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Garbo vs. CA
July 5, 1996 Francisco, J.
FACTS: The RTC appointed Gloria Z. Garbo administratrix of the intestate
estate of Manuel G. Garbo. Three months later, the intestate estate of
Manuel G. Garbos wife, Magdalena B. Garbo, filed a petition for the
allowance of Manuel G. Garbos Last Will and Testament which devised and
bequeathed all of Manuel’s properties and assets exclusively to his wife
Magdalena. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal and, subsequently, her
record on appeal. Contending that pertinent pleadings were not included in
the record on appeal, private respondent objected to its admission.
Petitioner filed her compliance not by filing the amended record on appeal
but by attaching the omitted pages to be annexed or inserted to the
original record on appeal which private respondent stressed in his
opposition to compliance. The probate court directed the issuance of
letters of administration in favor of private respondent. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the probate courts
Order. Petitioner argues that she has substantially complied with the
probate courts order to submit an amended record on appeal and that she
is entitled to the liberal application of the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court and respondent Court of Appeals
properly dismissed petitioners appeal.
HELD: NO. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the
rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Petitioner offers no cogent
reason and none appears on record to justify her failure to file her
amended or redrafted record on appeal as directed by the probate court
twice despite the vehement objection of the private respondent.
Petitioners failure, if not an obstinate refusal to comply with the probate
courts orders is fatal. Decision Affirmed.
SSS vs. Chaves
Oct. 13, 2004 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, for
Specific Performance. They prayed that the Social Security System (SSS) be
ordered (1) to cancel the mortgage on the properties of the spouses; (2) to
release the documents covering the said properties; and (3) to pay the
spouses moral damages. The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim
alleging that the private respondents had an unpaid obligation. On motion
of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses, respondent
judge issued an Order declaring petitioner in default and allowed private
respondents to present their evidence ex-parte. The petitioner appealed
the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals
by way of a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in declaring the
petitioner in default.
HELD: YES. There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to
declare a party-defendant as in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial
conference. The declaration of default for nonappearance at a pre-trial
conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. Aside
from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the motion
to lift the order of default must further show that the defendant has a
meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the

order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not accompanied
by affidavits of merits, it may properly be denied. A perusal of petitioners
motion to lift order of default shows that it is neither under oath nor
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing.
There was also no showing, save in the instant petition, that it has
meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the
order of default set aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly denied petitioners
motion. Petition Denied.
Quiambao vs. CA
March 28, 2005 Tinga, J.
FACTS: Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along Capulong Street in
Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin
Garais who left the house the day before. After having asked her neighbors
and bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a certain policeman
was looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the
area as directed by the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by
petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Western Police District Command, and five (5) other persons.
Quiambao and his companions forcibly took Catolicos handbag and carried
away its contents consisting of precious assorted merchandise, jewelry and
other personal items worth approximately Nine Thousand Pesos
(P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner-
type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and,
while thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and warned her not
to look anymore for her housemaid. The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise
conducted an investigation on the charges filed. The Summary Dismissal
Hearing Officer (SDHO) recommended the dismissal of petitioner. The
National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. The Third Division of
the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from
police service. The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state all
the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
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reglementary period provided by law as it failed to state the date when
petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB. The appellate court
ruled that the issue of which administrative disciplinary authority had
jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only for the first time
before it. He did not raise it before the SDHO nor before the NAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate courts denial of the motion for
reconsideration was based on purely technical considerations.
HELD: NO. The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates
such as the date when the resolution or order denying a motion for
reconsideration was received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43. But the scenario is not
present in the case at bar for the aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition
filed with the appellate court reflected the date when petitioner actually
received the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23
September 1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied
so as not to frustrate substantial justice that this Court seeks to achieve.
Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in being passive to
Catolicos surreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary
documents of which petitioner was not furnished and to the latter's
prejudice. Sad to say, the matter is a factual one which is outside the ambit
of this mode of review. Besides, this issue was not even raised in the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals.
Petition Denied.
Barcenas vs. Tomas
March 31, 2005 Panganiban, J.
Petitioners are required by the Rules of Court to provide appellate courts
with certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the
subjects of review, as well as the material portions of the record. The
reason for such requirement is that these documents and pleadings are

needed by the reviewing courts in resolving whether to give due course to
petitions. Hence, this requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored or
violated. Failure to comply with it hinders the review of cases on the
merits, deprives the appellate courts of definitive bases for their actions,
results in frustrating delays, and contributes havoc to the orderly
administration of justice.
FACTS: A case for recovery of ownership and possession of real property
with damages was filed by Respondent Spouses Anastacio Tomas and
Candida Caliboso against the heirs of Veronica Tolentino. The Complaint
stated, among others, that after the death of her husband, Benedicto
Guerzon, Veronica sold to respondents a one-hectare portion of her
undivided share, the land was co-owned by her and her ten children.
Respondents took possession of the property immediately after the sale.
The couple migrated to the United States, leaving the lot in the possession
of Victoriano Tomas, the husband’s brother. The heirs of Veronica executed
an Extrajudicial Partition covering the entire property. As a result, a new
title was issued in the name of one of the heirs, Maximo Guerzon, who
wrested possession of the lot from Victoriano Tomas. Ruling that
respondents had the better right of possession and ownership of the land
in question, the MTC held that the sale of the one-hectare portion to them
had sufficiently been established by the notarized document of sale and by
their continuous possession of the property. The RTC affirmed the decision
of the MTC. The CA dismissed the Petition for Review because of the
following procedural infirmities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in giving evidentiary weight to
the deed of sale.
HELD: NO. Petitioners do not deny that the pertinent pleadings and
portions of the record in support of their allegations were not attached to
the Petition as required by Section 2(d) of Rule 42. They attribute this
procedural lapse to personal shortcomings, as well as to the purported
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unwillingness of lower court personnel to provide the needed documents.
No proof was adduced to validate these excuses, however. Unfortunately,
petitioners have not given any reasonable justification for liberalizing the
rules here. As pointed out earlier, because they had not moved for a
reconsideration of the CA Resolution -- for which they cited no reason --
they were not able to show reasonable diligence in subsequently
complying with the requirements. They must be reminded that except for
the most compelling grounds, procedural rules must be strictly complied
with to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Petition Denied.
Daikoku Electronic Phils., Inc. vs. Alberto Raza
June 25, 2009 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as company driver,
eventually assigning him to serve as personal driver to its president,
Mamuro Ono (Ono, hereafter). By arrangement, Alberto, at the end of each
working day which usually starts early morning and ends late at night,
parks the car at an assigned slot outside of Onos place of residence.
Alberto, after being let off by Ono, took the company vehicle to his own
place also in Makati City. This incident did not go unnoticed, as Ono asked
Alberto the following morning where he parked the car the night before. In
response, Alberto said that he parked the car in the usual condominium
parking area but at the wrong slot. Alberto received a show-cause notice
why he should not be disciplined for dishonesty. A day after, Alberto
submitted his written explanation of the incident, owning up to the lie he
told Ono and apologizing and expressing his regret for his mistake.
Following an investigation, the investigation committee recommended that
Alberto be suspended for 12 days without pay for the infraction of parking
the company vehicle at his residence and for deliberately lying about it. The
committee considered Albertos voluntary admission of guilt and apology as
mitigating circumstances. Daikoku’s general affairs manager, however, was
unmoved and ordered Alberto dismissed from the service. The labor
arbiter, on the finding that Albertos dismissal was predicated, among

others, on offenses he was neither apprised of nor charged with. The NLRC
reversed the decision of the LA and declared that complainant was validly
dismissed from his employment. The appellate court rendered the assailed
decision dismissing Daikokus appeal as well as denying Albertos contempt
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daikoku timely filed its motion for reconsideration
with the NLRC.
HELD: NO. The relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any
valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner
must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules
and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of substantive justice. Daikoku urges a less
rigid application of procedural rules to give way for the resolution of the
case on its merits. The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid
and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. The appellate court
saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does
the Court. Petition Denied.
Abrenica v. Gonda
XXXX
SCC vs. CA
Feb. 28, 2001 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman,
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito)
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter
SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest
rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance of the principal upon nonpayment on the due date-January 12,
1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private
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respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the
maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
thereof, no payment was made. In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of
cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which
SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for
lack or failure of consideration. The court promulgated its decision in favor
of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
Petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through
the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and
whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was
not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 36
and 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that
the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document
presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its
genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of
private documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner
likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues
that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate
court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-
production of the originals of the documents presented in evidence allows
the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
ISSUE: Whether or not witness, whose personal knowledge of the
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated.

HELD: NO. The right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of a party to crossexamine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-
examine the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner
had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party’s witness. It is
now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for
petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the
existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation.
Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. Petition
Partly Granted, the award of attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is
deleted.
Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn
Sept. 17, 1903 Willard, J.
FACTS: Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question from Don Pablo
Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, when Don Miguel
Aldeguer, their grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four
children, the present plaintiffs. Don Manuel sold the land to one Martinez,
who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn. In the deed to Martinez, Don
Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo
Garcia twenty-four years before. The court finds that this declaration was
the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any title to the land.
The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from
parol evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don
Pablo and Doña Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary
evidence was received on this point, but it is also stated that the existence
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of a written contract was proved, as also its record in the registry of
property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the plaintiffs in
1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
contents thereof. After such preliminary proof had been made, parol
evidence of the contents of the document was properly received. The
appellant has moved for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new trial should be granted based in newly
discovered evidence.
HELD: NO. Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency to the showing of due
diligence by the defendant, and as to the failure to procure the affidavits of
the proffered witnesses, the motion must be denied on the ground that
such evidence is not "of such a character as to probably change the result."
The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs bought the land from Don
Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would be immaterial.
Such evidence would merely strengthen the decision of the court. It would
not overthrow it. What took place during the trial we do not know, but it is
certain that evidence was introduced showing that the purchase was made
from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. We must presume that
this was done without objection on the part of the defendant, for no
exceptions relating to the matter appear in the record. Judgement
Affirmed.
Tan Jr. v. CA
XXXX
Heirs of Simon v. Chua
FACTS:
 December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a
Landbank Check dated December 26, 1996 worth P336,000.00

 December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
 After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen -
MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment
 Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia
because there is already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 - granted by the MeTC
 Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of
the MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action
HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC
 Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
 Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded
and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving
her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory,
of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended
party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her,
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the
payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would,
therefore, be brought to naught. However, there is no independent
civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed
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 DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts):
issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct
crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the
recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes
are different and non-interchangeable
 In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to
reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code
 In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court
has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance
of the bouncing check
Montañez vs. Cipriano Oct. 22, 2012 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. A
petition for the Annulment of her (Lourdes) marriage with Socrates on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC said that at the
time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983,
i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not
require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family
Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of the first marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
bigamy filed against respondent.
HELD: YES. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by
Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision

was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter. In
other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage
with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
However, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first
marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting. As far back as
1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights.” The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. Petition Granted.
Del Rosario and Sons Logging Ent. Inc. vs. NLRC
May 31, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a
"Contract of Services" with private respondent Calinar Security Agency
(Security Agency, for short) whereby the latter undertook to supply the
former with security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each
guard. Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint
against the Security Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of salary,
non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay. Petitioner
contended that complainants have no cause of action against it due to
absence of employer-employee relationship between them. The Labor
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Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint against petitioner for
want of employer-employee relationship but ordering the Security Agency
to pay complainants the amounts sought by them. The Security Agency
appealed to the NLRC, which modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by
holding that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally,
with the Security Agency on the ground that petitioner is an indirect
employer. Reconsideration sought by petitioner having been denied, this
certiorari petition was instituted contending that the NLRC erred in giving
due course to the appeal despite the fact that it was not under oath and
the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly and severally
liable with the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal fee to the NLRC, being not paid is a fatal
defect.
HELD: NO. The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were
not fatal defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected
by requiring an oath. Payment of the appeal fee is "by no means a mere
technicality but is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal."
However, where as in this case, the fee had been paid, unlike in the Acda
case, although payment was delayed, the broader interests of justice and
the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits demanded
that the appeal be given course as, in fact, it was so given by the NLRC.
Besides, it was within the inherent power of the NLRC to have allowed the
late payment of the appeal fee. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee
confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and
such power must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal
of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances. Judgement
Affirmed.

Sasan v. NLRC
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate
complaints against E-PCIBank andHI for illegal dismissal. In their position
papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-
PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed,
havingcontinuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the
bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to
performtheir jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because
the latter had no power to do sosince they had become regular employees
of E-PCIBank.For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract
for Services with HI, an independent jobcontractor which hired and
assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and
messengerialservices thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was
an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank
was oneof its clients. On the basis of the parties’ position papers and
documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not
possess therequired substantial capital or investment to actually perform
the job, work, or service under its ownaccount and responsibility as
required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor
andthe real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to
petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez,
respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed thesame to the NLRC, 4th Division.
The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took
into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first
time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized
venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged
in "labor-only contracting."Distressed by the decision of the NLRC,
petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petitionfor
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Certiorari
under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that
HI was alegitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss
petitioners. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is
allowed in labor cases.
RULING:The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling inlabor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every
and all reasonable means toascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been
held that
the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submi
tted by the parties for the firsttime on appeal. The submission of additional
evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could
submit counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
becausetechnical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases
Ong Chia vs. Republic
March 27, 2000 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was born on China. As a nine-year old boy, he arrived at
the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed
in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his
own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. At the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under the Revised Naturalization Law. During the hearings, petitioner
testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.

Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness
against him. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been
known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of
C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation
of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous
incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence. The CA ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower
court and brought up for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questions not presented in the lower court can
be brought up for the first time on appeal in cases of Naturalization.
HELD: YES. The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving
a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by
the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents. CA decision Affirmed.
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BSB Group Inc. vs. Go
Feb. 16, 2010 Peralta, J.
FACTS: The BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation
presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan).
Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
Bangayan, is Bangayan’s wife, who was employed in the company as a
cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the
payments made by the various customers of the company. Bangayan filed
with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified
theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the
aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in
payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the
company’s coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her
personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
(Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. Upon a finding that the
evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor
recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against
respondent. On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the
subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her
personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers
or records custodians of Security Bank’s Divisoria Branch, as well as of the
Asian Savings Bank. Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena
addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit
filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank
account. The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative
of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded
by operation of R.A. No. 1405.

HELD: YES. The admission of testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose
than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount
kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible
inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which
is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent
in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the
controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court. In
sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of
respondents supposed bank account with Security Bank and the
documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support
thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A.
No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not
appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of
respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents
objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was,
therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court. Petition
Denied.
Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.
Feb. 21, 1929 Street, J.
FACTS: Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered two
mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for the
purpose of engaging in mercantile business. Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar
& Co., purchased a one-story building; and soon thereafter he begun to
assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which was the subject of
insurance in this case. Nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out
by Prats in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored. Prats
procured from the agent of the defendant in this case a policy of insurance.
The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure
manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at
95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega
10
before the fire. In this connection it appears that forty-five cases of old
stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi, P. I., were shipped to Manila before
the fire, but instead of being taken directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia, they were
housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in
which Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. had their offices. Moreover, a
quantity of merchandise purchased from place shortly before the fire,
instead of directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia; and it is the theory of the
defendant that new merchandise purchased from Talambiras Brothers was
substituted for the old stock in boxes from Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi,
leaving the old goods to be deposited in the bodega to swell the debris of
the fire. There is evidence also, which was credited by the court, to the
effect that on various occasions before the fire goods were removed from
the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were received
without invoice. Some of these goods were subsequently sent away by
Abolafia for sale in the provinces. The trial court found that the proof
submitted was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proof submitted was false.
HELD: YES. The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff had
submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well
founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of
proof, and with respect to at least two of these, we think that the
conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that
the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value
of P12,800 when the rule value of said jewellery was about P600; and,
secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance
company the value of goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by
it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two facts are
consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted
a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of fraudulent
devices and false proof with respect to the loss. The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objection to its materiality or technical objection to

the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of
the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept
the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of error without
returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this court is always very
loath to take. Appealed Decision Affirmed.
People vs. Yatco
Nov. 28, 1955 Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is
still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder
of one Jose Ramos. Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several
hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the
progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau
of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extrajudicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a
general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it
was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution
could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them,
11
without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower Court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence
on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
trial when the ruling was made.
HELD: YES. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence
on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
trial when the ruling was made. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against
his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as
such. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator
during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence")
and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. It is particularly
noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made
on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon
an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio.
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the
guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as
to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its
own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of
such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances,
etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing,
the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the
parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not

reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence. The order excluding
the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the
trial in accordance with law and this opinion.
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Cormpososa
Aug. 12, 2003 Panganian, J.
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative
value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto
mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
FACTS: A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
[petitioners] against [respondents] before the MTC. The [C]omplaint
alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor, he died
leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren. Out of pity and for
humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to
occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his
neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this
case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people. Francisco Comorposa
left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the
premises through petitioners tolerance. A formal demand was made upon
the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the
same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual
and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. The MTC rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on
appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. According to the CA,
respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual,
physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof since 1960.
12
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of respondents to file their position
paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by
silence.
HELD: NO. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain
pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers
to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply
does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. Petition Denied.
Calamba Steel Center Inc. v CIR
GR 151857, April 28, 2005
Facts:Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
steelblanks for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics
inindustrial and household appliances.In it's amended Corporate Annual
Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 itdeclared a net taxable income of
P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00and tax due in the amount of
P3,311,559.00. It also reported uarterlypayments for the second and third
quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
respectively.It is the contention of the petitioner in this case filed in 1997,
that it is entitledto a refund. The refund was purportedly due to income
taxes witheld from it,and remitted in its behalf, by the witholding agents.
Such witheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not utilised in
1996 since due to it's income/losspositions for the three quarters of 1996.

ISSUE: Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyong the
taxableyear following that in which the tax credit arises.
Held: Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it
isentitled to such refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax
exemptionssuch must be construed strictissimi juris against the taypayer-
claimant. Under the NIRC, the only limitation as regards the claiming of tax
refunds is thatsuch must be made within two years. The claim for refund
made by Calambasteel was well within the 2 year period. As regards the
procedure taken by counsel of Calamba Steel in submitting thefinal
adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been conducted, the Court
saidthat although the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this
jurisprudencemandates that the proceedings before the tax court's shall
not be governed bystrictly technical rules of evidence. Moreoover,
as regards evidence, thecourt further said that Judicial notice could have
been taken by the cA and theCTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made
by petitioner in another casethen pending with the CTA.
Tating vs. Marcella
March 27, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS: Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied
in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the
name of Nena. The land remained in possession of Daniela. Daniela
executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply
to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable
her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena
did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in
13
the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed and, as a consequence, they are demanding from
Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs
of Daniela. The RTC declared that the Deed of Absolute sale is null and
void. Herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has
decided the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the
applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported
by and is even against the evidence on record.
ISSUE Whether or not the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and
the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn
Statement of Daniela.
HELD: YES. The main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents
evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
weight to this document. There is no issue in the admissibility of the
subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified
as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. The Court finds that both the trial
 14

court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she
is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value
on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of
sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence,
a trust relationship was created between them. Petition Granted.