THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS 87-GT-103

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Copyright © 1987 by ASME

Fire Detection and Suppression in Natural Gas Pipeline

Compressor Stations
COLTON W. MEYER, P.E.
Pacific Gas Transmission Company

Presented at the Gas Turbine Conference and Exhibition, Anaheim, California — May 31-June 4, 1987

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 ABSTRACT
The occurrence of fires in natural gas
compressor stations is fortunately in-
frequent. The consequences, however, can be
severe. This paper will discuss the design
concepts and experience of Pacific Gas
Transmission Company (PGT) with fire detec-
tion and suppression systems in its natural
gas pipeline compressor stations.
INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of fires in natural gas
compressor stations is fortunately in-
frequent. The consequences, however, could
be severe, ranging from damage or destruction
of equipment to loss of an entire station and
even loss of lives. For this reason, the
prevention, detection and suppression of
fires are important considerations in the
design and operation of compressor stations.
This paper will focus on Pacific Gas
Transmission Company's design concepts and
experience with fire detection and suppres-
sion systems. The prevention of fires,
through good design and operating practices,
is of primary importance but is not the
primary thrust of this paper.
The PGT system includes 12 pipeline com-
pressor stations with a total of 23 gas
turbine powered compressor units, all located
in the Pacific Northwest. Four stations have
two units in a single building. The re-
maining stations have separate buildings for
each unit. The stations are all remotely
controlled via telemetry and operated from
the Spokane, Washington Gas Control Center
and are normally unattended. Some of them
are located as much as two hours driving time
from the nearest maintenance base.
While there are local fire departments often
within 10 to 15 minutes driving time of the
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stations, most of these are small volunteer
fire departments and are often not trained
for or accustomed to fighting gas or oil
fires. The company policy has been not to
call in the fire department until company
personnel are on the scene and have assured
that the station has shut down properly and
the gas piping has been depressurized.
FIRES
The two major causes of fires in compressor
stations are failures of the gas piping
systems and failures of the lubricating and
seal oil systems on the compressor units.
Gas fires are potentially the most catas-
trophic and can normally be contained only by
cutting off the supply of gas. Oil fires, on
the other hand, are normally confined to a
limited area and can often be extinguished by
chemical, foam or inert gas fire suppression
systems. PGT has experienced two major
fires. Both were oil fires on gas turbine
driven compressor units.
On Sunday evening, October 3, 1976, a lube
oil fire occurred at PGT's compressor station
near Sandpoint, Idaho. At 8:47 p.m., station
and unit emergency shutdown alarms were
received at the Spokane Gas Control Center.
The station was unattended at the time.
Between 9:15 and 9:25 p.m. the first company
employees arrived at the station to find the
"B" unit engulfed in flames. The other unit
at the station, housed in a separate build-
ing, was not affected. After the second
employee arrived, the two men tried
unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire using
150-pound dry chemical extinguishers. No
fire suppression system was installed on this
unit. The local volunteer fire department
truck arrived at 9:40 p.m. and the fire was
ultimately extinguished at 9:55 p.m. by a
company employee using a water hose from the
fire truck.
 On the positive side, the station emergency
shutdown system functioned properly. The
unit was stopped and the station piping
isolated from the main line and depressur-
ized.
A post-mortem investigation found that the
fire, which caused extensive damage to the
gas turbine, related equipment and building,
was caused by an interaction of two separate
problems. The outboard thrust bearing seal
on the gas compressor failed, allowing
excessive lubricating oil to flow into the
drain cavity between the thrust bearing and
the outboard journal bearing. This over-
loaded the drain line, causing a positive
pressure of several pounds per square inch in
the drain cavity, which normally operates at
a slightly negative pressure. An improperly
tightened 3/4 inch pipe plug had backed out,
allowing a stream of oil to escape. This oil
was ignited by contact with the exposed hot
parts in the vicinity of the turbine bearing
and on the exhaust duct, which operate at
800° to 1000°F. The flash point of the
mineral oil was in the range of 600° to
750°F. A portion of the burning oil then
flowed under the axial air compressor and
combustion sections of the turbine. The fire
in this area caused most of the damage.
The turbine, a General Electric Frame 3, was
removed and shipped to the G.E. repair
facility in Salt Lake City on October 21,
1976. It was received back at the station on
December 13, 1976 and returned to service on
February 3, 1977, four months after the
fire.
The second major fire on the PGT system
occurred on the morning of Tuesday, December
18, 1984, at a compressor station near Ione,
Oregon. At about 5:15 a.m., a shutdown/
lockout alarm on the "B" unit was received by
the Gas Control Center in Spokane. As no
personnel were on site, a technician and a
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mechanic were called out. They reported to
the maintenance base at Wallula, Washington
and departed for the Ione Compressor Station
(approximately 85 miles away) at approxi-
mately 6:45 a.m.. The first report by a
neighbor of smoke coming from the compressor
station was received at 8:15 a.m.. The crew
arrived at the station at 9:05 a.m. to find
a fire burning on the "B" unit. After
verifying that the station emergency shutdown
system had functioned properly and all gas
was evacuated, they attempted to extinguish
the fire using 150-pound dry chemical and 30-
pound CO2 fire extinguishers. They were
successful in extinguishing the flames but
unable to prevent a flashback.
The Ione Volunteer Fire Department was
summoned and arrived at the station shortly
after 10:00 a.m.. The fire was then extin-
guished by company personnel using the Fire
Department's CO2 extinguishers. A water hose
in the compressor building was used to cool
the metal to prevent a flashback.
The cause of the fire was determined to be a
crack in the threads of a half inch pipe
nipple in a gauge tap on the lube oil pump
discharge line. The oil spraying from the
crack was ignited by striking exposed hot
surfaces on the load side of the turbine.
The foam fire suppression system, which had
been installed at Ione after the Sandpoint,
Idaho, fire, had activated. It was the
significant factor in confining the fire to
the area between the power turbine and the
gas compressor of the "B" unit. The "A"
unit, which was in the same building, was not
damaged. There was, however, major damage to
the lighting and other systems in the build-
ing.
The damaged unit, an Ingersoll-Rand GT51
power turbine with a G.E. LM 1500 gas genera-
tor driving an Ingersoll-Rand compressor, was
installed in 1969 and had logged over 90,000
hours of operation. A preliminary assessment
 indicated that replacement would be prefera-
ble to repair. PGT awarded a contract for a
replacement unit based on competitive bids in
early March 1985. The new unit was placed in
service on November 26, 1985, eleven months
after the fire.
The lessons learned from these two fires have
influenced PGT's design concepts and policies
regarding fire detection and suppression.
One obvious conclusion has been that there is
a significant risk of fire resulting from
failures in the lube and seal oil systems on false operation has been a major concern.
pipeline compressor units. Unnecessary shutdowns of equipment can in-
FIRE DETECTION
Fire detection can take a number of forms,
starting of course with merely the visual
observation of smoke and flame. Because this
requires the presence of an observer, it
won't work when a station is unattended.
Most operators prefer something more sophis-
ticated and utilize automatic systems at
unattended locations. Typical functions of
these fire detection systems in pipeline
compressor stations include initiation of
alarms, shutdown of equipment, blowdown of
gas piping systems and operation of fire
suppression systems. PGT also uses the fire
detection system to shut down the building
ventilation system to reduce the air avail-
able to the fire.
Some of the common types of detectors are:
o Heat Detectors, including
High temperature, fusible link
or bimetallic strip
High temperature, pneumatic
tube
Rate of temperature rise
Combination high temperature
and rate of rise
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o Smoke Detectors, including
Photoelectric
Ionization
o Flame Detectors, including
Infra-red
Ultra-violet
Regardless of the type of system, reliability
is of great importance. In PGT's experience,
crease operating costs and disrupt through-
put. Station piping blowdowns are wasteful
of gas. False operations of fire suppression
systems are costly and in some cases can
leave a mess to be cleaned up. In our search
for the ideal system, PGT has tried different
types of fire detection systems. We give
them mixed reviews.
Our original installations used high temper-
ature fusible link or bimetallic detectors.
While quite simple, they had the disadvantage
that they would trip under high ambient
temperature conditions, particularly if the
unit was running. Turbine bleed valve opera-
tion would sometimes trip the detectors. To
avoid false operation it was necessary to set
the detectors to operate well above maximum
normal temperatures. The frequency of false
fire detection was at the annoyance level,
but the costs were not major as we did not at
that time have fire suppression systems
installed on any of our units.
After the fire at the Sandpoint Compressor
Station in 1976, we installed fire suppres-
sion systems on certain units, specifically
those where two units were in a single build-
ing. Due to our lack of confidence in the
fire detectors, and in order to avoid the
cleanup and recharging cost of false opera-
tions, we tied the operation of the fire
 suppression systems to fire detection in
conjunction with a low lube oil level alarm.
We also changed the set points for the low
lube oil level alarm and shutdown so that
they would trip with less oil loss than was
previously the case. We took this approach
due to our belief that the most likely cause
of fire was from oil system problems, and
that in a major fire enough oil would be
dumped (three to four barrels) to trip the
low lube oil level alarm. We were not
terribly comfortable with this solution;
however, it was expedient and was likely to
satisfy our primary concern of not losing
both units at a station in a single fire. We
also began looking at alternative fire detec-
tion systems.
Our next move was to install ultra-violet
detectors at those locations where we had
installed fire suppression systems. These
were found to be a substantial improvement.
While ultra-violet detectors are susceptible
to being set off by, among other things,
welding and lightning, this has not been a
serious problem if care is taken. We have
found, however, as a plus, that they will
detect a spark plug or cross fire tube blow-
out and will shutdown the unit.
We have recently installed both infra-red and
pneumatic tube detectors at two stations and
plan to do so this year at three more.
Existing systems (high temperature and ultra-
violet) will be left in operation. The
operating performance of each of these fire
detection systems will be evaluated for
reliability and effectiveness for possible
installation at other stations in addition to
the high temperature and ultra-violet
systems.
FIRE SUPPRESSION
PGT had considered the installation of fire
suppression systems prior to the 1976 fire
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but had elected not to install them. After
the fire, the subject was reopened. The
potential benefits of installing fire
suppression systems were thought to include:
o Reduced risk to personnel
(primarily from fighting fires)
o Minimized fire damage and reduced
downtime
o Minimized loss of system throughput
capacity
o Reduced financial loss from fire
damage and business interruption
The potential costs or problems included:
o Cost to install, maintain and
operate the systems
o Potential for false operation
o Depending upon the type of system,
risk to personnel or equipment
Due to PGT's insurance coverage and its cost
of service tariff, there was no significant
economic benefit from installing fire
suppression systems. For PGT, the primary
consideration in doing so was to assure the
ability to maintain service to our customers
without interruption.
The design of the PGT pipeline system is such
that the loss of a single unit will have only
a minor effect on system capacity as long as
the other nearby units remain available for
operation. Loss of both units at a two unit
station, however, can be a serious concern.
For this reason, PGT concluded that fire
suppression systems were warranted at those
stations where both units were contained in a
single building such that a major fire could
damage or destroy both units. The decision
was made, therefore, to install fire suppres-
sion systems at the four stations with two-
unit buildings.
The types of fire suppression systems which
were considered included CO2, Halon, dry
 chemical, water and foam. CO2 and Halon were
rejected due to the large volume required.
As none of PGT's units have enclosures, the
entire building would have to be filled. CO2
was also rejected due to personnel hazard.
Dry chemical systems were rejected as they do
not have a lasting effect. Re-ignition could
occur requiring subsequent repeated opera-
tion. There is also a clean-up problem, as
the residue can "cook on" to a hot unit.
Water was considered undesirable due to the
potential for damage to hot equipment by
causing warpage. The system selected was an
Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).
A prototype system was installed in 1979 at
the Rosalia, Washington Compressor Station.
While this system met most design require-
ments, it was found that the premixed foam
was unstable and did not have a reasonable
"shelf life." The system was therefore
modified to store water and the foam concen-
trate separately for mixing at time of use.
AFFF systems were then installed in the
remaining stations with two-unit buildings.
The 1984 fire, defying all expectations,
occurred at one of the four stations with a
fire suppression system installed. The
functioning of the system was a qualified
success. There was no ignition of pooled oil
under the unit, the major cause of damage in
the 1976 fire. There was also no significant
damage to the other unit in the building.
The location of the fire was confined to the
area between the power turbine and the
compressor, above the level protected by the
foam. Damage in this area, however, was
major as was the damage to building systems.
RECENT ACTIONS
As a result of the most recent fire experi-
ence, we have made two changes in our control
system with regard to fire detection. The
first is to have a fire alarm telemetered to
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the Spokane Gas Control Center. Due to SCADA
limitations which have since been eliminated,
a fire alarm was previously lumped with other
alarms requiring immediate dispatch of
personnel to the station. The gas control
operator in Spokane therefore only knew that
there was a problem, not that there was a
fire. Now, the operator can distinguish a
fire from other alarms. The other change is
in the activation of the fire suppression
systems. Having installed multiple types of
fire detectors at those stations with fire
suppression systems, the fire suppression is
now activated by the operation of any two
different fire detection systems. The low
lube oil level alarm has been eliminated from
this logic.
PGT considers multiple redundant fire detec-
tion systems to be cheap insurance in that
they increase the chance of early detection
of a fire. The voting system reduces the
probability of false fire suppression system
operation.
Another action taken following the recent
fire was to make a complete review of the
fire suppression system design for compliance
with the latest National Fire Protection
Association codes and standards.
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
PGT does not have any definite program to
install fire suppression systems on all our
compressor units, although we have recently
installed a system in conjunction with a
turbine replacement at one station. We are
continuing to consider other ways of reducing
fire risk and improving our fire detection
and suppression systems. Possible ideas
include the following:
o PGT has avoided spraying foam onto
the hot parts of the turbine to
avoid the risk of warpage damage.
 This is being reconsidered. Had
the foam nozzles been directed at
the ignition sources, the fire
damage could have been minimized.
While there may have been some
warpage, it would probably have
been repairable and would have been
more than offset by the reduced
fire damage.
o One way to reduce the risk of fire
is to reduce or eliminate the
sources of oil to fuel the fire.
PGT plans to install dry seals in
its compressors in conjunction with
turbine replacements, thus elimi-
nating the high pressure seal oil
systems. The first dry seal was
installed in 1986. We are also
considering the use of magnetic
bearings.
o PGT currently uses mineral oil for
the compressor lube and seal oil
systems. Fire resistant synthetic
oils are available which have flash
temperatures in the order of
1150°F, thus considerably reducing
the chance of ignition. While
these are used in the separate gas
generator lube oil systems of
aircraft derivitive units, PGT has
not used these fire resistant oils
for compressor lube and seal oil
systems due to their potential
deleterious affect on seals,
gaskets and diaphragms in the
downstream gas systems if oil is
lost into the line. If the
compressors are converted to dry
seals, this would not be a problem.
Fire resistant oils could then be
used for the gas turbine lubricat-
ing systems.
o Even in the event of a unit shut-
down due to a fire, we follow the
manufacturer's recommendations for
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operation of the lube oil pumps
during the cool-down period. While
possibly protecting the shaft, this
has the disadvantage of continuing
to feed oil to the fire. We are
considering shutting down the pumps
to cut off the oil flow, even if it
means sacrificing the shaft. This
would also be tied into our voting
logic with multiple fire detection
systems to avoid losing a shaft on
a false alarm.
SUMMARY
Based on PGT's experience, we believe that
there is a significant risk of lube oil fires
on compressor units; however, the extent of
the damage from fires can be significantly
reduced by properly designed fire suppression
systems. Effective operation of the fire
suppression systems is dependent in turn upon
reliable fire detection systems which must be
designed to minimize false operation. PGT's
solution has been to install redundant fire
detection systems and to require two inde-
pendent systems to detect a fire before the
suppression system is actuated.
Fire suppression systems are not warranted
for all applications. Factors to consider
include whether the station is attended or
not, economics, and the affect of the unit
loss on the system operation. I hope, how-
ever, that PGT's experience may provide some
food for thought.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In writing this paper I have drawn greatly
upon the knowledge and experience of various
members of the PGT staff, including but not
limited to Thomas J. Cusworth, John S.
Dughman, John G. Lisk, Douglas E. Tuck,
Alfredo W. Visitacion and Hiro Yamada.