THIRD DIVISION
Based on the documents obtained
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA
NEALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution2 dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2008 and 12 February 2009
of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to Branch
40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.3cralawlawlibrary
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The accusatory portion of the Information filed against
her reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the
Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such and the confidence reposed on her, personal
interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then
and there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused
fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5cralawlawlibrary
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue
of a Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the
school principal, directed petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson.
Instead, petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce
financial statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the
Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga
(member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed
their respective affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner.
from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements
prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its
members for three (3) years in the following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y.
1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the
Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so.
Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by
way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime
charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held
criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be
punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has
no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level
courts.cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction,
further discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the principle of primary
jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to purposely empower them to
file the instant case become moot and academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6cralawlawlibrary
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's motion for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal.7 The RTC held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability for violation of acts or
omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an act or omission
is not a crime unless there is a law making it so and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the
facts charged in the information do not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do
constitute an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A.
[6938] which is "imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is the undisputed fact that
before this case was filed in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the
dispute was not availed of by the private complainants who are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the
Cooperative and the Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of
Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute
involving the parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and among directors, officers or members
of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the
Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the President as outlined
in the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to by the complainants,
the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the present case.8cralawlawlibrary
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders dated
October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC for further
proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND
CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE
PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND
ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER
PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE
DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court had again stressed the
distinction between the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of
the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including
that to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.13cralawlawlibrary
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,14 the Court explained that
one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of
the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct
applications. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper
remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.

2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the petition before it is
DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938, clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. 15 In accordance with the liberal spirit
(COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION - which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO having been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered by petitioner for a more
COURT. liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the
petition at bench lacks substantive merit and raises only questions of law which should have been duly
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE made in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.16
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL OF
THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's criminal case for violation of
NOT APPEALABLE. Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the
CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER case.
PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER
PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information,
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P.
CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]10cralawlawlibrary imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition has no merit. Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out Trial Courts shall exercise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
as the proper remedy to assail the CA decision. xxxx

Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the assailed CA decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one
of the party respondents, and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue
raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938,
in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with
the same question of law.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. � Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938
provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her
criminal case which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain,
unambiguous, and categorical. She submits that statutory construction of such clear provisions,
especially if prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject her to higher penalty, should not
be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's case pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Section 47 (liability of
directors, officers and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and Section 51 (illegal
use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both
at the court's discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical error because the
"liability of directors, officers and committee members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA
6938, while Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who
are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee
member shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the
cooperative, members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty,
any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has been reposed in him
in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the profits
which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their
compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by a majority
vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special general assembly meeting specifically
called for the purpose: Provided further, that no additional compensation other than per diems shall be
paid during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason to warrant
a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her
criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors,
mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty or
nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is
apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. To correct the error
or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the
duty of the court to give a statute a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and
avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not
adopt an arbitrary rule under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature
intended to make a typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act, and
not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
xxxx
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124, paragraph 4, as the trial court
did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To
reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members,"
provides for violations under which the said officers could be held liable for, and the corresponding
liability for damages and profits from the said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for
penal sanction, an application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently
refers to the penal sanction on erring directors, officers and committee members. It would make no
sense if we were to follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124,
paragraph 4 instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47, which upon
examination of the Code provides for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees
of the cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should refer to "[Section] 46
(Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and
[Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46,
therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of
not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under
B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.18cralawlawlibrary
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on
the liability of directors, officers and committee members, has been recognized and duly corrected
when the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008." Pertinent portions of the
corrected provision read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and committee
members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty
of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee members shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members,
and other persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Article 45 on the Liability of
Directors, Officers and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article 49
on the Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's
discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the Cooperative filed
a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to
the Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation
or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against
petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the
CA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and should have been
resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute.
Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The
instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The
Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in
behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the
jurisdiction of the regular court.19cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the
prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal
case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while the Cooperative
and its members are mere private complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil
aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is
not one arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends
there.23cralawlawlibrary
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal
does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is an acquittal.
It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc." 25cralawlawlibrary
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double jeopardy due
to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds
the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did
not attach, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It
must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to
evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's
consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly
argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is
deemed to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was
granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach. 26cralawlawlibrary
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case before the
RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res
judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012, granted her
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in
Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the
private complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported
sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private
documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings. 29 At
any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition
against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may
prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.32
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are present in
view of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence
and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-
CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy � a second jeopardy
is for the same offense as in the first � is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity of
offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such
elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved. 34
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the information for
Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private
document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine
whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under Section
5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for falsification of private
document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case
No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not
necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.

The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that petitioner, being
THIRD DIVISION
then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year
1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015
RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; 36(2) ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING
that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY.
damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.

The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being then such
officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse DECISION
to it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with
Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales profits of such products should PERALTA, J.:
have accrued to the Cooperative. The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1)
that the offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and
lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated
in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict August 28, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member. G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification
of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as The factual antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to
necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
attach�a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first�is, therefore, absent. Not only are
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses
their elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it
in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what
claimed reimbursement for it.
makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
portion of the Information filed against her reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not
TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT
an essential element of the other.38cralawlawlibrary
Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as discussed
of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be
above�the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article
the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)�one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes
as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4
against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence,
one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other. 39 the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for
arraignment, the decretal portion of the Order reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set
this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall,
10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.

The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby set
aside.
SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a
Resolution7 dated January 24, 2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January
24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis
or merit.9 On Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private document against her was
filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence, the RTC
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the improper
venue was already resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that �there are
sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna�.
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms.
Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen
and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded
that Ms. Lavaro's statement �describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.�
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically
states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was
made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification
was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would necessarily result in a �neither here
no there� situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the
September 21, 2006 RTC Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008.
Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document was
committed in Jagna, Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the alleged acts
of the petitioner on a totally different and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights of the
accused and to prevent undue harassment and oppression.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for
falsification of a private document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of
such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that there is no showing in
the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of
falsification of a private document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the
allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol,
cannot determine the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said
crime. It was also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged
request for reimbursement under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4,
2003, was prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued
on October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the issuance of
the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of
falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that any damage that private respondent
could have suffered would only occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense
Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the
said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court
in Foz, Jr. v. People,14 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Place of commission of the offense. � The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the
venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually
falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the
falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. 1
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because
not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was committed within its
jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case
that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information clearly alleged that she
committed such crime thereat, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in
the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim
reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of
which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said
crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
�4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly
incurred at Garden's Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October 2003 she sent to
the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as Annex
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual
amount she incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official
receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as
Annex
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage
to DKT.
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information and not by the result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for
falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.
Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna,
Bohol, cannot be sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the
material allegations of the charge against her, which include the place where the subject receipt was
falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show
that the crime was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the
case based on such ground.
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the
time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the
Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present, as Article 172 (2) 21 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.22chanrobleslaw
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the
sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her
sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely
separate and distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said
statement in upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions
of the accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be
determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or
presumed from other collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of
whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions
of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a
certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is
on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of
fact.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is
a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and,
subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to
probe and resolve factual issues, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA�s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner�s main and reply briefs, are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.27
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the
issue of improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in one
�there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna.�29 The Court jurisdiction would be a blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other
perceives no compelling reason to disturb such factual finding. than where the offense was allegedly committed.

Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different venues,
Prosecutor without specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC then it is just unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different
had squarely addressed such issue as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal.36
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms.
Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases
and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded is an essential element of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not
that Ms. Lavaro's statement �describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may,
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.� Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a
states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued. fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places
made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair
was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would necessarily result in a �neither here and impartial trial.
no there� situation.30
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue
committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is
of the case violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary
only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of falsification as there are documents
rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was committed for purposes of filing a
falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually falsified40.
criminal information which merely requires the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
for certiorari from the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
file a motion to quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such
objection may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
appeal.
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
for certiorari to question the denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. She claims
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient
that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, but
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and dispatch. In
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
support of her assertion, she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.34
filing of the complaint, the court should dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the
accused, and strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and
Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court
inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court from that of the province where
reiterated the fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and,
the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to prosecute separately the other
therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari,
cases for falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain her financial resources, when all
these criminal cases, involving minimal amounts of actual damages, 35 should have been filed in one (1)
In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that �a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
criminal jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such
an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling
thereon:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrar continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
appeal in the manner authorized by law.�
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:c
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in
the consideration thereof.43
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to
prove that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of
discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the
MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are
properly resolved in due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007
and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to correct the penalty
imposed in the Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City,
Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of
petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial payment for
her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks
have a uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for payment.
However, all the checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face value of the
dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(BP 22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch
67, MeTC of Makati.
In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the
issuance of the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value
of ₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of
₱40,002.00. The fallo of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay n.
fine of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She is likewise ORDERED to
indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12%
annual legal interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration 3 before the
MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her appeal, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off
to Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the petition for certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration8 filed by
petitioner met the same fate of dismissal.9
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review 10 under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court is the correct remedy under the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. 11
On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011 Resolution12 of the CA denying her
Motion for Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition.14
On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari15 within the period of extension
granted in our Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON
TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE
OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE
MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17
Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her
erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of
six counts of violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner
seeks the relaxation of the rules of procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the
MeTC can be modified to make it in accord with existing law and jurisprudence.
Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege can only be exercised in
accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected through the present remedial
recourse of a petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14,
2009, which is already final and executory, may still be modified.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of
violation of BP 22. For every count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00,
petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-
payment. She assails the penalty for being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP
22, and the subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-
2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals. 20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum penalty of
fine that can be imposed against her in each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face
value of the dishonored check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus
excessive. She further implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment contravened Section 20
of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused found
criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one
year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed
₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment
or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the face value of the
rubber check which in no case should exceed ₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22, the
maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double
the face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond
the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times
the amount of the face value of each check that was dishonored.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the
amount of fine using the total face value of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in
Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the
consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only double the amount of the face value of
the subject check.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after petitioner
failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 22 Upon finality
of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power
and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice
requires it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former
must yield to the latter,25 as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at
stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we
declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of
the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a
longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be
accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this
only.
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.
Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that
supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison 28 when
imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on
the Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the
February 14, 2001:
accused which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of
justice and only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing
else.29 x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent power of the Court to 1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22; and
correct the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law.
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of
violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons anchored upon in considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v.
Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v.
the notice of appeal was belatedly filed. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme
Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22, without
mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's
In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the range of the
inability to pay the fine.
penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final on the ground of substantial
justice, thus:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner.1awp++i1 If his
for in B.P. Big. 22.
penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be
made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P.
prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum
should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the
provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
power of the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same
the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge
in the interest of substantial justice." Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After all,
not be deemed a hindrance.
the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x." 34 All the accused in Almuete
v. People,35 People v. Barro,36Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid
Prison,38 failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the Court It is, therefore, understood that
corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were
outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the 1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon violations of B.P Big. 22;
the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or
excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39 xxxx

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, 3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which
proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in
Lozano v. Martinez.44Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.
xxxx
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from
September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized
representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio
City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated
August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and
prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also
authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the
facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was
allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking
and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo
Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio
City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the
clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was
then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp,
respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is
₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not
paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-
Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A
preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a
case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents,
respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed
the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the
vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he
had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he
filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against
the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The
elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant
cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the
wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of
Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the
provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands.
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey
Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he
was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-
2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City
dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and
concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an
immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate
No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by
Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and
prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such
clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel
Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004.
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following
grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to
state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7,
2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed
with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if
any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed
the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription
of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that
the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting
respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic]
for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of
prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R.
No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act
No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL
BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that
the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not
when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed
with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph
thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of
the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or
not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses
charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on
Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal
cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not
apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the
complaint should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city
ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged
have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of
the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003
and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial
Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge
Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since
cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-
month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City
Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004
and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a
municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months,
filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months.
This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the
Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the
cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in
their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents
were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not
assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the
ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil
aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February
10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner
also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the
preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons
aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws
and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does
not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not
apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on
the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be
either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered
Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however,
that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of
existing cities. Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent
of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component
cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as
United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or
Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The
Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which
is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of
B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The
recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special
laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the
doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued
to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the
judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the
preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of
the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in
arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense
before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period
had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the
dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice – National
Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath
by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that
the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which
punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense
charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the
Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and
established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were
assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the
area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag,
and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable
to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in
court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is
filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain presentment for payment.
language.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
problem here sought to be corrected.33
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis
the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
SO ORDERED.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private
SECOND DIVISION complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs.
People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9)
checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
G.R. No. 152662 Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Present: On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
CARPIO, respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount
Chairperson, of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
BRION, amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other
PEREZ, checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Promulgated: Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June
2000.
June 13, 2012
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October
2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to
RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5
October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the
Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are
covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal
action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed
when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint
that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review[5] on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate
action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private
complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of
1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private
[complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace
period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999
to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the
petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on
03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings
referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which
means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise
stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8]likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it
admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23
November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts
the period of prescription of the offense charged. [10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit
by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22
cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In
relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the
aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint
with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It
therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February
2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be
dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a
certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses
are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors
Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a
violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous
premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [15] Respondent pointed out that the
crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is
governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between
offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the
RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and
violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16
September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate
original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service
is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition
is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the
proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that
the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases.Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b)
after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years
in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was
broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when it held that the
filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is
bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special
laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is
not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v.
CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the
Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the
instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for
the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning
date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within
which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and
the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September
1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only
after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997
initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice
is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief
State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the
Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to
include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain
way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June
27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing
petitioner’s petition for mandamus.2
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians
were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the
principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao
Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General
Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other
suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao
massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special
Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations
for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On December 1, 2009, 25
informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial
Region, in Cotabato City.5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno
requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to
Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December 8,
2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. 7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior
to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding
the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City
RTC.8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon
City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court.9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he
was arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution
of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag,
both dated December 7, 2009.14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. 15 On
September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one
of the Prosecution witnesses.17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De
Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October
22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila
(Civil Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in
the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No.
10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18, 2011,25 respondents
questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the RTC in
Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena.28 Petitioner opposed the motion to quash
the subpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply
dated April 26, 2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another reply dated
May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the
petition for mandamus.34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE
AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE
MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION
THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC
RTC; and,
2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION
PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS
COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT
HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as
an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal
power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.36
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient
to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent.
Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in
court.37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a
sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the
Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of
exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law."38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of
discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in
this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals
to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged
as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his
exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that
"the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is
when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are,
namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court;
and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). 39 These
modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its
commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating
authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of
several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by
the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial
court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with,
namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said
accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires
to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal
Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a
State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his
petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in
this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules
are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the
trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to
Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal
of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he
fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the
basis for his discharge.40 The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which
has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose
exist.41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in
order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court,42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the
proper administration of justice.43 Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and
the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should
know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would
best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed
to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, 44 as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the
‘most guilty’ one, and the like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first
charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness
Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an
acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he
fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial
court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon
presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition
the trial court for the discharge of the witness.46 The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion
of said accused from the information.47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner
since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately
prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and
were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao close associates.
massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for
all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be
The Case
charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an
acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that
became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes. Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v.
Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations) 1 and August 10,
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash), 2 alleging that the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
excess of jurisdiction.
tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action,
but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, 48or to Antecedents
compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.49
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210
but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
available as petitioner's recourse.
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on
June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner Criminal Case No. 28001
to pay the costs of suit.

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
SO ORDERED. this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the
then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
FIRST DIVISION feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused
DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and
Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering
and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of
vs. the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in
fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in
relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be
x-----------------------x
awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public
G.R. Nos. 174764-65 officials.

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, CONTRARY TO LAW.3

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Criminal Case No. 28002

DECISION
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then
BERSAMIN, J.: President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing
partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was
the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family,
taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project
("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from
Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more
or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of
Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having
business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for
and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain,
the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural
design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive
subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction
Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated
amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary
advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct
intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract,
and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The
Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea
of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed
resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9
but the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution. 10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION
4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED
JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF
R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE
APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF
INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED
ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled
Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.)
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-
defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as
follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the
husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant
Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the
nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
taking undue advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to
prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such
as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through
which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large
commissions from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special
concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the
country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions –
defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant; 15
the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman,
who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to
conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by
the Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject
of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:

original jurisdiction over the offenses charged

In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG
(G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for
appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of
action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the
respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil
cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer
to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct
an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against
petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the
subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation.
x x x.
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the
charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-
A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because
the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved
sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG;
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the
purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints
initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and
file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No.
to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly
8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
xxxx
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be of the commission of the offense:
impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner
and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.
xxxx

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and
 b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the
Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a
prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded
through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering
and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was
no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined
with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini
pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly
granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public
status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 22
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of
which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only
in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause
to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases
pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan
properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being
a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts
and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did
award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts
constituted the crime of corruption of public officials. 24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212
of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." 25 Under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by
the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer
executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is
15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By
express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses
committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive
period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador,28 however, that the longer
prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be
given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period
from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which
his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It
was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in
People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a
catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of
the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the
time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,
the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to
have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation,
resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character,
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official
functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of
the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was
possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In accordance
with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 35 the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of
prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose
of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the
discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or
information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the
law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense;
otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002
(violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth
that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and
confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and
gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as
President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents
offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President
Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer;
and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer
under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect
bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and
promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers,
promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office,
was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus,
even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an
essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable
for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
 2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation
by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or DEL CASTILLO, J.:
contract with the government;

3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being
the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at
the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and
free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close
personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from
Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in
connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or
close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated
on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
METROPOLITAN BANK and G.R. No. 164538
It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion,
even though complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the private offended party. Since a
criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime.[1]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CAs) Decision[2]dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further Resolution[3] dated July 12,
2004 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In the
affidavit[5] of petitioners audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that the special audit conducted on the
cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only
voting members of the branchs credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up
to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of
only P125,000.00 and actualmaintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals
totaling P81,652,000.00[6] against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch;
that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even before the seven-day clearing period for
regional checks expired; that Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior
approval of petitioners head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Account Closed; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

TRUST COMPANY, In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they
only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Petitioner,
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement[7] whereby the
Present: latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27[8] as of February 4, 1997 and
undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered
by postdated checks, plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any,
on December 31, 2001.[9]
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Findings of the Prosecutor

BERSAMIN,* Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her
Resolution[10] dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa.
DEL CASTILLO, and
According to Prosecutor Edad:
PEREZ, JJ.
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to
ROGELIO REYNADO and argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this
case, the relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented
JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Promulgated:
the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents.[11]
Respondents. August 9, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be

DECISION dismissed.[12]

On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of Justice (DOJ) by
means of a Petition for Review.[13]
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its
employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who
benefited from this transaction and instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment
basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the
law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed
that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player
and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are
based only on conspiracy with Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks
deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that
the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of
these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it
agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.[14]
A Motion for Reconsideration[15] was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by
then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.[17]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision[18] of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Citing
jurisprudence[19] wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of
such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court.[20] Hence, according to the CA,
[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private
respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions.[21] The CA
added that [s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, public respondents may not be
compelled by mandamus to file an information in court.[22]
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment[23] of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where the latter,
despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing
the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution
negate the offense already committed.[24]
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible
individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their
inclusion in the information.[25] This notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of
Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required[27] respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the petition within 10
days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment[28] while respondent Jose C.
Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment[29] on the petition. The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required
comment on the OSGs Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado)
did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause order[30] on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-
compliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a
fine of P1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda, the
instant petition was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the
offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did
not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only
the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the
CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the
appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v.
Tonda,[31] the negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for
the offense already committed.[32]
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the sole
responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent documents being the head
of petitioners Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they
cannot be held liable for estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA to
give due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of the Debt
Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for estafa under Art. 315
(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.[33]
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability
for estafa not affected by compromise or
novation of contract.
 Initially, it is best to emphasize that novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.[34]
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of
contract. In Firaza v. People[35]and Recuerdo v. People,[36] this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or
belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability
of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno[37] and in People v. Ladera[38] that criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party. Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda[39] cited by petitioner, we
held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the
commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into after the
commission of the crime does not extinguish accuseds liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of
said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against respondents should not be
dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at
the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement
Agreement entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines
extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latters liability as a corporate entity but not the
criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner
Metrobank. x x x[40]
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body of
the assailed Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement did not prevent the incipience of
criminal liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition absolving
the respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that contracts can only bind
the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and
has acted with knowledge thereof.[41]
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention of the
parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said
agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement, respondents
cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for
respondents to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud,
unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank
officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so,
respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed
to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the
criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the agreement between petitioner and Universal has
no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the respondents.
Determination of the probable cause, a
function belonging to the public prosecutor;
judicial review allowed where it has been
clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.[42] The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or
modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[43] Generally, a public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[44] Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls
under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily reveals that were it not for
the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged. From
her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioners auditor, her preliminary finding is that Ordinarily, the
offense of estafa has been sufficiently established.[45] Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the
agreement altered the relation of the parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal
liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone that
far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioners petition,
ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks
deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that
the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of
these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it
agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.[46]
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense
best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To
emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not a part of
the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[47] A finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[48] So we held
in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:[49]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming
the dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of
whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In requiring hard facts and solid evidence as the basis for a finding of probable
cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained
of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.The term does not mean actual and positive
 cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. While probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no evidence was
actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were teeming; or
it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was
adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously
exercised its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its
resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against respondents. As
perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her
belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas[50] we had occasion
to rule that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[51]
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not
hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a
ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioners appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another
ground failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification
under the law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your
client agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the
principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose
liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.[52]
The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents rests
upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the latters conspiratorial
participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be charged with
what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth
before the law those who have transgressed it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court[53] mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint
or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible
therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the
evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons
who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the
complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have
been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in
defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not
indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to
justify desistance by the public prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are
probably guilty thereof were charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution
of public respondent is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.[54] The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel
the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons
appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his
inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its
discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence
before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his
discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on
the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa
as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters finding and proceeded with the
questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause as
pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to
have been made with grave abuse.[55] The present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this
case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548
promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary
of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information for estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG.
GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174786
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, and the
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for hazing,
this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under
Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been characterized
by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and responsibility.1 This responsibility
has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to
take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as
accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of
patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate
duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under
the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed 2 the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to
include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the
Information.
THE CASE BACKGROUND
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. 3 In order
to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
"Indoctrination and Orientation Period,"4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3
May 2001.6
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it
forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and
possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class
of 2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding
probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez),
Leotharius C.Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) –
collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the
finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear
Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos
(Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG.
Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco
(Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman
Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus
ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against
respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor
eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the
crime of hazing.11
Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal
accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. Bayabos,
Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the
Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential elements of the
offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported act had been made a
prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been
accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the Information that
the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the
Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical,
mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized that
there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had
permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been
dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged
the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime
of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals
must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition
of the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an
allegation that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and
whether the academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them.
According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was
dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices,
whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be
an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the
criminal design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was
no one else with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of
the dismissal of the case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et
al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the
alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure
and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members" of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the law.16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not
make any categorical determination that the PMMA was considered an "organization" within the
meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos
et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash, 17 adopting the grounds
raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006. 18 However, on 3 August 2006, the
Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According
to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must
likewise be quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et
al.), explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same offense. 19 It is
unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were arrested, or
whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court on 13
March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition challenging
SB Resolution II.
THE ISSUES
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough evaluation
of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of
the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed
outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals
had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against
the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly, so long as the
commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine
their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal. 24 We note in the
present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment 25 dismissing the case
against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the
alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason
for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the
Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case
against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the
Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the
key components of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense charged, subject of the complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary
and concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged
against them.27 This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have
purportedly committed.28 The information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law
relied upon.29
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court based on
the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on
that ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the
essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without
consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or
controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into
account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other
similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training
and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved
by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police
shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished
as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a
person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological
suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or
entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes
against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of
physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an
organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act,
they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the
above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they
consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization.
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to –
groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs,
societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. 31 Attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution33 established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant
marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for
failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly
recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element
of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused,
not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. 35 Thus,
the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not
justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The
Information charging respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM]
VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD
G. MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.] GERRY P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR
B. OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S. VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing
Law), committed as follows:
program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active
midshipman status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be
quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing. Finally,
we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of
another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case
outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution
fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special
Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash 40 that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash
would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions
dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.

That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus of the THIRD DIVISION
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, Province of
Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186460
ARIS, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G. FERRER, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P. Promulgated:
DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS.
DENNIS S. VELASCO, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping - versus December 4, 2009
one another, committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their duties as
such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty members did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal
accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. GUALBERTO CINCO y SOYOSA,
during the school’s Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence Accused-Appellant.
of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.36
DECISION
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
For review is the Decision[1] dated 30 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term 37 – in this case, hazing – is
No. 01537 which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 14 July 2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a
Branch 106, Quezon City, in Criminal Cases No. Q-98-79944, No. Q-99-89097 and No. Q-
mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information
89098,[2] finding accused-appellant Gualberto Cinco y Soyosa guilty of two counts of simple rape.
must include, inter alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument 38 in
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation
 In November 1998, an information[3] was filed before the RTC accusing appellant of acts of
lasciviousness, thus:
Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944
That on or about the 30th day of November 1998, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual abuse upon the person of
AAA,[4] a minor, 14 years old, by then and there touching her body and mashing
her breast, against her will and without her consent which act debases, degrades,
or demeans the intrinsic worth and human dignity of said complainant as a human
being, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Subsequently, on 18 August 1999, two separate informations[5] were filed with the RTC
charging appellant with rape. The accusatory portions of the informations read:
Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097
That on or about the month of November, 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a minor, 14 years
of age, inside her room of the house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal
knowledge with [AAA] against her will and without her consent.
Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098
That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a minor, 14 years
of age, in the sala of their house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal
knowledge with [AAA] against her will and without her consent.
Thereafter, the aforementioned cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 7 February
2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits
followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Mariella Castillo and AAA. Their testimonies,
woven together, bear the following:
Herein private complainant, AAA, was born on 21 August 1984 in the province of YYY. When
she was 12 years old, her aunt, BBB, took her from the custody of her paternal grandmother and
brought her to BBBs residence located at XXX. Since then, AAA lived in the said house with BBB and
herein appellant (BBBs common-law spouse/live-in partner).
On 1 November 1998, at around 6:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was inside the house
watching television. Appellant entered the house and proceeded to the kitchen. He took a knife
therefrom and poked it at AAA. He told her not to shout or he would kill her. He tied her two hands at
the back of her head and removed her skirt and panty. She began to cry, but he told her to stop doing
so. He went on top of her, spread her thighs, and inserted his penis into her vagina. He then made push
and pull movements. As she felt pain in her vagina, she tried to push him away but to no avail. He
pinched her breast which was very painful. After satisfying his lust, he untied her hands, put on his
shorts and left her. She then stood up and put on her clothes. She went to the comfort room and saw
her panty stained with blood.
In the latter part of November 1998, at about 4:00 p.m., AAA was inside the house while
appellant was drinking with friends outside. Later, appellant, then armed with a knife, entered AAAs
room and approached AAA. He pointed the knife at her neck and told her not to make noise. He covered
her mouth with a handkerchief and tied her hands with a nylon rope. He then removed his pants and
brief, stripped her of her shorts and panty, and went on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina
and made up and down movements. Before leaving her, he warned her not to tell anyone of the
incidents or he would kill her.
Subsequently, AAA went to the barangay hall to report the incidents. However, upon arriving
thereat, she told the barangayofficials that she was merely touched and not raped by appellant. She was
forced to make such statement because appellants siblings, namely, Sonia and Roel, threatened to kill
her if she would divulge the truth. Appellant was eventually arrested and detained. She then filed with
the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against appellant.
Thereafter, AAA confided to BBB that appellant raped her. BBB accompanied AAA to the
office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Marilac Hills, Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thereupon, AAA disclosed to a social worker that she was raped by appellant. After the
interview, the social worker and BBB accompanied AAA to Camp Crame where the latter underwent
physical and genital examination, which was conducted by Dr. Mariella Castillo (Dr. Castillo). In the said
genital examination, Dr. Castillo found that AAA had an estrogenized hymen with healed laceration at
the 6:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock positions. The deep notches, being in the posterior part of the hymen,
indicate that the same had been lacerated before, but were now healed. The notches were caused by
penetration injuries or by an object being inserted through the hymen opening to the vaginal canal.
Afterwards, appellant was charged with two counts of rape.[6]
The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to buttress the testimonies of its
witness, to wit: (1) provisional medical certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit A); [7] (2) final
medical certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit B);[8] (3) sworn statement of AAA (Exhibit
C);[9] and (4) AAAs birth certificate (Exhibit D).[10]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Gregorio Frias and Roel
Cinco to refute the foregoing accusations. No documentary evidence was adduced. Appellant denied
any liability and interposed an alibi.
Appellant claimed that he was not in the house when the alleged incidents occurred. He
testified that from 8:00 a.m. to midnight of 1 November 1998, he sold ice cream in Cubao, Quezon
City. He went home in the morning of the following day, 2 November 1998. Also, during the latter part
of November 1998, he sold ice cream for the whole day in the same place and went home in the
morning of the following day. He alleged that AAA had ill motive to fabricate the rape charges, because
he caught her several times stealing money from his box inside the house.[11]
Gregorio Frias, friend of appellant, narrated that on 1 November 1998, he and appellant
were selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. At about 5:00 p.m. of the same day, he went to appellants
house and upon arriving therein, he noticed that the people inside were arguing about the loss of
money. On 30 November 1998, he and appellant were selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City.[12]
Roel Cinco, brother of appellant, stated that on 1 November 1998, he was watching
television inside appellants house. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant arrived at the house. Later that
evening, appellant quarreled with BBB because AAA had several times stolen money from him. [13]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant of rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
99-89097 and Q-89098. Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in both cases. He was also
ordered to pay AAA in each of the cases the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944
for acts of lasciviousness, appellant was acquitted therein for failure of the prosecution to establish said
charge. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 January 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
Decision. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 February 2008.[14]
In his Brief, appellant assigns a lone error, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE INFORMATIONS
UNDER CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-99-89097 AND Q-99-89098 AS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO STATE WITH PARTICULARITY THE APPROXIMATE DATES OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPES.[15]
Appellant maintains that the approximate times and dates of the commission of the offense
must be stated in the informations; that the informations in the instant cases do not state the
approximate times and dates of the alleged rapes; that although AAA testified that the first rape
occurred nearly before All Saints Day of 1998, the information in Criminal Case No. Q-89098,
nonetheless, states that such incident transpired on 1 November 1998; that the informations are fatally
defective; that the times and dates of the alleged rapes are so indefinite, thereby depriving appellant of
the opportunity to prepare for his defense; that appellants constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated; and that by reason of the foregoing,
appellant is entitled to an acquittal.[16]
An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the prosecutor and filed with the court.[17] To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. [18] The purpose of the
requirement for the informations validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for
his defense, since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.[19]
With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission.
In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the
commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has
no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute
accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at
any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. [20] In sustaining the view that the exact
date of commission of the rape is immaterial, we ruled in People v. Purazo[21]that:
We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge
of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be
accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place
or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged,
conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears
that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the
proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact
committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within
the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the
court.
This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely
alleged the month and year of its commission.[22] There is no cogent reason to deviate from these
precedents, especially so when the prosecution has established the fact that the rape under Criminal
Case No. Q-99-89097 was committed prior to the date of the filing of the information in the said
case. Hence, the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097, which states that
the rape was committed on or about November 1998, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant
in the said case.
Appellants allegation of variance between the date of the commission of rape in Criminal
Case No. Q-99-89098 and that established by the evidence during the trial is erroneous. AAA
categorically testified that she was raped by appellant on 1 November 1998.[23] This is consistent with
the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098 that appellant raped AAA on 1
November 1998.
Since the sole issue raised by appellant was resolved by this Court in favor of the validity of
the informations filed against him, then the subsequent trial court proceedings and the resulting
judgment of conviction against appellant should likewise be affirmed, there being no other questions
raised by appellant as to them. We further uphold the penalty imposed on appellant by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals.
Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, was the law pertinent
to the rapes committed on 1 November 1998 and in the latter part of November 1998. The law states
that the death penalty shall be imposed if the rape victim is a minor, and the offender is the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.[24] The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved during the
trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[25]
The informations in Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 and Q-99-89098 allege that AAA was a
minor at the time she was raped. However, there is no allegation therein that the offender, herein
appellant, is the common-law spouse of AAAs parent. Thus, the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship cannot be properly appreciated. In the absence of such qualifying circumstances, the
rapes in the instant cases are treated as simple rapes. Under Republic Act No. 8353, the penalty for
simple rape is reclusion perpetua.
We also sustain the RTC and the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to AAA, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[26] Nonetheless, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
deleted, as no aggravating circumstance in the commission of rapes was proven. [27]
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 30 January 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01537, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is
deleted.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 201620 : March 6, 2013
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA
JAIME, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the May 17, 2011
Decision1 and March 30, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952.
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,3 viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia
Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling
the same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire proceeds of
the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated
demands therefor, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds of the
sale of said items or to return any of the items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but
instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned
amount of P705,685.00.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-
law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of
September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing
her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On September 10, 2000, Rita's
daughter-in-law and business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth
seven hundred five thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP 705,685).5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter undertook to sell the
jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return
the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the delivery.6 However, as events turned out,
Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the given
period.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold jewelry or
the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf ears
prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against Senador.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603 dated
March 31, 2001 for the amount of PhP 705,685,9 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the
check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution, and
instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and
established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended
party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint.
According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime,"
whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was
never presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy
and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador guilty as charged
and sentenced as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA
JAIME, the following: 1) Actual Damages in the amount of P695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate
from the filing of the Information until fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
and 3) the amount of P50,000 as Attorney's fees.
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the appellate court
rendered a Decision upholding the finding of the RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established the
guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The CA opined that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the pieces of
jewelry in trust under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted
the pieces of jewelry to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and Cynthia; and (3)
Senador failed to return the pieces of jewelry despite demand made by Rita.
Further, the CA finding that Uba13 is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against
property and not oral defamation, as in Uba ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Dumaguete City, in
Criminal Case No. 16010, finding accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 2012.
Hence, the present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation in the
Information of the offended party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the information and the
evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal,14 more so if the
variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the appellant
was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against
whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the
person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a
crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the
name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the
criminal act charged in the information.16 Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended
party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the
information, not its dismissal:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname
of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation
or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he
must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous
designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense
was sufficiently described and identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic or
one which is not described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an
erroneous designation of the offended party is material and would result in the violation of the
accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such
error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have
been described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this provision can have no application to
a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar; and
at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case
would not be sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the
defendants "took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner
thereof the sum of P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either
of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money has no
earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can be
described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner
or possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must
correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no conviction. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100. Since money is
generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could be
described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who
was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is material and necessary
for the proper identification of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of the
offended party would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be described
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner,18 Sayson v. People,19 and Ricarze v. Court of Appeals20 support
the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with such particularity
as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is not
material and would not result in the violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the
accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person injured by a
criminal act is not material for the prosecution of the offense because the subject matter of the offense,
a warrant, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of the warrant was
to the prejudice of Aun Tan may be disregarded by virtue of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, which
declares that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty to
identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. In any
event the defect, if defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right
of the defendant on the merits, and can not, therefore, under the provisions of section 10 of the same
order, affect the present proceeding.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there was an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured because the subject matter of the offense, a check, is
specific and sufficiently identified. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in
the complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual
backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the
cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be
immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the
complaint with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. In the instant
suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check,
which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it
was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto
Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information." 22(Emphasis supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person injured is not
material because the subject matter of the offense, a check, was sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as and cause of the accusation against her.
in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the
acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable,
Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No. 0003603, which
such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of
was dishonored because it was drawn against an already closed account. The offer indicates her receipt
the offended party is immaterial.
of the pieces of jewelry thus described and an implied admission that she misappropriated the jewelries
themselves or the proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic
property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry
In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and
be compromised. an offer of compromise by the accused may he received in evidence as implied
proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement24 signed by Senador and presented during trial, which
admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
enumerates these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685,"
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime of estafa.

Description In light of current jurisprudence,25 the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary damages excessive.
Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
#1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams correction for the public good. Nevertheless, "exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party
or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
#2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams deleterious actions."26 On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 100,000 is
reduced to PhP 30,000.
#1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams

#319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in C A-G.R. CJ.C No. 00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
#1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams crime of ESTAFA under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages he reduced to PhP 30,000.
#393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams
SO ORDERED.
#2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams

#1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams

FIRST DIVISION
#2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams

#206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

RAMON A. ALBERT, G.R. No. 164015
Petitioner,
# 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams Present:
# 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
#2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
#1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams BRION,* JJ.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
#1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
# 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams Respondents. February 26, 2009

#1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present case,
not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the offended party in the DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari[1] of the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004[2] and 3 May
2004[3] of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecutions Motion to
Admit the Amended Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsideration of
petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).
The Facts
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D.
SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A.
3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the
President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance
Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade
above 27, while in the performance of his official function,
committing the offense in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the
Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to
the government and public interest, enter and make it appear
in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two
parcels of real property particularly described in the
Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted
to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well
knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate
of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land,
and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than
the loanable amount the land could command being
agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his
co-accused.
On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following grounds:
(1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a
speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February
1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence. [5]
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion
on the condition that petitioner would be provisionally arraigned. [6] On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The
following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of not
guilty. In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners Urgent Motion to
Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.
On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and ordered the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated
6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the
indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause.However, the Ombudsman, in an
Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman.
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment
of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of
the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the
Ombudsmans denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an
Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte
motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.[7]
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The
Amended Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as
amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the
President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance
Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade
above 27, while in the performance of his official function,
committing the offense in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
 Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the
Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause
undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and
make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-
7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described
in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted
to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well
knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate
of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land,
and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than
the loanable amount the land could command being
agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial
and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,[9] the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit
Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that gross neglect of duty which
falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from gross inexcusable negligence under Section 3(e), and
held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement
that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information
alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive
element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering
that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally
intended.
It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the
offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the
prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to warrant
conviction.[10]
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be
formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not
yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001
was merely provisional, then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in
substance.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition.
The Issues
The issues raised in this petition are:
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE
AMENDED INFORMATION; AND
2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On Whether the Sandiganbayan
Should Admit the Amended Information
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused.
xxx
Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the information may be
made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a provisional or a
permanent arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of not guilty during the 13 March 2001
arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form.
An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. [11] The accused is
formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily.[12]
The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting provisional or conditional arraignments is not
sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Court.[13] However, in People v. Espinosa,[14] this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided
that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.[15] or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions.
In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan
Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the [a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is,
of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[20] In Uriarte v.
accused persons travelling (sic) abroad.[16] In the Resolution of 16 April 2001, [17] the Sandiganbayan
People,[21] this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when
mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold
the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which,
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or
however, were limited only to petitioners itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. [22] Evident bad faith
required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of the
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. [23] Evident bad faith
arraignment.Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
be deemed simple and unconditional.
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. [24] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[25]
Petitioner contends that replacing gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable negligence is a
substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the
amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with gross inexcusable negligence,
The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with evident bad faith and
evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his argument,
manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty. The amended information, on the other hand,
petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change
alleges that petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert
negligence. Simply, the amendment seeks to replace gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable
from the one originally intended.[18]
negligence. Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019specifically, gross
neglect of duty is under Section 3(f) while gross inexcusable negligence is under Section 3(e) of the
We are not convinced.
statutethe question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights
of petitioner.
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. [26] On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
xxx
original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is
an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.[27]
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase gross neglect of duty from the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. [28] As a replacement, gross inexcusable
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
negligence would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,[29] the
Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only manifest
partiality and evident bad faith as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. Gross
This crime has the following essential elements:[19] inexcusable negligence was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the
said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of
the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
proof thereof.[30] In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v.
official functions;
Sandiganbayan[31] where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same
felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under
inexcusable negligence; and an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of gross inexcusable negligence in the
Information, which merely alleges manifest partiality and evident bad faith as modalities in the
commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.
 PHILIPPINES and DESI
On Whether Petitioners TOMAS, Present:
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated Petitioners,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it VELASCO, JR.,
was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case, BRION,
recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this PERALTA,
recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information BERSAMIN,
was later filed by the prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10 DEL CASTILLO,*
February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years - versus - ABAD,
since the initial filing of the complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the VILLARAMA, JR.,
Amended Information, in violation of petitioners right to a speedy trial. PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
Petitioners contentions are futile. SERENO,**
REYES, and
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Philippine Constitution which provides: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This right, however, is deemed violated Respondent. Promulgated:
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable February 28, 2012
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.[32] A simple x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings
do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.[33] DECISION

After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy
trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-
affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against
petitioner was raised in petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous
motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioners
co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although
the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not
have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-
settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is
necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.[34] The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial
proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or
unjustified. Hence, petitioners contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail.
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside
the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and 3 That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
SO ORDERED. statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
Republic of the Philippines the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money
Supreme Court with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Manila Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
EN BANC another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]
UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No. 192565

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed
on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the PasayCity court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or
proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with
perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a
false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-
Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside
the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what
has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this
particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to
declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject
of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said
territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state
that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for
perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge
against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not
simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of
the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio.
The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present
case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can
later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury
against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11]They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the
filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information
Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation
and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or
intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General
observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before
the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City,
where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court
to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and
hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-
defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within
its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity
and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court
which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the
court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in
the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction aredeemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement
for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either
by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also
be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant
is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any
competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she
shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard
against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. [14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by
law or made for a legal purpose.[15](emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by
Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit:
said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil]
Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made
the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus,
Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the
division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy
Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained
in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates
of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to
in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court
(Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed.The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Caet[18]which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it
appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit,
"swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in
a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to
in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification
under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a
witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case
(Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the
Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit
on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in
their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back
to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the
other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a
1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through
the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time
the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal
offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4,
Section 6 of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate
by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by
imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be
incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the
Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and 5393[25] of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false
affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the
court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act
of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to
be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well
the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of
Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the
old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts.
318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed
by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was
expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the
express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed
revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art.
367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes
perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art.
183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes
the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false
testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on perjury. [italics
ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than
a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on
any material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the
SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in
a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place
where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper
venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual
testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied
by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury
law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately
penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with
false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the
making of false affidavits).Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was
made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was
sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the
cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn
petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it
was in the courts of these cities where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether
new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of
Title] may issue.[31] To the Court, whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional
giving of false statement,[32]citing Caet as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of
its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it
leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC
likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been
Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil
case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a
civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act
No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then
only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the
other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedingswhich a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in
court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the
oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from
the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940.
Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it
expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases
is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients
took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged
was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed
and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making
of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are
executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199210 October 23, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICARDO M. VIDAÑA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04019, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricardo M Vidana which affirmed the Decision 2 dated June
26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 in Criminal Case No.
2163~G The trial court convicted appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña of one (1) count of rape in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The accusatory portion of the lnformation3 dated February 6, 2004 for rape in relation to Republic Act
No. 7 61 0 reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 2003, at x x x Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
designs and intent to have carnal knowledge of [AAA4], his own daughter, a minor, 15 years old, and
while using his influence as a father, over said minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of and sexual intercourse with said minor against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
After more than a year of being at large since the issuance on September 1, 2004 of the warrant for his
arrest,5appellant was finally arrested and subsequently arraigned on January 30, 2006 wherein he
pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge of rape.6
The prosecution’s version of the events that transpired in this case was narrated in the Plaintiff-
Appellee’s Brief in this manner:
[Appellant] and wife [BBB] were separated in 1998. They have four (4) children namely: [AAA], [CCC],
[DDD] and [EEE]. In 1999, [appellant] began living in with a certain Irene Valoria, his common-law wife,
who became the aforementioned children’s stepmother. They were staying in a one-bedroom house
owned by a certain Edgar Magsakay at Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija. At night, [appellant] and his
common-law wife sleep in the sala while the children occupy the bedroom. [AAA] is the eldest of the
brood and was 15 years old in the year 2003, having been born on 13 June 1988.
Around midnight of 16 September 2003, [appellant] was alone at the sala and the children were asleep
inside the bedroom. [AAA] suddenly was jolted from her sleep when somebody pulled her out of the
bed and brought her to the sala . She later recognized the person as her father, herein [appellant], who
covered her mouth and told her not to make any noise. At the sala, [appellant] forcibly removed [AAA]’s
short pants, t-shirt, bra and panty. As she lay naked, [appellant] inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina.
[AAA]’s ordeal lasted for about five (5) minutes and all the while she felt an immense pain. [Appellant]
tried to touch [AAA]’s other private parts but she resisted. During the consummation of [appellant]’s
lust upon his daughter, he warned her not to tell anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings.
The next day, [AAA] went to the house of Francisco and Zenny Joaquin. Spouses Joaquin are friends of
[appellant], whose house is about 500 meters away. Zenny Joaquin noticed something was bothering
[AAA] so she confronted the latter. [AAA] broke down and revealed to Zenny what happened to her at
the hands of [appellant]. Taken aback by the trauma suffered by the young lass, Zenny promptly
accompanied [AAA] to the police to report the incident.
The examination of the medico-legal officer on [AAA] revealed "positive healed laceration at 7 o’clock
position positive hymenal tag."7 (Citations omitted.)
On the other hand, the defense presented a contrasting narrative which was condensed in the Accused-
Appellant’s Brief, to wit:
[Appellant] together with his family were living in the house of Edgar Magsakay in Sta. Maria, Licab,
Nueva Ecija. He has four children but only three, namely: [EEE], [CCC] and [DDD] were staying with him.
His daughter [AAA] was staying with his kumpare Francisco Joaquin at Purok 2, Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva
Ecija, since August 15, 2003. He did not have the opportunity to visit her nor was there an occasion that
the latter visited them. On September 16, 2003 at 4:00 to 5:00 in the morning, he was at the fields
harvesting together with Irene Valoria (his wife and stepmother of his children). They finished at around
5:00 to 6:00 in the evening, then they proceeded home (TSN November 14, 2008, pp. 2-4).
[EEE] corroborated in material points the testimony of his father [appellant]. (TSN, February 13, 2009,
pp. 2-5)8
Trial on the merits ensued and at the conclusion of which the trial court rendered judgment against
appellant by finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 in relation to Section
31 of Republic Act No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the assailed June 26, 2009 RTC Decision is
reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, this court
sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA] ₱50,000 in moral damages.9
Insisting on his innocence, appellant appealed the guilty verdict to the Court of Appeals but was foiled
when the appellate court affirmed the lower court ruling in the now assailed March 18, 2011 Decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 26 June 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 2163-G, finding the accused-appellant RICARDO
M. VIDAÑA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.10
Hence, appellant takes the present appeal and puts forward a single assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5 IN RELATION TO SECTION 31 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610.11
Appellant vehemently denies his eldest child’s (AAA’s) allegation of rape by asseverating that he could
not have raped AAA because, on the date when the alleged rape took place, she was living in Francisco
and Zenny Joaquin’s house and not in his residence where the alleged rape was consummated. This
assertion was corroborated on material points by appellant’s son, EEE. Furthermore, appellant insists
that the credibility of AAA is suspect since her narration of the alleged rape incident does not indicate
that she resisted appellant’s carnal desires.
We find no merit in appellant’s contention.
Not unlike most rape cases, appellant hinges his hopes for freedom on undermining the credibility of
AAA’s testimony. Since AAA is the only witness that can connect appellant to the crime, appellant
beseeches this Court to take a closer look at AAA’s testimony and, at the end of which, render a
judgment of acquittal.
It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.12 Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect, if not
conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose Q And you said you were sleeping?
direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of
the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offense charged. 13
A Yes Sir.

A careful review of the evidence and testimony brought to light in this case does not lead to a conclusion
Q How were you awakened?
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were mistaken in their assessment of the credibility of
AAA’s testimony. Absent any demonstration by appellant that both tribunals overlooked a material fact
that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or misunderstood a circumstance of consequence A He pulled me out of the place where we were sleeping, Sir.
in their evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, we are thus inclined to affirm the facts as
established by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Q You were sleeping on a bed?

We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was delivered in a straightforward A Yes Sir.
and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. The pertinent portions of her testimony are reproduced
below:
Q You said you were pulled. Who pulled you from your bed?

[PROS.] FLORENDO
A My father, Sir.

Q We are referring to this particular case. During the last setting, you stated that you were raped on
September 16, 2003. Is that right Miss Witness? [PROS.] FLORENDO

A Yes Sir. At this point, Your Honor, may we just have it on record that the witness is crying again.

Q And where were you at that time on September 16, 2003 when your father raped you? PROS.] FLORENDO

A In our house at x x x, Nueva Ecija, Sir. Q He pulled you to what place?

Q And what were you doing before your father raped you on September 16, 2003? A He pulled me to the sala where he was sleeping, Sir.

A We were sleeping with my siblings, Sir. Q I thought your father had a companion in the sala at that time?

Q And where was your father at that time? A When my stepmother was not there, he was alone in the sala, Sir.

A He was also there in our house, Sir. Q When your father pulled you, you did not shout, you did not scream?

Q He was sleeping with you? A I was not able to shout or scream because he covered my mouth and told me not to make noise, Sir.

A No Sir. They were sleeping in the sala. Q Was that your first time that your father raped you on September 16, 2003?

Q You said "they". You mean your father has companions? A No Sir.

A When my stepmother is present, she was sleeping with my father, Sir, but when she was not there, my Q So, he pulled you out of the bed, out of the bedroom and took you to the sala?
father sleeps alone in the sala, Sir.
A Yes Sir.
Q So, about what time of the day on September 16, 2003 that you said you were raped by your father?
Q What did he do to you while you were already in the sala?
A I cannot remember exactly the time, Sir. As far as I can recall, it was almost midnight, Sir.
A He forcibly removed the shorts I was wearing then, Sir.
Q You were only wearing shorts at that time? Q He did not kiss you?

A Yes Sir. Shorts and also a dress. A No Sir.

Q What dress was that? Q He did not touch your other private parts?

A T-shirt, Sir. A He was trying to touch my other private parts but I resisted, Sir.

Q Aside from the shots and t-shirt, you were not wearing anything? Q And after doing that, what did he do next if there was any?

A I was wearing shorts, t-shirt, panty and bra, Sir. A Nothing more, Sir.14

Q Did your father succeed in removing your shorts? The quoted transcript would show that when AAA testified and, thus, was constrained to recount the
torment she suffered at the hands of her own father, she broke down in tears in more than one instance.
This can only serve to strengthen her testimony as we have indicated in past jurisprudence that the
A Yes Sir.
crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of
such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic
Q What else did he do after removing your shorts? experience.15 It is also worth noting that appellant’s counsel did not even bother to cross-examine AAA
after her direct examination by the prosecutor.
A He also removed my panty and inserted his penis into my vagina with a warning that I should not tell it
to anybody because he will kill us all, Sir. We have previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the
Q What do you mean by "penis"? death or lifetime imprisonment of her father.16 That legal dictum finds application in the case at bar
since appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely
accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh and blood. His allegation that AAA’s
A "Titi", Sir. (Male sexual organ) admission in open court, that she is not close to him and that they do not agree on many
things,17 cannot suffice as a compelling enough reason for her to fabricate such a sordid and scandalous
Q His sexual organ was erected or not at that time? tale of incest.

A Erected, Sir. With regard to appellant’s contention that AAA’s lack of resistance to the rape committed against her,
as borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth to her accusation, we rule that such an argument
deserves scant consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure to shout or offer tenuous
Q And he inserted it to what part of your body? resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused since
rape is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend.18
A Inside my vagina, Sir.
Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the moral
Q And what did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your vagina? ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing her to do
whatever he wants.19 In other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need
not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice.20
A It was painful, Sir.

Q And how long was his penis inserted inside your vagina?
A About five (5) minutes, Sir.
Q Aside from that, he did nothing to you? He only inserted his penis?
We likewise rule as unmeritorious appellant’s assertion that he could not have committed the felony
attributed to him because, at the date of the alleged rape, AAA was not residing at the place where the
alleged rape occurred. Jurisprudence tells us that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime, thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 21

A Yes Sir. Moreover, we have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the
same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.22 Based on this doctrine, the
corroborating testimony of appellant’s son, EEE, who, undoubtedly, is a person intimately related to annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
him cannot serve to reinforce his alibi. paid.25

In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant.1âwphi1 However, the trial WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
court erred in impliedly characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuse under Sections 5 and 31 of G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04019, affirming the conviction of appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña in Criminal Case No.
Republic Act No. 7610. 2163-G, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:

Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that "the complaint or information shall (1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole is imposed upon appellant
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the Ricardo M. Vidaña;
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it." The
(2) The moral damages to be paid by appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is increased from Fifty
information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);
Penal Code, the relevant portions of which provide:

(3) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy-
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –
Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
(4) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00); and
(5) Appellant Ricardo M Vidaña is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all
damages at the legal rate of six percent (6) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
People vs. Abrencillo, November 28, 2012 (PDF FILE)

The same statute likewise states: SECOND DIVISION

Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014
reclusion perpetua.
DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner,
xxxx vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: DECISION

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, BRION, J.:
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 651 filed by Dr. Joel C. Mendez
(petitioner) assailing the June 12, 2007 and August 13, 2007 resolutions 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals
In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the information with feloniously having carnal knowledge of (CTA)3 The assailed resolutions granted the prosecution's Motion to Amend Information with Leave of
his own minor daughter against her will by using his influence as a father. Considering further that the Court and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
minority of AAA and her relationship to appellant were both alleged in the information and proven in
court, the proper designation of appellant’s felony should have been qualified rape. As such, the penalty
ANTECEDENTS
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, in lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 934623 must be imposed. Furthermore, in line with jurisprudence, the award of moral damages
should be increased to ₱75,000.00 in addition to the award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages in The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Department of Justice against
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00, respectively.24 Likewise, interest at the rate of 6% per the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing
business and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to 2003 under the following trade names
and registration addresses:5
1. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 39 – South Quezon City
2. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with RDO No. 39 – South Quezon City
3. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
Registered with RDO No. 40 – Cubao
4. Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic
Registered with RDO No. 47 – East Makati
5. Weigh Less Center
Registered with RDO No. 21
6. Mendez Weigh Less Center
Registered with RDO No. 4 – Calasiao Pangasinan
Based on these operations, the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable
years 2001 to 2003 and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the
government.6
In his defense, the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor under these
trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he countered that he did
not file his income tax returns in these places because his business establishments were registered only
in 2003 at the earliest; thus, these business establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his
alleged failure to file his income tax return.7
After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against
petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply
correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National
Internal Revenue Code.8Accordingly an Information9 was filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with
violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997). The Information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the
above named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of "Weigh Less Center" with
principal office at No. 31 Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon City, Makati,
San Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his
Income Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage
and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties,
surcharges and interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
The accused was arraigned11 and pleaded not guilty on March 5, 2007.12 On May 4, 2007, the prosecution
filed a "Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court."13 The amended information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the
above named accused, doing business under the name and style of "Weigh Less Center"/Mendez
Medical Group", with several branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati
City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties,
surcharges and interest (underscoring and boldfacing in the original).14
The petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the required period; thus on June 12,
2007,the CTA First Division granted the prosecution’s motion.15 The CTA ruled that the prosecution’s
amendment is merely a formal one as it "merely states with additional precision something already
contained in the original information."16The petitioner failed to show that the defenses applicable under
the original information can no longer be used under the amended information since both the original
and the amended information charges the petitioner with the same offense (violation of Section 255).
The CTA observed:
the change in the name of his business to include the phrase "Mendez Medical Group" does not alter the
fact the [petitioner] is being charged with failure to file his Income Tax Return... The change in the
branches of his business, likewise did not relieve [the petitioner] of his duty to file an ITR. In addition,
the places where the accused conducts business does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction... nor ... change
the nature of the offense charged, as only one [ITR] is demanded of every taxpayer. We likewise see no
substantial difference on the information with the insertion of the phrase ‘for income earned’ for it
merely stated the normal subject matter found in every income tax return.
The petitioner filed the present petition after the CTA denied his motion for reconsideration. 17 THE
PETITION
The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment
prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is substantial in
nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to him and affect the form of his defense. 18 Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Adopting the observation of a dissenting CTA justice, he claims that to change the allegation on the
locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to Muntinlupa and
Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he would have to assume.
The petitioner adds that the change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002 would
also alter his defense considering that the difference in taxable years would mean requiring a different
set of defense evidence. The same is true with the new allegation of "Mendez Medical Group" since it
deprived him of the right, during the preliminary investigation, to present evidence against the alleged
operation and or existence of this entity.19 In sum, the amendments sought change the subject of the
offense and thus substantial.20 RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT
The respondents claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CTA
resolutions. Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en
banc is the proper remedy, to be availed of within fifteen days from receipt of the assailed resolution.
The filing of the present petition was clearly a substitute for a lost appeal. Even assuming that certiorari
is the proper remedy, the CTA did not commit an error of jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of
discretion. On the contrary, the assailed resolutions were in accord with jurisprudence. The amended
information could not have caused surprise to the petitioner since the amendments do not change the
nature and cause of accusation against him. The offense the petitioner probably committed and the acts
or omissions involved remain the same under the original and the amended information, i.e., his failure
to file his ITR in 2002 for income earned in 2001 from the operation of his businesses. 21
Neither would the change in the date of the commission of the crime nor the inclusion of the phrase
"Mendez Medical Group" cause surprise to the petitioner since he was fully apprised of these facts
during the preliminary investigation. Likewise, the original information already alleged that the
petitioner’s failure to file an ITR refers to "taxable year 2001."
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the preparation of the defense contemplated in the law does
not strictly include the presentation of evidence during the preliminary investigation because this stage
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. ISSUES:
1. Is the remedy of certiorari proper?
2. Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are
substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
COURT’S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
Preliminary consideration
The petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. After failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider its admission of the amended
information, the only remedy left to the petitioner is to file a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is not available to the
petitioner. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision
he intends to assail. What Section 9 Rule 922 of the Rules of the CTA provides is that appeal to the CTA
en banc may be taken from a decision or resolution of the CTA division in criminal cases by filing a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1, Rule 43, the remedy of a
petition for review is available only against a judgments or a final order.
A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved
party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves
something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the present case, the order is
interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s only remedy after failing to obtain a reconsideration of the
ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, while we rule that the petitioner availed of the correct remedy, we resolve to dismiss the
petition for failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion, much less gravely abused its
discretion.
Amendment of information
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of amending the
information:
Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial,
a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to jurisprudence,
substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. 23 Under Section 14, however, the
prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so
long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under
the second paragraph of Section 14.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from
seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the
accused.24 One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the
charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense
against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment,
then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
To illustrate these points, in Almeda v. Judge Villaluz,25 the prosecution wanted to additionally alleged
recidivism and habitual delinquency in the original information. In allowing the amendment, the Court
observed that the amendment sought relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction. Since they do not have the effect of charging an offense different
from the one charged (qualified theft of a motor vehicle) in the information, nor do they tend to correct
any defect in the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the amendment sought is merely
formal.
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,26 the prosecution sought during trial to amend the information from
frustrated to consummated murder since the victim died after the information for frustrated murder
was filed. The accused refused to be arraigned under the amended information without the conduct of a
new preliminary investigation. In sustaining the admission of the amended information, the Court
reasoned that the additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was
merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Again, there is no
change in the nature of offense charged; nor is there a change in the prosecution’s theory that the
accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim; nor does the amendment affect
whatever defense the accused originally may have.
In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
one;27 or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change in the
date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase "doing business
under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of
petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We cannot see how these
amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as accused.
The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income earned"
At the outset we note that the actual year of the commission of the offense has escaped both the
petitioner and prosecution. In its Motion to Amend the Information, the prosecution mistakenly stated
that the information it originally filed alleged the commission of the offense as "on or about the 15th
day of April, 2001" – even if the record is clear that that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002.
The petitioner makes a similar erroneous allegation in its petition before the Court.
Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007 resolution, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the
CTA implicitly ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in the information by correctly
citing what the original information alleges. This, notwithstanding, the petitioner still baselessly
belaboured the point in its present petition by citing the erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion
to amend instead of the original information itself.28 This kind of legal advocacy obviously added
nothing but confusion to what is otherwise a simple case and another docket to the High Court’s
overwhelming caseload.
That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with
the allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year 2001. Since the
information alleges that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the
offense could only possibly be committed when petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the
due date of filing, which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the addition of the phrase
"for the income earned" before the phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal
amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that is already
contained in the original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the
income earned for the preceding taxable year.
The nature of the remaining two items of amendment would be better understood, not only in the
context of the nature of the offense charged under the amended information, but likewise in the
context of the legal status of the "Mendez Medical Group."
The addition of the phrase "doing business
under the name and style of Mendez
Medical Group and the change and/or
addition of the branches of petitioner’s
operation
Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), a resident citizen who is engaged in the practice of a
profession within the Philippines is obligated to file in duplicate an income tax return on his income from
all sources, regardless of the amount of his gross income. 29 In complying with this obligation, this type
of taxpayer ought to keep only two basic things in mind: first is where to file the return; and second is
when to file the return. Under Section 51 B of the NIRC, the return should "be filed with an authorized
agent bank, Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or
municipality in which such person has his legal residence or principal place of business in the
Philippines."
On the other hand, under Section 51 C of the NIRC, the same taxpayer is required to file his income tax
return on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of April of each year covering income for the preceding
taxable year.30 Failure to comply with this requirement would result in a violation of Section 255 of the
NIRC which reads:
Section 255. Failure to File Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax Withhold and
Remit Tax and Refund Excess Taxes Withheld on Compensation. - Any person required under this Code
or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make a return, keep any record, or
supply any correct and accurate information, who wilfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep
such record, or supply correct and accurate information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund
excess taxes withheld on compensation, at the time or times required by law or rules and regulations
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of
not less than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000) and suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but
not more than ten (10) years. [emphasis supplied]
Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should
have filed a consolidated return in his principal place of business, regardless of the number and location
of his other branches. Consequently, we cannot but agree with the CTA that the change and/or addition
of the branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information does not constitute substantial
amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his
income tax return.
Still, the petitioner cites the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division31 in claiming that the
deletion of San Fernando (Pampanga City) and Dagupan City deprives him of the defenses he raised in
his counter-affidavit.
In Matalam, the prosecution charged the accused with violation of RA No. 3019 for "[c]ausing undue
injury to several [government employees] thru evident bad faith xxx by illegally and unjustifiably
refusing to pay [their] monetary claims xxx in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they
have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials and other benefits." After a reinvestigation,
the prosecution sought to amend the information to allege that the accused –
[c]ause[d] undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service [several government] employees, xxx to
their damage and prejudice amounting to ₱1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the period
when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other benefits. 32
The accused moved to dismiss the amended information for charging an entirely new cause of action
and asked for preliminary investigation on this new charge of illegal dismissal.
The Sandiganbayan observed that (i) there is a clear change in the cause of action (from refusal to pay to
illegal dismissal); and (ii) the main defense of all the accused in the original information – the lack of a
corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses –
would no longer be available under the amendment. After finding, however, that the complainants’
demand for monetary claim actually arose from their alleged illegal dismissal, the Sandiganbayan
allowed the amendment because an "inquiry to the allegations in the original information will certainly
and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended
Information."33
As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment made after he had pleaded to the
original information, Montenegroruled34 that prejudice exists when a defense under the original
information would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as amended.35 Applying this test, the
Court disallowed the amendment for being substantial in nature as the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was altered.36
The inapplicability of Matalam to the present case is obvious. Here, the prosecution’s theory of the case,
i.e., that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001 did not change. The
prosecution’s cause for filing an information remained the same as the cause in the original and in the
amended information. For emphasis, the prosecution’s evidence during the preliminary investigation of
the case shows that petitioner did not file his income tax return in his place of legal residence 37 or
principal place of business in Quezon City or with the Commissioner. In short, the amendment sought
did not alter the crime charged.
At first, a change in the location of branches alleged in the information may appear to deprive the
petitioner of his defense in the original information, i.e., the petitioner’s branches in Dagupan and San
Fernando were registered only in 2003 and were therefore "in existent" in 2001. However, this is not the
kind of defense contemplated under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and broadly under the due process
of law.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the opportunity given to the accused to present his defense evidence
during the preliminary investigation is not exhaustive. In the same manner that the complainant’s
evidence during preliminary investigation is only required to establish the minimal evidentiary threshold
of probable cause, the evidence that the respondent may present during trial is not limited to what he
had presented during the preliminary investigation, so long as the evidence for both parties supports or
negates the elements of the offense charged.
To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused previously
had under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the characteristic
thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the essence of the
offense charged.38
In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the
petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly,
the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
We also reject for lack of merit petitioner’s claim that the inclusion of the phrase "doing business under
the name and style of Mendez Medical Group" after his preliminary investigation and arraignment
deprives him of the right to question the existence of this "entity."
The petitioner however has not drawn our attention to any of his related operations that actually
possesses its own juridical personality. In the original information, petitioner is described as "sole
proprietor of Weigh Less Center." A sole proprietorship is a form of business organization conducted for
profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to
secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government
without acquiring juridical or legal personality of its own. 39
In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is "doing business
under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the nature of a sole
proprietorship, the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style" is merely
descriptive of the nature of the business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out
the practice of his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of the "entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than the
shadow of its business owner - petitioner himself.
At any rate, we agree with the prosecution that petitioner has no reason to complain for the inclusion of
the phrase "Mendez Medical Group." In the Reply-Affidavit it submitted during the preliminary
investigation, the prosecution has attached copies of petitioner's paid advertisements making express
reference to "Mendez Medical Group."40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-
in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor,
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor,
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. 1 The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take
recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require consideration.
Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon
the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions of
public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed
to be victims of Operation VD.5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was immediately
dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze
the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence
officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from
alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the
length of time that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to
confirm the identities of the remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National
Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them
swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and
were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those discovered at the mass grave
site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M.
Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were
former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall
B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then
members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement Operation VD,
namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on suspected military spies and
civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3)
the Investigation Group which would subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group
or the "cleaners" of those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by
members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring,
among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner
Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-
affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8
December 2006 during the preliminary investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a
counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information
for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio
Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin
Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco
Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were
vital to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC
Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the
filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them
with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment
of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the
RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion. 40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and set 42 the case for oral
arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007. 43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy of
petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge
against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days.45 On 3 April 2007, the
Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a ₱100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information filed
before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Admit Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27
July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the
proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court. 48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007. 49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. 51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon, Judge
Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution
dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to
transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina
(Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred
to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration. 55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the case pending the
resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss. 57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of
Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina. 58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No.
185587, prayed for the unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further
incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge
Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina. 60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636,
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis. 61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with G.R. No.
176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echanis’s immediate release,
to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall
only be for the purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August
2009; and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months. 65 The latter condition was later
modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the
peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under a ₱100,000
cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlad’s motion to
quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009. 69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge
Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and
185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment 74 on 7
May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and
185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January
2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail. 79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner
Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant
of a ₱100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team,
which was then holding negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount of ₱100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period
of their actual participation in the peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses
lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of
one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. 89 Thus, one who has been
afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to
the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to
Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance
before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’
addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case
without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14
September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the
launching of Operation VD was agreed upon.95Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-
affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his
escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007
admitted that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in
June 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental
Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the
Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process. 98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor
Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be
found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
@ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite
entry of appearance by their respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.100The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007, 108 the
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter
majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. petition for certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.

Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St., B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of
the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same address, and
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
that she was among those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affidavits.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a formal entry of
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution
appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad
in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. 109
had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case." 106 Having opted to remain passive
during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due
process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to surreptitiously insert the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious about the
Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed
regarding the date of the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was
also clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his
counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity
to question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For
him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental
Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the
Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on
the collective affidavits of several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the
judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable
for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents
showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records
submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and
evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is
addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge. 116 Further elucidating on the wide
latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan117 as follows:

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court's
pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings,
Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the
as well as the conclusions of law. x x x.
resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within
Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated
above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the
requirement of personal determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached
thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with
which he is being charged."118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the following
portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the Provincial
Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of Complainants,
Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and
skeletal remains, this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of
arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within
the purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. 122 Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for
the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly
seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the
defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. 125 The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 126 if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of
rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
(n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid
indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. 128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under
Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the indictment for
rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a
petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the
inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed
supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131We eventually ordered
the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.

Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond posted before the
Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila.1âwphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in
view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of
₱100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the
period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It
shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are
concluded.

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner
Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G.
Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this
Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.