THE CITY OF MANILA v.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF

MANILA and THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA
CONCEPCION SARMIENTO

G.R. No. L-10033 August 30, 1917

EN BANC JOHNSON, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It
provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no
heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the
procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may be declared escheated.

FACTS:

Ana Sarmiento executed a will which contained provisions for the establishment of
a "Capellania de Misas.” The first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro
del Castillo. Said will also contained a provision for the administration of said property in
relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" that succeeding administration should
continue perpetually. Ana Sarmiento died about the year 1672.

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on
the 15th day of February, 1913. Its purpose was to have declared escheated to the city of
Manila certain property situated in and around said city. The theory of the City of Manila is
that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without
leaving "her or person entitled to the same."

The Court of First Instance reached the conclusion that the prayer of the City of
Manila should be denied. The City of Manila appealed. Aside from the abovementioned
facts, the Supreme Court found that the following facts were proved by a large
preponderance of the evidence: that for more than two hundred years the intervener, the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said
property; that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and legally
succeeded in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
ISSUE:

Can the property of Ana Sarmiento be declared escheated?

RULING:

No. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated.
It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no
heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the
procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may be declared escheated.

The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will
provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent
administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to
administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law
entitled to inherit her property. In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question cannot
be declared escheated as of the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property
may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana
Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same.

The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what
disposition shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said will
evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance
therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with
the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original
owner. In view of the facts therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated
as of the property of Ana Sarmiento.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS v. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO,
P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT.
LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT.
RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE
NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

EN BANC PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in
the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may
be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

FACTS:

Petitioner Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent who was a member
of the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA), was
allegedly abducted during the course of her immersion under the exposure program of said
group. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009 in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission, Roxas and her companions, Carabeo and Jandoc decided to rest. At around 1:30 in
the afternoon, 15 heavily armed men forcibly took them to a nearby blue van. Before
petitioner was blindfolded, she saw the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. The
van travelled for about an hour, and upon arrival at their destination, petitioner was informed
that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA).
 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur,
Nueva Ecija. What followed was five straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. She
was continuously blindfolded except when a woman named Rose bathed her, but despite
being deprived of sight, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as Dex, James and RC. RC even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group, and that she
was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.

On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in
Quezon City. Roxas was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.

Roxas then filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the
Supreme Court, impleading public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents
who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose,
Dex and RC. The CA was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under
the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for petitioner’s abduction, however,
it still issued the privilege of the writ of amparo on the ground that petitioner was indeed
abducted and tortured, and that there is still an ongoing threat against her security. The Court
of Appeals likewise granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, observing that there was
a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of
records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-
NPA.

ISSUE/S:

1.) Is the doctrine of command responsibility proper to implicate the high-ranking

civilian and military authorities Roxas impleaded as respondents in
her amparo petition?
2.) Should the privilege of the writ of habeas data be granted?

RULING:
 As to the first issue, no. Command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired, the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under
the applicable substantive law.
However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may be impleaded not actually on the
basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that
she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.

With regard to the second issue, the petition for the privilege of the writ of habeas
data should be denied. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim, which Roxas failed to do. There was actually
no evidence on record that shows that any of the public officials had violated or threatened
the right to privacy of the petitioner. The keeping by the public officials of records of
investigations and other reports about Roxas’ ties with the CPP-NPA was not adequately
proven considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its
existence was only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released
by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record
even shows that any of the public officials had access to such video or photograph. The
public officials cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.

The Supreme Court finally noted that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the
abduction and torture of Roxas and that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant
to its Constitutional mandate to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights, must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.