JOINT AND SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS

MARSMAN DRYSDALE LAND, INC. VS. PHILIPPINE GEOANALYTICS,

INC. AND GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC.
June 29, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:

On February 12, 1997, Marsman Drysdale Land, Inc. (Marsman Drysdale)

and Gotesco Properties, Inc. (Gotesco) entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the construction and development of an office building
on a land owned by Marsman Drysdale in Makati City. Under the JVA,
Marsman Drysdale shall contribute the Property which is appraised for
P420,000,000.00. while Gotesco shall contribute the amount of
P420,000,000.00 (P50,000,000.00. upon the signing of the agreement and
the balance shall be paid based on progress billings, relative to the
development of the building).
Via Technical Services Contract (TSC) dated July 14, 1997, the joint venture
engaged the services of Philippine Geoanalytics, Inc. (PGI) to provide
subsurface soil exploration, laboratory testing, seismic study and
geotechnical engineering for the project. PGI, was, however, able to drill
only four of five boreholes needed to conduct its subsurface soil exploration
and laboratory testing, justifying its failure to drill the remaining borehole to
the failure on the part of the joint venture partners to clear the area where
the drilling was to be made. PGI was able to complete its seismic study
though. PGI then billed the joint venture on November 24, 1997 for
P284,553.50 representing the cost of partial subsurface soil exploration; and
on January 15, 1998 for P250,800 representing the cost of the completed
seismic study.
Despite repeated demands from PGI, the joint venture failed to pay its
obligations. Meanwhile, due to unfavorable economic conditions at the time,
the joint venture was cut short and the planned building project was
eventually shelved. PGI subsequently filed on November 11, 1999 a
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City against Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco.
In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim, Marsman Drysdale passed
the responsibility of paying PGI to Gotesco which, under the JVA, was solely
liable for the monetary expenses of the project.
Gotesco, on the other hand, countered that PGI has no cause of action
against it as PGI had yet to complete the services enumerated in the
contract; and that Marsman Drysdale failed to clear the property of debris
which prevented PGI from completing its work.
Issue:
The core issue to be resolved then is which between joint venturers Marsman
Drysdale and Gotesco bears the liability to pay PGI its unpaid claims.
Ruling:
The Court finds Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco jointly liable to PGI.
PGI executed a technical service contract with the joint venture and was
never a party to the JVA. While the JVA clearly spelled out, inter alia, the
capital contributions of Marsman Drysdale (land) and Gotesco (cash) as well
as the funding and financing mechanism for the project, the same cannot be
used to defeat the lawful claim of PGI against the two joint venturers-
partners.
The TSC clearly listed the joint venturers Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco
as the beneficial owner of the project, and all billing invoices indicated the
consortium therein as the client.
As the appellate court held, Articles 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code, which
respectively read:
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more
debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when
the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to
which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or
debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many equal shares as there are
creditors or debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one
another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied), presume that the obligation owing to
PGI is joint between Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco.
The only time that the JVA may be made to apply in the present petitions is
when the liability of the joint venturers to each other would set in. A joint
venture being a form of partnership, it is to be governed by the laws on
partnership.
Article 1797 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the
agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been agreed
upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the same proportion.
In the absence of stipulation, the share of each in the profits and losses shall
be in proportion to what he may have contributed, but the industrial partner
shall not be liable for the losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner shall
receive such share as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
If besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a
share in the profits in proportion to his capital. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the JVA, Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco agreed on a 50-50 ratio on the
proceeds of the project. They did not provide for the splitting of losses,
however. Applying the above-quoted provision of Article 1797 then, the
same ratio applies in splitting the P535,353.50 obligation-loss of the joint
venture.
The appellate court’s decision must be modified, however. Marsman
Drysdale and Gotesco being jointly liable, there is no need for Gotesco to
reimburse Marsman Drysdale for “50% of the aggregate sum due” to PGI.
Allowing Marsman Drysdale to recover from Gotesco what it paid to PGI
would not only be contrary to the law on partnership on division of losses but
would partake of a clear case of unjust enrichment at Gotesco’s expense.
The grant by the lower courts of Marsman Drysdale cross-claim against
Gotesco was thus erroneous.
Marsman Drysdale’s supplication for the award of attorney’s fees in its favor
must be denied. It cannot claim that it was compelled to litigate or that the
civil action or proceeding against it was clearly unfounded, for the JVA
provided that, in the event a party advances funds for the project, the joint
venture shall repay the advancing party.
Marsman Drysdale was thus not precluded from advancing funds to pay for
PGI’s contracted services to abate any legal action against the joint venture
itself. It was in fact hardline insistence on Gotesco having sole responsibility
to pay for the obligation, despite the fact that PGI’s services redounded to
the benefit of the joint venture, that spawned the legal action against it and
Gotesco.
Finally, an interest of 12% per annum on the outstanding obligation must be
imposed from the time of demand as the delay in payment makes the
obligation one of forbearance of money, conformably with this Court’s ruling
in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Marsman Drysdale and
Gotesco should bear legal interest on their respective obligations.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Roberto Reyes

G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
452 SCRA 532

FACTS:

Respondent herein Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the

screen name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that while he was having coffee at the
lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend of
several years, invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in
celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu
Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for whom she
replied: “of course.” Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying
the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant. At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the
buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. Reyes alleged that Ruby Lim, in a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were
making a queue at the buffet table, told him to leave the party because he
was not invited. Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart
but the latter, who was within hearing distance, completely ignored him
thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Afterwards, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached
and asked him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was
escorted out of the party by the policeman. Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes
asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s
fees.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Filart for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s ruling that Ms. Lim
did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to
him politely and discreetly. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of
Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that
she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee. Had respondent simply left the party as requested, there was no
need for the police to take him out.

People of the Philippines vs. Rosauro Sia

G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001
370 SCRA 123

FACTS:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court

finding the accused Johnny Balalio y Deza and Jimmy Ponce y Tol guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals by conspiracy for violation of RA
6539 (Anti- Carnapping law) as amended, and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of death.

Accused are likewise adjudged jointly and severally liable to pay

Agripina Bermudez, the mother of the deceased Christian Bermudez the
sums of: (a) P50, 000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of
Christian Bermudez; (b) P200, 000.00 as burial and other expenses
incurred in connection with the death of Christian; and (c) P3, 307,199.60
(2/3 x [80-27] x 300 per day x 26 days (excluding Sundays) x 12 months)
representing the loss of earning capacity of Christian Bermudez as taxi
driver.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the trial courts’ award for damages is
proper.

HELD:

The decision is partly correct. The Court finds the amount of P50,
000.00 as death indemnity proper, following prevailing jurisprudence, and
in line with controlling policy. The award of civil indemnity may be granted
without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. Though not
awarded by the trial court, the victim’s heirs are likewise entitled to moral
damages, pegged at P50, 000.00 by controlling case law, taking into
consideration the pain and anguish of the victim’s family brought about by
his death.
However, the award of P200, 000.00 as burial and other expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim must be deleted. The
records are bereft of any receipt or voucher to justify the trial court’s award
of burial and other expenses incurred in connection with the victim’s death.
The rule is that every pecuniary loss must be established by credible
evidence before it may be awarded. Credence can be given only to claims,
which are duly supported, by receipts or other credible evidence.
The trial court was correct in awarding damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the non-availability of documentary evidence. The court
based on testimony in several cases has awarded damages representing
net earning capacity. However the amount of the trial court’s award needs
to be re computed and modified accordingly.
In determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken
into account: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise
have lived; and (2) the rate of the loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased. The second variable is computed by multiplying the life
expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased meaning total earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income less
living and other incidental expenses considering that there is no proof of
living expenses of the deceased, net earnings are computed at fifty percent
of the gross earnings.
In this case, the court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the
time of his death and his mother testified that as a driver of the Tamaraw
FX taxi, he was earning P650.00 a day.
Based on the foregoing computation, the award of the trial court with regard
to lost income is thus modified accordingly.
The court ordered the accused to pay the heirs of the victim Christian
Bermudez the sum of P50, 000.000 as civil indemnity, the sum of P50,
000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P2, 996,867.20 representing
lost earnings. The award of P200, 000.00 as burial and other expenses is
deleted for lack of substantial proof.

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED vs. LEONORA NAVAL

G.R. No. 131541
OCTOBER 20, 2000

FACTS:

"On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem
was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig,
going towards Cainta. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse
the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan
Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta
collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab
was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver
to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby
Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop,
and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident."

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against

petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan
Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower
court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly
and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE:
What are the liabilities of both parties?

RULING:
 The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and
the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. It is established
that Castro was driving at a speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour
because it was a downhill slope. But as he allegedly stepped on the brake,
it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently
hit the taxicab. Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event.
Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties such
as commuters, drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is
presumed to know about the conditions of his vehicle and is duty bound to
take care thereof with the diligence of a good father of the family. A
mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the streets. As petitioner's
vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a
downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover,
the record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when
the collision occurred.

The taxi driver is contributorily liable since he took a U-turn where it is

not generally advisable. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had
not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to
have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill
slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him
contributorily liable. Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of
private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi,
should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for
lack of merit.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION VS. HUANG

GR No. 172122 June 22, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990

Mitsubishi Truck. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando Del Rosario as
driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of
respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla. These
two vehicles figured in a road accident. At the time of the accident,
petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt. A driver’s
license had been confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face and lung. He is paralyzed for
life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation
treatment. Respondent’s fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury
Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver.

The trial court found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Mercury Drug is liable for the negligence of

its employee.

RULING:

Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relationship
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.”
“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.”

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and

immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint
and solidary with the employee. To be relieved f the liability, petitioner
should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both
in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance
of his duties.

In this case, the petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for back-up
driver for long trips. As the time of the accident, Del Rosario has been
driving for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate. Moreover, Del
Rosario took the driving test and psychological exam for the position of
Delivery Man and not as Truck Man.

With this, petitioner Mercury Drug is liable jointly and severally liable
to pay the respondents.

CEREZO VS. TUAZON

GR No. 141538 March 23, 2004

FACTS:

Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle

driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner
of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo
A. Foronda.

After considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence,

the trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no
pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was no service of
summons on him. The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon
failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the family, pursuant to
Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely
liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of
Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable.

RULING:

Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable

party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected
by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an
action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors,
as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available
from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as
Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,”
refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than
to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article
2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party
may sue the employer directly.
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the
employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal
negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his
own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely
subsidiary is wrong.
To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a
delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the
present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over
Foronda is necessary.
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs.
Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Thus, the petition was denied ordering the defendant Hermana
Cerezo to pay the plaintiff.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 126297 February 11, 2008

FACTS:
 On April 04, 1984, Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City
General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from “cancer of the
sigmoid”. Thus, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City,
performed a surgery upon her. During the surgery, he found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating
the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent
of Natividad’s husband topermit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy upon
Natividad. Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy.
Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the
incision. The operation, however, appeared to be flawed as the attending
nurses entered in the corresponding Record of Operation that there were 2
lacking sponge and announced that it was searched by the surgeon but to
no avail.

After a couple of days, Natividad complained excruciating pain in her

anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. They told her
that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgical operation
performed upon her. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an
oncologist to treat the cancerous nodes which were not removed. Natividad
and her husband went to the US to seek further treatment. After 4 months
she was told that she was free of cancer. They then flew back to the
Philippines. Two weeks thereafter , Natividad’s daughter found a piece of
gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil saw immediately informed. He
proceeded to Natividad’s house where he extracted by hand a piece of
gauze. Natividad sought the treatment of Polymedic General Hospital
thereat Dr. Gutierrez detected a foreign object in her vagina - a foul-
smelling gauze which infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had
formed in her reproductive organ which forced stool to excrete in her
vagina. Another surgical operation was performed upon her.

Spouses Agana filed a complaint against PSI (owner of Medical City),

Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The Trial Court found the respondents jointly
and severally liable. The CA affirmed said decision with modification that
Dr. Fuentes was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether there is an employee-employer relationship in order to hold
PSI solidary liable.
RULING:

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an

independent contractor-physician. However, the hospital may be held liable
if the physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This exception is
also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority”. The doctrine of
apparent authority involves two factors to determine the liability of an
independent contractor-physician. First factor focuses on the hospital’s
manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the
hospital acted in a manner which would lead a responsible person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital. The second factor focuses on the
patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether
the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In this case, it has been
proven that the two factors were present. The hospital indeed made it
appear that Dr. Ampil was its employee when they advertise and displayed
his name in the directory at the lobby of the said hospital and that Natividad
relied on such knowledge that Dr. Ampil was indeed an employee of the
hospital.

Wherefore PSI and Dr. Ampil are liable jointly and severally.

PURITA ALIPIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond

in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan, for a period of five years ending on
September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the
remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and
the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of
rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and
P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989.
Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the
Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the
Regional Trial Court. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the
sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case because her

husband had passed away. And that any action for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, shall be dismissed when the defendant dies before
final judgment.The trial court denied petitioner's motion and held that the
obligation is solidary. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of
a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such
claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.

RULING:

The Court held that the respondent cannot sue the surviving spouse
of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership. Because when the
husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
debts chargeable against it is to be paid in the settlement of estate
proceedings.
Moreover, respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides
that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the
latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary.Thus, the liability of the
sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio
spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the
unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each
couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00. Hence, the petition is
granted.

PH CREDIT CORP VS CA
GR No. 109648 November 22, 2001
FACTS:

PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos

Farrales, Thomas H. Van Sebille and Federico C. Lim, for [a] sum of
money. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-17751 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Manila. After service of summons upon
the defendants, they failed to file their answer within the reglementary
period, hence they were declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was then
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The RTC judged in favor of PH
Credit Corp.

On July 27, 1990, a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession

was filed and on October 12, 1990, the same was granted. The writ of
possession itself was issued on October 26, 1990. Said order and writ of
possession are now the subject of this petition. Petitioner claims that
Respondent Judge erred in applying the presumption of a joint obligation in
the face of the conclusion of fact and law contained in the decision showing
that the obligation is solidary.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?

RULING:

The Rules of Court requires that all available objections to a

judgment or proceeding must be set up in an Omnibus Motion assailing it;
otherwise, they are deemed waived. In the case at bar, the objection of
private respondent to his solidary liability became available to him, only
after his real property was sold at public auction. At the time his personal
properties were levied and sold, it was not evident to him that he was being
held solely liable for the monetary judgment rendered against him and his
co-respondents. That was why his objections then did not include those he
asserted when his solidary liability became evident.
 In the dispositive portion of the January 31, 1984 Decision of the trial
court, the word solidary neither appears nor can it be inferred therefrom.
The fallo merely stated that the following respondents were liable: Pacific
Lloyd Corporation, Thomas H. Van Sebille, Carlos M. Farrales and
Federico C. Lim. Under the circumstances, the liability is joint, as provided
by the Civil Code.

We should stress that respondent’s obligation is based on the

judgment rendered by the trial court. The dispositive portion or the fallo is
its decisive resolution and is thus the subject of execution. The other parts
of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi
for the disposition. Where there is a conflict between the dispositive part
and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision,
the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering
nothing. Hence the execution must conform with that which is ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT VS NLRC

GR No. 101723 May 11, 2000

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution dated

September 4, 1991 issued by the National Labor Relations Commission in
RAB-VII-0711-84 on the alleged ground that it committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the Alias Writ of
Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter which deviated from the dispositive
portion of the Decision dated March 10, 1987, thereby holding that the
liability of the six respondents in a case adjudicated by the NLRC is
solidary despite the absence of the word "solidary" in the dispositive portion
of the Decision, when their liability should merely be joint.

ISSUE:
 Is the petitioner’s liability pursuant to the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated March 10, 1987, solidary or not?

RULING:

In the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter, the word "solidary"

does not appear. The said fallo expressly states the following respondents
therein as liable, namely: Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation,
Gerardo Sicat, Antonio Gonzales, Industrial Management Development
Corporation (petitioner INIMACO), Chiu Chin Gin, and Lo Kuan Chin. Nor
can it be inferred therefrom that the liability of the six (6) respondents in the
case below is solidary, thus their liability should merely be joint.

Moreover, it is already a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction

that, when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to
pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be
compelled to satisfy in full said judgment. Granting that the Labor Arbiter
has committed a mistake in failing to indicate in the dispositive portion that
the liability of respondents therein is solidary, the correction -- which is
substantial -- can no longer be allowed in this case because the judgment
has already become final and executory.