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The United States federal government should shift health insurance to a free-
market system by:
Solves costs and increases coverage---the aff shuts down competition and leads to
worse health outcomes
Eric Schansberg 11, Professor of Economics at Indiana University Southeast, Ph.D. in
Economics, 2011, “Envisioning a Free Market in Health Care,” Cato Journal, Vol. 31, No 1.
Insurance Regulation
Another important area for reform would be three sets of policy proposals that would
dramatically reduce insurance regulation.
First, insurers are often prevented from competing with each other across state lines. Insurance from
out-of-state providers was greatly reduced by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. The Act followed a 1944 Supreme
Court ruling that insurance was classified as “interstate commerce” and could be regulated by federal antitrust laws. The Act gave
antitrust exemptions to the insurance industry and implicitly codified state insurance
regulations into federal policy. These restrictions need to be eliminated to promote competition,
increase choice, and reduce costs.
Second, in the current environment, it is very difficult to offer insurance services across state lines because of insurance
mandates that increase the number of services covered by insurance. This requirement results in
higher costs, less flexibility for consumers, and less ability for insurers to compete. A free-
market system would allow people and insurers to make mutually beneficial
arrangements on what insurance would cover.
All 50 states require insurers to either offer or include certain benefits in the insurance policies they offer (Bunce and Wieske 2009).
Some states, for example, require an insurer to include benefits for the treatment of alcoholism or treatment by a chiropractor,
regardless of whether any given person wants those features (Graham 2008b). More broadly, insurance companies are not allowed
to specialize in insurance for specific ailments (e.g., diabetes or cancer).
As a result of these mandates, one finds significant levels of market concentration in the
insurance industry within the states. In 38 states, the largest firm serves more than one-third of
the market and in 16 states more than half. In 47 states, the largest three firms serve more than
half of the market and in 36 states more than 65 percent (Robinson 2004). In 2008, the market
share of the five largest insurers was at least 75 percent in every state (Emmons, Guardado, and
Kane 2008).4
Third, states commonly mandate coverage for certain groups of people, again resulting in higher
costs and cross-subsidies from the healthy to the unhealthy, and from those who plan well for their futures to
those who do not. These restrictions come in a variety of forms. There are “guaranteed issue” mandates that require all insurers to
make insurance available to all applicants regardless of a change in health status. There are also “guaranteed renewal” mandates that
require insurers to renew insurance policies when the policy expires, and mandates to require insurers to cover additional persons—
for example, children up to 25 years of age (King 2009).
In addition, a number of states have substituted “community rating” for “risk rating” (Sloan and Conover 1998). “Strict” community
rating requires an insurer to charge each insured individual the same premium regardless of age, sex, health status, claims
experience, or other risk factors. “Modified” community rating allows an insurer to vary the premium based on age or another of
these factors, but not health status.
Bunce and Wieske (2009) find 2,113 state mandates nationwide on services and providers. Those
mandates are costly to insurers who respond by increasing premiums or leaving the
market, thus reducing competition and driving up prices. Evidence of this is seen in the remarkable cost
differences between similar policies in different states. For example, in 2005, the average individual paid $4,044 in New Jersey and
$3,996 in New York for health insurance, but only $1,188 in Iowa and Wyoming (Matthews 2005). More recently, minimum
coverage for a family of four cost $145 in Iowa versus $906 in Massachusetts (Armey 2009). A healthy 25-yearold male could
purchase a policy for $960 a year in Kentucky but would pay about $5,880 in New Jersey. An average family in Texas paid $5,501 a
year for coverage in 2006–2007, whereas an average family in New Jersey paid $10,398 (Bond 2009).
Parente and Bragdon (2009) report that the proportion of individual plans in New York decreased from 4.7 percent to 0.2 percent
from 1994 to 2007, while the national average increased from 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent. They attribute this to the guaranteed issue
and community rating mandates enacted by New York.
The overall costs of such regulations are even more staggering. Conover (2004) calculates $170
billion in benefits from such regulations but $339 billion in costs, a 2:1 ratio with a net social
loss of $169 billion—which costs the average family of four more than $2,200, enough to
implement the free-market reforms discussed earlier. Conover (2004: 1) further estimates that regulations are “responsible for more
than seven million Americans lacking health insurance or one in six of the average daily uninsured” and fi nds that “4,000 more
Americans die every year from costs associated with health services regulation (22,000) than
from lack of health insurance (18,000).
The market remedy here is to repeal all of these mandates and allow insurers to freely set rates based on risks. One should note that
some of these regulatory efforts are Band-Aids to deal with unfortunate outcomes in the current health care and health insurance
systems—e.g., pre-existing conditions. As described earlier, a deregulated and unsubsidized insurance environment would take care
of those problems.
Bast (2007) has two policy suggestions worth mentioning. First, he would eliminate the requirement that health insurers pay a very
high proportion of their claims within a certain period of time (see Bunce 2002). Second, as a second-best solution, he argues that
insurers should be allowed to offer temporary or permanent medical waivers for pre-existing conditions (see Wieske and Matthews,
2007).
Mobilizing security around insurance and social cohesion enables a global regime
of violence---surplus populations are simultaneously encouraged to be self-reliant
in the face of instability and treated as threats to the Western social order
Mark Duffield 7, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre,
University of Bristol, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of
Peoples, 2007, pp. 184-188
This chapter is concerned with development as a technology of containment associated with the
division of the global population into insured and non-insured life at the time of
decolonization, and especially the permanent crisis of containment arising from the moral,
political and practical impossibility of maintaining this division. The opposite of containment is
the unsecured circulation of surplus population that external poverty, instability and associated
social breakdown continually threaten. As a supreme technology of containment, the new or culturally coded
racism that shapes development discourse is examined. During decolonization an early success of this racism was to
place the immigrant within a zone of exception excluded from normal society. At the same time, development became a
series of compensatory state-led technologies that divided into interconnected domestic and
overseas sites or variants. The former is associated with a state-encouraged race relations industry based on identity,
entitlement and integration, while the latter is denoted by the emergence of development as a contemporary interstate relationship.
The policing of global circulation brings together the search for internal harmony and the quest for external homeostasis within an
episodic international security architecture. At each crisis of containment, the biopolitical linkages between these sites and
technologies multiply and thicken. The governmentalization of the aid industry and the shift to a post-interventionary terrain of
contingent sovereignty, for example, interconnects with the abandonment of multiculturalism in favour of more collective forms of
national identity and social cohesion. The threat from ungoverned space is now an internal as well as an external problem. In
attempting to think across the national–international divide, this chapter begins by examining the blurring of these categories
within political imagination.
The collapse of the national–international dichotomy
The end of the Cold War heralded two interconnected revolutions in international affairs. With the weakening of former restrictions,
including respect for non-interference, the first was the ability of the UN, donor governments and aid agencies to intervene in
ongoing and unresolved internal conflicts. This allowed a step change in all forms of humanitarian, development and peace activism,
which, together with its increasing militarization, has contributed to a significant decline in formal civil conflicts within the erstwhile
Third World (HSC 2005). While political instability and insecurity are still rife, this process of pacification has produced a new
political space of contingent sovereignty; while respect for territorial integrity remains, sovereignty over life within ineffective states
is now internationalized, negotiable and conditional. Continent sovereignty, however, is closely associated with another revolution,
that is, the collapse of the traditional national–international dichotomy within political imagination. The French sociologist Didier
Bigo has commented that many students of crime, conflict and international relations have, for some time, been struck by how the
institutions of the police and military, once thought of as belonging to the separate domains of ‘national’ and ‘international’
security respectively, ‘now appear
to be converging regarding border, order and the possible threats to
identity, linked to (im)migration’ (Bigo 2001: 91). Moreover, this perception of the merging of internal and external
security was being driven by practitioners and politicians rather than ‘a cross-fertilisation from the literature’ (ibid.). As if on cue, in
addressing the UK Labour Party’s annual conference following the events of 9/11, Tony Blair outlined his now often quoted view of a
new and radically interdependent world.
Today the threat is chaos, because for people with work to do, family life to balance, mortgages to pay, careers to further,
pensions to provide, the yearning is for order and stability and if it doesn’t exist elsewhere, it is unlikely to exist here. I have long
believed this interdependence defines the new world we live in (Blair 2001).
This does not mean that in the past the national and international were somehow unconnected. As suggested by successive
epochs of world exploration, trade, conquest and war, the national and the international have
for centuries been closely interwoven within the narrative of modernity. Indeed, in all these historic
phases of the national/international, one finds ‘a temporal bracketing that crucially coincides with fundamental politico-legal
changes in the West itself’ (Hussain 2003: 23). However, when threats to the territorial nationstate were security’s primary concern,
the home/foreign distinction played an essential role in the art of government. It helped to mobilize national armies against those of
other nations. As the above quote suggests, however, international security is now experienced differently. In a globalized
world, international instability menaces society more than it does the state. It undermines the
dependability of jobs, careers and livelihoods; it weakens financial stability and savings and pensions; it threatens
the ability of people to raise families and secure their futures; and it jeopardizes energy supplies, mass transport systems, centralized
food chains, and just-in-time commodity flows. Such threats are biopolitical in nature since they impact upon the collective
existence of population. They are, in short, threats to the West’s way of life. Moreover, these dangers do not
emanate from enemy states as such. Apart from the occasional rogue regime, states now figure more
frequently as the facilitators, conduits or ineffectual hosts of opposing or contrary ways of
life . Rather than opposing armies on a battlefield, unending war fields oppose ways of life on the
radically interconnected terrain of global society .
The post-Cold War pacification of the global borderland has revealed that ending internal wars within ineffective states is relatively
easy. Winning the post-interventionary peace among the world of peoples, however, is more difficult. The danger is no longer the
early 1990s fear of uncontrollable local scarcity wars (Kaplan 1994); today the concern is over low-intensity but
generalized political instability that threatens mass society’s radically interconnected global way
of life (Strategy Unit 2005). The interlinkage of homeland and borderland populations through the dynamics of global circulation
has moved questions of the integration or non-integration of peoples, regions, religions, cultures, generations and genders into the
political foreground (Denham 2001). At the time of writing, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has rekindled and already
claimed the lives of a number of British soldiers. Reflecting today’s radical interdependence, however, the first British casualties in
this long war were not from the British Army. They were five London Muslims killed in October 2001 fighting for the Taliban (Harris
et al. 2001). State-led technologies of development and security now interconnect mass society’s
internal anthropological frontier built around notions of equality, entitlement and identity,
with an external frontier located within the individual psyches, gendered subjectivities,
households and self-reliant communities that inhabit zones of crisis . While conditions differ greatly,
within both of these frontier zones the key issue is social cohesion and the developmental need to reconcile the necessity of order
with the inevitability of progress. The emergent security architecture linking the two is planetary in ambition.
Or at least, it
predicates the security of the homeland on the stability of a post-interventionary
borderland. The national and international have always been interconnected. However, what is happening in, say, the
backstreets of Bradford and the alleyways of Islamabad now assumes a new significance. Looking for connections has historically
been the task of the police and intelligence services. Today, however, with the collapse of the national–international dichotomy in
political imagination they come together as parts of the same developmental challenge. Defending the West’s way of life
is dependent on promoting social cohesion within the homeland as well as the
borderland.
The internal and external frontiers of this security architecture are radically interconnected through the flows and spaces of global
circulation, which itself creates a need to police its dynamics, that is, allowing the ‘good’ circulation on which globalized markets
depend – such as investment, commodity flows, information, patent rights, technology, skilled migration and tourism – while
preventing the ‘bad’ circulation that poses a risk to national and international stability: non-insured
migrants , refugees and asylum seekers, together with the shadow economies, money
laundering, drugs, international crime, trafficking and terrorism associated with ineffective states and zones
of crisis. The development of computers and information technologies, the digitalization of the flows and
spaces of circulation, new modes of surveillance and data mining all promise ever more
comprehensive and intimate ways in which movement can be monitored and policed (I-CAMS 2005). It
has already been argued that development offers a liberal alternative to the extermination or eugenic manipulation of surplus
population. The scope of the challenge facing development is suggested by claims from political economy that most of the
people living on the margins of global society, that is, outside the greater North American, west European and east
Asian economic blocs, are now ‘structurally irrelevant’ to the process of capitalist
accumulation (Castells 1998: 75–82). Their only relevance is political: an excess freedom to move,
flow and circulate thus potentially destabilizing international society’s finely balanced and globally interconnected way of life.
While the differences between the United States’ militarized approach to unending war and the more developmental European
stance is often flagged (Kagan 2003; Coker 2003), they are united in terms of the need to protect mass consumer society from
transborder, non-state asymmetric threats (compare Bush 2002 and Solana 2003). In examining the origins of the NGO movement,
chapter 2 outlined the way in which decolonization allowed the re-expansion of international trusteeship
based on the non-governmental promotion of community self-reliance . Development
as self-reliance, however, exists in relation to a double exception. The expansion of the NGO movement was
premised on the condition of permanent emergency in which self-reliance exists. It was this state of
exception that called forth the necessity of a developmental trusteeship over non-
insured peoples . As well as providing a developmental opportunity, however, permanent emergency also
encourages social breakdown, displacement and the circulation of surplus population. In terms of
achieving security over life, this double exception constitutes decolonization as both an opportunity and a
threat , that is, as an occasion for the consolidating effects of development and, at the same time, as a need
for the globalizing reach of security .
Previous chapters have analysed the post-Cold War governmentalization of the aid industry and the emergence of post-
interventionary society. This chapter provides a greater appreciation of how this deepening external biopolitical
frontier is bracketed together with an internal one . Moreover, within the international architecture of
unending war, development as a state-led technology of security now interconnects the two . Since
threats to the West’s way of life now stem from contrasting and contrary ways of life, it is essential that the place of racism within
liberalism and development is considered. Using Foucault’s work on state racism as a point of departure, the shift from a biological
to a culturally coded racism during the struggle for independence is examined, before the way in which the policing of immigration
links to compensating technologies of internal and external development is considered.
The fifty states and relevant subnational territories of the United States should
ensure establishment of single payer health insurance programs in the United
States.
States solve
PPG 8/5, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial board, 8/5/17, "Healthy devolution: For the next
round of health care reform, look to states," www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/editorials/2017/08/06/Healthy-devolution-For-the-next-round-of-
health-care-reform-look-to-states/stories/201708310015
The conservative principle of federalism and the liberal cause of a single-payer option could, for example, be combined.
Both sides understand that the source of ballooning health care costs lies in the system’s vast
complexity, which makes government and insurance companies alike unaccountable in
keeping costs under control . Liberals recognize that simplifying the health insurance
market on free enterprise principles would make insurance utterly unaffordable or simply inaccessible for
millions of Americans. But conservatives fear that a health care service based in Washington would be
too far removed from patient needs . They also bridle against the rationing and wait
times such a system would require to control costs and equalize access. Canadians in need of a hip or knee
replacement wait an average of six months for the procedure. With a much larger population
than Canada — or any of the other countries with single-payer health care and comparable governments —
America under an equivalent system could see substantially worse waiting periods.
But such a system need not be administered from Washington —
a state could do it .
This is where conservatives
and liberals could find common cause: having states create their own
systems . The reason Massachusetts’ and Vermont’s experiments in state-provided health care
failed is that they were basically state-sized Medicaid programs added on top of the
existing Byzantine structure .
Conservatives have good reason to believe the health care systems of Europe and the Pacific Rim
would translate poorly to our much larger democracy and its history of individualism. But they are
wrong to deny the relative success of the universal model in those countries. Rather than
simply copying and pasting that model, consider an adaptation . Government health care
administration could be steered toward the states , building on the American traditions of federalism and choice.
With Congress often paralyzed by partisan conflict, states and cities are taking more
matters into their own hands , in any event.
1NC
Midterms DA
Filibuster-proof majority’s the only way for the GOP to reverse net neutrality
Kyle Daly 17, Bloomberg writer, 2/13/17, “GOP Lawmakers Leave Net Neutrality to FCC to
Pressure Dems,” https://www.bna.com/gop-lawmakers-leave-n57982083721/
For now, leading Democrats are digging in against potential changes to the net neutrality
rules.
Sen. Edward Markey, D-Mass., promised a “political firestorm” if the FCC or Congress make any
attempt to loosen net neutrality rules. Markey and four other Senate Democrats opposed to net
neutrality rule changes spoke at a Feb. 7 news conference. Senate Minority Leader Charles E.
Schumer (D-N.Y.) issued a supportive statement promising that “any attempt to roll back this
rule and its protections would be foolish and will be met with fierce resistance by Senate
Democrats.”
Republicans, who currently control 52 Senate seats, eventually will need a filibuster-proof
60-vote majority in the Senate for a net neutrality bill, and that means they’ll need to get
some Democratic buy-in. Schumer’s stance against changing the rules makes it unlikely that
would happen any time soon.
Turns econ
Chad Terhune 17, works for the Kaiser Health News, a nonprofit health newsroom. 4/25/17,
“In bid to revamp health care, Trump could hurt one of U.S.'s biggest job creators”
http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/25/news/economy/health-care-jobs-trump-
obamacare/index.html
In many ways, the health care industry has been a great friend to the U.S. economy. Its plentiful jobs
helped lift the country out of the Great Recession and, partly due to the Affordable Care Act, it now employs
one in nine Americans — up from one in 12 in 2000.
As President Donald Trump seeks to fulfill his campaign pledge to create millions more jobs, the industry
would seem a promising place to turn . But the business mogul also campaigned to repeal Obamacare and
lower health care costs — a potentially serious job killer.
"The goal of increasing jobs in health care is incompatible with the goal of keeping health care affordable," said Harvard University
economist Katherine Baicker, who sees advantages in trimming the industry's growth. "There's a lot of evidence we can get more
bang for our buck in health care. We should be aiming for a health care system that operates more efficiently and effectively. That
might mean better outcomes for patients and fewer jobs."
But the country has grown increasingly dependent on the health sector to power the economy.
Thirty-five percent of the nation's job growth has come from health care since the recession hit in late
2007, the single biggest sector for job creation.
Hiring rose even more as coverage expanded in 2014 under the health law and new federal dollars flowed in. It gave hospitals,
universities and companies even more reason to invest in new facilities and staff. Training programs sprang up to fill the growing job
pool. Cities welcomed the development — and the revenue. Simply put, rising health spending has
been good for some economically distressed parts of the country, many of which voted for
Trump last year.
In Morgantown, West Virginia, the West Virginia University health system just opened a 10-story medical tower and hired 2,000
employees last year. In Danville, Pennsylvania, the Geisinger Health System has added more than 2,200 workers since July and is
trying to fill 2,000 more jobs across its 12 hospital campuses and a health plan. Out West, the UCHealth system in Colorado
expanded its Fort Collins hospital and is building three hospitals in the state.
In cities such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland and St. Louis, health care has replaced dying industries
like coal and heavy manufacturing as a primary source of new jobs.
"The industry accounts for a lot of good middle-class jobs and, in many communities, it's the
single-largest employer," said Sam Glick, a partner at the Oliver Wyman consulting firm in San Francisco. "One of the
hardest decisions for the new Trump administration is how far do they push on health care costs at the expense of jobs in health
care."
House Republicans, with backing from Trump, took the first swipe. Their American Health Care Act sought to roll back the current
health law's Medicaid expansion and cut federal subsidies for private health insurance. The GOP plan faltered in the House, but
Republican lawmakers and the Trump administration are still trying to craft a replacement for Obamacare.
Neither the ACA nor the latest Republican attempt at an overhaul tackle what some industry experts and economists see as a serious
underlying reason for high health care costs: a system bloated by redundancy, inefficiency and a growing number of jobs far
removed from patient care.
Labor accounts for more than half of the $3.4 trillion spent on U.S. health care, and medical professionals from health aides to nurse
practitioners are in high demand. But the sheer complexity of the system also has spawned jobs for
legions of data-entry clerks, revenue-cycle analysts and medical billing coders who must
decipher arcane rules to mine money from human ills.
For every physician, there are 16 other workers in U.S. health care. And half of those 16 are in
administrative and other nonclinical roles, said Bob Kocher, a former Obama administration official who worked on
the Affordable Care Act. He's now a partner at the venture capital firm Venrock in Palo Alto, California.
"[W]hat's driving our health insurance premiums is that we are paying the wages of a whole bunch of people who aren't involved in
the delivery of care. Hospitals keep raising their rates to pay for all of this labor," Kocher said.
Take medical coders. Membership in the American Academy of Professional Coders has swelled
to more than 165,000, up 10,000 in the past year alone. The average salary has risen to nearly
$50,000.
Bioterror
No impact to bioterror
Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior
Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College
London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and
Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy
advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research
Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The
myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-
realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626
The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an
and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament
and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they
consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is
backed up by historical evidence . The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks
in the past were small-scale , low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ¶ The
second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that
producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not.
Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and
dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers .¶ Even if a biological
weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who
are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A
medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can
prompt response with effective
alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality. The
physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of
the strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in
action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But
tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is
either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with
considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[ i]n
the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost
inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s
government and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are
fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one
hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very
unlikely to harm human beings directly, let alone damage physically the machines on
which they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences)
might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be
serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the
possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely
to prove a precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as
surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from
cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that
cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined
Cyber defense is difficult, but should be
strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2.
sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are
easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift
almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it
might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to
attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note,
this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly
disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were
The literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the
obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶
nuclear attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston
Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only are there
cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors
The more
of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and that detail.
sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain must it be that
mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined
minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of
war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One
of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is
more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of
strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable
target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters
feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable
at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason
that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical
information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped.¶ Cyber
defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best
defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the
geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own
design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular,
when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our
Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting
combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that
less should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear
dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the
past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded
We can be confident
reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58
that cyber defense should be able to function well enough, given the strength of political,
military, and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides
air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important
defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3.
Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from
, cyber power is not technically forgiving of user error.
the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically
Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if their intended
exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there
are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated
It is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay.
as a potential source of serious danger.¶
But it is quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an
enemy. Critically important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the
inspired amateur outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a
hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects both poor history and ignorance of
contemporary military common sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for cyber
attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical
knowledge, skills, and effort required to do serious harm to national security is forbiddingly
high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely could not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a
scenario is extremely improbable . Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail
can one be in the making of cyberspace, that confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular
discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the
EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict catastrophic damage
would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.
Offense
The US is key to global medical innovation---NHI trades off with new drugs that
combat diseases
Ryan Huber 17, PhD, Executive Editor of Arc digital magazine. 3/29/17, “U.S. Health Care
Reality Check #1: Pharmaceutical Innovation” https://arcdigital.media/u-s-health-care-reality-
check-1-pharmaceutical-innovation-574241fb80ba
That is, despite the many regulations and laws aimed at consumer protection and safety that do exist in the United
States, our health care market is relatively freer and more dynamic than those of other
developed countries. This leads to a high rate of medical and pharmaceutical innovation that
ends up benefiting the rest of the world, particularly other rich countries, in a similar way that
NATO nations, for example, benefit from close military alliance with the United States. In short and
somewhat reductive terms: we spend more money so everyone else can be healthier.
But this doesn’t make total sense at first. If the United States is developing
more innovative medicines,
devices, and procedures than every other advanced economy, why aren’t we making money by
selling these medical innovations to others for a hefty profit? Why aren’t there many more billions of dollars
of revenue coming into the United States Treasury because of our status as a medical innovator?
The answer is complicated, but here are some facts you need to know:
First, pharmaceutical companies which innovate in the United States chargetheir domestic
customers much more than they do their customers abroad. This is because, if countries don’t like
the prices charged by a given pharmaceutical company for a certain drug, they will simply ignore
the patent that company holds for their drug in the United States or elsewhere.
Novartis spent nearly 15 years seeking a patent in India for Glivec, a medicine for chronic myeloid leukemia. That quest reached its
dead end, at last. India’s Supreme Court rejected the Swiss drugmaker’s patent application. Glivec (marketed in America as
“Gleevec”) is a blockbuster, earning the Swiss drugmaker $4.7 billion last year. Its prospects in India are now zilch.
Although in this example Novartis happens to be a Swiss drug company, the ruling sends the same clear message to drug makers in
the United States: Give us your drugs for next to nothing or you’ll get exactly nothing.
Second, and relatedly, notice that there seems to be a correlation between how much a country
spends on prescription drugs and the percentage of NMEs (New Molecular Entities) produced
by that country.
If you combine points 1 and 2, you start to understand that the high spending of health care
consumers in the United States is arguably funding not only global pharmaceutical
innovation but is also facilitating the availability of new medicines to other countries at much
lower prices than domestic consumers pay.
There is a third factor that might help explain why health care, especially with regard to pharmaceutical innovation, is so much more
expensive in the United States: our massive regulatory agency of all things drugs and food, also known as the FDA, is significantly
more burdensome for medical innovation than the analogous agency for all of Europe, the EMA (European Medicines Agency).
The EMA doesn’t get the final say on whether a drug gets approved for sale in the EU, and perhaps even more significantly, they
don’t breathe down their drug companies’ necks during clinical trials.
In the U.S., because of the cumbersome bureaucracy of the FDA and its processes, we decide to tackle more targets in the drug
development scene through “Fast Track” and “Breakthrough Therapy” route than through the more traditional and more costly
standard drug approval processes.
Does this represent an implicit admission that government is inefficient?
It’s understandable that, given limited resources, the regulatory process can’t be automatic, or even fast-tracked, for all applicants.
But if the FDA can put a medication on a path where an evaluation can be made “quickly and efficiently,” does that mean the normal
course of action is to proceed slowly and inefficiently? If so, this could represent a needless driver of health care costs.
We need to be able to ask this question: Is there something going wrong with the drug development process to have the costs so high
and climbing higher every year?
Looking at a cost breakdown of Big Pharma companies from 2014, a big chunk of their costs, almost equal to the sum of the entire
first and second phase of their clinical trials, come from the 4th phase of clinical trials, which is often referred to as “post-marketing
surveillance.”
This is the phase of a drug’s life that takes place after its approval for sale on the U.S. market, in which the FDA requires continued
and ongoing studies to validate the drug’s safety and efficacy using data generated from every phase of clinical trials leading up to its
approval in the first place. It’s in this phase of a drug’s life where, after spending large amounts of money to get the drug approved,
companies can still watch as the FDA rescinds a drug’s approval status, which leads to the drug getting withdrawn from the market,
in many cases never to be seen again.
In fact, as of 2015, 462 medicinal products were withdrawn from the market between 1953 and 2013, and the supporting evidence in
72 % of cases consisted of anecdotal reports. Only 43 (9.34 %) drugs were withdrawn worldwide and 179 (39 %) were withdrawn in
one country only. Withdrawal was significantly less likely in Africa than in other continents (Europe, the Americas, Asia, and
Australasia and Oceania).
So, not only is almost a fourth of a drug’s average R & D cost attributable to legislative constraints the government imposes on
pharmaceutical companies to police their own products even after they’ve been approved based on incredibly high standards of
safety and testing, but also, compared to less developed countries, we’re more likely to pull drugs off the
market and revoke their status as a result of anecdotal case reports of adverse effects that
generally go unverified.
We consistently decide to err on the side of safety, even if it means pulling the plug on a 10–15-year-long investment (the average
length of development for a drug), which helps clarify how aspiring for safer and more effective drugs begins to preclude cheaper
drugs.
So the United States produces the most novel and cutting edge therapeutic compounds despite
the most expensive and stringent approval process and sells them to other countries at much
lower prices than we do at home. In doing this, we are indeed subsidizing research and
development of drugs and medical devices for the rest of the world. This subsidized medical innovation is a
major contributing factor to the out-of-control health care costs in the United States, and losing this innovation will be
one of the sacrifices we make if we move toward a more cost-controlled or government-run
health care system over the next several years.
As a spin off from this research activity, techniques in tissue engineering and
are substantial.¶
regenerative medicine may be used to produce organs to produce food. This idea is not new and had in fact been proposed by
Winston Churchill in his 1932 book ‘Thoughts and adventures' [2] and by Alexis Carrel [3]. Although the biological principles of tissue
engineering of food are very similar to the medical application there are also differences in goals, scale of
production, cost-benefit ratio, ethical-psychological considerations and regulatory requirements.¶ In this chapter the distinctions between the challenges of tissue engineering
for food production are highlighted and discussed. The focus will be mainly on tissue engineering of meat as a particularly attractive and suitable example.¶ Why Tissue
Engineering of Food?¶ Growing food through domestication of grasses, followed by other crops and livestock has a 13,000 years head start. The success of economical food
production likely determined the growth and sophistication of our civilization [4]. Why would we try to replace the relatively low-tech, cheap and easy natural production of food
by a high-tech complicated engineering technology that is likely to be more expensive? There are two main reasons why current ways of food production need to be
with growth of the world population to 9.5 billion and an even faster growth in global economy,
reconsidered.¶ First,
traditional ways of producing food, and in particular meat, may no longer suffice to feed
the world [5]. Food security is already an issue for some populations, but absence of this security may
spread across all civilizations due to generalized scarcity of food . Meat production
through livestock for example already seems maximized by the occupation of 70% of current arable land surface, yet the
demand for meat will double over the next four decades [6]. Without change, this will lead to scarcity and high
prices. Likely, the high prices will be an incentive for intensification of meat production, which will increase the pressure of
using crops for feed for livestock instead of feeding people . The arable land surface could be increased but this
would occur at the expense of forests with predictable unfavorable climate consequences. Lifestyle changes that include the reduction of
meat consumption per capita would also solve the problem, but historically this seems unlikely to happen. A
technological alternative such as tissue engineering of meat might offer a solution. In fact, the
production of meat is a good target for tissue engineering. Pigs and cows are the major sources of the meat we consume, and these animals are very
inefficient in transforming vegetable proteins into edible animal proteins, with an average bioconversion rate of 15% [7]. If this
efficiency can be improved through tissue engineering, this will predictably lead to less
land, water and energy use for the production of meat [8], which introduces the second major reason why
alternatives and more efficient meat production should be considered.
Doctor Shortages---1NC
Single payer causes doctor shortages---lower payment rates force retirement and
deters people from going to med school
Robert A. Book 9, Senior Research Fellow in Health Economics. 4/3/9, “Single Payer: Why
Government-Run Health Care Will Harm Both Patients and Doctors”
http://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/single-payer-why-government-run-health-
care-will-harm-both-patients-and
The Medicare Model
If Medicare or something like it were the "single
payer"-the sole purchaser of health care-no such pressure would exist. If the
single payer established
lower payment rates, by definition physicians could not drop out and make
their living from other patients, because there wouldn't be any other patients .[3] The only
alternative for a physician would be to cease the practice of medicine and either retire or find
another profession. While this would certainly happen to some degree, a large percentage of physicians-who have invested
many dollars and years of training in their practices-would be unable to find an alternative profession that is nearly as satisfying or
as remunerative. The inevitable result would be much lower payment rates and lower income for
physicians.[4]
Patients would suffer as well, especially in the long run. Because fewer highly talented people would be
willing to undergo the years of training (under difficult working conditions and low pay) to become
physicians, patients would suffer decreased access to health care and longer wait times. Lower
payments would mean that physicians would invest less in advanced medical equipment and
would likely spend less time with each patient. In addition, with fewer people undergoing the training necessary to
conduct medical research, new treatments and cures would be developed at a slower rate, costing many lives.
Hospital Modernization---1NC
They make hospitals incapable of responding
Brett Skinner 8, President and CEO of the Fraser Institute. With Mark Rovere, and Marisha
Warrington. 9/2008, “The Hidden Costs of Single Payer Health Insurance A Comparison of the
United States and Canada”
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/HiddenCostsSinglePayer.pdf
Government control over hospital financing has also resulted in the capital deterioration of
these facilities in Canada. Research has shown that in 2003 the average age of a hospital in Ontario
(Canada’s largest province) was 40 years, which nearly matches the length of time that Canadian
single-payer health insurance has been in place. By comparison, the same research found that the
average age of an American hospital in 2003 was only nine years (OHA, 2003).
The Canadian health insurance system is not designed with appropriate incentives to
modernize and recapitalize the nation’s health care infrastructure. In Canada, it takes central
planners and bureaucrats years to realize that shortages of equipment or health professionals are
occurring, or that hospitals are in need of repair and renewal. Government central planners are
simply not able to make timely decisions to modernize the health care infrastructure. By contrast,
consumer choice and private-sector competition within American health care forces hospitals to constantly modernize and invest in
new technologies.
2NC
Framework---2NC
Security depends on actors who strip out political questions in favor of purely
technical debates over the delivery of goods by the government---sole focus on the
plan constrains the bounds of social life within narrow institutional parameters of
security and national identity
Michael S. Drake 10, Lecturer in Sociology, University of Hull, Political Sociology for a
Globalizing World, 2010, no page #
Ignoring the status of security as an ‘essentially contested concept’ in Gallie’s sense (1964), and
assuming its content as given in technical expertise rather than as political, Loader and Walker thus
posit a prior value of security as a public good that is a condition of social life , then
identify the state as the ‘prior’ agent of delivery and proceed to announce imperatives which
displace politics and the political from everyday life , with the explicit aim of
containing contention within the given institutional parameters of formal
political practice , though these are precisely the channels that have been disrupted by the politics of identity, new social
movements, representation, culture and globalization. The
parameters of the political thus become the
parameters of control , a new front line on which the task of security is to constrain and
contain the possibilities of social life within given limits, thus establishing set conditions for
living. Loader and Walker thus subordinate classical questions of the political – questions of how we should live – to the technical
prerequisites of security, its maintenance and guarantee.
The state provision of functions of security, we are told, is essential because ‘they entail the crafting of stable identities’ (Loader and
Walker 2007: 172), thus precluding hybridity, fluidity and creativity of identification. For Loader and Walker, identity, both personal
and social, must be indexed to the apparatus of the state lest it undermine the latter’s capacity to fulfil its functions in providing
security. The argument becomes doubly tautological when they discuss why the state is the best means for the provision of security,
since it appears that the state alone produces identities which constitute an environment that enables security (ibid.: 172–6). The
politics of self and social identity , in the sense of the contention and challenge of conventional forms, are thus
off-limits, illegitimate and even dangerous, since politics are to be restricted to the politics of
distribution (in their terms, the ‘delivery of public goods’). Restricting the political to such questions
means rolling back its parameters to exclude the contention of authority. As we have seen, that
contention is implicitly marked not only by 1968, but also by the revolts of 1989 and the reassertion of civil society as a space of
freedom against the determinations of the state, since the necessary attributes of the state’s provision of
security ‘require the priority of the state as a site of political identity over others to be
internalized ’ (ibid.: 181). The task of democratic governance then becomes the improvement of security, state and police, a
structural order of precedence in which the political – the question of how we should live – becomes conditional
on given technical prerequisites of how we must live, without any scope for challenging those
norms which are assumed, a priori, as given.
Once they have established this imperative of police security and the essential priority of the state in its legitimate provision, Walker
and Loader note four cautions against the untrammelled operations of security forces, which necessitate the civilizing of security,
but, whereas as security provides the condition for civility, democratic governance is clearly predicated on security, and these
‘pathologies’ are as much those of governance as of security (Loader and Walker 2007: 196–212). The risks are the tendencies of
policy drift to ‘professional paternalism’ (which indicates security-sector technocracy, the only one that is truly a risk or pathology of
security itself), to consumerism (particularly electoral pandering to populism), to authoritarianism (which can arise from either of
the former paths) and to fragmentation (in which either consumerist individuals or interest groups particularize security,
contravening its function as a common good). However, each of these is ultimately dismissed as a second-order concern, after
security, which is to say they are risks that must be taken, a conclusion in stark contrast to the imperative basis of security as an
essential and preconditional public good. The practice of civilizing security subsequently turns out to mean the use of the state and
its ordering capacities to constrain popular demands for security, which is in effect a further security function.
For Loader and Walker, police ordering operations and the security of the state apparatus that provides this function are the
precondition of democracy and politics, rather than vice versa, so that democratic governance of security is conditional on the
technical prerequisites of police security and the state, precluding social experiments in identification, representation and living
arrangements. In attempting to develop normative guidelines for securitization, Loader and Walker thus seem to have reconstructed
in abstract the logic of the security reflex which converts protest or resistance into terror, so they appear as an
ontological threat to the given order and its parameters of the political. Such forces of the creation of
identity and the opening of new possibilities for life can be understood as exercises of constitutive power, in contrast to the
constituted power of established institutions and given relations, but these are two moments of power, not two opposed forces; they
are incommensurable and therefore cannot be brought into ‘balance’ as security and liberty, a formulation which misunderstands
the contemporary political situation, reducing it to the dichotomy of norm and deviance.
When their order of precedence is extended to the global dimension, Loader and Walker are clear that security is not only prior to
society, but if necessary it must be imposed. In their reasoning, global security order could be established as a public good on the
basis of the shared understandings of national state security apparatuses quite regardless of the conventional requirements of
democratic consent or legitimation (2007: 262). However, if security is also enabling and even productive of identities, opportunities
for global identity formation and new forms of association would remain containerized within nation-states. The common
functions of states as security providers, and the technical expertise invested in that
provision , would establish an integrated grid of security for a subject which will internalize
the identity given by that grid , just as the national citizen is normatively expected to
internalize a love for their nation-state. The subject of global order is thus the subject of security, which is
constructed by channelling political action into given institutions and by controlling
the parameters of the political to maintain given constraints, producing a naturalized
antagonism to anything outside those parameters.
AT Perm
Attempting to rehabilitate security remains locked within its terms---attempting to
redefine one example of a violent political order actively prevents resisting its very
foundation
Chris Rossdale 16, Teaching Fellow, International Relations, University of Warwick,
“Activism, resistance and security,” Chapter 14 of Ethical Security Studies: A new research
agenda, eds. Nyman and Burke, 2016, no page #
The previous two sections have highlighted a number of ways in which practices of resistance and activism engage the relationship
between ethics and security in different ways. In producing subjugated knowledges, revealing the exclusions and power relations of
established discourses, and engaging in security practices which seek to more directly respond to the
insecurity faced by ordinary people, they invite an ethical response to security and
insecurity. However, it limits our engagement with practices of resistance if we only see them as
exploring ‘better’ or ‘more ethical’ ways of providing security. The more radical challenge to
the politics of security comes when we see activism not simply as refusing particular orders of security,
but as resisting the very conceptual and political foundations of security . This final section
explores such an interpretation, looking at the ways in which the most substantive way to engage the relationships between ethics,
security, resistance and activism comes when we view practices of resistance as (at their best) working to deconstruct security. I
security cannot so easily be
begin by outlining some of the arguments which suggest that the concept of
refashioned in a more ethical form and that thinking in terms of resistance might take us further. I then look at
how we might view such a resistance in the context of political activism, looking at some examples from anarchist activist groups.
A number of writers have argued that the concept of security is built around a series of images, codes and logics
which render it deeply problematic and a dangerous candidate for rehabilitation. They have pointed
out the ways in which our contemporary fascination with proliferating images of threat, danger and
response, grounded in desperate but impossible fantasies of control and mastery, tends towards authoritarian political
formations and the de facto legitimacy of dominant power relations (Edkins 2003; Campbell 1998: Shepherd
2008: 72–75). The pursuit of security serves to contain subjects within the existing order , promising
protection in return for some level of compliance or obedience in a manner not dissimilar to a protection racket (Spike Peterson
1992: 50–52). As Mark Neocleous notes, such dynamics serve to neutralise radical political action ,
‘encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion’ (2008: 4).
To understand how the pursuit of security intertwines with political authority, it is important to recognise the dependent
relationship between security and insecurity. Institutions and technologies of security can only function in a
context of insecurities, which they may identify and seek to pacify, but which they also need (and for which, of course, they
are often responsible). In Michael Dillon’s terms, ‘it is only because it is contoured by insecurity, and because in its turn it also
insecures, that security can secure’ (1996: 127). The nature and content of security depends on its particular relationship with
insecurity, with its exclusions and violences and particular (political) designations of threat. This regulative binary of
security/insecurity intersects with others that have similar effects, such as order/chaos, inside/outside and sovereignty/anarchy. All
of them regulate politics in a manner which cements the place of political authority. On the latter dichotomy, Richard Ashley’s
comments are pertinent:
On the one hand, the sign of ‘sovereignty’ betokens a rational identity: a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically
ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent ‘self’, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an
external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its identical being. On the other hand, the sign of ‘anarchy’
betokens this residual external domain: an aleatory domain characterised by difference and discontinuity, contingency and
ambiguity, that can be known only for its lack of the coherent truth and meaning expressed by a sovereign presence. ‘Anarchy’
signifies a problematic domain yet to be brought under the controlling influence of a sovereign centre … whether it be an individual
actor, a group, a class, or a political community.
(1988: 230)
As he identifies the conservatising regulation at the heart of the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy, so would I suggest that a similar
process is at work in the logic of security, privileging that which is rationally bounded, coherent and compliant, and necessitating the
pacification or pathologisation of that which is not.
Political imaginaries rooted in binary concepts limit our ethical landscape in a variety of ways. As
V. Spike Peterson argues:
[a]s long as we remain locked in dichotomies, we cannot accurately understand and are less likely to
transform social relations: not only do oppositional constructions distort the contextual complexity of social reality, they
set limits on the questions we ask and the alternatives we consider. True to their “origin” (Athenian
objectivist metaphysics), the dichotomies most naturalized in Western world views (abstract-concrete, reason-emotion, mind-body,
culture-nature, public-private) are both medium and outcome of objectification practices. Retaining them keeps us locked in to their
objectifying-reifying-lens on our world(s) and who we are.
(1992: 54)
In such a context, rather than seeking to rehabilitate security (and remain within this
security/insecurity dichotomy), it might be more productive to resist, displace or
deconstruct it .
This is not a simple prospect; refusing the social fantasy of security would, in Jenny Edkins’ terms, involve ‘facing,
on a day-to-day basis, questions many of us prefer to forget, if we can’, and ‘would involve a shift away from the notion of sovereign
state and sovereign individual … would entail the development of a new vision of political community, one
that was not based on the coming together of discrete participles to produce closed systems’ (2003: 368–369). While the
violent
politics of security is enacted through social institutions, it is also (as the discussion above shows) embedded in
categories of thought. The binaries of security/insecurity, order/chaos, sovereignty/anarchy and more impose a theoretical
domination which conditions political possibility in particular authoritarian ways. As such, the task of resistance might be to break
down such binaries. This may take place through mocking, subverting or outwardly refusing the closures such binaries
enact (Rossdale forthcoming-a; Rossdale forthcoming-b), or through embracing
the proliferation of definitions of
security as an aporetic space in which ‘to think and create new social, ethical and economic
relationships outside the oppressive structures of political and epistemological order’ (Burke 2007: 30–
31).
What I want to suggest here is that we can interpret many practices of activism and resistance as engaging in precisely this kind of
resistance to security/insecurity; that is, not just as affirming ‘more ethical’ securities (though they may also do this), but as
mounting a challenge to the conceptual and political order of security more generally. In a sense, this is not surprising, so often is
resistance framed as that insecurity, chaos and anarchy which necessitates securing, ordering and sovereign gestures. It is also an
unstable series of interventions, liable to recuperation within a set of security discourses which swiftly reposition challenge as threat.
Nonetheless, these resistances hold open
spaces for an ethical critique not only of particular orders
of security, but more generally of the ways in which security orders .
Link---Health Insurance/Developed World
Public health is a critical arena in which visions of the social order are created---
national health insurance is a way of differentiating the civilized West that takes
care of its citizens from the unhealthy developing world---(Example of how 1AC does
that)---that legitimizes violence against the under-developed periphery
Scott Watson 11, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Victoria, “Back Home,
Safe and Sound: The Public and Private Production of Insecurity,” International Political
Sociology, Volume 5, 2011, pp. 160-177
In Canada, potential migrants may be excluded for various reasons beyond fears of contagious disease—criminality, membership in
a violent organization, physical ⁄ mental disorder, or insufficient financial support (CIC 2009). Each of these categories of difference
reflects distinct moral bases on which Canadian national identity is reproduced and through which exclusion is necessitated. A
number of these exclusions, such as those with insufficient financial resources and those with contagious disease, partially reflect a
concern with the maintenance of the welfare state and the prosperity of the country. Foucault notes that this has been a concern of
Health,
states since the eighteenth century and gave rise to health policing in that era (Foucault 1980; Turner 1997).
economic prosperity, and national security became intimately intertwined as the
citizenry’s health, wealth, and longevity emerged as the greatest resource of the state (Rosen 1953;
Osborne 1997:177–178; Lowenheim 2007:205). Over time, the view of the healthy citizen as strategic resource for the state was
supplemented by the view that citizens had a right to good health in the eighteenth century and thereafter, public health
became the duty of the state and a proper area for intervention and control (La Berge 1992:16). Health
and the provision of healthcare by the state as a marker of difference internationally blossomed with
the birth and growth of the welfare state. Though contagion from foreigners continues to be understood as a threat to
the health of society, it also increasingly reflects a concern with the protection and security of the public health system itself. To take
one contemporary example, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) subjects certain migrants to health checks ‘‘to protect the
health and safety of Canadians and to reduce and prevent excessive demand on Canada’s health and social services’’ (CIC 2010c).
Protection of the social safety net in the modern nation-state is necessitated by the crucial
role it plays in legitimizing the state (Beck 2002:40–41). In Canada, as in other Western states, the two
dominant features of the welfare state are to protect citizens from poverty and disease,4 and these
dangers are, in turn, associated with foreign spaces and migrants . Excluding poor and diseased
migrants, who are expected to make immediate and costly demands on the welfare state, reproduces national subjects as legitimate
recipients of such assistance and the perception that potential migrants are illegitimate recipients. The moral basis of
exclusion incorporates beliefs about contagion as well as beliefs about just deserts based on
contribution . Externally, the undeserving migrant is justifiably excluded through the representation of them as profiteers
gaining benefits and security from the welfare system of a community to which they do not belong and have not contributed
(Huysmans 2000:768). The internal manifestation of the just deserts moral basis of exclusion is the ‘‘welfare cheat’’ (see
Cruickshank 1997; Moffatt 1999; Chunn and Gavigan 2004).
The construction of the undeserving migrant motivated to cross international border to gain access to the social safety net of
Western states also serves to reinforce another aspect of the Western state identity: the Western welfare
state model as the exemplar of good governance and rationality . Equating the Western
world with the civilized world is a prominent boundary condition differentiating the West from
the rest based on features of Western states such as democratic ideals and
rationality (Tsoukala 2008:147–148). I would add that the welfare state and modern medicine serve as similar
function as democracy, as a boundary through which the West is reproduced as civilized and rational. In
this construction, weak social security provisions and an unhealthy citizenry reinforce the tropicality
discourse that constructs certain areas as less developed, culturally unhealthy, and
potentially dangerous . The representation of certain parts of the world as prevalent with disease in the media (Youde
2005) or in UN documents such as the Human Development Index reinforces the conception of the West as advanced, rational, and
desirable, and other areas as backward, irrational, and undesirable. In turn, nationals of these states ⁄ zones are thereby constructed
as threatening, by their potential to flood or invade the developed Western states and overwhelm their social safety nets (Faist
1994:61), and by their backward or irrational cultural characteristics (Youde 2005) that threaten the rationality on which the welfare
state is based. This in turn necessitates and legitimizes the creation and maintenance of designated lists to
identify and exclude unhealthy, and thus potentially dangerous, zones and peoples.
The Regulation of Human Movement into and out of Canada
Regulating cross-border movement is among the most conspicuous ways states demarcate the domestic and orderly from the international and anarchic. This is achieved partially by identifying and keeping out that which is viewed as disruptive of the domestic
order. For instance, border control officers in Canada identify and prevent the inflow of inadmissible people, illegal goods, dangerous plants, and animals, as well as dumped and subsidized goods (CBSA 2010). Each of these categories of exclusion reproduces the
ordered ⁄ anarchic binary; though I am concerned here with the regulation of human movement for reasons of health security. As noted earlier, the Canadian state identifies certain regions and populations as potential health risks and presents the state as the
guarantor of security against those risks. Canada’s border services agency is tasked with preventing the inflow of inadmissible people, which includes those who have a health condition that is likely to be a danger to public health, to public safety or that might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services (CIC 2006:24). In instances where the security and border control functions of the state break down, such as the arrival of unauthorized migration, CIC reassures the Canadian public that
all unauthorized migrant arrivals are required to undergo health checks prior to their release into the community (Mountz 2004; Watson 2009).
To identify inadmissible or risky populations whose movements are subject to greater regulation and surveillance, Canada and other Western states rely heavily on medical experts. Though mostly neglected in security studies, medical experts figure prominently in
the field of critical health research (see Osborne 1993; Lupton 1995; Peterson and Bunton 1997). Bunton contends that the growing importance and influence of medical experts is part of the expansion of the modern liberal state, as political authorities utilize and
instrumentalize forms of authority and expertise outside of the state apparatus through processes of licensing and bureaucratization (1997:224). These medical experts play a crucial role in the construction of health risks—not unlike other specialized security
agencies that are charged with protecting the state from various security risks, such as migration, terrorism, criminality, and military conflict.
In Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), and its sub-agency the Canadian Committee to Advise on Tropical Medicine and Travel (CATMAT— note again the concern with tropicality), is the expert agency tasked with identifying dangerous, unhealthy
populations and regions. CATMAT is made up of health intellectuals that include prominent doctors from various hospitals and health authorities around the country, representatives of medical associations such as Medical Microbiology and Infectious Disease,
Pediatric Society, and Emergency Physicians, from the International Development Research Centre, Canadian Public Health Association, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as Ministries of Health from
other states. CATMAT advises PHAC, which in turn advises various governmental bodies and the Canadian public on the dangers associated with certain parts of the world, with certain diseases and with certain behaviors, ranging from sexual practices to
international adoption. CATMAT also includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of National Defence, and CIC, reinforcing the connection between international travel, health and the security of the Canadian body politic. The expert knowledge
produced by PHAC and CATMAT forms the basis on which the federal government, the CIC and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) make decisions regulating inadmissibility (which diseases qualify as a risk to public health, public safety, or excessive
demand), which countries require visas and medical examinations, how long to detain unauthorized arrivals and who to quarantine and for how long.
These medical experts and bureaucracies also help to regulate human movement out of Canada through the production of ‘‘insecurity texts,’’ such as travel reports, travel health notices, and advisories. According to Lowenheim (2007), the primary function of these
texts is to responsibilize international travelers by identifying threats to the Canadian traveler and prescribing appropriate behavior. PHAC uses a four-point system to identify zones of danger, which correspond to the severity of risk posed and the type of behavior
regarded as responsible: (1) practice usual precautions; (2) practice special precautions; (3) avoid non-essential travel; and (4) avoid all travel. According to PHAC, the decision to issue a warning takes into consideration a variety of factors, including standards of
hygiene and sanitation, availability of safe food and clean water and climate or environmental conditions that support diseases that do not occur in Canada (PHAC 2010). Employing Canadian standards of hygiene and health to establish the level of threat posed by
other regions clearly reflect the ongoing importance of tropicality as a boundary producing narrative (Arnold 1996; Bankoff 2001).
The behaviors prescribed in these advisories reflect the level of perceived threat to both the international traveler and the non-traveling Canadian public. In levels one and two, the traveler is the entity that is threatened and responsibility for the in dividuals’ well-
being rests with the individual herself. In levels three and four, the Canadian public and the international traveler are threatened by the traveler’s decision to leave the safe and secure domestic space, and the international traveler is responsible for their own security
and the security of the Canadian public. As Lowenheim (2007) notes, these advisories function to responsibilize international travel by advising against travel, but they do much more than this, they also reproduce the international ⁄ domestic binary that forms the
basis on which the necessity for the state rests, with the Canadian state serving as the authoritative source on everyday dangers and responsible behavior and as the safe and secure location for Canadian citizens.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) produces a similar insecurity text and issues travel reports and warnings based on a variety of risks, such as weather, political upheaval, criminal activity, and terrorist attacks. Like PHAC, DFAIT
employs a four-scale system, ranging from (1) exercise normal security precautions; (2) exercise high degree of caution; (3) avoid non-essential travel; and (4) avoid all travel. Not surprisingly, most of the most dangerous rankings are concentrated in Africa, Southern
Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Eastern Europe. Just as telling, perhaps, is the lowest travel advisory that is visited on the United States and Western Europe—‘‘exercise normal security precautions.’’ Even these safe zones are presented as potentially
dangerous, and the responsible Canadian traveler is reminded to exercise ‘‘normal security precautions.’’ Once again, this description demonstrates the state’s efforts to responsibilize the travel er (Lowenheim 2007:205) while reproducing the international realm as
anarchic and dangerous. All foreign spaces, and thus travel, are potentially dangerous, which reinforces the production of the home state, Canada, as a safe and secure location for the modern, national subject.
Regulating Healthcare in Canada
The regulation of healthcare serves a similar function and includes defining what qualifies as healthcare and who has access to it. State regulation of healthcare primarily consists of maintaining the medical infrastructure and delegating powers of health to an
accredited medical profession (Osborne 1997:183). A foundational component of this system is to define experts and expertise as it relates to the modern practice of medicine (Johnson 1993:150). This system decides what qualifies as medical care by identifying and
excluding that which is traditional, alternative, or non-conventional—and thus excluded from public insurance coverage. It also defines who is a qualified medical practitioner. These practices necessarily exclude a range of practices and actors, often associated with
the ‘‘foreign’’ other; whose expertise is not recognized as sufficiently scientific or rational to qualify as medical care in the modern, Western sense. As Lupton (1995) note s, the public health discourse in Western states produces a wide range of binary oppositions
associated with discriminatory moral judgments: including the mind ⁄ body, healthy ⁄ unhealthy, rational ⁄ irrational, disciplined ⁄ self-indulgent, clean ⁄ dirty—oppositions that often overlap with and reproduce the inside ⁄ outside, self ⁄ other, and domestic ⁄ foreign. In
these representations, traditional or non-Western modes of healthcare are regarded as non-scientific. This is simultaneously reinforced through the construction of certain regions of the world as irrational, unscientific, or medically incompetent. For instance, Youde
observes that in Western countries, southern Africa is presented as both threatened by HIV⁄AIDS and also as partially responsible due to certain cultural practices and the apparent rejection, incomprehension or misunderstanding of basic scientific facts about the
AIDS virus (2005:203).
Consequently, the Canadian healthcare system is a boundary reproducing practice that differentiates between the rational West, and non-rational regions of the world. In turn, the healthcare system is portrayed as needing protection from non-rational modes of
medical expertise even as medical capacity, and expertise in foreign spaces is simultaneously demanded and questioned. This is perhaps best illustrated through the process of recognizing the foreign medical credentials of international medical graduates (IMGs).
The Foreign Credential Recognition Program set up and run by CIC provides funds for the recognition of foreign medical credentials, which is administered by the Medical Council of Canada and the Physician Credentials Registry of Canada. This process allows the
state and the accredited medical profession to evaluate the medical competency of IMGs and to determine whether they need to upgrade their training in a Canadian medical program. According to the Medical Council of Canada, IMGs seeking to practice medicine in
Canada need to: verify their medical degree is from an approved university, pass the MCC Evaluating Examination, the MCC Qualifying Exams, provide proof of language proficiency, complete a minimum of 12 months of supervised clinical training, in addition to
any further provincial requirements (MCC 2010). Here, we witness the Canadian state attempt to maintain order, safety, and the rational ⁄ scientific basis of the Canadian health system as it comes into contact with the anarchic, disordered, and irrational
international realm as represented by IMGs.
The international realm is further reproduced as anarchic and disordered by virtue of the perception that Canadian healthcare is in high demand and acts as a pull factor for many migrants. In a document entitled ‘‘Deterring Individuals from Coming to Canada as
part of a Human Smuggling Operation,’’ the CIC (2010a) asserts, ‘‘Canadians enjoy health services that are among the best in the world. However, it is unfair that those who have not followed the rules be rewarded for their crimes by having access to more generous
benefits that the average Canadian receives.’’ In a subsequent document, the CIC directly ties access to healthcare to illegal entry, asserting the government will: ‘‘reduce the attraction of coming to Canada by way of illegal human smuggling by ensuring health
benefits participants receive are not more generous than those received by the Canadian public’’ (CIC 2010b). The construction of Canada’s healthcare system as the envy of the world serves to reinforce suspicions of migrants as unhealthy and to justify increased
surveillance on these populations.
The moral bases of exclusion rest on both the need to protect a rational, scientific healthcare
system, and on that of just deserts . Those that have not, or cannot, contribute to the system
are excluded. As was raised in previous sections, people with severe health problems are denied visas for entry to Canada, not
because they do not need care but because as non-Canadians they have not contributed to the creation and maintenance of the
Canadian healthcare system. Thus, the Canadian state attempts to exclude these people while they are still outside the state. Inside
the state, accessibility to healthcare reflects a hierarchy of exclusion partially based on just deserts. The primary mode of exclusion
rests with eligibility for public medical insurance, which is a provincial responsibility. Though eligibility for public insurance varies
across provinces, there is a hierarchy of eligibility based on contribution to the system. In all
provinces, Canadian citizens and permanent residents are eligible for public insurance, subject to provincial exclusions—Canadians
who do not physically reside in the province5 may be ineligible for public insurance in that province,6 as are out-of-province
students. For Canadians taking up residence across provincial borders, there are short waiting periods to establish eligibility. The
inter-provincial distinctions between eligible and ineligible groups reflect a concern with just deserts—to have access, one must have
resided in that province long enough to contribute to or signal an intention to contribute to the maintenance of that provincial
healthcare system.
Similar concerns are evident in the case of non-permanent residents within Canada. Visitors are completely excluded under
provincial plans, as are refugee claimants—though they are eligible for limited essential-health services through the Interim Federal
Health Program (Gagnon 2002). Foreign students are ineligible in some provinces; in others, they are subject to waiting periods
ranging from 3 months to over a year; while those in Canada on work permits are eligible in all provinces after a waiting period
between one and 3 months (Gagnon 2002:36). Those who are perceived to contribute least (visitors, refugee claimants, and
students) are excluded, given limited access or subject to greater wait periods, while those who contribute most (citizens and
regulation of healthcare
permanent residents, foreign workers) are eligible in a short time. At a very basic level,
through public insurance in Canada establishes a typology of inclusion ⁄ exclusion that
rests on moral considerations of maintaining order of the system and just deserts based on
contribution to the system.
The Technology of Insurance
public insurance is the primary technology through which the Canadian state regulates
Access to
access to healthcare, which in turn reproduces the insecurity associated with foreign spaces, people
and disease essential to the legitimation of the state . The importance of insurance in modern societies is
a central theme of Ulrich Beck’s work on risk society, and he argues that ‘‘uncertainty and insecurity is produced in every niche of
modern existence, and security against such uncertainty is essentially stitched together out of a
combination of public and private insurance agreements’’ (Beck 1992:100). This is evident in the case of health
security in Canada, where the costs of health security are split 70–30 between public and private insurance schemes (Government of
Canada 2004). The prevalence of public and private insurance as modes of providing security in modern states has led Francois
Ewald to conclude that societies are constituted not in accordance with wider political or cultural
principles, but as vast systems of insurance (1991:210). While this conceptualization of the state ignores the
internal ⁄ external dynamic and the role that identity plays in excluding human populations from inclusion in such insurance
protections, Ewald’s broader contention about insurance as a socio-political arrangement is important—insurance operates on logic
distinct from that of collective identity in that it conceptualizes risk and insecurity as calculable (evaluates probability), capital
(rectifies financial repercussion of loss, not loss), and collective (applies only to groups) (Ewald 1991:201). For the purposes of this
paper, the collective is the most significant component. Insurance as a technology of risk relies on the
establishment of a community through the pooling of contributions of individual
members and the redistribution of costs associated with the risks of life in modern societies.
The importance attached to the collective and the redistribution of cost leads Ewald to conclude that the logic of insurance is
Public insurance is
fundamentally about justice and social redistribution (1991:202–203; see also Elbe 2008:186).
foundational to the formation and continuation of the state’s population as a
relevant human collective , bound together by mutual insurance agreements aimed at social redistribution within
that group. In turn, the state, which provides security (and some measure of justice) through the social redistribution associated
with social insurance, guarantees its own existence, since the technology of risk and insurance ‘‘requires permanent institutions with
quasi-infinite longevity’’ (Ewald 1991:209).
Reps/Securitization First---Aff = War Inev
Security is a psychological construction---representations of external threat bias
decision-making and make war inevitable
Sybille RD Buitrago 16, studied International Affairs, Peace Research, Conflict Resolution and
International Communication at American University. Article was double-bind peer reviewed.
“Threats of a Different Kind: China and Russia in U.S. Security Policy Discourse”
https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/0175-274X-2016-3-165/threats-of-a-different-kind-
china-and-russia-in-u-s-security-policy-discourse-jahrgang-34-2016-heft-3
It matters how a state’s national decision makers perceive and construct challenges and threats
in international security. This also extends to the construction of other states; whether or not another state is
constructed as threatening or as nonthreatening shapes policy /security policy and interstate relations
accordingly . As argued by scholars and outlined below, how something or someone is constructed
constitutively affects interpretation of issues, developments or actors’ behavior, confines the
way in which action and interaction are thought possible, and thereby contributes to
behavior towards another state. U.S. national decision makers follow a U.S. self-role of global leader in international
security, and U.S. national security is defined as extending beyond national borders. This also
facilitates an extended view of threats and threatening others. In the U.S. perspective, more issues and actors
represent potential threats. Thus, also states that challenge globally defined U.S. national security or the
U.S. in the provision of international security may be viewed as potentially threatening. Aside from
international terrorism, extremism, fragile states, rogue actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational
organized crime, cyber attacks, and consequences from external violent conflicts, as stated in the 2015 U.S. National Security
Strategy (see for example White House 2015), both China and Russia are/have become again serious
concerns in U.S. security policy discourse. And while U.S. discourse under the Obama administrations has also
increasingly highlighted the need for multilateral action, it is unilateral measures that remain primary for the
U.S.
This article offers empirical results on how the U.S. approach international security, and, in
particular, how U.S. security policy discourse constructs current challengers. Perceiving and
constructing another state as rival, threat or enemy has constitutive effects on interaction with
that state. Discourse’s constitutive effects on behavior are illustrated in recent scholarship (Herschinger/ Renner 2014;
Diez/Bode/Fernandes da Costa 2011; Nabers 2009). Thus, as this article argues, if states such as the U.S. perceive and construct
other states such as China and Russia as threat to own and international security, it will constitutively affect interaction with these
countries (see also Campbell 1998; Dalby 1997).
As U.S. decision makers are said to still see the U.S. leading the world (Nye 2015; Tomes 2014: 46; Wolf 2014: 89-92),1 this
article poses the question of how potential challengers to U.S. primacy are constructed. Regarding
China, for example, scholars point to the U.S. fearing a loss of influence in the region (Hacke 2013; Goh 2007/2008: 113-157), to
China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its interests, its options for asymmetric conduct towards the U.S. (Colby 2015;
Worcester/Bühler 2011: 28-29), and even a new bipolarity (Maull 2015). In case of rising U.S.-Sino conflict, the great U.S.
mistrust in the Chinese government would likely favor tough policies (Wolf 2014: 96). Additional tension
can come from Chinese efforts to increase military presence in the South China Sea. Russia, on the other side, was not seen as threat
to U.S. interests until the Ukraine crisis. Some merely argued that Russia is a difficult partner for the U.S. and that the U.S. have the
dilemma of needing Russian cooperation to deal with global challenges but also aiming for deeper relations with the young
democracies in Russia’s neighborhood (Hacke 2013: 6-7). In 2012, Russia was still no clear challenge, as Russian and U.S. interests
did not intolerably interfere (Smith 2012: 184-186). But the Ukraine crisis has created the view of a threatening Russia and even
conjured up Cold War images (Monagan 2015). Increased strategic Sino-Russian aligning (Trenin 2015; Rudolf 2014) likely
increases U.S. concern.
As outlined here, perception, national identity and self-other constructions inform – via decision
makers – interstate relations. By their very nature, interstate relations are the experience of
different and at times opposed perspectives, where perception and identity impact the
interpretation of events and of self and other. Possible outcomes are threat constructions,
even enemy images, and the demarcation and defense of spheres of influence. The sense of national
identity is also shaped by historical experience as shared by the collective of a state; experienced gains and victories as well as losses
and traumata in relations with other states impact how national identity is felt and acted out vis-à-vis others. This also
includes relations with those perceived as rivals or enemies. As argued (Nabers 2009: 191-214; Mersken 2005:
373), an enemy can be a useful hegemonic tool for mobilization and the enabling of new policy
measures. But when one state discursively constructs another state as a threat, it creates
dichotomies and boundaries to that state (Eriksson/Noreen 2002: 8-10; Campbell 1998: 3-4, 170-171). A critical
geopolitics lens adds the link of identity, discourse, space, power and policy, and how this link
may translate into processes of ordering by one state towards another, referring to the creation
of spatial order with effects of inclusion or exclusion (Agnew/Muscarà 2012: 1-2, 11, 28-29). In this light,
U.S. security policy is explained with America’s myth and universalizing tendency as facilitator
of both expansion and strong self-other differentiation (Ó Tuathail/Agnew 2008: 225-228). A state’s
national identity can become threatened, motivating a need to safeguard national identity, which
in turn may facilitate the creation of dichotomies and barriers between states (Campbell 1998; Shapiro
1997: 58-59). It must be clearly stated here, that there is a distinction between states engaging in
self-other constructions for their identity – a normal process, and divisive processes of othering,
in which another state is articulated as threat. Since also states have ontological security, national identity can
become threatened by changing situations and inherent uncertainty (Steele 2008: 12), including increases in other states’ power.
This article is based on an analysis of national security documents and speeches by U.S. security
policy officials. It should be pointed out that such documents, in particular national security documents, are products of
lengthy processes with multiple authors and rounds of writing and editing, etc. Such processes and the resulting assessments are
also informed by information and analyses of other actors, including security and defense agencies/ departments (CIA, NSC,
Pentagon, etc.), foreign policy institutions (State Department), legislative bodies (Congress), a number of U.S. think tanks – of
varying ideological position, and the media (key among them being the New York Times and Washington Post, for example).2
Additional actors in the political establishment that provide information and interpretation, and thereby inform policy formulation,
are, for example, the United States European Command (EUCOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM), or NATO. These
bodies are based in specific regions/countries and in dialogue with local representatives. The commanders typically report to the
U.S. president via the U.S. defense secretary about issues and developments in their particular region. These reports then become
part of the policy formulation process regarding a region or country. Developments and issues that are interpreted
as particularly important or threatening likely receive greater attention, while it is typically the case that
several issues must be attended to at the same time. There are then multiple actors that are directly and indirectly involved in policy
formulation (for more information, see Bolton 2008; Dixon 1984). Constructions of enmity relate to perception
and discursive processes; it can be influenced by conscious efforts to create or exaggerate
enmity, for various reasons, including political agendas, or by efforts to overcome enmity and foster dialogue. Because national
identity, self-other constructions, perceptions and even emotions are involved in perceiving and
interpreting developments, processes relating to the construction of enmity are also
psychologically driven and not only conscious; whether conscious or not is however difficult to analytically
assess. In the following sections, the article presents empirical results on 2) the U.S. construction of China, and 3) the U.S.
construction of Russia. The article closes with 4) implications of U.S. self-other constructions vis-à-vis China and Russia.
2. U.S. Construction of China
The analysis of U.S. discourse on China reveals both positives and negatives. Also changes over time are expressed, in response to
changes in U.S. administrations, the global environment and China’s influence; constructions of a threatening China have increased.
Already in 1994, the U.S. recognized China’s possible impact on U.S. security, based on China’s growing economic power, UN
Security Council veto power, nuclear arms and military advancements, and thus called for rebuilding relations with China by
establishing high-level dialogues and working-level relations (Perry 1994). Today, China is perceived as challenge to U.S. influence
and interests and even as threatening near-pear adversary, due to the rapid modernization of its military and global defense industry
and a more complicated world (Hagel 2014; U.S. Department of Defense 2015).
China is constructed as clear challenge and threat to U.S. vital interests. Thus, China is said to aim to “replace the United States as
primary power in Asia”, weaken U.S. alliances with Asian partners and limit U.S. access to and deterrence of threats in the region,
and that China’s “dangerous policies” present a “systematic” challenge for the U.S. (Blackwill/Tellis 2015: 19, 20). Not only is China
articulated as threat to the U.S., but also to the future of Asia and the liberal international order (Blackwill/Tellis 2015: 20, 39; U.S.
Department of Defense 2012: 2, 4). The representation of China as systematic challenge to the U.S., thus to core values and
interests, is particularly telling. It points to China having become the key other of the U.S., against which the U.S. must safeguard.
Actions directed against China as threat likely promote conflict potential. Portraying China as threat for regional
stability furthermore fits with expressed U.S. regional interests.
Impact
Upholding life at home and protecting it from risk abroad makes nuclear war and
genocide inevitable
Zohreh Bayatrizi 8, Associate Professor Social Theory at Alberta University, Life Sentences:
The Modern Ordering of Mortality, 165-7
The drive to protect life against the threat of anarchic and disorderly death has significance not
only within national borders but also internationally. The United Nations measures ‘human development,’ in part,
in terms of longevity, health, and infant mortality, and, as a con sequence, international aid is often targeted to address high mortality rates in poor
countries. Moreover, provisions are made within international laws and conventions to protect all citizens of the
world against genocide, war crimes, and arbitrary killings. In
practice, however, the principle of the sanctity of life has
been upheld in a morally inconsistent manner. Beginning with Hobbes, the moral commitment to
the value of life has always been qualified and conditional: it has meant respect for
the life of some but not all people . Hobbes himself argues that the prohibition against war only
applies to civil wars — wars of ‘us’ against ‘us’ — and not wars aimed at the domination of ‘other’
peoples by ‘us’ (Leviathan, xx). By waging wars and colonial campaigns or by presiding over a
system of distribution of wealth in the world that leaves many to die from hunger, the
‘civilized,’ life-respecting countries of the West have, arguably, imposed more death on one
another or on the rest of the world than any of the vilest empires that history can remember. The
case of Terri Schiavo, which I first discussed in the introductory chapter of this book, is instructive. In the spring of 2005, when this conclusion was
originally being drawn up, a genocidal campaign was being waged in Sudan, many civilians were struggling with the ‘collateral damage’ of the war on
terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thousands of people in the world’s poorest countries were dying prematurely from easily preventable causes. As all
this was unfolding, the United States came to grips with a moral crisis over the question whether it was right or wrong to let one person, Terri Schiavo,
die after being in a persistent vegetative state for years. The pilot
who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national
hero, the terrorist who blows himself up is a coward, the child dying from hunger is a non-person , and
Terri Schiavo is a cause célèbre for a morally confused culture of respect for life. The writings of Foucault (1990, 2003), Agamben (1998, 2005), and
Bauman (1992, 1998), as well as those of postcolonial writers such as Balibar (2001), suggest that this
moral inconsistency is
integral to the dynamics of the Western culture of life and death. Foucault has argued that
racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order: ‘For millennia man remained
what he was for Aristotle: a living being with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence
as a living being into question’ (1990: 143). According to this view, the
Holocaust, as well as the looming possibility of a
nuclear war during the Cold War, both stemmed, ironically, from the modern Western political
imperative to take charge of life and how it is lived. Wars are no longer waged to defend the
sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire
populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life
necessity : massacres have become vital’ (ibid.: 137). Similarly, today the ‘naked question of
survival’ (ibid.) is reinvoked to justify the actions of those who endanger the lives of thousands of civilians around the world in the
name of a pre-emptive ‘war on terror,’ undertaken to protect their own citizens and civilization from the
mere potential of terrorist, nuclear, and biological attacks at some uncertain point in the future.
In all of these cases, ‘the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of
the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’ (ibid.). Giorgio Agamben and
Etienne Balibar explain this ironic contradiction in terms of the creation of categories of living non-
citizens (within national borders as well as on a global scale) and their subsequent exclusion
from participation in the politico-legal realm. Invoking the ancient figure of homo sacer — the person who
falls outside of legal and political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not
sacrificed — Agamben argues that sovereignty ancient or modern, is characterized by the
exceptional right to define and exclude homo sacer or bare life from the politicolegal realm: ‘What is
at stake is, once again, the definition of a life that may be killed without the commission of homicide’ (1998: 165). Agamben describes the Nazi
concentration camps, as well as contemporary refugee camps in the heart of Europe and elsewhere, as zones of exception, which function to exclude
certain categories of people from the legal protections afforded ordinary citizens who are integrated in the political community (ibid.: 147). Balibar
has argued that under modern capitalist political-economic conditions, the whole world is
divided into life zones and death zones, the former occupied by the citizens of affluent, stable, and
mostly Western countries,
while the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected
to various forms of extreme violence, including primarily, the lack of access to political participation, as well as being
subject to hunger, war, and genocide. For Balibar (2001: 10), although it is not always clear whether the life zones are responsible
for the creation of the death zones, what is less in doubt is that the existence of such zones is beneficial for the workings of Western capitalism, as they
leave millions of people too concerned with the naked question of survival to democratically participate in securing their political and economic rights
against global powers.
Impact---De Larrinaga Subject Formation
The production of subjectivities based on coherent social orders justifies violence
in the name of protecting that ideal subject---global militarization becomes
ingrained in social practices as life is mobilized toward interventions,
incarceration, and dispossession
Miguel de Larrinaga 12, Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Ottawa, “A Day in the Life”:
A Tomogram of Global Governmentality in Relation to the “War on Terror” on November 20th,
2003, in War Beyond the Battlefield, ebook
What is articulated and disseminated here, through these governmental rationalities and technologies, is a particular form of power. It is within this context that Foucauldian
notions of biopolitics and biopower can be addressed. Biopolitics concerns those governmental rationalities and technologies with the health and well-being of the population as
In contrast to sovereign power which, according to Foucault, is the power to “take life or let live”, biopower is the power to “‘make’ live and
its target.
understand this strategy of power as an attempt to provide a space to secure life in general but, rather, to produce and
secure specific forms of life that, as Dillon and Reid succinctly argue, are “amenable to its sway.”23 Indeed, one crucial aspect of
biopolitics is precisely that it is, as Sergei Prozorov argues, not “life-as-such” that is being nurtured, but “only the forms of
life that are in accordance with its specific rationality.”24 Moreover, it is within the context of biopolitics that the
extermination of populations can be rationalised in the name of the securing of the life of a
particular population. Indeed, as David Campbell argues, by having the health and welfare of the population as its referent, “decisions are
made in terms of collective survival, and killing is justified by the necessity of preserving
life.”25 In order to understand how governmentality and biopolitics can be deployed to understand the current “war on terror,” one needs to further understand how Foucault
articulates the relationship between sovereign power and biopower in relation to war beyond the battlefield.
Biopolitics, War and Exceptionalism
Foucault was ambiguous regarding the relationship between sovereign power and biopower. In some instances, he seems to indicate that biopower displaces sovereign power as
the dominant economy of power from the eighteenth century onward26 while in other instances Foucault highlights the way in which these economies of power live in tension
with each other and mutually reinforce each other.27 There is one instance, however, in which Foucault does bring together these forms of power explicitly and which is
particularly apposite to the subject matter of this article in terms of elucidating the spatial and temporal contours of the “war on terror”: the question of racism and war.
the power to kill could operate within an economy of power
In Society Must be Defended, Foucault addresses the question of how
that has “life as its object and objective.”28 As aforementioned, when power takes life as its referent, threats are understood in terms of the
survival of a particular population. It is in the delineating of this population and the way in which this
circumscription inscribes race in the “mechanisms of the state” 29 that sovereign power is
deployed in the service of the exigencies of biopolitics. In relation to sovereign power then, racism, for Foucault,
introduces “a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between
what must live and what must die.”30 It is through race then that sovereign power and its right to kill can be brought to bear in relation to
biopolitical rationalities that separate, categorise and create hierarchies in the biological. Moreover, the logic that underpins the way the biological is taken into account by
sovereign power in this sense is connected to, and ultimately transforms, the relationship of war that Foucault characterises as “if you want to live, you must destroy your
enemies.”31 By being articulated biopolitically, this relationship is intimately related to the health and welfare of the population. As Foucault illustrates, “The death of the other,
the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.”32 Within this
contex,the threat need not be articulated explicitly in biological terms. It suffices to understand
these threats as “either external or internal, to the population and for the population” and the vitality of this population being
predicated, not upon victory against political adversaries, but upon “the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race.”33 Instead of
understanding war in terms of conflict between self-same Others within an international realm,
war can be understood as something internal to the social , as an asymmetric threat to the integrity of the
population. When one translates this, as in our contemporary moment under the sign of the war on terror, as threats to “humanity” as
a whole, then one can understand the articulation between sovereign power and biopower no
longer in international terms but as having the globe as its plane of operation. As Vivienne Jabri illustrates, “If
biopower is conceived as a generalized terrain of humanity, its logic is the production of political space that extends well beyond the limits of the state, thereby reframing the
sphere of the international in imperial terms.”34
Foucauldian analytics of the relationship between sovereign power and biopower thus enables a spatial reconfiguration of war by understanding the central referent of war-
and temporally reconfiguring the meaning of war . In attempting to continue to move beyond an understanding of
power based upon a juridico-political model, one of the central questions that Foucault tries to grapple with in the 1975–1976 lectures at the Collège de France, is if “war can
serve as an analyzer of power relations?”35 In addressing this question, the author attempts to trace the existence of a counter-discourse to the “philosophico-juridical”
discourse of war as a limit concept and of the Clausewitzian dictum of war being the continuation of politics by other means. What Foucault identifies in his genealogical
investigation is that Clausewitz was actually responding to this counter-discourse, a discourse that paradoxically develops concurrently with the establishment of the State’s
monopoly on violence and thus the cleansing of the social body of bellicose relations by expelling war to the limit of the State.36 This discourse, that he labels as “historico-
under the great juridico-political edifice of the
political,” posits that politics is the continuation of war by other means. In other words,
State lies war, which is at once the condition of possibility of this State in a foundational sense in
that “the law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields,” and in its performative
maintenance in that “war is the motor behind institutions and order .”37 In this sense,
instead of understanding war as a limit concept; destructive of social and political order, war, as
with the way Foucault generally understands power, is productive of such order as well as of the formation of particular
subjects.38 This discourse identifies war as running “through the whole of society, continuously
and permanently” while order is produced through an array of rationalities and technologies
that have characterised and continue to characterise liberal governmental order. In responding to how
Foucault understands the “distant roar of battle” as continuously underscoring global liberal governmentality Jabri reflects:
What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix
of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies
and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of
analysis is to point out that war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some
form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the
elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply
rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This
implies a continuity of sorts between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent
manifestations of government .39
Impact---Taleb
Risk management fails---black swans mean doing nothing is better than doing
something
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB 11 is Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New
York University's Polytechnic Institute and the author of The Black Swan: The Impact of the
Highly Improbable. MARK BLYTH is Professor of International Political Economy at Brown
University. "The Black Swan of Cairo: how suppressing volatility makes the world less
predictable and more dangerous." Foreign Affairs 90.3 (May-June 2011): p33 Gale
Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007-8,
when the global financial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard
everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one
hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The
critical issue in both cases is the artificial suppression of volatility --the ups and downs of life-- in the
name of stability . It is both misguided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the
statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability "tail risks" to
disappear from policymakers' fields of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what
happens when highly constrained systems explode.
Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely
fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability
as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and
economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result
tends to be the opposite . These artificially constrained systems become prone to "Black
Swans "--that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the
statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.
Such environments eventually experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard
and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state.
Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems.
Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to
chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is
the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic
crisis of 2007-8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world . The policy implications are identical: to make
systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open--fluctuat nec mergitur (it fluctuates but does not sink) goes the
Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of "fail small" and "fail
fast"), the U.S. government should stop supporting dictatorial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow
political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be
visible; the same is true in politics.
SEDUCED BY STABILITY
Both the recent financial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are
grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in
the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating
fluctuation--no more booms and busts in the economy, no more "Iranian surprises" in foreign policy.
These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking
system became very fragile following a succession of progressively larger bailouts and government interventions,
particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trumpeted free
markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan effort throughout. Republicans have been
good at fragilizing large corporations through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the
same time, the financial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept getting weaker
while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben
Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of "the great
moderation" in 2004.
Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan
Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle's booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with
interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his economic
policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop--the now infamous "Greenspan put." These policies
proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain companies
to grow "too big to fail." Because
policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do
nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its
own.
The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to
Greenspan's implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak's in Egypt for years engaged in overt
plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support.
Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road
must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major
explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artificially sterilized environment for a decade and then
invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest fires can
cause larger forest fires to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics,
price controls are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these
controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly
blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the benefits accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable,
are no different, in the long run, from those of an artificially controlled price.
Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to
the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite
reasonably, is to intervene in an effort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But
government interventions are laden with unintended--and unforeseen -consequences,
particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that
absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent
celebrated documentary on the financial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfeasance and dishonesty of
bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the film naively overlooks the fact that
humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only difference this time around
was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a misunderstanding of the statistical properties of the system.
What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited
competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate
these flaws. Humans
must try to resist the illusion of control : just as foreign policy should be intelligence-
proof (it
should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the
predictions of "experts" in what are inherently unpredictable domains ), the economy should be
regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets,
intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and profits for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build
complicated financial products that skirt those regulations.
DON'T BE A TURKEY
The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to confirm that
the farmer cares for it--until the last day, when confidence is maximal. The "turkey problem" occurs when a naive analysis of
stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, confidence in stability was maximal at the onset of the
financial crisis in 2007.
The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously
inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability
and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts
reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the
elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability.
Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misunderstood, as
"tipping points." Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the
entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile,
but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error.
U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the government's not
foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure
for his administration's not foreseeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the
statistical tails that matters--not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated
interdependence and contagion effects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate,
namely, Black Swans.
Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are
linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics.
Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive
jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans' sophistication,
obtained over the history of human knowledge in the linear domain, does not transfer
properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a
space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems
have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of
those properties.
THE ERROR OF PREDICTION
As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it,
and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the
components. But after the financial crisis of 2007-8, many people thought that predicting the
subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the
crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama's blaming "bad intelligence" for his
administration's failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the
misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved.
Obama's mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains--that is, confusing catalysts for causes
and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which effect. The final episode of the upheaval in
Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blaming the CIA is as
foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting
to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not
statistically understandable at the individual level.
As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted
regarding Egypt, policymakers should "think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the
average, you're making real money." But the analogy is spurious. There is no "four percent better" on Egypt. This is not just
money wasted but the construction of a false confidence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence
analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis--and offered the
exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic "tail events" are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not
scientifically measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting
revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics
into the tractable randomness of blackjack.
Most explanations being offered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the
"catalysts as causes" confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity
prices, not to stifling and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high GDPs that can afford to
import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its
fragility, not events, that must be studied--what physicists call "percolation theory," in which the properties of the terrain are
studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable,
what should be done? Differentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the first, changes in government do not
lead to meaningful differences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type,
changes in government lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes.
Consider that Italy, with its much-maligned "cabinet instability," is economically and politically stable despite having had
more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy's stability is because of these switches of
government). Similarly, in spite of consistently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments
can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend
to be comparatively mild. For example, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a
consequential jump in terms of the country's economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the
government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have
total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained.
In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein both constrained volatility by any
means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing
Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the democratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the
mosque had made Khomeini's rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to find
that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict
ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more
constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the
Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what
they mean.
THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS
Humans fear randomness --a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a different environment. Whereas in the
past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced fitness and increased chances of
survival, it can have the reverse effect in today's complex world, making volatility take the
shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of "great moderation." This is not
to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example.
But alongside the "catalysts as causes" confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of
control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing
nothing). This leads to the desire to impose (hu)man-made solutions. Greenspan's actions were
harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better
outcome than the other guy, regardless of the actual, delayed cost.
Impact
Their impact calc is part of a system of governance that polices the boundaries
between war and peace---endless war is present in incarceration, global policing,
privatization of common resources, and more---voting affirmative elides those
systems of violence by insisting on narrow chains of causality and the most
catastrophic impacts possible
Kevin McDonald 13, Professor and Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing
at Victoria University, Our Violent World: Terrorism in Society, 2013, pp. 1-4
Among the most significant Of these changes are transformations in forms Of social and political violence, the kinds Of violence recently described by the philosopher Charles
Taylor as 'categorial', directed towards people whom the protagonists do not personally know (2011). Often such violence is contrasted to the violence that takes place within
personal relationships, but as we will see as this book develops, this distinction is not as clear as it once may have been. The chapters that follow attempt to explore a con- text
that has become increasingly evident, as violence that once appeared to be 'contained' by key dimensions of modern society is now
much more fluid, increasingly part of the flows making up a global world (Urry 2005). But such violence is not a
'thing' or an object. It is a form of agency, an embodied relationship and human experience. As such, it is a critical lens through which to
explore wider transformations of social life. On the Other hand, to separate violence from such
transformations profoundly limits our capacity to understand, and respond to, one of
the most urgent questions shaping the twenty-first century. ¶ The Surveillance Society ¶ Most of us are aware
of changing forms or potentials of violence through the growth of security and surveillance (Crelinsten 2009). Some
developments are obvious, such as airport security. Others are less so, such as passport tracking systems, internment camps,
control orders and detention without trial, or erosion of the distinction between immigration
policy and security policy (Connolly 2005: 54). Some receive extensive debate in the press and social media, while Other developments are less discussed.
Over recent years, for example, states as different as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States have been engaged in the construction Of thousands Of kilometres Of walls
Global
along national bor- ders, a development that the political scientist Wendy Brown calls 'walling', something she contends is driven by 'waning sovereignty' (2010).
military expenditure, which had declined in the years following the end of the Cold War in 1989, expanded rapidly over the first
decade of the new century, increasing by some 49 per cent to reach US$1.53 tril- lion in 2009 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011).
New types of public surveillance involve pervasive but ambiguous categories Of 'pre-crime' as public policy seeks to identify groups and individuals 'at risk' of committing
criminal acts (Zedner 2007). The changing role of the criminal justice system has become evident in the
relentless increase in the number of people imprisoned in the world, a figure that reached some 10.65 million in 2009
(Walmsley 2010). ¶ Political theorists in particular have been aware of the ways these transformations 'resonate', mutually
amplifying each other (Connolly 2005: 54). Brian Massumi (2007) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a
new type of governance in complex societies, one shaped by a shift from a model Of prevention, which operates in an 'objectively knowable
world', to a model of pre-emption, which involves the attempt to wield power in a world based on uncertainty. Brad Evans (2010) points to the rise of
'consequentialist ethics' involved in this development, where forms of moral judgement framed in terms of 'right'
and 'wrong' are becoming redefined as calculations to determine whether a situation is
to be judged better or worse as a result of a course of action. These are not minor trans- formations. The
OECD argues that 'security' has become a major area Of economic activity, a driver Of modern economies (OECD 2004), while the sociologist David Lyon traces the contours of
this new social and
a surveillance society increasingly based on digital technologies (Lyon 2004). The political philosopher William Connolly argues that
of war and zones of peace, a separation that for the philosopher Immanuel Kant constituted the very basis Of modern society (Kleingold 2006: ix). This
account of the birth Of modernity locates violence beyond the borders of increasingly peaceful societies, and
to a significant extent has established itself as a structure of thought preventing any significant
exploration of the violence at the heart of modern societies, in particular the violence present
in colonial expansion , or in the extent of atrocities and extreme violence undertaken by the colonizers in the process Of decolonization (Bennett 2011).
Within this modern self-understanding, the capacity for extreme violence has always been
associated with 'the Other with modern society, by definition, understood as being
inherently peaceful. ¶ The securitization we have referred to above signals two related transformations: the separation between war
and peace is becoming less and less clear, while the state's monopoly of violence is becoming less and less certain. Rather than
war being an external event, the cultural geographer Nigel Thrift argues that contemporary, globalizing societies have entered
an 'era of permanent and pervasive war' (2011: 11), with war no longer understood as taking
place beyond borders, but across all areas of social life. This shift seems particularly evident when we 100k at urban design, where
we encounter not simply the increasing integration of blast proofing and other defensive systems into buildings, but the actual militarization of urban
space, evident in particular in contemporary military theory where older conceptions of 'battlefield' are giving way to new models of 'battle space' (see Graham 2012) where
the space of warfare becomes 'cotermi- nus with the space of civil society itself' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 128). This pattern is
evident in the extent that conceptions of urban security devel- oped in a warzone such as post-2003 Baghdad have established themselves as paradigms for policing and security
War, from this perspective, rather than being an activity
in the cities Of North American and Europe (Graham 2010). ¶
beyond the borders Of modern society, becomes instead a lens with which to conceive of
the core organization of such societies. The rise of war as a lens to frame social life has been particularly evident in military theory. William Lind,
for example, argues that the world has entered an age of 'fourth generation war', characterized by the loss Of the state's monopoly over the exercise Of War. Today states find
themselves at war with non-state opponents, wars he argues that states are losing. Writing in a respected journal, Lind argues 'invasion by immigration can be at least as
dangerous as invasion by a state army' (2004: 14). We do not need to embrace this type Of argument to rec- ognize that the twenty-first century has been shaped by an
awareness of a new vulnerability.
1NR
Free Market
Cost NB---2NC
Subsidizing health care spikes demand---causes massive cost increases
Kel Kelly 11, Wall Street trader, a corporate finance analyst, and a research director for a
Fortune 500 management consulting firm. 3/9/11, “The Myth of Free-Market Healthcare”
https://mises.org/library/myth-free-market-healthcare
The other major problem with our healthcare system is our third-party payer system, where we
rely on
When something is free or mostly free, people demand more of it. With someone else paying
their bills, people make more trips to the doctor, they don't negotiate against increasing prices
they face, and they don't balk at more and more superfluous tests and more specialist visits being
required of them. This constitutes more demand for healthcare services and equipment, the owners
of which raise prices in response, not only to take advantage of their increased pricing power, but to try to reduce their
workload, because more people start to demand healthcare than providers have the time and resources to address. Prices are used to
equate supply with demand. With the supply of doctors restricted by the AMA, and increasing demand for relatively
free healthcare on the part of consumers, prices began to rise rapidly, and waiting times to
see doctors became longer.
Cost Adv
Link---Economic Security/Competitiveness
millennium the United States strode the globe like a colossus as the sole global super power.
With a decade of the 21st Century having gone past, many strategic and political analysts the
world over have toyed with projections that United States global predominance is on the
decline, and that the 21st Century will not be a second American Century. Having toyed, with such projections, these analysts however shy away from predicting
whose century the 21st Century will strategically be? The trouble with such projections is that they are based
predominantly on analyses of economic trends and financial strengths and less on detailed
analyses of strategic and military strengths, and more significantly strategic cultures. Presumably,
it is easier for such analysts to base trends on much quoted statistical data. Strategic analysis
of global predominance trends is a more complex task in the opinion of the Author, as it cannot be based on statistical data
analysis. Global predominance trends need unravelling of strategic cultures of contending
powers, the reading of national intentions and resolve and the inherent national strengths and willpower demonstrated over a
considerable time span of half-centuries and centuries. Crisply put, one needs to remember
that in the 1980's, Japan and Germany as "economic superpowers" could not emerge as
global superpowers. Hence global predominance calls for more than economic strengths. The
United States getting strategically bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of
the 21st Century has not led to any noticeable decline in American global predominance.
Despite Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States reigns supreme globally even in East Asia where
China could have logically challenged it. More significantly, and normally forgotten, is the fact that the off-quoted shift
of global and economic power from the West to East was facilitated by United States massive
financial direct investments in China, Japan, South Korea and India. China quoted as the
next superpower to rival the United States would be economically prostate, should the United States
surgically disconnect China's economic and financial linkages to the United States. More significantly,
while examining the prospects of the 21st Century as a "Second American Century" it must be remembered that besides other factors, that out of the six
multipolar contenders for global power, none except China have shown any indications to
whittle down US global predominance. Even China seems to be comfortable with US power
as long as it keeps Japan in check. This Paper makes bold to assert that the 21st Century would be a Second
American Century despite China's challenge and the strategic distractions arising from the
global Islamic flash-points.
Like many entrepreneurs, we at the Kauffman Foundation are optimists. We expect the trends of
lower entrepreneurship and diminished dynamism to turn around. The United States, we
believe, is on the verge of a new entrepreneurial boom. One, perhaps counterintuitive,
reason for our optimism is demography: this country is about to experience a surge of labor
market entrants, thanks to the millennial generation. The millennials now span the age range
between roughly sixteen and thirty-five, and their labor market heft will only grow over the
next decade. As the millennials approach the “peak age” for business creation—their late
thirties and early forties—we might expect a boost to overall business creation.33 Second,
the early stages of the tech boom we’ve described, marked particularly by lower costs to start
nology
a company and the spread of smartphones, may progress and bolster entrepreneurial activity.34
The entrepreneurial benefits of this IT wave have not been realized fully yet. The
explosion of mobile apps for smartphones undoubtedly has been a boon to many entrepreneurs,
but it also appears that the initial stages of this new industry have been biased somewhat toward
incumbent firms.35 Considerable room for innovation remains, and we are at the point
in the cycle when the diffusion of IT will create even more entrepreneurial opportunities than
the first stages did.36 We are entering the “learning by doing” stage, in which a greater
diversity of entrepreneurs will help realize the full value of smartphones, cloud
computing, the Internet of Things, and other technologies.37 This next
entrepreneurial wave, however, is not inevitable. Public policy shapes the environment
in which entrepreneurs start and grow companies, and policymakers can take specific actions
to help foster—rather than inhibit—the era of renewed entrepreneurial growth we see
approaching. The decisions made by government at the federal, state, and local levels, therefore,
will have a significant impact, and it is certainly possible that public policy could derail our
optimistic forecast.
Minnesota’s card ends
We present our own policy priorities for entrepreneurial growth below, incorporating many of the
conclusions in the papers that follow. The policy changes we need, including those discussed here, are much harder to
implement than the announcement of a government agency’s superficial new entrepreneurship program. Subsidizing business
creation is not the same as fostering entrepreneurial growth, and, above all, policymakers must focus on identifying ways to, as
economists put it, lower the costs of entrepreneurial experimentation or reduce the “frictions on experimentation.”38
Even as we pursue better entrepreneurship policy, however, we must be mindful that there are limits to the amount of
entrepreneurial activity that public policy can create—and that better policy alone will not necessarily lead to more entrepreneurial
success. A recent compilation of interviews with unsuccessful entrepreneurs and investors concerning the reasons for their business
failures is telling: entrepreneurs most often cited factors related primarily to management or strategy, rather than regulation or
money.39 Entrepreneurship is, and always will be, challenging—a “hard thing.”40 That said, policymakers can take specific actions
to help foster a new era of entrepreneurial growth.
Mobility and Risk. Many commentators, observing an overall decline in the rate of American firm formation, have wondered
if Americans have somehow become more risk averse over time. While we hesitate to make broad demographic or
cultural generalizations, a shift in the policy perspective toward entrepreneurs could make a difference in Americans’ labor mobility
and attitude toward risk.
For many years, the approach to most entrepreneurship policy and programs has focused on sufficiency: entrepreneurs and
potential entrepreneurs, policymakers have observed, have insufficient resources – primarily money, but also talent and expertise.
Policy and programs, therefore, have focused on providing them with the resources needed. As the notion that entrepreneurs faced
severe financial constraints dominated these discussions, it was thought that alleviating these constraints—through loans, subsidies,
grants, incentives, and so on—would increase entrepreneurship.
Yet, research has called this assumption of financial constraints into question. One common theme of the
following essays and conference session summaries is that we may need to move from a sufficiency approach to what might be called
an insurance approach. For many individuals, the barrier to starting a business is not insufficient funds, but the opportunity cost of
trying. As one conference participant noted, “If we want people to take more risk, we need to make it less risky.” We need an
entrepreneurial safety net, of sorts—something that creates a form of insurance to reduce the opportunity cost of
entrepreneurs and enable more people to experiment with ideas. This effort could take the form of a new type of social insurance
program or a tweak to a current program, like unemployment insurance.
Social insurance, of course, is a politically complex term. There are those who believe that the very idea of entrepreneurship, red in
tooth and claw, is incompatible with the idea of social insurance. But we believe that we need to think about social insurance in
terms of risk, the personal risks we wish entrepreneurs to take in pursuit of starting up companies. As our economy changes, we
need to walk in the shoes of those trying to make the decision whether or not to start companies, and find ways to help them. If
social insurance needs to be part of that discussion, so be it.
Labor Supply. Another approach to renewing entrepreneurial growth is to focus on the labor supply. If—as preliminary research
suggests—slowinglabor force growth is found to be the principal reason behind the long-term fall
in business creation, then attention should be directed at ways to encourage faster labor force growth. That’s much easier
said than done, of course, and attempts to expand the labor force would run up against large demographic trends.
Immigration, however, is an obvious place to look for more people to enter the labor force. The Kauffman Foundation
and others have touted the economic benefits of immigration for many years, including immigrants’ high rate of entrepreneurial
activity. If and when immigration reform is enacted in Washington, research strongly suggests that it should include new pathways
for immigrant entrepreneurs, including a startup visa program.41 The federal government also should encourage and support the
early-state experimentation using H-1B visas for “resident entrepreneurs” that has occurred at universities in Massachusetts and
Colorado, and clarify administrative rules regarding Optional Practical Training (OPT) and Curricular Practical Training (CPT)
opportunities to ensure that they can include entrepreneurship.42
To encourage younger workers to enter the labor force, educational institutions should expand the range of startup apprenticeships
available for high school and college students. Apprenticeships have gained credence with many observers in recent years, and we
need to ensure that entrepreneurial companies have the resources to support apprentices and interns. More exposure to
entrepreneurship in these settings may lead to more new business creation later.
Data and Measurement. The government also should use its statistical and funding powers to gather
and publish data on pathways to entrepreneurship. The federal government has compiled an enormous set of
data on earnings by degrees and on various institutions among colleges and universities. Such data are useful and have greatly
expanded the amount of information prospective students, their parents, and future employers have about the links between college
degrees, fields of study, and employable skills. But, they don’t always reflect the realities of the labor market and how people fall into
certain careers. With the Census Bureau collecting reams of new information on business owners through the new Annual Survey of
Entrepreneurs, there should be scope to compile data on the routes people take to entrepreneurship. This could take some of the
mystique out of entrepreneurship—you don’t have to be a Stanford dropout to do it—and show people that there are multiple
pathways to entrepreneurial success. More information should enable people to make better decisions about whether and when to
start businesses.