Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
RIGHTS
ESTATE OF MOTA V SERRA
G.R.No. 22825 February 14, 1925
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was confusion of the rights of the creditor and
debtor
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
After the steamship Yusingco had been sold by virtue of the judicial
writ issued in civil case No. 41654 for the execution of the judgment rendered
in favor of Vicente Madrigal, the only right left to the plaintiff was to collect its
mortgage credit from the purchaser thereof at public auction, inasmuch as
the rule is that a mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property on
which it is imposed, whoever its possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for the security of which it was created (article 1876, Civil code);
but it so happens that it can not take such steps now because it was the
purchaser of the steamship Yusingco at public auction, and it was so with full
knowledge that it had a mortgage credit on said vessel. Obligations are
extinguished by the merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor (articles
1156 and 1192, Civil Code).
The First Iligan Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (FISLAI) and
the Davao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (DSLAI) banks that entered
into a merger, with DSLAI as the surviving corporation. The articles of merger
were not registered with the SEC but when DSLAI changed its corporate
name to MSLAI the amendment was approved by the SEC.Meanwhile, the
Board of Directors of FISLAI passed a resolution, assigning its assets in favor
of DSLAI which in turn assumed the former’s liabilities.The business of
MSLAI, however, failed was ordered its closure and placed under
receivership.
Prior to the closure of MSLAI, Uy filed an action for collection of sum
of money against FISLAI. The RTC issued a summary decision in favor of
Uy, directing defendants therein (which included FISLAI) to pay the former
the sum of P136, 801.70. Therafter,sheriff Bantuas levied on six (6) parcels
of land owned by FISLAI and Willkom was the highest bidder. New
certificates of title covering the subject properties were issued in favor of
Willkom who sold one of the subject parcels of land to Go.
MSLAI, represented by PDIC, filed a complaint forAnnulment of
Sheriff’s Sale, Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance of Properties against
respondents. Therespondents averred that MSLAI had no cause of action
against them or the right to recover the subject properties because MSLAI is
a separate and distinct entity from FISLAI as the merger did not take effect.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable.
RULING:
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected
by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an
action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors,
as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available
from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as
Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,”
refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than
to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article
2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party
may sue the employer directly.
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the
employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal
negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his
own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely
subsidiary is wrong.
To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a
delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the
present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over
Foronda is necessary.
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs.
Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Thus, the petition was denied ordering the defendant Hermana
Cerezo to pay the plaintiff.