Baseline Study On Security Sector Governance in Mozambique

Baseline study on Security Sector Governance in Mozambique st
3. Mozambique

3. 1 Introduction

Commonly described as a “failed state” in the early 1990’s, a country which had a brutal
civil war imposed on it largely by outside actors, Mozambique is nowadays often
considered as one of the rare African success stories. The country has made remarkable
progress in restoring stability and security. Yet massive socio‐economic problems remain
a legacy of the destructive impact of twenty five years of war.
Mozambique is one of the largest countries in the region, covering some 800 000 km2.
The majority of the population live in rural areas. It has a colonial history stretching back
half a millennium. It has one of the lowest population densities in the region and is
comparatively resource rich.

Colonial and post‐colonial rule were dominated by weak administrative structures.
Portuguese colonial rule under António de Oliveira Salazar (1932–1968) and Marcelo
Caetano (1968–1974) was an autocratic and corporatist regime supported by the
Catholic Church, the military and the secret police (PIDE). Characteristic of the
Portuguese “Estado Novo” (New State) was its strong anti‐communist stance and its
violent approach towards any opposition.

The economic and social tensions and opportunities of the period 1945‐1961 saw the
rebirth of local political activity. By the 1960’s the nationalist movements in the
Portuguese colonies had begun to emerge into militant action. They were opposed by a
Portuguese state whose conservative political rigidity militated against any compromise
to opposition.

In June 1962 three exiled Mozambique groups merged in a single new organization, the
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) with Dr Eduardo Mondlane as its first
president. In 1969 Mondlane was assassinated. Samora Machel succeeded him.
The decolonization of Portuguese Africa occurred only after a left‐wing military coup in
Portugal ousted the so called “Estado Novo” dictatorship that had run the country since
1926. It meant that in 1975, after thirteen years fighting nationalist liberation wars, the
colonies finally achieved independence almost by default. The Peoples' Republic of
Mozambique came into existence on 25 June 1975 with Samora Machel as president.
Soon after independence, in 1976, Mozambique closed the border with Rhodesia. It also
supported the Rhodesian liberation movements and the African National Congress
(ANC) during the 1980’s. This resulted in frequent commando raids by Rhodesian and
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1
South African forces into Mozambican territory. The government also had to contend
with armed opposition from the Resistencia Nacional de Mozambique (National
Resistance of Mozambique ‐Renamo), created at the end of 1976.
By 1989/90, the Frelimo and Renamo at last reached exhaustion and stalemate, creating
an opening to end a civil conflict that had devastated the countryside, caused extensive
displacement of the population and the destruction of the economy. Constitutional
reforms in 1990 ended the state’s formal commitment to a Marxist‐Leninist single‐party
system. Serious peace negotiations followed in 1991. Several African countries,
including South Africa, gave support. On 4 October 1992 a General Peace Agreement
(GPA) was signed in Rome. The accord made provision for a cease‐fire and for multiparty
elections.

In October 1994 the first free elections were held. Frelimo gained 44% of the vote
against 38% for Renamo. The fourth Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held
on 28 October 2009. Frelimo won by an overwhelming margin.
3.2 Mozambique Police

3.2.1 History

Understanding of the security sector must take account the local status quo in terms of
structures, actors, processes and behaviours, as influenced by a long and very diverse
history. The police in Mozambique have undergone major transformation, and any
evaluation must consider this historical context, taking note of the major changes that
implemented over the past 25 years.

The security forces played a central role in Portugal’s right‐wing dictatorship until 1974.
What began as a military dictatorship became a civil authoritarian regime under the
leadership of Salazar, after the approval of the “Estado Novo” constitution in 1933.

The Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE ‐ International and State Defence
Police), was the main tool of repression. Although the name PIDE was only used from
1945 to 1969, the whole network of secret police forces, which existed during the 40
years of the regime, are commonly known as PIDE.1
PVDE2/PIDE was created 1933. Common with most branches of the police, military
officers served in the higher ranks, with lower positions held by civilians. It was a

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PIDE
2
Vigilance and Defence of the State Police. “Vigilance” was substituted for “International” in
1945 since it was considered to have fewer negative connotations.
Leon Kukkuk
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national and international political police and dealt with passports. The PIC/PJ (Criminal
Investigation Police /Judiciary Police) was created in 1927 with a judge in charge. Staff
was civilian and dealt with national criminal investigation.3
The other three branches were: PSP (Public Security Police), created in 1935, was the
urban security police, administrative police and dealt with public order. GNR (National
Republican Guard), created in 1911, was responsible for rural Portugal, the Gendarmerie
force as well as a security police responsible for public order. GF (Fiscal Guard), created
in 1885, was responsible for frontiers, ports, coast and customs.4
PIDE infiltrated agents into almost every underground movement, including the
Portuguese Communist Party as well as the independence movements in Angola and
Mozambique.
PIDE intensified its actions during the Portuguese Colonial War, creating a successful
paramilitary unit called Flechas (Arrows) that participated in covert operations. With the
start of the nationalist struggles in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, twelve Mobile
Police units were sent to Africa. This represented the official Portuguese position. There
was no colonial war. It was a struggle between a sovereign State and unrepresentative
terrorist forces. It quickly became apparent though that the police forces were not
enough and the Army became fully entangled in a protracted war.
Information on the transfer of power and the creation of new police force in
Mozambique immediately after independence is sketchy at best. Frelimo established a
transitional government in Lourenco Marques on 25 September 1974. They then
proceeded to organizing villages, neighbourhoods and workplaces to maintain the
functioning of infrastructure, and to prevent racial conflict and settler sabotage. “Grupos
Dinamizadores” (GD ‐ Dynamising Groups) were set up to facilitate the transfer of
power.
A special secret police unit – the National Service of Popular Security or SNASP – was
formed to provide additional protection for “interests of the state.” Responsible directly
to the president, SNASP was allowed to act on any grounds it chooses to “detect,
neutralize and combat all forms of subversion, sabotage and acts directed against the
People's Power and its representatives, the national economy or against the objectives
of the People's Republic of Mozambique.” As one Mozambique resident complained, "It

3
Sá, Leonor
4
Ibid
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
3
is Frelimo’s PIDE (the dreaded Portuguese a secret police). There is no habeas corpus or
means of appeal. If they pick you up, that's it.”5
On 26 May 1979 a law was passed creating the PPM (Polícia Popular de Moçambique).6
This replaced the CPM (Corpo da Polícia de Moçambique ‐ Police Corps of Mozambique)
that operated during the colonial period and the first few years of independence.
There were no specific recruitment procedures for the new police. The police performed
mainly the functions of war. As a result distinction between internal and external
security functions were not apparent. The police and the intelligence agency were
subordinated to the military. One of the requirements for recruitment to the police
force was to serve in the army. Intelligence officers carried a military identity
document.7
The police force simply ceased to exist in large parts of the country. Where it did exist, it
was paramilitary in nature. Politicised, it in effect operated as an arm of Frelimo.
In early 1991 a new constitution was negotiated and the parliament was renamed
Assembleia de Republica (Assembly of the Republic). By July it passed a law abolishing
the state secret police, the People’s National Security Service (SNASP), replacing it with
the State Information and Security Services (SISE). SISE was exclusively an intelligence‐
gathering agency with no police powers.8
3.2.2 Formation of the Mozambique Republic Police
Law 19/92 created the PRM (Polícia da República de Moçambique) on 31 December
1992.9 The police service was given a general command equivalent to a national police
commissioner. Its functions were to guarantee public order, safety and security, respect
for the rule of law, and the strict observance of citizens’ rights and fundamental
liberties. In 1993, the police statutes were approved by cabinet decree 22/93.10

5
Robin Wright Mozambique: Six Months After Independence January 5, 1976
http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright16/Wright16.html (Accessed 08
December 2007)
6
Lei n.o 5/79, de 26 de Maio
7
Chachiua, Martinho. Internal security in Mozambique: Concerns versus policies, Institute for
Security Studies African Security Review Vol 9 No 1, 2000
www.iss.co.za/PUBS/ASR/9NO1/%20SecurityMozambique.html (Accessed 25 December 2009)
8
Chachiua, Martinho. 2000
9
Lei n.o 19/92, de 31 de Dezembro
10
Chachiua, Martinho
Leon Kukkuk
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A large number of soldiers were transferred to the police. The transfer of soldiers to the
police resulted in “demoralized armed forces, with little capacity to protect the territory,
in spite of an excess of weapons, and a police force with excess staff consisting of men
without training in police service.”11
“Relations between the police and other elements of the local power structure were
very uneasy. The Minister of the Interior (who had responsibility for the police force)
was detained in late 1991 as a suspected coup plotter. Cooperation between the
military and police forces was the exception rather than the rule. One such exception
was a joint police and military operation in September 1991 which led to the arrest of
over 800 criminal suspects.”12
The most challenging problems facing the police force in the initial years of the
transition included low standards of education and training, a lack of objective criteria in
the selection of police candidates, a predisposition among police officers to take bribes
and a lack of resources.
“A general problem facing the PRM is its heterogeneity resulting from the merger in
1992 of the formerly independent transit police, the criminal police (PIC), and the
migration and border police. Additional reforms would have inevitably meant the loss of
power and position for certain people, and resistance in those ranks remains high.”13

3.2.3 Organisation

There are only about 20 000 police agents to enforce the law in the whole county.14 This
translates to one of the lowest ratios of police officers to citizens worldwide, with one
police officer to 1 089 citizens (compared to one to 450 in South Africa).15 It is not
surprising that, with such thin coverage, it is widely believed that many crimes go
unreported and that crime rates are much higher than reported figures.
Furthermore, the apathy of the police to overcome insubordination is public knowledge.
Low salaries and weak incentives provided to the police and investigators turn this into

11
Leão, A. Armas em Moçambique reduzindo a oferta e a procura 2004
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No94Port/Chap2.pdf (Accessed 27 December 2009)
12
Woods, James L
13
Hillenbrand, O and Thiery, P
14
Groelsema, Robert J., Turner, J. Michael, Shenga, Carlos, Avaliação Da Democracia E
Governação Em Moçambique Relatório Preliminar, USAID, February 2009
15
Mozambique Justice Sector and the Rule of Law, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa,
2006
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Moz%20Discussion%20Paper%20(english).pdf
(Accessed 27 December 2009)
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
5
an unattractive option to be embraced as a career.16 Further measures for the
transformation of the police – despite past large involvement of donors such as Spain
and Switzerland – are needed.
Efforts have been made to improve recruitment and also to provide training to the
police, particularly with the establishment of the Academy of Police Sciences (Academia
de Ciências Policiais, ACIPOL). However, in order to make any substantial improvement
in policing coverage of the country, greater funding will be required to pay a larger
salary roll and provide training.17

With the additional impact of HIV/AIDS on the police force—in 2006, a representative
of the Ministry of the Interior said that the PRM was losing 1 000 police officers a year to
HIV/AIDS—there is a growing urgency to address this issue.18

3.2.4 Corruption

In spite of some verified efforts to combat corruption, generalized corrupt behaviour
and practice continues in the government. Petty bureaucrats, school principles,
teachers, nurses and members of the police always expect ‐ as a matter of routine ‐
payment for service provided. They are motivated by self enrichment and use public
office for personal gain. The president declared “zero tolerance” for corruption,
reiterating that accused ministers will be dismissed first and investigated afterwards.
Even so, not a single senior civil servant was accused, including a judge caught in an
extortion racket in May 2008.19

Lack of confidence is problematic from the perspective of state/institution legitimacy
and social trust, as well as in terms of overall police operations and activities. This is
corroborated by further survey findings which indicate that 76.2% of people do not
contact the police to ask for help in dealing with local problems. Such a lack of trust may
undermine the new community policing initiative in which citizens are supposed to
cooperate with the police in identifying criminals.20

3.2.5 Police reform
Negotiations started in 1996 for assistance for police reforms. An agreement was signed
in 1997 with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide logistical,

16
Groelsema, Robert J., Turner, J. Michael, Shenga, Carlos
17
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2006
18
19
20
Lalá, Anícia And Ostheimer, Andrea E
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technical and material support. 21 The project became operational early in 1998. With
technical assistance from the Spanish Guardia Civil, the project was focused on three
main components: training, reorganisation and equipment.22The main objective was to
strengthen the capacity of the PRM to prevent and suppress crime and to foster an
internal culture that upholds both the rule of law and civilian and political rights. With
the newly founded police academy, ACIPOL, the PRM received additional support for the
training and education of senior police officers.23
The first phase of the UNDP project (1997–2000) concentrated mainly on the
reorganization and restructuring of the Comando Geral. Whenever partial reforms of
the current legal framework were required, they were to be proposed. However,
without substantial input from PRM’s side and a lack of discussion on transformation in
the organisation, the process of restructuring lagged behind.24
As police officers were retrained, or new recruits trained, and structures and operational
procedures reorganised, appropriate equipment was provided, mainly through
rehabilitation of police stations. Police also received substantial salary increases, so that
the territorial infrastructure of the new police force was accordingly adjusted.25
By the end of 1998, 580 police officers were retrained. A project team report raised
concerns about the need to retrain all police officers to counter the risk of having two
policing standards. There was a problem in the fact that many of the existing police
officers did not meet the conditions required for the retraining courses. According to the
same report, this is created uncertainty among police officers about their possible
future in the police force. The question remained whether the government was
prepared to retrench those who were found unfit for the police standards required.26

3.2.6 Safety and Security
As the peace process grew and crime established itself as the most challenging security
threat. Mozambican cities, known for their lack of crime during the civil war, were
caught up in a crime wave against which the local police seemed almost powerless.

21
MOZ 95/015; MOZ/00/007
22
Chachiua, Martinho
23
24
25
Chachiua, Martinho
26
Ibid
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
7
There was a huge gap between the country’s security concerns and its security policies.
“Security policies were very much a reflection of the narrow political interests of the
former warring parties. Efforts to curb crime were postponed or crime was used as the
reason for militarising the police.”27 The Frelimo government maintained troop loyalty
to the party and the state. It particularly tried to keep the “Rapid Intervention Forces”
loyal to the party. Mistrust on the side of Frelimo generally prevented an integration of
Renamo combatants into the police force.28
3.2.7 Police responsiveness
Most Mozambicans considered the police force highly corrupt and as crime increased,
citizens took the law into their own hands. The police became almost irrelevant to the
public. “When the police did act, it was sometimes with such excessive force that
suspects were killed.”29
“The possibility that Mozambique will develop into a “society of fear” cannot be totally
disregarded.”30 The most serious threat to Mozambique's stability is not a renewal of
civil war. Economic constraints continue to prevent the government from adopting
policies that will fully consolidate the peace. Increasing crime and violence as the
economy fails to expand quickly enough, constitute the biggest threat. “This is all the
more likely considering the impunity of growing criminal activities by organized crime
networks and the ineffectiveness of the police and justice systems. The state will either
become increasingly implicated in these criminal and corrupt networks or, even if this
tendency is reversed, the state will remain weak in terms of control mechanisms that
provide security to citizens.”31

Although there is progress in terms of an adequate legislative and regulatory
framework, much remains to be done operationally. The rule of law is further
constrained by the structural dysfunctions in the justice system.32 Mozambique’s justice
sector suffers from a lack of territorial expansion, an adequately trained staff and
financial resources.
Nevertheless, given the crime wave and the powerful pressure it has ignited since 1996,
the police have been in the spotlight.

27
Chachiua, Martinho
28
29
Woods, James L
30
Ibid
31
Ibid
32
Leon Kukkuk
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8
The US Department of State Human Rights report of 2006 (Exercício dos Direitos
Humanos do Departamento de Estado dos EUA ‐ 2006)33 reports that “[although] the
civil authorities generally maintain sufficient control of the security forces, there do exist
some cases where elements of the security forces act independently of government
authority.” Apart from this, the report indicates “improvements during the course of the
year [but] there continue to exist serious social and human rights problems” such as:

• Use of excessive force by the police resulting in illegal deaths and injuries
• Lynching and violence against the masse
• Prison conditions that are extremely hard, threatening and resulting in death
• Imprisonment and detention for long periods of preventative detention
• Police violence and arbitrary detention of journalists
• Spreading domestic violence and discrimination against women
• Abuse and criminal exploitation of children, including child prostitution
• Traffic in women and children
• Discrimination against handicapped people and those with HIV/AIDS
• Child labour in the informal sector and forced child labour
• Poor implementation of labour laws.

It is noteworthy that PRM sees itself primarily as an authority of the state, which the
citizen must obey. The role of the police as providers of services has yet to gain
momentum.34

3.2.8 Strategic Plan

In 2003, for the first time, the police force elaborated a strategic plan. Approved in
2004, the Plano Estratégico da PRM, 2003–2012 (PEPRM) provided a vision for ten
years. Apparently consultations were held with members of the community during its
formulative stages, but no further information is provided. The Council of Ministers
approved the plan without any accompanying debate in Parliament.35
UNDP provided support to this plan through a project that ran from end 2004 to May
2008.36 This phase aimed to improve the effectiveness of the PRM by supporting the

33
As quoted in DFID Análise da Governação do País em Moçambique Draft para discussão
Outubro 2007
34
35
36
Donor project number: 00039444
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
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implementation of the Strategic Plan in four key areas: Monitoring and implementation
of the Strategic Plan; Organizational and management improvement; Personnel and
training; Improvement of PRM image.37
3.2.9 Governance and Oversight
In its annual report for 2007, Amnesty International raised a number of concerns about
the behaviour of Mozambique’s police, including the use of excessive force by the
police, extra‐judicial executions and torture. It recommended as a precondition more
severe accountability mechanisms at an internal and external level. However, in general
the concerns raised are less serious than many raised in neighbouring countries,
including South Africa.38

The Public Sector Reform Strategy launched in 2001, and the UNDP Justice Project, the
project also attempted to assist the PRM to improve accountability and transparency.
To date, neither the PRM nor UNDP has made any information public on monitoring and
evaluation of the plan, and so it is difficult to comment on its progress.39
But other structural concerns govern the development of these institutions within a
Democratic environment. For example, despite efforts to train the police on human
rights, the police force is still seen as one of the most corrupt state institutions and
receives the least trust from people in relation to other state institutions.40

37
ODAMOZ Projects Database ‐ Project Description
http://www.odamoz.org.mz/reports/rpt_desc.asp?pn=492585 (Accessed 19 January 2010)
38
Ibid.
39
The full list of outputs are the following:
‐ Institutional mechanisms in place to monitor and support the implementation of the Strategic
Plan.
‐ Policies, practices and procedures for logistics and finances including budgeting, administrative
records management, purchasing and maintenance of equipment and capital assets reviewed,
updated, documented and implemented.
‐ Review and evaluation of existing human, financial and physical resources completed.
‐ Program for decentralisation and management of resources at provincial and district level
established.
‐ Ethics, integrity and professionalism of PRM strengthened.
‐ Plan for the effective application of technology developed and costed.
‐ A training subsystem with well defined policies, coordination and evaluation mechanisms.
‐ An enhanced basic training program able to respond to the personnel needs of the PRM.
‐ Consolidated specialized, on‐the‐job and superior training.
‐ An institutional strategy to spread the objectives of the Strategic Plan among the PRM and
reinforce its application designed and implemented.
‐ Program of exchange with educational institutions designed and implemented.
40
Leon Kukkuk
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10

There is no government‐funded independent external mechanism established by law to
investigate complaints against the police, and implementation of such an oversight
mechanism is urgently needed.41 Mozambique does not have a national Human Rights
Commission, although internal discussions within the government for the establishment
of such a body have begun. A Human Rights Commission could play an important role in
ensuring, for example, a greater degree of independent oversight of the police and
prisons. Legislation creating an ombudsman (Provedor de Justiça) was recently approved
by Parliament, but the ombudsman has not yet been appointed.42The ombudsman
would provide an additional mechanism in providing for the defence of rights outside
the court system, and should be appointed speedily to enable this work to begin. Civil
society should lobby and advocate for its establishment and should be involved in the
process of appointment of the ombudsperson by Parliament.43

3.3 Private Security
The official number of demobilised soldiers were 78 078, out of a total of 92 881
recognised as being part of the two military forces. It appears as though the majority
found employment as security guards. Thus these guards continued to be involved in
the same activities that they were familiar with as soldiers. This is contrary to the
“principles of reintegration to maintain ex‐combatants dispersed and away from
weapons.” 44
According to Borges Coelho that although there is no direct relationship between ex‐
combatants and violence, there is a direct relationship between insecurity and an
increase in security companies. There is also a relationship between insecurity and the
efficiency of the security sector: the police, the army and the courts.45
3.4 Justice Sector

The justice sector ‐ including the courts and the police – is one of the weakest sectors in
Mozambique. The Global Integrity report for Mozambique (Relatório de Integridade

41
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Coelho, J. P. Borges (2002)
45
Coelho, J. P. Borges. Da violência colonial ordenada à ordem pós‐colonial violenta. Sobre um
legado das guerras coloniais nas ex‐colónias portuguesas. Lusotopie 2003
http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/borges2003.pdf (Accessed 04 April 2006)
Leon Kukkuk
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Global para Moçambique 2007) classifies the rule of law as “weak” and compliance with
the law as “very weak.”

Within criminal justice, reform requires an independent and highly educated judiciary,
prosecutors and defence lawyers, well‐trained and representative police, humane
correction staff and an appropriate prison infrastructure. These all require investment in
universities and professional academies. The low levels of education, obsolete
equipment, and physical infrastructure of poor quality characterises the main part of the
system. As a result of this lack of capacity Mozambicans take recourse to popular
militias.46 In general, according to informants, “the police do not defend, the courts do
not react, there are no institutions.” As a result private security companies continue to
be lucrative, as can be seen from their large numbers. They exist and grow in a country
with a police that has no capacity to put a lid on transnational criminal networks.47

3.5 Crime information

Data collection and analysis are done manually. There is no database, not even a
computer, disk, or shelf where the final drafts of the annual reports can be found; this
provides a strong indication of the extent to which data collection and analysis, and
monitoring systems, are under‐resourced. The PRM is not an exception, but rather
typifies the situation found in other government departments. However PRM data has
other limitations and gaps, restricting its reliability and validity.48

In addition to the limitations of data collection and retention, there is little scope for
analysing the data and integrating findings into the planning and design of prevention
strategies. For example, while the number of reported cases has been increasing, so has
the national population. Because statistics are not presented using rates that would
account for population growth, it is difficult to judge whether crime is actually
increasing. Given that the number of reported crimes has been rising, the perception is
that crime is on the rise as well. This negatively affects the morale of the police force.49

46
47
da Costa, Ana Bérnard. A pobreza, a guerra e a paz em Moçambique: teorias, relações e
percepções, II Conferência do IESE, Maputo, 22 a 23 de Abril de 2009, “Dinâmicas da Pobreza e
Padrões de Acumulação em Moçambique”, Conference Paper Nº20, Instituto de Estudos Sociais
e Economicos http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/II_conf/CP20_2009_Costa.pdf (Accessed
27 December 2009)
48
49
A joint publication of the Ministry of the Interior of Mozambique, the World Health
Organization–Mozambique, and the Small Arms Survey Firearm‐related Violence in Mozambique
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
12

Potential areas are the development and constant updating of a crime data base
including the training of staff, as well as the development of law on issues of public
security, which could benefit profoundly from material assistance and the exchange of
information on international best practices.50

3.6 Civil Society

“Mozambique’s democracy is fragile, yet it is important to acknowledge that a
constructive potential for change does exist. It is particularly important to not only focus
on the institutions but to look for actors of potential change.

The first of these potential actors for change is the growing civil society sector. If
strengthened and made more independent, this sector could constitute an effective
check on state activity, and would serve not as an alternative to it, but rather a
“compelling” voice of “awareness”.

A second positive development is the work of various CSO's, NGO's, religious groups and
traditional authorities in maintaining a conciliatory position concerning polarized issues,
both at the national and local levels.

A third positive mover for change is freedom of the media. Although critical journalism
suffered a setback after the murder of the journalist Carlos Cardoso, the media seems to
have maintained its position and has remained vocal and critical of the current events in
the country. There are, however, problems of polarization in this sector, whereby the
two main currents – one pro‐government and the other pro‐opposition – are at times at
odds, rather than working together toward a more positive conflict‐resolution process.
This tends to stifle possible alternatives. However, the liberty that is conceded by
government in this area is remarkable, particularly in comparison to the freedom of the
media (or rather the lack thereof) in other countries in the region.

June 2009 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/spe_reports_pdf/2009‐SR10‐
Mozambique.pdf (Accessed 27 December 2009)
50
Ibid.
Leon Kukkuk
01 March 2010
13

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