The Facts

The property subject of this case is situated at Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga, with an area of ten (10)
hectares, more or less, previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 70829-R (subject property)
and formerly owned by one Dalmacio Sicat (Dalmacio).

On December 2, 1969, Dalmacio offered to sell the subject property to respondent Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO), a domestic corporation engaged in sugar milling, to be used as a housing
complex for PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per
square meter.[5] On January 26, 1970, Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per square meter.[6] In a meeting
held on April 15, 1970, the Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution No. 057 [7]authorizing the
purchase of the subject property at P4.00 per square meter.

On May 22, 1970, Dalmacio and his tenants[8] jointly filed a Petition[9] with the then Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR), San Fernando, Pampanga, seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with
payment of disturbance compensation. On the same date, the CAR rendered

a Decision,[10] approving the voluntary surrender of the subject property by the tenants to Dalmacio, thus,
terminating their tenancy relationship effective May 21, 1970, the date when the parties entered into the
agreement.
On May 22, 1970, a Deed[11] of Sale with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO.
Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes were prepared, such as
the subdivision layout with specifications as to the size of each lot; topographic survey; monumenting of all
corners of the subdivision lots; and approval of the plan including the technical description of the land. No
trespassing signs were also installed around the premises. Thus, on May 31, 1974, TCT Nos. 110325-
R,[12] 110326-R[13] and 110327-R[14] were registered in favor of PASUDECO. However, due to financial setbacks
suffered after the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, PASUDECO deferred the construction of the housing project.
PASUDECO averred that no person was authorized to occupy and/or cultivate the subject property.

On the other hand, the petitioners have a totally different version.

Petitioners Joaquin Soliman, Lazaro Almario, Isidro Almario, Baldomero Almario, Demetrio Soliman, Romeo
Abarin, Ernesto Tapang and Crisostomo Abarin (petitioners) claimed that, sometime in November 1970, they
started working on the subject property with a corresponding area of tillage, as certified to by the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) on December 6, 1989, to wit: (1) Lazaro Almario with an area of 1.65
hectares;[15] (2) Demetrio Soliman with an area of 1.70 hectares;[16] (3) Crisostomo Abarin with an area of 1.10
hectares;[17] (4) Baldomero Almario with an area of 1.5 hectares;[18] (5) Isidro Almario with an area of 1.5
hectares;[19] (6) Romeo Abarin with an area of 0.400 hectare;[20] and (7) Ernesto Tapang with an area of .6500
hectare.[21] A Certification[22] dated December 28, 1989 was also issued by the Samahang Nayon in favor of
petitioner Joaquin Soliman with respect to the remaining area of 1.5 hectares. Likewise, on December 28, 1989,
the Barangay Chairperson of Macabacle, Bacolor, Pampanga, certified that the eight (8) petitioners had been the
actual tenant-tillers of the subject property from 1970 up to the present,[23] and that petitioner Baldomero Almario
(Baldomero) was issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-043466[24] with an area of 3.2185 hectares on
July 22, 1981.
The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation Report[25] issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
on March 13, 1990 showed that since 1970, petitioners cultivated the subject property, allegedly managed by the
late respondent Gerry Rodriguez (Gerry), manager of PASUDECO from 1970-1991. Petitioners alleged that in
1970, Gerry made one Ciriaco Almario (Ciriaco) his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from
petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals to Gerry. On May 14, 1990, Ciriaco certified that petitioners were
the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property.[26] Moreover, petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in San Fernando, Pampanga, as land amortizations, in varying amounts,
from 1989

to 1993, as shown by the official receipts issued by LBP.[27] Thus, petitioners averred that from 1970 up to 1990
or for a period of almost twenty (20) years, they had been in actual and peaceful possession and cultivation of
the subject property.

The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the property into a housing
project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. On May 14, 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint [28] for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with a Prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction against Gerry
before the PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings.
Petitioners alleged that Gerry, together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed some of their crops.
Traversing the complaint, Gerry raised as one of his defenses the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the
subject property. Thus, on November 26, 1990, petitioners filed their Amended Complaint [29] impleading
PASUDECO as a party-defendant. Meanwhile, PASUDECO asserted that petitioners were not tenants but
merely interlopers, usurpers and/or intruders into the subject property.

Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, the PARAD conducted an ocular inspection and found that the subject
property was planted with palay measuring one (1) foot high. There were also several dikes or pilapil dividing the
subject property. The PARAD also observed that there was a big sign installed therein, reading Future Site of
PASUDECO Employees Housing Project.[30]

The PARAD's Ruling

On August 16, 1995, the PARAD dismissed petitioners' complaint and denied their application for the writ of
preliminary injunction. The PARAD held that petitioners had not shown direct and convincing proof that they were
tenants of the subject property. Petitioners could not show any receipt proving payment of lease rentals either to
PASUDECO or Gerry. In addition to the absence of sharing, the PARAD ruled that there was no consent given
by PASUDECO in order to create a tenancy relationship in favor of the petitioners.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB on September 7, 1995 on the following grounds:
(a) that the PARAD abused its discretion by ignoring or disregarding evidence which, if considered, would result
in a decision favorable to the petitioners; and (b) that there were errors in the findings of fact from which equally
erroneous conclusions were drawn, which, if not corrected on appeal, would cause grave and irreparable
damage or injury to the petitioners.
While the case was pending resolution before the DARAB, the subject property was devastated by lahar due to
the eruption of Mount Pinatubo sometime in October 1995. As a result, the farming activities on the subject
property ceased. Shortly thereafter, PASUDECO fenced the subject property and placed additional signs
thereon, indicating that the same was private property.[31] At present, the subject property is unoccupied and
uncultivated.[32]

The DARAB's Ruling

On January 15, 2004, the DARAB rendered its Decision in favor of the petitioners, reversing the findings and
conclusions of the PARAD. The DARAB held that, without the approval of the conversion application filed by
PASUDECO, it could not be substantiated that the subject property was indeed residential property intended for
housing purposes. Because of this, and the fact that petitioners tilled the subject property for almost twenty (20)
years, the same remained agricultural in character. Moreover, the DARAB held that, contrary to the findings of
the PARAD, the elements of consent and sharing were present in this case. The DARAB, citing Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,[33] ratiocinated that petitioners entered the subject property in 1970 upon the
request of Ciriaco who, with the consent of Gerry as manager of PASUDECO, was authorized to look for people
to cultivate the subject property. Petitioners cultivated the same and shared their harvests with PASUDECO,
received by Gerry through Ciriaco. Later on, when Gerry refused to accept their lease rentals, petitioners
deposited the money with LBP. The DARAB opined that these pieces of evidence established the fact of consent
and sharing. While express consent was not given, the fact that Gerry accepted the lease rentals for a
considerable number of years signified an implied consent which, in turn, bound PASUDECO.

PASUDECO filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which was, however, denied by the DARAB in its
Resolution[35] dated May 21, 2004. Thus, PASUDECO went to the CA for recourse. [36] However, some of the
records were found missing, as certified by the DARAB on June 22, 2004.[37]
The CA's Ruling

On April 12, 2005, the CA reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The CA held that,
while the subject property was agricultural, there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, express or
implied. The CA concurred in the findings of the PARAD and found no credible evidence to support the
contention that petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the elements of consent and sharing were absent.
Citing these Court's rulings in Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court[38] and Bernas v. Court of Appeals,[39] the
CA reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual relationship but also a legal relationship; hence, the fact that
PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject property, was uninvolved in and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation
thereof, tenancy relations did not exist. Thus, the CA concluded that in the absence of any tenancy relationship
between the parties, the case was outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[40] which was denied by the CA in its Resolution[41] dated
August 3, 2005.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following errors:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the facts of the case when it ruled
that the occupation of the petitioners of the subject lot was without the consent of
the respondents, express or implied.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying the principles laid down in the cases
of Hilario v. [Intermediate Appellate Court]and Bernas v. Court of Appeals and [in]
consequently ruling that there is no tenancy relation between the parties.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the provision[s] of Section 5[,]
Republic Act No. 3844 which provides for the establishment of agricultural
leasehold relation by mere operation of law.

IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the instant case [does] not fall
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
[Board].[42]

This submission boils down to the sole issue of whether petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject property.

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder
a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.[43]

Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of
tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. [44] The
presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program
of the Government under existing tenancy laws.[45] Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is
a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.[46]

Pertinent are Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 3844 as amended, which provide:

SEC. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy. Agricultural share tenancy, as herein

defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be
abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect
in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the
agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government
machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this
Code are operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system: Provided, further, That in order not to
jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing
allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate provisions,
such as the organization of cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other similar workable
 arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops: Provided,
furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract has ceased to be operative
by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been entered into in violation of
the provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in
possession of the land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold
relationship under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the right of the landowner
and the former tenant to enter into any other lawful contract in relation to the land formerly
under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the security of tenure of the former tenant
under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as
provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful leasehold tenancy
contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and obligations
arising therefrom shall continue to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.

SEC. 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural leasehold relation

shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in
other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.

The pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in this case, tenancy by operation of law under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 3844 is not correct. In Reyes v. Reyes,[47] we held:

Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural
leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or
(2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied.

By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy
system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The
other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing.

Rather, consistent with the parties' assertions, what we have here is an alleged case of tenancy by implied
consent. As such, crucial for the creation of tenancy relations would be the existence of two of the essential
elements, namely, consent and sharing and/or payment of lease rentals.

After a meticulous review of the records, we find that the elements of consent and sharing and/or payment of
lease rentals are absent in this case.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the
owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of the supposed
landholder who has no right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion
among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. [48] As duly found by the PARAD and
the CA, Gerry was not authorized to enter into a tenancy relationship with the petitioners. In fact, there is no proof
that he, indeed, entered into one. Other than their bare assertions, petitioners rely on the certification of Ciriaco
who, likewise, failed to substantiate his claim that Gerry authorized him to select individuals and install them as
tenants of the subject property. Absent substantial evidence showing Ciriaco's authority from PASUDECO, or
even from Gerry, to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actions could not give rise to an
implied tenancy.[49]

Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment of lease rentals was not substantiated other than by the deposit-
payments with the LBP, which petitioners characterized as amortizations. We cannot close our eyes to the
absence of any proof of payment prior to the deposit-payments with LBP. Not a single receipt was ever issued by
Gerry, duly acknowledging payment of these rentals from Ciriaco who, allegedly, personally collected the same
from the petitioners. Notably, the fact of working on another's landholding, standing alone, does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of
sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate
to prove the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must
be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.[50]

The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the
certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the
BARC, concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is
considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.[51]

The onus rests on the petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which they failed to discharge
with substantial evidence. Simply put, he who makes an affirmative allegation of an issue has the burden of
proving the same, and in the case of the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule
applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.[52]
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without opposition, does not mean
that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued
possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.[53] This much we said in VHJ Construction and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[54] where we held that:
Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals[347
SCRA 35 (2000)]:

"Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or

tenancy relationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra
firma for a security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold
relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial."

Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important.
Thus, we agree with the following findings of the CA:

First, there is no credible evidence to show that the alleged caretaker, Ciriaco Almario, was
designated by PASUDECO or its manager, Gerry Rodriguez, to facilitate the cultivation of
the property. There is likewise no evidence to suggest that the respondents ever dealt
directly with and acted upon the instruction of PASUDECO with respect to the cultivation of
the property.

Second, it is indeed inconceivable, as petitioner claims, for the respondents to allow

petitioners to work on the property considering that before its purchase, the prior owner,
Dalmacio Sicat, sought for the voluntary surrender of the landholding agreement with the
 previous tenants of the property so that the same can be sold to PASUDECO free from
tenancy. This proves to be true considering that it is undisputed that the subject property
was offered for sale by Dalmacio Sicat to the petitioner in order for the latter to build its low
cost housing project thereon.

Third, the certifications issued by Isidro S. Almario as BARC Chairman of Agdiman, Bacolor,
Pampanga to the effect that respondents were actually cultivating he subject property
deserves scant consideration. Said certifications can easily be considered as self-serving
since the issuing officer is himself one of the respondents who claimed to be tenants of the
subject property and it is quite natural for him not to declare anything which is adverse to his
interest. The same scant consideration can also be accorded to the certification issued by
the Barangay Captain of Macabacle, Bacolor, Pampanga, As it was held in Esquivel v.
Reyes [ G.R. No. 152957, September 8, 2003, 410 SCRA 404 ]. Obviously, the barangay
captain or the mayor whose attestation appears on the document was not the proper
authority to make such
determination. Even certifications issued by administrative agencies and/or officials
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship are merely preliminary or
provisional and are not binding on the courts.

xxxx

Not a single piece of traceable evidence was shown by respondents when and how much
are the rental payments that they supposedly paid before 1988. In fact, they neither
mentioned the terms and conditions of their oral tenancy agreement, i.e. kind of agricultural
crops to be planted, if indeed it existed; nor did they mention that such payments were
made in the form of harvest sharing equivalent to a certain percentage agreed upon by the
parties. While there were indeed payments made with the Land Bank of the Philippines in
varying amounts starting 1988 and thereafter, it cannot be ignored that such payments were
precipitated only by PASUDECOs resistance of respondents presence in the subject
property. Thus, we concede to the Adjudicator a quos finding that said payment was made
only as afterthought.[55]

Finally, the long period of petitioners' alleged cultivation of the subject property cannot give rise to equitable
estoppel. It should be remembered that estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the other rightfully relies and acts on such beliefs
so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. The real office of the
equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supplying deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law.
The elements for the existence of a tenancy relationship are explicit in the law and these elements cannot be
done away with by conjectures.[56]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
84405 dated April 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1 dated
January 14, 1999 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43905 which affirmed in toto the
Decision dated June 10, 1994 of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DARAB); and the
CA Resolution2 dated November 8, 1999 which denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The petition originated from an action for ejectment filed with the DARAB principally on the grounds of non-
payment of lease rentals and sub-leasing without the knowledge and consent of the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land, consisting of 2.2277 hectares, more or less, devoted to rice and mango production, located at
Barangay Obong, Basista, Pangasinan and registered in the name of Nicolasa Tamondong Vda. de Perez,
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31822.

The facts declared by the DARAB, as supported by the evidence on record, are clear:

On January 28, 1973, Nicolasa Tamondong Vda. de Perez sold the property with a right to repurchase in favor of
[respondent] Miguel Resultay who was already cultivating the subject land under a 50-50 sharing basis of the rice
harvest. After said sale, Miguel Resultay stopped delivering the shares to Nicolasa Tamondong and it was during
this period or sometime in 1976, that [respondent] Miguel Resultay constituted [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab to
work on a one-half (1/2) hectare portion of the land devoted to rice under an agreed lease rental agreement of
seven (7) cavans per cropping season (T.S.N., February 16, 1989, pp. 7-9).

On July 15, 1977, Nicolasa Tamondong Vda. de Perez died. She is survived by her children [petitioners herein].

On November 29, 1983, [petitioners] Purificacion and Federico Rosario repurchased the subject property from
[respondent] Miguel Resultay in the total amount of P16,000.00 as evidenced by a document denominated as
DEED OF RESALE OF LAND UNDER PACTO DE RETRO. Thereafter, defendant Miguel Resultay resumed his
delivery of 50% share of the rice harvest to the plaintiffs-heirs [petitioners] through [petitioners] Purificacion and
Federico Rosario on the portion of 1.6 hectares of the land planted to rice [sic] while the other one-half hectare
portion of this 2.2277 of hectares land [sic] continued to be cultivated by defendant Basilio Cayabyab who then
dealt directly with [petitioners] Purificacion and Federico Rosario. On November 28, 1986, Basilio Cayabyab
deposited with the Gangano’s Family Rice Mill at Malimpec, Bayambang, Pangasinan a total of fourteen (14)
cavans at forty-five (45) kilos per cavan of palay.

On December 20, 1986, [petitioner] Federico Rosario received from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab seven (7)
cavans at forty-five (45) kilos per cavan of clean and dry palay representing lease rental for 1984 and also seven
(7) cavans at forty-five (45) kilos per cavan of clean and dry palay representing lease rental for 1985, or a total of
fourteen (14) cavans of clean and dry palay.

On February 1, 1989, [petitioner] Purificacion Rosario received from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab the total
amount of Php 2,511.60 representing the lease rentals for 1985 and 1986.3

On February 16, 1989, [petitioner] Purificacion Rosario received from [respondent] Cayabyab the amount
of P1,228.50 representing the lease rental for 1988.

On May 25, 1990, [petitioner] Federico Rosario received from [respondent] Cayabyab seven (7) cavans of palay
at 45 kilos per cavan.

On December 11, 1990, [petitioner] Federico Rosario received from defendant Cayabyab seven (7) cavans of
palay.

Sometime in 1988, [respondent] Miguel Resultay who is already old and senile was paralyzed. However, [the]
shares of [petitioner] Purificacion Rosario from the rice harvest were being delivered.

On November 24, 1988, [petitioners] filed the instant complaint for ejectment of defendants from the land on the
grounds that: a) [respondent] Miguel Resultay delivered only 33.30 cavans of palay to them (plaintiffs); b)
[respondents] Miguel Resultay and Federico Baniqued constructed their own residential houses on the subject
landholding without their knowledge and consent; c) [respondent] Miguel Resultay is now old and senile and is
no longer capable of doing the necessary manual work; and, d) due to old age, [respondent] Miguel Resultay
sub-leased the land to [respondents] Federico Baniqued and Basilio Cayabyab without [petitioners’] knowledge
and consent.
[Respondents] controverted the allegations of [petitioners] by averring that: 1) [respondent] Federico Baniqued is
only a hired farm worker who constructed a shanty inside the disputed landholding for the purpose of guarding
the plants inside the land; 2) [respondent] Miguel Resultay has been cultivating the land since 1973 and he had
constructed his house on the land itself; 3) the net harvest during the agricultural year of 1987 was twenty-one
(21) cavans and one (1) can, and it was divided into 50-50 basis; 4) [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab is an
agricultural lessee on a portion of one-half hectare of the land paying a lease rental of seven (7) cavans of palay;
and 5) the lease rental of seven (7) cavans which is being paid by Basilio Cayabyab is excessive and
unjustifiable considering that he can produce 14 to 18 cavans of palay.4

The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator identified the issues as follows: first, whether
respondent Miguel Resultay or his wife, respondent Mercedes Resultay, is entitled to remain as agricultural
lessee of the land in question with respondent Federico Baniqued as their hired farm worker; and, second,
whether respondent Basilio Cayabyab is entitled to remain as an agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare
riceland portion of the landholding in question.5

On June 14, 1991, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring [respondent] Mercedes Resultay as having succeeded [respondent] Miguel Resultay as

agricultural lessee of the land in question as of the time the former suffered a stroke which paralyzed
him;

2. Dispossessing the [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab for deliberate non-payment of the 1986, 1987,
1988 and 1989 lease rental of the one-half (1/2) hectare riceland portion until the filing of this complaint
against him;

3. Ordering [respondent] Federico Baniqued to refrain from further performing farmworks on the
riceland in question;

4. Dispossessing [respondent] Mercedes Resultay from the riceland portion of the land in question
which she retained after giving the one-half (1/2) hectare portion to [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab;

5. Maintaining [respondent] Mercedes Resultay as agricultural lessee on the non-riceland portion of the
land in question.6

In support of the foregoing, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator held that although
respondent Mercedes Resultay succeeded respondent Miguel Resultay after a stroke which caused his
paralysis, she did not perform the farm work on the land in question; that, for this reason, she hired respondent
Federico Baniqued to work for her; that the hiring of respondent Baniqued amounted to a "substantial non-
compliance of her obligation" as an agricultural tenant and a ground for dispossession under Section 36,
paragraph 2,7 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended; that although the receipt of the lease rentals by petitioner
Federico Rosario is indicative of respondent Cayabyab’s status as an agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare
riceland portion, he should be evicted on the ground of deliberate refusal to pay rental; that respondent Baniqued
is merely a hired farm laborer and, thus, he "has no better right than (respondent) spouses Miguel Resultay and
Mercedes Resultay who hired him;" and that the non-riceland portion where respondent spouses Resultay reside
does not appear to have been subleased or given to any third party for farm work and, hence, they should remain
in possession of the same.8

Respondents appealed to the DARAB. On June 10, 1994, the DARAB promulgated its decision, the decretal
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment dated June 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Miguel and
Mercedes Resultay are declared to be agricultural tenants on the land they till. Likewise, Basilio Cayabyab is
maintained in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land he tills as an agricultural lessee. The responsible
officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Province of Pangasinan, specifically in the Municipality of
Basista, Pangasinan are hereby ordered to fix the lease rental on the land being cultivated by Miguel and
Mercedes Resultay in accordance with pertinent agrarian laws, rules and regulations.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9

The DARAB declared that respondent Cayabyab is a bona fide agricultural lessee; that he substantially complied
with his obligation to deliver the landholders’ share and was not remiss in paying the rentals whenever they fell
due; that he could not be faulted for seemingly delayed payment of lease rentals after the institution of the
complaint on November 24, 1988, nor could he be blamed for the confusion in the accounting and liquidation of
harvests since the petitioners gave rise to it by refusing to receive promptly his tender of lease rentals; that
petitioner Purificacion Rosario herself admitted in her testimony that she received the rental payments; that the
conclusion that respondent Mercedes Resultay, as successor of her old and paralyzed husband Miguel Resultay,
did not herself perform the farm work on the land had no factual basis; that the burden to prove the averment that
she did not actually perform her obligations as an agricultural tenant rested with the petitioners and they failed to
discharge that burden; that the hiring of the services of a farm laborer to do certain piece work or on an
occasional basis is not prohibited by law, as long as the agricultural tenant herself cultivates the farm and
manages it with due diligence; that the hiring of a farm laborer to do a certain phase of farming is, in itself, a
generally accepted practice in a farming community; that respondent Mercedes Resultay had faithfully and
religiously shared the rice produce with the petitioners; that there is no legal impediment for respondent Miguel
Resultay to build his house within the landholding, and neither did petitioners adduce any concrete evidence to
show that respondent Baniqued had constructed a house thereon, since Baniqued, who is only a farm helper,
merely built a shanty which is not a dwelling contemplated by law; that petitioners failed to prove the existence of
any other lawful cause for the ejectment of the respondents; and that since the juridical relationship between the
parties appears to be a share tenancy which is contrary to law and public policy, it should be converted to a
leasehold pursuant to law and existing rules and regulations.

On February 11, 1997, the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 16, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, raising the following grounds:

1. That public respondent Adjudication Board grossly misappreciated the established facts and
evidence adduced in the above-entitled case;

2. That the Decision dated June 10, 1994 and Resolution dated February 11, 1997 rendered by public
respondent Adjudication Board in the instant case, were contrary to existing agrarian laws and
jurisprudence applicable on the matter at issue; and

3. That due to public respondent Adjudication Board’s patent and gross errors committed in the
issuances of the assailed Decision and Resolution, petitioners suffered not only irreparable damage
and prejudice but also caused grave injustice to petitioners.10

On January 14, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the DARAB ruling. In
particular, the CA agreed with the DARAB that no factual basis supported the averment that respondent
Mercedes Resultay did not comply with her obligations as an agricultural tenant; that the hiring of a farm helper in
itself is not prohibited; that the land in question had not been abandoned as it is actively being cultivated by the
respondents; that respondent spouses have been paying their shares and rentals to the landowners, herein
petitioners; that respondent Mercedes Resultay succeeded her incapacitated husband, co-respondent Miguel
Resultay, by operation of law; that respondent Cayabyab is a bona fide agricultural lessee on the one-half
hectare riceland portion; that the evidence clearly shows that he paid the lease rentals from 1984 to 1989; that
there was no delay in payment; that petitioner Purificacion Rosario admitted the receipt of these payments; that
while the withdrawal of deposited rentals by the petitioners litis pendentia should not be construed as a
recognition of the tenancy relationship between them and respondent Cayabyab, the fact that petitioner Federico
Rosario received on December 20, 1986 the lease rental pertaining to 1984 as well as the rental for 1986 is
indeed indicative of respondent Cayabyab’s status as an agricultural lessee of the one-half hectare; and that
respondent Cayabyab had no conscious intent to unlawfully deprive the landholders of their share in the farm
proceeds, considering that they had received from Cayabyab in 1989 and 1990 the rentals for the other years. 11

Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the CA denied the motion through its Resolution dated November 8, 1999, a
copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 15, 1999.

Twenty-two days later, or on December 7, 1999, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

 1. Whether or not public respondents Honorable Court of Appeals and Honorable Adjudication Board
(DARAB) grossly erred in declaring private respondents Mercedes Resultay and Basilio Cayabyab as
agricultural lessees over the landholding co-owned by the petitioners;

2. Whether or not the declarations of private respondents as agricultural lessees by the public
respondents are contrary to the established facts, adduced evidences [sic], law and jurisprudence
applicable on the matter; and

3. Whether or not honorable public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
private respondents as agricultural lessees over the landholding co-owned by the petitioners.12

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2002, Arturo Resultay, one of the children of respondent Miguel Resultay, as well as
respondent Cayabyab, filed a Manifestation and Motion with the Court stating that respondent Miguel Resultay
had passed away on July 6, 1993. Hence, as prayed for, Miguel Resultay is deemed substituted by Arturo
Resultay. The parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The instant Petition for Certiorari "based on Rule 65" must fail.

Under Rule 65, the petitioners must show that they have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against the error that they seek to correct. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy, and adequate" if
it will promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency.13 In this case, an appeal under Rule 45 by way of petition for review on certiorari was not only available
but also a speedy and adequate remedy.14 When the petitioners received on November 15, 1999 a copy of the
CA Resolution dated November 8, 1999 denying their Motion for Reconsideration, and absent any motion for
extension, they had until November 30, 1999, or 15 days later, within which to perfect their appeal. They did not.
What they chose to do was to file a "Petition for Certiorari" "based on Section 1, Rule 65" on December 7, 1999,
repeating in essence the issues and arguments already heard by the CA. The petitioners cannot lodge a special
civil action of certiorari to make good the loss of the right of ordinary appeal. In view of this serious procedural
error, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment or denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless
of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.15 A special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not cure the failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.16 The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.17 A petition under Rule 65
is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own

neglect or error in the choice of remedies.18 And under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, an error in
the choice or mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.

But even if this Court should excuse the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice, the same result
obtains, because the decisions and resolutions of the DARAB and CA, as well as their findings of fact, are in
accord with law and jurisprudence.

The determination of personal cultivation is a factual issue and requires the exercise of a function not within the
province of this Court. Well established is the rule that in an appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may be
reviewed.19 And so, too, is the rule that in agrarian cases, the only function of the appellate courts is to determine
whether the findings of fact of the agrarian courts, such as the DARAB or, its predecessor, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, are supported by substantial evidence, and where they are so supported, such findings are conclusive
and binding upon the appellate courts.20

Petitioners insist that respondent spouses Miguel and Mercedes Resultay did not perform in their personal
capacity the major phases of the farm work over the land in question, but through hired hands. Both the CA and
the DARAB are of the same opinion that this negative averment has no factual basis. While it is conceded in all
quarters that respondent Baniqued is a hired farm worker, from this fact alone, it cannot be inferred that
respondent Mercedes Resultay is not actually performing her obligations as an agricultural tenant or, stated
otherwise, that she did not cultivate the land in person or through other members of the immediate household.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and coupled with the fact that the petitioners are the
complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee rests upon them, since they are the agricultural lessors.21 This proceeds from the principle that
a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. She can only be ejected from
the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.22 Section 36 of the same law enumerates the grounds
for dispossession of the tenant’s landholding.

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation
the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have
the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because
of said dispossessions.

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had
been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of
a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to
pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section twenty-seven.

The petitioners failed to discharge that burden. They invoke Gabriel v. Pangilinan[23] where the Court held:24

A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act No.
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.

But precisely, as discussed above, it falls upon the

petitioners to demonstrate through substantial evidence that the respondents did not actually cultivate the land in
order to consider the latter as having abandoned the same. It does not follow that, if the tenant hires a farm
worker to do certain phases of the farm work, then the tenant entirely ceases all cultivation.
Respondent Baniqued himself testified that he was being paid for a certain phase of work.25

In the recent past, the Court has held that the employment of farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm
work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural
lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law
explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land, this Court nevertheless
has declared that the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does
not negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold
relationship.26

The foregoing pronouncements are nothing new; the Court, quoting established authority, has recognized as far
back in 1962

that the mere fact that the agricultural lessee did not do all the work himself but temporarily utilized the services
of others to help him, does not mean that he violated the requirements provided by law and jurisprudence; it
would have been otherwise

had the lessee entirely entrusted the work to other persons and

employed laborers on a permanent basis. The law does not prohibit the tenant or the landowner who works the
land himself to avail occasionally of the help of others.27

Petitioners maintain that respondent spouses Resultay sub-leased a portion of the land in question to respondent
Cayabyab, and that the employment of a sub-lessee who is not a member of the tenant’s immediate household,
and without the knowledge and consent of the landowner, is prohibited by law.28 To support this contention,
petitioners refer to a decision rendered by the CA.29 Further, petitioners aver that respondent Cayabyab
deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals for the period covering 1986 to 1989. Even if Cayabyab attempted to
pay the rentals by depositing them during the pendency of the case, petitioners argue, their withdrawal, however,
was made with leave of court, prompted by extreme human needs, and on the condition that the receipts shall
not be used as evidence of any tenancy relationship.

These mixed questions of fact and law are interrelated, and have been correctly resolved by the CA and the
DARAB whose decisions are supported by substantial evidence as it appears on the record. This Court affirms
the CA decision which, in turn, upheld in toto the DARAB’s finding that respondent Cayabyab is a bona
fide agricultural lessee,30 as well as the finding that he duly paid the rentals, to wit:

There is no factual basis which shall lead to a conclusion that [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab deliberately refused
to pay the lease rentals on the land for the cropping years of 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989. Evidence on records
clearly show[s] that Basilio Cayabyab was not remiss of his obligation to pay lease rentals when they fall due. For
the cropping years of 1984 and 1985, he paid to [petitioner] Federico Rosario a total amount of fourteen (14)
cavans as evidenced by a receipt dated December 20, 1986 (Exhibit "3", Defendants). The lease rentals due for
the cropping years of 1986 and 1987 in the total amount of fourteen (14) cavans were deposited by [respondent
Cayabyab] with Gangano’s Family Rice Mill at Malimpec, Bayambang, Pangasinan on November 28, 1986.
These rentals which were converted into its money equivalent of Php 2,511.60 were received by [petitioner]
Purificacion Rosario on February 1, 1989 (Exh. "1" Defendants). The act of depositing the lease rentals due on
the land supports the claim of [respondent] Cayabyab that [petitioners], specifically Purificacion Rosario, refused
to accept payment of lease rentals from the former. This fact becomes evident from the allegations contained in
the complaint itself and also from the declaration of [petitioners] and their witnesses themselves that [respondent]
Cayabyab is not a tenant on the land but a mere sub-lessee who was instituted by [respondents] Miguel and
Mercedes Resultay without the knowledge and consent of [petitioners]. One should not lose sight of the correct
conclusion arrived at in the assailed [DARAB] decision that [respondent] Cayabyab is a bona fide agricultural
lessee.

The lease rentals due for 1988 harvest season amounting to seven (7) cavans was deposited by [respondent]
Cayabyab with the Rural Bank of San Carlos (T.S.N., February 1, 1989, pp. 2-3), but it was withdrawn and
acknowledged to have been received by [petitioner] Rosario on February 16, 1994 (Exh. "4", Defendants, p. 8,
Rollo). The lease rental due for the 1989 harvest season amounting to seven (7) cavans was received by
[petitioner] Federico Rosario on May 25, 1990. Thus, the total amount of lease rentals due for a period of (6)
years from 1984 to 1989 was forty-two (42) cavans. Documentary proof such as receipts show that [respondent]
Cayabyab paid exactly forty-two cavans during this period of time. He could not be faulted for the seemingly
delayed payment of lease rentals after the institution of the complaint on November 24, 1988, nor could he be
blamed for the confusion in the accounting and liquidation of harvests since, as discussed earlier, [petitioners]
gave rise to it by refusing to receive promptly the tender of lease rentals made by [respondent] Cayabyab. x x x

x x x Finally, the issue on payment of lease rentals is undoubtedly resolved by the admission of [petitioner]
Purificacion Rosario herself when she testified in the following manner –

Q — So, in 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 nagdedeliver sa inyo si Cayabyab ng renta sa lupa.

A — Opo.

Q — Sigurado kayo?

A — Until 1991 pala." (T.S.N., September 29, 1992, p. 7).

We find no cogent reason to find otherwise than the above quoted findings of public respondent Adjudication
Board.31 (emphasis supplied)

With respect to the question of whether the withdrawals made with leave of court may prejudice the petitioners,
the CA aptly held:32

Furthermore, while it is true that the approved withdrawal of the deposited rentals thereon by the [petitioners]
should not be construed as recognition of tenancy relationship, it is likewise true that the act of [petitioner]
Federico Rosario in receiving from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab on December 20, 1986 the lease rental of
seven (7) cavans of palay for 1984 and another seven (7) cavans of palay for 1986 is indicative of his being [an]
agricultural lessee of the one-half (1/2) hectare riceland portion of the land in question. Besides, it should be
noted, that in cases for ejectment of a tenant for failure to pay lease rentals, there must be a conscious intent to
unlawfully deprive the landholder of his share, which is not so in the case at bar especially considering that, on
February 1, 1989, [petitioner] Purificacion Rosario received from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab the total amount
of Php 2,511.60 representing the lease rentals for 1985 and 1986, and on February 16, 1989, the amount of Php
1,228.50 representing the lease rental for 1988; on May 25, 1989, [petitioner] Federico Rosario received from
[respondent] Cayabyab seven (7) cavans of palay at 45 kilos per cavan; and on December 11, 1990, [petitioner]
Federico Rosario received from [respondent] Cayabyab seven (7) cavans of palay.

This Court has held that rental payments are factual issues beyond the reach of an appeal via certiorari, as only
questions of law may be reviewed.33 Likewise, the question of whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not is
basically a question of fact.34

Apart from the foregoing findings of the courts a quo, there is evidence on the record, unrebutted by petitioners
and confirmed by the DARAB, showing that respondent Miguel Resultay constituted respondent Cayabyab as an
agricultural lessee by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by them at the time the former owned the land as
vendee a retro before its redemption by the petitioners in 1983.35 Hence, when the petitioners repurchased the
land, they are deemed to have assumed this lease by virtue of subrogation. Respondent Cayabyab himself
testified that at the time of the redemption and reversion of ownership, he was made to sign a receipt describing
the parcel he cultivated in order to acknowledge that he had received the land from the petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest.36

As stated above, in agrarian cases, when the appellate courts confirm that the findings of fact of the agrarian
courts are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence, such findings are conclusive and binding on
the appellate courts.37 Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the DARAB, as affirmed by
the CA, that respondent Cayabyab was an agricultural lessee of the subject land, considering that this conclusion
was supported by substantial evidence.38

As correctly noted by the DARAB, it appears that the juridical relationship of the parties is still governed by
agricultural share tenancy. The relationship should be converted into a leasehold. On August 8, 1963, R.A. No.
3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, R.A. No. 6389, amending R.A. No. 3844, declared share
tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, is the governing
statute in this case.39 Petitioners filed their complaint on November 24, 1988 or long after the approval of R.A.
No. 6389 but before R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Notably, R.A. No. 6657 only expressly repealed Section 35 of R.A. No. 3844.40

Sections 4 and 541 of R.A. No. 3844 provide for the automatic conversion of share tenancy to agricultural
leasehold. The lease rental should be determined in accordance with Section 12 42 of R.A. No. 6657 in relation to
Section 3443of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, and existing rules and regulations.

It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political
disturbances that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people as well as the continuity of
the national order. To subdue these acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of the
nation passed a series of laws calculated to accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material standards
of living and eliminate discontent.44 Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of
social justice found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the extraordinary national
experience, and the prevailing national consciousness, all command the great departments of government to tilt
the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the
law. But annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every
effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield
illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on her side.45 In the occupation of the legal questions in all
agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony, the considerations of social
advantage must be weighed,46 an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the adjustment

of conflicting demands and expectations of the people,47 and the social interdependence of these interests,
recognized.48

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP)
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no
law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if
the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the
just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of
the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be
used for just compensation.

10.G.R. No. 169514- March 30, 2007-

CONFED vs.DAR
FACTS: Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc (CONFED), the National Federation ofSugarcane
Planters, Inc. (NFSP), United Sugar Producers Federation of the Phil., Inc. (UNIFED),the Panay Federation of
Sugarcane Farmers, Inc. (PANAYFED). It seeks, inter alia, to enjoin theDepartment of Agrarian Reform(DAR),
the Land Bank of the Philippines(LBP), and the Land RegistrationAuthority(LRA) from "subjecting the sugarcane
farms of Petitioner Planters to eminent domain orcompulsory acquisition without filing the necessary
expropriation proceedings pursuant to theprovisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and/or without the
application or conformity of a majority ofthe regular farmworkers on said farms."Petitioners CONFED, NFSP,
UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their members own or administer privateagricultural lands devoted to
sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been plantingsugarcane on their lands allegedly since
time immemorial. While their petition is denominated as onefor prohibition and mandamus, the petitioners
likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) ofSection 16 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In other words,their arguments, are anchored on the proposition that
these provisions are unconstitutional.The petitioners thus contend that a landowner cannot be deprived of his
property until expropriationproceedings are instituted in court. They insist that the expropriation proceedings to
be followed arethose prescribed under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. In other words, for a valid exercise
of thepower of eminent domain, the Government must institute the necessary expropriation proceedings inthe
competent court in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON paragraphs d,e,and f of RA6657 valid?WON the compulsory acquisition of land valid?RULING:(1)
The validity of Section 16, including paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) thereof, of RA 6657 has already beenaffirmed in
Association of Small Landowners, which sets forth the manner of acquisition of privateagricultural lands and
ascertainment of just compensation, in this wise:Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary
for it to make a deposit upon its takingpossession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public
charge, the good faith of thepublic is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed
in raising theamount." Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment, or in case of rejection or no responsefrom the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of thecompensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediatepossession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with theredistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. x x x the DAR shall
conduct summaryadministrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, theLBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
withinfifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter
isdeemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned
.Otherwise,
the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination inthe exercise
of what is admittedly a judicial function
.
(2)

Contrary to the petitioners’ submission that the compulsory acquisition procedure

adopted by theDAR is without legal basis, it is actually based on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said law,
there aretwo modes of acquisition of private agricultural lands: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure
forcompulsory acquisition is that prescribed under Section 16 of RA 6657.In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the
farmerbeneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition tothe
landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in themunicipal building
and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days fromreceipt of the Notice of
Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform theDAR of his acceptance or rejection
of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers adeed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty daysfrom the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR’s offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, theLBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation withinfifteen days from
notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and informthe owner of its decision and
the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of thecorresponding payment, or, in case of
rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall depositthe compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately takepossession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Republicof the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the
farmer beneficiaries. Any party mayquestion the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination
of just compensation.