Abellera

2. DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO

Facts:

Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig told
Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and
that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig
and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.

On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. Dr. Perez reminded
Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty.
Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once
his “impediment is removed.” Catindig then abandoned Dr. Perez and their son.

Catindig, in his comment, admitted that he married Gomez. He claimed, however, that after the wedding, Gomez showed
signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations which led to their de facto separation. He claimed
that Dr. Perez knew that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the disbarment of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling: Yes, respondents committed gross immorality.

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense
of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is
a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr.
Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez. By his
own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in
the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.

3. In Re: Argosino (ON HAZING)

Facts:

Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. Camaligan died due to the affliction of severe physical injuries in
course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were
consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years.

Mr. Argosino upon application was granted probation. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take
the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He
averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10
months.

Issue: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the practice of law.

Ruling: Yes, Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict, intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court
upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by
the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known
Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The
petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal
profession.

Lachica

14. FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON,respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the
decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents
Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and
for attorney's fees.

Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked
for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary", they were also required to pay for car
washing, and to further make a deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report
for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for another taxi company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and
thereafter stabbed him.

Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was
first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis.”. However, on several occasions, he failed to
report for work during his schedule.

Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab without fuel refill.
Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that
he was driving a taxi for another company." Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash
deposits, but petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to
cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit,
petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

Private respondents filed a complaint with the Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed.

The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated.
It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards
stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Issue: Whether or not a non-lawyer maybe entitled to attorney’s fees?

Ruling: No, he/she is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence,
by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.

15. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP
WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

(BACKGROUND ONLY KAY TAAS NI NA KASO)

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while
still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the
secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal
assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from
the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise
made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3),
were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one
striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of
the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided
to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the
City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were
Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-
strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the
Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the
strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly
committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life
Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-
NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively
as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to
now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to
work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning
them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against
the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and
degree of participation in the strike.

(THIS IS ACTUALLY A LABOR CASE/LABOR DISPUTE. Mao lang ni related to our topic)

The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge
Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents , on the
ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter
quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:

In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the
employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the
employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize
the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of
the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of
the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal . (Lopez,
Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis
supplied)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the
above citation read however as follows:

Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by
the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it
really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle
management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the
employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a
report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away
with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been
viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to
determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act
justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof
under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant
employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest .

In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a
public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on
the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to
the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious
character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be
achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)

ISSUE: WON the judge and the counsels for the private respondent should be cited for contempt.

RULING: NO

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge
do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence
in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's
decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision,
appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately
succeeding paragraph.

This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result
of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how
saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure
of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents'
counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it
verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the
respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest."

Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the
bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last
resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of
this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not
faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the
bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's
decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in
finding out whether the citations are correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of
this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they
are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the
respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the
respondents.