Torts Cases – Prada

Gan vs CA
Hedy Gan y Yu vs CA
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.

Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:

Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along
North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one
side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a
vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried
to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car
driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as
a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning
him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact
caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle
in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked
vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at
the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA
modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple
imprudence.

Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple
imprudence.

Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not
guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.
US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, Oct. 3, 1912

SIMPLE RURAL FOLK:

Two native farmers who all their lives have seen nothing that moves faster
than a bull cart, except on the two or three occasions on which they testify
they have visited Iloilo, cannot be expected to give an intelligent idea of
speed of an automobile, train, or even a fast horse. Xxx…finding himself
alone on the right hand side, which had been the most accessible to him at
the moment, it would be perfectly natural for an ignorant farmer at such a, to
him, hazardous moment to decide suddenly to cross and join his companions
on the other side. And it is not surprising if such a man should miscalculate
the time necessary for an automobile, even running at only a very slow pace,
to cover an intervening distance.

DRIVER OF AN AUTOMOBILE:

A driver of an automobile,under such circumstances, is required to use a

greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the
machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely
under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal
can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to
be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding,
driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along
and the let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner
possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and accident
occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts.
An automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a
careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances.

‘The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury”
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
STREET, J.:

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge
he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before
him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart
has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is
here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
July 17, 2011

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa”

thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a
criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed
a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla).
The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers
in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that
his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have
been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil
action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already
serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is
negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.
Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act
(his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).
Elcano vs Hill
July 17, 2011

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano
filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of
intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald
and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the
criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article
2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the
filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delictonly and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is
applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the
decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary
only – as a matter of equity.
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City,
Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS
PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on
account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent
Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of
the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of
the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176
and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be
prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential
averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the
jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that
plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection
exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the
defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among
others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally
predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in
nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may
proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in
Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in
which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from
the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of
Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is
that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi
delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes
no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the
"harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is
plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law
itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may
be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal
action is
finally terminated.
CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA

CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113 (1979)] - Where in a

multiple highway accident involving a truck which hit a jeep which then hit a
Mercedes Benz coming from the opposite direction, two criminal actions for
reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of the truck and jeep, and
the driver of the truck was found guilty and the driver of the jeep acquitted,
a civil action for damages against the owner of the truck would prosper as
there is no res judicata, the parties and causes of action being different.
Furthermore, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from crime, the civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of result of the latter.
Citing Garcia v. Florido,
"As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had
its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that
in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proced independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule
111 (requiring reservation of civil actions) with reference to Articles 32, 33,
and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said
articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as
exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, which is procedura, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code,
which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
However, a civil action for damages against the owner-driver of the jeep
would not prosper because civil liability arising from crime co-exists with
criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option
to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasi-delict. His
active participation in the criminal case implies that he opted to recover the
civil liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal
case, which was not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
can no longer be instituted.
Mendoza v. Arrieta G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

CASE DIGEST
Facts:

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned

and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven
by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by
respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a
consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-
owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings
that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a
complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil
case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by
his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.

Issue:

W/N the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for

damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents

Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent

Judge wrongfully sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civil suit is barred by
the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where
the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, “When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.” Timbol’s submission
that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his
right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule
111, Rules of Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is
untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177)
of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil
action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code,
no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to
reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that
petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an
independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil

liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly
waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The
circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that
petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation
and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar.
The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until
its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to
have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil
liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.

Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by

petitioner’s car for considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting
on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that
Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from
Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which provides that,
“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil right arise did not exist…”
Torts And Damages Case Digest: German Garcia Et Al., V. The Hon. Mariano
M. Florido Et Al. (1973)
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger
bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro
Tumala
Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their
owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in
gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is
a violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite
having a criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of
the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the
collision
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice
and the fault or negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners
petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of
Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one
where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason
that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation
and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing
the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918

FACTS:

On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
Company where he was an employee. As the train drew near to his
destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight from the
train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed
to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened.
As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its

employees placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from the company’s trains.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent
in placing an obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause
of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.

HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing

such act – that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
– the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to
get on and off the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he
was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
 Air France v. Carrascoso
on 6:00 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law
0
G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966

o When culpa aquiliana may arise even when there is a pre-existing

contract between the parties

FACTS:

Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his
way to Rome for a pilgrimage. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in ‘first
class,’ but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his
seat in favor of a ‘white man’ who had a ‘better right to the seat.’ Carrascoso
filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage
between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award
for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon
which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral

damages

HELD:

The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad
faith when petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first
class accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat
in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in
the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from
the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put
on wrongful expulsion.

NOTA BENE: Here there is a contract of carriage between the parties and
such contract was breached by Air France when it wrongfully forced
Carrascoso to vacate the first class seat which he paid for. The wrongful
expulsion is independent of the breach since even without the contract, such
wrongful expulsion may still make Air France liable for damages. In other
words, the wrongful expulsion is in itself a tort.
Singson vs BPI
Singson vs BPI

23 SCRA 1117

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had
been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment
became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an
appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI — in which the
Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the
Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading
the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party
defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits
by the plaintiff in that case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of
B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the
check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.

Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s
claim for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery
of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon
the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature … the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort”.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages —
the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s rights.
Gilchrist v Cuddy (Torts)

GILCHRIST V CUDDY February 18, 1915 G.R. No. L-9356 C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee, vs. E. A.
CUDDY, ET AL., defendants. JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.

FACTS:
One Cuddy, the owner of a cinematographic film “Zigomar”, let it under a rental contract to the
plaintiff Gilchrist, the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo, for a specified period of time or for a
number of days beginning May 26. In violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to
turn over the film also under a rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga The
arrangement between Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th
of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26.
Gilchrist thereupon restored to the Court of First Instance

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI - produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their
theater during the period specified in the contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist

ISSUE:
Whether the injunction was properly granted; Whether Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist

RULING:
Yes, although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the
plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor of
someone In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on
the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering
with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they
were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such
liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee
(Gilchrist) of the film.

Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article
which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a
person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no
such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from
using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better right.

Chief Justice Wells:"Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry,
skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or
annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it
is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."
"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces
one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference may be
ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."