Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 18-5004
v.
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Human Services, Kelly M. Cleary, Deputy General Counsel,
Janice L. Hoffman, Associate General Counsel, Susan M.
Lyons, Deputy Associate General Counsel for Litigation, and
Robert W. Balderston, Attorney.
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intermediary”) acting on behalf of the Secretary. 42 C.F.R.
§ 424.32. If dissatisfied with the contractor’s initial
determination, the hospital then may pursue within HHS
various other avenues for redetermination, reconsideration,
hearings, and appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff; 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.904. Congress has precluded judicial review of various
classifications, calculations, and adjustments of the OPPS
reimbursement rates. See id. § 1395l(t)(12).
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The regulation at issue here sets the OPPS reimbursement
rate for these drugs for 2018. It reduces the rate from 106% to
77.5% of the average sales price. Hospital Outpatient
Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center
Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 82 Fed.
Reg. 52,356, 52,493–511 (Nov. 13, 2017). In reducing the rate,
the Secretary invoked his authority to adjust the average-price
determination for OPPS purposes. See id. at 52,496. To justify
the reduction, he cited various studies indicating that hospitals
participating in the 340B Program are able to buy covered
drugs at amounts significantly below the average sales price.
See id. at 52,494.
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II
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Likewise, in Illinois Council, the Supreme Court held that
an association of providers was barred from “claiming that
certain Medicare-related regulations violated various statutes
and the Constitution.” 529 U.S. at 5. The Court explained that
§ 405(g) and (h) channel “most, if not all, Medicare claims
through this special review system,” id. at 8, including
“virtually all legal attacks” on regulations, id. at 13. The Court
rejected proposed limitations to these channeling provisions
“based upon the ‘potential future’ versus the ‘actual present’
nature of the claim, the ‘general legal’ versus the ‘fact-specific’
nature of the challenge, the ‘collateral’ versus ‘noncollateral’
nature of the issues, or the ‘declaratory’ versus ‘injunctive’
nature of the relief sought,” as well as “a distinction that limits
the scope of § 405(h) to claims for monetary benefits.” Id. at
13–14. None of this would make sense if the overarching
“special review system” were nothing more than notice-and-
comment rulemaking.
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(D.C. Cir. 2010). Neither decision suggests that filing
comments in an informal rulemaking can constitute
presentment. In Eldridge, the named plaintiffs had “fully
presented” specific claims for disability benefits—to both a
district and regional Social Security Office—and had secured
an agency decision denying the benefits. 424 U.S. at 329. In
Action Alliance, our entire discussion of presentment was a
statement that the plaintiffs had “cured” their prior failure to
present. 607 F.3d at 862 n.1. Because we did not explain what
constituted the cure, the decision has no precedential value on
that specific point. See United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296,
308 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In any event, the plaintiffs in Action
Alliance were embroiled with HHS in a specific payment
dispute, which arose from the agency’s efforts to recover
Medicare payments erroneously made to them. See 607 F.3d
at 861. The presentment “cure” presumably consisted of
letters, sent to HHS on behalf of each plaintiff, invoking an
alleged statutory right to a waiver. See Action Alliance of
Senior Citizens v. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37–38 (D.D.C.
2009). And the result was an agency decision denying the
waivers. See id. at 38. Neither case suggests that submitting
comments in response to a proposed rule about reimbursement
rates—wholly detached from any specific payment dispute—is
the kind of “concrete claim for reimbursement” required for
presentment. See Ringer, 466 U.S. at 622.
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plaintiff had presented any concrete claim for reimbursement
implicating the new regulation, which had not even become
effective.
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III
Affirmed.