G.R. No.

78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners
of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their
land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their
own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
part of the agrarian reform program.
 Due Process – impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that
the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further,
Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute
requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,
Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being
moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with
a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.