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The United States federal government should shift health insurance to a free-
market system by:

 Removing regulatory and tax advantages for employer-provided group

health insurance

 Removing regulatory barriers to insurance market competition, including

limits on cross-state competition, mandates affecting the amount of services
covered by insurance, individual and employer mandates, and mandates
that insurers cover particular groups

 Ending anti-trust exemptions currently applied to health insurance

 Repealing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

 Reforming tort laws to decrease physician liability, and capping damages

 Ending hospital certificate of need laws

 Providing vouchers for Medicare recipients to participate in insurance


 Subsidizing initial health-status insurance accounts for individuals with

pre-existing conditions. Subsidies should be phased out as the market
evolves and stabilizes.

Solves costs and increases coverage---the aff shuts down competition and leads to
worse health outcomes
Eric Schansberg 11, Professor of Economics at Indiana University Southeast, Ph.D. in
Economics, 2011, “Envisioning a Free Market in Health Care,” Cato Journal, Vol. 31, No 1.
Insurance Regulation
Another important area for reform would be three sets of policy proposals that would
dramatically reduce insurance regulation.
First, insurers are often prevented from competing with each other across state lines. Insurance from
out-of-state providers was greatly reduced by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. The Act followed a 1944 Supreme
Court ruling that insurance was classified as “interstate commerce” and could be regulated by federal antitrust laws. The Act gave
antitrust exemptions to the insurance industry and implicitly codified state insurance
regulations into federal policy. These restrictions need to be eliminated to promote competition,
increase choice, and reduce costs.
Second, in the current environment, it is very difficult to offer insurance services across state lines because of insurance
mandates that increase the number of services covered by insurance. This requirement results in
higher costs, less flexibility for consumers, and less ability for insurers to compete. A free-
market system would allow people and insurers to make mutually beneficial
arrangements on what insurance would cover.
All 50 states require insurers to either offer or include certain benefits in the insurance policies they offer (Bunce and Wieske 2009).
Some states, for example, require an insurer to include benefits for the treatment of alcoholism or treatment by a chiropractor,
regardless of whether any given person wants those features (Graham 2008b). More broadly, insurance companies are not allowed
to specialize in insurance for specific ailments (e.g., diabetes or cancer).
As a result of these mandates, one finds significant levels of market concentration in the
insurance industry within the states. In 38 states, the largest firm serves more than one-third of
the market and in 16 states more than half. In 47 states, the largest three firms serve more than
half of the market and in 36 states more than 65 percent (Robinson 2004). In 2008, the market
share of the five largest insurers was at least 75 percent in every state (Emmons, Guardado, and
Kane 2008).4
Third, states commonly mandate coverage for certain groups of people, again resulting in higher
costs and cross-subsidies from the healthy to the unhealthy, and from those who plan well for their futures to
those who do not. These restrictions come in a variety of forms. There are “guaranteed issue” mandates that require all insurers to
make insurance available to all applicants regardless of a change in health status. There are also “guaranteed renewal” mandates that
require insurers to renew insurance policies when the policy expires, and mandates to require insurers to cover additional persons—
for example, children up to 25 years of age (King 2009).
In addition, a number of states have substituted “community rating” for “risk rating” (Sloan and Conover 1998). “Strict” community
rating requires an insurer to charge each insured individual the same premium regardless of age, sex, health status, claims
experience, or other risk factors. “Modified” community rating allows an insurer to vary the premium based on age or another of
these factors, but not health status.
Bunce and Wieske (2009) find 2,113 state mandates nationwide on services and providers. Those
mandates are costly to insurers who respond by increasing premiums or leaving the
market, thus reducing competition and driving up prices. Evidence of this is seen in the remarkable cost
differences between similar policies in different states. For example, in 2005, the average individual paid $4,044 in New Jersey and
$3,996 in New York for health insurance, but only $1,188 in Iowa and Wyoming (Matthews 2005). More recently, minimum
coverage for a family of four cost $145 in Iowa versus $906 in Massachusetts (Armey 2009). A healthy 25-yearold male could
purchase a policy for $960 a year in Kentucky but would pay about $5,880 in New Jersey. An average family in Texas paid $5,501 a
year for coverage in 2006–2007, whereas an average family in New Jersey paid $10,398 (Bond 2009).
Parente and Bragdon (2009) report that the proportion of individual plans in New York decreased from 4.7 percent to 0.2 percent
from 1994 to 2007, while the national average increased from 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent. They attribute this to the guaranteed issue
and community rating mandates enacted by New York.
The overall costs of such regulations are even more staggering. Conover (2004) calculates $170
billion in benefits from such regulations but $339 billion in costs, a 2:1 ratio with a net social
loss of $169 billion—which costs the average family of four more than $2,200, enough to
implement the free-market reforms discussed earlier. Conover (2004: 1) further estimates that regulations are “responsible for more
than seven million Americans lacking health insurance or one in six of the average daily uninsured” and fi nds that “4,000 more
Americans die every year from costs associated with health services regulation (22,000) than
from lack of health insurance (18,000).
The market remedy here is to repeal all of these mandates and allow insurers to freely set rates based on risks. One should note that
some of these regulatory efforts are Band-Aids to deal with unfortunate outcomes in the current health care and health insurance
systems—e.g., pre-existing conditions. As described earlier, a deregulated and unsubsidized insurance environment would take care
of those problems.
Bast (2007) has two policy suggestions worth mentioning. First, he would eliminate the requirement that health insurers pay a very
high proportion of their claims within a certain period of time (see Bunce 2002). Second, as a second-best solution, he argues that
insurers should be allowed to offer temporary or permanent medical waivers for pre-existing conditions (see Wieske and Matthews,

Single payer increases costs---overconsumption, fraud, and political incentives---

free-market care solves
Roger M. Battistella 9, is Emeritus Professor of Health Policy and Management in the Sloan
Graduate Program in Health Administration at Cornell University. 9/11/09, “Health Care
Turning Point: Why Single-Payer Won’t Work” Proquest Ebook Central.
Curbing the inflationary spending that stems from the popular, but misconceived, mindset that
health care is a free good when paid for by a third party is one of the more difficult challenges
elected officials face. Whatever they do is bound to be unpopular with voters. Inaction, in the hope that the problem will diminish or
go away, is unrealistic given the currently unsustainable rate increase in health spending. So long as national health insurance or
single-payer coverage are conceived as vehicles for eliminating the influence of price in the
allocation of health services, their adoption will only make matters worse.
So long as national health insurance or single-payer coverage are conceived as vehicles for
eliminating the influence of price in the allocation of health services, their adoption will only
make matters worse. Free care is a stimulus for insatiable demand , contrary to what once was
thought logical. The gap between what people want and what the system can provide widens with advances in economic
development. The pursuit of health, when expressed as a state of total physical, emotional, and
mental well-being and not the mere absence of disease, as promulgated by the World Health
Organization, is a formula for endless expansion of the boundaries of health care (Battistella
1986: 55– 70).
The abuse of generous sick pay and disability benefits in some European welfare state countries
is informative in this regard. In Sweden, these payments consume 8 percent of the
government’s budget or 4 percent of the country’s GDP. Swedes, according to the World Health Organization,
are among the healthiest people in the world. Yet some 13 percent of working-age Swedes live on some type of disability benefit.
During recent World Cup soccer finals sick leave among Swedish men rose by 55 percent (Walker
2007: A1). Disability is also on the rise in Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom despite the lack of any indication that people’s health has declined. This suggests that the
more people are compensated for complaints like mental and physical stress or bad backs, the
more such problems are reported (Finfacts 2007). Health-related job absenteeism among public-
sector workers in Italy is considered a plague . In 2005, state employees took an average of eighteen
days sick leave. In the health service the figure was almost six weeks ( The Economist 2008: 52). In
comparison, workers in the United States average five sick days a year (Finfacts Ireland).
Well-intentioned, overly generous benefits and the perception of health care as a free good not only
contributes to wasteful spending and overconsumption but furthers public
indifference to health provider charges and billing practices. This, together with the strong bonds of
the physician– patient relationship, creates a politically powerful public-provider
coalition for unrestrained spending that makes it hard for elected officials to control— if for no
other reason than their dependence on voter favor for job security. Efforts to tame health care will remain an
arduous uphill struggle so long as the patient– physician coalition remains intact. It stimulates
demand for reimbursement for a constantly expanding array of marginally efficacious
services that, like many forms of alternative medicine, cosmetic treatments, and performance-enhancing drugs, stretches
the definition of what is medically necessary and appropriate (Mechanic 2006: 39– 50; National Council
against Health Fraud 2002).
The experiences of Switzerland and England are instructive in this regard. In both countries, expanding government outlays for
popular but unproved complementary and alternative medical therapies have sparked cries for investigations into the size and merit
of such spending (BMC Health Services Research 2009; Times Online 2006). Constraining voters’ penchant for an endless array of
services of dubious efficacy is impossible when health care is perceived to be free. Transforming the public from
inflation enablers to inflation fighters, while difficult, is an objective that lends itself to a
market-oriented solution.
National insurance is a technology of security---it’s aimed at promoting a collective
national identity in the face of external threats to Western ways of life, which is
inseparable from violent global security strategies and depoliticizes critique of the
social order
Chris Zebrowski 16, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Loughborough
University, The Value of Resilience: Securing Life in the Twenty-first Century, 2016, pp. 51-58
To a nation still very much steeped in war, the promise of a stable post-war period financed through the peace dividend provided
comfort, solace and hope. Less than a month after the last major raid of the London Blitz, which had devastatingly displayed modern
life's total exposure to modern total war, an interdepartmental committee, chaired by William Beveridge, commenced planning for
an ambitious scheme for post-war social security. Social Insurance and Allied Services popularly known as the Beveridge report —
was presented to Parliament in 1942. No doubt strongly influenced by the spectre of the Great Depression, the report spoke
powerfully to the forms of civil contingency expected to greet post-war administrations. It advocated compulsory social
insurance , social housing, public education, a national health service and a commitment to full employment to
ensure freedom from the 'Giant Evils' of want, squalor, ignorance, disease and idleness in post-war Britain. The document would
be widely recognized as the cornerstone for what would emerge, post-war, as an ambitious state programme for the
management of Civil Contingencies: the British welfare state.
The concurrent operation of these two great machineries of government has been difficult to reconcile within a common historical
account of the post-war period given the very different meanings commonly associated with their inceptions. Historical
narratives of civil defence and the welfare state regularly appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to
diametrically opposed teleologies of the modern liberal state. On the one hand, the welfare state is
taken to represent the culmination of a long project associated with the humanization of the
state wherein policies guided by raison d'état were marginalized and state interests aligned with those of the
nation which it serves Cold War civil defence, on the other hand, invokes a more sinister narrative of
the historical trajectory of the modern state: Advances in weaponry, paired with a conviction of their
necessity, raised the stakes of war so as to wager the existence of whole nations while persistently
underfunded civil defence programmes placated an anxious nation so as to keep it from turning against the official policy of
deterrence. But what if these projects were not so dissimilar? Could it be, as Foucault insisted, that an
indissociable relation exists between state biopolitics, aimed at the protection and
promotion of the species-life of the nation , and the emergence of a thanatopolitical
geopolitics wagering the continued existence of the nation (Foucault. 1998: 143)?
Rather than treating the coexistence of these two great machineries of governance as either coincidental or ironic. this chapter
argues that the security logic of these two albeit distinct machineries of security emanates from a
shared matrix of governmentality . We begin by examining the protective logic of security shared
by the welfare state and civil defence. Building on the analysis undertaken in the previous chapter, the logic of
protection enacted by these two great machineries of emergency governance is shown to derive from a common
problematization of public anxiety and the threat it posed to social order. Identifying this common logic
of security of course is not to reduce these two distinct machineries of governance to the same. Indeed, given the diverse
technologies and practices comprising these machineries of security governance this protective logic of security was in actuality
enacted in quite diverse ways both within and across these assemblages. By focusing on the distinct ways in which this protective
logic was differentially enacted by social insurance and civil defence machineries this chapter locates the composition of a
line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 9—15: Deleuze. 1992) leading to the emergence a novel approach to the
government of anxiety and, ultimately, the origins of resilience.
In contrast to conventional resilience narratives which place the discovery of resilience in the 1970s, this chapter traces
origins of resilience to critiques of the protective logic of security enacted by post-war social
liberal security initiatives. This critique is traced to concerns surrounding the potentially demoralizing effects of social
insurance in debates leading up to the constitution of the British welfare state. Next, we show how this critique of protection was
mobilized in the wake of the Strath report, which demonstrated to policy-makers the genocidal potential of a thermonuclear attack
on Britain. to redirect investment from protectionist policies of civil defence, to "active defence" policies rooted in the idea of
deterrence. Rather than seeking to placate public fears, a policy of active defence required the development of new techniques of
security governance which would mobilize anxieties to encourage preparedness and maintain support for deterrence policies.
Eclipsing a security project rooted in the manufacture of a stoic citizenry, governmental techniques would
increasingly aim at the production of subjects acclimatized to dangerous worlds, confident in
their ability to overcome the risks they faced — even if those included thermonuclear war.
Freedom from fear: social insurance and the British welfare state
Of the diverse mechanisms comprising the welfare state social insurance has been recognized as
its quintessential technology (Dean, 2010; Ewald, 1986, 1991; O’Malley, 2004; Rose, 1996a). By spreading risks
across every member of the nation, social insurance permitted the contingencies inherent to
liberal capitalist societies to be managed without requiring a wholesale reform of the
economic and political order . In doing so, social insurance did more than just free citizens from the Great Evils of
want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness which stood in the way of 'social progress' (Beveridge, 1942: 6). Social insurance
sought to free liberal subjects from the fear of the future. Social insurance thus enacted a social
form of security: reinforcing the social bonds of the nation while simultaneously working to
manage both the risks and the fears which threatened their dissolution . In order to better
understand the role or technologies of government in promoting this notion of social security it is useful to draw on the analyses of
insurance conducted within governmentality literatures before moving on to examine the social and political context which gave
British social insurance its particular form.
Ewald (1991) describes insurance as an abstract technology which operates in relation to a calculative
rationality of risk. Risk, for Ewald, is not an objective condition (cf. Beck, 1992). It is a mode of rationalizing
uncertainty, a way of ordering reality, representing events and understanding dangers which makes them amenable to governance.
Of course, the ways in which risks are conceptualized and addressed vary markedly within and across different fields. Compare, for
example. the risks dealt with by social workers, epidemiologists and insurers (Dean, 2010: 217—27), It is therefore imperative that
risk be analysed in relation to the varied governmental techniques and political projects which invoke it in order to shape the
conduct of individuals and populations.
Risks are rendered calculable through actuarial sciences which 'produce' (Dean, 2010: 213) risks by
extrapolating the regularity of past instances of an event into the future to form probabilities of
its reoccurrence. With insurance, risk can then operate as 'a capital against whose loss the insurer offers a guarantee' (Ewald,
1991: 204). What is offered by insurance does not, and cannot, equal the loss suffered - indeed the loss of a limb, or a life, would be
incalculable (Ewald, 1991: 204). Rather, what is remunerated is an amount which has been contractually agreed upon with the
insurer to be paid out should a particular event materialize. For example. while the cost of an industrial accident to the individual is
itself incalculable, insurance ensures that one need not worry that the loss of one's ability to earn a
wage resulting from such an accident cascades into the bankruptcy of one's family. While
insurance cannot therefore protect one from harm, it can help to mitigate the financial
implications arising from an event's occurrence . It can ensure a degree of financial
stability in an uncertain world . Insurance thus provides the policy holder with a form of
'reparational security' which mitigates financial exposure to a pre-specified event in order to ensure the
continuation of a particular lifestyle (Lobo-Guerrero, 201 1: 6, 911. For this reason, the security referent of
insurance technology is not the material body but a way of life (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011).
The financial security provided by insurance has ethical consequences. As a moral technology (Ewald, 1991: 207) insurance
helps to shape particular behaviours and subjectivities. Insurance provides a way of managing an uncertain
future. Through the purchase of insurance, subjects are compelled to understand their lives in an enterprising manner. They are
encouraged to adopt a disposition to the future that is both rational and calculative (Ewald, 1991: 207). This in turn imposes a
number of moral obligations on subjects with regards to their personal, familial and social responsibilities. The insurance industry
has long capitalized on invoking the responsibility of the policy owner for the well-being of their dependants to sell products such as
life insurance.
Purchasing insurance (the industry tells us) means no longer having to worry about the future. "Insurance…liberates man from fear"
(Ewald, 1991: 208):
One of the first and most salutary effects of insurance is to eliminate from human affairs the fear that paralyses all activity and
numbs the soul. Seneca says somewhere Rex est quit metuit nihil: he who fears nothing is a king. Delivered from fear, man is king of
creation: he can dare to venture; the ocean itself obeys him, and he entrusts his fortune to it.
(Chauffon as quoted in Ewald. 1991: 208)
Ewald thus refers to insurance as a 'liberator of action' (Ewald, 1991: 208). By immunizing the subject from the negative financial
implications of an event, insurance may encourage risk-taking and enable risky lifestyles. The disinhibition produced by insurance
has obvious advantages for the entrepreneur. Citing a passage from Gros, Ewald draws an affinity between the effects produced by
insurance and those of religion:
The global sense of security produced by our already fragmentary existing forms of insurance, and still more by its integral forms yet
to come, is like a transposition on to the earthly plane of the religious faith that inspires the believer. (Gros as quoted in Ewald, 1991:
As an abstract technology, the
spread of insurance is dependent on the extension of an ‘ insurantial
imaginary’: "that is to say, on the ways in which, in a given social context, profitable, useful and necessary uses can be found
for insurance technology" (Ewald, 1991: 198). In contrast to the spread of private insurance, which rests on the ability of insurers to
actualize the abstract technology in innovative ways in order to render insurable. and thus profitable, new forms of risk, the
advent of social insurance, according to Ewald, represented 'the realization of a new form of
insurance, linked to the development of an insurantial imaginary which in this case is also a
political imaginary’ (Ewald. 1991: 198). In order to account for the specific ‘insurantial form’ (Ewald 1991: 198) which social
insurance took in Britain, it is therefore necessary to further inquire into the particular social and political context in which the
abstract technology of insurance was actualized.
In the UK, the evolution of social insurance was shaped to a considerable extent by the social and political environment of the Poor
Laws. By the end of the nineteenth century, the deterrent and moralizing discipline of the Poor Laws was increasingly perceived as
inadequate in addressing the various 'social' problems afflicting Britain's urban labouring classes such as disease, suicide, cyclical
unemployment and the working conditions of many industries. Nikolas Rose explains that 'the social' emerged as an 'invention of
the late nineteenth century that both sociology and welfare government constituted as their object and target' (Rose, 1996b: 56). The
social is not synonymous with society (Donzelo, 1979: xxvii). Rather it 'refers to a particular sector in which quite diverse problems
and special cases can be grouped together, a sector comprising specific institutions and an entire body of qualified personnel'
(Deleuze, 1979: ix). In Britain, empirical investigations spawned by the new Poor Law helped to gradually dissociate a distinctly
'social' domain from political and economic issues in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Poovey, 1995:8—13). In particular, the
application of statistical sciences to the 'avalanche' of information generated from institutions including workhouses, prisons and
hospitals. was instrumental in giving the sense that regularities existed in the appearance of events associated with social problems
such as reproduction, disease and mortality (Foucault, 2003, 2007; Hacking, 1982, 1990, 1991). By the late nineteenth century,
contingencies such as accidents, illness, unemployment and even death were increasingly seen as properties of statistical
distribution rather than negligence (Hacking, 1990). The gradual consolidation of a distinctly social domain gave rise to a vision of
society increasingly understood as a phenomenon displaying laws of statistical regularity. In turn, a variety of personal and
economic problems formerly subject 'to the hazards of struggle, charitable practices and repression' (Donzelot, 1979: 81) would be
redefined as social risks.
Social insurance arises from the application of the abstract technology of insurance to social
risks (Ewald, 1986. 1991). With the Beveridge report, social insurance would be mobilized as the principal means for combating the
'Giant Evils' of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness which stood in the way of the 'Road to Reconstruction' and 'social
progress' more generally (Beveridge, 1942: 6). The Beveridge report sought to review, integrate and extend across the entire social
body a number or pre-existing insurance schemes which had arisen in piecemeal fashion from the turn of the century, including
those already operating in the fields of old age pensions (1908), health (1912) and unemployment (1920). Its success rested on the
ability to portray poverty in a manner consistent with the rationality of insurance Drawing on a 'diagnosis of want' advanced
by inter-war social surveys (Beveridge. 1942: 8), Beveridge would portray
a variety of events including sickness,
unemployment, accident, retirement and death as risks which threatened the interruption or
loss of earning power (Beveridge, 1942: 120). In construing these problems as social risks, as opposed
to , say, problems endemic to the structure of capitalism , the Beveridge report encouraged the
application of insurantial technologies while side-lining more ambitious calls for a
restructuring of society itself . Social insurance would translate the 'abstract technology of
insurance' into a comprehensive political programme which would cover all the major risks and pay benefits at a
subsistence level as a benefit of national citizenship.
For Foucauldian analysts, social insurance was thus not only a response to the emergency of the social,
but a technology of solidarity (Ewald, 1986, 1991: 209-10). Rose explains:
It incarnates social solidarity in collectivizing the management of the individual and dangers
posed by the economic riskiness of a capricious system of wage labour, and the
corporeal riskiness of a body subject to sickness and injury, under the stewardship of a 'social'
State. And it enjoins solidarity in that the security of the individual across the vicissitudes of a life history is guaranteed by a
mechanism that operates on the basis of what individuals and their families are thought to share by virtue of their common sociality,
Social insurance thus establishes new connections and association between 'public' norms and procedures and the fate of individuals
in their 'private' economic and personal conduct. (Rose, 1996b: 48)

Mobilizing security around insurance and social cohesion enables a global regime
of violence---surplus populations are simultaneously encouraged to be self-reliant
in the face of instability and treated as threats to the Western social order
Mark Duffield 7, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre,
University of Bristol, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of
Peoples, 2007, pp. 184-188
This chapter is concerned with development as a technology of containment associated with the
division of the global population into insured and non-insured life at the time of
decolonization, and especially the permanent crisis of containment arising from the moral,
political and practical impossibility of maintaining this division. The opposite of containment is
the unsecured circulation of surplus population that external poverty, instability and associated
social breakdown continually threaten. As a supreme technology of containment, the new or culturally coded
racism that shapes development discourse is examined. During decolonization an early success of this racism was to
place the immigrant within a zone of exception excluded from normal society. At the same time, development became a
series of compensatory state-led technologies that divided into interconnected domestic and
overseas sites or variants. The former is associated with a state-encouraged race relations industry based on identity,
entitlement and integration, while the latter is denoted by the emergence of development as a contemporary interstate relationship.
The policing of global circulation brings together the search for internal harmony and the quest for external homeostasis within an
episodic international security architecture. At each crisis of containment, the biopolitical linkages between these sites and
technologies multiply and thicken. The governmentalization of the aid industry and the shift to a post-interventionary terrain of
contingent sovereignty, for example, interconnects with the abandonment of multiculturalism in favour of more collective forms of
national identity and social cohesion. The threat from ungoverned space is now an internal as well as an external problem. In
attempting to think across the national–international divide, this chapter begins by examining the blurring of these categories
within political imagination.
The collapse of the national–international dichotomy
The end of the Cold War heralded two interconnected revolutions in international affairs. With the weakening of former restrictions,
including respect for non-interference, the first was the ability of the UN, donor governments and aid agencies to intervene in
ongoing and unresolved internal conflicts. This allowed a step change in all forms of humanitarian, development and peace activism,
which, together with its increasing militarization, has contributed to a significant decline in formal civil conflicts within the erstwhile
Third World (HSC 2005). While political instability and insecurity are still rife, this process of pacification has produced a new
political space of contingent sovereignty; while respect for territorial integrity remains, sovereignty over life within ineffective states
is now internationalized, negotiable and conditional. Continent sovereignty, however, is closely associated with another revolution,
that is, the collapse of the traditional national–international dichotomy within political imagination. The French sociologist Didier
Bigo has commented that many students of crime, conflict and international relations have, for some time, been struck by how the
institutions of the police and military, once thought of as belonging to the separate domains of ‘national’ and ‘international’
security respectively, ‘now appear
to be converging regarding border, order and the possible threats to
identity, linked to (im)migration’ (Bigo 2001: 91). Moreover, this perception of the merging of internal and external
security was being driven by practitioners and politicians rather than ‘a cross-fertilisation from the literature’ (ibid.). As if on cue, in
addressing the UK Labour Party’s annual conference following the events of 9/11, Tony Blair outlined his now often quoted view of a
new and radically interdependent world.
Today the threat is chaos, because for people with work to do, family life to balance, mortgages to pay, careers to further,
pensions to provide, the yearning is for order and stability and if it doesn’t exist elsewhere, it is unlikely to exist here. I have long
believed this interdependence defines the new world we live in (Blair 2001).
This does not mean that in the past the national and international were somehow unconnected. As suggested by successive
epochs of world exploration, trade, conquest and war, the national and the international have
for centuries been closely interwoven within the narrative of modernity. Indeed, in all these historic
phases of the national/international, one finds ‘a temporal bracketing that crucially coincides with fundamental politico-legal
changes in the West itself’ (Hussain 2003: 23). However, when threats to the territorial nationstate were security’s primary concern,
the home/foreign distinction played an essential role in the art of government. It helped to mobilize national armies against those of
other nations. As the above quote suggests, however, international security is now experienced differently. In a globalized
world, international instability menaces society more than it does the state. It undermines the
dependability of jobs, careers and livelihoods; it weakens financial stability and savings and pensions; it threatens
the ability of people to raise families and secure their futures; and it jeopardizes energy supplies, mass transport systems, centralized
food chains, and just-in-time commodity flows. Such threats are biopolitical in nature since they impact upon the collective
existence of population. They are, in short, threats to the West’s way of life. Moreover, these dangers do not
emanate from enemy states as such. Apart from the occasional rogue regime, states now figure more
frequently as the facilitators, conduits or ineffectual hosts of opposing or contrary ways of
life . Rather than opposing armies on a battlefield, unending war fields oppose ways of life on the
radically interconnected terrain of global society .
The post-Cold War pacification of the global borderland has revealed that ending internal wars within ineffective states is relatively
easy. Winning the post-interventionary peace among the world of peoples, however, is more difficult. The danger is no longer the
early 1990s fear of uncontrollable local scarcity wars (Kaplan 1994); today the concern is over low-intensity but
generalized political instability that threatens mass society’s radically interconnected global way
of life (Strategy Unit 2005). The interlinkage of homeland and borderland populations through the dynamics of global circulation
has moved questions of the integration or non-integration of peoples, regions, religions, cultures, generations and genders into the
political foreground (Denham 2001). At the time of writing, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has rekindled and already
claimed the lives of a number of British soldiers. Reflecting today’s radical interdependence, however, the first British casualties in
this long war were not from the British Army. They were five London Muslims killed in October 2001 fighting for the Taliban (Harris
et al. 2001). State-led technologies of development and security now interconnect mass society’s
internal anthropological frontier built around notions of equality, entitlement and identity,
with an external frontier located within the individual psyches, gendered subjectivities,
households and self-reliant communities that inhabit zones of crisis . While conditions differ greatly,
within both of these frontier zones the key issue is social cohesion and the developmental need to reconcile the necessity of order
with the inevitability of progress. The emergent security architecture linking the two is planetary in ambition.
Or at least, it
predicates the security of the homeland on the stability of a post-interventionary
borderland. The national and international have always been interconnected. However, what is happening in, say, the
backstreets of Bradford and the alleyways of Islamabad now assumes a new significance. Looking for connections has historically
been the task of the police and intelligence services. Today, however, with the collapse of the national–international dichotomy in
political imagination they come together as parts of the same developmental challenge. Defending the West’s way of life
is dependent on promoting social cohesion within the homeland as well as the
The internal and external frontiers of this security architecture are radically interconnected through the flows and spaces of global
circulation, which itself creates a need to police its dynamics, that is, allowing the ‘good’ circulation on which globalized markets
depend – such as investment, commodity flows, information, patent rights, technology, skilled migration and tourism – while
preventing the ‘bad’ circulation that poses a risk to national and international stability: non-insured
migrants , refugees and asylum seekers, together with the shadow economies, money
laundering, drugs, international crime, trafficking and terrorism associated with ineffective states and zones
of crisis. The development of computers and information technologies, the digitalization of the flows and
spaces of circulation, new modes of surveillance and data mining all promise ever more
comprehensive and intimate ways in which movement can be monitored and policed (I-CAMS 2005). It
has already been argued that development offers a liberal alternative to the extermination or eugenic manipulation of surplus
population. The scope of the challenge facing development is suggested by claims from political economy that most of the
people living on the margins of global society, that is, outside the greater North American, west European and east
Asian economic blocs, are now ‘structurally irrelevant’ to the process of capitalist
accumulation (Castells 1998: 75–82). Their only relevance is political: an excess freedom to move,
flow and circulate thus potentially destabilizing international society’s finely balanced and globally interconnected way of life.
While the differences between the United States’ militarized approach to unending war and the more developmental European
stance is often flagged (Kagan 2003; Coker 2003), they are united in terms of the need to protect mass consumer society from
transborder, non-state asymmetric threats (compare Bush 2002 and Solana 2003). In examining the origins of the NGO movement,
chapter 2 outlined the way in which decolonization allowed the re-expansion of international trusteeship
based on the non-governmental promotion of community self-reliance . Development
as self-reliance, however, exists in relation to a double exception. The expansion of the NGO movement was
premised on the condition of permanent emergency in which self-reliance exists. It was this state of
exception that called forth the necessity of a developmental trusteeship over non-
insured peoples . As well as providing a developmental opportunity, however, permanent emergency also
encourages social breakdown, displacement and the circulation of surplus population. In terms of
achieving security over life, this double exception constitutes decolonization as both an opportunity and a
threat , that is, as an occasion for the consolidating effects of development and, at the same time, as a need
for the globalizing reach of security .
Previous chapters have analysed the post-Cold War governmentalization of the aid industry and the emergence of post-
interventionary society. This chapter provides a greater appreciation of how this deepening external biopolitical
frontier is bracketed together with an internal one . Moreover, within the international architecture of
unending war, development as a state-led technology of security now interconnects the two . Since
threats to the West’s way of life now stem from contrasting and contrary ways of life, it is essential that the place of racism within
liberalism and development is considered. Using Foucault’s work on state racism as a point of departure, the shift from a biological
to a culturally coded racism during the struggle for independence is examined, before the way in which the policing of immigration
links to compensating technologies of internal and external development is considered.

Vote negative to problematize the limits of political community

Vivienne Jabri 13, Professor of International Politics in the Department of War Studies, King's
College London, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming politics/governing others in late
modernity, 2013, pp. 61-62
When the lens is placed on the limits of political community, the focus is not simply on how
these limits are constructed historically, but also on their power to reconstitute the
subject of politics . It is in this sense that the ‘international’ matters to the postcolonial subject, as we will see later in this
book, for the international, while certainly of the modern colonial order, is at the same time (and aporetically) constitutive of the
postcolonial subject. However, it is this very aporia that confers the potential of an authorial voice for the postcolonial subject, as we
will see in the next chapter.
In rendering the limits of political community the subject of international political theory, the
interesting question to ask is wherein lies agency in relation to the drawing and re-drawing of
such limits. A juridical approach to this question focuses on sovereign authority, while a historical-sociological approach
relocates the lens to practices of government and specifically the government of populations and their classification and
distribution.4 Both renditions of this Foucaultian-inspired distinction understand the capacity, or indeed
agency, to draw and redraw the limits of political community on the side of power. As we will see
below, another option we have in discerning or seeking out the agency to draw the limits of political community is to
relocate the lens towards the subject of politics, the subject who claims the right to politics.
The question of limits is not only of significance in the history of the postcolonial world, but is of particular salience
now in late modernity, when inside/outside distinctions can no longer be associated with the
boundaries of the state, but are manifest in corporeal terms, both in relation to the individual self
and in relation to populations. While the juridical rendition on the limits of political community is and continues to be a
defining factor in the constitution of the postcolonial subject, it is the ‘government’ of the postcolonial subject
and their capacity to draw and redraw the limits of political community that is core to any
critical discourse on the postcolonial international. It is in the context of these practices of government that the claim to
the right to politics must be understood.
The motivating force of events brings into sharp focus the seductions of the empirical domain, and especially when these concern
resistance and mass protest. How do we capture this moment in a discipline whose historic remit is defined in terms of the state,
international order, and material capabilities? This neo-realist rendition of the international has, of course, been long questioned
and indeed discredited, variously by constructivists, feminists, postcolonial, critical, and poststructural theorists. These latter
perspectives have rendered the international a political as well as a social domain, so that ‘people’, to borrow from Christine
Sylvester (1994), are as much part of the picture as states and institutional arrangements. However, the
problem has
never simply been one of ‘peopling’ international relations, nor simply one of adding non-
state actors to the so-called pluralist mix so that the relationships purportedly within the scientific
purview of the discipline are not confined to one set of relations defining the inter-state system. The
problem, rather, is one of interrogating the very limits of political community , how these
limits are historically defined, pre-determined, naturalised, and ultimately complicit in the
practices and discourses of inclusion and exclusion .
The aff didn’t specify the details of implementation---key to neg ground and
effective topic debating
Kelsey Snell 16, covers Congress with a focus on budget and fiscal issues for the Washington
Post. Jim Tankersley covers economic policy for The Post. 3/15/16, “The many mysteries
surrounding Bernie Sanders’s single-payer health care plan”
Bernie Sanders’ health care revolution would come with a lot of question marks.
Sanders has staked his campaign for president on a platform of converting the U.S. health care system into a $14
trillion single-payer program run by the government. His opponent for the Democratic nomination, Hillary
Clinton, has criticized the cost and the political feasibility of his plan, but Sanders makes it sound simple: If Europe can do it, so
can we.
Experts say it’s not so simple, in part because no large free-market country, not in Europe or even
Canada, has ever tried what Sanders is proposing — to socialize an industry that accounts for nearly one-
fifth of the national economy.
“It is not just a problem of the politics,” said Sherry Glied, dean of the Wagner School of Public Service at New York University.
“ The devil truly is in the details in designing single payer – you have to define what you
are going to give up, the trade offs, and once you do that [single payer] isn’t a simple elegant
thing anymore.”
Experts say Sanders’ plan might decimate the health-insurance industry and force hundreds of thousands of Americans to find new
jobs, or it might simply force insurers and their employees to cater more to the rich. It might bust the federal budget
and stall economic growth, or it might supercharge the economy. It might give Americans the
best, most affordable health care in the world, or it might sentence them to long waits,
substandard care and a system that works much better for the wealthy than everyone else.
The plan’s likely effects on the federal budget are just as murky. Analysts at the Congressional Budget Office
started but never released an estimate in 2009 when Democrats were pushing for a single payer option to be considered alongside
the Affordable Care Act. The details of that report are confidential, but it is generally very hard to know with any certainty what a
policy upheaval like socializing health care would actually do to the government’s bottom line, said former CBO director Doug
Sanders voted for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but he criticizes the law for continuing to leave millions of Americans without
health coverage.
“There is only one way that I know of that you can provide universal, cost effective and comprehensive health care for all of our
people,” Sanders said in 2009 while ACA was being debated in the Senate. “That is a Medicare for all single-payer system.”
Sanders has not yet offered key details about what such a system would look like if he were to
enact it, such as how much it would pay doctors and what treatments would be
covered. Those details could all significantly change how people use health insurance and
how much it would cost the government.
The lack of detail makes it very difficult to estimate how his plan would change the economy. So
does the lack of any comparable historical precedent for what he is proposing.
The United States federal government should establish all-payer rate-setting,
including global budgeting and administered by an independent, bipartisan
federal commission, for basic services in the United States.

Solves health care costs and lowers premiums

David Dayen 17, contributor to The Intercept and also writes for Salon, the Fiscal Times, the
New Republic, and more, “Single Payer, Meet All Payer: The Surprising State That is Quietly
Revolutionizing Health Care,” 7/24/17,
MARYLAND IS THE only state in America where all hospitals must charge the same rate for services to
patients, regardless of what insurance they carry. There’s some variance between hospitals, but every patient in a
particular hospital pays the same. Other states experience huge, seemingly random differences in hospital costs, depending on the
insurer (or lack thereof).
Maryland’s Health Services Cost Review Commission has set hospital reimbursement rates for over 40
years. The state obtained a federal waiver to include Medicaid and Medicare in its all-payer system, with the goal of keeping cost
increases below Medicare growth. And it’s worked, creating the lowest rate of growth in hospital costs in
In 2014, to prevent hospitals from making up profit margins through volume, Maryland tweaked the
system, adding global budgeting . “The traditional way it worked, every hospital got a rate card,” said Joshua Sharfstein,
an associate dean at Johns Hopkins’s Bloomberg School of Public Health, and a former head of Maryland’s Health Department.
“Now you get a number, which is the total revenue for the year.”
this creates hospital incentives
Because the global budget doesn’t change based on the number of admissions,
toward better outcomes . “It makes the health system focused on keeping people healthy
rather than just treating illnesses,” said Vincent DeMarco, president of the Maryland Citizen’s Health Initiative, a state
advocacy group. That includes increased preventive treatment, using case managers to connect patients to primary care, eliminating
unnecessary tests, and encouraging good health outside the hospital walls.
Three years into global budgeting, the state is “meeting or exceeding” its goals, according to a January
Health Affairs study. Hospital revenue growth is well below counterparts nationwide, or the growth of
Maryland’s economy. Plus, state hospitals have saved $429 million for Medicare, more in three years than it
targeted for five. Most important, every state hospital (all of which are nonprofit) and every insurer in Maryland are on board with
the system.
If a centralized rate-setter bands every insurer together to negotiate prices, all payer can
functionally act like single payer in terms of bringing down costs. All payer reduces
hospital and insurer overhead, since billing costs are known in advance. And because the
Affordable Care Act caps the amounts insurers can take in as profits, lower hospital costs should flow back to the
individual in the form of smaller premiums .
This is why five countries — France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and The Netherlands — use all-payer rate setting
as the basis for their universal health care systems. These countries have been found to control costs far better
than America’s fragmented system.
The system only applies to hospital payments, not primary care doctors or clinicians. However, last year Maryland submitted a
“progression plan” to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, with the goal of expanding the system by January 2019. That
would line up with the swearing in of Maryland’s next governor.
Other states have looked to Maryland as a model. Pennsylvania has adopted global budgeting for rural hospitals. And in the wake of
its single-payer failure, Vermont moved to an all-payer accountable care organization, where providers are paid based on health
outcomes for the population. “In
some ways it’s more radical [than single payer] if you’re able to
get the incentives right,” said Joshua Sharfstein. But the true test of Maryland-style all payer is whether it can support
universal coverage for every resident.
States CP

The fifty states and relevant subnational territories of the United States should
ensure establishment of single payer health insurance programs in the United

States solve
PPG 8/5, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial board, 8/5/17, "Healthy devolution: For the next
round of health care reform, look to states,"
The conservative principle of federalism and the liberal cause of a single-payer option could, for example, be combined.
Both sides understand that the source of ballooning health care costs lies in the system’s vast
complexity, which makes government and insurance companies alike unaccountable in
keeping costs under control . Liberals recognize that simplifying the health insurance
market on free enterprise principles would make insurance utterly unaffordable or simply inaccessible for
millions of Americans. But conservatives fear that a health care service based in Washington would be
too far removed from patient needs . They also bridle against the rationing and wait
times such a system would require to control costs and equalize access. Canadians in need of a hip or knee
replacement wait an average of six months for the procedure. With a much larger population
than Canada — or any of the other countries with single-payer health care and comparable governments —
America under an equivalent system could see substantially worse waiting periods.
But such a system need not be administered from Washington —
a state could do it .
This is where conservatives
and liberals could find common cause: having states create their own
systems . The reason Massachusetts’ and Vermont’s experiments in state-provided health care
failed is that they were basically state-sized Medicaid programs added on top of the
existing Byzantine structure .
Conservatives have good reason to believe the health care systems of Europe and the Pacific Rim
would translate poorly to our much larger democracy and its history of individualism. But they are
wrong to deny the relative success of the universal model in those countries. Rather than
simply copying and pasting that model, consider an adaptation . Government health care
administration could be steered toward the states , building on the American traditions of federalism and choice.
With Congress often paralyzed by partisan conflict, states and cities are taking more
matters into their own hands , in any event.
Midterms DA

Democratic wave now in the midterms motivated by anger over healthcare---the

plan saves the GOP and prevents historic Democratic gains
Bruce Reed 17, the former chief of staff to Vice President Joe Biden, and the former CEO of the
Democratic Leadership Council; and Rahm Emmanuel, neoliberal sellout, 6/20/17, “How the
Democrats Can Take Back Congress,”
Donald Trump is a historically unpopular president, and Republicans in Congress are pushing through a
remarkably unpopular agenda . Under such auspicious circumstances, it’s only natural for ardent
Democrats to feel energized and empowered. Some see 2018 as their own Tea Party moment to sweep even the
bluest of candidates to victory in the reddest of districts. It looks like an election Democrats can’t lose —
the sort Americans haven’t seen since, well, last year.
So how can Democrats ensure that 2018 delivers the success they failed to achieve in 2016? The
stakes are too high to rely entirely on one side’s enthusiasm or the other side’s disenchantment. If their overriding
objective in 2018 is to save the country, not realign the Democratic Party, Democrats need to look back to the last time they won
back the House in 2006. We helped coordinate that effort, and the lessons we learned then still apply today. Waves don’t
happen on their own: Democrats need a strategy, an argument , and a plan for what they’ll do if they win.
In the last 60 years, control of the U.S. House of Representatives has changed hands just three times,
always in midterm elections, with control shifting away from the president’s party. The 1994
and 2010 campaigns were dominated by attacks against the incumbent president and his
party over health care; 2006 became a referendum over the ruling party’s incompetence and
corruption. In percentage terms, the worst midterm defeat in the past century came in 1974, when a nation weary of obstruction of
justice sent a quarter of the House Republican caucus packing. Some presidents are unfortunate enough to face one of these
circumstances; with the midterms still more than a year away, Donald Trump already seems to have all those
bases covered .
Opposition parties, by contrast, find the odds forever in their favor. In the last 20 midterm elections, the president’s party has picked
up seats only twice: in 2002, when Republicans gained eight right after 9/11, and in 1998, when Democrats gained five thanks to
House Republicans’ obsession with impeachment.
Trump and his party have particular reason to fear a reckoning in 2018. No first-term president
has gone into a midterm this unpopular since Harry Truman lost 55 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate
in 1946. Like Democrats in 1994 and 2010, Republicans in 2018 face a firestorm over health
care . If Hurricane Katrina, Iraq, and the Jack Abramoff scandal dogged congressional Republicans in 2006, Trump is already
torturing them with incompetence and corruption of unprecedented scale. Add potential electoral devastation to the list of Trump
mistakes Republicans can’t prevent. Donald Trump came to Washington to make waves—and he may deliver a wave
election powerful enough to sweep his party out of control of Congress.
Democrats enter the cycle with a distinct advantage. For campaigners in chief, the toughest race to win is when they’re the name in
voters’ sights but not the name on the ballot. Trump will be an exceptional liability on the campaign trail—
determined to redeem himself , desperate for validation from his base, and toxic to every candidate in
a marginal race. Trump presents vulnerable Republicans with a no-win proposition: They can’t run with him and their
Democratic opponents won’t let them run without him. The last thing a majority of voters want is to give this president a blank
check—or as Trump prefers to call it, loyalty.
So Democrats don’t need to spend the next year navel-gazing over how to motivate their base. In 2018, Trump will provide the
greatest fundraising and get-out-the-vote machine the party has ever had. Wave elections are a chance to build on
that base by winning back voters disappointed in the other side. Democrats will have
plenty of disappointments to bring to their attention, including Republican health-
care and tax-cut plans that betray the working-class voters who put Trump in
the White House .
To pull that off, though, Democrats must channel their anger, not be defined by it. In 1994, Gingrich Republicans used an alternative
agenda, the Contract with America, to take back the House for the first time in 40 years. In 1998, those same Gingrich Republicans
played to their conservative base by campaigning for impeachment, producing another historic result: making Bill Clinton the first
president in 176 years to gain House seats in the sixth year of his presidency. Democrats should heed that same lesson. They don’t
have to make 2018 a referendum on Trump’s impeachment. If they want to win the majority they need in order to hold Trump
accountable, they’ll do much better making the election a referendum on Trump’s record.
That referendum will be won or lost in swing districts —and they are much harder to find than they used to be.
The Cook Political Report found that the number of swing seats—where neither party runs more than 5 points better than it does
nationally—has dropped by more than half over the last 20 years, from 164 to 72. The most vulnerable seats in the
current House majority belong to 23 Republican incumbents in districts Hillary Clinton carried,
largely clustered in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington. These districts
tend to be mainstream in tone and interest. That’s a tough place to win the hand Trump has
dealt Republicans of cutting student aid, denying climate change, and eliminating protections for pre-
existing conditions .

Filibuster-proof majority’s the only way for the GOP to reverse net neutrality
Kyle Daly 17, Bloomberg writer, 2/13/17, “GOP Lawmakers Leave Net Neutrality to FCC to
Pressure Dems,”
For now, leading Democrats are digging in against potential changes to the net neutrality
Sen. Edward Markey, D-Mass., promised a “political firestorm” if the FCC or Congress make any
attempt to loosen net neutrality rules. Markey and four other Senate Democrats opposed to net
neutrality rule changes spoke at a Feb. 7 news conference. Senate Minority Leader Charles E.
Schumer (D-N.Y.) issued a supportive statement promising that “any attempt to roll back this
rule and its protections would be foolish and will be met with fierce resistance by Senate
Republicans, who currently control 52 Senate seats, eventually will need a filibuster-proof
60-vote majority in the Senate for a net neutrality bill, and that means they’ll need to get
some Democratic buy-in. Schumer’s stance against changing the rules makes it unlikely that
would happen any time soon.

That kills the open internet

Kevin Collier 1-25, Senior privacy and security reporter, Vocativ, 1/25/17, “The U.S. Without
Net Neutrality: How An Internet Nightmare Unfolds,”
Picture this: It’s six months into the great Comcast-Verizon War of 2018. A buddy texts you how insane the third season of
Stranger Things is, but he knows he’s just rubbing it in. You can’t legally watch it, since Netflix sided with Verizon in the conflict, and
your neighborhood only gets Comcast. You try to visit the Wikipedia page to read the summary, and not even that works. Ever since
Congress voted to defang the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), there’s nothing keeping internet
providers in check .
For years, internet
freedom activists have campaigned to keep anything resembling that situation from ever
happening, by championing for the abstract concept of net neutrality , an idea that has always been hard to
explain and usually even harder to get people fired up about.
But under President Trump, the public may finally get a firsthand look at what net neutrality means in practice — because if
Trump administration is able to successfully abolish it, the internet is going to get a lot more
expensive and harder to use .
Net neutrality is the reason internet providers like Comcast or Verizon are required to let their
customers access the entire internet without restriction. To use a famous example, net neutrality doesn’t care if
it takes a lot of bandwidth to stream movies — it can’t use that fact as an excuse to charge either Netflix or their customers more, or
to slow down their internet speeds. Internet providers had for years lobbied against it, but in 2015, to much acclaim from internet
advocates, the FCC enshrined firm net neutrality rules, and in June 2016, solidified them in
court .
Trump’s team hadn’t been explicitly clear about its policies in this area, but it just recently picked fierce net neutrality opponent and
former Verizon lawyer Ajit Pai to chair the FCC, the federal body that oversees Internet regulation.
In addition, both the new president and some of his closest allies have expressed both a strong opposition to net neutrality and a
profound ignorance of what the concept actually means. This includes Congresswoman Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), a vice chair on
Trump’s transition team’s Executive Committee, who received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the telecommunications
industry before introducing a failed bill that would have reversed FCC rules and allowed internet service providers (ISPs) to self-
regulate their customers’ traffic. The Republican Party platform, authored in 2016 while current Trump Chief of Staff Reince Priebus
was chair of the party, strictly condemns net neutrality, describing it as “plans to turn over the Information Freedom Highway to
In what’s believed to be the only time he addressed the subject personally, Trump himself tweeted in 2014 that “Net neutrality is the
fairness doctrine,” a former FCC policy that required TV stations present dissenting views, a comparison that simply doesn’t begin to
make sense.
So what would the internet look like without net neutrality? Internet providers would likely start using it for a business advantage,
said Gigi Sohn, a recently-retired FCC senior official who advised former FCC chairman Tom Wheeler on net neutrality rules.
“They’re in the business to make money,” Sohn told Vocativ. She pointed to CBS CEO Leslie Moonves, who said in February 2016
that Trump’s candidacy “may not be good for America, but it’s damn good for CBS.”
“I mean, they have their own political predilections, but they pray at the altar of money,” Sohn said.
To start, internet providers not burdened by net neutrality could begin by offering deals and
exclusives for their content. Comcast, consistently rated one of the most hated companies in America, is owned by
NBCUniversal. NBC owns streaming rights the Olympics through 2032. Without the FCC’s rules, NBC could choose to only allow
Comcast subscribers unfettered access to the games. People who used Spectrum to get online, for instance, would maybe have to pay
for a special Olympic pass. Or if NBCUniversal wanted to get really nasty, it could bar anyone but Comcast subscribers from viewing
their Olympic stream, period, daring customers of other providers to switch to Comcast.
Streaming video sites could balkanize even further: Hulu might cut an exclusive deal with Comcast while Netflix inked one with
Verizon, meaning no one could get access to both. And if you’re one of those unlucky Americans whose neighborhood is only served
by a single provider? Hope you like whichever service it struck a deal with, because that’s all you’ll be able to legally get.
Internet providers could also squeeze websites , instead of consumers directly. Verizon could start a bidding war
for streaming video services, for instance. Since YouTube is owned by Google and has a lot more money than Vimeo, YouTube could
pay Verizon for faster or even exclusive service. YouTube would have an effective monopoly on streaming video for Verizon
But even then, those costs would eventually be paid by the consumer, according to Matt Wood, the policy director at the nonprofit
tech policy group Free Press.
“No matter who the ISPs hold up for more money, it’s all going to come back to their customers who’ll have to pay more to somebody
in order to gain access to content,” Wood told Vocativ.
A total lack
of net neutrality would enable internet providers to slow down or fully block
access to any site it didn’t like. Most of the internet’s most popular sites are free to access
for anyone who’s got an internet package and don’t mind those sites collecting their personal data. But just because Facebook
and Wikipedia don’t charge you to use those doesn’t mean that an ISP not bound by net neutrality rules would refrain from adding,
for instance, a $5 monthly “convenience fee” to view them.
In theory, a lackof net neutrality could bring true censorship. ISPs in several countries, like
China and Russia, already block politically sensitive sites by government order. In a nightmarish
political scenario where American companies existed in genuine fear of their government, ISPs
could choose to block access to sensitive sites. If Trump’s current feud with NBC escalated to
absurd lengths — and Trump is already able to send a company’s stock into free-fall with a single Tweet — a craven NBC
could block access to , for instance, a Washington Post investigation that revealed improper
Trump business ties .
The good news for consumers is that even though Trump will almost certainly have a majority-Republican
FCC — traditionally, the five-member FCC is made up of three members of the president’s party and two of the opposition —
overturning net neutrality rules is no simple task, especially because a U.S. Court
of Appeals so recently ruled in favor of them .
“They’d have to show to a court that circumstance had changed, within the space of two years, as to warrant the re-reclassification of
broadband to a deregulated information service,” Sohn said. “They can’t just snap their fingers and say ‘ok we’re now deregulating
And while a united Congress and President Trump certainly could pass a law to kill net neutrality if they
agreed to it together, it would likely face enormous public opposition . After a campaign led by
numerous activist groups including the Center For Democracy and Technology, Free Press, and Fight For the Future, and bolstered
by a viral video from John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight, more than four million people wrote in to the FCC when it considered net
neutrality rules in 2014, a number exponentially higher than any prompted by any other issue, including Janet Jackson’s exposed
breast during Super Bowl XXXVIII.
U.S.-driven internet openness is key to overall global interdependence
Ryan David Kiggins 14, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College,
2014, “US Leadership in Cyberspace: Transnational Cyber Security and Global Governance,” in
Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges, p. 169-170
The Open Door holds that US policymakers subscribe to a worldview where the security of the United
States rests on sustained economic and political expansion abroad (Beard 1934; Williams 1959;
also see Bacevich 2002; Layne 2006, 1998). Adas (2006) has shown that US policymakers from the founding of the United
States through the present consistently leverage technology in pursuit of that expansion. Beginning in late
1994 and continuing to the present, US policymakers initiated and sustain a policy to repurpose the Internet as a platform for the
expansion of American products and political ideals (Kiggins 2011). From the view of US policymakers, the social purpose of
the Internet in the post-Cold War era is to serve as a platform for expanding free-market commerce and
free speech, for globally expanding information and economic exchange (Kiggins 2011). To ensure
the Internet is used in accordance with this social purpose, US policymakers have
constructed a discourse around the Internet founded on the principle of openness (Antonova 2008;
McCarthy 2011). US policymakers discursively promote and protect the Internet as an open domain in
order to create global institutional conditions that are favorable for global expansion of
information and economic exchange consistent with the worldview of US policymakers. Castells (1999) has shown how
the Internet assists globalization by linking states in a deepening web of economic
interdependence that characterizes this era of global capitalism shaped by the United States and other
allied advanced industrialized democracies. Evidence of the growing economic import of the Internet
supports the claim that the Internet is an increasingly vital global platform for exchange.
By 2015, total international trade over the Internet, more commonly referred to as global electronic commerce, is projected to be SI
.4 trillion and is expected to continue to grow at a 13.5 % compounded annual growth rate for the foreseeable future (Enright 2011).
Mann and Kierkegaard (2006, 25) estimate that global electronic commerce adds roughly .25 basis points of growth to annual GDP
for industrialized nations. In the case of the United States, that translates to over $400 billion added to US GDP per year. While 53
% of all global electronic commerce transactions occur in the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, developing
countries such as Brazil, China, Russia, and Mexico are projected to experience electronic
commerce growth at an annual rate of 26% for the foreseeable future (Enright 2011). A shift is
underway where global electronic commerce moves from the developed world to the developing
world driven, in part, by successful economic development strategies that are creating consumer classes in
those countries and, in part, by the expansion of mobile telecommunications networks throughout the developing world. More
consumers, on a global scale, plug into cyber space through their new mobile devices such smart phones and tablet computers
reflecting a shift from desktop computing to cloud computing. This shift will deepen interdependence ,
shrinking the distance between private Internet based computing and public Internet based
computing (Castells 1999, 1996). With this shift in computing, global consumption patterns may change, and, with that change
in consumption patterns may come change in global trade, economic production, employment, and political institutions (Ibid.). The
Arab spring could be construed as reflecting these tectonic shifts in the global political economy that are amplified and accelerated
by cyber based and enabled communications technologies. Combined, the Stuxnet virus, the cyber attack on Google and thirty-three
other US enterprises, and the
growing import of the Internet to global trade and information
flows argue against a state-centric framework of cyber security that elides the role that the
Internet plays in deepening linkages among state and non-state actors (Keohane and Nye 2001).

Interdependence prevents great power transition wars, independently of

economic growth
Daniel W. Drezner 16, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, professor of
international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, May
2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,”
Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or
military aggression. Interdependence
can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely
to break out during a great power transition . Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a
ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power
status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the
Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict
that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States
have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce
the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war —from taking place.
Impact d
Economic crises don’t cause war
Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson
Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International
Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015,
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing
behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with
conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step
possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on
data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated , the evidence suggests
rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were
during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative
explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance,
common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This
research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that
in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles .
Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination
I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a
military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry
to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual
recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries
terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.
This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson,
J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In
work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military
threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:
The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military
preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries
take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker
utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3
Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from
1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on
the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5
Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?
Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity
pressures , which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2)
Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment , so that leaders can argue to their peers and their
publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where
elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple
threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization , a process that is postponed
during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic
benefit from international economic cooperation . Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade,
and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are
reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of
resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these
mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic
normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms
recur in practice.

No chance of water wars

Giorgos Kallis 14, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political
ecology, and Professor, Department of Geography and Institute of Environmental Science &
Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, “Hydro-climatic change, conflict and
security,” Climatic Change, Volume 123, 2014, pp. 69-82
This field examines relations between hydro-climatic factors, conflict and adaptation at the national scale (Table 1). Findings suggest
cooperation trumps violent conflict by far , and that acute disputes involving violence are
very limited with the only evidence for a genuinely water war pointing to an event 4,500 year
ago (Wolf 2007). Countries sharing rivers engage more in disputes (Gleditsch et al. 2006) but when
separating the effects of shared border and shared water the significance of the latter is
reduced (Toset et al. 2000). Drought has no influence on disputes but the size of the basin does, suggesting that water
abundance and related economic opportunities (e.g. hydropower) may be causing conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2006).
Institutional arrangements seem to mitigate the
What accounts for this relative lack of hydro-scarcity conflict?
risk of conflict (Tir and Stinnett 2012) depending on the design and efficacy of international water treaties. Countries with
larger shared basins and larger GDP and population differences are more likely to enter a treaty agreement
(Song and Whittington 2004). Compensations and side-payments are a common treaty mechanism in water quality agreements, but
In a climate change context , resilient treaties adopt
not in water quantity ones (Dombrowsky 2007).
portfolio approaches that spread uncertainty risks by including diverse management
arrangements simultaneously in open-ended strategies rather than rigid, codified rules (Drieschova et al.
2011). Also, transboundary water management institutions that are unable to absorb and effectively manage change—which points
to the importance of time given to absorb change – as well as large or rapid changes in a basin’s physical (e.g. dam construction) or
political (e.g. breakup of a nation) setting can be two key conflict-likelihood increasing factors (Wolf 2009).
However, a more critical perspective on institutions and cooperation questions binary distinctions between cooperation and conflict
and problematizes institutional ‘solutions’. The term hydro-hegemony refers to the covert use of power by a State to perpetuate
water-sharing arrangements that while on the surface appear cooperative are in practice inequitable and unreasonable, yet tolerated
and stable as they are not readily challenged (Woodhouse and Zeitoun 2008). Selby (2003) holds that Israelis and their neighbours
do not fight over water; rather the Israeli Administration uses control of scarce water as a tool for subjugating Palestinians.
If water wars are unlikely, then why the media and policy hype? First, water may not be a cause of war yet but
may become in the future due to climate change (De Stefano et al. 2012). Second, wars may not be fought over water, but caused by
consequences of its scarcity, e.g. rising food prices or scarce arable land (Serageldin 2009). Possible wars related to land-grabs are a
case in point. Finally, although unfounded, statements about water wars may persist because some key
actors—policymakers, academics, journalists, and NGO activists—have incentives to exaggerate their
probability (Katz 2011).
3.2 Climate, water and armed conflict
This field uses large-N datasets of countries or regions to examine correlations between
hydroclimatic variability and civil conflict, controlling for socio-economic and political factors. Although under
certain social conditions they might aggravate the risk of conflict, scarcity and climate change are overall not
found to have an important association with armed conflict, especially if compared to poverty and
dysfunctional institutions (Gleditsch 2012).
Lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks are more associated to increased conflict risk in sub-Saharan Africa (Miguel et al.
2004), though the specification of rainfall intervals of the study has been criticised, and the result is not robust to different
specifications (Ciccone 2011). In a similar study, Burke et al. 2009 find that global warming, could increase probabilities of armed
conflict incidence in Africa by 54 % until 2030, but due to temperature increases, not rainfall changes. These results too are sensitive
to the time period and severity threshold used and are not reproducible with alternative specifications (Buhaug 2010). Other studies
Political exclusion of
conclude that climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict (Hendrix and Glaser 2007).
ethnic groups rather than a drought-conflict nexus drives conflict, and this is not influenced by
drought occurrence, suggesting that water may not even be a threat multiplier (Theisen et al. 2011).
General Solvency---1NC
The system will collapse
Sarah Kliff 14, Vox health care writer, “How Vermont's single-payer health care dream fell
apart,” 12/22/14,
About half of countries who attempt to build single-payer systems fail . That’s Harvard health
economist William Hsiao’s estimate after working with about 10 governments in the past two decades. Whether he is in Taiwan,
Cyprus, or Vermont, the process is roughly the same: meet with legislators, draw up a plan, write legislation. Only half of
those bills actually become law. The
part where it collapses is, inevitably, when the country has to
pay for it.
In the United States, the failure rate is even higher . The California legislature has twice passed single-payer
legislation, only to have the bills vetoed by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. There was also a single-payer ballot measure in California
in 1994, but the insurance industry pushed back aggressively against it. And those are relative success stories: activists in Colorado
failed to get enough signatures for a single-payer ballot measure this past November. Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) has introduced
and re-introduced a bill to bring a public plan to the entire country since 2009. It has languished through three consecutive sessions
of Congress.
In a way, the fact that America hasn’t taken serious steps to control health spending makes it
particularly hard for the country to move to a single-payer system in the future. Our health-
care system costs $2.8 trillion annually, about 17.7 percent of the entire economy. This is way more
than any single-payer system anywhere in the world costs. Take Canada, where 11.2 percent of all spending
goes towards medical care.
That's the irony of America's health-care system: its incredible failure to control costs makes change that much harder, because so
many powerful players profit so handsomely from the status quo, and because rearranging the
financing creates so many losers .
Mismanagement and inadequate planning undermines solvency
Michael A. Diamond 9, family medicine doctor in Miami, Florida and is affiliated with multiple
hospitals in the area. 2009. “Con: Single-Payer Health Care Why It's Not the Best Answer”
Single-payer health insurance would also lead to rationing and long waiting times for medical
services. The adverse consequences of waiting for health services in countries with single-payer
insurance are well documented (12, 13). Access to a waiting list for health care does not equate with access to health
care, which is one reason why patients from abroad often prefer to come to the U.S. for treatment. It is unlikely that Americans
would welcome these changes.
The strongest argument against a single-payer system may well be the outcomes in states that
have attempted to expand health care access through the use of government programs and
mandates. TennCare was a widely touted managed-care Medicaid program adopted by Tennessee
in 1994 that was characterized as the solution to providing health insurance to most uncovered
residents while simultaneously controlling costs (14). TennCare's subsequent collapse has been attributed
to mismanagement and unrealistic fiscal planning, a perhaps predictable consequence
of government administration of health care (15). Massachusetts enacted legislation in 2006 that was
intended to move that state to near-universal health care coverage. Indeed, by 2008 some 165,000 more
residents were insured through a combination of employer mandates and government subsidized insurance, and overall, almost 93%
of nonelderly adults had coverage by late 2007 (16). However, because inadequate (or no) provision was made to expand the
provider workforce, many of these patients had no access to care (16), and costs have escalated so far beyond
estimates that additional financial support is required (17).
General Solvency---1NC
Single-payer can’t solve health care costs---even the biggest states can’t make it
Megan McArdle 17, Bloomberg View columnist, “States Where Single-Payer Health Care Could
Work (If It Could Work Anywhere),”
Casual believers in single payer often eyeball European governments, eyeball what the U.S. spends, and conclude that there must be
fabulous cost savings to be had from a single-payer system, making it easily affordable even for states on a tight budget. Folks
actually charged with designing a single-payer system know the truth: single payer will not make health care cheap.
Analyses by single-payer-friendly sources (such as Gerald Friedman of UMass Amherst, and the heavily Democratic California State
Senate) tend to indicate that moving to single payer would involve roughly doubling the budgets of even
high-tax, high-spending states like New York and California. Less friendly sources suggest that the cost might be
substantially higher than that . Unless they find some way to dramatically slash the incomes
of health-care workers (not gonna happen), then single-payer advocates are going to have to persuade
voters to support breathtaking tax increases. It hardly needs pointing out that this will be difficult.
The second thing to say is that New York and California represent absolutely the best possible
scenarios for single payer in this country. If they can’t make it work (and I’m betting they can’t), then single
payer cannot be done in this country--full stop, end of story, print as written .
These states are, obviously, extremely liberal and firmly under the control of the Democratic Party. That is a huge advantage in the
battle for single payer. But it is not the only advantage that they have. New York and California are also, for example, very big. That’s
important for a state looking to move toward single payer. Though not, as you might think, because health care offers economies of
scale (it does, some, but it also offers diseconomies of scale: the bigger your state and population, the more
layers of bureaucracy that will be required to supervise its health-care system, making it more
prone to inefficiencies and fraud ).
Job Lock---General---1NC
No impact to job lock---people who leave won’t create productive businesses, and
the safety net de-motivates entrepreneurship---empirics
Megan Mcardle 10, columnist at Bloomberg View and a former senior editor at The Atlantic.
12/16/10, “Will National Health Care Improve Our Economic Health?”
During the latter half of the debate over the health care bill, you started to hear an intriguing argument about the effects of the bill.
Where conservatives claimed that it would stifle the economy, liberals countered that in fact, it
would unleash the entrepreneurial power of people "locked into" their jobs by fear of losing their
health coverage. David Leonhardt rehearses this argument in his most recent column:
It's easy to look at the current debate and see an unavoidable trade-off between this country's two economic traditions -- risk-taking
and security. But I don't think that's quite right. I think it is ultimately as misplaced as those worries about Social Security and
Medicare equaling Bolshevism.
Guaranteeing people a decent retirement and decent health care does more than smooth out the rough edges of capitalism. Those
guarantees give people the freedom to take risks. If you know that professional failure won't leave you penniless and won't prevent
your child from receiving needed medical care, you can leave the comfort of a large corporation and take a chance on your own idea.
You can take a shot at becoming the next great American entrepreneur.
With every previous major expansion of the safety net, history has had a chance to prove the naysayers wrong. It may yet in the case
of universal health coverage. But the decision now seems to rest with the nine members of the Supreme Court.
This is the sort of argument I am fond of because it's so intuitively counterintuitive--it gives you one of those, "A-ha! Of course!"
moments that are the main pleasure of writing about economics.
But while that a-ha! reaction means a theory is plausible, it doesn't actually mean it's true. And while I think that Leonhardt's
narrative about freedom from fear is certainly one possible outcome of passing health care reform, there are also quite a
few reasons to think that it might not be true. I worked through a bunch of them earlier in the year, and still believe,
as I noted then, that "the number of people who wish to start businesses, but are held back by the
health insurance problem, cannot be zero."
But that is a far cry from saying that on net, creating this new safety net will help spur labor mobility
and entrepreneurship. Creating the safety net imposes costs, as well as benefits. Some of those
costs come in forms that discourage entrepreneurship.
Net cost or net benefit? How do we know?
A lot of self employment is what economists call tax and regulatory arbitrage. In plain words,
companies often employ contractors because the overhead cost is cheaper, since contractors
aren't subject to the same tax and work rules. They can pay the contractors higher hourly rates, because their
overhead is lower.
It's not surprising that people are more willing to be contractors or consultants when they have
access to benefits through another company. But this is not really the same thing as the
entrepreneurship that Leonhardt is describing.
Nonetheless, they tend to get conflated when people are looking for the effect of the safety net.
It's easier to measure "people who are working for themselves" than "people who are starting a
company that will do something new and innovative and improve the economy's net
productivity". Tthe latter number, the one we really care about, is certainly much smaller than the former.
Let's look at another attempt to quantify the problem: net jobs created. Economist Scott Shane
took a crack at calculating the number of people who will start companies that eventually
employ someone else. This is not a perfect proxy for entrepreneurship and dynamism--very small operations can add to an
economy's growth, as I've written elsewhere. But net jobs created is a pretty powerful way to approximate
what Leonhardt is talking about. Here's Shane's math:
Small Business Economy an annual publication of The Office of Advocacy of theSmall Business Administration explains that 60.7
million people have employer-sponsored health insurance from their employment (people covered by their spouses don't matter
here because they don't face job lock). Therefore, 607,000 additional people per year would begin the
entrepreneurial process if we eliminated health insurance job lock.
But not everyone who begins the process of starting a business manages to get one up and
running. In fact, analysis of the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics data by Paul Reynolds
shows that a new business results from about one-third of startup efforts. So we will get about
200,000 new businesses if we can eliminate the job lock that comes from employer-sponsored
health insurance.
This same research shows that only about 19% of new businesses employ someone other than the
founder. Because people who leave jobs to start nonemployer businesses don't generate any
net new jobs, it's the 38,000 additional new employer businesses that would be created if we
eliminated the health insurance job lock that would be the source of any additional jobs.
Data from the Small Business Administration's Web site reveals that the average number of employees in a new
employer firm is 5.6. Therefore, we will create an estimated 213,000 annually if universal health
care eliminates the problem of job lock.
It actually might be slightly smaller than that--people currently covered by their employer might still have access to spousal coverage
if they decided to leave (or so I read the data).
Meanwhile, as Shane points out later, the bill will also cost jobs --Doug Elmendorf, the head of the CBO, has
estimated that PPACA will cause employment to fall by about half a percent, or about 700,000 people. The job losses come from two
sources: the taxes and penalties that make hiring more expensive for a company, and the Medicaid expansion and the subsidies
making it more attractive to leave the workforce altogether.
Knowing that Elmendorf is a very smart and thorough man, I presume that he has already accounted for the positive effects of
PPACA on entrepreneurship. But even if he hasn't, that's a net loss of about half a million jobs.
Of course, maybe we're trading 700,000 terrible jobs for 200,000 awesome ones. That could be a net gain. But to me, we just
don't have a lot of good evidence that generous social safety nets somehow spur labor mobility
or entrepreneurship. For every "just so" story you can tell about health insurance or generous
welfare benefits making someone willing to leave their cushy corporate job in order to risk it all
founding a company, you can tell an equal and opposite "just so" story about someone who
doesn't bother to become an entrepreneur because it's so comfortable there on the dole,
someone discouraged from pursuing a promising idea because taxes reduce the potential payoff
or make it harder to turn a profit, or someone who isn't motivated to work harder because
they're not so worried about security.
Looking at the Big Picture
In fact, probably both effects exist. The prophets of dynamism tend to focus only on the studies that show the benefit side--mostly
studies that show people are more likely to become self-employed if they have access to alternative health insurance, such as a
spouse's insurance, COBRA, or Medicare.
But when we try to look at the net effect, it's hard to see much dynamism coming out of the places
with a generous safety net. Rates of entrepreneurship and labor mobility are far lower in
Europe than they are in America--and one of the many factors restraining European labor
mobility is thought to be the social safety net, both because of the difficulty of moving between
benefit system, and because the benefits lessen the urgency of say, relocating in order to find a
Nor do US states show much of a pattern of dynamism created by generous benefits. Unemployment in Massachusetts after
RomneyCare passed does not drop (or rise) noticeably compared to the rest of the US. High-tax, high-benefit states
New York don't seem to generate a lot of new businesses--in fact, New York routinely ranks last or next to last
on surveys of business climate. Then there are states like California, with high rates of innovation in entertainment and tech--but
even before the state's budget crisis, it was losing manufacturing jobs and experiencing net out-migration to other states. It's hard to
know how to score that one.
And of course, there are other things going on in all these states, so it's not as simple as drawing a straight line from the government
safety net, to the entrepreneurship rate--one way or another.
Nonetheless, I'd say that if the safety net made a significant positive difference, we should see a
clearer pattern than we do in state and national comparisons. Instead, if anything, the pattern points
in the opposite direction. So I'm pretty skeptical that on net, PPACA is going to build us a better economy.
However, unless the Supreme Court strikes it down, we have an excellent test. If the law really makes a different on net, then by late
in this decade, we should see significantly rising rates of entrepreneurship and labor mobility, and at least a slight uptick in trend
productivity growth and GDP. I'll certainly be watching avidly.
Costs Not K2 Econ---1NC
Health care costs aren’t key to the economy
John R. Graham 16, a public-policy analyst, is Director of the Health Technology Forum: DC;
and a Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis. 4/20/16, “The U.S. Health
System Is Not An Economic Burden”
Health spending consumes a higher share of output in the United States than in other countries.
In 2013, it accounted for 17% of Gross Domestic Product. The next highest country was France, where health
spending accounted for 12% of GDP. Critics of U.S. healthcare claim this shows the system is too expensive
and a burden on our economy, demanding even more government intervention. This conclusion is misleading
and leads to poor policy recommendations, according to new research published by the National Center for Policy
Analysis (U.S. Health Spending is Not A Burden on the Economy, NCPA Policy Report No. 383, April 2016).
Discussing health spending in dollars, rather than proportion of GDP, the report notes Americans spent $9,086 per capita on
healthcare in 2013, versus only $6,325 in Switzerland, the runner-up. (These dollar figures are adjusted for purchasing power parity,
which adjusts the exchange rates of currencies for differences in cost of living). This big difference certainly invites us to question
whether we are getting our money’s worth. However, it is not clear that this spending is a burden on
Americans, given our very high national income.
After subtracting health spending from U.S. GDP, we still had $44,049 per capita to spend on all
other goods and services we value. Only two countries, Norway and Switzerland, beat the United
States on this measure. But compared to larger developed countries, Americans have
higher income per capita after subtracting healthcare spending. For example, in the United
Kingdom, GDP per capita after health spending was only $34,863 in 2013. So, even though
Americans spent significantly more on healthcare than the British, the average American
enjoyed $9,185 more GDP after health spending than his British peer; and just under $6,000
more than his Canadian neighbor.
Britain socialized its health system shortly after World War II, completing the work by 1948. Canada’s healthcare was more
gradually socialized by provincial and federal governments during the period 1947 through 1966. Many assert these so-called single-
payer systems relieved the burden of private payment from citizens and made the economy more productive.
On the contrary: Since 1960, the U.S. economy has outperformed all comparable developed countries
except Norway and Switzerland with respect to economic growth, after subtracting health
spending. From 1960 through 2013, the share of U.S. GDP allocated to healthcare more than
tripled. However, this had no impact on the ability of the U.S. economy to deliver
high GDP per capita, outside healthcare . Adjusted for purchasing power parity, U.S. health spending
increased $8,937, while GDP per capita increased $50,269, from 1950 through 2013. Thus, GDP per capita available for other goods
and services, after spending on health care, increased $41,332, or $780 per year.
The plan destroys the economy---cost overruns, and tax hikes
Michael Tanner 17, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. 6/7/17, “Embracing the Hard Realities
of Health-Care Reform”
The utopian fantasy of a single-payer system is attractive to many voters, but it would destroy the
American economy.
It is an old joke among health-policy wonks that what the American people really want from health-care reform is unlimited care,
from the doctor of their choice, with no wait, free of charge. For Republicans, trying to square this circle has led to panic, paralysis,
and half-baked policy proposals such as the Obamacare-replacement bill that passed the House last month. For Democrats, it has
led from simple disasters such as Obamacare itself to a position somewhere between fantasy and delusion.
The latest effort to fix health care with fairy dust comes from California, whose Senate voted last
week to establish a statewide single-payer system. As ambitious as the California legislation is, encompassing
everything from routine checkups to dental and nursing-home care, its authors haven’t yet figured out how it will
be paid for. The plan includes no copays, premiums, or deductibles. Perhaps that’s because the legislature’s own estimates
suggest it would cost at least $400 billion, more than the state’s entire present-day budget. In fairness, legislators hope to recoup
about half that amount from the federal government and the elimination of existing state and local health programs. But even so, the
plan would necessitate a $200 billion tax hike. One suggestion being bandied about is a 15 percent state payroll tax. Ouch.
The cost of California’s plan is right in line with that of other recent single-payer proposals. For example, last fall, Colorado voters
rejected a proposal to establish a single-payer system in that state that was projected to cost more than $64 billion per year by 2028.
Voters apparently took note of the fact that, even after figuring in savings from existing programs, possible federal funding, and a
new 10 percent payroll tax, the plan would have still run a $12 billion deficit within ten years.
Similarly, last year Vermont was forced to abandon its efforts to set up a single-payer system after
it couldn’t find a way to pay for the plan’s nearly $4 trillion price tag. The state had considered a number of
financing mechanisms, including an 11.5 percent payroll tax and an income-tax hike (disguised as a premium) to 9.5 percent.
On the national level, who could forget Bernie Sanders’s proposed “Medicare for All” system, which would
have cost $13.8 trillion over its first decade of operation? Bernie would have paid for his plan by
increasing the top U.S. income-tax rate to an astounding 52 percent, raising everyone else’s
income taxes by 2.2 percentage points, and raising payroll taxes by 6.2 points. Of course, it is no
surprise that Medicare for All would be so expensive, since our current Medicare program is
running $58 trillion in the red going forward.
It turns out that “free” health care isn’t really free at all.
How, though, could a single-payer system possibly cost so much? Aren’t we constantly told that other countries spend far less than
we do on health care?
It is true that the U.S. spends nearly a third more on health care than the second-highest-spending developed country (Sweden),
both in per capita dollars and as a percentage of GDP. But that reduction in spending can come with a price of its own: The most
effective way to hold down health-care costs is to limit the availability of care. Some other developed countries ration care directly.
Some spend less on facilities, technology, or physician incomes, leading to long waits for care. Such trade-offs are not inherently bad,
and not all health care is of equal value, though that would seem to be a determination most appropriately made by patients rather
than the government. But the fact remains that no health care system anywhere in the world provides everyone with unlimited care.
Moreover, foreign health-care systems rely heavily on the U.S. system to drive medical innovation and technology. There’s a reason
why more than half of all new drugs are patented in the United States, and why 80 percent of non-pharmaceutical medical
breakthroughs, from transplants to MRIs, were introduced first here. If the U.S. were to reduce its investment in such innovation in
order to bring costs into line with international norms, would other countries pick up the slack, or would the next revolutionary
cancer drug simply never be developed? In the end, there is still no free lunch.
American single-payer advocates simply ignore these trade-offs. They know that their fellow citizens
instinctively resist rationing imposed from outside, so they promise “unlimited” care for all, which is about as
realistic as promising personal unicorns for all. In the process, they also ignore the fact that many of the systems
they admire are neither single-payer nor free to patients. Above and beyond the exorbitant taxes that must almost always
be levied to fund their single-payer schemes, many of these countries impose other costs on
patients. There are frequently co-payments, deductibles, and other cost-sharing requirements. In fact, in countries such as
Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, consumers cover a greater portion of health-care spending out-of-
pocket than do Americans. But American single-payer proposals eliminate most or all such cost-sharing.
Adopting a single-payer system would crush the American economy, lowering wages,
destroying jobs, and throwing millions into poverty. The Tax Foundation, for instance,
estimated that Sanders’s plan would have reduced the U.S. GDP by 9.5 percent and after-tax
income for all Americans by an average of 12.8 percent in the long run. That is, simply put, not going to
happen. So Americans are likely to end up with a lot less health care and than they have been promised.
Santa Claus will always be more popular than the Grinch. But the health-care debate needs a bit more Grinch and a lot less Santa
Claus. Americans cannot have unlimited care, from the doctor of their choice, with no wait, for free. The politician that tells them as
much will not be popular. But he or she may save them from something that will much more likely resemble a nightmare than a
utopian dream.

They destroy the insurance industry

Margot Sanger-Katz 16, domestic correspondent for The New York Times, where she writes
about health care. 5/16/16, “A Single-Payer Plan From Bernie Sanders Would Probably Still Be
The Sanders plan would require a huge reorganization of the country’s health care system.
Overnight, it would put the private insurance industry out of business, along with many
other businesses that support it. It would shift billions of dollars of spending from individuals,
workers and states into the federal budget. Doing that might well reduce some of the country’s health care spending that is
going toward insurer profits and paper-pushing.
But more than 80 percent of the dollars we currently spend on health care actually go toward health care. And
making big
cuts all at once to doctors and hospitals could cause substantial disruptions in care. Some
hospitals would go out of business. Some doctors would default on their mortgages and
student loans. Even if the country decided that medicine should become a more middle-class profession — not an obvious
outcome, given the substantial public support for the medical professions — it would be difficult to get there at once.

Turns econ
Chad Terhune 17, works for the Kaiser Health News, a nonprofit health newsroom. 4/25/17,
“In bid to revamp health care, Trump could hurt one of U.S.'s biggest job creators”
In many ways, the health care industry has been a great friend to the U.S. economy. Its plentiful jobs
helped lift the country out of the Great Recession and, partly due to the Affordable Care Act, it now employs
one in nine Americans — up from one in 12 in 2000.
As President Donald Trump seeks to fulfill his campaign pledge to create millions more jobs, the industry
would seem a promising place to turn . But the business mogul also campaigned to repeal Obamacare and
lower health care costs — a potentially serious job killer.
"The goal of increasing jobs in health care is incompatible with the goal of keeping health care affordable," said Harvard University
economist Katherine Baicker, who sees advantages in trimming the industry's growth. "There's a lot of evidence we can get more
bang for our buck in health care. We should be aiming for a health care system that operates more efficiently and effectively. That
might mean better outcomes for patients and fewer jobs."
But the country has grown increasingly dependent on the health sector to power the economy.
Thirty-five percent of the nation's job growth has come from health care since the recession hit in late
2007, the single biggest sector for job creation.
Hiring rose even more as coverage expanded in 2014 under the health law and new federal dollars flowed in. It gave hospitals,
universities and companies even more reason to invest in new facilities and staff. Training programs sprang up to fill the growing job
pool. Cities welcomed the development — and the revenue. Simply put, rising health spending has
been good for some economically distressed parts of the country, many of which voted for
Trump last year.
In Morgantown, West Virginia, the West Virginia University health system just opened a 10-story medical tower and hired 2,000
employees last year. In Danville, Pennsylvania, the Geisinger Health System has added more than 2,200 workers since July and is
trying to fill 2,000 more jobs across its 12 hospital campuses and a health plan. Out West, the UCHealth system in Colorado
expanded its Fort Collins hospital and is building three hospitals in the state.
In cities such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland and St. Louis, health care has replaced dying industries
like coal and heavy manufacturing as a primary source of new jobs.
"The industry accounts for a lot of good middle-class jobs and, in many communities, it's the
single-largest employer," said Sam Glick, a partner at the Oliver Wyman consulting firm in San Francisco. "One of the
hardest decisions for the new Trump administration is how far do they push on health care costs at the expense of jobs in health
House Republicans, with backing from Trump, took the first swipe. Their American Health Care Act sought to roll back the current
health law's Medicaid expansion and cut federal subsidies for private health insurance. The GOP plan faltered in the House, but
Republican lawmakers and the Trump administration are still trying to craft a replacement for Obamacare.
Neither the ACA nor the latest Republican attempt at an overhaul tackle what some industry experts and economists see as a serious
underlying reason for high health care costs: a system bloated by redundancy, inefficiency and a growing number of jobs far
removed from patient care.
Labor accounts for more than half of the $3.4 trillion spent on U.S. health care, and medical professionals from health aides to nurse
practitioners are in high demand. But the sheer complexity of the system also has spawned jobs for
legions of data-entry clerks, revenue-cycle analysts and medical billing coders who must
decipher arcane rules to mine money from human ills.
For every physician, there are 16 other workers in U.S. health care. And half of those 16 are in
administrative and other nonclinical roles, said Bob Kocher, a former Obama administration official who worked on
the Affordable Care Act. He's now a partner at the venture capital firm Venrock in Palo Alto, California.
"[W]hat's driving our health insurance premiums is that we are paying the wages of a whole bunch of people who aren't involved in
the delivery of care. Hospitals keep raising their rates to pay for all of this labor," Kocher said.
Take medical coders. Membership in the American Academy of Professional Coders has swelled
to more than 165,000, up 10,000 in the past year alone. The average salary has risen to nearly
No impact to bioterror
Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior
Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College
London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and
Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy
advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research
Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The
myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014,
The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an

imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks ,

performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.¶ The first involves the identities of terrorists and
what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons

and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament

and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they
consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is

backed up by historical evidence . The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks
in the past were small-scale , low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ¶ The
second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that
producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not.
Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and
dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers .¶ Even if a biological
weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who
are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A
medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can
prompt response with effective

significantly blunt the impact of an attack.

Zero impact to cyber-attacks --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors goes

Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of
Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War
College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S. Army
War College Press,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SKY IS NOT FALLING ¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the strategic
meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?” Today we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has
not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely
technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is
understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of
tactical behavior un - guided by any credible semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists
that claims fairly convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec ommendations
offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1. Cyber can only be an enabler of physical effort.

alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality. The
physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of
the strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in
action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But

tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is
either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with

considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[ i]n

the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost
inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s
government and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are
fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one

hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very
unlikely to harm human beings directly, let alone damage physically the machines on
which they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences)
might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be

serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the
possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely
to prove a precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as
surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from

cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that
cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined
Cyber defense is difficult, but should be
strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2.

sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are
easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift
almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it
might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to
attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note,
this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly
disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were
The literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the
obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶

nuclear attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston
Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only are there
cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors
The more
of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and that detail.

sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain must it be that
mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined
minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of
war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One
of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is
more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of
strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable
target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters
feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable
at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason
that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical
information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped.¶ Cyber
defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best
defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the

geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own
design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular,
when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our
Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting
combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that
less should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear
dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the
past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded
We can be confident
reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58

that cyber defense should be able to function well enough, given the strength of political,
military, and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides
air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important
defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3.
Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from
, cyber power is not technically forgiving of user error.
the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically

Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if their intended
exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there
are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated
It is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay.
as a potential source of serious danger.¶

But it is quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an
enemy. Critically important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the
inspired amateur outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a
hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects both poor history and ignorance of
contemporary military common sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for cyber
attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical
knowledge, skills, and effort required to do serious harm to national security is forbiddingly
high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely could not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a
scenario is extremely improbable . Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail
can one be in the making of cyberspace, that confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular
discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the
EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict catastrophic damage
would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.
The US is key to global medical innovation---NHI trades off with new drugs that
combat diseases
Ryan Huber 17, PhD, Executive Editor of Arc digital magazine. 3/29/17, “U.S. Health Care
Reality Check #1: Pharmaceutical Innovation”
That is, despite the many regulations and laws aimed at consumer protection and safety that do exist in the United
States, our health care market is relatively freer and more dynamic than those of other
developed countries. This leads to a high rate of medical and pharmaceutical innovation that
ends up benefiting the rest of the world, particularly other rich countries, in a similar way that
NATO nations, for example, benefit from close military alliance with the United States. In short and
somewhat reductive terms: we spend more money so everyone else can be healthier.
But this doesn’t make total sense at first. If the United States is developing
more innovative medicines,
devices, and procedures than every other advanced economy, why aren’t we making money by
selling these medical innovations to others for a hefty profit? Why aren’t there many more billions of dollars
of revenue coming into the United States Treasury because of our status as a medical innovator?
The answer is complicated, but here are some facts you need to know:
First, pharmaceutical companies which innovate in the United States chargetheir domestic
customers much more than they do their customers abroad. This is because, if countries don’t like
the prices charged by a given pharmaceutical company for a certain drug, they will simply ignore
the patent that company holds for their drug in the United States or elsewhere.
Novartis spent nearly 15 years seeking a patent in India for Glivec, a medicine for chronic myeloid leukemia. That quest reached its
dead end, at last. India’s Supreme Court rejected the Swiss drugmaker’s patent application. Glivec (marketed in America as
“Gleevec”) is a blockbuster, earning the Swiss drugmaker $4.7 billion last year. Its prospects in India are now zilch.
Although in this example Novartis happens to be a Swiss drug company, the ruling sends the same clear message to drug makers in
the United States: Give us your drugs for next to nothing or you’ll get exactly nothing.
Second, and relatedly, notice that there seems to be a correlation between how much a country
spends on prescription drugs and the percentage of NMEs (New Molecular Entities) produced
by that country.
If you combine points 1 and 2, you start to understand that the high spending of health care
consumers in the United States is arguably funding not only global pharmaceutical
innovation but is also facilitating the availability of new medicines to other countries at much
lower prices than domestic consumers pay.
There is a third factor that might help explain why health care, especially with regard to pharmaceutical innovation, is so much more
expensive in the United States: our massive regulatory agency of all things drugs and food, also known as the FDA, is significantly
more burdensome for medical innovation than the analogous agency for all of Europe, the EMA (European Medicines Agency).
The EMA doesn’t get the final say on whether a drug gets approved for sale in the EU, and perhaps even more significantly, they
don’t breathe down their drug companies’ necks during clinical trials.
In the U.S., because of the cumbersome bureaucracy of the FDA and its processes, we decide to tackle more targets in the drug
development scene through “Fast Track” and “Breakthrough Therapy” route than through the more traditional and more costly
standard drug approval processes.
Does this represent an implicit admission that government is inefficient?
It’s understandable that, given limited resources, the regulatory process can’t be automatic, or even fast-tracked, for all applicants.
But if the FDA can put a medication on a path where an evaluation can be made “quickly and efficiently,” does that mean the normal
course of action is to proceed slowly and inefficiently? If so, this could represent a needless driver of health care costs.
We need to be able to ask this question: Is there something going wrong with the drug development process to have the costs so high
and climbing higher every year?
Looking at a cost breakdown of Big Pharma companies from 2014, a big chunk of their costs, almost equal to the sum of the entire
first and second phase of their clinical trials, come from the 4th phase of clinical trials, which is often referred to as “post-marketing
This is the phase of a drug’s life that takes place after its approval for sale on the U.S. market, in which the FDA requires continued
and ongoing studies to validate the drug’s safety and efficacy using data generated from every phase of clinical trials leading up to its
approval in the first place. It’s in this phase of a drug’s life where, after spending large amounts of money to get the drug approved,
companies can still watch as the FDA rescinds a drug’s approval status, which leads to the drug getting withdrawn from the market,
in many cases never to be seen again.
In fact, as of 2015, 462 medicinal products were withdrawn from the market between 1953 and 2013, and the supporting evidence in
72 % of cases consisted of anecdotal reports. Only 43 (9.34 %) drugs were withdrawn worldwide and 179 (39 %) were withdrawn in
one country only. Withdrawal was significantly less likely in Africa than in other continents (Europe, the Americas, Asia, and
Australasia and Oceania).
So, not only is almost a fourth of a drug’s average R & D cost attributable to legislative constraints the government imposes on
pharmaceutical companies to police their own products even after they’ve been approved based on incredibly high standards of
safety and testing, but also, compared to less developed countries, we’re more likely to pull drugs off the
market and revoke their status as a result of anecdotal case reports of adverse effects that
generally go unverified.
We consistently decide to err on the side of safety, even if it means pulling the plug on a 10–15-year-long investment (the average
length of development for a drug), which helps clarify how aspiring for safer and more effective drugs begins to preclude cheaper
So the United States produces the most novel and cutting edge therapeutic compounds despite
the most expensive and stringent approval process and sells them to other countries at much
lower prices than we do at home. In doing this, we are indeed subsidizing research and
development of drugs and medical devices for the rest of the world. This subsidized medical innovation is a
major contributing factor to the out-of-control health care costs in the United States, and losing this innovation will be
one of the sacrifices we make if we move toward a more cost-controlled or government-run
health care system over the next several years.

Investment by big pharma is key to tissue engineering advances---high market

costs in the US drive investment
Nicholas Kitonyi 15, is a financial analyst with extensive experience in investment research and
stock market analysis. His analysis has been featured on research sites like Seeking Alpha and
Benzinga. 3/26/15, “Big Pharma Companies Are Betting On Regenerative Medicine - Should
Regenerative medicine is organized around medical technologies potentially possessing the
answers to reversing the human aging process. It is described as a medicine with the unique ability to repair,
replace or regenerate deteriorating tissues and organs affected by either injury, disease or simply due to the natural aging process.
Regenerative medicines can be applied in a wide variety of disorders including
neurodegenerative diseases like Parkinson's and Alzheimer's Diseases, among others. Often these are chronic diseases,
which in many cases tend to come at later stages in life. Other potential applications of regenerative medicine include
cardiovascular, hepatic, dermatological and orthopedic disease and disorders.
This industry has existed for more than two decades with the majority of early entrants concentrated around the use of stem cells,
but growth has only started to pick up over the last few years driven by developments in
specific areas of technology, such as tissue engineering , improved stem cell therapies, nanotechnology and
electroceuticals. The rapid aging of the global population and the increasing prevalence of obesity is
leading to a significant and growing rate of inflammatory and degenerative diseases of all types.
These demographically driven changes are generating significant interest from large, multi-national
pharmaceutical companies now targeting small biotechnology start-ups engaged in developing
diagnostics and treatments for these degenerative diseases.
Some of the notable companies already showing interest in regenerative medicine research include Pfizer (NYSE:PFE), Johnson &
Johnson(NYSE:JNJ) and Celgene (NASDAQ:CELG), among others.
So why exactly are big pharma companies investing heavily in regenerative medicine?
I pointed out at the beginning that regenerative medicine technologies and treatments could possibly replace current methods of
treatment in the coming years. While current technologies are treating symptoms of disease or injury, it's not curing the underlying
pathology, which explains why the process of aging remains such a huge quandary to human existence.
However, with regenerative medicine, the possibility exists of regenerating deteriorating tissue and
potentially slowing the rate of deterioration or even curing the basic pathology permanently.
The Big Pharma companies know precisely how people value life and thus would embrace the process of living a
longer healthy life with open arms. Take an example of America alone, where people spend more than $300
billion on healthcare every year. Everyone would be looking to cut down on spending by
using regenerative medicine to cure chronic conditions they suffer from, rather than continually seeking general medicine
on a yearly basis.
Therefore, this indicates early industry players are far likelier to benefit more than companies coming in later stages, especially given
the vast number of people already suffering from various diseases. Additionally, the industry is attracting all types of players from
large cap companies to SME's and private startups. This means an open arena still exists for savvy operators to venture into endless
possible capacities.
Generally, small startup biotech companies are leading the way in terms of research in this new
market, while big pharma offers the financial muscle required for financing clinical trials for
commercializing potential products . This is why we are seeing a lot of collaboration
between the big players and small biotech companies.
There are already consolidations and partnerships in regenerative medicine research taking place to allow these companies to
position themselves for early entry into the market. Notably, a few players already have products in the clinical pipeline while others
are still at preclinical stage.
For instance, Celgene recently announced a 4.5% stake in Mesoblast (MEOBF), which is one of the leading players in regenerative
medicine research. Celgene's investment is geared towards the development of an Acute Graft Versus Host Disease "GVHD"
program, which is now in Phase III.
The price of Mesoblast rallied following Celgene's announcement, which was an indication of investor approval. The company
definitely needs funds to conduct the clinical trial and subsequent pursuit of FDA approval, but Celgene certainly does have the
finances to pursue this path.
Another major player, Teva Pharma (NYSE:TEVA), already holds about a 20% stake in Mesoblast and is a major partner in the
Chronic Congestive Heart Failure "CCHF" program, which is also in Phase III. This is an excellent example of how major
pharmaceutical companies are eyeing stakes in the regenerative medicine space, especially after the startup biotech's establish
positive grounds for clinical trials.
In another example, Pfizer has created a unit of its own dedicated specifically to regenerative
medicine research. The company initiated operations in Cambridge, MA in 2008 for the sole purpose of regenerative
medicine research, but now that unit, Neusentis, has grown to include other types of therapies.
Since 2011, Neusentis' main research areas have been in therapies for pain and sensory disorders. Neusentis is currently developing
cell based therapies for age related macular degeneration.
Lastly, Johnson & Johnson invested $12.5 million last year (and that could rise to $325 million based on milestones) in a stem-cell
therapy program being developed by startup company Capricor Therapeutics (NASDAQ:CAPR). The program, which has also
attracted $20 million in support from the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine is set to begin a Phase II trial for
cardiovascular disease in 2016.
It is worth mentioning that while most Big Pharma players are investing in more traditional cell-based therapies, GlaxoSmithKline
(NYSE:GSK) is heavily investing in a new field called "bioelectronics" or "electroceuticals" by establishing a $50 million strategic
venture capital fund. The purpose of this fund is to finance companies whose technologies use electrical signals in the body to target
diseases. SetPoint Medical was the first company to receive a $5 million investment from GlaxoSmithKline to develop implantable
devices for immune system disorders like rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn's disease.
In a nutshell, it
remains pretty clear the research and development process of regenerative
medicine requires significant capital and extensive testing before getting the product to
market. However, one of the companies in the sector Endonovo Therapeutics (ENDV) claims that it has already created a new
and less invasive way to treat chronic and inflammatory diseases using electroceutical™ technology originally developed at NASA
that could prove to be more affordable and safer alternative for patients once their products are on the market.

Key to food security---turns resource wars

Mark Post 14, MD, PhD in Pharmacology from Utrecht University, Professor of Vascular
Physiology and Chair of Physiology at Maastricht University, and Cor van der Weele, Prof and
bioethicist in the Dept of Applied Philosophy at Wageningen University, PhD in philosophy of
Biology, “Principles of Tissue Engineering for Food,” Ch 78 in Principles of Tissue Engineering
(Fourth Edition), 2014, Pages 1647–1662, Science Direct
Most techniques in tissue engineering were developed for medical applications. The potential benefits of tissue
engineering and regenerative medicine for the repair of non-regenerative organs in the human body have not really been questioned. It is generally accepted that these
technologies offer therapeutic opportunities where very limited alternatives are at hand to improve quality of life. Therefore, a tremendous amount of government funded
research and business R&D has been and continues to be devoted to tissue engineering. Still, 25 years after its introduction, regenerative medicine by tissue engineering is not
yet part of mainstream medical therapy [1]. This suggests that the technical challenges to generate tissues that are fully functional and can immediately replace damaged tissue

As a spin off from this research activity, techniques in tissue engineering and
are substantial.¶

regenerative medicine may be used to produce organs to produce food. This idea is not new and had in fact been proposed by

Winston Churchill in his 1932 book ‘Thoughts and adventures' [2] and by Alexis Carrel [3]. Although the biological principles of tissue

engineering of food are very similar to the medical application there are also differences in goals, scale of
production, cost-benefit ratio, ethical-psychological considerations and regulatory requirements.¶ In this chapter the distinctions between the challenges of tissue engineering
for food production are highlighted and discussed. The focus will be mainly on tissue engineering of meat as a particularly attractive and suitable example.¶ Why Tissue
Engineering of Food?¶ Growing food through domestication of grasses, followed by other crops and livestock has a 13,000 years head start. The success of economical food
production likely determined the growth and sophistication of our civilization [4]. Why would we try to replace the relatively low-tech, cheap and easy natural production of food
by a high-tech complicated engineering technology that is likely to be more expensive? There are two main reasons why current ways of food production need to be

with growth of the world population to 9.5 billion and an even faster growth in global economy,
reconsidered.¶ First,

traditional ways of producing food, and in particular meat, may no longer suffice to feed
the world [5]. Food security is already an issue for some populations, but absence of this security may
spread across all civilizations due to generalized scarcity of food . Meat production
through livestock for example already seems maximized by the occupation of 70% of current arable land surface, yet the
demand for meat will double over the next four decades [6]. Without change, this will lead to scarcity and high
prices. Likely, the high prices will be an incentive for intensification of meat production, which will increase the pressure of

using crops for feed for livestock instead of feeding people . The arable land surface could be increased but this
would occur at the expense of forests with predictable unfavorable climate consequences. Lifestyle changes that include the reduction of

meat consumption per capita would also solve the problem, but historically this seems unlikely to happen. A
technological alternative such as tissue engineering of meat might offer a solution. In fact, the
production of meat is a good target for tissue engineering. Pigs and cows are the major sources of the meat we consume, and these animals are very

inefficient in transforming vegetable proteins into edible animal proteins, with an average bioconversion rate of 15% [7]. If this
efficiency can be improved through tissue engineering, this will predictably lead to less
land, water and energy use for the production of meat [8], which introduces the second major reason why
alternatives and more efficient meat production should be considered.
Doctor Shortages---1NC
Single payer causes doctor shortages---lower payment rates force retirement and
deters people from going to med school
Robert A. Book 9, Senior Research Fellow in Health Economics. 4/3/9, “Single Payer: Why
Government-Run Health Care Will Harm Both Patients and Doctors”
The Medicare Model
If Medicare or something like it were the "single
payer"-the sole purchaser of health care-no such pressure would exist. If the
single payer established
lower payment rates, by definition physicians could not drop out and make
their living from other patients, because there wouldn't be any other patients .[3] The only
alternative for a physician would be to cease the practice of medicine and either retire or find
another profession. While this would certainly happen to some degree, a large percentage of physicians-who have invested
many dollars and years of training in their practices-would be unable to find an alternative profession that is nearly as satisfying or
as remunerative. The inevitable result would be much lower payment rates and lower income for
Patients would suffer as well, especially in the long run. Because fewer highly talented people would be
willing to undergo the years of training (under difficult working conditions and low pay) to become
physicians, patients would suffer decreased access to health care and longer wait times. Lower
payments would mean that physicians would invest less in advanced medical equipment and
would likely spend less time with each patient. In addition, with fewer people undergoing the training necessary to
conduct medical research, new treatments and cures would be developed at a slower rate, costing many lives.
Hospital Modernization---1NC
They make hospitals incapable of responding
Brett Skinner 8, President and CEO of the Fraser Institute. With Mark Rovere, and Marisha
Warrington. 9/2008, “The Hidden Costs of Single Payer Health Insurance A Comparison of the
United States and Canada”
Government control over hospital financing has also resulted in the capital deterioration of
these facilities in Canada. Research has shown that in 2003 the average age of a hospital in Ontario
(Canada’s largest province) was 40 years, which nearly matches the length of time that Canadian
single-payer health insurance has been in place. By comparison, the same research found that the
average age of an American hospital in 2003 was only nine years (OHA, 2003).
The Canadian health insurance system is not designed with appropriate incentives to
modernize and recapitalize the nation’s health care infrastructure. In Canada, it takes central
planners and bureaucrats years to realize that shortages of equipment or health professionals are
occurring, or that hospitals are in need of repair and renewal. Government central planners are
simply not able to make timely decisions to modernize the health care infrastructure. By contrast,
consumer choice and private-sector competition within American health care forces hospitals to constantly modernize and invest in
new technologies.
Security depends on actors who strip out political questions in favor of purely
technical debates over the delivery of goods by the government---sole focus on the
plan constrains the bounds of social life within narrow institutional parameters of
security and national identity
Michael S. Drake 10, Lecturer in Sociology, University of Hull, Political Sociology for a
Globalizing World, 2010, no page #
Ignoring the status of security as an ‘essentially contested concept’ in Gallie’s sense (1964), and
assuming its content as given in technical expertise rather than as political, Loader and Walker thus
posit a prior value of security as a public good that is a condition of social life , then
identify the state as the ‘prior’ agent of delivery and proceed to announce imperatives which
displace politics and the political from everyday life , with the explicit aim of
containing contention within the given institutional parameters of formal
political practice , though these are precisely the channels that have been disrupted by the politics of identity, new social
movements, representation, culture and globalization. The
parameters of the political thus become the
parameters of control , a new front line on which the task of security is to constrain and
contain the possibilities of social life within given limits, thus establishing set conditions for
living. Loader and Walker thus subordinate classical questions of the political – questions of how we should live – to the technical
prerequisites of security, its maintenance and guarantee.
The state provision of functions of security, we are told, is essential because ‘they entail the crafting of stable identities’ (Loader and
Walker 2007: 172), thus precluding hybridity, fluidity and creativity of identification. For Loader and Walker, identity, both personal
and social, must be indexed to the apparatus of the state lest it undermine the latter’s capacity to fulfil its functions in providing
security. The argument becomes doubly tautological when they discuss why the state is the best means for the provision of security,
since it appears that the state alone produces identities which constitute an environment that enables security (ibid.: 172–6). The
politics of self and social identity , in the sense of the contention and challenge of conventional forms, are thus
off-limits, illegitimate and even dangerous, since politics are to be restricted to the politics of
distribution (in their terms, the ‘delivery of public goods’). Restricting the political to such questions
means rolling back its parameters to exclude the contention of authority. As we have seen, that
contention is implicitly marked not only by 1968, but also by the revolts of 1989 and the reassertion of civil society as a space of
freedom against the determinations of the state, since the necessary attributes of the state’s provision of
security ‘require the priority of the state as a site of political identity over others to be
internalized ’ (ibid.: 181). The task of democratic governance then becomes the improvement of security, state and police, a
structural order of precedence in which the political – the question of how we should live – becomes conditional
on given technical prerequisites of how we must live, without any scope for challenging those
norms which are assumed, a priori, as given.
Once they have established this imperative of police security and the essential priority of the state in its legitimate provision, Walker
and Loader note four cautions against the untrammelled operations of security forces, which necessitate the civilizing of security,
but, whereas as security provides the condition for civility, democratic governance is clearly predicated on security, and these
‘pathologies’ are as much those of governance as of security (Loader and Walker 2007: 196–212). The risks are the tendencies of
policy drift to ‘professional paternalism’ (which indicates security-sector technocracy, the only one that is truly a risk or pathology of
security itself), to consumerism (particularly electoral pandering to populism), to authoritarianism (which can arise from either of
the former paths) and to fragmentation (in which either consumerist individuals or interest groups particularize security,
contravening its function as a common good). However, each of these is ultimately dismissed as a second-order concern, after
security, which is to say they are risks that must be taken, a conclusion in stark contrast to the imperative basis of security as an
essential and preconditional public good. The practice of civilizing security subsequently turns out to mean the use of the state and
its ordering capacities to constrain popular demands for security, which is in effect a further security function.
For Loader and Walker, police ordering operations and the security of the state apparatus that provides this function are the
precondition of democracy and politics, rather than vice versa, so that democratic governance of security is conditional on the
technical prerequisites of police security and the state, precluding social experiments in identification, representation and living
arrangements. In attempting to develop normative guidelines for securitization, Loader and Walker thus seem to have reconstructed
in abstract the logic of the security reflex which converts protest or resistance into terror, so they appear as an
ontological threat to the given order and its parameters of the political. Such forces of the creation of
identity and the opening of new possibilities for life can be understood as exercises of constitutive power, in contrast to the
constituted power of established institutions and given relations, but these are two moments of power, not two opposed forces; they
are incommensurable and therefore cannot be brought into ‘balance’ as security and liberty, a formulation which misunderstands
the contemporary political situation, reducing it to the dichotomy of norm and deviance.
When their order of precedence is extended to the global dimension, Loader and Walker are clear that security is not only prior to
society, but if necessary it must be imposed. In their reasoning, global security order could be established as a public good on the
basis of the shared understandings of national state security apparatuses quite regardless of the conventional requirements of
democratic consent or legitimation (2007: 262). However, if security is also enabling and even productive of identities, opportunities
for global identity formation and new forms of association would remain containerized within nation-states. The common
functions of states as security providers, and the technical expertise invested in that
provision , would establish an integrated grid of security for a subject which will internalize
the identity given by that grid , just as the national citizen is normatively expected to
internalize a love for their nation-state. The subject of global order is thus the subject of security, which is
constructed by channelling political action into given institutions and by controlling
the parameters of the political to maintain given constraints, producing a naturalized
antagonism to anything outside those parameters.
AT Perm
Attempting to rehabilitate security remains locked within its terms---attempting to
redefine one example of a violent political order actively prevents resisting its very
Chris Rossdale 16, Teaching Fellow, International Relations, University of Warwick,
“Activism, resistance and security,” Chapter 14 of Ethical Security Studies: A new research
agenda, eds. Nyman and Burke, 2016, no page #
The previous two sections have highlighted a number of ways in which practices of resistance and activism engage the relationship
between ethics and security in different ways. In producing subjugated knowledges, revealing the exclusions and power relations of
established discourses, and engaging in security practices which seek to more directly respond to the
insecurity faced by ordinary people, they invite an ethical response to security and
insecurity. However, it limits our engagement with practices of resistance if we only see them as
exploring ‘better’ or ‘more ethical’ ways of providing security. The more radical challenge to
the politics of security comes when we see activism not simply as refusing particular orders of security,
but as resisting the very conceptual and political foundations of security . This final section
explores such an interpretation, looking at the ways in which the most substantive way to engage the relationships between ethics,
security, resistance and activism comes when we view practices of resistance as (at their best) working to deconstruct security. I
security cannot so easily be
begin by outlining some of the arguments which suggest that the concept of
refashioned in a more ethical form and that thinking in terms of resistance might take us further. I then look at
how we might view such a resistance in the context of political activism, looking at some examples from anarchist activist groups.
A number of writers have argued that the concept of security is built around a series of images, codes and logics
which render it deeply problematic and a dangerous candidate for rehabilitation. They have pointed
out the ways in which our contemporary fascination with proliferating images of threat, danger and
response, grounded in desperate but impossible fantasies of control and mastery, tends towards authoritarian political
formations and the de facto legitimacy of dominant power relations (Edkins 2003; Campbell 1998: Shepherd
2008: 72–75). The pursuit of security serves to contain subjects within the existing order , promising
protection in return for some level of compliance or obedience in a manner not dissimilar to a protection racket (Spike Peterson
1992: 50–52). As Mark Neocleous notes, such dynamics serve to neutralise radical political action ,
‘encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion’ (2008: 4).
To understand how the pursuit of security intertwines with political authority, it is important to recognise the dependent
relationship between security and insecurity. Institutions and technologies of security can only function in a
context of insecurities, which they may identify and seek to pacify, but which they also need (and for which, of course, they
are often responsible). In Michael Dillon’s terms, ‘it is only because it is contoured by insecurity, and because in its turn it also
insecures, that security can secure’ (1996: 127). The nature and content of security depends on its particular relationship with
insecurity, with its exclusions and violences and particular (political) designations of threat. This regulative binary of
security/insecurity intersects with others that have similar effects, such as order/chaos, inside/outside and sovereignty/anarchy. All
of them regulate politics in a manner which cements the place of political authority. On the latter dichotomy, Richard Ashley’s
comments are pertinent:
On the one hand, the sign of ‘sovereignty’ betokens a rational identity: a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically
ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent ‘self’, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an
external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its identical being. On the other hand, the sign of ‘anarchy’
betokens this residual external domain: an aleatory domain characterised by difference and discontinuity, contingency and
ambiguity, that can be known only for its lack of the coherent truth and meaning expressed by a sovereign presence. ‘Anarchy’
signifies a problematic domain yet to be brought under the controlling influence of a sovereign centre … whether it be an individual
actor, a group, a class, or a political community.
(1988: 230)
As he identifies the conservatising regulation at the heart of the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy, so would I suggest that a similar
process is at work in the logic of security, privileging that which is rationally bounded, coherent and compliant, and necessitating the
pacification or pathologisation of that which is not.
Political imaginaries rooted in binary concepts limit our ethical landscape in a variety of ways. As
V. Spike Peterson argues:
[a]s long as we remain locked in dichotomies, we cannot accurately understand and are less likely to
transform social relations: not only do oppositional constructions distort the contextual complexity of social reality, they
set limits on the questions we ask and the alternatives we consider. True to their “origin” (Athenian
objectivist metaphysics), the dichotomies most naturalized in Western world views (abstract-concrete, reason-emotion, mind-body,
culture-nature, public-private) are both medium and outcome of objectification practices. Retaining them keeps us locked in to their
objectifying-reifying-lens on our world(s) and who we are.
(1992: 54)
In such a context, rather than seeking to rehabilitate security (and remain within this
security/insecurity dichotomy), it might be more productive to resist, displace or
deconstruct it .
This is not a simple prospect; refusing the social fantasy of security would, in Jenny Edkins’ terms, involve ‘facing,
on a day-to-day basis, questions many of us prefer to forget, if we can’, and ‘would involve a shift away from the notion of sovereign
state and sovereign individual … would entail the development of a new vision of political community, one
that was not based on the coming together of discrete participles to produce closed systems’ (2003: 368–369). While the
politics of security is enacted through social institutions, it is also (as the discussion above shows) embedded in
categories of thought. The binaries of security/insecurity, order/chaos, sovereignty/anarchy and more impose a theoretical
domination which conditions political possibility in particular authoritarian ways. As such, the task of resistance might be to break
down such binaries. This may take place through mocking, subverting or outwardly refusing the closures such binaries
enact (Rossdale forthcoming-a; Rossdale forthcoming-b), or through embracing
the proliferation of definitions of
security as an aporetic space in which ‘to think and create new social, ethical and economic
relationships outside the oppressive structures of political and epistemological order’ (Burke 2007: 30–
What I want to suggest here is that we can interpret many practices of activism and resistance as engaging in precisely this kind of
resistance to security/insecurity; that is, not just as affirming ‘more ethical’ securities (though they may also do this), but as
mounting a challenge to the conceptual and political order of security more generally. In a sense, this is not surprising, so often is
resistance framed as that insecurity, chaos and anarchy which necessitates securing, ordering and sovereign gestures. It is also an
unstable series of interventions, liable to recuperation within a set of security discourses which swiftly reposition challenge as threat.
Nonetheless, these resistances hold open
spaces for an ethical critique not only of particular orders
of security, but more generally of the ways in which security orders .
Link---Health Insurance/Developed World
Public health is a critical arena in which visions of the social order are created---
national health insurance is a way of differentiating the civilized West that takes
care of its citizens from the unhealthy developing world---(Example of how 1AC does
that)---that legitimizes violence against the under-developed periphery
Scott Watson 11, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Victoria, “Back Home,
Safe and Sound: The Public and Private Production of Insecurity,” International Political
Sociology, Volume 5, 2011, pp. 160-177
In Canada, potential migrants may be excluded for various reasons beyond fears of contagious disease—criminality, membership in
a violent organization, physical ⁄ mental disorder, or insufficient financial support (CIC 2009). Each of these categories of difference
reflects distinct moral bases on which Canadian national identity is reproduced and through which exclusion is necessitated. A
number of these exclusions, such as those with insufficient financial resources and those with contagious disease, partially reflect a
concern with the maintenance of the welfare state and the prosperity of the country. Foucault notes that this has been a concern of
states since the eighteenth century and gave rise to health policing in that era (Foucault 1980; Turner 1997).
economic prosperity, and national security became intimately intertwined as the
citizenry’s health, wealth, and longevity emerged as the greatest resource of the state (Rosen 1953;
Osborne 1997:177–178; Lowenheim 2007:205). Over time, the view of the healthy citizen as strategic resource for the state was
supplemented by the view that citizens had a right to good health in the eighteenth century and thereafter, public health
became the duty of the state and a proper area for intervention and control (La Berge 1992:16). Health
and the provision of healthcare by the state as a marker of difference internationally blossomed with
the birth and growth of the welfare state. Though contagion from foreigners continues to be understood as a threat to
the health of society, it also increasingly reflects a concern with the protection and security of the public health system itself. To take
one contemporary example, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) subjects certain migrants to health checks ‘‘to protect the
health and safety of Canadians and to reduce and prevent excessive demand on Canada’s health and social services’’ (CIC 2010c).
Protection of the social safety net in the modern nation-state is necessitated by the crucial
role it plays in legitimizing the state (Beck 2002:40–41). In Canada, as in other Western states, the two
dominant features of the welfare state are to protect citizens from poverty and disease,4 and these
dangers are, in turn, associated with foreign spaces and migrants . Excluding poor and diseased
migrants, who are expected to make immediate and costly demands on the welfare state, reproduces national subjects as legitimate
recipients of such assistance and the perception that potential migrants are illegitimate recipients. The moral basis of
exclusion incorporates beliefs about contagion as well as beliefs about just deserts based on
contribution . Externally, the undeserving migrant is justifiably excluded through the representation of them as profiteers
gaining benefits and security from the welfare system of a community to which they do not belong and have not contributed
(Huysmans 2000:768). The internal manifestation of the just deserts moral basis of exclusion is the ‘‘welfare cheat’’ (see
Cruickshank 1997; Moffatt 1999; Chunn and Gavigan 2004).
The construction of the undeserving migrant motivated to cross international border to gain access to the social safety net of
Western states also serves to reinforce another aspect of the Western state identity: the Western welfare
state model as the exemplar of good governance and rationality . Equating the Western
world with the civilized world is a prominent boundary condition differentiating the West from
the rest based on features of Western states such as democratic ideals and
rationality (Tsoukala 2008:147–148). I would add that the welfare state and modern medicine serve as similar
function as democracy, as a boundary through which the West is reproduced as civilized and rational. In
this construction, weak social security provisions and an unhealthy citizenry reinforce the tropicality
discourse that constructs certain areas as less developed, culturally unhealthy, and
potentially dangerous . The representation of certain parts of the world as prevalent with disease in the media (Youde
2005) or in UN documents such as the Human Development Index reinforces the conception of the West as advanced, rational, and
desirable, and other areas as backward, irrational, and undesirable. In turn, nationals of these states ⁄ zones are thereby constructed
as threatening, by their potential to flood or invade the developed Western states and overwhelm their social safety nets (Faist
1994:61), and by their backward or irrational cultural characteristics (Youde 2005) that threaten the rationality on which the welfare
state is based. This in turn necessitates and legitimizes the creation and maintenance of designated lists to
identify and exclude unhealthy, and thus potentially dangerous, zones and peoples.
The Regulation of Human Movement into and out of Canada
Regulating cross-border movement is among the most conspicuous ways states demarcate the domestic and orderly from the international and anarchic. This is achieved partially by identifying and keeping out that which is viewed as disruptive of the domestic
order. For instance, border control officers in Canada identify and prevent the inflow of inadmissible people, illegal goods, dangerous plants, and animals, as well as dumped and subsidized goods (CBSA 2010). Each of these categories of exclusion reproduces the
ordered ⁄ anarchic binary; though I am concerned here with the regulation of human movement for reasons of health security. As noted earlier, the Canadian state identifies certain regions and populations as potential health risks and presents the state as the
guarantor of security against those risks. Canada’s border services agency is tasked with preventing the inflow of inadmissible people, which includes those who have a health condition that is likely to be a danger to public health, to public safety or that might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services (CIC 2006:24). In instances where the security and border control functions of the state break down, such as the arrival of unauthorized migration, CIC reassures the Canadian public that
all unauthorized migrant arrivals are required to undergo health checks prior to their release into the community (Mountz 2004; Watson 2009).
To identify inadmissible or risky populations whose movements are subject to greater regulation and surveillance, Canada and other Western states rely heavily on medical experts. Though mostly neglected in security studies, medical experts figure prominently in
the field of critical health research (see Osborne 1993; Lupton 1995; Peterson and Bunton 1997). Bunton contends that the growing importance and influence of medical experts is part of the expansion of the modern liberal state, as political authorities utilize and
instrumentalize forms of authority and expertise outside of the state apparatus through processes of licensing and bureaucratization (1997:224). These medical experts play a crucial role in the construction of health risks—not unlike other specialized security
agencies that are charged with protecting the state from various security risks, such as migration, terrorism, criminality, and military conflict.
In Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), and its sub-agency the Canadian Committee to Advise on Tropical Medicine and Travel (CATMAT— note again the concern with tropicality), is the expert agency tasked with identifying dangerous, unhealthy
populations and regions. CATMAT is made up of health intellectuals that include prominent doctors from various hospitals and health authorities around the country, representatives of medical associations such as Medical Microbiology and Infectious Disease,
Pediatric Society, and Emergency Physicians, from the International Development Research Centre, Canadian Public Health Association, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as Ministries of Health from
other states. CATMAT advises PHAC, which in turn advises various governmental bodies and the Canadian public on the dangers associated with certain parts of the world, with certain diseases and with certain behaviors, ranging from sexual practices to
international adoption. CATMAT also includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of National Defence, and CIC, reinforcing the connection between international travel, health and the security of the Canadian body politic. The expert knowledge
produced by PHAC and CATMAT forms the basis on which the federal government, the CIC and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) make decisions regulating inadmissibility (which diseases qualify as a risk to public health, public safety, or excessive
demand), which countries require visas and medical examinations, how long to detain unauthorized arrivals and who to quarantine and for how long.
These medical experts and bureaucracies also help to regulate human movement out of Canada through the production of ‘‘insecurity texts,’’ such as travel reports, travel health notices, and advisories. According to Lowenheim (2007), the primary function of these
texts is to responsibilize international travelers by identifying threats to the Canadian traveler and prescribing appropriate behavior. PHAC uses a four-point system to identify zones of danger, which correspond to the severity of risk posed and the type of behavior
regarded as responsible: (1) practice usual precautions; (2) practice special precautions; (3) avoid non-essential travel; and (4) avoid all travel. According to PHAC, the decision to issue a warning takes into consideration a variety of factors, including standards of
hygiene and sanitation, availability of safe food and clean water and climate or environmental conditions that support diseases that do not occur in Canada (PHAC 2010). Employing Canadian standards of hygiene and health to establish the level of threat posed by
other regions clearly reflect the ongoing importance of tropicality as a boundary producing narrative (Arnold 1996; Bankoff 2001).
The behaviors prescribed in these advisories reflect the level of perceived threat to both the international traveler and the non-traveling Canadian public. In levels one and two, the traveler is the entity that is threatened and responsibility for the in dividuals’ well-
being rests with the individual herself. In levels three and four, the Canadian public and the international traveler are threatened by the traveler’s decision to leave the safe and secure domestic space, and the international traveler is responsible for their own security
and the security of the Canadian public. As Lowenheim (2007) notes, these advisories function to responsibilize international travel by advising against travel, but they do much more than this, they also reproduce the international ⁄ domestic binary that forms the
basis on which the necessity for the state rests, with the Canadian state serving as the authoritative source on everyday dangers and responsible behavior and as the safe and secure location for Canadian citizens.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) produces a similar insecurity text and issues travel reports and warnings based on a variety of risks, such as weather, political upheaval, criminal activity, and terrorist attacks. Like PHAC, DFAIT
employs a four-scale system, ranging from (1) exercise normal security precautions; (2) exercise high degree of caution; (3) avoid non-essential travel; and (4) avoid all travel. Not surprisingly, most of the most dangerous rankings are concentrated in Africa, Southern
Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Eastern Europe. Just as telling, perhaps, is the lowest travel advisory that is visited on the United States and Western Europe—‘‘exercise normal security precautions.’’ Even these safe zones are presented as potentially
dangerous, and the responsible Canadian traveler is reminded to exercise ‘‘normal security precautions.’’ Once again, this description demonstrates the state’s efforts to responsibilize the travel er (Lowenheim 2007:205) while reproducing the international realm as
anarchic and dangerous. All foreign spaces, and thus travel, are potentially dangerous, which reinforces the production of the home state, Canada, as a safe and secure location for the modern, national subject.
Regulating Healthcare in Canada
The regulation of healthcare serves a similar function and includes defining what qualifies as healthcare and who has access to it. State regulation of healthcare primarily consists of maintaining the medical infrastructure and delegating powers of health to an
accredited medical profession (Osborne 1997:183). A foundational component of this system is to define experts and expertise as it relates to the modern practice of medicine (Johnson 1993:150). This system decides what qualifies as medical care by identifying and
excluding that which is traditional, alternative, or non-conventional—and thus excluded from public insurance coverage. It also defines who is a qualified medical practitioner. These practices necessarily exclude a range of practices and actors, often associated with
the ‘‘foreign’’ other; whose expertise is not recognized as sufficiently scientific or rational to qualify as medical care in the modern, Western sense. As Lupton (1995) note s, the public health discourse in Western states produces a wide range of binary oppositions
associated with discriminatory moral judgments: including the mind ⁄ body, healthy ⁄ unhealthy, rational ⁄ irrational, disciplined ⁄ self-indulgent, clean ⁄ dirty—oppositions that often overlap with and reproduce the inside ⁄ outside, self ⁄ other, and domestic ⁄ foreign. In
these representations, traditional or non-Western modes of healthcare are regarded as non-scientific. This is simultaneously reinforced through the construction of certain regions of the world as irrational, unscientific, or medically incompetent. For instance, Youde
observes that in Western countries, southern Africa is presented as both threatened by HIV⁄AIDS and also as partially responsible due to certain cultural practices and the apparent rejection, incomprehension or misunderstanding of basic scientific facts about the
AIDS virus (2005:203).
Consequently, the Canadian healthcare system is a boundary reproducing practice that differentiates between the rational West, and non-rational regions of the world. In turn, the healthcare system is portrayed as needing protection from non-rational modes of
medical expertise even as medical capacity, and expertise in foreign spaces is simultaneously demanded and questioned. This is perhaps best illustrated through the process of recognizing the foreign medical credentials of international medical graduates (IMGs).
The Foreign Credential Recognition Program set up and run by CIC provides funds for the recognition of foreign medical credentials, which is administered by the Medical Council of Canada and the Physician Credentials Registry of Canada. This process allows the
state and the accredited medical profession to evaluate the medical competency of IMGs and to determine whether they need to upgrade their training in a Canadian medical program. According to the Medical Council of Canada, IMGs seeking to practice medicine in
Canada need to: verify their medical degree is from an approved university, pass the MCC Evaluating Examination, the MCC Qualifying Exams, provide proof of language proficiency, complete a minimum of 12 months of supervised clinical training, in addition to
any further provincial requirements (MCC 2010). Here, we witness the Canadian state attempt to maintain order, safety, and the rational ⁄ scientific basis of the Canadian health system as it comes into contact with the anarchic, disordered, and irrational
international realm as represented by IMGs.
The international realm is further reproduced as anarchic and disordered by virtue of the perception that Canadian healthcare is in high demand and acts as a pull factor for many migrants. In a document entitled ‘‘Deterring Individuals from Coming to Canada as
part of a Human Smuggling Operation,’’ the CIC (2010a) asserts, ‘‘Canadians enjoy health services that are among the best in the world. However, it is unfair that those who have not followed the rules be rewarded for their crimes by having access to more generous
benefits that the average Canadian receives.’’ In a subsequent document, the CIC directly ties access to healthcare to illegal entry, asserting the government will: ‘‘reduce the attraction of coming to Canada by way of illegal human smuggling by ensuring health
benefits participants receive are not more generous than those received by the Canadian public’’ (CIC 2010b). The construction of Canada’s healthcare system as the envy of the world serves to reinforce suspicions of migrants as unhealthy and to justify increased
surveillance on these populations.

The moral bases of exclusion rest on both the need to protect a rational, scientific healthcare
system, and on that of just deserts . Those that have not, or cannot, contribute to the system
are excluded. As was raised in previous sections, people with severe health problems are denied visas for entry to Canada, not
because they do not need care but because as non-Canadians they have not contributed to the creation and maintenance of the
Canadian healthcare system. Thus, the Canadian state attempts to exclude these people while they are still outside the state. Inside
the state, accessibility to healthcare reflects a hierarchy of exclusion partially based on just deserts. The primary mode of exclusion
rests with eligibility for public medical insurance, which is a provincial responsibility. Though eligibility for public insurance varies
across provinces, there is a hierarchy of eligibility based on contribution to the system. In all
provinces, Canadian citizens and permanent residents are eligible for public insurance, subject to provincial exclusions—Canadians
who do not physically reside in the province5 may be ineligible for public insurance in that province,6 as are out-of-province
students. For Canadians taking up residence across provincial borders, there are short waiting periods to establish eligibility. The
inter-provincial distinctions between eligible and ineligible groups reflect a concern with just deserts—to have access, one must have
resided in that province long enough to contribute to or signal an intention to contribute to the maintenance of that provincial
healthcare system.
Similar concerns are evident in the case of non-permanent residents within Canada. Visitors are completely excluded under
provincial plans, as are refugee claimants—though they are eligible for limited essential-health services through the Interim Federal
Health Program (Gagnon 2002). Foreign students are ineligible in some provinces; in others, they are subject to waiting periods
ranging from 3 months to over a year; while those in Canada on work permits are eligible in all provinces after a waiting period
between one and 3 months (Gagnon 2002:36). Those who are perceived to contribute least (visitors, refugee claimants, and
students) are excluded, given limited access or subject to greater wait periods, while those who contribute most (citizens and
regulation of healthcare
permanent residents, foreign workers) are eligible in a short time. At a very basic level,
through public insurance in Canada establishes a typology of inclusion ⁄ exclusion that
rests on moral considerations of maintaining order of the system and just deserts based on
contribution to the system.
The Technology of Insurance
public insurance is the primary technology through which the Canadian state regulates
Access to
access to healthcare, which in turn reproduces the insecurity associated with foreign spaces, people
and disease essential to the legitimation of the state . The importance of insurance in modern societies is
a central theme of Ulrich Beck’s work on risk society, and he argues that ‘‘uncertainty and insecurity is produced in every niche of
modern existence, and security against such uncertainty is essentially stitched together out of a
combination of public and private insurance agreements’’ (Beck 1992:100). This is evident in the case of health
security in Canada, where the costs of health security are split 70–30 between public and private insurance schemes (Government of
Canada 2004). The prevalence of public and private insurance as modes of providing security in modern states has led Francois
Ewald to conclude that societies are constituted not in accordance with wider political or cultural
principles, but as vast systems of insurance (1991:210). While this conceptualization of the state ignores the
internal ⁄ external dynamic and the role that identity plays in excluding human populations from inclusion in such insurance
protections, Ewald’s broader contention about insurance as a socio-political arrangement is important—insurance operates on logic
distinct from that of collective identity in that it conceptualizes risk and insecurity as calculable (evaluates probability), capital
(rectifies financial repercussion of loss, not loss), and collective (applies only to groups) (Ewald 1991:201). For the purposes of this
paper, the collective is the most significant component. Insurance as a technology of risk relies on the
establishment of a community through the pooling of contributions of individual
members and the redistribution of costs associated with the risks of life in modern societies.
The importance attached to the collective and the redistribution of cost leads Ewald to conclude that the logic of insurance is
Public insurance is
fundamentally about justice and social redistribution (1991:202–203; see also Elbe 2008:186).
foundational to the formation and continuation of the state’s population as a
relevant human collective , bound together by mutual insurance agreements aimed at social redistribution within
that group. In turn, the state, which provides security (and some measure of justice) through the social redistribution associated
with social insurance, guarantees its own existence, since the technology of risk and insurance ‘‘requires permanent institutions with
quasi-infinite longevity’’ (Ewald 1991:209).
Reps/Securitization First---Aff = War Inev
Security is a psychological construction---representations of external threat bias
decision-making and make war inevitable
Sybille RD Buitrago 16, studied International Affairs, Peace Research, Conflict Resolution and
International Communication at American University. Article was double-bind peer reviewed.
“Threats of a Different Kind: China and Russia in U.S. Security Policy Discourse”
It matters how a state’s national decision makers perceive and construct challenges and threats
in international security. This also extends to the construction of other states; whether or not another state is
constructed as threatening or as nonthreatening shapes policy /security policy and interstate relations
accordingly . As argued by scholars and outlined below, how something or someone is constructed
constitutively affects interpretation of issues, developments or actors’ behavior, confines the
way in which action and interaction are thought possible, and thereby contributes to
behavior towards another state. U.S. national decision makers follow a U.S. self-role of global leader in international
security, and U.S. national security is defined as extending beyond national borders. This also
facilitates an extended view of threats and threatening others. In the U.S. perspective, more issues and actors
represent potential threats. Thus, also states that challenge globally defined U.S. national security or the
U.S. in the provision of international security may be viewed as potentially threatening. Aside from
international terrorism, extremism, fragile states, rogue actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational
organized crime, cyber attacks, and consequences from external violent conflicts, as stated in the 2015 U.S. National Security
Strategy (see for example White House 2015), both China and Russia are/have become again serious
concerns in U.S. security policy discourse. And while U.S. discourse under the Obama administrations has also
increasingly highlighted the need for multilateral action, it is unilateral measures that remain primary for the
This article offers empirical results on how the U.S. approach international security, and, in
particular, how U.S. security policy discourse constructs current challengers. Perceiving and
constructing another state as rival, threat or enemy has constitutive effects on interaction with
that state. Discourse’s constitutive effects on behavior are illustrated in recent scholarship (Herschinger/ Renner 2014;
Diez/Bode/Fernandes da Costa 2011; Nabers 2009). Thus, as this article argues, if states such as the U.S. perceive and construct
other states such as China and Russia as threat to own and international security, it will constitutively affect interaction with these
countries (see also Campbell 1998; Dalby 1997).
As U.S. decision makers are said to still see the U.S. leading the world (Nye 2015; Tomes 2014: 46; Wolf 2014: 89-92),1 this
article poses the question of how potential challengers to U.S. primacy are constructed. Regarding
China, for example, scholars point to the U.S. fearing a loss of influence in the region (Hacke 2013; Goh 2007/2008: 113-157), to
China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its interests, its options for asymmetric conduct towards the U.S. (Colby 2015;
Worcester/Bühler 2011: 28-29), and even a new bipolarity (Maull 2015). In case of rising U.S.-Sino conflict, the great U.S.
mistrust in the Chinese government would likely favor tough policies (Wolf 2014: 96). Additional tension
can come from Chinese efforts to increase military presence in the South China Sea. Russia, on the other side, was not seen as threat
to U.S. interests until the Ukraine crisis. Some merely argued that Russia is a difficult partner for the U.S. and that the U.S. have the
dilemma of needing Russian cooperation to deal with global challenges but also aiming for deeper relations with the young
democracies in Russia’s neighborhood (Hacke 2013: 6-7). In 2012, Russia was still no clear challenge, as Russian and U.S. interests
did not intolerably interfere (Smith 2012: 184-186). But the Ukraine crisis has created the view of a threatening Russia and even
conjured up Cold War images (Monagan 2015). Increased strategic Sino-Russian aligning (Trenin 2015; Rudolf 2014) likely
increases U.S. concern.
As outlined here, perception, national identity and self-other constructions inform – via decision
makers – interstate relations. By their very nature, interstate relations are the experience of
different and at times opposed perspectives, where perception and identity impact the
interpretation of events and of self and other. Possible outcomes are threat constructions,
even enemy images, and the demarcation and defense of spheres of influence. The sense of national
identity is also shaped by historical experience as shared by the collective of a state; experienced gains and victories as well as losses
and traumata in relations with other states impact how national identity is felt and acted out vis-à-vis others. This also
includes relations with those perceived as rivals or enemies. As argued (Nabers 2009: 191-214; Mersken 2005:
373), an enemy can be a useful hegemonic tool for mobilization and the enabling of new policy
measures. But when one state discursively constructs another state as a threat, it creates
dichotomies and boundaries to that state (Eriksson/Noreen 2002: 8-10; Campbell 1998: 3-4, 170-171). A critical
geopolitics lens adds the link of identity, discourse, space, power and policy, and how this link
may translate into processes of ordering by one state towards another, referring to the creation
of spatial order with effects of inclusion or exclusion (Agnew/Muscarà 2012: 1-2, 11, 28-29). In this light,
U.S. security policy is explained with America’s myth and universalizing tendency as facilitator
of both expansion and strong self-other differentiation (Ó Tuathail/Agnew 2008: 225-228). A state’s
national identity can become threatened, motivating a need to safeguard national identity, which
in turn may facilitate the creation of dichotomies and barriers between states (Campbell 1998; Shapiro
1997: 58-59). It must be clearly stated here, that there is a distinction between states engaging in
self-other constructions for their identity – a normal process, and divisive processes of othering,
in which another state is articulated as threat. Since also states have ontological security, national identity can
become threatened by changing situations and inherent uncertainty (Steele 2008: 12), including increases in other states’ power.
This article is based on an analysis of national security documents and speeches by U.S. security
policy officials. It should be pointed out that such documents, in particular national security documents, are products of
lengthy processes with multiple authors and rounds of writing and editing, etc. Such processes and the resulting assessments are
also informed by information and analyses of other actors, including security and defense agencies/ departments (CIA, NSC,
Pentagon, etc.), foreign policy institutions (State Department), legislative bodies (Congress), a number of U.S. think tanks – of
varying ideological position, and the media (key among them being the New York Times and Washington Post, for example).2
Additional actors in the political establishment that provide information and interpretation, and thereby inform policy formulation,
are, for example, the United States European Command (EUCOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM), or NATO. These
bodies are based in specific regions/countries and in dialogue with local representatives. The commanders typically report to the
U.S. president via the U.S. defense secretary about issues and developments in their particular region. These reports then become
part of the policy formulation process regarding a region or country. Developments and issues that are interpreted
as particularly important or threatening likely receive greater attention, while it is typically the case that
several issues must be attended to at the same time. There are then multiple actors that are directly and indirectly involved in policy
formulation (for more information, see Bolton 2008; Dixon 1984). Constructions of enmity relate to perception
and discursive processes; it can be influenced by conscious efforts to create or exaggerate
enmity, for various reasons, including political agendas, or by efforts to overcome enmity and foster dialogue. Because national
identity, self-other constructions, perceptions and even emotions are involved in perceiving and
interpreting developments, processes relating to the construction of enmity are also
psychologically driven and not only conscious; whether conscious or not is however difficult to analytically
assess. In the following sections, the article presents empirical results on 2) the U.S. construction of China, and 3) the U.S.
construction of Russia. The article closes with 4) implications of U.S. self-other constructions vis-à-vis China and Russia.
2. U.S. Construction of China
The analysis of U.S. discourse on China reveals both positives and negatives. Also changes over time are expressed, in response to
changes in U.S. administrations, the global environment and China’s influence; constructions of a threatening China have increased.
Already in 1994, the U.S. recognized China’s possible impact on U.S. security, based on China’s growing economic power, UN
Security Council veto power, nuclear arms and military advancements, and thus called for rebuilding relations with China by
establishing high-level dialogues and working-level relations (Perry 1994). Today, China is perceived as challenge to U.S. influence
and interests and even as threatening near-pear adversary, due to the rapid modernization of its military and global defense industry
and a more complicated world (Hagel 2014; U.S. Department of Defense 2015).
China is constructed as clear challenge and threat to U.S. vital interests. Thus, China is said to aim to “replace the United States as
primary power in Asia”, weaken U.S. alliances with Asian partners and limit U.S. access to and deterrence of threats in the region,
and that China’s “dangerous policies” present a “systematic” challenge for the U.S. (Blackwill/Tellis 2015: 19, 20). Not only is China
articulated as threat to the U.S., but also to the future of Asia and the liberal international order (Blackwill/Tellis 2015: 20, 39; U.S.
Department of Defense 2012: 2, 4). The representation of China as systematic challenge to the U.S., thus to core values and
interests, is particularly telling. It points to China having become the key other of the U.S., against which the U.S. must safeguard.
Actions directed against China as threat likely promote conflict potential. Portraying China as threat for regional
stability furthermore fits with expressed U.S. regional interests.
Upholding life at home and protecting it from risk abroad makes nuclear war and
genocide inevitable
Zohreh Bayatrizi 8, Associate Professor Social Theory at Alberta University, Life Sentences:
The Modern Ordering of Mortality, 165-7
The drive to protect life against the threat of anarchic and disorderly death has significance not
only within national borders but also internationally. The United Nations measures ‘human development,’ in part,
in terms of longevity, health, and infant mortality, and, as a con sequence, international aid is often targeted to address high mortality rates in poor
countries. Moreover, provisions are made within international laws and conventions to protect all citizens of the
world against genocide, war crimes, and arbitrary killings. In
practice, however, the principle of the sanctity of life has
been upheld in a morally inconsistent manner. Beginning with Hobbes, the moral commitment to
the value of life has always been qualified and conditional: it has meant respect for
the life of some but not all people . Hobbes himself argues that the prohibition against war only
applies to civil wars — wars of ‘us’ against ‘us’ — and not wars aimed at the domination of ‘other’
peoples by ‘us’ (Leviathan, xx). By waging wars and colonial campaigns or by presiding over a
system of distribution of wealth in the world that leaves many to die from hunger, the
‘civilized,’ life-respecting countries of the West have, arguably, imposed more death on one
another or on the rest of the world than any of the vilest empires that history can remember. The
case of Terri Schiavo, which I first discussed in the introductory chapter of this book, is instructive. In the spring of 2005, when this conclusion was
originally being drawn up, a genocidal campaign was being waged in Sudan, many civilians were struggling with the ‘collateral damage’ of the war on
terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thousands of people in the world’s poorest countries were dying prematurely from easily preventable causes. As all
this was unfolding, the United States came to grips with a moral crisis over the question whether it was right or wrong to let one person, Terri Schiavo,
die after being in a persistent vegetative state for years. The pilot
who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national
hero, the terrorist who blows himself up is a coward, the child dying from hunger is a non-person , and
Terri Schiavo is a cause célèbre for a morally confused culture of respect for life. The writings of Foucault (1990, 2003), Agamben (1998, 2005), and
Bauman (1992, 1998), as well as those of postcolonial writers such as Balibar (2001), suggest that this
moral inconsistency is
integral to the dynamics of the Western culture of life and death. Foucault has argued that
racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order: ‘For millennia man remained
what he was for Aristotle: a living being with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence
as a living being into question’ (1990: 143). According to this view, the
Holocaust, as well as the looming possibility of a
nuclear war during the Cold War, both stemmed, ironically, from the modern Western political
imperative to take charge of life and how it is lived. Wars are no longer waged to defend the
sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire
populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life
necessity : massacres have become vital’ (ibid.: 137). Similarly, today the ‘naked question of
survival’ (ibid.) is reinvoked to justify the actions of those who endanger the lives of thousands of civilians around the world in the
name of a pre-emptive ‘war on terror,’ undertaken to protect their own citizens and civilization from the
mere potential of terrorist, nuclear, and biological attacks at some uncertain point in the future.
In all of these cases, ‘the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of

the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’ (ibid.). Giorgio Agamben and
Etienne Balibar explain this ironic contradiction in terms of the creation of categories of living non-
citizens (within national borders as well as on a global scale) and their subsequent exclusion
from participation in the politico-legal realm. Invoking the ancient figure of homo sacer — the person who
falls outside of legal and political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not
sacrificed — Agamben argues that sovereignty ancient or modern, is characterized by the
exceptional right to define and exclude homo sacer or bare life from the politicolegal realm: ‘What is
at stake is, once again, the definition of a life that may be killed without the commission of homicide’ (1998: 165). Agamben describes the Nazi
concentration camps, as well as contemporary refugee camps in the heart of Europe and elsewhere, as zones of exception, which function to exclude
certain categories of people from the legal protections afforded ordinary citizens who are integrated in the political community (ibid.: 147). Balibar
has argued that under modern capitalist political-economic conditions, the whole world is
divided into life zones and death zones, the former occupied by the citizens of affluent, stable, and
mostly Western countries,
while the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected
to various forms of extreme violence, including primarily, the lack of access to political participation, as well as being
subject to hunger, war, and genocide. For Balibar (2001: 10), although it is not always clear whether the life zones are responsible
for the creation of the death zones, what is less in doubt is that the existence of such zones is beneficial for the workings of Western capitalism, as they
leave millions of people too concerned with the naked question of survival to democratically participate in securing their political and economic rights
against global powers.
Impact---De Larrinaga Subject Formation
The production of subjectivities based on coherent social orders justifies violence
in the name of protecting that ideal subject---global militarization becomes
ingrained in social practices as life is mobilized toward interventions,
incarceration, and dispossession
Miguel de Larrinaga 12, Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Ottawa, “A Day in the Life”:
A Tomogram of Global Governmentality in Relation to the “War on Terror” on November 20th,
2003, in War Beyond the Battlefield, ebook
What is articulated and disseminated here, through these governmental rationalities and technologies, is a particular form of power. It is within this context that Foucauldian
notions of biopolitics and biopower can be addressed. Biopolitics concerns those governmental rationalities and technologies with the health and well-being of the population as
In contrast to sovereign power which, according to Foucault, is the power to “take life or let live”, biopower is the power to “‘make’ live and
its target.

biopower is also understood as a normalising power in that it

‘let’ die.”22 Along with what he termed disciplinary power,

works to regulate certain conduct through the production of certain subjectivities.

Unlike disciplinary power, however, which individualises in its production of subjects, biopower can be seen as massifying in that it operates and intervenes at the level of
One should not
populations as a whole. Having lived life as its target does not necessarily mean that this is a “benign” form of power as opposed to sovereign power.

understand this strategy of power as an attempt to provide a space to secure life in general but, rather, to produce and
secure specific forms of life that, as Dillon and Reid succinctly argue, are “amenable to its sway.”23 Indeed, one crucial aspect of
biopolitics is precisely that it is, as Sergei Prozorov argues, not “life-as-such” that is being nurtured, but “only the forms of

life that are in accordance with its specific rationality.”24 Moreover, it is within the context of biopolitics that the
extermination of populations can be rationalised in the name of the securing of the life of a
particular population. Indeed, as David Campbell argues, by having the health and welfare of the population as its referent, “decisions are
made in terms of collective survival, and killing is justified by the necessity of preserving
life.”25 In order to understand how governmentality and biopolitics can be deployed to understand the current “war on terror,” one needs to further understand how Foucault
articulates the relationship between sovereign power and biopower in relation to war beyond the battlefield.
Biopolitics, War and Exceptionalism
Foucault was ambiguous regarding the relationship between sovereign power and biopower. In some instances, he seems to indicate that biopower displaces sovereign power as
the dominant economy of power from the eighteenth century onward26 while in other instances Foucault highlights the way in which these economies of power live in tension
with each other and mutually reinforce each other.27 There is one instance, however, in which Foucault does bring together these forms of power explicitly and which is
particularly apposite to the subject matter of this article in terms of elucidating the spatial and temporal contours of the “war on terror”: the question of racism and war.
the power to kill could operate within an economy of power
In Society Must be Defended, Foucault addresses the question of how

that has “life as its object and objective.”28 As aforementioned, when power takes life as its referent, threats are understood in terms of the
survival of a particular population. It is in the delineating of this population and the way in which this

circumscription inscribes race in the “mechanisms of the state” 29 that sovereign power is
deployed in the service of the exigencies of biopolitics. In relation to sovereign power then, racism, for Foucault,
introduces “a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between
what must live and what must die.”30 It is through race then that sovereign power and its right to kill can be brought to bear in relation to
biopolitical rationalities that separate, categorise and create hierarchies in the biological. Moreover, the logic that underpins the way the biological is taken into account by
sovereign power in this sense is connected to, and ultimately transforms, the relationship of war that Foucault characterises as “if you want to live, you must destroy your
enemies.”31 By being articulated biopolitically, this relationship is intimately related to the health and welfare of the population. As Foucault illustrates, “The death of the other,
the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.”32 Within this
contex,the threat need not be articulated explicitly in biological terms. It suffices to understand
these threats as “either external or internal, to the population and for the population” and the vitality of this population being
predicated, not upon victory against political adversaries, but upon “the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race.”33 Instead of

understanding war in terms of conflict between self-same Others within an international realm,
war can be understood as something internal to the social , as an asymmetric threat to the integrity of the
population. When one translates this, as in our contemporary moment under the sign of the war on terror, as threats to “humanity” as

a whole, then one can understand the articulation between sovereign power and biopower no
longer in international terms but as having the globe as its plane of operation. As Vivienne Jabri illustrates, “If
biopower is conceived as a generalized terrain of humanity, its logic is the production of political space that extends well beyond the limits of the state, thereby reframing the
sphere of the international in imperial terms.”34
Foucauldian analytics of the relationship between sovereign power and biopower thus enables a spatial reconfiguration of war by understanding the central referent of war-

his work on war goes further in both spatially

making as the health and welfare of the population as a global biopolitical stance. Another facet of

and temporally reconfiguring the meaning of war . In attempting to continue to move beyond an understanding of
power based upon a juridico-political model, one of the central questions that Foucault tries to grapple with in the 1975–1976 lectures at the Collège de France, is if “war can
serve as an analyzer of power relations?”35 In addressing this question, the author attempts to trace the existence of a counter-discourse to the “philosophico-juridical”
discourse of war as a limit concept and of the Clausewitzian dictum of war being the continuation of politics by other means. What Foucault identifies in his genealogical
investigation is that Clausewitz was actually responding to this counter-discourse, a discourse that paradoxically develops concurrently with the establishment of the State’s
monopoly on violence and thus the cleansing of the social body of bellicose relations by expelling war to the limit of the State.36 This discourse, that he labels as “historico-
under the great juridico-political edifice of the
political,” posits that politics is the continuation of war by other means. In other words,

State lies war, which is at once the condition of possibility of this State in a foundational sense in
that “the law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields,” and in its performative
maintenance in that “war is the motor behind institutions and order .”37 In this sense,
instead of understanding war as a limit concept; destructive of social and political order, war, as
with the way Foucault generally understands power, is productive of such order as well as of the formation of particular

subjects.38 This discourse identifies war as running “through the whole of society, continuously
and permanently” while order is produced through an array of rationalities and technologies
that have characterised and continue to characterise liberal governmental order. In responding to how
Foucault understands the “distant roar of battle” as continuously underscoring global liberal governmentality Jabri reflects:
What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix
of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies
and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of
analysis is to point out that war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some
form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the
elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply
rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This
implies a continuity of sorts between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent
manifestations of government .39
Risk management fails---black swans mean doing nothing is better than doing
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB 11 is Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New
York University's Polytechnic Institute and the author of The Black Swan: The Impact of the
Highly Improbable. MARK BLYTH is Professor of International Political Economy at Brown
University. "The Black Swan of Cairo: how suppressing volatility makes the world less
predictable and more dangerous." Foreign Affairs 90.3 (May-June 2011): p33 Gale
Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007-8,
when the global financial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard
everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one
hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The
critical issue in both cases is the artificial suppression of volatility --the ups and downs of life-- in the
name of stability . It is both misguided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the
statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability "tail risks" to
disappear from policymakers' fields of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what
happens when highly constrained systems explode.
Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely
fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability
as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and
economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result
tends to be the opposite . These artificially constrained systems become prone to "Black
Swans "--that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the
statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.
Such environments eventually experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard
and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state.
Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems.
Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to
chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is
the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic
crisis of 2007-8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world . The policy implications are identical: to make
systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open--fluctuat nec mergitur (it fluctuates but does not sink) goes the
Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of "fail small" and "fail
fast"), the U.S. government should stop supporting dictatorial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow
political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be
visible; the same is true in politics.
Both the recent financial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are
grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in
the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating
fluctuation--no more booms and busts in the economy, no more "Iranian surprises" in foreign policy.
These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking
system became very fragile following a succession of progressively larger bailouts and government interventions,
particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trumpeted free
markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan effort throughout. Republicans have been
good at fragilizing large corporations through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the
same time, the financial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept getting weaker
while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben
Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of "the great
moderation" in 2004.
Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan
Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle's booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with
interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his economic
policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop--the now infamous "Greenspan put." These policies
proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain companies
to grow "too big to fail." Because
policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do
nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its
The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to
Greenspan's implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak's in Egypt for years engaged in overt
plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support.
Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road
must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major
explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artificially sterilized environment for a decade and then
invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest fires can
cause larger forest fires to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics,
price controls are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these
controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly
blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the benefits accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable,
are no different, in the long run, from those of an artificially controlled price.
Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to
the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite
reasonably, is to intervene in an effort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But
government interventions are laden with unintended--and unforeseen -consequences,
particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that
absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent
celebrated documentary on the financial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfeasance and dishonesty of
bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the film naively overlooks the fact that
humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only difference this time around
was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a misunderstanding of the statistical properties of the system.
What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited
competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate
these flaws. Humans
must try to resist the illusion of control : just as foreign policy should be intelligence-
proof (it
should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the
predictions of "experts" in what are inherently unpredictable domains ), the economy should be
regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets,
intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and profits for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build
complicated financial products that skirt those regulations.
The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to confirm that
the farmer cares for it--until the last day, when confidence is maximal. The "turkey problem" occurs when a naive analysis of
stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, confidence in stability was maximal at the onset of the
financial crisis in 2007.
The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously
inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability
and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts
reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the
elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability.
Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misunderstood, as
"tipping points." Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the
entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile,
but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error.
U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the government's not
foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure
for his administration's not foreseeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the
statistical tails that matters--not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated
interdependence and contagion effects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate,
namely, Black Swans.
Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are
linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics.
Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive
jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans' sophistication,
obtained over the history of human knowledge in the linear domain, does not transfer
properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a
space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems
have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of
those properties.
As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it,
and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the
components. But after the financial crisis of 2007-8, many people thought that predicting the
subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the
crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama's blaming "bad intelligence" for his
administration's failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the
misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved.
Obama's mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains--that is, confusing catalysts for causes
and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which effect. The final episode of the upheaval in
Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blaming the CIA is as
foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting
to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not
statistically understandable at the individual level.
As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted
regarding Egypt, policymakers should "think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the
average, you're making real money." But the analogy is spurious. There is no "four percent better" on Egypt. This is not just
money wasted but the construction of a false confidence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence
analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis--and offered the
exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic "tail events" are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not
scientifically measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting
revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics
into the tractable randomness of blackjack.
Most explanations being offered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the
"catalysts as causes" confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity
prices, not to stifling and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high GDPs that can afford to
import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its
fragility, not events, that must be studied--what physicists call "percolation theory," in which the properties of the terrain are
studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable,
what should be done? Differentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the first, changes in government do not
lead to meaningful differences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type,
changes in government lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes.
Consider that Italy, with its much-maligned "cabinet instability," is economically and politically stable despite having had
more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy's stability is because of these switches of
government). Similarly, in spite of consistently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments
can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend
to be comparatively mild. For example, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a
consequential jump in terms of the country's economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the
government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have
total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained.
In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein both constrained volatility by any
means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing
Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the democratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the
mosque had made Khomeini's rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to find
that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict
ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more
constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the
Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what
they mean.
Humans fear randomness --a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a different environment. Whereas in the
past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced fitness and increased chances of
survival, it can have the reverse effect in today's complex world, making volatility take the
shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of "great moderation." This is not
to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example.
But alongside the "catalysts as causes" confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of
control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing
nothing). This leads to the desire to impose (hu)man-made solutions. Greenspan's actions were
harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better
outcome than the other guy, regardless of the actual, delayed cost.
Their impact calc is part of a system of governance that polices the boundaries
between war and peace---endless war is present in incarceration, global policing,
privatization of common resources, and more---voting affirmative elides those
systems of violence by insisting on narrow chains of causality and the most
catastrophic impacts possible
Kevin McDonald 13, Professor and Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing
at Victoria University, Our Violent World: Terrorism in Society, 2013, pp. 1-4
Among the most significant Of these changes are transformations in forms Of social and political violence, the kinds Of violence recently described by the philosopher Charles
Taylor as 'categorial', directed towards people whom the protagonists do not personally know (2011). Often such violence is contrasted to the violence that takes place within
personal relationships, but as we will see as this book develops, this distinction is not as clear as it once may have been. The chapters that follow attempt to explore a con- text
that has become increasingly evident, as violence that once appeared to be 'contained' by key dimensions of modern society is now
much more fluid, increasingly part of the flows making up a global world (Urry 2005). But such violence is not a
'thing' or an object. It is a form of agency, an embodied relationship and human experience. As such, it is a critical lens through which to

explore wider transformations of social life. On the Other hand, to separate violence from such
transformations profoundly limits our capacity to understand, and respond to, one of
the most urgent questions shaping the twenty-first century. ¶ The Surveillance Society ¶ Most of us are aware
of changing forms or potentials of violence through the growth of security and surveillance (Crelinsten 2009). Some
developments are obvious, such as airport security. Others are less so, such as passport tracking systems, internment camps,

control orders and detention without trial, or erosion of the distinction between immigration
policy and security policy (Connolly 2005: 54). Some receive extensive debate in the press and social media, while Other developments are less discussed.
Over recent years, for example, states as different as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States have been engaged in the construction Of thousands Of kilometres Of walls
along national bor- ders, a development that the political scientist Wendy Brown calls 'walling', something she contends is driven by 'waning sovereignty' (2010).

military expenditure, which had declined in the years following the end of the Cold War in 1989, expanded rapidly over the first
decade of the new century, increasing by some 49 per cent to reach US$1.53 tril- lion in 2009 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011).
New types of public surveillance involve pervasive but ambiguous categories Of 'pre-crime' as public policy seeks to identify groups and individuals 'at risk' of committing
criminal acts (Zedner 2007). The changing role of the criminal justice system has become evident in the
relentless increase in the number of people imprisoned in the world, a figure that reached some 10.65 million in 2009
(Walmsley 2010). ¶ Political theorists in particular have been aware of the ways these transformations 'resonate', mutually

amplifying each other (Connolly 2005: 54). Brian Massumi (2007) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a
new type of governance in complex societies, one shaped by a shift from a model Of prevention, which operates in an 'objectively knowable
world', to a model of pre-emption, which involves the attempt to wield power in a world based on uncertainty. Brad Evans (2010) points to the rise of

'consequentialist ethics' involved in this development, where forms of moral judgement framed in terms of 'right'
and 'wrong' are becoming redefined as calculations to determine whether a situation is
to be judged better or worse as a result of a course of action. These are not minor trans- formations. The
OECD argues that 'security' has become a major area Of economic activity, a driver Of modern economies (OECD 2004), while the sociologist David Lyon traces the contours of
this new social and
a surveillance society increasingly based on digital technologies (Lyon 2004). The political philosopher William Connolly argues that

political model involves an increasing mobilization of the population against

'unspecified enemies' (2005: 54). ¶ The Blurring of War and Peace ¶ One Way to think about this transformation is in terms Of a changing relationship
between peace and war. The historical sociologist Charles Tilly argues that the emergence Of modern societies from the seventeenth century to the Second World
War Saw violence moving in two directions: increasingly deadly inter-state confrontations and increasingly peaceful domestic societies, evident in the disarming Of populations
an increasingly clear separation between zones
and the rise Of peaceful forms Of protest and conflict (Tilly 2002, 2003). This constituted

of war and zones of peace, a separation that for the philosopher Immanuel Kant constituted the very basis Of modern society (Kleingold 2006: ix). This
account of the birth Of modernity locates violence beyond the borders of increasingly peaceful societies, and
to a significant extent has established itself as a structure of thought preventing any significant

exploration of the violence at the heart of modern societies, in particular the violence present
in colonial expansion , or in the extent of atrocities and extreme violence undertaken by the colonizers in the process Of decolonization (Bennett 2011).
Within this modern self-understanding, the capacity for extreme violence has always been
associated with 'the Other with modern society, by definition, understood as being
inherently peaceful. ¶ The securitization we have referred to above signals two related transformations: the separation between war
and peace is becoming less and less clear, while the state's monopoly of violence is becoming less and less certain. Rather than
war being an external event, the cultural geographer Nigel Thrift argues that contemporary, globalizing societies have entered
an 'era of permanent and pervasive war' (2011: 11), with war no longer understood as taking
place beyond borders, but across all areas of social life. This shift seems particularly evident when we 100k at urban design, where
we encounter not simply the increasing integration of blast proofing and other defensive systems into buildings, but the actual militarization of urban

space, evident in particular in contemporary military theory where older conceptions of 'battlefield' are giving way to new models of 'battle space' (see Graham 2012) where
the space of warfare becomes 'cotermi- nus with the space of civil society itself' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 128). This pattern is
evident in the extent that conceptions of urban security devel- oped in a warzone such as post-2003 Baghdad have established themselves as paradigms for policing and security
War, from this perspective, rather than being an activity
in the cities Of North American and Europe (Graham 2010). ¶

beyond the borders Of modern society, becomes instead a lens with which to conceive of
the core organization of such societies. The rise of war as a lens to frame social life has been particularly evident in military theory. William Lind,
for example, argues that the world has entered an age of 'fourth generation war', characterized by the loss Of the state's monopoly over the exercise Of War. Today states find
themselves at war with non-state opponents, wars he argues that states are losing. Writing in a respected journal, Lind argues 'invasion by immigration can be at least as
dangerous as invasion by a state army' (2004: 14). We do not need to embrace this type Of argument to rec- ognize that the twenty-first century has been shaped by an
awareness of a new vulnerability.
Free Market
Cost NB---2NC
Subsidizing health care spikes demand---causes massive cost increases
Kel Kelly 11, Wall Street trader, a corporate finance analyst, and a research director for a
Fortune 500 management consulting firm. 3/9/11, “The Myth of Free-Market Healthcare”
The other major problem with our healthcare system is our third-party payer system, where we
rely on
When something is free or mostly free, people demand more of it. With someone else paying
their bills, people make more trips to the doctor, they don't negotiate against increasing prices
they face, and they don't balk at more and more superfluous tests and more specialist visits being
required of them. This constitutes more demand for healthcare services and equipment, the owners
of which raise prices in response, not only to take advantage of their increased pricing power, but to try to reduce their
workload, because more people start to demand healthcare than providers have the time and resources to address. Prices are used to
equate supply with demand. With the supply of doctors restricted by the AMA, and increasing demand for relatively
free healthcare on the part of consumers, prices began to rise rapidly, and waiting times to
see doctors became longer.
Cost Adv
Link---Economic Security/Competitiveness

Instability from economic decline doesn’t translate into conflict

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International
and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol.
25, No. 4, p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the
more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum
sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of
the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine
democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these
dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead
the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that
economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become
discredited , it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and
mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or
even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought
that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that
the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone
suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about
greater economic conflict , it will not make war thinkable .

The pursuit of competitiveness causes overstretch---makes competitiveness

collapse inevitable
Stephen M. Walt 16, is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at
Harvard University. 5/26/16, “A New-Old Plan to Save the World … That Has No Hope of
Saving the World”
Third, like the neoconservatives who promised the invasion of Iraq would be quick and cheap and yield manifold benefits, the
report assumes the recommended “extensions” of American power carry no real risks. If America just asserts itself
in all these places, the report assumes adversaries will be cowed and behave pretty much as we want. The
past 25 years might have taught the signatories that 1) other states have vital interests too; 2) the
enemy gets a vote; 3) even close allies don’t always follow the U.S. lead; and 4) military force is a
crude instrument that typically produces lots of unintended consequences, and sometimes
fails completely — as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya . Yet the possibility that their various
prescriptions will not work as intended does not seem to have occurred to them. As soon as one of their ambitious projects goes
badly, America’s ability to pursue the others will perforce decline.
Fourth, and following from the last point, the report’s authors do not recognize that even a global power like the
United States needs to set priorities and make choices. There is no recognition that doing more
in the Middle East might impinge on the U.S. ability to balance China in Asia, or that the
strategy they recommend might drive China, Russia, and Iran closer together. There is
no awareness that confronting Russia in its own backyard might undermine efforts to cooperate
with Moscow over the conflict in Syria, China’s rising power, Iran’s nuclear program, or nuclear security more broadly.
Nor do they admit that their strategy inevitably means higher taxes or bigger deficits (or both)
and less money to devote to strengthening the long-term foundations of U.S. power:
infrastructure, education, and R&D. For these reasons, as Daniel Davis warns in his own critique of the report, their
prescriptions are more likely to jeopardize U.S. primacy than prolong it.
That possibility is even more likely if China’s leaders are smart enough to avoid costly conflicts and focuses primarily on building a
world-class economy. Remember: The United States joined the ranks of the great powers by staying out of distant battles and
building power at home, and the European powers’ penchant for fighting ruinous wars helped accelerate America’s rise. Beijing
appears to have learned that lesson well, while Washington repeatedly forgets it.
Fifth, what is perhaps most revealing about this unqualified defense of liberal hegemony is how
insensitive it is to the actual state of the world. It doesn’t matter where the United States
is located, what its internal condition is, where principal dangers might lie, what the balance of
power is in different parts of the world, or whether the main challenge we face is a large and
well-armed peer competitor like the Soviet Union or a shadowy terrorist network like al Qaeda.
No matter what the question is, the answer is always the same: The United States is the
“indispensable power,” it must take the lead in solving every global issue, and it must actively
interfere in other countries in order to keep the current world order intact.
Extending American Power ends by warning that “the task of preserving a world order is both difficult and never-ending.” The
authors undoubtedly hope this admonition will persuade readers to suck it up and bear the necessary burdens of running the world.
What this statement actually reveals, however, is that they recognize the liberal order the United States has labored
for decades to create is about as durable as cotton candy.
This depressing realization suggests America’s foreign-policy experts need to rethink their basic approach
to dealing with the rest of the world, instead of simply devising new rationales for a failing
strategy. But as this report (and others like it) demonstrate, that much-needed reassessment is not likely to emerge from the
same people and institutions that helped bring us to where we are today.

Competitiveness impact empirically denied

Kapila 10 [Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst and
the Consultant for Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group and a graduate of the Royal
British Army Staff College with a Masters in Defence Science and a PhD in Strategic Studies.,
“21st Century: Strategically A Second American Century With Caveats,” June 26,
Strategically, the 20th Century was decidedly an American Century. United States strategic,
military, political and economic predominance was global and undisputed. In the bi-polar global power
structure comprising the United States and the Former Soviet Union it was the United States which globally prevailed. The 20th Century's dawn was marked by the First
World War which marked the decline of the old European colonial powers, noticeably Great Britain. The Second World War marked the total eclipse of Great Britain and
other colonial powers. The United States replaced Great Britain as the new global superpower. The 20th Century's end witnessed the end of the Cold War, with the
On the verge of the new
disintegration of the Former Soviet Union as the United States strategic challenger and counter-vailing power.

millennium the United States strode the globe like a colossus as the sole global super power.
With a decade of the 21st Century having gone past, many strategic and political analysts the
world over have toyed with projections that United States global predominance is on the
decline, and that the 21st Century will not be a second American Century. Having toyed, with such projections, these analysts however shy away from predicting
whose century the 21st Century will strategically be? The trouble with such projections is that they are based

predominantly on analyses of economic trends and financial strengths and less on detailed
analyses of strategic and military strengths, and more significantly strategic cultures. Presumably,
it is easier for such analysts to base trends on much quoted statistical data. Strategic analysis
of global predominance trends is a more complex task in the opinion of the Author, as it cannot be based on statistical data
analysis. Global predominance trends need unravelling of strategic cultures of contending

powers, the reading of national intentions and resolve and the inherent national strengths and willpower demonstrated over a
considerable time span of half-centuries and centuries. Crisply put, one needs to remember
that in the 1980's, Japan and Germany as "economic superpowers" could not emerge as
global superpowers. Hence global predominance calls for more than economic strengths. The
United States getting strategically bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of
the 21st Century has not led to any noticeable decline in American global predominance.
Despite Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States reigns supreme globally even in East Asia where
China could have logically challenged it. More significantly, and normally forgotten, is the fact that the off-quoted shift
of global and economic power from the West to East was facilitated by United States massive
financial direct investments in China, Japan, South Korea and India. China quoted as the
next superpower to rival the United States would be economically prostate, should the United States
surgically disconnect China's economic and financial linkages to the United States. More significantly,
while examining the prospects of the 21st Century as a "Second American Century" it must be remembered that besides other factors, that out of the six

multipolar contenders for global power, none except China have shown any indications to
whittle down US global predominance. Even China seems to be comfortable with US power
as long as it keeps Japan in check. This Paper makes bold to assert that the 21st Century would be a Second
American Century despite China's challenge and the strategic distractions arising from the
global Islamic flash-points.

Doesn’t translate into leverage

Nye 10 Joseph Prof @ Harvard, The Future of American Power, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec2010,
Vol. 89, Issue 6, EBSCO
Pundits lament the inability of Washington to control states such as Afghanistan or Iran, but
they allow the golden glow of the past to color their appraisals. The United States' power is not what it used to be, but it
also never really was as great as assumed. After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and an

overwhelming preponderance of economic power but nonetheless was unable to prevent

the "loss" of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome stalemate in the Korean
War, to stop the "loss" of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba. Power measured
in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes, and cycles of
belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power
resources. Unfortunately, mistaken beliefs in decline--at home and abroad--can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy.
Internal Link---1NR
Plan’s not sufficient to solve IT entrepreneurship, financial constraints are irrelelvant, and more
immigration is needed so changing the limits of political community is key to solve---their
Stangler 16 — Dane Stangler, Vice President of Research & Policy at the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, JD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Last Cited 01-28-2016,
"The Looming Entrepreneurial Boom" Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation,

Like many entrepreneurs, we at the Kauffman Foundation are optimists. We expect the trends of
lower entrepreneurship and diminished dynamism to turn around. The United States, we
believe, is on the verge of a new entrepreneurial boom. One, perhaps counterintuitive,
reason for our optimism is demography: this country is about to experience a surge of labor
market entrants, thanks to the millennial generation. The millennials now span the age range
between roughly sixteen and thirty-five, and their labor market heft will only grow over the
next decade. As the millennials approach the “peak age” for business creation—their late
thirties and early forties—we might expect a boost to overall business creation.33 Second,
the early stages of the tech boom we’ve described, marked particularly by lower costs to start

a company and the spread of smartphones, may progress and bolster entrepreneurial activity.34
The entrepreneurial benefits of this IT wave have not been realized fully yet. The
explosion of mobile apps for smartphones undoubtedly has been a boon to many entrepreneurs,
but it also appears that the initial stages of this new industry have been biased somewhat toward
incumbent firms.35 Considerable room for innovation remains, and we are at the point
in the cycle when the diffusion of IT will create even more entrepreneurial opportunities than
the first stages did.36 We are entering the “learning by doing” stage, in which a greater
diversity of entrepreneurs will help realize the full value of smartphones, cloud
computing, the Internet of Things, and other technologies.37 This next
entrepreneurial wave, however, is not inevitable. Public policy shapes the environment
in which entrepreneurs start and grow companies, and policymakers can take specific actions
to help foster—rather than inhibit—the era of renewed entrepreneurial growth we see
approaching. The decisions made by government at the federal, state, and local levels, therefore,
will have a significant impact, and it is certainly possible that public policy could derail our
optimistic forecast.
Minnesota’s card ends
We present our own policy priorities for entrepreneurial growth below, incorporating many of the
conclusions in the papers that follow. The policy changes we need, including those discussed here, are much harder to
implement than the announcement of a government agency’s superficial new entrepreneurship program. Subsidizing business
creation is not the same as fostering entrepreneurial growth, and, above all, policymakers must focus on identifying ways to, as
economists put it, lower the costs of entrepreneurial experimentation or reduce the “frictions on experimentation.”38
Even as we pursue better entrepreneurship policy, however, we must be mindful that there are limits to the amount of
entrepreneurial activity that public policy can create—and that better policy alone will not necessarily lead to more entrepreneurial
success. A recent compilation of interviews with unsuccessful entrepreneurs and investors concerning the reasons for their business
failures is telling: entrepreneurs most often cited factors related primarily to management or strategy, rather than regulation or
money.39 Entrepreneurship is, and always will be, challenging—a “hard thing.”40 That said, policymakers can take specific actions
to help foster a new era of entrepreneurial growth.
Mobility and Risk. Many commentators, observing an overall decline in the rate of American firm formation, have wondered
if Americans have somehow become more risk averse over time. While we hesitate to make broad demographic or
cultural generalizations, a shift in the policy perspective toward entrepreneurs could make a difference in Americans’ labor mobility
and attitude toward risk.
For many years, the approach to most entrepreneurship policy and programs has focused on sufficiency: entrepreneurs and
potential entrepreneurs, policymakers have observed, have insufficient resources – primarily money, but also talent and expertise.
Policy and programs, therefore, have focused on providing them with the resources needed. As the notion that entrepreneurs faced
severe financial constraints dominated these discussions, it was thought that alleviating these constraints—through loans, subsidies,
grants, incentives, and so on—would increase entrepreneurship.
Yet, research has called this assumption of financial constraints into question. One common theme of the
following essays and conference session summaries is that we may need to move from a sufficiency approach to what might be called
an insurance approach. For many individuals, the barrier to starting a business is not insufficient funds, but the opportunity cost of
trying. As one conference participant noted, “If we want people to take more risk, we need to make it less risky.” We need an
entrepreneurial safety net, of sorts—something that creates a form of insurance to reduce the opportunity cost of
entrepreneurs and enable more people to experiment with ideas. This effort could take the form of a new type of social insurance
program or a tweak to a current program, like unemployment insurance.
Social insurance, of course, is a politically complex term. There are those who believe that the very idea of entrepreneurship, red in
tooth and claw, is incompatible with the idea of social insurance. But we believe that we need to think about social insurance in
terms of risk, the personal risks we wish entrepreneurs to take in pursuit of starting up companies. As our economy changes, we
need to walk in the shoes of those trying to make the decision whether or not to start companies, and find ways to help them. If
social insurance needs to be part of that discussion, so be it.
Labor Supply. Another approach to renewing entrepreneurial growth is to focus on the labor supply. If—as preliminary research
suggests—slowinglabor force growth is found to be the principal reason behind the long-term fall
in business creation, then attention should be directed at ways to encourage faster labor force growth. That’s much easier
said than done, of course, and attempts to expand the labor force would run up against large demographic trends.
Immigration, however, is an obvious place to look for more people to enter the labor force. The Kauffman Foundation
and others have touted the economic benefits of immigration for many years, including immigrants’ high rate of entrepreneurial
activity. If and when immigration reform is enacted in Washington, research strongly suggests that it should include new pathways
for immigrant entrepreneurs, including a startup visa program.41 The federal government also should encourage and support the
early-state experimentation using H-1B visas for “resident entrepreneurs” that has occurred at universities in Massachusetts and
Colorado, and clarify administrative rules regarding Optional Practical Training (OPT) and Curricular Practical Training (CPT)
opportunities to ensure that they can include entrepreneurship.42
To encourage younger workers to enter the labor force, educational institutions should expand the range of startup apprenticeships
available for high school and college students. Apprenticeships have gained credence with many observers in recent years, and we
need to ensure that entrepreneurial companies have the resources to support apprentices and interns. More exposure to
entrepreneurship in these settings may lead to more new business creation later.
Data and Measurement. The government also should use its statistical and funding powers to gather
and publish data on pathways to entrepreneurship. The federal government has compiled an enormous set of
data on earnings by degrees and on various institutions among colleges and universities. Such data are useful and have greatly
expanded the amount of information prospective students, their parents, and future employers have about the links between college
degrees, fields of study, and employable skills. But, they don’t always reflect the realities of the labor market and how people fall into
certain careers. With the Census Bureau collecting reams of new information on business owners through the new Annual Survey of
Entrepreneurs, there should be scope to compile data on the routes people take to entrepreneurship. This could take some of the
mystique out of entrepreneurship—you don’t have to be a Stanford dropout to do it—and show people that there are multiple
pathways to entrepreneurial success. More information should enable people to make better decisions about whether and when to
start businesses.

Costs don’t hurt US industries

Toni Johnson 12, CFR analyst. 3/26/12, “Healthcare Costs and U.S. Competitiveness”
Still, other experts debate the degree to which health care affects U.S. industries. "Health benefits are largely
substitutes for other forms of labor compensation," says American Enterprise Institute Fellow
Thomas Miller in a roundup. "Hence U.S. firms have performed well [in the
past], despite rising levels of healthcare costs, because high levels of productivity and a
favorable investment climate were (and remain) much more important factors in
determining competitiveness."
Health care is one of several factors--entrenched union contracts are another--that make doing business in the
United States expensive, and it’s difficult to parse the effects of each factor. Moreover, economists disagree on
the number of U.S. jobs that have been lost to offshoring--the transfer of business operations
across national boundaries to friendlier operating environments. A RAND June 2009 study published in the
Health Services Research Journal found that industries with the highest level of employer-sponsored health care (such as
manufacturing, telecommunications, education, and finance) showed the slowest amounts of growth between 1987 and 2005
compared to industries with the smallest level of employer-provided insurance in the United States and compared to their industry
competitors in Canada, where insurance is provided by the state. U.S. News and World Report Money blogger Rick Newman uses
some of the RAND data to project the decrease in industry growth and potential job losses for fifteen sectors should healthcare costs
rise to 20 percent of U.S. GDP.
Link---Water Scarcity

Water war scenario planning creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and reactionary

militarization---ensures violent reactions that turn the case and cause global wars-
--only the alt solves the root cause
Guslits 11 Bayly Guslits Political Science Department University of Western Ontario “The War
on Water: International Water Security” February 28,
The world is facing a water crisis, but there is still much that can be done to address the problems causing the emergency. First,
"securitization" of the water crisis can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it is
not approached from a holistic viewpoint that takes into consideration ecological, human and state water security
needs. If academics and policymakers continue to debate over whether the "water
wars" scenario will ever come true, states may take this as a cue to securitize
and militarize their water resources , and this will certainly lead to political and even
violent conflict. However, if instead policymakers and government leadership use a holistic and diplomatic approach
to address ecological and human water needs sustainably, international water security can be achieved. Whether this approach
is branded a "post-security" or "environmental security" paradigm, the
ultimate goal lies in changing policy
and practice to address the root causes of water scarcity, and thus ensure water availability
for environmental and anthropogenic purposes.
Coverage Adv

Synthetic bioweapons aren’t widespread, reproducible, or controllable

Catherine Jefferson 14, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine
at King’s College London, et al., 9/18/14, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,”
Synthetic biology is not easy . The assumption that synthetic biology makes it easy for anybody to
“engineer biology” is not true. The underlying vision holds that well-characterized biological parts can
be easily obtained from open-source online registries and then assembled, by people with no specialist
training outside professional scientific institutions, into genetic circuits, devices and systems that will reliably perform desired
functions in live organisms.
This vision, however, does not even reflect current realities in academic or commercial science
laboratories , let alone the situation facing people with no specialist training who work outside
professional scientific institutions. Academic and commercial researchers are still struggling with every
stage of the standardization and mechanization process.
Even if the engineering approaches offered by synthetic biology make processes more systematic and more
reproducible, skills do not become irrelevant , and all aspects of the work do not become easier. Certainly,
advances in synthetic biology do not make it easier for anybody to engineer biological systems,
including dangerous ones. An analogy to aeronautical engineering is useful: Planes are built from a large
number of well-characterized parts in a systematic way. But this does not mean that any
member of the general public can build a plane, make it fly, and use it for commercial

Catastrophic descriptions of a bioterror threat justify violent management of life

at the population level, along with a continuous state of bio-emergency
Dagmar Rychnovská 17, Department of Security Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, and
Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Czech Republic, “Bio(in)security, scientific
expertise, and the politics of post-disarmament in the biological weapons regime,” Geoforum,
Volume 84, 2017, pp. 378-388
The imaginaries of biological threats and the prominence of these issues on the political agenda of Western governments have
undergone major changes. What started to be seen as a security concern has been not only a deliberate spread
much broader scope of biological risks related to the increasing global
of disease, but also
circulation of bodies, materials, and technologies (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). The narratives of how
biological agents may be used in political violence changed further in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the
anthrax letters incidents as a part of a broader concern that malign nonstate actors may seek to develop and use WMD (Guillemin,
2005; Wright, 2006). The taxonomy of biological threats and risks started to increasingly include not only
biological warfare, but also biological terrorism , biological crimes, laboratory incidents, and dual-use research,
and some add even naturally occurring pandemics to this issue-area as well (Koblentz, 2010). To address biological risks and threats,
many governments started to develop new strategies for managing these issues (Bonin, 2007; Lentzos and Rose, 2009).
These changes have been compiled under the notion of biosecurity (Lakoff and Collier, 2008; Rappert and Gould, 2009).
Biosecurity embodies a new approach to secure society against biological threats and risks,
legitimizing a state of continuous bio-emergency (Braun, 2007). As such, biosecurity leads to
not only new understanding of values and vulnerabilities in security politics but also new techniques of anticipatory
governance (cf. Anderson, 2010), which justify the establishment of new preparedness policies and practices
crossing the boundaries of disarmament, policing, public health, science governance, etc. (Caduff,
2012; Cooper, 2006; Dobson et al., 2013).
The attempts to develop new governmental techniques to address bio-insecurities can also be observed in the biological weapons
regime, with an effect on science–security relations. Similarly to the chemical weapons regime, biological disarmament is thought of
as facing the challenge of “global shifts in the nature and mode of organized violence and conflicts, and incremental and interlinked
changes in science and technology” (Ilchmann and Revill, 2014: 754). These challenges have been recognized at the BWC especially
after 2002, when new ways to approach biological disarmament started to be sought.5 Scholars point out several dimensions of this
development in this regard.
On-the-one-hand, linking
bioweapons with terrorism and other nontraditional forms of political violence caused
changing understandings of the referent object threatened by bioweapons. Not militaries, but whole
populations are perceived as the risk group to be protected. As a result, the preparedness for
biological risks started to be linked more with the governance of public health —both in national
and international contexts (Kelle, 2007).6 On-the-other-hand, what came to be seen as a key concern for the BWC has been the pace
of techno-scientific progress in life sciences and the convergence of life sciences with chemistry, engineering, and other academic
fields. Because biowarfare programs of the 20th century were established in close conjunction with broader scientific developments,
the capacity of disarmament practices to keep up with the rapid advances in life sciences is seen as crucial for the success of the
regime (Dando, 1999). Scholars and practitioners alike in this regard point out especially the increasing scope of facilities,
equipment, agents, and knowledge that have socalled dual-use and may be thus used in legitimate research and development and for
causing harm (Atlas and Dando, 2006; Buchanan and Kelley, 2013; Revill and Jefferson, 2013; Tucker, 2012). Given the apparent
accessibility of biological materials and technologies, the rising power of science and technology is seen as increasing the
opportunities of state and nonstate actors to obtain bioweapons and enhance their lethality (Atlas and Dando, 2006; Chyba and
Greninger, 2004; McLeish and Nightingale, 2007; Tucker and Zilinskas, 2006).

Their description of the pandemic threat constructs a vision of a limitless field of

possible diseases that might arise, creates zones of vulnerability subject to violent
control---that also promotes counterproductive disease control policies like the
closing of borders and stockpiling of drugs
Sarah Sanford 16, Senior Research Coordinator at Public Health Toronto, PhD from the Dalla
Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, “Preparedness as a technology of
(in)security: Pandemic influenza planning and the global biopolitics of emerging infectious
disease,” Social Theory and Health, Volume 14, 2016, pp. 18-43
Our analysis sheds light on how pandemic influenza has been conceived of as a political problem by the WHO and, by extension, one
that requires a particular form of intervention. The texts analyzed here construct specific versions of reality that are
implicated in both the problematization of, and the solution to, a future pandemic. This in-depth
empirical work contributes to contemporary understandings of biopolitical regulation by exposing the organizing logic underpinning
preparedness, and by considering the possible implications of this imagining for intervention into a future global pandemic. The
construction of the natural features of the influenza virus in terms of its potential to transform
into the next pandemic virus and spread across multiple boundaries, necessitates the integration of
preparedness activities (characterized by flexibility and contingency) into everyday practice. Thus, the potentiality
and inherent uncertainty of the virus becomes at once the target of intervention and
representative of the underlying reasoning of response mechanisms.
Pandemic preparedness discourse operates as a technology of (in)security that renders the
uncertainty of pandemic emergence governable. The threat of pandemic influenza to the health of the global
population is conceived of, and responded to, through specification of the very features of the virus and its potential to disrupt
society in numerous ways. The construction of the virus, both in terms of its pandemic potentiality and
its capacity to transgress corporeal and territorial boundaries, is key in this regard; these features reveal the
interconnectedness of territories, and how such interconnectedness constitute zones of vulnerability to
pandemic emergence, and thus threats to global health.
This study contributes to recent critical social science work analyzing the framing of pandemic influenza and corresponding
preparedness and response mechanisms in terms of: securitization (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012); the extension of public
health intelligence activities beyond traditional means (French and Mykhalovskiy, 2013); understandings of ‘vulnerability’ by the
public and within national and sub-national planning (Stephenson et al, 2014); and the governing of uncertainty through potential
or future biosecurity threats (Samimian-Darash, 2013; Thomas, 2014). Our interpretation also resonates with other work that
critically examines technologies of security, which are presented as a panacea in environments
increasingly marked by insecurity (Aas et al, 2009). As Zedner (2009) points out, technologies of
security frequently result in greater insecurity for many individuals or social groups (for
example, checking of ID cards of immigrants and refugees). Similarly, we have demonstrated the mutually constitutive way in which
pandemic preparedness, as a technology of (in)security, discursively constructs new
vulnerabilities , increasing both the demand for security solutions and insecurity of those
deemed unable to protect themselves against emerging threats (for example, through the purchase of
pharmaceuticals or the stockpiling of non-pharmaceutical resources ).
Furthermore, we have analyzed the ways in which the molecular level of the ‘viral’ is discursively implicated in the
logic of pandemic preparedness at the scale of the global population , which enables the
implementation of interventions at the national and transnational level (Raman and Tutton, 2010). The
‘natural’ potentiality of the virus implicates all viral strains in a future pandemic and
constructs multiple possibilities for the source and origin of emergence of the next pandemic
virus. The discursive linking of pandemic and non-pandemic viral activity poses a problem for risk governance; the uncertainty
that is constituted by these blurred distinctions creates a need for the continuous differentiation between these possibilities. In this
way, pandemic planning constitutes society as ‘insecure’ because of the ongoing possibility that ‘normal’ viruses will transform and
spread across bodies and territories, a threat that preparedness simultaneously aims to preempt in the objective of global security.
Thus, these viral
constructions also serve as a key technique in enabling the forms and logic of
preemption that characterize preparedness, and necessitate the continuity that drives ongoing global
pandemic influenza governance – if every influenza virus has the potential to transform and become the pandemic virus,
then preemptive intervention is required to respond to this risk.
The integration of pandemic into everyday processes is co-constituted with the viral object. The
viral potentiality and
ubiquity of risk, which occurs in the interconnections or boundaries that constitute the social world, and in the viral
circulations that we know as ‘natural’, also expand the possibilities for the temporality and territory of
intervention . Risk is rendered governable through the ongoing engagement with the possibility of the exceptional pandemic,
rather than through the calculation of probabilities. This integration is most apparent in the 2005 restructuring of pandemic phases
to include the ‘normal’ state of, animal, infection (not necessarily accompanied by human infection). The logic of
preparedness, while still oriented toward a future event, is no longer focused on the prevention of specific or
isolated disease outbreaks or events by precluding certain risks that may lead to these undesirable outcomes (for
example, pandemic), but is rather focused on securing uncertainty through the regulation and
control of emergent risk via ongoing engagement and adaptation (Dillon, 2007; Lakoff, 2007).
In pandemic planning, biopolitical regulation targets not simply circulation characterizing the (human) population, but also as it
pertains to the ‘natural’ tendency of the influenza virus to circulate and expand. Of particular concern is the regulation of those
‘between’ spaces that present a potential conduit for transmission of the virus between bodies and species, as well as across
territories. While between spaces and the social relations that are implicated in their creation are constituted as sites of potential risk
because of possible viral transgression, and consequently as possible targets of surveillance and control, the final objective of this
form of regulation is not immobilization, or the restriction of circulation.
Instead, national bodies and other actors are called upon to account for shared or proximate borders that are
constituted as sites of vulnerability in terms of the possible spread of disease across such
boundaries. Response to viral threat is framed in terms of the mapping of vulnerabilities in a ‘society’ that is imagined largely
along organizational lines, for example, in terms of the interconnectedness of businesses or governmental ministries. Thus, much of
the reference to the restriction of movement involves the recourse to discretion on a case-by-case basis, and at various levels of
control is a crucial feature of global
governance (for example, national, local and individual). This
biopolitical regulation, which involves the calculation of ‘the extent to which life must be
incited to be free, or subjected to scrutiny and discipline’ (Kiersey, 2009, p. 41).
The construction of viral potentiality and expansion across social boundaries is complicated by the parallel functioning of epidemic
as operating ‘for’ or ‘against’ the people, a point that recognizes the processes of circulation as intrinsic to the population (Thacker,
2009). Preemptive responses to this threat allow for the ongoing distinction between desirable and undesirable forms of circulation.
The problematization of the pandemic influenza virus according to its potential to transgress boundaries and expand across states
and populations opens up multiple possibilities for intervention. For example, the positioning of risk in relation to animals
encourages the surveillance of animal populations that often culminates in culling, regardless of whether all of the animals are
infected. While such interventions are positioned as justifiable in order to manage viral circulation and potential disease outbreaks,
they may have significant economic consequences for those involved in the farming and trade of livestock. Moreover, intensive
surveillance may also result in the stigmatization of human bodies closely connected to
infected animals. Finally, the positioning of particular nations and pan-national regions (for
example, nations that are linked through proximity, shared borders or trade partnerships) as inadequate in the tracking
and containment of the natural mutability of the virus justifies certain exclusionary practices .
For instance, this construction legitimizes
the closing of borders to protect against products and beings
from these ‘uncontained’ regions, enacted as a last resort. It also justifies global surveillance and
other containment measures within national borders that aim to ensure the ‘global good’ while
condemning those nations unable or unwilling to undertake such preparedness activities.
At the global level, this mode of governance diverges from the disciplinary mechanisms that attempt to bring individuals in-line with
the norm, through various forms of expert knowledge (Lemke, 2011). Instead, uncertainty is taken as the given in terms of the
emergence of pandemic viral strains, and rather than prevent emergence, security mechanisms attempt to regulate this uncertain,
yet imminent, event. This securitization is to be achieved through a recourse to freedom (Lentzos and Rose, 2009), which allows for
the circulation of viral strains (among other entities) and responds primarily through the adaptation of existing infrastructure and
networks (for example, vaccine production networks) in order to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic. In line with Cooper’s
(2006) observation, discourse
concerning the potential threat posed by the virus entrenches
wealthy nations in the very process of emergence to the point of actualizing it
through the production of a global stockpile of anti-virals and other materials, with significant
consequences for economic profit from an unrealized event.3
Central to Foucauldian interpretations of security apparatuses is their position as ‘counterparts to liberal freedom and [as] the
condition for its existence. Security mechanisms are meant to secure and protect the permanently
endangered naturalness of the population, as well as its own forms of free and spontaneous self-regulation’ (Lemke,
2011, p. 47). Technologies of security are aimed at protecting the whole from the internal
threats that exist within the social body , which is always at risk. Our analysis illuminates how molecular
constructions operate in service of global security and freedom, in addition to the disciplinary mechanisms discussed earlier in this
article. The ubiquitous risk of a pandemic virus that could disrupt the ‘naturalness’ of circulation of living and non-living things (for
example, humans, goods, information) necessitates an ongoing response to all possibilities of viral activity in order to mitigate or
minimize disruptions within networks of circulation (for example, by targeting/accounting for advisories around social gatherings,
work/school attendance and travel). This is substantiated by predictions that illness because of a global pandemic could result in
GDP losses between 0.5 (£8.4 billion) and 4.3 per cent (£72.3 billion) in the UK alone (Smith et al, 2009). These estimates would
increase when accounting for changes in routine such as widespread school closures or prophylactic absenteeism (Smith et al, 2009;
Smith et al, 2011). Thus, the
threat to the imagined ‘whole-of-society’ is in the undesirable
disruption to the circuitous arrangement of global capitalism and the interruption of economic
and social functioning. The possible closure of borders, restriction of movement through quarantine and other measures, or
the cancellation of social events, in response to a transgressive virus threaten the neoliberal conception of individual rights and
freedoms that is so highly valued in the West.