Ethical Education in Accounting: Integrating Rules, Values and Virtues

Author(s): Domènec Melé

Source: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Thirteenth IESE Symposium "Ethics,
Business and Society": Accounting and Accountability: A Challenge for Corporate Culture
(Mar., 2005), pp. 97-109
Published by: Springer
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Journal of Business Ethics 57: 97-109, 2005.
DOI 10.1007/sl0551-004-3829-y
Ethical Education in Accounting:
Integrating Rules, Values and Virtues
ABSTRACT. Ethics in accounting and ethical educa
tion have seen an increase in interest in the last decade.
However, despite the renewed interest some important
shortcomings persist. GeneraUy, rules, principles, values
and virtues are presented in a fragmented fashion. In
addition, only a few authors consider the role of the
accountant's character in presenting relevant and
truthful information in financial reporting and the
importance of practical reasoning in accounting. This
article holds that rules, values and virtues are inter
connected. This provides a sound approach to ethics in
accounting, in which character and practical reasoning
are crucial. Consequently, ethical education in
accounting has to simultaneously include the knowl
edge of proper rules and principles and their correct
appHcation; values (understood as moral goods) and
virtues, whose acquisition, in the view of the author,
should be encouraged.
KEY WORDS: Codes of conduct, connection of
virtues, ethical education in accounting, ethics in
accounting, ethical theories, natural law, values, virtue
ethics.
Dom?nec Mel? is Professor and Director of the Department of
Business Ethics at IESE Business School, University of
Navarra, Spain. He also chairs the bi-annual International
Symposium on Ethics, Business and Society' held by IESE.
He has Doctorate degrees in Industrial Engineering from the
Polytechnic University of Catalonia, and Theology from the
University of Navarra, Spain. He is the author of three books
on economic and business ethics and social ethics (in Spanish)
and has edited eight books (in Spanish), which include dif
ferent topics in business ethics. In addition, he has written 20
case studies (IESE Publishing) and numerous articles and
chapters related to subject. His articles are published in
journals including Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of
Business Ethics, Business Ethics: A European Review and
Philosophy of Management.
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? 2005 Springer
Dom?nec Mel?
Introduction
Ethics in accounting has seen an increased interest in
the last decade, although it is not by any means a
new subject. In the USA, public accounting has had
some form of ethical standards since at least the
beginning of the 20th century (Casier, 1964, men
tioned by Loeb, 1988). Issues regarding ethics in
accounting are briefly touched on in some early
European textbooks on business ethics (e.g., Azpi
azu, 1964; Baudhuin, 1954). However, specific
training on accounting ethics for accounting students
or a systematic presentation of this matter had rarely
been undertaken until the 1970s (Loeb and Be
dingfield, 1972). In 1978, Loeb edited Ethics in the
Accounting Profession, a pioneering monograph on
this topic.
Since the mid-1980s several institutions related
with accounting associations have encouraged ethi
cal education in accounting, starting in 1986 with
the report of the American Accounting Association
Committee on the "Future Structure, Content, and
Scope of Accounting Education" and continuing, in
1987, with the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission). Since
then many other institutions have adopted a similar
focus (Armstrong et al., 2003, note 1).
Nowadays, accounting ethics is part of the cur
riculum in several colleges and business schools, and
a number of scholars have written textbooks and
casebooks on accounting ethics (Armstrong, 1993;
Cottell and Perlin, 1990; Duska and Duska, 2003;
Gowthorpe and Bake, 1998; Maurice, 1996; Mintz,
1997; among others). Thus, considerable steps have
been made in ethical accounting education, but,
after the well-known recent accounting scandals, it
seems absolutely essential to pay increasing attention
to ethics in accounting and to improve ethical
education for accountants. In line with this, this
 98 Dom?nec Mel?
paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of
accounting ethics and to provide some insights on
ethical education in accounting.
First, this article examines some relevant current
approaches in accounting ethics and ethical educa
tion in accounting and the corresponding role given
to rules and principles, ethical theories, values, and
virtues. Second, it presents an approach in which
rules, values and virtues are presented in an inter
related consistent manner. FinaUy, some impHcations
of this approach for ethical education in accounting
are discussed.
Ethics for professional accountants: only a set
of standards for moral behavior?
Accountants can perform their work in many dif
ferent areas, including auditing, managerial
accounting, tax accounting, financial planning,
consulting and, of course, simply preparing accounts.
In each of these spheres, ethical issues appear
(Armstrong, 2002), and accountants perceive that
opportunities exist in their work to engage in
unethical behavior.1
Codes of conduct for accountants give guidelines
for proper behavior in the profession. For accoun
tants, as in any other profession, codes are the most
concrete cultural form in which professions
acknowledge their societal obligations (Abbott,
1983). Codes, and possibly some procedures for
reinforcing them, are a public commitment of the
profession and a basic element in achieving social
recognition of, and public trust in the profession.
Codes of conduct contain a set of principles and
rules, which specify what society expects to be
considered in decision making. According to Bowie
and Duska (1985), from a practical perspective, codes
of conduct are useful in several ways: (1) motivating
through the use of peer pressure; (2) providing a
stable and permanent guide to right or wrong rather
than leaving the question to continual ad hoc deci
sions; (3) giving guidance, especiaUy in ambiguous
situations, guiding the behavior of the employees and
controUing the autocratic power of employers over
employees; (4) helping to specify the social respon
sibility of business itself; (5) contributing to the
interest of business itself, for if businesses do not
police themselves ethicaUy, others wiU do it for them.
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Although some ethical standards with sound
foundations could easily be recognized in most codes
of conduct for accountants, in practice, the rules are
often applied in a mechanical way. There also exists
the risk that people might confuse ethics in
accounting with a set of rules, legal standards or
other regulations. Adams et al. (1995) believe that,
in today's legalistic society, the question of "what is
the right thing to do?" is often confused with "what
is legal?" While they refer to accountants in the USA
this statement could readily be extended to many
other countries.
Velayutham (2003) points out that the focus of
codes of ethics has been to progressively replace the
"true and fair view" requirement by "compliance
with accounting standards". Thus, codes have
moved from focusing on moral responsibility to a
public good to that of a technical specification for a
product or service. In this way, technique has sup
planted character. Velayutham adds that the term
"code of ethics" is now misleading, and it would be
more appropriate to talk about "code of quality
assurance".
On the other hand, Lere (2003), an Accounting
Professor, suggests that it is often rare to have a sit
uation where codes of ethics impact on decision
making. While enforcement provisions can increase
the likelihood that an individual wiU select (forego)
the action that a code of ethics indicates to be ethical
(unethical), there are limits as to how effective
enforcement provisions can be.
Another fault of codes and rules appears when
questioning whether the best ethical behavior is al
ways to foUow the established rules. Adams et al.
(1995) have studied several cases regarding auditing
client confidentiality in which disclosure could be the
best ethical behavior, in spite of the applicable rules,
which state that a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
member acting in public practice shaU not disclose any
confidential information without the specific consent
of the client. A survey among CPAs showed that a
substantial percentage (between 30% and 47%)
thought that the best ethical behavior would be not
foUowing the rules of the code for these specific cases.
The range and limitations of these codes could be
understood from what Louis Vlasco affirmed in
1983, as chairman of the National Association of
Accountants (NAA) of the USA, when he presented
the association's code of conduct:
 Ethical Education in Accounting 99
"I make no claim that the NAA standards, in and of
themselves, are the ultimate solution to aU ethical
dilemmas that management accountants may face. In
the future, however, if a management accountant is
asked, for example, to recalculate certain figures to
make his or her division appear to be more profitable
than is warranted, that accountant has somewhere to
turn for guidance. He or she wiU be able to point to
the standard that explicitly states that management
accountants have a responsibility to communicate
information fairly and objectively."
Summarizing, codes of conduct have a role to play,
although ethics in accounting cannot be reduced to
simply what codes of conduct state. In fact, text
books in accounting ethics usuaUy include some
relevant codes of conduct, or significant excerpts,
with the corresponding rules and principles, but
generaUy they agree that ethical education in
accounting should be more than just knowing and
applying rules. As, Loeb and Rockness, two experts
in ethical education in accounting, recognized: "our
(the authors) coUective experience indicate that both
coUege students and practicing accounting profes
sionals are interested in accounting ethics education
that moves beyond the rules of a code ethics and the
code's corresponding official interpretation." (Loeb
and Rockness, 1992, p. 488)
Principles and moral reasoning
In some fields of professional activity there is a
tendency to emphasize basic principles from which
particulars norms derive. Thus, in 1957, the Amer
ican Medical Association replaced its Code of Ethics,
which stated the duties that American physicians
owed to their patients, their society, and to one
another, with a statement of moral principles, sup
plemented by opinions and commentaries on spe
cific cases and questions (Roth, 1994, p. 695). This
tendency is also perceived in accounting ethics,
although in a much less extended fashion.
Numerous accounting codes of conduct, espe
ciaUy those in the USA, emphasize specific standards
rather than generic principles. Thus, the Code of
Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), revised significantly in
1988), specifies that independence requires fulfiUing
the standards promulgated by bodies designated by
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the Council (Rule 101); objectivity and integrity
involve being free of conflict of interests, and not
knowingly misrepresenting facts and not sub
ordinating one's judgments to others (Rule 102).
This also occurs with compliance in the general
standards and accounting principles (section 200);
responsibility to clients, including issues related with
confidential client information and contingency fees
(section 300); responsibility to colleagues (section
400) and other responsibilities and practices (section
500). The Code of Institute of Management
Accountants, much more succinct than the AICPA's
code, presents generic principles as well as a heading
grouping the rules.
In contrast, other codes, generally with a more
international approach, stress general principles as a
foundation for accounting ethics, without omitting,
of course, specific standards of behavior. This is the
case of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants of
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
which highlights a crucial principle as the main
reference for the whole code: the public interest. In
the Introduction to this code it states:
"The IFAC Board and the IFAC Ethics Cornmittee
believes that the establishment of a conceptual frame
work that requires professional accountants to identify,
evaluate and address threats to compliance with the
fundamental principles, rather than merely comply
with a set of specific rules which may be arbitrary, is in
the public interest."6
This code also includes a set of principles and values
(technical and moral), with a brief explanation of each:
integrity, objectivity, professional competence and
due care, confidentiality, professional behavior
and technical standards.7 This emphasis on values and
principles is made even sharper by an explicit recog
nition of the superiority of principles over the rules.
The latter, according to this code, "may be arbitrary."
Considering the general principles that serve as a
rule's basis provides a broader perspective for ethical
behavior in accounting. With this approach, it may
well be easier to avoid a legalistic vision of ethics in
accounting or a mechanistic application of rules in
decision-making.
Frequently principles adopted come from ratio
nalistic theories which propose diverse methods of
moral reasoning to apply properly these principles
for solving dilemmas or to justify certain actions. For
 100 Dom?nec Mel?
this purpose, ethical education in accounting usually
includes teaching several normative theories, such as
Kantianism, Utilitarianism and other rationalistic
ethical theories. These theories help to identify
moral dilemmas and to provide a pathway for moral
reasoning.
These approaches reflect on the idea, implicitly or
exphcitly, that ethics in accounting, as in other
matters, is an "application of ethics or morality (...)
to practical issues" (Cottell and Perlin, 1990, p. x).
Here, by ethics or morality it is understood that
ethical systems or ethical theories, such as those
above, are rooted in the philosophy of modernity
and oriented to solve ethical dilemmas.
Certainly, "identifying moral conflicts, thinking
them through, discussing them with colleagues and
others, and utilizing the tools of ethical analysis are
useful, in fact, indispensable activities." (Cottell and
Perlin, 1990, pp. ix-x) No doubt exists that
encouraging professionals or students to use ethical
reasoning is valuable. But presenting Kantian theory,
with its categorical imperatives or the Utilitarian
principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest
number" or any other ethical theory based on apri
oristic principles of morality has some shortcomings.
First, depending on the aprioristic principle ac
cepted, the action can be seen only as a set of duties
(Kantian and Neo-Kantian theories) or only as the
set of consequences (Utilitarianism, if they are evalu
ated in terms of satisfaction or consequentialism, if
they are evaluated in terms of other chosen values).
Authors in favor of understanding ethics only as
duties criticize others that think only consequences
are relevant. Contrasted with these approaches,
many people consider relevant both the action itself
and also the action's foreseeable and avoidable
consequences.
Second, well-known post-modern philosophers,
such as Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Wittgenstein,
Rorty and others, repudiate all these aprioristic the
ories, because they believe that modern philosophy,
including Kantianism and Utilitarianism, err by
accepting the unshakable foundation of knowledge.
From a different perspective, an Aristotelian critique
can also be made against the foundations of modern
moral theories (Duska, 1993).
Third, even though teaching these theories
develops students' skills in solving ethical dilemmas,
applying theories and determining what is right
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according to a set of duties or systematicaUy ana
lyzing the consequences, this does not motivate
students to act weU. Ethics cannot become so
mechanical as merely applying a rule, a "technol
ogy" for solving moral dilemmas. In teaching busi
ness ethics, Cooley (2004) has observed that students
memorize enough of the moral theories to pass their
tests, but never understand the motivating spirit
underlying the theories. He concludes that students
know how to apply the moral principles to various
situations, but produce the wrong results due to their
iUicit biases and rationaUzations. FulfiUing your (self
evident) duties (Kantianism) or calculating the con
sequences in terms of satisfaction (Utilitarianism)
does not seem enough for ethical behavior, because
human behavior is far more complex than accepting
aprioristic principles and knowing how to apply
them. As wiU be discussed afterwards, motivation
and habits are also very important for correct
behavior.
The fourth shortcoming has to do with the lack of
consideration of the decision-maker's character in
moral reasoning (Anscombe, 1958; Maclntyre,
1984; Veatch, 1968; among others). Since the
enlightenment, modern moral philosophy has
emphasized duties and norms without examining the
personal disposition of the person making the moral
judgment in a concrete situation and without con
sidering the habits acquired by deciding and acting in
a certain way. In contrast to modern moral philos
ophy, the Aristotelian view argues that moral judg
ment "is not merely an inteUectual exercise of
subsuming a particular under rules or hyper-norms.
Judgment is an activity of perceiving while simul
taneously perfecting the capacity to judge actions
and choices and to perceive being" (Koehn, 2000, p.
17). This vision contrasts with Kantian theory and
Utilitarianism, which, as has been pointed out, take
for granted this capacity and consider it irrelevant in
making moral judgments.
Values and virtues
Teaching values could also counter a concept of
ethical training reduced to a mere application of
rules or the shortcoming of the rationalistic theories
mentioned before. Values can also go as far as
providing a motivation to act weU.
 Ethical Education in Accounting 101
"Value in general may best be glossed as that
which is worth having, getting, or doing (...) Value,
thus understood, is essentially relational, i.e., it is
value for some person(s) or living being(s) " (Bond,
2001, p. 1745). Values, in the context of business,
belong to whatever is necessary, or makes a positive
contribution, for maintaining and improving busi
ness, as human activity. These include moral values,
which express what is worth for a human activity.
Many codes present the grounding values. Thus,
the AICPA Code includes the folio wing values:
service to others or public interest, competency,
integrity, objectivity, independence, professionalism,
including continuing education, and accountability
to the profession, which are similar to considerations
that appear in most professional codes (Duska and
Duska, 2003, p. 77). For its part, the Standards of
Ethical Conduct for Management Accountants of the
NAA of the USA defined the ethical responsibilities
of managers through four values: competence,
confidentiality, integrity and objectivity. Afterwards,
this code was the basis for the current Standards of
Ethical Behavior for Practitioners of Management
Accounting and Financial Management adopted in 1997
by the Institute of Management Accountants (the
former National Association of Accountants),
which also presents these values, although they add a
fifth section devoted to resolving ethical conflicts.
But values are not enough. Accountants, as with
every professional, have to make practical judgments
about concrete situations and, above all, have to
behave correctly. Both conditions require not only
bearing values in mind but having good character, as
we will try to explain later.
Pioneers in ethical education in accounting, in
spite of their praiseworthy task, focused on dilemmas
and ethical theories rather than on the role of virtues.
This is the case of Loeb (1988), Langenderfer and
Rockness (1989), and others at the end of the
1980s.9 Although Loeb (1988, p. 322) included
"setting the stage for" a change in ethical behavior,
"he does not go so far as to imply accounting edu
cators have the power to bring about good or bad
behavior on the part of students." (Armstrong et al.,
2003, p. 10)
Similarly, from a practitioner perspective, up until
recently, perhaps the only virtue, at least implicitly
stressed, is the disposition to fulfill the obligations
prescribed by code or by normative ethical theories.
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Thus, the Standards of the Institute of Management
Accountants states: "Practitioners of management
accounting and financial management have an
obligation to the public, their profession, the orga
nization they serve, and themselves to maintain the
highest standards of ethical conduct."
Several scholars have strongly criticized those
approaches which reduce ethical education to pre
senting ethical theories to solve ethical d?emmas
without considering personal virtues and behavior.
Pincoffs (1986, pp. 4-6) pointed out the problems
with theories used to solve ethical d?emmas. He
stated deontological or utilitarian ethical theories are
reductive, since they eliminate what is moraUy rel
evant (character) and they legislate the form of moral
reflection (duties and consequences). In similar
terms, Shaub (1994) focused on several potential
weaknesses in implementing accounting ethics
education in the classroom and criticized the current
overreliance on ethical dilemmas.
As an alternative to teaching ethical theories,
Pincoffs (1986, p. 150) presented the primary
objective of moral education as encouraging the
development of the person. This means encouraging
the development of virtues, that is to say, permanent
dispositions that favor ethical behavior.
Subsequently, other scholars have presented sig
nificant insights into the role of virtue in accounting,
both in practice and education. Francis (1990)
emphasized the role of the agent beyond rules and
the capacity of accounting to be a virtuous practice.
Mintz (1995, 1996), foUowing Pincoffs (1986) and
Mclntyre (1984), presented significant pedagogical
insights in the teaching of virtue to accounting stu
dents and mentioned several virtues which enable
accountants to withstand environment pressures and
to act in accordance with the moral point of view:
(1) benevolence and altruism; (2) honesty and
integrity; (3) impartiality and open-mindedness; (4)
reliability and dependability; (5) faithfulness and
trustworthiness.
The crucial importance of the agent's
character
Regarding practical judgments, Armstrong (2002, p.
145) affirms that "accounting is an art, not a science. It
requires significant judgments and assumptions and 10
 102 Dom?nec Mel?
accountants, given complex circumstances, wiU
probably arrive at several different net income or
taxable income figures." Accountants must determine
the significance of each situation while acting with
objectivity, independence, professional competence,
due care, confidentiaUty, professional behavior, con
fidentiaUty, integrity, and so on. Rules cannot deter
mine what to do in every situation. Universal
principles can give guidelines, but each situation is
unique. Accountants have to judge each situation and
judge what objectivity, integrity, etc. mean in a given
situation; and then act according to this judgment.
It has been rightly said that a "practical judgment
is, at the very least, cruciaUy dependent upon per
ception" (Koehn, 2000, p. 4). The ethical percep
tion depends on certain human capacities, related
with character, which is different from others, such
as logic or aesthetics. This capacity to perceive the
ethical dimension of the reality is no more than
practical wisdom or prudence (in the moral sense),
an inteUectual virtue, caUed "phronesis" by Aristotle
(Nichomachean Ethics, bk 5, chap. 7). Practical wis
dom may be expressed, for instance, in being sin
cerely objective, truly unbiased and independent,
and in foUowing the "spirit of the law" rather than
the letter of the law.
Character of a person, in which practical wisdom
forms an important part, is made up of habits (good
habits, or virtues, or bad habits, or vices). Habits
shape personal character, which combines with
personaUty (understanding by personality mainly the
innate features and non-moral qualities). Aristotle
described personality as the foUowing:
"virtues we get by first exercising them, as also hap
pens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we
have to learn before we can do them, we learn by
doing them, e.g., men become builders by building
and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become
just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate
acts, brave by doing brave acts (...); by doing the acts
that we do in our transaction with other men we
become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we
do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to
feel fear or confident, we become brave or cowardly."
(Nichomachean Ethics, bk 2, chap. 1; 1103a31 and
1103M5)
The virtue of man is "the state of character which
makes a man good and which makes him do his own
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work well." (Nichomachean Ethics, bk 2, chap. 6;
1106a22). In other words, virtuous individuals
habitually perform moral actions. Thus, courage
drives us to do what is good and justice to give to
each what is his or hers by right.
To sum up, virtues should be introduced in eth
ical education as a crucial element to overcome the
hmitations previously discussed. However, a new
problem arises: how to harmonize virtues with rules
and values. Some versions of "virtues" only judge as
virtues those which foster outcomes: industriousness
for a productive life: justice for achieving good
relations: loyalty to maintain a sound adhesion:
truthfulness to garner more the reputation of being a
reliable person. Similarly, for some authors virtues
are virtues only if they are accepted in a particular
context. Thus, Solomon, defines virtue as "a per
vasive trail of character that allows one to "fit into" a
particular society and excel in it" (1992, p. 107). In
spite of Solomon's valuable contribution in intro
ducing virtues in business ethics, and his general
directive that all the virtues of everyday life apply to
business, the definition he gives can be criticized
(Ewin, 1995) because some "virtues" which are
accepted as such in a particular society, would be
dubious examples of human excellence in another.
Another problem is found in certain approaches
in which virtues are proposed without any reference
to norms or principles, which according to some
authors is a failure to supply the means to resolve
moral dilemmas (Messerly, 1994; p. 109; among
others).
Both problems arise from considering virtues
apart from rules and values or principles instead of
simultaneously considering rules, values and vir
tues.1 But, are rules, values and virtues really
interrelated?
Understanding the interrelation between rules,
values and virtues
Rules, values and virtues are indeed interrelated if
one accepts the basic anthropological and ethical
concepts presented by Aristotle and his main com
mentator, Thomas Aquinas (Maclntyre, 1993). A
crucial point in this approach is that values have to
be considered as "intrinsic moral values", or "moral
goods" rooted in human nature.
 Ethical Education in Accounting 103
This makes sense, since values, although fre
quently considered either as subjective or as social
agreements, can also be understood objectively.
Some scholars have even distinguished values, in
general, from "moral or ethical values". The latter
are defined as those which, when one lives in
accordance with them, contribute to "the good of
the person", that is to say, to the perfection or
flourishing of individuals as a human beings. In this
sense, Guardini (1999, pp. 30-31) wrote that the
good (of the person) "is different from any other
values". These other values "drive our behavior here
and now, depending on the situation, while the
good compels us always (...)" In other words, the
requirements of values are always specific; the
requirements of good are universal. The former is
presented to men and women in certain circum
stances (...)> while the requirement of good drives
men and women for the simple fact of being hu
man." If moral values, relate to "the good of the
person", they can be distinguished from other values
(technical, economics, aesthetics, etc.).
FoUowing Aquinas (Summa Theologica, I?II, q. 94,
a. 2), moral goods can be known by human reason
from the spontaneous inclinations of human nature,
such as the good of life from the inclination to
conserve life, the good of true knowledge from the
inclination to know, and the good of a harmonic and
peaceful social life, from the inclination to live in
society. Truthfulness, justice and loyalty, which are
crucial values in accounting, are ethical values tied to
the goods of true knowledge and sound social life.
Without these values social life deteriorates and trust
? a cement of social life ? is destroyed.
Humans are responsible for their own acts and,
therefore, for their human development, which at
the same time produces a good society. It requires
the foUowing of rules associated with moral goods.
Some rules need extensive study due to compli
cated issues in each profession or environment.
But there are some elemental moral rules relatively
easy to learn. Thus, practicaUy everyone can dis
cover the "golden rule" (treat others in the same
way you would like to be treated), the rule of
respecting human dignity, "giving people their
rights", honoring promises and fulfiUing contracts,
and some others. Likewise, abusing power by
exploiting human need, manipulating people and
considering persons as mere instruments for the
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sake of one"s own interests, are ethical rules
regarding what must be avoided.
By acting in accordance with these rules and
consequently in accordance with moral goods, the
individual acquires virtues. These virtues acquired by
acting according to moral goods and the corre
sponding rules can be called "human virtues".
Understanding rules, goods (values), and virtues in
this way is, by definition, interrelated.
Because human virtues are habits, they provide
promptness or readiness to do good, ease or facility
in performing a good action and joy or satisfaction
while doing it. Human virtues, or virtues proper to
human beings as such, are traditionally grouped in
four major categories called "cardinal virtues":
practical wisdom (or prudence); justice, which in
cludes all "transitive virtues" or virtues related with
dealing with others; and two self-master virtues:
fortitude (sometimes known as courage) and tem
perance (or moderation) (Houser, 2004; Pieper,
1965), which many consider genuine human virtues
(Geach, 1977).
Moral values (goods) entail rules and acting in
accordance with these rules develops human virtues,
and these virtues make it easier to grasp moral values
(see Figure 1). In grasping moral values, practical
wisdom has a crucial role, since this virtue provides
the capacity for perceiving human good in every
action and to determine what is the content of
each virtue (e.g., pointing out what does it mean to
be courageous in a particular situation). Other hu
man virtues are united among them, and practical
wisdom requires the existence of the other virtues.
For Aristotle, "it is not possible to be good in the
RULES
Figure 1. Interdependence of moral values, rules, and
human virtues.
 104 Dom?nec Mel?
strict sense without practical wisdom, or practically
wise without moral virtues." (Nichomachean Ethics,
bk VI, chap. 13; 1144b31.)15
In other words (see Figure 2), practical wisdom
points out what is the right means in each situation
regarding transitive and self-mastering virtues. Prac
ticing these latter virtues develops practical wisdom as
a necessary condition. Finally, transitive and self
mastering virtues have reciprocal influences (e.g.,
fairness requires courage, and being fair is fostered by
the development of courage needed to act fairly).
Rules, goods and virtues, understood in this way,
are indeed interconnected. Furthermore, "virtues,
rules and goods (...) have to be understood in their
relationship or not at all"; and "rules, conceived
apart from virtues and goods, are not the same as
rules conceived in dependence upon virtues and
goods; and so it is also with virtues apart from rules
and good and good apart from rules and virtues."
(Maclntyre, 1993, p. 144)
Ethical education for good behavior
In line with the Aristotelian tradition, I suggest
ethical behavior of a person in accounting, as in any
other human activity, depends on (see Figure 3)
Moral sensitivity, which could be described as how
the subject comprehends the ethical dimension of
a situation. Human beings have a certain capacity
to feel other's people needs. In the face of certain
situations we experience feelings of compassion,
solidarity, sympathy for a noble cause, and other
moral sentiments. In accounting, one can feel that
a practice can adversely or favorably affects some
people. But there are also sentiments of greed,
TRANSITIVE VIRTUES
Fairness, truthfulness, loyalty,.
i
PRACTICAL WISDOM
sound ethical judgments. This latter is especiaUy
SELF-MASTERING VIRTUESvaluable for those without experience and with
Courage, moderation,...
low practical wisdom. However, rules, principles
Figure 2. Practical wisdom as a and
driver of moral
not as a substitute
for practical wisdom.
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External Ethical
Influence Knowledge
Moral Sensibility Moral Sentiments
I x
Moral Judgement
Moral
Behaviour
I Practical Wisdom
Moral
1 f
Motivation
Transitive Virtues
Self-Mastering Virtue
Moral Virtues
Figure 3. Constituent factors and vi
behaviour.
self-sufficiency or even fear which can be stronger
than those related to good behavior. Sentiments
can also lead to attitudes of sentimentalism, the
morality of which could be questioned. There
fore, moral sentiments seem not sufficient for an
authentic moral sensibility; they need practical
wisdom to bring about moral sensibility. Practical
wisdom helps one to grasp the moral good in each
particular action. External influences, including
the perceptions of peers, education, and ethical
knowledge can cultivate (or discourage) moral
sentiments.
Moral judgment, or capacity to judge which alter
natives are ethicaUy acceptable and which are not
and to determine the uprightness of the intention.
Good behavior requires deliberation and deciding
to carry out an action. Making sound moral
judgments is previous to making a good decision.
In this deliberation, practical wisdom plays a
crucial role. It fosters upright moral reasoning by
taking into account universal principles and the
pertinent circumstances of each situation. Fur
thermore, some other relevant virtues in
accounting, such as objectivity, open-mindedness,
insight and perspicacity can be considered as
integrated within practical wisdom.
Ethical knowledge, including a right under
standing of rules, principles and values, which
could be seen as accumulation of wisdom
throughout time, can also help one to make
and values have to be considered only as an aid
virtues.
 Ethical Education in Accounting 105
Moral motivation, understood as willingness to take
the moral course of action, placing moral values
(human goods) above other values, and taking
personal responsibility for moral outcomes. Fre
quently, moral motivation is the driving force for
making good moral judgments but it plays a
crucial role in selecting the right action and in
executing it. Practical wisdom and transitive
moral virtues (indirectly also self-mastering
virtues) foster moral motivation, since they give a
permanent motivation for acting well. External
motivation, such as moral role modeling, ethical
leadership, culture, education, etc., can also play a
significant role in motivating people towards
moral behavior.
Moral virtues or permanent attitudes and interior
strength for moral behavior. Among these virtues,
those which have special relevance to accounting
are fairness, integrity, truthfulness, honesty, loy
alty, faithfulness, trustworthiness, service to the
common good, gratitude and benevolence
("transitive virtues" or justice in a broad sense).
Courage, perseverance, competence, diligence,
professional will, humility, and other self-mas
tering virtues which help to defeat inner resistance
to act as one should. Practical wisdom, as has been
said, provides capacity to perceive the right means
for each virtue.
If this sketch is correct, character, shaped by the
virtues of the subject, is crucial for moral behavior.
Rules, values (goods) and virtues in ethical
education in accounting
If the goal of ethical education is achieving good
behaviors, it should insist on awaking moral sensi
bility, help make sound moral judgments, induce
moral motivation and encourage moral virtues.
Possibly some people would argue that ethical
education is only about developing moral reasoning
in students. I side with those that think that this is
not enough. What does it matter if students know
how to reason well in ethics if they are not moti
vated to act ethically? Thus, in my view, ethical
education requires not only the development of
intellectual skills but also the development of
attitudes for good behavior.
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Another problem, as we have seen, is that gen
eraUy, rules, principles, values and virtues in current
ethical education are presented in a fragmented
fashion in accounting. But, if moral values, rules and
virtues are so closely intertwined, ethical education
ought to present aU of these elements in their
interrelation, although the main orientation should
be toward virtues (character) since virtues are critical
for moral behavior, as explained in the preceding
section.
Teaching rules, starting with prohibitive rules,
makes sense and should be promoted. The order of
learning is "that we first have to learn in certain
initial situations what is always enjoined or always
prohibited, in order that we may become able to
extrapolate in a non-rule-governed way to other
types of situations in which what courage or justice
or truthfulness, together with prudence, demands is
more than conformity to the universal rule."
(Maclntyre, 1993, p. 143). Thus, the knowledge of
rules contained in codes of conduct is stiU necessary
but they have to be critically examined and under
stood in their relation with human values.
Thus, human values and general principles related
to them should occupy a central role in ethical
education as well. Rather than presenting enlight
ened ethical theories to students I would suggest
challenging them to reflect on what is reaUy good.
This question is not so common since many view
the answer to it as a mere personal choice. Certainly,
each person has to discover what is good for him or
her. But such a choice entails great responsibility.
According to Maclntyre (1993), the starting point
of moral reasoning for ordinary and plain people ?
by which I mean those who have not received any
philosophical influence ? is the question "What is
my good?" When an ordinary persons ask "what is
my good?" he or she is asking about what he or she
values, but he or she could be wrong and might re
think the real value for him or her. This leads to the
further, already philosophical question: "What in
general is the good, for my kind of history in this
kind of situation? And that in turn wiU lead to a
fundamental philosophical question "What is the
good as such for human being as such?" (Maclntyre,
1993, pp. 136-137).
An accountant is involved in a professional prac
tice which demands reputation and a contribution to
the public interest or the common good, but he or
 106 Domin?e Mel?
she is, above aU, a person who asks him or herself,
"what is my good here and now?" From a relatively
early age we foUow rules given by parents, teachers,
clergy or other people who eHcit our confidence.
Afterwards, we may have reaHzed that some of these
were social conventions, or organizational rules and
came from reasons of efficacy or utiHty, but others
we discover to have a moral sense (fairness, truth
fulness, loyalty, ...). Through this process of trial
and error, one discovers moral values and the dif
ference between them and their opposites.
Wisdom accumulated over centuries recognizes
some ethical values rooted in human nature, which
ordinary persons have a certain capacity to take hold
of, for instance, the value of human Hfe, contributing
to the weU being of others or living together in a
peaceful and amiable way. This latter includes a set
of moral values that most people can understand as
such. Ethical education should be aware of this and
present questions and comments regarding human
values and how rules correspond to them.
Regarding virtues, ethical education is different
from rules and values since the acquisition of virtues
is not a question of knowledge, but a result of
personaUy dehberated and free actions. As Aristotle
reaHzed, it takes place by repetition of good actions.
Here arises the age old question, coming from
Socrates and Plato's time about whether virtues can
be taught. If virtues are acquired trough dehberated
and free actions, it is clear that ethical education
cannot produce virtues by itself, but virtues can be
shown. Furthermore, the importance of virtues can
be emphasized to motivate students toward moral
behavior, which generates virtues. Several authors
have given suggestions in this respect. For Mintz
(1995) educators should inform students about the
importance of virtues and facilitate the learning of
virtue through case analysis, cooperative and col
laborative learning techniques and role-playing.
Dobson and Armstrong (1995) stressed the essential
role played by moral exemplars or role models, or
"white-hat" accountants. Stewart (1997) urges the
use of narrative to enhance moral motivation. At
the same time, he points out how the accounting
faculty must be role-models to students in their
professional responsib?ities. AU these proposals can
contribute to fostering ethical behavior, if it is
though? together with rules and human good in an
integrated manner.
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Conclusion
This paper has attempted to present some short
comings to approaches of ethical education in
accounting that separately consider rules and prin
ciples, values and virtues in a fragmentary manner. I
have considered that values are "intrinsic moral
values" or "moral goods" rooted in human nature
and virtues are human virtues, that is to say, virtues
of the person as such. Values (in the intellect) have a
correspondence with virtues (in character). It has
been argued that rules, values and virtues are inter
related and form a unity. This should lead us to
re-think ethics in accounting by considering
simultaneously rules, values and virtues and their
interrelation.
This paper also holds that the main goal for ethical
education in accounting ? and of course, in any
other professional field ? should be to impact on the
ethical behavior of those receiving this education
and not only to provide a set of theories tools to
solve ethical dilemmas. Ethical behavior primarily
has to do with character, although ethical knowledge
and external motivation must also be an influence.
Consequently, ethical education has to be oriented
toward motivating moral behavior and acquiring
virtues, as some scholars have pointed out in recent
years. 7 However, virtues are not a matter of
knowledge but personal moral development. What
ethical education can do is to show virtues, exhort
and motivate the student to acquire them and ex
plain how to do so. This includes the presentation
and discussion of rules, generally from codes, prin
ciples and values which are necessary for acquiring
virtues.
From a practical perspective, this proposal re
quires, first of all, changing the status quo of teaching
which exclusively presents rules and enlightened
ethical theories. Teaching material should also seek a
different focus than what is common in many places,
which is presenting dilemmas based on cases and
providing little or no information about the people
involved. What I have proposed is a comprehensive
ethical approach interrelating rules, values and vir
tues. Cases studies should include not only dilemmas
but also descriptions of specific people involved in a
particular situation, significant facts of their life, traits
of their character, as well as other relevant infor
mation about factors with an influence on moral
 Ethical Education in Accounting 107

behavior, such as how people are motivated by their stage for" a change in ethical behaviour; (7) appreciating
organization (incentives, moral role modeling, and understanding the history and composition of aU
leadership, organizational culture and so on) and by aspects of accounting ethics and their relationship to the
the socio-cultural environment. general field of ethics (1988, p. 322).
"Given Solomon"s account of what virtues are, the
obvious virtues in business might weU seem to be those
traits that make somebody, for example, a good salesper
Acknowledgements son traits which includes exceUence in persuading people
to accept falsehood as much as honesty." (Ewin, 1995, p.
I am grateful to Ronald Duska, Mary B. Armstrong 823)
and Josep M. Rosanas for their thoughtful comments 11 Mintz (1985, 1996), who has emphasized the role of
on an early draft of this paper. virtues in accounting education, as has been said, seems to
have been aware of the necessity to integrate virtues with
rules (standards), duties and values. He states: "Ethics
refers to standards of conduct that indicate how one ought
Notes to behave based on values and moral duties and virtues
arising from principles about right and wrong." (1995, p.
1 Finn et al. (1988) surveying the responses of 332 251). However, he did not go further by integrating
members of the AICPA found that the most frequenttheses three elements. In fact, it would be very difficult to
ethical issues in the accounting profession (CPAs) were: do so, since he considers universaHstic perspectives
client proposals of tax alteration and tax fraud (47%), ("principles about right and wrong") and subjective
conflict of interest and independence (16%), client perception of values: ("values are basic and fundamental
proposal of alteration of financial statements (10%) and beliefs that guide or motivate attitudes or actions": p. 251)
others issues (15%). which are one of the sources for standards of conduct
The authors of this study interpret this percentage for (standards of conduct ... based on values and moral
different moral development among respondeees, many duties).
would not surpass level 4 of Kohlberg (1976) for whom12 The idea develops an original approach of Thomas
the right thing is respecting authority and preserving theAquinas (Summa Teol?gica, I?II, q. 94, a. 2),
rules of society, while others will be at level 5, related to According to Thomas Aquinas (Summa Teol?gica, I?II,
individual rights or level 6, which employs universalq.100, a.l), the Ten Commandments, apart from being a
moral and ethical principles. set of fundamental moral rules both for Jews and
It was the Standards of Ethical Conduct for ManagementChristians, contain the whole of natural law. These rules
Accountants of the NAA, which afterwards become the contribute to the good of the person who fulfiU them and
current Ethical Behavior for Practitioners of Managementone can easily realize that the Commandments are
Accounting and Financial Management. indispensable rules of aU social life.
Published in Management Accounting, September 1983, It is "right reason about things to be done", says
p. 68. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, I?II, q. 65, a. 1).
5 http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm (April 16, Aquinas insists on the same point: "no moral virtue can
2004). be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to
6 www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.php?EDFID make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right
=00058 (April 16, 2004). choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, the
7 www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.php?EDFID inclination to which is the direct outcome of moral virtue,
=00058 (April 16, 2004). but also the correct choice of things conducive to the end,
8 http://www.imapdx.org/ethics.htm (April 16, 2004). which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges,
Loeb proposed the following goals for ethics education and commands in those things that are directed to the
in accounting, taken from Callahan (1980), who wrote end."(Summa Teol?gica, I?II, q. 65, a. 1. Elsewhere, he adds:
about goals in the teaching of ethics: (1) relating "... discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice,
accounting education to moral issues; (2) recognizing moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to
issues in accounting that have ethical impUcations; (3) fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties
developing a "sense of moral obligation" or responsibil to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident:
ity; (4) developing the abilities needed to deal with ethical for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be
conflicts or dilemmas; (5) learning to deal with the without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so
uncertainties of the accounting profession; (6) "setting the forth." (Summa Teol?gica, I?II, q. 58, a. 4).

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 108 Dom?nec Mel?
On the interdependece of virtues, see, e.g., Simon
(1986, chap. 6)
See a similar goal for ethical education, although from a
different perspective in Armstrong et al. (2003).
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Department of Business Ethics
IESE Business School,
University of Navarra,
Av. Pearson, 21
08034 - Barcelona, Spain
E-mail: mele@iese.edu

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