EMX 11 G MKA - GA71 EA 012-R En-Generator Protection

Generator Protection
EVM II
EVM Energía del Valle de México II
Combined Cycle Power Plant
Owner Contractor
GE Global Parts & Products GmbH

General Electric Global Services GmbH, México Branch
Grid Solutions México S.A de C.V
GE POWER
Gas Power Systems
Project Document Code EMX/11/G/MKA---GA71/EA/012
Title Generator Protection
Identification Number GEK75512
Revision
Revision R 2018-04-10
Date
KKS
Information Class, if applicable, on pg. 1 et sqq

DWG Number GEK75512 Rev R Released 11/21/2017 Page 1 of 39
g
GEK 75512R
Revised, October 2017
GE Energy
Generator Protection
These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in equipment nor to provide for every possible contingency to
be met in connection with installation, operation or maintenance. Should further information be desired or should particular
problems arise which are not covered sufficiently for the purchaser's purposes the matter should be referred to General Electric
Company. These instructions contain proprietary information of General Electric Company, and are furnished to its customer solely
to assist that customer in the installation, testing, operation, and/or maintenance of the equipment described. This document shall
not be reproduced in whole or in part nor shall its contents be disclosed to any third party without the written approval of General
Electric Company.
© 2017 General Electric Company. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be copied or distributed in whole or in part,
without prior permission of the copyright owner.
GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection
The following notices will be found throughout this publication. It is important that the
significance of each is thoroughly understood by those using this document. The definitions are
as follows:
NOTE
Highlights an essential element of a procedure to assure correctness.
CAUTION
Indicates a potentially hazardous situation, which, if not avoided, could result in minor
or moderate injury or equipment damage.
WARNING
INDICATES A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION, WHICH, IF

NOT AVOIDED, COULD RESULT IN DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY
***DANGER***
INDICATES AN IMMINENTLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION,

WHICH, IF NOT AVOIDED WILL RESULT IN DEATH OR
SERIOUS INJURY.
2 © 2017 General Electric Company. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be copied or distributed in whole or in part,

Generator Protection GEK 75512R
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 4
A. Standards................................................................................................................................................ 4
B. Protection Responsibility ....................................................................................................................... 4
C. Protection Equipment............................................................................................................................. 5
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS ................................. 6

A. Operation and Protection ....................................................................................................................... 6
B. Protection and Alarms............................................................................................................................ 6
III. ALARMS ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE ........................................................................... 6
V. PROTECTION DURING STATIC START ............................................................................................. 7
VI. TRIPPING METHODS .............................................................................................................................. 7
VII. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................. 10

Electrical Faults ............................................................................................................................. 10
System Faults ................................................................................................................................. 16
System Operations ......................................................................................................................... 20
Mechanical or Thermal Faults ....................................................................................................... 24
VIII. REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 38
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Recommended V/Hz protection............................................................................................................ 14
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Alarms .................................................................................................................................................... 33

Table 2. Summary of Protection Recommendations ............................................................................................ 36
© 2014 General Electric Company. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be copied or distributed in whole or in part, 3

I. INTRODUCTION
This instruction book insert was prepared to provide a summary of General Electric's recommendations
for protection of its cylindrical rotor synchronous generators. Since a wide variety of technology is
applied to machines of various size and rating, not all of the alarm and protection recommendations are
applicable for a given generator design. For example, references to hydrogen and stator water cooling
systems are not applicable to air cooled machines. The alarm and protection sections are sequenced so
that recommendations which are generally applicable appear first, ones related to hydrogen systems next,
and finally stator water cooling system alarms and protection. Recommendations for excitation system
protection are not included, but are covered in separate instructions.
This instruction book discusses the kinds of protection that are desirable, and the action that is believed to
be best for the needed protection. Specific relays and relay circuits are not discussed.
A. Standards
General Electric turbine-generators are designed and built to meet or surpass applicable industry
accepted standards. For the cylindrical rotor synchronous generators covered by these instructions,
these standards are:
1. IEEE C50.13
IEEE Standard for Cylindrical-Rotor 50 Hz and 60 Hz Synchronous Generators Rated 10 MVA
and Above
2. IEEE C50.14
Requirements for Combustion Gas Turbine Driven Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generators
3. IEC 60034-1
Rotating Electrical Machines - Rating and Performance
4. IEC 60034-3
Rotating Electrical Machines - Specific requirements for synchronous generators driven by
steam turbines or combustion gas turbines
B. Protection Responsibility
There are IEEE Standards covering generator protection which provide guidance material on
generator protective relaying. These include:
1. IEEE C37.101
IEEE Guide for Generator Ground Protection
2. IEEE C37.102
IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection
3. IEEE C37.106
IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants

The combination of above IEEE/IEC standards are accepted by the industry today as the most
prominent standards for generator protection. At the time of the original publication of this document,
two IEEE Press Books were published which also provide a useful anthology of the background
material related to generator protection. These are:
1. Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 1, IEEE Press, 1980.
2. Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 2, IEEE Press, 1992.
Another useful reference is the IEEE Buff Book from the color series - IEEE Standard 242 – 2001
IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power
Systems.
The operating limits specified by the manufacturer may be inadvertently exceeded for a number of
reasons. These include, among others:
 internal generator failure

 auxiliary equipment failure
 operator error
 abnormal system conditions
The protection methods and equipment in place should be able to safely protect the generator no
matter which of these circumstances, or combination of them, causes the abnormal operation.
Since protective relays and other devices are not immune to failure, it is recommended that
consideration be given to providing back-up protection for those faults where a device failure could
subject the generator to serious damage.
Generator protection is a large and complex subject. These instructions were written to provide
information on protection, based on our experience as designers and manufacturers that may not
always be readily available in other forms.
The recommendations contained in these instructions are based on the best available information at
the time of publication. Changes in the state of the art may result in modification of these
recommendations. Such modifications will usually be communicated to all owners of affected
turbine-generators through General Electric Technical Information Letter (TIL) series. These
modifications will be incorporated in periodic revisions to these instructions.
C. Protection Equipment
It should not be assumed that any required hardware is part of the turbine-generator supplied,
although in certain cases some protection is due to special requirements or it is integrated into the
excitation or control system.
In either case, it is the owner's or his designee’s responsibility to check, adjust, calibrate and connect
all protective equipment to suitable tripping relays or circuits in order to provide the intended
protection. The manufacturer should be consulted for specific protection application issues or
concerns.

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS

A. Operation and Protection
The line between generator operation and protection is not always clear and there is inevitably an
area of overlap. These instructions cover those functions that are mainly performed by protective
relaying or similar devices or functions. A companion instruction (Ref. 1) covers those aspects of
generator operation that are mainly under control of an operator and/or electronic turbine-generator
controller. Both of these publications should be consulted during plant design and should be used in
conjunction with other parts of the instruction book for proper operation of the turbine-generator.
B. Protection and Alarms

Those protective relays or devices that trip the generator should alert an operator as to the cause of
any trip, and be able to take direct action if this should prove necessary. In addition to the tripping
relays there are other relays or devices that initiate only an alarm or data logging. In these cases, it
becomes an operator's responsibility to decide what corrective action is required and to take it.
III. ALARMS
Many of the "alarm only" devices are for temperature measurement. These are Resistance Temperature
Detectors (RTDs) and Thermocouples (TCs). Some measure other variables such as hydrogen pressure
and purity, and stator cooling water pressure, flow and conductivity (if applicable). A typical list of alarm
devices furnished with the generator is given in Table 1, including recommended alarm points and signal
ranges. If additional special instrumentation is supplied, alarm settings will be specified in the appropriate
section of the instruction book.
Table 1 contains information which may be useful when specifying signal monitoring or recording
equipment.
The table also includes typical ranges of the variable for each of the devices shown. These ranges do not
represent the actual capabilities of the generator or its auxiliary equipment and should not be used in any
way as a guide for operation.
When a protective device or function signals a trip, or when the operator trips the unit because of an
alarm or other indication of malfunction, it is most important that the cause of the problem be determined
and corrected before attempting to restart or resynchronize. Failure to do so may lead to more serious
troubles.
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE
The need for protecting a generator while on line is well known, but the need when off line may not be as
well understood. Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which a generator could be damaged while
off line.
For this reason, it is recommended that, as a general rule, all alarms and protections be kept operative at
all times. Exceptions to this rule are those protections which would not operate properly or give false
signals when the unit is below rated speed, not excited, or not synchronized. Relaying and interlocking
circuitry that operates when the unit is off line should be reviewed to make certain it does not
inadvertently incapacitate any essential protection.

V. PROTECTION DURING STATIC START
Most GE heavy-duty gas turbines employ static starter (Load Commutated Inverter, LCI) to accelerate
the turbine to a self-sustaining rotational speed.
The LCI has a built-in DC ground fault protection scheme. Proper operation of this scheme requires that
there be no closed path to the neutral to avoid a possible damage to the power electronics in the event of a
DC ground fault. Therefore, the generator must remain ungrounded (neutral disconnect switch open) for
the duration of LCI start.
Ground fault protection schemes in protective relays that rely upon the measurement of generator neutral
voltage will not be available while the neutral disconnect switch is open. Ground fault protection
available in the LCI is generally deemed to be adequate for this short duration and the overall scheme
appropriate to protect expensive power electronics against any possible grounds during LCI operation.
Other generator protection functions that are required to be blocked prior to closing of the generator
breaker to avoid mis-operation will naturally not be available during static start. If the zone of differential
protection covers multiple regions and one of them senses the LCI current during static start, a separate
group of de-sensitized settings should be enabled during this period to avoid mis-operation of the
differential protection.
VI. TRIPPING METHODS
There are a number of ways a turbine-generator, or a generator alone, may be tripped, i.e., disconnected
from the system or shut down. Some of the factors that should be considered in determining what type of
trip to use for each fault requiring one are:
 severity of fault to generator

 probability of fault spreading
 amount of overspeed resulting
 probability of high overspeed
 importance of removing excitation
 need for maintaining auxiliary power
 need for shutting down the unit
 time required to resynchronize
 effect on the power system
In recognition of the factors above, the manufacturer recommends an action that insures protection of the
generator. Unless otherwise noted, a protective action with a lower number than the recommended action
is allowable (see Table 2). Although the lower number protective action may provide faster protection,
additional danger to the turbine is incurred. These dangers include higher overspeed and worse turbine
thermal shock duty. The recommended protective actions are selected based on the manufactures
judgment with regard to providing acceptable generator protection, while minimizing unnecessarily harsh
turbine duty. The owner should select the action to be used based on the importance of the applicable
factors in his case. The number of ways a generator can be tripped from faults is categorized into the
following (trip) types with some notable differences in gas turbine vs. steam turbine driven generators.

Note that for single shaft combined cycle applications where a gas turbine and a steam turbine share a
common generator, protection considerations can be made as if the prime mover were gas turbine. This is
because the primary danger of steam turbine overspeed is generally mitigated by the inertia from the gas
turbine compressor. Also, any interface of the protective system that need to be made with the turbine
control system will only be to that of the gas turbine controller.
1. Simultaneous trip - trips the turbine valves closed, opens generator line breakers and removes
excitation simultaneously, as with a lock-out relay. A Simultaneous trip is acceptable for all (gas
turbine or steam turbine) generator faults, and generally provides the highest degree of protection
for the turbine-generator although it does permit a small overspeed and there is a slight
probability of high overspeed.
2. Generator trip - opens the generator line breakers and removes excitation simultaneously, but
leaves the turbine running near rated speed. Where maintaining speed is not harmful, this
provides as high a degree of protection for the generator as a Simultaneous trip (Type 1). If the
plant can operate following a full load rejection, and if the cause of the trip can be identified and
rectified quickly, it may make resynchronization possible in a shorter time than Type 1. Since it
does result in a higher overspeed than Type 1, it should only be used when there is an advantage
in not tripping the turbine.
It should be noted that high overspeed events in a gas turbine, while possible, are not as likely or
as severe as in a steam turbine. As a result, tripping just excitation and the generator breaker is
acceptable in gas turbine-generator applications but should be avoided for steam
turbine-generators other than those in single shaft combined cycle applications.
3. Breaker trip - trips all generator line breakers but not the excitation or the turbine. This trip has
advantages similar to Generator trip, Type 2 when the fault permits excitation to remain applied,
and can be applied regardless of whether the prime mover is gas or steam turbine. Its advantage
over Type 2 is that it provides auxiliary power in cases where this cannot be switched to another
bus. If this is not an advantage, Types 2 or 1 should be used.
4. Sequential trip (exclusive to multi-shaft steam turbines) - trips the steam turbine first. When the
steam turbine inlet valve limit switches indicate the valves are closed, and the recommended
reverse power relay (or function) operates, normally after a three-second delay, the generator line
breakers are tripped. Opening of the breakers then trips excitation. This trip should prevent any
overspeed and thus is preferred whenever the risk from a three-second delay in tripping the
generator is slight. This is the preferred method for executing a normal shutdown of a steam
turbine generator.
Certain multiple limit-switch failures, or a reverse power relay failure, can prevent completing
the trip. Although this probability is small, a second reverse power relay, with a 10 to 30 second
time delay, connected to produce a Type 3, Breaker Trip, is recommended as a back-up. This
back-up relay also serves as the primary protection for motoring which does not occur as part of
a Sequential trip.
5. Manual trip - turbine is tripped manually. In a steam turbine, when generator power reverses,
reverse power relay trips generator line breakers. Breaker opening trips excitation. This trip is
recommended whenever an operator sees the need for a fault trip and is not certain that a
Runback and trip (Type 6) will be fast enough. Note that Type 5 is actually a manually initiated
Sequential trip.

NOTE
There are no cases for which manually tripping the generator breakers is
recommended. This is because the generator breakers should not normally be
tripped until after the turbine has been tripped and power has reversed. Then the
generator breakers should be automatically tripped by the reverse power relay. A
protected bypass switch may be used to permit manually tripping the generator
alone in case of limit-switch or reverse power relay failure. A manual generator
breaker trip should only be used with full recognition of the risk involved.
6. Manual runback and trip - manually decreases turbine output to low level or to zero, followed
by a Breaker trip in a gas turbine generator or a Sequential trip in a steam turbine generator. This
is the "normal" trip, which is preferred for all normal shutdowns. It is also recommended for
trips required by alarms when the operator judges a Type 5 Manual trip is not essential.
7. Automatic runback - reduces load (via turbine control) at a preset rate to a preset load. It is
recommended here only for loss of stator coolant (if required). It is an alternative to tripping the
unit, and permits continuing on line at a very low load. When it can be used, it has the advantage
of enabling earlier return to full load if the trouble can be quickly corrected.
8. Manual runback - manually reduces load at a rate and to a level determined by operator. This is
useful for some faults which may be load sensitive, such as local overheating, and where there is
no need to trip immediately. It also allows the generator to continue to supply reactive power to
the system.
The recommendations in these instructions are intended to provide the best-balanced protection for
the turbine-generator for generator faults. Unusual circumstances or other plant limitations must be
considered by the owner, and may require different actions. Turbine problems should be handled in
accordance with applicable turbine instructions.

VII. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
The remainder of this instruction book comprises discussions of, and detailed recommendations for, each
of the "faults" listed in the table of contents, and summarized in Table 2.
References are listed at the end of the book.
Electrical Faults
1. Stator Overcurrent
1. Description
Generators are designed to operate continuously at rated kVA, frequency and power factor
over a range of 95 to 105% of rated voltage. Operation beyond rated kVA may result in
harmful stator overcurrent. Note that at rated kVA, 95% voltage, stator current will be
105%. This is permissible.
Normally, generator load is under the control of an operator. Situations can arise during
system disturbances, such as accompanying generator or line trip-outs, which can result in
an overcurrent condition.
For short times, it is permissible to exceed the current corresponding to rated kVA. This
capability is specified in IEEE Standard C50.13 as follows:
Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120

Armature current (percent) 226 154 130 116
2. Detection
Stator current should be monitored by an operator, and kept within rated value by
adjustment of the turbine-generator controls.
A consequence of overcurrent is stator winding overheating, which should be detected by

winding temperature detectors, usually TCs measuring stator cooling water temperature,
and/or RTD's in slots with the stator winding (if applicable). All functioning TCs and RTDs
should be continuously monitored and alarmed (see Ref. 1, and 2&3 for H2O cooled
machines). However, even though it may not result in excessive stator winding
temperatures, operating above specified currents is not an acceptable practice since
unmonitored phenomena, such as temperatures in other parts of the stator circuit, winding
forces, abnormal magnetic fields, etc., may become excessive.
3. Recommendation
Automatic tripping is not provided for protection against stator overcurrent. However, all
operators should be made aware of the importance of operating the generator within its
rated capability. In cases when a generator will operate in an unattended station, some form
of overcurrent (overload) protection should be provided. An alternative is stator
overtemperature which provides similar protection. For additional information, see Ref. 1.

2. Stator Ground Fault

1. Description
The generator stator neutral normally operates at a potential close to ground, generally
through a high impedance grounding transformer/resistor. In some cases, a reactor is used in
a resonant grounding arrangement. Should a phase winding or any equipment connected to
it fault to ground, the normally low neutral voltage could rise as high as line-to-neutral
voltage, depending on fault location.
Although a single ground fault will not necessarily cause immediate damage, the presence
of one increases the probability of a second. This is because the occurrence of such a fault is
probably the result of damage which is not confined to one spot. In fact, the existence of a
ground fault through tough, high-voltage insulation is usually a result of another, potentially
catastrophic, trouble. A second fault, even if detected by differential relays, may cause
serious damage. A second fault in the same phase will not be detected by differential relays,
and could cause serious damage as a result.
2. Detection
The usual method of detection is by a voltage relay across the grounding resistor. A current
relay is sometimes used in place of a voltage relay or as a back-up. The relay should be
insensitive to third harmonic voltage, but should have as low a pick-up level at line
frequency as is practical to reduce the unprotected zone at the neutral end of the windings.
Methods are available which are designed to protect the entire winding. These schemes
include monitoring the third harmonic voltage at the generator neutral, as well as comparing
third harmonic voltages at the generator line and neutral terminals.
Another method to detect ground faults in 100% of the stator windings is to inject a sub-
harmonic frequency voltage signal via the generator neutral. In the event of a ground fault,
the relay can measure the increased current resulting from the smaller impedance of the
ground fault path, and this sub-harmonic overcurrent and/or the sub-harmonic resistance
(calculated by the relay from the injected voltage and fault current) can be used to detect
presence of stator grounds. The injection based scheme has an advantage over the third
harmonic based schemes in that protection can be available when the generator is online as
well as offline, as long as injection is enabled. These schemes supplement the fundamental
frequency neutral voltage based protection.
WARNING
IF INJECTION BASED GROUND FAULT DETECTION SCHEME IS

EMPLOYED DURING GENERATOR OFFLINE CONDITIONS, IT
MUST BE ENSURED THAT THE INJECTION VOLTAGE SOURCE IS
DISABLED AND LOCKED OUT/TAGGED OUT PRIOR TO
PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON THE GENERATOR OR ANY
EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO THE GENERATOR LINE AND
NEUTRAL TERMINALS.

3. Recommendations
The grounding impedance should limit the ground fault current to less than 25 amperes. The
usual criterion based on circuit capacitance will normally result in less than 10 amperes. The
stator ground fault relay should be connected to trip the unit within several seconds, via a
Simultaneous trip, Type 1.
For further information, see Ref. 5.
3. Stator Phase-to-Phase Fault

1. Description
A stator phase-to-phase fault is any electrical fault between two phases of the armature
winding. This type of fault is very serious because very large currents can flow and produce
large amounts of damage to the winding if allowed to persist. Because of the nature of the
construction of the armature it is very likely that this type of fault will grow to include
ground, thereby causing significant damage to the stator core.
2. Detection
It is possible to detect a phase-to-phase fault in the winding by means of a differential relay.

This method provides protection for the entire winding, and its sensitivity is limited mainly
by the degree to which the various current transformers are matched.
The differential relay method cannot protect against a fault within one phase of the winding.
Such a turn-to-turn fault can only be detected by the resulting armature current unbalance.
However, such faults are rare and will usually include ground, in which case they will be
detected by the stator ground fault relay.
3. Recommendations
Upon detection of a phase-to-phase fault in the winding, it is imperative that the unit be
tripped without delay, using a Simultaneous trip, Type 1.
4. Over-Voltage
1. Description
Permissible voltage limits under various operating conditions are given in the Generator
Operation instructions (Ref. 1). It is normally an operator's responsibility to maintain
voltage (and the corresponding kVA) within specified limits.
With turbine-generators it is unlikely that voltage will depart significantly from the preset
value. If it does, due to a regulator failure or a system disturbance, a trip signal will usually
be produced by one of the protective relays, such as volts/Hertz or maximum excitation
limit.
2. Recommended Action
Therefore, specific over-voltage protection is generally not required for the generator. In
cases where protective relays are set to provide over-voltage protection, it should be
programmed to produce a Generator trip, Type 2. However as mentioned above, such a trip

will already be available from the volts/Hertz or upper excitation limit in the Exciter.
Depending on the circumstances, it may be desirable to protect other equipment connected
to the generator. For unmanned generating stations, consideration should be given to
implementing automatic over voltage protection. For additional info, see Ref. 1.
5. Volts Per Hertz

1. Description
Per unit voltage divided by per unit frequency, commonly called volts/Hertz, is a readily
measurable quantity that is proportional to flux in the generator and step-up transformer
cores.
Moderate over fluxing (105%-110%) increases core loss, elevating core temperatures for all
generator designs and armature temperatures for generators with conventionally cooled
stator windings. Long term operation at elevated temperatures can shorten the life of the
stator insulation systems. More severe over fluxing (above 110%) further increases core
loss, and saturate portions of the core to the point that flux flows out into adjacent
structures. The resulting induced voltages can be coupled to stator punchings due to the
manner in which cores are assembled and clamped. Severe over fluxing can breakdown
interlaminar insulation, followed by rapid local core melting.
Over-volts/Hertz can be caused by regulator failure, load rejection while under control of
the dc regulator, or excessive excitation with the generator off line.
It can also result from decreasing speed while the ac regulator or the operator attempts to
maintain rated stator voltage.
2. Detection
The volts/Hertz sensor is normally included as part of the excitation system, and are this
protection is also built-into modern microprocessor based protective relays.
3. Recommendation
Even though over-volts/Hertz is more likely to occur when offline, it can also occur when
on line. For this reason, the volts/Hertz protection should be in operation whenever
excitation is applied.
Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the recommended V/Hz protection.

Figure 1: Recommended V/Hz protection
In view of the potential consequences it is prudent to provide as conservative protection as

possible consistent with security from false tripping. Selection of a modest maximum trip
level of above 118%, coupled with a 2 second time delay satisfies these objectives. A load
rejection from full rated KVA, rated power factor and 105% of rated voltage will not result
in tripping if an automatic voltage regulator is in service. Operation at 118% should be
limited not to exceed 45 seconds. The curve shape from 118 to 110% V/Hz approximates
the over excitation capability of many transformers (for step-up and station service power
applications). However, if the transformers require lower values, the protective relays
should be set accordingly. The excitation control limiter (if applicable) should be set to
prevent continuous operation above 109.5%.
The trip signal should produce a Generator trip, Type 2 or a Simultaneous trip, Type 1.
6. Field Over excitation

1. Description
The generator field winding is designed to operate continuously at a current equal to that
required to produce rated kVA at rated conditions. In addition, higher currents are permitted
for short times, to permit field forcing during transient conditions. These limits are specified
in terms of a curve of field voltage vs. time defined by the following points in IEEE C50.13:
Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120

Field voltage (percent) 208 146 125 112

2. Detection
Most excitation systems now being furnished include an Upper Excitation Limit function.
Its purpose is to prevent prolonged field overcurrent by recalibrating the current regulator,
transferring to another regulator, and, finally, producing a trip signal, as required.
3. Recommendation
The owner's responsibility with respect to this function is to see that the Upper Excitation
Limit is properly adjusted and maintained, and properly connected to trip the unit when
required. Protection Type 2, Generator trip, or Type 1, Simultaneous trip, is recommended.
Since loss of potential transformer signal to the voltage regulator is one cause of field
overcurrent, relaying to detect this situation and automatic transfer to another regulator is
suggested. Sensing and transfer functions are part of most modern excitation systems.
7. Field Ground
1. Description
The generator field winding is electrically isolated from ground. Therefore, the existence of
one ground fault in the winding will usually not damage the rotor. However, the presence of
two or more grounds in the winding will cause magnetic and thermal imbalances plus
localized heating and damage to the rotor forging or other metallic parts. Unfortunately, the
presence of the first ground fault makes detection of a second fault difficult, if not
impossible. In addition, modern rotor winding insulation systems have achieved a level of
quality that reduces the likelihood of a field ground except under unusual circumstances
where the probability of occurrence of a second ground or other serious problem is high.
2. Detection
The relay necessary to detect a field ground is normally supplied with the excitation system.
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that the field ground detector be connected to produce a Generator trip,
Type 2 or a Simultaneous trip, Type 1.
8. Loss of Excitation
1. Description
Loss of excitation (or loss of field) results in loss of synchronism and operation of the
generator as an induction machine. This will result in the flow of slip frequency currents in
the rotor body, wedges, and amortisseur windings (if so equipped), as well as severe torque
oscillations in the rotor shaft. The rotor is not designed to sustain such currents, nor is the
turbine-generator shaft designed to long withstand the alternating torques. The result can be
rotor overheating, coupling slippage and even rotor failure. The length of time before
serious damage occurs depends on the generator load at the time of the incident, slip
frequency, and whether the field winding is open circuited or shorted, and may be a matter
of seconds.

A loss of excitation normally indicates a problem with the excitation system which,
depending on its nature, could be serious (e.g., collector ring flashover, if so equipped).
Because of the VARs absorbed to make up for the low or lost excitation, some systems
cannot tolerate the continued operation of a generator without excitation. Consequently, if
the generator is not disconnected immediately when it loses excitation, widespread
instability may very quickly develop, and major system shut-down may occur.
2. Detection
Since loss of excitation results in a marked change in reactive kVA, a loss of excitation
relay of the impedance or mho type is usually used (Ref. 6).
3. Recommendation
The generator should be tripped from the power system, using a Simultaneous trip (Type 1),
or a Generator trip (Type 2). It is important that all excitation power be removed. It should
not be assumed that, since there is loss of excitation, the exciter is not supplying power to an
internal fault.
System Faults
9. Unbalanced Armature Currents

1. Description
When the generator is supplying an unbalanced load, the phase currents and terminal
voltages deviate from the ideal balanced relationship, and a negative phase sequence
armature current (I2) is imposed on the generator. The negative sequence current in the
armature winding creates a magnetic flux wave in the air gap which rotates in opposition to
the rotor at synchronous speed. This flux induces currents in the rotor body iron, wedges,
retaining rings and amortisseur windings, if so equipped, at twice the line frequency.
Heating occurs in these areas and the resulting temperatures depend upon the level and
duration of the unbalanced currents. Under some conditions, it is possible to reach
temperatures at which the rotor materials no longer contain the centrifugal forces imposed
on them, resulting in serious damage to the turbine-generator set (Ref. 11).
There is always some low-level unbalance in any power system and therefore limits on the
continuous unbalance have been established. For currents above the permissible continuous
levels, a limit on the time-integral of I22 has been established for times up to 120 seconds.
Such levels will often result from faults, open lines or breaker failures.
Unless otherwise specified by the manufacturer as part of the generator design data
information, the negative sequence current limits are given in the applicable standards (Ref
31 or Ref 32), where I2 is the per unit negative sequence current on the generator base and t
is the time in seconds. See Ref 1 for further comments on unbalanced loading capability.
2. Detection
The protection scheme should be designed such that it will permit negative sequence
currents up to the continuous limit, but produce a trip signal if the level exceeds this value
long enough to reach the permissible I22t limit (Ref 13).

It is also desirable to alert an operator when I2 exceeds a normal level, which may be lower
than the permissible continuous negative sequence current. This enables the operator to
adjust load in order to prevent a trip. Ref. 1 describes in more detail the actions an operator
may take.
3. Recommendations
A negative sequence relay, similar to that described above, should be used on all units. It
should be arranged to cause a Generator trip, Type 2, or a Simultaneous trip, Type 1.
10. Loss of Synchronism

1. Description
Loss of synchronism, also referred to as out-of-step operation or pole slipping, can occur as
a result of steady-state transient or dynamic instability. It also may occur as a result of loss
of excitation or synchronizing errors.
2. Detection
The majority of users do not apply specific loss-of-synchronization relaying. However, a

skilled relay engineer can adjust impedance relaying to reliably detect loss of synchronism.
Loss of excitation relays may provide detection, but cannot be relied upon under all
conditions. If the electrical center during loss of synchronism is in the transmission system,
line relays may detect it. If they do not, specific relaying should be provided.
3. Recommendation
Out-of-step operation can result in pulsating torques and winding stresses and high rotor
iron currents that are potentially damaging to the generator. Excessive stator winding and
core end heating can also result if the out-of-step operation is caused by reduced or lost
excitation. Therefore, it is recommended that the generator be separated from the system
without delay, preferably during the first slip cycle (Ref. 14, 26, 27.). A Breaker trip, Type
3, is recommended, and permits the fastest resynchronization after conditions have
stabilized.
11. Abnormal Frequency Operation

1. Description
For a generator connected to a power system, abnormal frequency operation is a result of a

severe system disturbance. An isolated or unconnected unit could operate at low or high
frequency due to improper speed control adjustment or mis-operation of the speed control.
There are two effects to be considered. The generator can tolerate under frequency operation
for long periods, provided load and voltage are sufficiently reduced, as explained in
Generator Operation instructions (Ref. 1).
The generator can also tolerate over frequency operation provided voltage is within an
acceptable range.

2. Recommendation
For the generator, specific protection for abnormal frequency operation is not required.
However, the turbine is very sensitive to abnormal frequencies and recommendations given
for it should be carefully studied and followed (Ref. 25). Additionally, refer to GER3620k
(Heavy Duty Gas Turbine Operating and Maintenance Considerations), GEK103801
(Turbine Off-frequency Operation (for 60Hz Modern Units)) and GEK103802 (Turbine
Off-Frequency Operation (for 50Hz Modern Units)) for guidelines on GE turbine off-
frequency operations. Detection of abnormal frequency operation may also be used to
identify system problems.
Refer further questions on unusual frequency operation to the GE Company for

recommendations.
12. Breaker Failure

1. Description
Since most faults involving the generator require tripping of the generator/line breakers,
failure of any of them to open properly results in loss of protection and/or other problems,
such as motoring. If one or two poles of a generator line breaker fail to open, the result can
be a single-phase load on the generator and negative sequence currents on the rotor.
2. Detection
Both types of failure described above will cause conditions that may be detected by other
protective devices, e.g., reverse power, loss of synchronism or negative sequence relays.
However, a more direct method is the use a dedicated Breaker Failure protection, which
uses an overcurrent relay with a set time delay.
Part of the breaker failure scheme, energizes a Breaker Failure Initiate (BFI or IBF) signal
when any breaker trip is initiated. The status of breaker is monitored using the auxiliary
breaker contacts wired to the relays. If it is determined that the breaker is still closed after
the original trip command is sent, a re-trip signal can be sent immediately as one last
attempt to open the breaker without initiating tripping of other plant breakers.
A current detector, in conjunction with the breaker auxiliary contacts, is used to monitor
continued presence of current in any one or more phases after the original trip signal was
sent to the breaker.
3. Recommendation
Industry past practice has not always recognized the need for breaker failure protection
because of the reliability of generator breakers. However, it is recommended that breaker
failure protection be used with all tripping relays that can trip a generator breaker.
If a confirmation of breaker tripping in all three phases via the current detector or from the
breaker auxiliary contacts is not received after a suitable time delay (typically not less than
the longest possible operating time of the breaker), a signal is sent to trip all breakers that
can feed current to the generator through the failed breaker (Ref 15).

13. System Back-Up

1. Description
System back-up protection is also known as external fault back-up protection. As this name
implies, it is used to protect the generator from supplying short circuit current to a fault in
an adjacent system element because of a primary relaying failure (Ref. 15, 16).
2. Detection
Either voltage restrained or current restrained inverse-time overcurrent or distance relays
may be used, depending on the kind of relaying with which the back-up relays must be
selective. Negative sequence relays, in addition to their primary protective role, are
sometimes considered for system back-up protection. However, these will not provide
protection against balanced faults.
3. Recommendation
System back-up protection is recommended. A breaker trip Type 3 is recommended, which
permits the fastest resynchronization after the system fault has been cleared. In Steam
turbines, if immediate resynchronization is not a priority, a Type 1 trip may be considered to
trip the turbine, exciter and generator breaker simultaneously.
14. Voltage Surges

1. Description
Certain abnormal conditions could occur which might subject the generator to high voltages
surges. Among these are:
 Switching surges from circuit breakers at generator voltage

 Positive and negative surges arriving simultaneously on two phases
 Ineffective direct stroke shielding
 Failure of high side surge protective equipment
 Accidental connection between high and low side transformer windings, due to
internal failure, external flashover or other cause
The latter category is not a normal protective function of low voltage arrestors and would
subject them to excessive duty which could cause their failure. In view of the potential
personnel hazard in the event of surge arrestor failure, the user should consider physically
isolating the surge arrestor cubicles and limiting access to them.
2. Recommendation
To provide protection for these and similar situations, surge arrestors are recommended for
all units. Surge capacitors are generally not required for machines with single-turn coils.
They are provided on some packaged generators where optional installation of surge
capacitors close to the surge arrestors would not be convenient. Application of LCI (load
commutated inverters) for turbine-generator starting may also obviate the use of surge
capacitors on multi- turn coil machines.
Optimal protection requires surge protection be located in close proximity to the generator
terminals.

System Operations
15. Transmission Line Switching

1. Description
The switching of transmission lines at or near generating stations for maintenance purposes,
or simply restoring a line to service after a relayed trip, are recognized as normal functions
in the course of operating a power system. In some cases, these line switching operations
can subject nearby generating units to excessive duty. The effect on the generator in severe
cases is the same as for poor synchronizing in causing possible stator winding and shaft
fatigue damage (Ref. 7).
2. Detection
A measure of the severity of a switching event is the sudden step change in power (AP) seen
by the generator at the instant of switching. As a general guide, studies have shown that
where AP does not exceed 0.5 per unit on the generator kVA base the duty will be
negligible (Ref. 17, 18). Values of AP greater than 0.5 per unit may be determined to be
non-harmful to the generator, for specific units and system switching events, but these cases
should be carefully studied and identified.
Predetermination of duties associated with line-switching operations and operating

procedures which limit these duties to acceptable values can be found from simulating these
operations, using a computer program such as that normally used for stability studies (Ref.
17, 18).
3. Recommendation
The recommended procedure for avoiding excessive duty for the normal planned line-
switching operation is to establish, where necessary, operating procedures which limit the
machine AP to either the general 0.5 per unit level or an individually determined level for
that unit.
As an adjunct to established operating procedures, phase angle check relays at key breaker
locations can prevent line closings under circumstances predetermined to be excessive.
Note, however, that such check relays should not be applied without reliable means of
overriding which would permit necessary line closing operations under emergency
circumstances.

16. High Speed Reclosing

1. Description
High speed reclosing of transmission circuits directly out of generating stations or
electrically close to the station may cause significant shaft fatigue damage to the turbine-
generator unit, particularly where high speed reclosing following severe multi-phase faults
is permitted (Ref. 7, 19). The actual fatigue duty which a unit may experience during its
lifetime from this cause depends on many factors, including both the unit's and the system's
characteristics, the frequency of fault occurrence, etc. Studies substantiate that significant
shaft damage could occur with unsuccessful reclosing for close-in three-phase faults.
2. Recommendation
In order to eliminate or reduce the potential effects of unrestricted high-speed reclosing of
lines near generating stations, an alternative reclosing practice such as one of the following
is recommended:
 Delayed reclosing, with a delay of 10 seconds or longer.

 Sequential reclosing, i.e., reclose initially only from the remote end of the line and
block closing at the station if the fault persists. This is recommended only if the
remote end of the line is not electrically near other turbine-generator units.
 Selective reclosing, i.e., high speed reclosing only for the less severe faults such as
single line-to-ground; delayed reclosing on others. Other relaying practices
providing selectivity on the basis of fault severity would also be effective in
reducing shaft fatigue duty.
Where such alternative reclosing practices are not considered acceptable to the user, it is
recommended that either:
a. Detailed studies be performed to determine the probable lifetime fatigue damage

which might be experienced for the reclosing practice contemplated, or
b. Torsional monitoring equipment be installed to determine the accumulated fatigue
damage being incurred.
17. Subsynchronous Resonance (SSR)

1. Description
When a turbine-generator is connected to a transmission network that has series capacitor

compensation or a high voltage dc (HVDC) transmission system, it is possible to develop
subsynchronous (under line frequency) current oscillations in the lines and in the generator
armature. In the case of series compensated ac systems, these currents interact with the
synchronously rotating flux to produce torque pulsation on the generator rotor. If these
pulsations are at a frequency close to one of the torsional natural frequencies of the turbine-
generator, high levels of torsional vibration can be induced in the shafts. Torsional
instability of the turbine-generator shaft system has the potential for being extremely
damaging to the turbine-generator shafts, and resulted in two shaft failures in the early
1970s. A more recently observed phenomenon involves interaction between torsional modes
and HVDC controls (Ref. 28). This could lead to an unstable situation, resulting in
spontaneous growth of torsional vibrations and potential damage to the shaft.

2. Detection
Unstable or high levels of torsional vibration may be detected by observing the variations in
angular velocity of the turbine-generator. A common measuring system involves a toothed
wheel, a magnetic pickup and a frequency demodulator. Strain gauge telemetry systems
have also been utilized in short-term tests to detect shaft torsional oscillations. Indirect
methods of identifying subsynchronous resonance steady-state instability problems involve
monitoring generator electrical terminal quantities. The armature current relay described in
Ref. 20 utilizes this approach.
3. Responsibility for Detection
It should be understood by those utilities that utilize series capacitor compensation, or have
HVDC transmission in their system, that the potential for damaging torsional vibrations is a
consequence of the special electrical characteristics of the transmission network. It is,
therefore, the owner's responsibility to implement devices to detect, and protect the machine
from, the influences of subsynchronous torsional interaction. In the case of HVDC
transmission lines, the potential for interaction between the HVDC controls and the turbine-
generator rotor system needs to be accounted for in HVDC control design. General Electric
has worked closely with many utilities on system studies to define the requirements for
protective devices on particular systems. The company has also manufactured and has in
service protective devices. This equipment includes (Ref. 20):
a. A static subsynchronous resonance filter (static blocking filter)

b. A supplementary excitation damping control (excitation system damper)
c. A machine frequency relay (armature current frequency relay) (Ref. 21)
d. A torsional vibration monitor (Ref. 22)
In addition, generators that are applied for use in series capacitor compensated systems or
systems containing HVDC transmission are sometimes furnished with pole-face amortisseur
windings. The addition of pole-face amortisseur windings does not necessarily enhance
negative sequence capability. The function of amortisseur windings is to reduce the machine
electrical resistance in the subsynchronous frequency range, which reduces the potential for
torsional interaction at subsynchronous frequencies.
4. Recommendation
It is vital that the electric utility work closely with the manufacturer at the planning stage to
define the need for auxiliary equipment to protect the machine. This equipment, if required,
needs to be operational when the machine is first connected to the network containing series
capacitor compensated and/or HVDC transmission lines. It needs to be highly reliable, as
mis-operation could result in major machine failure.

18. Inadvertent Energization

1. Description
When a generator is energized three-phase while at standstill or reduced speed, it will

behave and accelerate as an induction motor. The equivalent machine impedance during the
high slip interval can be represented by negative sequence reactance (X2) in series with
negative sequence resistance (R2). The machine terminal voltage and current during this
interval will be a function of generator, transformer and system impedances. If the
generator-transformer is connected to an infinite system, the machine currents will be high
(several per unit), and conversely, if the unit is connected to a weak system, the machine
current could be low (1-2 per unit). During the period the machine is accelerating, high
currents will be induced in the rotor and the time to damage may be on the order of a few
seconds.
NOTE
Negative sequence reactance of a steam turbine-generator is approximately equal to

the subtransient reactance X"dv.
A number of generators have been accidentally energized while at standstill or very
low speed. While many have survived the experience with minor damage, others
have not.
2. Detection
While there are several generator zone relays that may detect this contingency, their
performance may be marginal. Therefore, the preferred approach is to provide detection
means specifically designed for this purpose.
One such method is to use overcurrent relays that are armed by a speed relay when the
generator is offline. A more common approach today is to arm the overcurrent relays by
three-phase under voltage conditions when the generator is off line.
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that one of the detection schemes described above be used to protect
every generator. To prevent damage to the rotor, stator bearings, etc., it is desirable that
highspeed protection be provided for this contingency. The relaying should be connected to
trip the main generator breaker, and excitation, and have a breaker failure protection scheme
in place to trip any breakers which could feed current to the generator if breaker failure is
detected, and be so implemented that it is never taken out of service when the unit is shut
down for any purpose, even with the rotor removed.

Mechanical or Thermal Faults
19. Bearing Vibration

1. Description
High vibration (as defined below) on a generator is a symptom of a problem. There are
many possible causes of vibration, including:
 Unbalance
 Misalignment
 Thermal sensitivity
 Damaged bearings
 Oil Whip
 Rubbing
 Bent overhangs
 Out-of-round journals or collectors
 Stiffness dissymmetry
2. Detection
All bearings are normally provided with vibration detectors and recorders. Either velocity
probes, proximity probes, or both are used. These permit recording and monitoring of
vibration, and alarming and/or tripping at predetermined levels of vibration. The vibration
recorders do not provide the frequency spectrum information which could be useful in
determining the cause of the vibration. This information must be obtained with a portable
vibration analyzer.
GE also offers the ADRE system to more precisely analyze vibration issues. For more
information on this system, GE representatives should be contacted.
3. Recommendation
For both generator and alternator bearings provided with proximity probes, the table below
summarizes recommendations for various levels of shaft vibration. The vibration levels are
given in mils [mm], peak-to-peak, unfiltered.
For Vibration Level Exceeding Recommendations

2 Poles 4 Poles
(
(mils) (mm) (mils) mm)
10 254 12 305 Simultaneous Trip (Type1)
7 178 10 254 Runback and trip within 15 minutes (Type 6)
6 152 8 203 Correct at first opportunity
3 76 5 127 Correct when convenient
For generators provided with velocity probes which monitor endshield or pedestal
deflection in the vicinity of the bearing, the alarm level is 0.5 in/sec, and the trip level is 1
in/sec.
In some applications, the transient thermal performance of the turbine results in temporarily
elevated vibration levels on the generator bearings as well. Accordingly, alarm levels may
be raised for a specified time following start-up. See References below.

4. Reference
For more detailed information on vibration, refer to the turbine section of the instruction
book (Ref. 24).
20. Synchronizing Errors

1. Description
Improper synchronizing of units to the line may occur for a number of reasons. The most
severe of these results from incorrect connection of potential transformer or synchronizing
aids such that gross out-of-phase synchronizing, such as a 120° error, may occur. A failure
of automatic synchronizing equipment may also result in large synchronizing errors. While
turbine-generators are designed to withstand these rare occurrences without catastrophic
results, provided stator current does not exceed the three-phase short circuit value, they can
result in damage, such as slipped couplings, with resulting high vibration, loosened stator
windings, and fatigue damage to the shaft and other mechanical parts (Ref. 7).
Careless synchronizing, while generally a less severe incident, may, on an accumulated

basis, have the same result.
The following synchronizing limits are recommended to avoid damaging effects:
 Breaker closing within ±10° (electrical angle)

 Voltage matching within 0 to +5%
 Slip slower than 10 seconds per slip cycle for manual synchronization.
 Slip slower than 6 seconds per slip cycle for automatic synchronization.
2. Detection
A severe out-of-phase synchronizing incident will be evident from the physical effects of
noise and turbine-generator foundation vibration. In addition, a trip may result from the
vibration trips or from electrical protective relays. Poor synchronizing routine is less evident
but would be observable by the synchroscope and an oscillation of electrical quantities
(power, VARs) subsequent to the synchronizing.
3. Recommendations
Careful checking of circuits during initial installation or equipment changeout and the
establishment of well-adhered-to procedures for manual synchronizing are key elements in
minimizing out-of-phase synchronizing incidents.
A Synch check function should monitor manual synchronizing to prevent large errors (Ref.
8).
Automatic synchronizing relays can provide very high accuracy. Where such relays are
used, however, it is important that a check function be applied to provide an independent
back-up. Failure of the primary relays to perform should be alarmed, since this might
otherwise not be noticed.

21. Motoring
1. Description
Motoring of a generator will occur when turbine output is reduced such that it develops less
than no-load losses while the generator is still on line. Assuming excitation is sufficient; the
generator will operate as a synchronous motor driving the turbine. The generator will not be
harmed by synchronous motoring, but, if it occurs as a result of failure to complete a
Sequential trip, protection for the fault originating that trip is lost. In addition, a steam
turbine can be harmed through overheating during synchronous motoring.
If field excitation is lost, along with turbine output, the generator will run as an induction
motor, driving the turbine. In addition to possible harm to the turbine, this will produce
slip-frequency currents in the rotor and could cause it to overheat if continued long enough.
A third type of motoring occurs when the generator is accidentally energized when at low
speed. This is discussed separately under "Accidental Energization".
2. Detection
Motoring following loss of turbine output can be detected with a reverse power relay. To
avoid false trips due to power swings, a time-delay pick-up of 10 to 30 seconds is
suggested. This is the backup relay suggested in the description of Trip 4 - Sequential trip.
Measurement of very low power levels at very low power factors will require relatively
high precision. Reduction in reactive power flow in the generator will reduce the
requirement for high precision. This may be accomplished through control action of the
excitation system or by operator action.
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that the reverse power relay referred to above be used and connected to
produce a Type 2, Generator trip or Type 3, Breaker trip. Breaker Failure Protection should
be initiated, since breaker failure may be the cause of the motoring. In addition, the turbine
section of the instruction book (Ref. 9) should be consulted and followed.
22. Stator Overtemperature

1. Description
Stator overheating may result from overcurrent operation, improper gas pressure or purity
(if applicable), gas or water cooling system malfunction, internal cooling passage blockage,
etc.
2. Detection
Armature bar temperatures are monitored by either TCs measuring stator cooling water
temperature and/or RTD's in the stator slots (if applicable). All functioning RTDs and TCs
should be constantly monitored and alarmed (see Ref 1, and 2&3 for H2O cooled machines).
As pointed out in the stator overcurrent section, these temperature detectors do not provide
complete protection against damage due to overcurrent operation, because temperatures in
other parts of the winding, winding forces, abnormal magnetic fields, etc. may become
excessive.

3. Recommendation
Automatic shutdown is not always provided for protection against stator overheating on
generators with conventionally cooled stator windings. Section 26 describes automatic
protection recommended for liquid cooled armature windings. All operators should be made
aware of the importance of operating the generator within its rated capability. In cases
where a generator will operate in an unattended station, some form of overtemperature
protection should be provided. Implementation of an automatic stator overtemperature
protection scheme also provides some overcurrent protection, and is generally easier to
implement than overcurrent relaying.
23. Loss of Coolant to Gas Coolers (if applicable)

1. Description
Serious overheating of all generator components will occur if coolant flow to the gas
coolers is lost. Various machine temperature alarms will detect the overheating condition
prior to any damaging over temperatures. However, without human monitoring and
intervention, the condition will persist.
2. Detection
The RTD's monitoring the hot and cold gas temperatures may be used as the basis for
establishing protection against the loss of gas coolant. Refer to Table 1 for Alarm
information.
3. Recommendation
For machines which run unattended, consideration should be given to implementing an

Automatic runback (Type 6) or Simultaneous Trip (Type 1), based on the cold and hot gas
RTD's.
24. Reduced Seal Oil Pressure (if applicable)

1. Description
A floating, radial ring-type seal is used to prevent hydrogen leakage from the generator
along the shaft. Oil is supplied to the seals at a pressure slightly higher than that of the
hydrogen in the generator.
For large, liquid cooled generators, the oil is supplied by a seal oil pumping unit. The main
pump is driven by an ac motor. An emergency back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This
pump will start automatically if the oil discharge pressure of the main pump decreases or if
ac power is lost. In addition to the main and emergency pumps, bearing header pressure is
available to maintain hydrogen pressure in the generator at a maximum of approximately 8
psig or 5 psid less than the available bearing header pressure, whichever is lower.
For most conventionally cooled hydrogen generators, seal oil is supplied from the lube oil
tank by the same pump supplying bearing oil. The main pump is driven by an ac motor. An
emergency lube oil back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This pump will start
automatically if the seal oil differential pressure decreases or if ac power is lost. Some
machines are provided with a specific DC seal oil emergency backup pump in addition to
the lube oil backup pump.

Higher pressure (greater than 30 psig) conventionally cooled machines are provided with
separate seal oil pumps. See Ref. 10 for details on the seal oil system provided.
2. Detection
Alarms indicate low differential seal oil pressure, main pump motor overload, and
emergency pump running (see Table 1).
3. Recommendation
If the main pump is lost an operator should take immediate action to determine the cause. If
the problem requires more than a few hours to correct, gas pressure should be reduced to the
lowest value required for the generator load, as determined from the reactive capability
curves. This procedure is recommended because the emergency pump has only the bearing
header pressure as back-up on liquid cooled machines, and no additional backup is provided
on conventionally cooled generators. Careful consideration of the DC supply capacity and
the purge cycle time is required to decide how long it is safe operate on the backup DC
pump. If this gas pressure cannot be maintained, additional reductions in both gas pressure
and load will be required. Operation for long periods with the emergency pump or the
bearing header supply only will result in a reduction of hydrogen purity. For most
generators under these conditions, gas must be scavenged from the generator to maintain
hydrogen purity as described in Ref. 4. Some conventionally cooled machines will
automatically increase the scavenge gas rate in an attempt to maintain purity. Again, see
Ref. 4 for details.
25. Local Overheating (if applicable)

1. Description
Before synchronization, there are at least two areas of possible overheating in the generator
which are a function of field excitation:
 Stator core heating, which is related to the stator flux (volts/Hertz).

 Generator field heating, which is related to field current.
After synchronization, in addition to these two, there is also the possibility of stator winding
heating (including end windings, connection rings, leads, and high voltage bushings), which
is related to armature current.
Local overheating can be caused in a number of ways. One is damage to the laminations at
the inner diameter of the stator core. This might cause electrical contact between
laminations leading to a flow of current and therefore heating. This type of damage may be
caused by a foreign object striking the core under the influence of electromagnetic forces in
the machine. Overheating may also be caused by improper cooling or by faulty or damaged
insulation, allowing excessive leakage current to flow. It can also be caused by operating
outside the capability limits, especially in under excited regions.

2. Detection
On hydrogen-cooled steam turbine-generators, overheating can be detected by the use of the

Generator Gas Monitoring System (GGMS). The GGMS consists of a generator Core
Monitor, a Signal Validation Control and a Pyrolysate Collector. The generator Core
Monitor is an ionization-type particulate detector that is connected to the generator so that a
constant flow of cooling gas passes through it. The cooling gas is monitored for the
presence of submicron particles (particulates). Under normal conditions, the gas coolant
contains no particulates that can be detected by the monitor. When overheating occurs, the
thermal decomposition of organic material, epoxy paint, core lamination enamel or other
insulating materials produces a large number of particulates which can be detected by the
monitor to produce an alarm. The particulates can be collected by the Pyrolysate Collector
which is designed to operate when a generator Core Monitor alarm occurs. Confirmation of
overheating may be accomplished by laboratory analysis of the particulates.
The Validation Control is used to automatically discriminate between a Core Monitor alarm
caused by an instrument malfunction and one caused by local overheating. When the alarm
is verified, the Validation Control actuates a machine heating alarm.
3. Recommendation
When a machine heating alarm occurs, load should be reduced by Manual runback (Type 8)
until the alarm signal clears. If the alarm signal does not clear within five minutes the
generator should be tripped manually (Type 5).
Contacts are provided in the Validation Control which can be used to actuate runback or trip
circuits if this feature is desired. Additional information may be found in specific Generator
Gas Monitoring System publications in the Operation and Maintenance Manual (O&M
Manual).
26. Loss of Stator Coolant (if applicable)

1. Description
Stator winding cooling water is supplied by one of two identical pumps. The pump not
running is in a standby mode and is connected to start automatically if the discharge
pressure of the operating pump falls.
Cooling flow may be reduced or lost because of:
a. System restrictions such as plugged filters or strainer, or a buildup of material such

as copper oxide in the stator winding strands
b. Localized restriction in a single bar or group of bars in the winding
c. Pipe break
d. Loss of pumps
e. Mis-adjustment of the control valve
f. Control valve failure
g. Freeze-up of the system or instrument lines containing moisture

2. Detection
a. System restrictions downstream of the control valve sensing point will be signaled
by the low flow alarm. System restrictions upstream of the sensing point will be
compensated for by the control valve. If the limits of control valve operation are
reached, a restriction will be signaled by the low pressure and low flow alarms. A
high differential pressure will occur across the component containing the restriction,
and the most likely place for this is the main filter. On newer units, filter pressure is
monitored by a differential pressure alarm. System restrictions can also be signaled
by the bulk water outlet temperature sensor which provides an alarm function, and
by the individual liquid header outlet TCs and slot RTDs.
b. Localized restrictions in a single bar or group of bars might be detected by the
individual liquid header outlet TCs and the slot RTDs.
c. A pipe break will be detected by a rise in the bulk outlet temperature and the
individual liquid heater TCs, or by the low-pressure alarm and a temperature rise
indicated by the slot RTDs.
d. Loss of both pumps will be detected by low pressure and low flow alarms and by a
temperature rise signaled by the entire slot RTDs.
e. Mis-adjustment of the control valve, which causes a flow restriction, will be
detected by low pressure, low flow, and high bulk outlet temperature alarms. The
individual outlet TCs and slot RTDs will also be affected.
f. Control valve failure is likely to cause higher flow than required. There are no
alarms to detect this, but the situation will, in time, be apparent to an operator when
higher than normal flows and pressures are observed.
g. Freezing temperatures in the station are particularly dangerous because some of the
protective devices may freeze and either fail to operate or operate incorrectly. The
generator should not be operated above its no-liquid capability when station
temperatures are below freezing unless provisions are made to protect vital parts of
the system from the low temperature.
3. Recommendation
Most serious faults will initiate an alarm. These are listed in Table 1. Appropriate operator
action should be taken at the time of the alarm (Ref. 2, 3). The nature of the problem
dictates the action required, as discussed below.
Abnormal temperatures in the stator require that a check be made of the cooling flow. If a
pumping unit abnormality is not apparent, a local restriction in the stator winding may be
the cause. Load reduction may be necessary to prevent exceeding limits.
Problems with the cooling system should be corrected at the time of the alarm. If they are
not, and the condition (flow, pressure, etc.) becomes more abnormal, a second contact will
operate. This should be used to initiate either a runback or a trip, as selected by the owner
during the design stage. If tripping was selected, a Simultaneous Trip, Type 1, may be used.
Operators should be advised, however, not to wait for automatic protection to operate but to
take corrective action immediately. This is the reason for the alarm.
If runback, rather than trip, was selected, but the runback fails to occur, a trip signal will be
produced.

In many cases a load reduction to the no-liquid capability of the generator is required before
maintenance can be performed, such as adjustment of the control valve, changing filters or
calibrating sensors. These tasks should be performed periodically as recommended in the
applicable O&M instructions.
27. High Water Conductivity (if applicable)

1. Description
High purity water is required to cool the stator winding conductors safely. The water purity
is maintained by fine filtration and a deionizer. A reduction in deionizer resin capacity will
result in an increase in water conductivity.
2. Detection
Water conductivity is continuously monitored at both inlet and outlet of the stator.
Conductivity above 0.5 mmhos/cm [0.5 mS/cm] will initiate an alarm. A second alarm will
register when conductivity rises to 9.9 mmhos/cm [9.9 mS/cm].
3. Recommendation
The operator should replace the deionizer resin after the first alarm at 0.5 mmhos/cm [0.5
S/cm], and before the second alarm. The unit should not be operated with water
conductivity above the second alarm point, which is 9.9 mmhos/cm [9.9 mS/cm]. If this
alarm sounds, the unit should be removed from service, using Manual runback and trip
(Type 6).
28. Liquid Leakage Detection System (air cooled generators)

1. Description
A liquid detection system is used to indicate oil or water inside the generator. The liquid
may be water from a cooler leak, water from a weather leak, or a lube or seal oil leak. Two
different schemes are used to accomplish this – float or ultrasonic type liquid level detectors
and humidity detectors.
2. Detection
a. Liquid level detectors are located in or connected to low points in the generator to
effectively sense the presence of any fluid accumulation in the generator. Liquid level
detectors are wired to the turbine-generator control system. If liquid in the generator
reaches the detector set point, a signal is sent to the control system, which triggers an
alarm.
b. Humidity detectors provide a reading of the relative humidity of the air circulating
within the generator. Humidity detectors process temperature/humidity measurements
into a relative humidity value, and send a signal to the control system, triggering an
alarm as appropriate.

3. Recommendation
Operate double valved liquid level detector drains as follows:
a. During normal operation, valves shall be in the closed position.
b. During alarm troubleshooting
i. Verify that inner and outer valves are closed
ii. Open the inner valve
iii. Close the inner valve
iv. Open the outer valve to check for liquid in generator
If water or oil in generator is verified, the generator shall be shut down and drained at
earliest opportunity.

Table 1. Alarms
SIGNAL DEVICE RANGE SETTING NOTES
MACHINE TEMPERATURES
GENERATOR WITH
BRUSHLESS EXCITER
BRUSHLESS EXCITER RTD -20° to 80°C Generator Cold Check Ventilation
OUTLET AIR Gas +40°C
GENERATOR WITH STATIC

EXCITATION
COLLECTOR AIR IN RTD or TC -30° to 70°C 65°C In: Check Ventilation
COLLECTOR AIR OUT RTD or TC -20° to 90°C AIR IN + Out: Check Filters
20°C
GENERATOR FIELD TRANSDUCER 0° to 150°C Reduce field current by adj.
MVAR load.
STATOR COIL (SLOT) RTD 0 to 100°C for H2O See Ref. 2
0 to 150°C for H2O
and Air
OTHER ALARMS
BEARING VIBRATION VIBRATION --- --- See Recommendation in this
DETECTOR publication.
BEARING OIL TEMP HIGH - --- --- See Turbine Section of
Instruction Book
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE RELAY Balance or reduce load.
CURRENT See Recommendation for
"Unbalanced Armature
Currents."
GENERATOR OVERVOLTAGE RELAY --- Over 1.05 pu Reduce machine voltage.

voltage
Collector / Cab Fire Detection Heat Detector 325°F (Not

System - High Temperature Adjustable - Set
By Device)
Collector / Cab H2 Detection H2 Detector 0% to 100% LEL 10% LEL High

System - Presence of Hydrogen Alarm & 25% LEL
High-High Alarm
Liquid Level Detector / Humidity Switch or Sensor --- --- See recommendations in this
Sensor publication
AIR COOLING (if applicable)
COLD AIR RTD -30 to 70°C

HOT AIR RTD -10 to 90°C
LOCAL OVERHEATING (if
applicable)
— —
CORE MONITOR LEVEL (if CORE MONITOR See Recommend. for "Local
applicable) Overheating."
MACHINE HEATING (if SIGNAL See Recommend. for "Local
applicable) VALIDATION Overheating."
DEVICE
@From operating pressure

†Two switches

Table 1. Alarms (Cont'd)
SEAL OIL SYSTEM (if applic.)
DIFF SEAL OIL PRESSURE LOW DIFF. PRESSURE 3 psid [20.7 kPa] See Ref. 3
2
SWITCH [211 g/cm ]
DRAIN ENLARGEMENT LIQUID LEVEL --- See Ref. 3
LIQUID DETECTOR FULL DETECTOR

EMERGENCY PUMP RUNNING RELAY --- See Ref. 3
FILTER DIFF. PRESSURE HIGH DIFF. PRESSURE 10 psid [69 kPa See Ref. 3
(if applicable) SWITCH (differential)]

[703 g/cm2 (diff.)]
—
VACUUM TANK OIL LEVEL FLOAT SWITCH +4/-6 in See Ref. 3
HIGH/LOW (if applicable) [+102/-152 mm]

—
MAIN PUMP MOTOR THERMOSTAT See Ref. 2
OVERLOAD (if applicable)
EMERGENCY PUMP MOTOR THERMOSTAT --- See Ref 2
OVERLOAD (if applicable)

HYDROGEN GAS SYSTEM
COOLER HOT GAS TEMP HIGH RTD or TC 0-100°C
COOLER COLD GAS TEMP RTD or TC 0-70°C
HIGH/LOW
COMMON COLD GAS TEMP RTD 0-70°C

HIGH (if applicable)
MACHINE GAS TEMP HIGH METER RELAY 0-100°C See Ref. 4
MACHINE GAS PRESSURE PRESSURE SWITCH +4/-2 psi @ See Ref. 4
HIGH/LOW [+27.6/-13.8 kPa]

[+281/-14.1
g/cm2]
MACHINE GAS PURITY LOW METER RELAY or 50-100°C 0-100°C 90% See Ref. 4
TRANSMITTER
GENERATOR CASING LIQUID LIQUID DETECTOR --- See Ref. 4
DETECTOR FULL
†Two switches @From operating pressure

Table 1. Alarms (Cont'd)
STATOR COOLING WATER

SYSTEM (if applicable)
INLET TEMP HIGH RTD or TC 0-70°C 2°C OVER See Ref. 2

MAX.
INLET FLOW LOW FLOW SWITCH See Ref. 3
INLET PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE SWITCH See Ref. 3
LIQUID HEADER OUTLET TC 0-100°C See Ref. 3
TEMP HIGH
BULK WATER OUTLET TEMP RTD 0-100°C See Ref. 2
HIGH
CONN RING TEMP HIGH (if TC 0-100°C See Ref. 2

separately cooled)
CONN RING FLOW LOW (if FLOWMETER See Ref. 3

separately cooled)
HV BUSHING OUTLET TEMP TC 0-100°C See Ref. 2

HIGH
HV BUSHING FLOW LOW FLOWMETER 3 gpm LOW [189 See Ref. 3
ml/s]
MAIN FILTER DIFF PRESSURE DIFF PRESSURE 0-15 psid [0-103 kPa 8 psid [55 kPa Change filter before 7 psid
HIGH SWITCH (differential)] [0-1.05 (differential)] [48 kPa (diff.)] [492 g/cm2
2
kg/cm (diff.)] [562 (diff.)]
g/cm2(diff.)]
CONDUCTIVITY HIGH TRANSDUCER 0-10 mho/cm [0-10 0.5 & 9.9 Change resin on first alarm.
μS/cm] μmho/cm [0.5 & Trip manually on second alarm
9.9
mS/cm]
—
TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW FLOAT SWITCH +4/-4 inches Check main pump
[+102/-102 mm]
RESERVE PUMP RUNNING PRESSURE SWITCH 0-150 psi [0-1.03 MPa] 10 & 20† psi Check cause and correct
[0-10.5 kg/cm2] below normal [69

& 138 kPa][0.7
& 1.41
kg/cm2]
RUNBACK INITIATED RELAY NONE PRESET
†Two switches
@From operating pressure

Table 2. Summary of Protection Recommendations
Fault Type Recommendation

Electrical Faults
Stator Overcurrent Runback 8 or 7
Stator Ground Fault Trip Type 1
Stator Phase-to-Phase Fault Trip Type 1
Over-voltage Alarm (Restore normal voltage)
Over-volts/Hertz Trip Type 2 (or 1)
Field Overexcitation Trip Type 2 (or 1)
Field Ground Trip Type 2 (or 1)
Loss of Excitation Trip Type 2 (or 1)
System Faults
Unbalanced Armature Currents Trip Type 2 (or 1)
Loss of Synchronism Trip Type 3
Abnormal Frequency Operation See Turbine Instructions
Breaker Failure Use Breaker Failure Protection
System Back-up Trip Type 3
Voltage Surges Use surge arrestors
System Operations
Transmission Line Switching Limit magnitude of power step
High Speed Reclosing See detailed recommendations
Subsynchronous Resonance See detailed recommendations
Inadvertent Energization See detailed recommendations
Mechanical or Thermal Faults

Bearing Vibration Trip Type 6 (or 1)
Synchronizing Errors Use check relays
Motoring Trip Type 3 (or 2 )
Stator Overtemperature Alarm (Trip Type 6)
Loss of Coolant to Gas Coolers Trip Type 6 (or 1)
Reduced Seal Oil Pressure Reduce H2 pressure & load
Local Overheating Runback 8 (or 7) or Trip Type 5
Loss of Stator Coolant Runback 7 or Trip Type 1
High Water Conductivity Trip Type 6

Protective Actions Key (i.e. Trip Types) for Table 2:
1. Simultaneous Trip
2. Generator Trip
3. Breaker Trip
4. Sequential Trip
5. Manual Trip
6. Manual Runback and Trip
7. Automatic Runback and Trip
8. Manual Runback
Table 2 does not purport to summarize all the descriptive material contained in the respective
sections. These must be read and understood when using this summary.

VIII. REFERENCES
1. Generator Section in O&M Manual.
2. GEK 75526 - Operator Action on High Temperature Alarms
3. GEK 89500 - Operator Action on Low Flow and Low Pressure Alarms.
4. "Gas Control and Monitoring System," Generator Auxiliary Systems section of O&M Manual.
5. Brown, P.G., Johnson, I.B. and Stevenson, J.R., "Generator Neutral Grounding," IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-97, No. 3, 1978, pp. 683-694.
6. Berdy, J., "Loss of Excitation Protection for Modern Synchronous Generators," IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-94, 1975, pp. 1457-1463; GE Publication GER 3183.
7. Brown, P.G. and Quay, R., "Transmission Line Reclosing - Turbine-Generator Duties and Stability
Considerations," Texas A&M Relay Conference, April 1976.
8. Winick, Kenneth, "Relay Supervision of Manual Synchronizing," GE Publication GER 2624.
9. GEK 46517 - Sequential Tripping and Prevention of Motoring.
10. “Shaft Sealing System”, Generator section of O&M Manual.
11. Linkinhoker, C.L., Schmitt, N. and Winchester, R.L., "Influence of Unbalanced Currents on the
Design and Operation of Large Turbine-Generators," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-92, 1973, pp. 1597-
1604.
12. IEEE C50.13-2005, Sections 4.2.3, Rotor short-time thermal requirements for unbalanced faults
(I22t) and 4.1.8.1, Continuous phase current unbalance capability (I2).
13. Graham, P.J., Brown, P.G. and Winchester, R.L., "Generator Protection with New Static Negative
Sequence Relays," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-94, 1974, pp. 1208-1223.
14. Working Group Report, "Out of Step Relaying for Generators," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-96, No. 5,
1977, pp. 1556-1564.
15. IEEE Committee Report, "Local Back-up Relaying Protection," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-89, No. 6,
1970, pp. 1061-1608.
16. Hoffman, D.C., "Back-up Protection for System Faults at the Generator," General Electric Review,
February 1950.
17. Walker, D.N., Adams, S.L. and Placaek, R.J., "Torsional Vibration and Fatigue of Turbine-
Generator Shafts," IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978 IEEE/ASME/ASCE Joint Power
Generation Conference; Digest State of the Art Symposium, Turbine-Generator Shaft Torsionals.
18. IEEE Working Group of the Subsynchronous Machine Committee, "Steady State Switching Guide."
19. Joyce, J.S. and Lambrecht, D., "Status of Evaluating the Fatigue of Large Steam Turbine-Generators
Caused by Electrical Disturbances," IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978 IEEE/ASME/ASCE
Joint Power Generator Conference; Digest State of the Art Symposium, Turbine-Generator Shaft
Torsionals.
20. "Counter-measures to Subsynchronous Resonance Problems," IEEE Subsynchronous Resonance
Working Group of the System Dynamic Performance Subcommittee; IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-99,
No. 5, 1980, pp. 1810-1818.
21. Bowler, C.E.J., et al., "The Navajo SMF Type SSR Relay," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-97, No. 5, 1978,
pp. 1489-1495.

22. Farmer, R.G., et. al., "Navajo Project Report on SSR Analysis and Solution," IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-96, No. 1, 1977, pp. 1226-1232.
23. GEK 95168 - Resistance Temperature Detectors.
24. GEK 106913 – Vibration Protection with Shutdown.
25. Smaha, D.W., Rowland, C.R. and Pope, J.W., "Coordination of Load Conservation with Turbine-
Generator Underfrequency Protection," IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-99, No. 3, 1980, pp. 1137-1150.
26. Berdy, J., "Out-of-Step Protection for Generators," GE Publication GER 3179.
27. Berdy, J., "Application of Out-of-Step Blocking and Tripping Relays," GE Publication GER 3180.
28. Piwko, R.J. and Larsen, E.V., "HVDC System Control for Damping of Subsynchronous
Oscillations," IEEE Paper No. 81-TD660-0 (presented September 1981 at IEEE Transmission and
Distribution Conference).
29. IEEE C37-101 IEEE Guide for Generator Ground Protection.
30. IEEE C37-102 IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection.
31. IEC 60034-3 Rotating Electrical Machines - Specific requirements for turbine-type synchronous
machines.
32. IEEE C50.13 Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generator.
33. GEK 103801 - Turbine Off-frequency Operation (for 60Hz Modern Units).
34. GEK 103802 - Turbine Off-Frequency Operation (for 50Hz Modern Units).
35. GER 3620K - Heavy Duty Gas Turbine Operating and Maintenance Considerations
g GE Energy
General Electric Company
www.gepower.com

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Generator Protection

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Project Document Code EMX/11/G/MKA---GA71/EA/012

Title Generator Protection

Identification Number GEK75512

Information Class, if applicable, on pg. 1 et sqq

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

Highlights an essential element of a procedure to assure correctness.

INDICATES A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION, WHICH, IF

INDICATES AN IMMINENTLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION,

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

Generator Protection GEK 75512R

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS ................................. 6

III. ALARMS ...................................................................................................................................................... 6

IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE ........................................................................... 6

V. PROTECTION DURING STATIC START ............................................................................................. 7

VI. TRIPPING METHODS .............................................................................................................................. 7

VII. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................. 10

VIII. REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 38

Figure 1: Recommended V/Hz protection............................................................................................................ 14

Table 1. Alarms .................................................................................................................................................... 33

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

Generator Protection GEK 75512R

1. Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 1, IEEE Press, 1980.

2. Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 2, IEEE Press, 1992.

 internal generator failure

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS

B. Protection and Alarms

IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

Generator Protection GEK 75512R

V. PROTECTION DURING STATIC START

VI. TRIPPING METHODS

 severity of fault to generator

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

Generator Protection GEK 75512R

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

VII. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

References are listed at the end of the book.

Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120

A consequence of overcurrent is stator winding overheating, which should be detected by

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

Generator Protection GEK 75512R

2. Stator Ground Fault

IF INJECTION BASED GROUND FAULT DETECTION SCHEME IS

GE Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal) US EAR - NLR

GEK 75512R Generator Protection

For further information, see Ref. 5.

3. Stator Phase-to-Phase Fault

It is possible to detect a phase-to-phase fault in the winding by means of a differential relay.

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Generator Protection GEK 75512R

5. Volts Per Hertz

Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the recommended V/Hz protection.

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