undated by the [petitioner DPI]. The PO did
not indicate the mode of procurement and the place and date of delivery;

b) There were two sets of [SI] Nos. 5806 and 5808 and two (2) sets of [DRs] Nos. 5206 and 5207, all dated
July 3, 1998, bearing similar serial numbers but with different signatories on the received portion thereof,
indicating possible falsification of public documents.

x x x The first set of Sis x x x and DRs x x x was signed on the received portion by DECS-ARMM [Regional]
Secretary x x x while the second set of Sis and DRs x x x was signed by x x x, Supply Officer I.

The owner of [petitioner] DPI, x x x sought to explain the two sets of Sis and DRs in his letter dated
November 26, 2009 x x x in response to our letter dated November 9, 2009 x x x; that this came about
when the then DECS-ARMM informed his Office that the Sis and DRs signed by DECS-ARMM [Regional]
Secretary x x x [were] not in accordance with their practice that it is the Supply Officer who is supposed to
sign these documents; that to rectify this, another set was signed by x x x, Supply Officer I, thus resulting
in two different signatories in the same set of Sis and DRs.

The said explanation is untenable. To give due course to the explanation is tantamount to allowing the
substitution of facts that did not actually happen and can be considered falsification of public documents.

c) Two Certifications purportedly issued by Sulpicio Lines differed in dates of delivery and receipt, casting
doubt on the authenticity of the delivery of textbooks.

There were two Certifications with no official logo on the [letterhead] purportedly issued by Sulpicio Lines,
Inc., Cotabato City Branch upon the request of [petitioner] DPI both dated 8th day of September 1999 but
bearing different delivery and receipt dates as follows:cha nrob lesvi rtua llaw libra ry

Date delivered by Sulpicio

Lines and received by
Date of Certification Annex
[the Regional Secretary of
ARMM]
September 8, 1999 June 23, 1998 24
September 8, 1999 July 2, 1998 25
Moreover, the dates of delivery and receipt in the said Certifications do not agree with the dates of the two
copies of Bill of Lading (BOL) of June 25, 1998 and June 29, 1998 x x x. The BOL states that the books are
supplementary books and reference materials and not textbooks as alleged;

d) Five contradicting reports on receipt and acceptance of deliveries and three sets of Inspection Reports by
the Regional Secretary of ARMM, indicate doubtful invoices and [DRs].

Four (4) sets of Reports on Receipt and Acceptance of the books by Regional Secretary x x x, DECS-ARMM,
dated July 5, 1998 and July 7, 1998, contained contradictory/conflicting facts and dates, as follows: chanro blesvi rtu allawli bra ry

Date of Report on Delivery Sales

Date of Date of
Receipt and Receipt (DR) Invoice (SI) Annex
DR SI
Acceptance No. No.
June 30, July 2,
July 5, 1998 5206-5207 5808-5806 28
1998 1998
June 30, July 2,
July 7, 1998 5098-5099 5508-3509 29
1998 1998
July 3, July 3,
July 7, 1998 [5208]-5209 5809-5810 30
1998 1998
July July 3,
July 7, 1998 5206-5207 5806-5808 31
3,1998 1998
In addition, his Affidavit dated July 1998 still states another date of receipt/inspection/acceptance of the
subject deliveries to be July 21, 1998. x x x
Also noted is a Certification dated December 15, 1998 xxx that [petitioner] DPI has fully delivered assorted
elementary books amounting to P63,638,032.00 on July 3, 1998 under PR No. 5206 and on July 5, 1998
under DR No. 5207, and that the deliveries were duly received and accepted by DECS-ARMM Regional
Secretary x x x. The Certification is under the letterhead of [the DepEd], which was renamed only in 2001
instead of [DECS], which was its designated name in 1998 when the transaction reportedly occurred,
indicating that it was antedated, casting doubt on the documents and the transaction.

Moreover, DECS Regional Secretary xxx issued three Inspection Reports bearing different serial numbers of
[SI] and dates, as follows:chanroble svi rtual lawlibra ry

Date of Inspection Date of Sales

Sales Invoice No. Annex
Report Invoice
July 5, 1998 5508-5509 July 2, 1998 34
July 7, 1998 5806-5808 July 3, 1998 35
July 7, 1998 5809-5810 July 3, 1998 36
e) Four different quantities of books ordered and delivered in PO, MRs, and Certification/Affidavit of receipt
by Supply Officer II, none of which were witnessed by COA Auditor/TAS, casting doubt on the alleged
delivery.

Examination of documents shows that there were different quantities or copies of books received per
documents submitted, as follows: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

Per Certification Affidavit of

PO DR MRs/IRs
Document of SO II SO II
Quantity (in
543,030/543,022 543,022 542,722 542,822 593,022
copies)
The figures on the PO and DRs x x x do not agree with the figures on the totals of Memorandum Receipt
(MRs) x x x for Equipment, Semi-expendable, and Non-expendable Property and Invoice Receipts (IRs) x x x
signed by the respective Supply Officers of Maguindanao, Sulu I and II, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao Sur I and II.
Neither do these figures agree with the figures certified to have been allegedly received on July 2, 1998 by x
x x, Supply Officer II, in his Certification dated July 24, 1998 and Affidavit of August 28, 2008, respectively
x x x.

Moreover, the volume of the books allegedly delivered notwithstanding, all the foregoing receipt and
acceptance of deliveries by DECS-ARMM x x x were not witnessed by any of the Auditors or Technical Audit
Specialists of COA assigned in the DECS-ARMM Division Schools concerned.

3) Review supporting documents on requisition, purchase order, receipt and acceptance and invoice of
property shows an unwarranted override of functions and responsibility by an approving official, violating
internal control on segregation of duties and responsibilities.

Examination shows that despite the substantial amount of P63,638,032.60, the RIV x x x was certified by x
x x Supply Officer I, instead of by x x x Supply Officer II, and approved by DECS-ARMM Secretary x x x. The
PO was recommended for approval by Regional Secretary x x x and approved by the ARMM Governor, x x x.

On the alleged delivery of books, examination of invoices and receipts revealed that it was DECS Regional
Secretary x x x and not the Supply Officer II who received the books as shown by his signature on the [SI]
Nos. 5806 and 5808 x x x and [DR] Nos. 5206 and 5207 x x x all dated July 3, 1998. Thereafter, he issued
five reports on receipt and acceptance of deliveries, and upon inspection, three Inspection Reports, as
discussed in Finding #2.d hereof.

Also, the undated and unnumbered MRs and IRs x x x signed by the respective Supply Officers of
Maguindanao, Sulu I and II, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao Sur I and II, state that the alleged textbooks have all
been received by them from DECS-ARMM Secretary x x x, indicating that it was really [the] Secretary x x x
who received the books. The [IRs] x x x however are under the letterhead of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) instead of DECS-ARMM and are not signed by the secretary who transferred the books
to the respective Supply Officers.
It is significant to note that receipt/acceptance of deliveries in government is normally a responsibility of the
Administrative/Supply/Property Officer. The receipt/acceptance and inspection of alleged deliveries by the
DECS-ARMM Secretary who also approved the RTV and recommended the approval of the purchase order,
[are] not in accordance with standard government procurement procedure as [they violate] internal control
on segregation of duties an functions. The involvement of senior [officials] at almost all stages of the
transaction is not in order, and signifies override of functionand responsibility which belong to the
Supply/Property Officer.

4)� Copies of exceipts of audited Balance Sheet of DECS-ARMM as of December 31, 1999 and 2000 show
no Inventory of Books amounting to P63,638,032, belying the MRs/ERs for books issued by the Supply
Officers of six division schools. x x x

Verification of the copies of the excerpts of the audited Final Trial Balance of DECS-ARMM, Cotabato City as
of December 31, 1999 and 2000 furnished by the COA ARMM x x x showed the balance of the account Fixed
Assets-Furniture, Fixtures, Equipment and Books to be only P4,624,023.46 and P4,705,693.46, respectively,
indicating that no books costing P63,638,032 were purchased/delivered in 1998.

xxxx

5)� Certified copies of the audited Financial Statements of the [petitioner] DPI for 1997-1998 and 2000-
2001, furnished by the SEC to the FAIO do not show that the P63,638,032 transaction transpired in 1998,
casting doubt on the veracity of the money claim.41 cralawlawlib ra ry

We believe that these inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies are enough reasons for the
respondent COA to deny the money claim.

It bears stressing that petitioner DPI has the burden to show, by substantial evidence, that it is entitled to
the money claim. Corollarily, it has to prove the actual delivery of the subject textbooks by presenting
substantial evidence or "evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [such]
conclusion."42 However, petitioner DPFs documentary evidence could hardly be considered substantial
evidence as these contain so many inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies, which would cause a
reasonable person to doubt the veracity and authenticity of the money claim.

It is significant that in the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001, the explanation given by the owner as to why
there are two sets of DRs and Sis is not consistent with the one offered by petitioner DPI in the instant
Petition. In the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001, the owner explained: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

xxx that this came about when the then DECS-ARMM informed his Office that the Sis and DRs signed by
DECS-ARMM [Regional] Secretary xxx was not in accordance with their practice that it is the Supply Officer
who is supposed to sign these documents; that to rectify this, another set was signed by x x x, Supply
Officer I, thus resulting in two different signatories in the same set of Sis and DRs.43 cralaw lawlib rary

However, in the instant Petition, the counsel for petitioner DPI reasoned that: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

xxx Considering the volume of the textbooks delivered, it is not difficult to appreciate that there were two
representatives or responsible officers of the agency who worked together to receive the textbooks. It is not
difficult to appreciate either that one officer signed the first copy of the [DR] while the other signed the
second copy of the receipt. xxx44 cralawlawl ibrary

If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the subject textbooks, we cannot understand why petitioner DPI
would have two versions of the story. Clearly, this is another reason to doubt the truthfulness of petitioner
DPI's money claim.

There was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks.

Aside from these inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies, there was also no appropriation for the
purchase of the subject textbooks as the SARO in the amount of P63,638,750.00, upon which petitioner DPI
anchors its claim, pertains to the payment of personal services or salaries of the teachers, not for the
purchase of textbooks.45

Anent petitioner DPI's claim that there were funds available for the procurement of the subject textbooks
but the funds were inadvertently reverted to the National Treasury because the said amount was twice
obligated under Personal Service, this has been addressed by the Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo
of the LGS in the Memorandum dated April 29, 2008, to wit: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
 a. There are no records to show that the funds were available when DECS-ARMM entered into contract
with [petitioner DPI] because SARO No. B-98-03383 dated October 10, 1998 was released by DBM
for payment of salaries and compensation benefits of 490 positions for Teacher I, but without the
corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation thus the allotment obligated became a prior year's accounts
payable of the Department;

b. The DBM issued two (2) Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA) for the SARO cited in (a) above. NCA No.
091427 dated May 5, 1999 was transferred to DECS-ARMM under ADA No. 99-7-049 for payment of
salaries, while NCA No. 091094 dated April 22, 1999 was reverted to the Bureau of Treasury on
December 31, 1999. As stated by the DepEd Secretary, only one accounts payable was recorded in
the OSEC books chargeable against the SARO to cover payment of personal services only.46

Since there was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks, the respondent COA had reason
to deny the money claim as Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

The letters and certifications issued by high-ranlang officials do not prove the actual delivery of the subject
textbooks.

To dispute the findings of the respondent COA, petitioner DPI attached to the instant Petition copies of
letters and certifications issued by high-ranking officials attesting to the validity of the money claim. Said
letters and certifications, however, are not sufficient to prove that there was an actual delivery of the
subject textbooks as the persons who signed these letters and certifications were not present during the
delivery nor were they privy to the transaction. In fact, COA Auditor Dagaranao Saripada in a letter47 dated
August 15, 2011 denied executing the undated Certification. According to him, at the time the transaction
transpired in 1998, he was not yet the Unit Head of the said Department.

Moreover, these letters and certifications cannot outweigh the findings and recommendations contained in
the Memorandum dated April 29, 2008 issued by Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo of the LGS and
in the LSS-FAIO Report No. 2010-001 prepared by the State Auditor IV Filomena D. Ilagan, reviewed by
Director III Nelia C. Villeza, and approved by Leonor F. Boado, as the findings and recommendations in the
memorandum and in the report were arrived at as a result of an exhaustive and extensive investigation
conducted by the auditors.

The principle of quantum meruit does not apply.

Petitioner DPI's invocation of the equitable principle of quantum rmeruit must also fail. The principle of
quantum meruit allows a party to recover "as much as he reasonably deserves."48 However, as aptly
explained by the respondent COA, the principle of quantum meruit presupposes that an actual delivery of
the goods has been made. In this case, petitioner DPI failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the
actual delivery of the-subject textbooks. Thus, the principle of quantum meruit invoked by petitioner DPI
cannot be applied.

All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent COA in denying petitioner DPI's
money claim for failure to present substantial evidence to prove the actual delivery of the subject textbooks.
Without a doubt, the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the documents submitted by petitioner DPI and
the lack of appropriation for purchase of the subject textbooks lead only to one inescapable conclusion: that
there was no actual delivery of the subject textbooks.

The factual findings of the respondent COA must be accorded great respect and finality.

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the respondent COA, which are
undoubtedly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded great respect and finality. The
respondent COA, as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government agencies
and instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 2649 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,50 has acquired special
knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. And as we have often
said:chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

[I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in
fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. x x x51 cralawlawl ibra ry

Such is the situation in the instant case. cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September
29, 2010 and the Resolution dated December 29, 2011 of the respondent COA are herebyAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

24. G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015

SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLAO AND ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO, Petitioners, v. LEO RAY
V. YANSON, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioners spouses Jose O. Gatuslao and Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao (petitioners) are assailing the
December 8, 20091 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Cad. Case No. 09-
2802 which granted respondent Leo Ray2 Yanson� s (respondent) Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession over the properties being occupied by petitioners, as well as the February 26, 2010 RTC
Order3 denying petitioners� motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao is the daughter of the late Felicisimo Limsiaco (Limsiaco) who
died intestate on February 7, 1989.� Limsiaco was the registered owner of two parcels of land with
improvements in the City of Bacolod described as Lots 10 and 11, Block 8 of the subdivision plan Psd-38577
and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-334294 and T-24331.5 chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Limsiaco mortgaged the said lots along with the house standing thereon to Philippine National Bank (PNB).�
Upon Limsiaco� s failure to pay, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and caused the properties�
sale at a public auction on June 24, 1991 where it emerged as the highest bidder. When the one-year
redemption period expired without Limsiaco� s estate redeeming the properties, PNB caused the
consolidation of titles in its name.� Ultimately, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City cancelled TCT Nos. T-
33429 and T-24331 and in lieu thereof issued TCT Nos. T-3088186 and T-3088197 in PNB� s name on
October 25, 2006.

On November 10, 2006, a Deed of Absolute Sale8 was executed by PNB conveying the subject properties in
favor of respondent.� As a consequence thereof, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued TCT Nos. T-
3111259 and T-31112610 in respondent� s name in lieu of PNB� s titles.

Then, as a registered owner in fee simple of the contested properties, respondent filed with the RTC anEx-
Parte Motion for Writ of Possession11 pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135,12 as amended by Act No. 4118
(Act No. 3135, as amended),13 docketed as Cad. Case No. 09-2802.

In their Opposition,14 petitioners argued that the respondent is not entitled to the issuance of an ex-
parte writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 since he was not the buyer of the subject
properties at the public auction sale and only purchased the same through a subsequent sale made by
PNB.� Not being the purchaser at the public auction sale, respondent cannot file and be granted an ex
parte motion for a writ of possession. Petitioners also asserted that the intestate estate of Limsiaco has
already instituted an action for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and auction sale affecting the
contested properties.15� They argued that the existence of the said civil suit bars the issuance of the writ of
possession and that whatever rights and interests respondent may have acquired from PNB by virtue of the
sale are still subject to the outcome of the said case.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC granted the issuance of the writ of possession in an Order16 dated December 8, 2009.� It cited the
Court� s pronouncement in China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,17viz: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

The Court recognizes the rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed property at the public auction
sale upon the consolidation of his title when no timely redemption of the property was made, x x x.

It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership
in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. x x x Possession of the land then
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title,
the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

The purchaser, therefore, in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession x x x.18

PNB, therefore, as the absolute owner of the properties is entitled to a writ of possession.� And since
respondent purchased the properties from PNB, the former has necessarily stepped into the shoes of the
latter.� Otherwise stated, respondent, by subrogation, has the right to pursue PNB� s claims against
petitioners as though they were his own.

The dispositive portion of the above Order reads: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby issues a writ of possession in favor of movant Leo Ray
V. Yanson ordering Spouses Jose and Mila Gatuslao, their heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest, agents,
representatives and/or any and all other occupants or persons claiming any interest or title of the subject
property to deliver the possession of said property to the herein movant/ petitioner.

SO ORDERED.19
Petitioners moved for reconsideration20 which was denied in an Order21 dated February 26, 2010, thus: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Oppositors is hereby DENIED. Thus, the Order dated
December 8, 2009 stands.

SO ORDERED.22

Respondent on March 19, 2010 moved to execute the possessory writ23 while petitioners on April 15, 2010
filed with this Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On September 30, 2010, the RTC issued an Order24 directing the implementation of the writ.� And per
Sheriff� s Return of Service,25 the same was fully implemented on March 14, 2011. cralawred

Issues

1. According to petitioners, the pending action for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and the
corresponding sale at public auction of the subject properties operates as a bar to the issuance of a
writ of possession;
 2. Claiming violation of their right to due process, petitioners likewise assert that as they were not
parties to the foreclosure and are, thus, strangers or third parties thereto, they may not be evicted
by a mere ex parte writ of possession; and

3. Lastly, petitioners argue that respondent, a mere purchaser of the contested properties by way of a
negotiated sale between him and PNB, may not avail of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 7 of
Act No. 3135, as amended, as he is not the purchaser at the public auction sale. Petitioners further
contend that respondent has no right to avail of the writ even by way of subrogation.

Our Ruling

Preliminarily, we note that petitioners� direct resort to this Court from the assailed Orders of the RTC
violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.� Their remedy lies with the Court of Appeals.� Considering
however the length of time this case has been pending and in view of our January 26, 2011
Resolution26 giving due course to the Petition, we deem it proper to adjudicate the case on its merits.

The Petition is denied.

It is settled that the issuance of a Writ of

Possession may not be stayed by a pending
action for annulment of mortgage or the
foreclosure itself.

It is petitioners� stand that the pending action for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and of the
corresponding sale at public auction of the subject properties operates as a bar to the issuance of a writ of
possession.

The Court rules in the negative. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center,
Inc.27 reiterates the long-standing rule that: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

[I]t is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a writ of possession is filed, does not
need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a
writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the pending annulment case.

This is in line with the ministerial character of the possessory writ. Thus, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Tarampi,28 it was held: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

To stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance, just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the
trial court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper
judgment � a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately.29 (Emphases supplied)

Clearly, petitioners� argument is devoid of merit.

Petitioners are not strangers or third

parties to the foreclosure sale; they
were not deprived of due process.

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, sets forth the following procedure in the availment of and issuance
of a writ of possession in cases of extrajudicial foreclosures, viz: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
SECTION 7.� In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of
First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be
shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of
this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or
cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register
of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of
such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six,
and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the
sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Although the above provision clearly pertains to a writ of possession availed of and issued within the
redemption period of the foreclosure sale, the same procedure also applies to a situation where a purchaser
is seeking possession of the foreclosed property bought at the public auction sale after the redemption
period has expired without redemption having been made.30� The only difference is that in the latter case,
no bond is required therefor, as held in China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,31thus: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership
in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand
possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. x x x32 (Emphasis supplied)

Upon the expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the purchaser, as confirmed
owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a
ministerial duty of the court upon proper application and proof of title.33cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Nevertheless, where the extrajudicially foreclosed real property is in the possession of a third party who is
holding the same adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor, the RTC� s duty to issue a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser of said real property ceases to be ministerial and, as such, may no
longer proceed ex parte.34� In such a case, the trial court must order a hearing to determine the nature of
the adverse possession.35 For this exception to apply, however, it is not enough that the property is in the
possession of a third party, the property must also be held by the third partyadversely to the judgment
debtor or mortgagor,36 such as a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary.37 chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry

In this case, petitioners do not fall under any of the above examples of such a third party holding the
subject properties adversely to the mortgagor; nor is their claim to their right of possession analogous to
the foregoing situations. Admittedly, they are the mortgagor Limsiaco� s heirs.� It was precisely because
of Limsiaco� s death that petitioners obtained the right to possess the subject properties and, as such, are
considered transferees or successors-in-interest of the right of possession of the latter.� As Limsiaco� s
successors-in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into his shoes and are, thus, compelled not only to
acknowledge but, more importantly, to respect the mortgage he had earlier executed in favor of
respondent.38� They cannot effectively assert that their right of possession is adverse to that of Limsiaco as
they do not have an independent right of possession other than what they acquired from him.39� Not being
third parties who have a right contrary to that of the mortgagor, the trial court was thus justified in issuing
the writ and in ordering its implementation.

Petitioners� claim that their right to due process was violated by the mere issuance of the writ of
possession must likewise fail.� As explained, petitioners were not occupying the properties adversely to the
mortgagor, hence, a writ of possession may be issued ex parte.� And precisely because of thisex
parte nature of the proceedings no notice is needed to be served40 upon them. It has been stressed time
and again that � the ex parte nature of the proceeding does not deny due process to the petitioners because
the issuance of the writ of possession does not prevent a separate case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale.� 41� Consequently, the RTC may grant the petition even without petitioners�
participation.� Nevertheless, even if the proceedings in this case was supposed to be ex parte, the records
of the case would show that petitioners� side on this controversy was actually heard as evidenced by the
numerous pleadings42 filed by them in the lower court.� In fact, in its July 27, 2009 Order,43 the RTC
expressly directed respondent, � in observance of equity and fair play x x x to furnish [petitioners] with a
copy of his motion/petition and to show x x x proof of compliance thereof x x x.� 44� Then and now, the
Court holds that a party cannot invoke denial of due process when he was given an opportunity to present
his side.45
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Respondent is entitled to the

issuance of writ of possession.�

Petitioners insist that respondent is not entitled to the issuance of the writ of possession under Section 7 of
Act No. 3135 as he is only a buyer of the subject properties in a contract of sale subsequently executed in
his favor by the actual purchaser, PNB.� To them, it is only the actual purchaser of a property at the public
auction sale who can ask the court and be granted a writ of possession.

This argument is not tenable. Respondent, as a transferee or successor-in-interest of PNB by virtue of the
contract of sale between them, is considered to have stepped into the shoes of PNB. As such, he is
necessarily entitled to avail of the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, as if he is PNB.�
This is apparent in the Deed of Absolute Sale46 between the two, viz: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

1. The Vendor hereby sells, transfer[s] and convey[s] unto[, and] in favor of the Vendee,
and the latter� s assigns and successors-in-interest, all of the former� s rights and title
to, interests and participation in the Property on an � AS IS, WHERE IS� basis. It is thus
understood that the Vendee has inspected the Property and has ascertained its condition.

xxxx

3. The Vendor is selling only whatever rights and title to, interests and participation it has
acquired over the Property, and the Vendee hereby acknowledges full knowledge of the nature
and extent of the Vendor� s rights and title to, [and] interests and participation in the Property.

4. x x x The Vendee further agrees to undertake, at its/his/her expense, the ejectment of

any occupant of the Property.47� (Emphases in the original)

Verily, one of the rights that PNB acquired as purchaser of the subject properties at the public auction sale,
which it could validly convey by way of its subsequent sale of the same to respondent, is the availment of a
writ of possession.� This can be deduced from the above-quoted stipulation that � [t]he [v]endee further
agrees to undertake, at xxx his expense, the ejectment of any occupant of the [p]roperty.� � Accordingly,
respondent filed the contentious ex parte motion for a writ of possession to eject petitioners therefrom and
take possession of the subject properties.

Further, respondent may rightfully take possession of the subject properties through a writ of possession,
even if he was not the actual buyer thereof at the public auction sale, in consonance with our ruling
in Ermita� o v. Paglas.48� In the said case, therein respondent was petitioner� s lessee in a residential
property owned by the latter.� During the lifetime of the lease, respondent learned that petitioner
mortgaged the subject property in favor of Charlie Yap (Yap) who eventually foreclosed the same.� Yap
was the purchaser thereof in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Respondent ultimately bought the property
from Yap.� However, it was stipulated in the deed of sale that the property was still subject to petitioner� s
right of redemption.� Subsequently and despite written demands to pay the amounts corresponding to her
monthly rental of the subject property, respondent did not anymore pay rents.� Meanwhile, petitioner� s
period to redeem the foreclosed property expired on February 23, 2001.� Several months after, petitioner
filed a case for unlawful detainer against respondent.� When the case reached this Court, it ruled that
therein respondent� s basis for denying petitioner� s claim for rent was insufficient as the latter, during the
period for which payment of rent was being demanded, was still the owner of the foreclosed property.� This
is because at that time, the period of redemption has not yet expired.� Thus, petitioner was still entitled to
the physical possession thereof subject, however, to the purchaser� s right to petition the court to give him
possession and to file a bond pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.�
However, after the expiration of the redemption period without redemption having been made by petitioner,
respondent became the owner thereof and consolidation of title becomes a right.� Being already then the
owner, respondent became entitled to possession.� Consequently, petitioner� s ejectment suit was held to
have been rendered moot by the expiration of the period of redemption without petitioner redeeming the
properties.� This is considering that petitioner already lost his possessory right over the property after the
expiration of the said period.

Although the main issue in Ermita� o was whether respondent was correct in refusing to pay rent to
petitioner on the basis of her having bought the latter� s foreclosed property from whom it was mortgaged,
the case is enlightening as it acknowledged respondent� s right, as a subsequent buyer of the properties
from the actual purchaser of the same in the public auction sale, to possess the property after the expiration
of the period to redeem sans any redemption.� Verily, Ermita� o demonstrates the applicability of the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135 to such a subsequent purchaser like respondent in the present case.

All told, the Court affirms the RTC� s issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent. chanro bleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.� The December 8, 2009 and February 26, 2010 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Cad. Case No. 09-2802 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry