Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
[MARCH 4, 2003].
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. cralaw
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You may also file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. A bigamous marriage or
marriage contracted by parties who both or either one of them has an existing previous marriage
is null and void under Article 35 of the Family Code, to wit:
xxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
xxx”
In relation thereto, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that a subsequent marriage is valid
despite existence of previous marriage if the spouse of one or both of the parties to such
subsequent marriage has been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. The spouse present, in this case,
must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.
An order from the court declaring a bigamous marriage as null and void is still necessary. Parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact
but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again (Domingo v. CA, G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993).
On the other hand, the filing of a petition for the declaration of your marriage as null and void is
separate and distinct from the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of your husband
with his previous wife. Thus, even if the petition filed by the first wife is dismissed, your
marriage may still be declared as null and void based on the merits of the case.
Please be reminded that the above legal opinion is solely based on our appreciation of the
problem that you have stated. The opinion may vary when other facts are stated.
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A petition to declare the marriage void presupposes that the marriage was void or invalid from the beginning. Legally, it
can be said that the marriage did not even exist. But there are so many questions about this issue like, do you need to file
the Petition if your marriage did not even exist from the beginning? The answers that you have been looking for can be
found below.
Q. I just found out that my husband was married before and I have obtained a
marriage contract from the NSO to prove this. It was also confirmed when I
confronted my husband about this. Do I still have to file a Petition? Can I also file
a criminal case against my husband? Can his ex-wife file a criminal case against
me? What is my defense, if any?
GTALAW: Although your marriage was void from beginning, the law still requires you to
obtain a declaration of absolute nullity of your marriage by filing a petition in court. Yes, you
can also file a criminal case for Bigamy against your husband. Yes, his ex-wife may file a
criminal case for bigamy against you and your husband. But your defense is lack or absence
of knowledge regarding his prior marriage or absence of criminal intent.
-----------------------------
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CENON R. TEVES, G.R. No. 188775
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION
PERALTA*
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal
Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision[2] found petitioner Cenon R.
Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE FACTS
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon)
and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila.[3]
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify
the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of
the Certificate of Marriage[4] indicating that her husband and Edita contracted
marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint[5] accusing
petitioner of committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information [6] which
reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the
municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united
in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said
marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of
the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the
execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the
existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court ,
Branch 130, Caloocan City, rendered a decision[7] dated 4 May 2006 declaring the
marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a
Certification of Finality[8] issued on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court
of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal
action or liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial
court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed
by the prosecution.[10]
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy
was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners
case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy
case was filed in court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law
that would sustain petitioners contention.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally
subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his
first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after
his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of
petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in
fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.[17]
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[18]
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.[19]
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining
prescription.[22] The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December
2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June
2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
-----------------------------
The Supreme Court held that Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. It further held that the Revised Penal
Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. The Supreme Court also ruled that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity “is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.”[32] Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of Tenebro’s second marriage
is not a defense in avoiding criminal liability for bigamy.
And the question thus arises: Is psychological
incapacity an element of legal capacity or of consent to
marry? If it is neither, then the Supreme Court should
have said that a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is more in the nature of a voidable marriage and
thus, not a defense to bigamy.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not utilize Article
41 of the Family Code in convicting Tenebro of bigamy.
Instead, the Supreme Court based its bigamy
conviction on Article 40 of the Family Code which
states:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.[33]
--------------------------
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information
which reads:
Contrary to law.3
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.6
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender
has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still
be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.11
SO ORDERED.
-------------------
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
72322 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded �not guilty,�
while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5 redarc law
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow
then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-
in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was �without
responsibility.�7 redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in
the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that
she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the
trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos.8 reda rclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, �her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of
their marriage.�9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10 reda rclaw
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the
parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued
that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void,
justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11 redarclaw
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the
former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses� narration. It
likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the
appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her
marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12 redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos�s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant
in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without
a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances
the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as
regards her husband�s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner�s denial of any
knowledge of Santos�s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Law lib raryofCRAlaw
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
In Monta�ez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows: Lawlib ra ryofCRAlaw
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting
marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse�s existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:18 reda rclaw
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the
CA. Indeed, the trial court�s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great
respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20 redarc law
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she
was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts�
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse,
if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada,
Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that �a person, whether
man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound
in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.�22 Therefore, her
conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve
years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence
imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23prision correccional, which has a
duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of
two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term,
to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of
one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused
wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during
the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner
has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground
that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab
initio.28 redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could
not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of
petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated
under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years
before their marriage.31
re darc law
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without
any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited
her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34and her children from her previous
marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of
petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36reda rclaw
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other
for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited
for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath
that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article
34 of the Family Code.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus
face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on
her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that
they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making
claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as
bigamy, punish an individual�s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State�s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals �to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.�
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner�s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40 re darc law
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will �lend its aid to x x x one who
has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded.�41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43 reda rclaw
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case
of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a
marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate
of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement
based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her
illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on
the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the
Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18
August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August
1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage
license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a
Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking
her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that �marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.�45 It must be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum
to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
----------------------
Attacking void and voidable
marriages – Part 8 – Personality to
assail a bigamous marriage
The discussion here is linked to previous posts under this topic. It will be recalled
that in Part 4 (Attacking void and voidable marriages – Part 4 Void marriages –
collateral attack rules from jurisprudence; during the lifetime of the spouses)
there were two situations to consider:
(I) During the lifetime of the spouses (or before either spouse
dies)
(II) After death of either spouse.
In Part 4, it was argued under situation (I) that
(I.4) the personality to institute the direct action solely belongs to the husband
and the wife: see Section 2(a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which states that a ‘petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife’.
In Part 4, we made note that proposition (I.4) does not apply for actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage excepted from A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
under the rulings of Ablaza vs Republic (G.R. No. 158298, 11 Aug 2010)
and Carlos vs Sandoval (G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008).
In Part 5 (Attacking void and voidable marriages – Part 5 Void marriages –
collateral attack rules from jurisprudence; after the death of either spouse) we
considered whether a direct action may be maintained after the death of either
spouse to the marriage, who had the personality to institute the direct action.
There were two views:
(II.2) The unqualified view, arguably from Niñal vs Bayadog (G.R. No. 133778,
March 14, 2000) where there is no prohibition for interested parties (not
confined solely to the surviving spouse) to institute a direct action (after the
death of the other spouse) to have the marriage declared void.
(II.3) The presently controlling view in Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses
Medinaceli (G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007) that the right of an interested
party (who is not a spouse) to file a direct action to nullify a void marriage is
limited to marriages that are not covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and that this
rule applies regardless of whether a spouse to the marriage has died. Pursuant to
this view, if a spouse to the marriage has died, it is still the surviving spouse that
has the right to institute the direct action; an interested party (who is not a
spouse) may still maintain a collateral action to assail the validity of the marriage.
The discussion here applies to situations (I) and (II) where a subsequent
marriage is being assailed on the ground of bigamy. The succeeding discussion
will illustrate that whenever it is a ‘spouse’ that has the right to institute the direct
action, case law has included within that definition of ‘spouse’, a spouse of the
first marriage.
Preliminarily, one notes that in Carlos vs Sandoval (G.R. No. 179922, December
16, 2008), the rationale for giving a spouse to the assailed marriage the sole right
to assail it was explained by the Supreme Court as follows:
‘Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made
it exclusively a right of the spouses…’
xxx
‘Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the
Rule is enlightening, viz.:
xxx
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of
their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
In Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 Jun 2013), the Supreme Court explained
that the reference to the husband or the wife in Section 2(a) is not confined to the
spouses themselves to the subsequent bigamous marriage, but includes the
spouse of the first marriage. In Fujiki, it was the Fujiki (husband of the first
marriage) who filed the petition for recognition of the Japanese court judgment
voiding the second bigamous marriage entered into by his wife. The Supreme
Court’s explanation although arguably obiter (there was an express statement by
the Court that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC ‘does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country’) on the significance of Section 2(a) is as follows:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,[47][G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637] this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”[48][Juliano-Llave v.
Republic G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, at 655.]
xxx
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife ”[75][Emphasis supplied.] ―it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages
are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,[76][REVISED
PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815, as amended), Article. 349. Bigamy . – The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.[77][See III RAMON AQUINO , THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.] If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,[78][RULES OF COURT , Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior
spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.[79][Cf.
R RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest . ― A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as
interest.]
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse.”[80][Juliano-Llave v. Republic , supra] Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
Juliano-Llave vs Republic (G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011)
This case involves two marriages by Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano — first, with
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites; second, with petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave whom Sen. Tamano
married twice 11 months before he died ‘initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993’.
It was Zorayda together with Zorayda and Sen. Tamano’s son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib) who filed on November 23, 1994 a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage of Sen. Tamano and Estrellita.
Upon the argument that Zorayda or Adib had no personality to file the complaint
for declaration of nullity due to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which limits
the petitioner to either the husband or the wife, the Supreme Court said that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because ‘[a]lbeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application
and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.[58][Carlos v.
Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132 citing Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, supra note 57 at 428.]’.
It was in obiter that the Supreme Court declared that (assuming A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC was applicable), Zorayda (aggrieved spouse of the first marriage) had the
capacity to file a petition for declaration of nullity of the second bigamous
marriage, being likewise an ‘aggrieved spouse’ since the rationale of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC states that ‘[o]nly an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages’, and according the the Supreme Court:
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the “injured spouse” who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity
is protected by the Constitution.
----------------
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
1
CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution that affirmed the same.
2
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous
valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the
other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a
second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this
purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first
marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA
was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's
declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying
that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7
that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time
she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid
and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in
its Order dated 8 March 2005.
10
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a
judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it
also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to
Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
In a Decision dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the
19
RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled
20
that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21
2009.
OUR RULING
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage
in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there
was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the
marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified
by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally
attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and
the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in
a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante,
34 35 36