RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
to establish, DNA testing could be resorted to.
People v. Rufino Umanito
FACTS
Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a
young male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He waited
for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife at her
abdomen. He dragged her into the Home Economics
Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed
her while still holding the knife. He set her down on a bench,
put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up
and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six
months later, AAA ’ s mother noticed the prominence on
her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her
mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the
police station. (Umanito’ s alibi: He was at home all day. Re:
AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him.
He conjectured that she had a crush on him since she
frequently visited him.)
RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and
sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito ’s
appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review
(as per Mateo ruling), and CA affirmed RTC. Umanito seeks
acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the
case and AAA ’ s questionable credibility as grounds. He
also said that AAA filed the complaint only upon her
mother ’s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had
sex with another (a married man). Also, he claimed that
there were several inconsistencies in her assertions.
CASE IS REMANDED TO THE RTC FOR RECEPTION OF DNA
EVIDENCE
RATIO
The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported
rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito ’ s
absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her
child are directed to submit themselves to DNA testing
under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No.
06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days
before promulgation of this case).
DNA print / identification technology is now
recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where
biological evidence is available. The groundwork for
acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first
laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA
analysis as evidence and traced the development of its
admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said
that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
The determination of WON Umanito is the father
(through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-
SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However,
since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate
that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the
feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the
standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing if it finds it
to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine the
institution to undertake the testing, and the parties are free
to manifest their comments on the choice. After the DNA
analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties
who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in
accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be
assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of
probative value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA
testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined to observe
confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.
To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although
the parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for
DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.
PEOPLE VS YATAR
Case Digest
Relevant Topics: Credibility of witness;
conviction by circumstantial evidence; DNA
evidence; requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
FACTS: This is an automatic review after
the accused, Joel Yatar, was sentenced to Death
for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide. Yatar, prior his separation to his wife,
used to live with the latter and the victim,
Kathlyn Uba, in the house of his mother-in-law.
On June 30, 1998, Yatar was found by several
witnesses acting strangely in and along the
vicinity of the house of the victim. Later that
day, the victim’s lifeless body was found with
stab wounds, her intestine protruding from her
stomach, and bruises. The victim’s clothes were
likewise found near the cadaver. The post-
mortem report of the victim’s body revealed the
presence of semen in her vagina. By DNA
examination, it was found that it matches Yatar’s
DNA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgement of conviction was
meritorious.
RULING: Yes. The Court affords much respect
and credibility to the testimonies of the
witnesses absent any showing that some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. The trial court latter is in a
better and unique position of hearing first hand
the witnesses and observing their deportment,
conduct and attitude. Furthermore, the
circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution proves beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime. The
requirements to determine the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence were complied with as
follows: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The DNA evidence presented
strengthens the conviction by circumstantial
evidence. Lastly, the case passed the test of
moral certainty which invariably proves beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused, Yatar is
guilty of Rape with Homicide.
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation
with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he
is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live
birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and
Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and
Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form
and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s
father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC
dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration
which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon
by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera
v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in
a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A
party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects
during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A
prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. It states that
the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio
or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon
a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists
that is relevant to the case;(b) The biologicalsample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This
Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA
testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a “search,”
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of
a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally
found that a preliminary showing must be made before a
court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a
court order for blood testing The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.”
Rosendo Herrera vs Rosendo Alba
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed
a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to
recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son.
Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial
court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic
acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is
indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However,
Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed
that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread
acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be
admissible in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-
incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled
in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the
Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order
of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim
case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to
the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object
evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in
the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA
analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative value of DNA test
results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known
as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a
doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a
test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific
test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test
inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer
review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread
acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation
cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test
result must state that the there is at least a 99.9%
probability that the person is the biological
father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or
higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately
result in the DNA test result being admitted as an
overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become
a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case
Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such
result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can
be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied
with.
What if the result provides that there is less than
99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological
father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA
testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant,
not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in
the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot
properly invoke self-incrimination.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID
PRISONS, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo
de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa,
seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a
new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of
purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after
performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples
allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to
the victim of the rape.
By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found
petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza when she
was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him
to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages,
costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza,
the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently
serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa
City. Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the alleged rape,
he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had
rendered him incapable of having an erection. On
automatic review, the court found that the date of birth of
Aileen’s child was medically consistent with the time of the
rape.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there
was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of
Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the
victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed
during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s
case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner. Thus,
petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of
a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the
paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the
rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein
he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and it
was denied with finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator
was undaunted by these challenges, for having been
informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de
Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of
Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup and used as a sample. Petitioner-relator then gathered
samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA
testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those
given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that
given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the
donors of the samples, save for the sample given by
Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary
report and showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have
sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due
to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas
corpus and new trial?
HELD:
No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some the legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was
held that review of judgment of conviction is allowed in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in a very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence
of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of
a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. This court stated the
general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of
error, and should not be thus used.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence
may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a)
that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trail even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight
that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the
existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded
carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the
existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the
part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In
either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon
petitioner.
AGUSTIN V CA
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante
sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the
Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted
Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but
despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested
to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s
leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several
months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has,
since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin
then sued Arnel for support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing
all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense
of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, thus this petition.
Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s
MTD
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA
paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search
Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss because the private respondents’
complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action
against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action
are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful
act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right
and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the
facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the
proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy.
The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of
communication where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves
neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right
against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
People vs. Enojas
Case Summary and Outcome
The Philippines Supreme Court found that text messages
can be admitted into evidence for purposes of prosecution
if the prosecution can show that the person testifying about
the text messages had actual knowledge of the text
messages. In this case, a police officer posing as an accused
had first hand knowledge of the text messages he was
sending and receiving, and therefore, the messages were
admissible.
Facts
The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police
while parked suspiciously in front of a glass shop. Enojas
provided the police with identification that the officers
suspected to be fake. The officers then asked Enojas to
accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed.
On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the
restroom. The officer who went into the store apprehended
two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The
other officer got out of the car upon hearing the gunshots.
Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled
the scene. Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car
and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the messages on
the phone and communicated with the other suspects,
resulting in an entrapment operation.
Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged
with murder in 2006 before the Las Pifias Regional Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the conviction. The accused then appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Decision Overview
The defense argued that the prosecution failed to provide
direct evidence that the accused shot the victim. The Court
ruled that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to
convict if: “1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
Court found that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to provide a basis for conviction
of the accused. The Court, however, disagreed with the
Court of Appeals, which found “that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of
unlicensed firearms” made the killing of the police officer a
murder. Rather, the Supreme Court found that the accused
could only be found liable for homicide.
The Court found that the text messages were properly
admissible because the police officer, posing as Enojas, had
personal knowledge of the messages and was competent to
testify about them. Further, the accused argued that they
were arrested without a valid warrant. The court found that
even if this were the case, it is not grounds for reversing
a conviction. Thus, the Court lowered the crime to that of
homicide and lessened Enojas’ sentence to 12 years in
prison.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CODILLA
Facts: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated
and owned by the herein private respondent Bangpai
shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc.,
accidentally bumped the power barge of the herein
petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for
damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of the herein
public respondent judge. During the presentation of
evidence, the petitioner presented as pieces of evidence
Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the
court. Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence was filed
before the court to which the court ordered that such
pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records but has to
be attached to the documents for proper disposition by the
appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The petitioner
aver that such documents be admitted for the basic reason
that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.
Issue: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by
the petitioner be regarded within the purview of the
electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as
follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by
sight or other means which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For the
purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document"
may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message".
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to
information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an
electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant
only in terms of the information contained therein, similar
to any other document which is presented in evidence as
proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the
information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination
can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount
to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same
may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
— There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of
which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original
writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the
custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing
record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to
prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of
the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in
offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with
the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo
denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.
Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as
evidence before the court were not within the purview
electronic document or electronic data message. It will be
highly unacceptable to regard an information manually
written down to be regarded as electronic message. The
petitioner cannot aver now to submit the original copies of
the documents since they were given enough time to
submit such but they refused to do so and insist that the
photocopies be admitted instead.
The high court denied such petition.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is
the responded, an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma
invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative
affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00
for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on
which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that
the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by
respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and
do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the
law merely admits as the best evidence the original
fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that,
from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma
invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic
document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law
and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the
photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under
the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently
explained the non-production of the original
fax transmittals.
Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as
such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long
as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be
admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to
be considered as the functional equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic
document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to
information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the
IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the
IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said
phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic
data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term
“electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of
the term “electronic data message,” which excludes telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony
with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless”
communications and the “functional equivalent approach”
that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this
sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an
original paper-based information or data that is scanned,
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving
end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts
of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of
“electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not
have included facsimile transmissions, which have an
original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based
facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct
from each other, and have different legal effects. While
Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated
faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term “electronic data message.”
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic
document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot
be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when
he presented his credit card in some establishments in
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not
honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour
and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason
that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank.
To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card,
Petitioner presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature
of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in
question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. It held that as
between the computer print-out presented by petitioner
and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by
respondent, the latter had more weight as their due
execution and authenticity was duly established by
respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was
reversed. Judge De la Peña ruled that the computer print-
out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular
course of business in the modern credit card industry and
Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
and cannot be reached by subpoena. The same took judicial
notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs)
and credit card facilities which readily print out bank
account status, therefore the print-out can be received as
prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioner’s credit
card.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer
print-out is an electronic document which must be
authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court by anyone who saw the document executed
or written; Petitioner, however, failed to prove its
authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
i. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization
Report” is an electronic document?
ii. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization
Report” constitutes electronic evidence?
Held:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of
merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a
computer print-out handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agency,
to prove that his credit card was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words
“DECL OVERLIMIT”.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however,
such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its
authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It provides that whenever any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually
see the document executed or written, neither was he able
to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer
print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by petitioner in this case, the authentication of the
computer print-out would still be found wanting.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c),
i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence showing integrity and
reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the judge.” The
Court is not convinced. Petitioner’s testimony that the
person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the
computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said
person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly
pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision,
Exh. “G” does not show on its face that it was issued by
Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing
how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency.
Petitioner also failed to show the specific business address
of the source of the computer print-out because while the
name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its
business address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was generated and
how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Lynette Garvida vs Florencio Sales, Jr.
Petitioner Garvida ran for SK Chairman in Illocos Norte.
When she applied for registration as member and voter of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan, the Board of Tellers denied her
application on the ground that the petitioner exceeded the
age limit for membership in the KK.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter – the court found the
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter of KK.
With that decision, the petitioner filed her COC for the
position of SK Chairman.
However, the Election Officer, per advice of the Provincial
Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s COC again
due to her age.
Petitioner appealed to COMELEC Regional Director and
allowed the petitioner to run.
Her rival, Sales filed a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation
of COC against Garvida for falsely representing her age
qualification in her COC. The petition was sent by facsimile
and registered mail to the National Office of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order suspending the
proclamation of the petitioner in the event she won in the
election.
Garvida won in the election.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of denial and/or
cancellation of COC transmitted by facsimile constitute
compliance with the formal requirements of pleading under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

RULING: No. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides

that all pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and
shall be in English or Filipino in at least ten legible copies.
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of
Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper

form. Only two copies of the petition were filed with the
COMELEC.

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned

by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules
of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading.

Without the original, there is no way of determining on its

face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel.

The petition is dismissed. Pero, gi declare gihapon sa

COMELEC nga ineligible si Garvida for being over the age
qualification.