FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE VS INNOCENCIO

Pacific Overseas is a recruitment agency which offers jobs abroad duly registered with the POEA. Finman General is acting as Pan
Pacific’s surety (as required by POEA rules and Art. 31 of the Labor Code). Pan Pacific was sued by William Inocencio and 3
others for alleged violation of Article 32 and 34 of the Labor Code. Inocencio alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected fees
but failed to provide employment abroad.

POEA ruled in favor of Inocencio et al and had impleaded Finman (upon request of Inocencio) in the complaint as well (Pan
Pacific changed business address without prior notice to POEA). The Labor Secretary affirmed POEA’s ruling. Finman General
asserts that it should not be impleaded in the case because it is not a party to the contract between Pan Pacific and Inocencio et
al.

ISSUE: Whether or not Finman General is solidarily liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its new address and from responding to the
complaints, petitioner Finman may well be regarded as an indispensable party to the proceedings before the POEA. Whether
Finman was an indispensable or merely a proper party to the proceedings, the SC held that the POEA could properly implead it
as party respondent either upon the request of Inocencio et al or motu propio. Such is the situation under the Revised Rules of
Court.

Finman General is solidarily liable. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety
bond (Finman) is joint and several with the principal obligor (Pan Pacific).

Further, Article 31 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 31. Bonds. — All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of
Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of
employment as appropriate.

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The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the
cash and surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds.

JMM PROMOTIONS VS NLRC

petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the second paragraph of Article
223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The
petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they
are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a
cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.” The Solicitor General
sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC?

Held: the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2 have
different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to monetary awards to
employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Indeed, this appeal bond is
intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the
bonds posted previously and the money placed in escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve
such a dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

Eastearn assurance and surety vs sec of labor

J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was its surety beginning
January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B recruited 33 persons but none of them were ever deployed. These 33 persons
sued J&B and the POEA as well as the Secretary of Labor ruled in favor of the 33 workers and ordered J&B to refund them (with
Eastern Assurance being solidarily liable). Eastern Assurance assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the Secretary of Labor
have no jurisdiction over non-employees (since the 33 were never employed, in short, no employer-employee relations).

ISSUE: Whether or not Eastern Assurance can be held liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. But only for the period covering from January 1985 when the surety took effect (as already held by the Labor
Secretary). The Secretary of Labor was given power by Article 34 (Labor Code) and Section 35 and 36 of EO 797 (POEA Rules) to
“restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,” but also to “promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions” governing said activities.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or
contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or
such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to
limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the
concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims.

Though some of the cases were filed after the expiration of the surety bond agreement between J&B and Eastern Assurance,
notice was given to J&B of such anomalies even before said expiration. In this connection, it may be stressed that the surety
bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated
surety like respondent Eastern Assurance is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather
than strictly in favor of the surety.
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, petitioners
vs.
NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Facts:

On November 2, 1982, a "crew Agreement" was entered into by private respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare Shipping
and Equipment Supply (hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel
"Santa Cruz" (renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly salary of US $ 300.00. Said agreement was processed and approved by the
National Seaman's Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982.

While on board said vessel and parties entered into a supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982 which
provides among others: (1) The employer shall be obliged to insure the employee during his engagement against death or
permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to US $ 40,000 - for death caused by accident and US $ 50,000 - for
permanent total disability caused by accident.
On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez
Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center from
October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984. On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as
"permanent in nature."

Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance in the amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for in the
contract of employment but his claim was denied for having been submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for
doing so.

Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against Philimare and Seagull Maritime Corporation in the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for non-payment of his claim for permanent total disability with damages and
attorney's fees.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers with the corresponding documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge
of the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA rendered for respondents to pay complainant the amount of US
$ 50,000.00 representing permanent total disability insurance and attorney's fees at 10% of the award. Payment should be
made in this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof at the prevailing rate of exchange. This Office cannot however rule
on damages, having no jurisdiction on the matter.

Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Hence, Seagull
and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Issue:
W/N the supplementary contract of employment entered into between petitioners and respondent is a prohibited practice to
afford greater benefits to the employee

Held:

This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public respondents are conclusive in this proceeding. Public respondents
found that petitioner Philimare and private respondent entered into said supplementary contract of employment on December
6, 1982. Assuming for the sake of argument that it was petitioners' principal which entered into said contract with private
respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as its manning agent in the Philippines, is jointly responsible with its principal thereunder.

The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners, motion for leave to
file third-party complaint and substitution inclusion of party respondent. Such motion is largely addressed to the discretion of
the said Commission. Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of interest took place only after the POEA had rendered its decision, the
denial of the motion so as to avoid further delay in the settlement of the claim of private respondent was well-taken. At any
rate, petitioners may pursue their claim against their alleged successor-in-interest in a separate suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
March 21, 1988 is hereby LIFTED. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

SUSPENSION AND CANCELLATION OF License