Cases On Marriage

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in
the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took note
of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed
by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.
On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. The
CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain
the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended
in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27, 1987
only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth
that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of
the parties?
Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted
the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain
the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying
its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights
of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is denied.
VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by Villareyes.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10, 1997, the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting petitioner
of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and insufficiency of
evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite
the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in
the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are
applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage contract presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of
any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character
of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37and 38may contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the
crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage
a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The act of the
accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly
on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence.
When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social
institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-
93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA,
petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration
of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their decision.
Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the
accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from

Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed
on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded
in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant
further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and
that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to
the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. After hearing during which both
complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a
Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then
the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two marriages
and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of
the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation
as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must
lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union.
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove
that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to
be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according
to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
The petition is dismissed.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14,
2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates
had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior
to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two
valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983,
the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case. Dissatisfied, a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution
dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of
nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage
never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.
Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the
crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet
been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged
in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage
was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition is granted.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned
to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract
expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked
in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first
met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had
no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.The trial court
granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are
four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined
to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged
letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he
berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the
following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere
to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided
to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan,
hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his
repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan
reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree,
to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence
on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that
he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton was already dead.
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and

LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since
1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been
living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels,
one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita
T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and
apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with
her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year
in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were
staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name,
Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the
property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985. Between
1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner,
using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral
arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having gone
there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that
Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito
came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial
Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for
the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado
Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to
settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to
be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988
despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. On appeal the
respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio’s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the presumption
of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by
appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio's
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge
this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e.,
since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the
property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because
there was no such partnership in the first place. In the second place, until otherwise shown in an
appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a
deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.Petitioner is in possession of the property. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to
the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation
with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to
be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to
Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned,
Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the
Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought
to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City
for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his
way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the
Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after
an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage
should be a justification for bigamy."
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based
on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit
of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation
should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety,
good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential
to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to
go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria
was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991,
Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of
his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals,
treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and
executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI:
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered
by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal
of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision

of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition
for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the
RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance
of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no
jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final
and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss
the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision
of law, the judgment was not appealable.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on
11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of

Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas,
Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is
valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
— one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being
entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation
in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at
Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts,
to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding.
Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of
the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent presented.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he
has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989,
while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while
the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of
a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except
as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of
their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought
is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together
at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented
him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part,
respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed
by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having
five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before
a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De Castro.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages
entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is
the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that
respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he
was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but
also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's
mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them.
They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them.
She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because
of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this Court
because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness
to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on
who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered
a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no
man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That
is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called
up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No.
106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter
a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person,
at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded

that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with
different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned
the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount
of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged
as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions
of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may
more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21,
1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood, petitioner
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared null and
void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the
respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to change children’s
diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy
towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She
then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent
Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence,
this petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, this
case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under
Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental, not
physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The
spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital
and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of
marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.

All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this
case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they have
gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major
parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the
petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at
the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never
honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner
and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the
sole breadwinner.
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel
moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends eve after
their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridel’s
failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
Regional Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but the
mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that
they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Although there was
evidence that the couple could not get along or are incompatible with each other, there was no
evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.
BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003
Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and
begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a family
crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner
would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would insist
the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would
eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21, 1995,
respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner. Petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of action and that it
violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for
annulment of marriage, its termination and status.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution
of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge Rosalina L.
Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action, the trial court
determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the
allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting
to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s claim that respondent was guilty of forum
shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer
pending and was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the allegations in
the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as well
as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status.
Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in
violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need not be
alleged, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –

x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when
he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was
not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.
TONGOL vs. TONGOL

G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were
married. From their marriage they begot four children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union and
their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of Filipinas’
parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop business, he was
met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop business
flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business venture by putting
up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to interfere with the operation
of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also resented that her
husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of their frequent and
continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his
relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their children.
Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however, this
was the fault of Orlando’s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from
Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only
consisted of her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect”.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave enough
to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there was no
evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered
in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must correspond to the
management of the household and the provision of support for the family. Fifth, marital obligations
must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence
was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in
Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder,
there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
MARCOS vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on
September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at the
Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. They were both
military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and started a
business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner’s urges on respondent to
be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the breadwinner, is the head of
the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s failure to provide for his family, he began beating
the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary wife. The tipping point
was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her mother. The following
day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she was
diagnosed with contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.
Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or clinically
identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity. The
evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period of more than six
years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support
and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this certain period
and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage. Equally important, the condition
was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court Rowena
after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their families
and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope
despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans,
left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling money
and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily sustenance and
joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents’ home,
Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed
to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years
old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle and
stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was
able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live together, she decided that
they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given
the petitioner’s totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment
adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality disorder and
Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at
first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder, he
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and
rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s affliction
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment
and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared
null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.
AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a
beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated by
Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive
because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot
four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the
nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible
immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away
from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of
their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him
since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male tenant in their house, discovered their love
notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in
extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed
that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former
household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the
hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between
parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his
evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified
true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac
which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court,
however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision on the grounds that the psychiatric
evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it
did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects but
failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must
be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally, the
Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina
precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or
“straightjacket”.
MARABLE vs. MARABLE

G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they happened
to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted the
respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and attention
from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and were married
in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a church wedding
on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The
relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred
from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy.
Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna
eventually found out about the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed.
Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the
conjugal home; gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October
8, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family and
his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and strive for
success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his relationship with his
family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and
stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that
the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine.
Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by
working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear
that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when,
actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his
extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them.
In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is
not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
AURELIO vs. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her
quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the
part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of
his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward
his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision
denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found
that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine
and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004,
petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.
On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the
standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina Doctrine:
(a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c) non-compliance of
marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the
complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert
psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and
incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with.
Petition for dismissal is denied.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16,
1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not blessed
with children due to Catalina’s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalina’s psychological
incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent; engaged in petty
arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of their adopted daughter;
gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their conjugal home to live with Bobbie
Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited
traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not curable. These manifested through her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina
did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house
and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo;
however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. First, Catalina’s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was
not established. Eduardo’s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes’ neuro-psychiatric evaluation
was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes merely
established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and childishness could
no longer be treated due to Catalina’s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one
interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been achieved
if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo’s statements but also with interviews by other
persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor which
effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In this case, the
Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to dispute psychological incapacity.

Cases On Marriage

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BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

The petition is dismissed.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

The petition is granted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded

The petition is denied.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(b) juridical antecedence, and

(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;

(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TONGOL vs. TONGOL

MARCOS vs. MARCOS

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MARABLE vs. MARABLE

AURELIO vs. AURELIO

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

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