Modes of Acquiring Ownership to Public Lands
ordered said land, including its walls, be adjudicated and registered in
Maximo Cortes vs. City of Manila
REALTY; ACCRETION. — If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to
floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters, and
if by virtue of lawful provisions said estates are subject to incumbrances
and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which
may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of
accretion acknowledged by article 84 of the Law of Waters of the 3d of
August, 1866, extended to the Philippines by the royal decree of April 8,
1873, and by article 366 of the Civil Code.
ACTS OF POSSESSION. — Acts of possession exercised by the owner over
his estate or land bordering on the banks of rivers are always understood
legally to cover that portion added thereto by accretion, by the effect of
the current of the waters.
SUMMARY:
1. Maximo Cortes filed a written application for the registration of a parcel
of land (1,172.21 sqm) owned by him, free of all encumbrances, situated
in Calle Aguilar, corner of Calle Cecilia in the district of Binondo, this city,
together with the buildings erected thereon, its boundaries being stated in
the application. The land was acquired by the applicant by purchase from
Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to a deed of sale dated July 3,
1894, recorded in the registry of property, no other person having any title
to or interest therein, and the property was assessed, for the purpose of
taxation of the last fiscal year, at $1,444, United States currency. The
buildings erected thereon were paid for by the applicant with his own
money, and the application is accompanied by the deed of sale, plan, and
technical description of the land.
2. Motion to deny registration:
Examiner of titles - said building lot was attached by reason of certain
proceedings instituted against the applicant for reason and rebellion, yet,
inasmuch as the land was acquired by him more than ten years previously,
he could be considered the real owner thereof by prescription.
Attorney for the city of Manila - both the plan and the technical description
exhibited contained errors;
Errors: excess in the measurement affects the interests of the city (33.40
sqm of the Meisic Creek, one of public use and belonged to the city of
manila) if registration allowed.
3. Judge’s Decision: DENY APPLICATION.
a. sustained City of Manila’s opposition
b.
favor of the applicant upon presentation of an amended description,
showing the measurements of the property, including its walls but
excluding therefrom the rest of the land shown in Exhibit A.
4. Applicant filed motion to reopen case (having discovered very important
proof; to this end he filed an affidavit stating that he had learned the
whereabouts of the original owner of the land, who was better informed
with respect to its conditions and location). DENIED.
Applicant excepted to the judgment and also moved for a new trial (the
decision of the court was contrary to law and to the weight of the
evidence). DENIED and Exception taken.
ISSUE:
WON the 33.40 sqm of the Meisic Creek can be registered by Petitioner
Cortes (YES)
HELD:
The dominion of the applicant, Maximo Cortes, over the land or building lot
acquired by him from Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to the public
deed executed before a notary on the 3rd of July, 1894, registered in the
registry of property, is unquestionable and has been fully proven; and, in
view of the validity of his title, the city attorney had to limit his opposition
to the registration simply to its effect upon the Meisic Creek. The court,
upon previous declaration of general default, then ordered the adjudication
and registration of the title of the applicant, Cortes, to said building lot
upon submitting an amended description of the land.
It having been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included in the
technical description presented by the applicant, situated between the lot
to which said instrument refers and the bed of the Meisic Creek, has been
gradually formed by alluvion, as the result of the current in the said
stream, it can not be denied that said portion of land with an area of 33.40
square meters, belongs by right accretion to the owner of the land referred
to in the instrument of the 3rd of July, 1894, exhibited by the applicant.
The Law of Waters, promulgated by royal decree of the 3d of August,
1866, and extended to these Islands by a royal decree dated April 8, 1873,
provides in article 84: The accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by
or sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of land bordering
on streams, torrents, lakes, and rivers.
Article 366 of the Civil Code: The accretions which banks of rivers may
gradually received from the effects of the currents belong to the owners of
the estates bordering thereon.
1

There is no evidence whatever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made artificially by the owner; therefore, the facts alleged
and proven in the proceedings must stand. The increase or accretion which
in a latent, incessant, and spontaneous manner is received by the land
from the effects of the current depositing, in the course of time, sediment
and alluvial matter along the shore, is undeniably the work of nature and
lawfully belongs to the owner of the property; and from the fact that all or
almost the whole area of said increased portion is soft and unsettled, one
is naturally convinced that it was formed by alluvion, and that for such
reason it appertains to the owner of the land bordering thereon by virtue
of the right of accretion recognized by the law.
The reason therefore is quite evident because, if lands bordering on
streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to destructive force
of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as
may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by
the right of accretion.
And, although the acts of possession exercised over the bordering land are
always understood legally to cover that portion added to the property by
accretion, in this case shrubs have been planted there, which furnish
additional proof that Maximo Cortes has exercised rights of ownership and
possession over the whole area of the property the registration of which he
requests.
Disposition: For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be reversed, as we do hereby reverse the
same, and that the court below should direct that the land to which the
appellant refers be recorded in the registry of property in accordance with
the law, including that portion of the same added by accretion up to the
water line of the Meisic River, without any special ruling as to costs. So
ordered.
Republic vs. de Guzman
Alienable and Disposable vs. Time of Application for Registration
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De
Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman,
Salvador Ermitao De Guzman, Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion,
Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro Dela Rosa, Jose Ermitao,
Esmerando Ermitao, Tricom Development Corporation and Filomeno
Ermitao
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE; DOCTRINE IN DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS.
CA, (G.R. NO. 94525, 205 SCRA 486 [1992]), NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE
AT BAR. — In the Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals, the
period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked
to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period
possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but
alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the
property subject of private respondents' application was only declared
alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable
of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless)
and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land
in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the
counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with
the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 85322, 196 SCRA 476
[1991]), and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
FOREST LANDS OR FOREST RESERVES; NOT CAPABLE OF PRIVATE
APPROPRIATION; POSSESSION THEREOF, HOWEVER LONG, CANNOT
CONVERT THEM INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY. — Forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of
the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries,
could never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the
latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex."
CASE: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a CA Decision
affirming the RTC Judgment in LRC Cases Nos. TG-362 and TG-396.
FACTS:
1. Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by
Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels
of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman.
RTC:
a. Norma R. Almanzor Application - DENIED for lack of factual and legal
bases
b. Salvador De Guzman Application - APPROVE
2
2. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the
petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of
land was approved.
3. Hence, this petition. The Trial Court erred, among others, in not
declaring that the De Guzmans have not overthrown the presumption that
the lands are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines
ISSUE:
WON the parcel of land sought to be registered
HELD:
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as
agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of
imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991. 6 Thus the
period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time
the application was filed in 1991 was only 26 years, 4 years short of the
required 30 year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29
and R.A. No. 6940.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the
time the subject land was released as agricultural is in direct contravention
of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, to wit —
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not
qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because
their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or
before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain
on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should
be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act
141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
In the case before us, the property subject of private respondents'
application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the
same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not
convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965,
any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting
of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling
in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject land for sixty 63 years at the time of the application of their
petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in
giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the
subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application,
private respondents' occupation thereof was only 26 years. We cannot
consider their 37 years of possession prior to the release of the land as
alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession
and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him
remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have
acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which
reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by
private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never
ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim
"dura lex, sed lex."
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and CA Decision
(February 26, 1998) and RTC Decision, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both
REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for failure
of the applicants therein to comply with the 30 year occupancy and
possessory requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Malabanan vs. Republic
Petitioners: Heirs of Mario Malabanan (Represented By Sally A. Malabanan)
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
3
CASE: For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision (April 29, 2009)
upholding the CA ruling denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on
the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right
to the registration in accordance with either Section 14 (1) or Section 14
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
SUMMARY:
1. The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite (Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
71,324-sqm).
Applicant Mario Malabanan (purchased property from Eduardo Velazco)
filed an application for land registration covering the property -> RTC -
Tagaytay City, Cavite.
Claims:
a. that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain
b. that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years
=> thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
To prove that the property was A&D land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification (June 11, 2001) issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR, which certifies that parcel of land (Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre) as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco containing an area of
249,734 sqm. as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified
to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.
After trial, RTC (December 3, 2002) GRANTED MALABANAN’S
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of 71,324 sqm, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of
this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
2. OSG’s appeal -> CA
Grounds:
a. Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to the A&D land of
the public domain
b. RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
February 23, 2007: CA GRANTED APPEAL. REVERSED RTC DECISION.
MALABANAN’S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION DISMISSED.
Cited ruling in Republic v. Herbieto:
- CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as
A&D was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession.
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared A&D
only on March 15, 1982.
Velazco's possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanan's period of possession.
3. Due to Malabanan's intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his
heirs elevated the CA's decision of February 23, 2007 to this SC through a
petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners assert that
a. ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land.
- Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as A&D could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree.
- ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of
the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering
that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
b. ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by
their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for
4
more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been "converted" into private property through prescription
at the time of the application without regard to whether the property
sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain.
SC DENIED PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI FILED BY HEIRS.
Ground: Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession
and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
4. Heirs’ MR -> SC
a. submit that the mere classification of the land as A or D should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
- rulings in Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, Menguito v. Republic, and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., argue that:
1. reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
2. Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-
interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to
validly transmit title and ownership thereof;
3. consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor;
4. when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February
20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost
16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
5. Republic’s partial MR -> SC
- to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in
Naguit and Herbieto.
- chiefly citing the dissents, Republic
a. contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree
through judicial legislation.
b. reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
WON the possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public
land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically
convert said property into private property or release it from the public
domain (NO)
HELD:
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss
the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable
land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if
it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without
being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is
not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. The State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution.
a. 1935 Constitution: agricultural, timber and mineral.
b. Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest, and grazing land (with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications).
c. 1987 Constitution adopted 1935 Constitution’s classification:
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their
legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
5
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
A&D lands of the State fall into:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation;
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not
in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land
is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of
public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus,
until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State
no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by
which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural
lands, can be disposed of.
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11 (4), in relation to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz.:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the CFI of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law
does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable
and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48 (b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public
Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for
his application to come under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has
been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious; (OCEN)
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12,
1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of
the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the
authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
6
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that
the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made
on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to
such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes
that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns,
and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be
left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified
the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning
of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's
imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines
its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over
it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during
the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as
a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant's
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to
a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary
that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for
the number of years prescribed by law will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent
legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023) in order to liberalize stringent requirements and
procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial
or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition
and registration is no longer Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act but the
Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree. As such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition
of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
7
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36
and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect
or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part
of the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession — possession and occupation
that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration
for their lack of merit.
San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner: San Miguel Corporation
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Director of Lands
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LANDS; REQUISITES IN THE
ACQUISITION THEREOF. — Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure
and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. Such open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years
must, however, be conclusively established.
NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — In this case, petitioner’s claim
that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of Lot 684 for more than thirty years is anchored on certain
documentary and testimonial evidence. Its documentary evidence consist
of tax declaration No. 923 wherein it appears that in 1974, Silverio Perez
declared as his own for taxation purposes, a certain riceland with an area
of 1.5657 hectares located in Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, and a
certification of the Office of the Treasurer of Sto. Tomas to the effect that
in 1977, Silverio Perez paid realty taxes for the land subject of tax
declaration no. 923. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Tax declarations only become
strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription, a mode of
acquisition of ownership relied upon by petitioner in this case, when
accompanied by proof of actual possession. Such proof of actual
possession was sought to be provided by the testimony of vendor Silverio
Perez that he had been in possession of the property since 1933 until he
sold it to SMC in 1975; that the property was given to him by his parents
when he got married; that no document evidenced that transfer; that it
had been in the possession of his parents since 1925; that he had declared
the property in his name for taxation purposes, that he had paid taxes
therefor, and that he was in peaceful, continuous and exclusive possession
of the property until its sale to SMC. Petitioner did not present other
witnesses to corroborate Perez’ testimony. Its other witness, Antonio M. de
las Alas, Jr., a lawyer of the petitioner, simply testified that he handled the
negotiations for the purchase of the property; that SMC was authorized to
own and acquire property as shown by its articles of incorporation and by-
laws; that since its acquisition in 1975, the property had been used as a
hatchery farm of SMC; that SMC’s possession in the concept of an owner
had been continuous, adverse and against the whole world, and that the
land was declared for taxation purposes still in the name of Silverio Perez.
CASE:
8
In this petition for review on certiorari, San Miguel Corporation seeks the
reversal of the CA Decision denying its application for registration of a
parcel of land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto.
FACTS:
1. December 23, 1975, petitioner SMC purchased from Silverio Perez Lot
684 (14,531 sqm) located in Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in
consideration of the sum of P133,084.80.
February 21, 1977: claiming ownership in fee simple of the land, SMC filed
before the then CFI Batangas an application for its registration under the
Land Registration Act.
The SolGen opposed the application for registration.
Contentions:
a. SMC's claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or
grant could no longer be availed of by the applicant as the six-month
period from February 16, 1976 prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 892
had elapsed
b. parcel of land in question is part of the public domain, and that SMC,
being a private corporation, is disqualified under Section 11, Article XIV of
the Constitution from holding alienable lands of the public domain.
At the initial and only hearing held on October 12, 1977, the Court, upon
motion of SMC and there being no opposition to the application except that
of the Republic of the Philippines, issued an order of general default. SMC
was allowed to mark documentary evidence to establish jurisdictional facts
and to present additional evidence before the Clerk of Court who was
appointed Commissioner for that purpose.
December 12, 1977: CFI (Judge Eduardo C. Abaya), rendered a decision
granting the application for registration and adjudicating the property in
favor of SMC.
2. SolGen’s Appeal -> CA. REVERSED CFI DECISION and declared the
parcel of land involved as public land.
3. Hence, the instant petition.
SMC alleged "grave errors" of the CA for this Court's resolution:
a. the CA's failure to hold that "prescription is a mode of acquiring title or
ownership of land and that the title thus acquired is registrable"
b. the CA's disregard of SMC's evidence "not on the basis of controverting
evidence but on the basis of unfounded suppositions and conjectures,"
c. the CAs' reversal of the factual findings of the trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and sincerity of the witnesses.
ISSUE: WON the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to
warrant a ruling that SMC and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a
registrable right over Lot 684.
HELD:
Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land
for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property.Such open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties for
more than 30 years must, however, be conclusively established.
This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous
validation of actually fictitious claims of possession over the
property in dispute.
In this case, petitioner's claim that its predecessor-in-interest had open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of Lot 684 for more than 30 years is
anchored on certain documentary and testimonial evidence. Its
documentary evidence consist of tax declaration No. 923 wherein it
appears that in 1974, Silverio Perez declared as his own for taxation
purposes, a certain riceland with an area of 1.5657 hectares located in
Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, and a certification of the Office of
the Treasurer of Sto. Tomas to the effect that in 1977, Silverio Perez paid
realty taxes for the land subject of tax declaration no. 923. 7
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Tax declarations only
become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by
prescription, a mode of acquisition of ownership relied upon by
petitioner in this case, when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.
Such proof of actual possession was sought to be provided by the
testimony of vendor Silverio Perez that he had been in possession of the
property since 1933 until he sold it to SMC in 1975; that the property was
given to him by his parents when he got married; that no document
evidenced that transfer; that it had been in the possession of his parents
since 1925; that he had declared the property in his name for taxation
purposes, that he had paid taxes therefor, and that he was in peaceful,
continuous and exclusive possession of the property until its sale to SMC.
Petitioner did not present other witnesses to corroborate Perez' testimony.
Its other witness, Antonio M. de las Alas, Jr., a lawyer of the petitioner,
simply testified that he handled the negotiations for the purchase of the
9
property; that SMC was authorized to own and acquire property as shown
by its articles of incorporation and by-laws; that since its acquisition in
1975, the property had been used as a hatchery farm of SMC; that SMC's
possession in the concept of an owner had been continuous, adverse and
against the whole world, and that the land was declared for taxation
purposes still in the name of Silverio Perez. 12
We hold that there is paucity of evidence of actual, notorious and exclusive
possession of the property on the part of vendor Silverio Perez so as to
attach to it the character of an express grant from the government.
Indeed, as correctly held by the CA, Silverio Perez's testimony, being
uncorroborated, is simply self-serving and hence, undeserving of any
weight. llcd
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co. Inc.
Petitioner: Director of Lands
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood and Veneer
Co. Inc. Etc.
CASE: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from an
IAC Judgment affirming CFI Decision which ordered registration in favor of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of 5 parcels of land (481,390 sqm)
acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
FACTS:
1. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended; and
the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. Acme is a duly organized and SEC registered (December 23, 1959)
corporation with Mr. Rodolfo Nazario as representative;
2. Acme (Nazario) can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation;
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was
ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on
October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the 1935 Philippine Constitution is applicable;
5. Infiels’ possession dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel;
6. Acme’s possession is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to
the present and tackling the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29,
1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land (RA No.
3872 - granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain)
8. Acme has introduced more than P45,000,000 worth of
improvements
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had
donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels
for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15,
1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-1'), during their
special session on November 22, 1979."
2. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except
as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was
in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, reads:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the CFI of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
10
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of the chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof."
The Petition for Review does not dispute — indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court
— the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the
lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have
their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
ISSUE: WON the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962
could be confirmed in favor of the latter (Acme) in proceedings instituted
by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of
the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares
HELD:
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at
the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make
any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable
public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under
section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) `presupposes
that the land is public.
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Cariño in 1909 thru Susi in 1925 down to Herico in
1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better — and, indeed, the correct, view — becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein.
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Cariño, involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those
`who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. . . ."
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in
more categorical language, in Susi:
". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et
de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
11
publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, like Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra,
by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."
If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land
to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be
conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in
the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had
already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire,
hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly
valid and proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the
new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows
private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to
doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the
issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process.
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by
Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought
to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
12
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered,
only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed
to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition
against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e.
as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are
duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act
and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged."
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the
lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule
on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in
Meralco.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs in this instance.
Susana Meguito, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines
Petitioners; Susana Menguito, Ermilita Menguito-Manalili, Helen Marta
Menguito-Luna, Renato Menguito, Bersamin Menguito, Froilan Menguito,
and Generoso Menguito
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND LAW; PUBLIC LAND; REQUISITE
FOR REGISTRATION. — Unless a piece of public land is shown to have
been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been
classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon
presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open
possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years. Hence, as
observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two
legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable;
and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
June 12,1945.
APPLICANT FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION MUST OVERCOME
PRESUMPTION THAT LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED FORMS PART OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN. — For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
EFFECT OF SURVEYOR-GEODETIC ENGINEER'S NOTATION THAT SURVEY
WAS INSIDE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND. — In the present case,
petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing
the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the
said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable.
OPEN CONTINUOUS POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS, REQUIRED;
CASE AT BAR. — Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able
to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their
imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be denied.
The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in
13
question — openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely — in the
concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.
ABSENCE OF PROOF TO SUBSTANTIATE CLAIM OF PAYMENT OF REAL
ESTATE TAXES IN CASE AT BAR NEGATES POSSESSION. — Petitioners
presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since
1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying
taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had
declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not present
any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim.
General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of
possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.
Synopsis:
Petitioners applied for registration of their imperfect title over a parcel of
land located at Usuan, Taguig, Metro Manila comprising of 2,112 square
meters. Petitioners claimed that their predecessor-in-interest possessed
the land even before the Second World War, that they possessed the lot in
1968 and that the land has been declared for taxation purposes in 1943.
Petitioners presented Survey Plan No. SWO-13-000227 which contained a
notation that the survey plan is inside the alienable and disposable land.
They, however, failed to submit any other evidence to support their claim.
The decision of the trial court was reversed on appeal. The Court of
Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove that the land applied for was
alienable and disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors had
been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
It was held that for registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public
domain the applicant must prove that the land applied for was alienable
and disposable and that his possession thereof for a minimum of 30 years
must be open, continuous, exclusive and adverse. An applicant who
miserably failed to comply therewith is not entitled to registration.
CASE: Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the CA Decision (September 30, 1997) and Resolution June
23, 1998. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the RTC Decision which
granted the petitioners’ application for registration.
The RTC Decision which was reversed by the CA granted petitioners'
application for registration.
Doctrine: Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as
alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Even assuming that such land has been classified as alienable, title thereto
can be registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of
adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for a
period of thirty years.
FACTS:
1. November 10, 1987: in the RTC at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application
for Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of
the deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito,
namely: Susana Menguito, Emelita Menguito-Manalili, Helen Marta
Menguito-Luna, Renato Menguito, Bersamin Menguito, Froilan Menguito
And Generoso Menguito.
- apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation
of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration
Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed
- apply to declare:
a. applicants are the owners in fee simple of 11 parcels of land
situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-
000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-
F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and
corresponding technical descriptions, ...;
b. said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year
at P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land
record of Taguig, Metro Manila;
c. to the best of applicants' knowledge and belief, there is no
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the
said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest
therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or
expectancy;
d. applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;
e. said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful,
continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of
said parcels of land for more than 30 years;
h. should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the
instant case, the applicants hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter
VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
2. Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a 'Notice of
Initial Hearing' addressed to: the SolGen, Director of LMB, Secretaries of
DPWH and DAR, Director of the BFD, and owners of the adjacent
properties as mentioned in the application, informing them that the
application is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The
addressees were then ordered 'to present such claims as you may have to
said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of
such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place
14
aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be
adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence
before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from
contesting said application or any decree entered thereon' (Exhibit 'A').
Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of
Abante,a daily tabloid.
3. Earlier, or on March 30, 1989: Republic of the Philippines, through the
SolGen, filed its Opposition to the application for registration contending:
- that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A.
141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
- that muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said
muniments - not appear to be genuine; indicate pretended possession of
applicant to be of recent vintage.
- that claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an
appropriate application for registration within the period of 6 months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the
records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.
- that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.' (Amended
Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).
SolGen’s prayer:
a. denial of the application for registration
b. declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
At scheduled initial hearing (April 25, 1989): Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared
and registered a verbal opposition to the application.
On motion of counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of
General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors
Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr.,who was directed to file his
written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
4. June 13, 1990: applicants filed their 'Formal Offer of Evidence,'
submitting therewith the following documentary exhibits: Plan Swo-13-
000227, technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive,
Engineer's Certificate, Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by
the applicants (December 12, 1985), description of the land and the
apportionment thereof among the applicants, Tax Declarations, Tax
Receipts, Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob (May 7, 1969, executed by Cirilo
Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito), and Deed of Partition (November 7,
1990 executed by the applicants).
September 12, 1990: oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and
Opposition to applicants' formal offer of evidence.
5. May 15, 1991: RTC affirmed the order of general default against the
whole world. CONFIRMED REGISTERABLE TITLE OF APPLICANTS
Oppositor Republic’s (SolGen) MR -> RTC. DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Oppositor Republic’s (SolGen) Appeal -> CA. GRANTED. REVERSED RTC
DECISION.
- agreed with respondent that the RTC failed to consider the legal
requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is
alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that
the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that
petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it
since June 12, 1945.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in reversing the RTC’s findings of fact and in rejecting
petitioners' application for the registration of their respective titles (NO)
HELD:
Registration of Petitioner’s Title
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, as amended, provides for
the registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this
wise:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the CFI of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
15
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter."
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073 clarified paragraph "b" of the said
provision by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-
bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for
was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land
openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12,
1945.
The records show that petitioners failed to establish these 2 requisites.
Classification of the Land
To prove that the land in question formed part of the A&D lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B
as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January
3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain,waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State....." (Italics supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent
such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question
has been declared alienable.
Period of Possession
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the
land is alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and
registration thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is that
they have failed to establish possession of the lots in question — openly,
continuously, exclusively and adversely — in the concept of owner for at
least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in
question, which had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he
donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly
passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back
as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had
supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War.
There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.
Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes
since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been
paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo
Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they
did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to
substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice.
Cirilo's 6 children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during
the hearing of their application for registration of the lots in question. In
fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of
petitioners' application. Still, she was not presented as a witness.
There can be no question that Cirilo's children were the best witnesses,
because they could have substantiated petitioners' claim that indeed the
lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may
even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their
16
supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista,
the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before
petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilo's children nor the
documents that they might have had in their possession were presented.
Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners' claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they are of recent
vintage, the tax declarations, tax receipts, and the Municipal Treasurer's
certifications of tax payments presented in evidence are incompetent and
insufficient to prove petitioners' and their predecessors-in-interest's
possession of the lots in question.
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were
contrary to each other, we waded into the records, but found no reason to
modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want to conform to the
State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social
justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against
registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that
petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the
legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Republic of the Philippines vs. East Silverland Realty Development
Corporation
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: East Silverland Realty Development Corporation
CASE: SC is urged to review and set aside the CA Decision (July 31, 2008)
and Resolution (February 20, 2009) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. The CA
Decision affirmed the RTC Decision (August 27, 2004) dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit. The CA Resolution denied the petitioner's MR
(August 29, 2008).
FACTS:
1. The respondent East Silverland filed with the RTC an application for land
registration for a parcel of land (Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, 9,794 sqm). The respondent purchased the
portion of the subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A)
from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale (November 27,
1990) and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area
B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to
a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale (April 11, 1991). It
was claimed that the respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property since June 12, 1945.
After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC (August 27, 2004)
GRANTED RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION
- applying the provisions of P.D. 1529
- LRA is ordered to issue a decree in the name of the applicant East
Silverlane Realty Development Corporation
- Based on the decree, the RD - Misamis Oriental is directed to issue an
OCT
2. July 31, 2008: Republic’s appeal -> CA. DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
AFFIRMED RTC DECISION (August 27, 2004).
- It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform
to 3 requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the applicant's
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is a bona fide
claim of ownership.
- In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements.
Anent the 1st requirement, both the report and certification issued by the
DENR shows that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable
zone classified under BF Project No. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map No. 585 and was
released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.
- Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. It is a settled rule that the classification or re-classification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains uncontested
and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did not present any evidence
to refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the alienable and
disposable character of the subject land certified as such as early as
December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence of the
petitioner-appellee.
- Anent the 3rd requirements, the applicant is required to prove his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the
subject land to that of its predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax
declarations and real property historical ownership pertaining thereto were
presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in 1948, a portion
of the subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel.
17
Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the same was declared under the name
of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of
ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of
Misamis Oriental that previous tax declarations pertaining to the said
portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be located as
the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.
On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously
declared in 1948 under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in
1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the name of Jacinto Tan.
Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A
certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of
previous tax declarations under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were
deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.
In 1991 or upon ESRDC's acquisition of the subject property, the latter
took possession thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said land to Asia
Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant, nonetheless, ESRDC
has its branch office located at the plant compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.
Corollarily, oppositor-appellant's contentions that the court a quo erred in
considering the tax declarations as evidence of ESRDC's possession of the
subject land as the latter's predecessors-in-interest declared the same
sporadically, is untenable.
It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by
petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-
appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence to contradict the
claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject property
and their possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in the
concept of an owner for over 30 years.
Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation
purposes until ESRDC filed an application for land registration in 1995,
ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the concept of an
owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for 47
years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been
in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which
possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
in the concept of an owner.
The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in
the manner and for the length of time required under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act"
(PLA), and Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the "Property Registration Decree" (P.D. No. 1529). According to the
petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and competent
witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership performed by its
predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The respondent's sole
witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent
witness as he is the respondent's liaison officer and he is not related in any
way to the respondent's predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were
planted on the subject property only shows casual or occasional cultivation
and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.
ISSUE:
WON respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and
P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
HELD:
NO. This Court's review of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence submitted by the respondent fell short of proving that it has
acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b)
of the PLA. The respondent cannot register the subject property in its
name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529. It was not established by the required quantum of evidence that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for the
prescribed statutory period.
The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles". On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the
qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
18
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant
of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in
force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and
their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on
January 25, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as
follows:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter
VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and
occupation for a period of 10 years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096
on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA until it
was amended by RA No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a
period of 30 years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on
January 25, 1977 that it was required that possession and occupation
should commence on June 12, 1945.
P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws
relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially
provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1)
covers "alienable and disposable land" while Section 14 (2) covers "private
property". As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines, the distinction between the two provisions lies
with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands.
Specifically:
At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code,a fact which does not hold true with
respect to Section 14 (1).
Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned. Under
Article 420 of the Civil Code,the following properties are of public
dominion:
(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and
others of similar character;
19
(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in
Article 420 is patrimonial property, hence, susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property
or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration
that the property is no longer intended for public service or development
of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2)
and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is
primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first
established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the
classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered
in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject
property on or prior to June 12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive
period of 30 years, the respondent submitted the following tax
declarations:
a) Agapita Claudel - 1948;
b) Francisca Oco - 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and
1991;
c) Respondent's name (East Silverland) - 1991, 1992 and 1994;
d) Jacinto Tan Lay Cho - 1948 and 1952;
e) Jacinto Tan - 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990; and
f) Respondent's name (East Silverland) - 1991, 1992 and 1994.
Pursuant to Agapita Claudel's 1948 Tax Declaration, there were 19 coconut
and 10 banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were
supposedly four years old, hence, the reasonable presumption that she
had been in possession even before June 12, 1945.
The respondent also offered the testimony of one Vicente Oco.
A reading of the CA's July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the
grant of the respondent's application given its supposed compliance with
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on the evidence
submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register the subject property
in its name under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its
predecessors-in-interest commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as
the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject property by
prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic
of the Philippines, 19 the CA held that even if possession commenced after
June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and
possession in the concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and
disposable public land into private property.
This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On
the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is
based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in
the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before
acquisitive prescription may apply.
20
While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable
on December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1,
1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), the DAR converted the same from agricultural to industrial only
on October 16, 1990. Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El
Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the
industrial zone. Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property
had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive
period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged
possession of its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the
withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain, it may
not be acquired by prescription.
On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on
Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax
declarations of the respondent's predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that
the respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-
interest is in 1948. That there were 4-year old coconut trees in Area A as
stated in Agapita Claudel's 1948 Tax Declaration cannot be considered a
"well-nigh controvertible evidence" that she was in possession prior to
June 12, 1945 without any evidence that she planted and cultivated them.
In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest tax declaration in his name
is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he occupied and possessed
Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the
respondent's lone witness that the respondent's predecessors-in-interest
were already in possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945
lacks probative value for being hearsay.
It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and
occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable
and disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious" in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,
this Court explained that the intent behind the use of "possession" in
conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the need for actual
and not just constructive or fictional possession.
On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of
possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118
thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be "in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted". In Heirs
of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, this Court expounded on the
nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party
who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent
to prove compliance with the possession required either under Section 14
(1) or Section 14 (2).
1st: the 12 Tax Declarations (Area A) and the 11 Tax Declarations (Area
B) for a claimed possession of more than 46 years (1948-1994) do not
qualify as competent evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this
Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the Philippines:
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for
the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and
occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent
and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any
event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax
declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or
declarant's right to registration of title.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner,"
by which the respondent describes its possession and that of its
predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on
the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that
the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature
and duration required by law. It is therefore inconsequential if the
petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the allegations
of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of
land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest
must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove
his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of
the oppositors.
The respondent's claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the
tax declarations alone. In Cequeña v. Bolante, this Court ruled that it is
only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of
21
ownership. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
2nd: that the 19 coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were 4 years
old at the time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not
suffice as evidence that her possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945,
in the absence of evidence that she planted and cultivated them.
Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these
trees, such can only be considered "casual cultivation" considering the size
of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho possessed Area B
in the concept of an owner on or prior to June 12, 1945 cannot be
assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.
3rd: that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it
was the respondent's predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that
actual cultivation or harvesting was made does not constitute "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and occupation. As this
Court ruled in Wee:
We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an
unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted
them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was
made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is
not sufficient to demonstrate petitioner's right to the registration of title in
her favor.
4th: Vicente Oco's testimony deserves scant consideration and will not
supplement the inherent inadequacy of the tax declarations. Apart from
being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente Oco lacks personal
knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent
started to occupy the subject property and admitted that his testimony
was based on what he allegedly gathered from the respondent's
predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot. Moreover,
Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or
ownership were performed by the respondent's predecessors-in-interest
and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they came
into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and
not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice. Evidence of this nature should have been received with suspicion,
if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.
5th: that the respondent's application was filed after only 4 years from the
time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the
DAR's October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for
ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in
Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of
the Philippines v. Rizalvo:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds 30 years. However, it is jurisprudentially
clear that the 30-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. 37
Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The CA Decision (July 31, 2008) and Resolution (February 20,
2009) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
respondent's application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan
Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Tan, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines
Petitioners: Jean Tan, Roseller C. Anacito, Carlo Loilo Espineda and Daisy
Aliado Manaois, Represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, Ma.
Wilhelmina E. Tobias
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
CASE: This is a petition for review (Rule 45) of the CA Decision (July 6,
2009) and Resolution (August 12, 2010) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88995.
FACTS:
1. June 14, 2001: petitioners filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land (Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre,
situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920
sqm) -> RTC - Naic, Cavite. Alleged:
a. that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant
to a Deed of Absolute Sale (April 25, 1996)
B. they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years.
After trial and hearing, the RTC (July 29, 2006) GRANTED PETITIONER’S
APPLICATION.
2. Republic’s Appeal -> CA. GRANTED. RTC DECISION SET REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
22
Ground: petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite
period of 30 years.
- records show that the appellees' possession over the subject property
can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when according to
evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable. From said
date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over the
subject property on 14 June 2001, only 18 years had lapsed. Thus,
appellees' possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
- no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their
predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land
as to indicate possession in the concept of owner. Except for the
Certification, showing payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year
2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the taxes due
corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest.
3. Petitioners’ MR -> CA. DENIED (August 12, 2010 Resolution)
Hence, petitioners’ petition for review (Rule 45).
- alleging that the evidence they presented prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject property for more than 30 years.
- claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that they acquired title
over the subject property by prescription:
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under
the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
HELD:
NO.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act"
governs the classification and disposition of lands forming part of the
public domain. Section 11 thereof provides that one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles". Section 48 thereof enumerates those
who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over
an alienable and disposable public land.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the
"Property Registration Decree", is a codification of all the laws relative to
the registration of property and Section 14 thereof specifies those who are
qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable
public land under the Torrens system. Particularly:
Section 14 .Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,
and Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation, Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable lands" while
Section 14 (2) covers "private property". Thus, for one's possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land to give
rise to an imperfect title, the same should have commenced on
June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that his
possession and occupation of private property has ripened to
imperfect title, the same should have been for the prescriptive
period provided under the Civil Code. Without need for an extensive
extrapolation, the private property contemplated in Section 14 (2) is
patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to Articles 420
and 422 of the Civil Code.
Going further, it was explained in Heirs of Malabanan and East Silverlane,
that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land
for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert it to
patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that
the property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be
alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus:
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property
or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration
that the property is no longer intended for public service or development
of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
23
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set
up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status
of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period
of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial
cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive
period.
The petitioners' application is obviously anchored on Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529 as they do not claim to have possessed, by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. That it was thru prescription that they had acquired an imperfect
title over the subject property is the foundation upon which the petitioners
rest their application.
Unfortunately, this Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to
be wanting. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that they and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite manner,
which this Court explained as follows:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party
who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual
possession for purposes of prescription. More so, if the payment of the
taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random such as in this
case. Indeed, how can the petitioners' claim of possession for the entire
prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were
paid only on 11 occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001?
Wee v. Republic of the Philippines: It bears stressing that petitioner
presented only 5 tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980
and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years
(1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other
competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either
possession or declarant's right to registration of title.
East Silverlane case: it was emphasized that adverse, continuous, open,
public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the
burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on the
applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax
declarations if unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.
While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by
testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies of
Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration and
do not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the 11 tax declarations
submitted by the petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific
acts of ownership or dominion were performed by the petitioners and
predecessors-in-interest and simply made that general assertion that the
24
latter possessed and occupied the subject property for more than 30
years, which, by all means, is a mere conclusion of law. The RTC should
have tackled evidence of such nature with a disposition to incredulity, if
not with an outright rejection.
Furthermore, the petitioners' application was filed after 1 year from the
time the subject property may be considered patrimonial. DARCO
Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by
the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the 30-
year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public
land under Section 14 (2) can only start from such date. Before the
property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion
order, it cannot be acquired by prescription. This is clear from the
pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted above and in
Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo, which states:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even 30 years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that
the 30-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of
P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The CA Decision (July 6, 2009) and Resolution
(August 12, 2010) are AFFIRMED.
Republic vs. C.A. and Tancinco, et al.
Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines (Director of Lands)
Respondents: The Hon. Court of Appeals, Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena
Tancinco Reyes, Marina Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco
CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF ACCESSION; REQUISITES OF
ACCRETION. — The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to
have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the
water, and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers.
ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE WORK OF NATURE; CASE AT BAR. —
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current
of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil
Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into
being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. There
is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made
and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the
sole effect of the current of the rivers but as result of the transfer of the
dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the
river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of
water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond
and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing river.
LAW GIVES RIPARIAN OWNER THE RIGHT TO ANY LAND OR ALLUVION;
RATIONALE. — The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for
the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced
by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions,
said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements,
it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owner thereof
should be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to
his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring
about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes
and not protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of
the river.
CASE: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Respondent CA (now
IAC) Decision affirming the CFI Decision which found that Lots 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by TCT No. 89709 and
ordered their registration in the names of the private respondents.
FACTS:
1. Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria
Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at
Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers.
25
June 24, 1973: private respondents filed an application for the registration
of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property.
Plan Psu-131892. Situated om Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Lot 1- 33,937 sqm, by Meycauayan and Bocaue River
Lot 2 - 5,453, by Meycauayan River
Lot 3 - 1,985 sqm, by Meycauayan River
2. April 5, 1974: Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, (Bureau of
Lands) filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
March 6, 1975: private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the
application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line
with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.
March 7, 1975: Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
June 26, 1976: CFI GRANTED APPLICATION.
Ground: finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds covered by TCT No. 89709.
August 19, 1982: petitioner Republic’s appeal -> CA. AFFIRMED IN TOTO
CFI DECISION appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Republic: there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of
the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of
the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is
man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
Private Respondents: establishes the fact of accretion without human
intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion
was complete.
ISSUE:
WON there was accretion to the rivate respondents' fishponds covered by
TCT No. 89709
HELD:
NO. We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of 3 requisites
before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to
have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the
Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost 4 hectares
of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to
be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in
1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had
already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a
gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase
in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If
she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made
and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the
sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the
dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the
river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under 2 meters of water.
The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond
and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to
any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for
the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his
land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by
26
virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the
risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. Hence, the riparian owner does
not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly
intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were
meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony
of the private respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939
there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It
should be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey of
their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral
Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the
years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation
purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently
formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not
have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951.
What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a
portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the
names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of
the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public
domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their
original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it
belongs.
Republic vs. Santos III and Santos, Jr.
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
Doctrine: By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water — belongs to the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of
the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a
law vests the ownership in some other person.
FACTS:
1. Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than 10 years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B in the RTC - Parañaque City. The property,
which had an area of 1,045 sqm., more or less, was located in Barangay
San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., in the Southeast by
the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
2. May 21, 1998: Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
latter's co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration, stating
that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property
was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to
the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the
reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion.
May 10, 2000: RTC GRANTED APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
Declaring Arcadio Santos III and Arcadion Santos Jr as the true and
absolute owners of the 1045 sqm. of land.
3. Republic’s appeal (thru OSG) -> CA. DENIED. RTC DECISION
AFFIRMED.
Republic’s MR -> CA. DENIED.
Hence, this appeal (Republic’s).
ISSUE:
WON Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein (NO)
WON respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) (NO)
HELD:
WON Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein (NO)
27
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to
respondents' benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents:
RTC: applicants are owners of the land which was previously a part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by
applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through
inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
CA: same with RTC.
Republic’s Appeal: application by RTC and CA of Article 457 of the Civil
Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents' evidence did
not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic's submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the
burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that
is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
opposition to it. They would be held entitled to claim the property as
their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if
they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion,
must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers. Accordingly, respondents should
establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant
of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did
not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the
effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their
evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque
River . . . (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
Respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed
from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the
current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 sqm. had
been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of
the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years — the span of time
intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and
the early 1950s (which respondents' witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be
the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only
plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B
was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation
was Arcadio, Jr.'s own testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an
orchard.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the
water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not
equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more
or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no
legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear
and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the
provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested
of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly
declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of
the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless
there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person.
WON respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) (NO)
In ruling for respondents:
RTC: favored respondents' application because they had taken possession
of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
28
30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner
of the parcel of land along the river bank.
CA: affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 14 (1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect
title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part
of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945.
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the
CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court
should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents' period of supposed possession
to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its
decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing
their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they
had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be
made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively
prove the payor's ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,
the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of
ownership; and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property
involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of
possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that
instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium
to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no
applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed
through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river
bank by respondents' predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in
relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of 30 years of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or
preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that
they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid
realty taxes only from 1999 signified that their alleged possession would at
most be for only 9 years as of the filing of their application for land
registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents
possessed Lot 4998-B for more than 30 years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration,
the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those
intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier
mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and
their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive
prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor
of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, a case involving the registration of
29
land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek.
There the Court held:
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man
and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after
the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a
river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is
not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its
inalienable character.
xxx xxx xxx
...Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation.
Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of
the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or
artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding
that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to
the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled
thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as
forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to
acquisition by private ownership. . . .
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has
been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply
dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan
Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the
opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion.
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore,
that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public
land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code
(which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to
the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only
after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public
dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed
to have acquired the property through prescription.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was
"inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property's nature as
alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of
a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and
disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
30
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof."
In Menguito v. Republic, which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento, we
specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan
was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in
this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we dealt with the sufficiency of the
certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or
Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of
public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz.:
. . . it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.
xxx xxx xxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land
as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications
do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of
Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not
prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of
Lot 4988-B.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the CA (May 27, 2003); DISMISSES the application for
31
registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III
respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 sqm., more or less,
situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and
DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part
of the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
Ignacio Grande vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners: Ignacio Grande et al.
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Domingo Calalung, and Esteban
Calalung
1. PROPERTY; ACCRETION; ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS ON REGISTERED LAND;
INCREMENT NOT AUTOMATICALLY REGISTERED. — An accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is
one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a
river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration
and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
CASE: This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso,
Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the CA Decision (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R)
reversing that of CFI (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners'
action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to
and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter
without petitioners' consent.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners (Grande et al) are the owners of a parcel of land (3.5032
hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela) by inheritance from their deceased mother
Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana
Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by OCT No.
2982, issued on June 9, 1934; identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342).
When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated
in the (title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of
the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had
receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an
alluvial deposit of 19,964 sqm. (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been
added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
2. January 25, 1958: petitioners instituted the present action in the CFI -
Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 sqm.)
formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous
possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for
damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs.
Respondents’ answer (February 18, 1958): claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 - present.
After trial, CFI of Isabela (May 4, 1959) RULED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS. Ordered respondents to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as
damages and costs.
… The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land
of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil
Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming, arguendo, that the accretion
has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no
moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the
part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit
becomes manifest (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
riparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp.
321-326).
"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants,
granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they
occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was
commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the
land for 10 years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by
ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as
the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the
same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of
Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person."
32
3. Respondents appeal -> CA (September 14, 1960) RULED IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFFS.
CFI Ruling:
1st: since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate,
and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which
states that 'no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession';
2nd: the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.
CA Ruling:
1st ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion
to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to
belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not
ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not
extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the
title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their
character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is
registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil.
55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by the
Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the
provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. vs.
Baguisa, et al., CA-G. R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
2nd ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that
the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that
he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as
claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as
the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation
(Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another
(Exhibit 2).... Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both
owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he
has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area
thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
"... We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter
(defendants), were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the
process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights
only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants."
Hence, this appeal (by petitioners) -> SC.
ISSUE:
WON whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby
making the alluvial property imprescriptible (NO)
WON respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through
prescription (YES)
HELD:
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new
Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful
owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners
of the land to which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion
becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives
it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just
as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the
Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But
to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remains, however, that
petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they
instituted the present action in the CFI - Isabela in 1958. The increment,
therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or
subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
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property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through
acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The
Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-
appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at
by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by
the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190
and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in
1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in
force and before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired the
alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

Disposition: The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby

affirmed, with costs against the petitions.

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