Mariwasa vs Leogardo

Facts: Dequila was employed as a general utilty worker by petitioner Mariwasa.

In the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was informed by his employer that
his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards.
To give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of
dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation
period for another three months from July 10 to October 9, 1979. His performance, however, did not
improve and on that account Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended
period.

Dequilla filed for illegal dismissal, contending that he was already a regular employee at the time of
his dismissal. Hence, he cannot be dismissed without just or authorized cause.

Issue: Whether employer and employee may by agreement extend the probationary period of
employment beyond the six months prescribed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:
An extension may lawfully be covenanted, notwithstanding the seemingly restrictive language of the
cited provision. As held in the case of Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr . recognized agreements stipulating
7

longer probationary periods as constituting lawful exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such
periods to six months, when it upheld as valid an employment contract between an employer and two
of its employees that provided for an eigthteen-month probation period.
An extension of Dequila's probation was, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him
a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such
an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer's account to compel it to keep on its
payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards.

BUISER vs LEOGARDO
FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the private respondent GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
COMPANY as sales representatives and charged with the duty of soliciting advertisements for
inclusion in a telephone directory.
Petitioners entered into an "Employment Contract (on Probationary Status)" on May 26, 1980 with
private respondent, a corporation engaged in the business of publication and circulation of the
directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.
Corollary to this, the private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the
petitioners.
Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the
private respondent. Under the "Employment Contract (On Probationary Status)", The company
hereby employs the employee as telephone representative on a probationary status for a period of
eighteen (18) months
ISSUE: Whether the 18 months probation is valid.
RULING:

The probationary employment of petitioners set to eighteen (18) months is legal and valid.
Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this
general rule is When the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the
same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be
performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial
prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case
where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, especially where the employee must
learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills,
experience or training.
In the case at bar, it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18) months to
determine the character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales representatives.

MILLARES vs NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by private respondent ESSO International Shipping Company LTD through its
local manning agency as a machinist. In 1975, he was promoted as Chief Engineer which position he
occupied until he opted to retire in 1989. He applied for leave and thereafter wrote a letter of his
intention to apply for optional retirement. His request for optional retirement was denied and one of the
grounds is that he was employed on a contractual basis. Petitioner filed case against private
respondents for illegal dismissal on the ground that they are regular employees, hence they must be
terminated only with due process, or with just cause.

Issue: Whether seafarers are considered regular employees under the Labor Code.
Ruling: Seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be considered as regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they
sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their
employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article
280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.Petitioners insist that they should be considered regular employees, since they have
rendered services which are usually necessary and desirable to the business of their employer, and
that they have rendered more than twenty(20) years of service.
While this may be true, the Brent case has, however, held that there are certain forms of employment
which also require the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do
not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article 280.Overseas workers including
seafarers fall under this type of employment which are governed by the mutual agreements of the
parties.Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are for a
fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique in

2
itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status
must be contractual only or for a certain period of time.