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Case Title Facts Held/Doctrine

I. Classification of Property
A. Immovable or real
B. Movable
LOPEZ v. OROSA In 1946, Respondent invited Petitioner to make an investment
in the theater business (PTI). Petitioner agreed to supply the
(1958) lumber necessary for the construction, and that payment would
be on demand. A balance of P41, 771.35 was left unpaid by
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint, and got a favorable
decision.
Question now is: W/N the lien attaches to the building alone,
excluding the land.
While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what
may constitute real properties means that a building is by itself an
immovable property. In the absence of any specific provision of law to the
contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner.

ASSOCIATED Petitioners filed a surety bond and executed an alleged chattel
INSURANCE v. mortgage on the house in favor of NARIC. The spouses didn’t
IYA yet own the land where the house was. When they did
purchase it, they executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
(1958) Respondent.
The spouses were not able to fulfill their obligation to NARIC, so
Petitioner was compelled to pay (as surety). Petitioner later
foreclosed the chattel mortgage.
It learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot, so
it filed an action against the spouses.
A building cannot be divested of its character as real property by the fact
that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another.
If held otherwise, it would result in confusion, for to cloak the building with
an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land would
create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or
character as the ownership of the land changes hands.
In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the only subjects of a
chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said
building is null and void.

Respondent filed another civil action against the spouses,

asserting that she has a better right over the property.

TUMALAD v. Respondent & Simeon executed a chattel mortgage over their
VICENCIO house in favor of Petitioners, which was being rented by
Madrigal and company.
(1971)
The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay
the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the
Petitioners were the highest bidder.
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that
buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation,
parties agree to treat as personal property those, by their nature, would be
real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel.
In the case at bar, there is no specific statement referring to the house as
personal property, but the ceding, selling or transferring of the property
through chattel mortgage could only have meant that Respondent
conveyed the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as
such. They should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by
claiming otherwise.

BOARD OF In 1902, the Philippine Commission authorized the Municipal
ASSESSMENT Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and
APPEALS v. operate an electric power system in the City of Manila.
MERALCO Meralco’s power is generated by its plant in Laguna and
transmitted to Manila by means of wires. These wires are
(1964) attached to steel towers.
Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within
Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
In 1955, The City Assessor of QC declared the steel towers for
real property tax.
MERALCO v. Petitioner owns 2 oil storage tanks, assembled on the spot.
CENTRAL They sit on a foundation of compacted earth, and a layer of
BOARD OF sand and of asphalt.
ASSESSMENT The municipal treasure of Batangas assed the two tanks for
APPEALS realty tax. MERALCO opposed this assessment, claiming that
the tanks are not real properties.
BERKENKOTTER A sugar company obtained a loan from Respondent, secured by
v. CU UNJIENG a first mortgage on 2 parcels of land, with all its buildings,
improvements, sugar-cane mill, etc. now existing or that may.
(1935) The sugar company decided to increase the capacity of its
sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment.
DAVAO Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession, and it operated
SAWMILL v. a sawmill on land it doesn’t own. Part of the lease agreement
CASTILLO was a stipulation in which, after the lease agreement, all
buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the
(1935) lessor, which would not include machineries and accessories.
Petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment
wherein some were bolted in foundations of cement.
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The steel towers of an electric company don’t constitute real property for
the purposes of real property tax. Steel towers are not immovable
property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of NCC 415.
The towers are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame
by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and
moved from place to place.
The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in
par. 1, because they do not constitute and/or are not analogous to
buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.
They cannot be included under par. 3, as they are not attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking
the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are
attached
They also do not fall under par. 5, for they are not machineries or
receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are
not intended for industry or works on the land.
While the 2 storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may still be
considered as improvements thereon, rendering it useful to the oil
industry.
For taxation purposes, the term real property may include things which
should generally be considered as personal property.
The installation of machinery and equipment in a mortgaged
sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the purpose of
carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production,
constitutes a permanent improvement on the said sugar central. It
subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted
thereon.
The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has
bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold
them as security does not alter the permanent character of the
incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central.
The machinery must be classified as personal property.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building, erected on land
belonging to another, with the understanding that the machinery was not
included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor upon the
expiration of the agreement.
The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property, executing
chattel mortgages over the same. It was also levied by the sheriff as
personalty, but no protest thereto was registered.
Machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property/plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any person having temporary right, unless they acted as agent of the
owner.
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II. Character of Ownership

A. Public Domain
GOVERNMENT Lots 36, 39 and 40, involved in a cadastral proceeding, Ownership of land reclaimed from the sea - When lands are converted to public
v. CABANGIS of the City of Manila were formerly a part of a large land, no person can acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established
parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of by law.
(1929) Respondent. Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that “lands reclaimed from the sea in
From 1896, said land began to wear away due to the consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or
waves of Manila Bay, until the said lots became private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
completely submerged in water in ordinary tides. It constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant
remained as such until 1912 when the Gov’t. undertook of authority."
dredging to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand The fact that, since 1912, some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and
and silt taken from the bed on the low lands depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Respondent, does
surrounding those belonging to PMC, thereby slowly not confer on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots. Since they were
and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of the converted into public land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the
proceeding. form and manner established by the law.
MIAA v. CiTY Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government
OF PASAY Erlinda, which originated from her civil liability from the instrumentality which is exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments.
criminal offense of slander. The exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the
(2009) She was ordered to pay, and their properties were limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government Code. Under
executed upon, and Petitioners bought the same at Section 133 (o) of the Local Government Code, local government units have no
public auction. power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like the MIAA.
Her husband then filed a complaint for annulment of Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax for the NAIA Pasay properties
said sale.
MIAA v. CA, et MIAA received a Final Notices of Real Estate Tax The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
al. Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for 1992- owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
2001. It’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated The properties of public dominion mentioned in NCC 420 are owned by the State; the
(2006) at P624M. term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
Parañaque issued notices of levy and warrants of constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under NCC 420, the MIAA Airport Lands
levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings, and later, and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
the Mayor threatened to sell these at public auction. Republic of the Philippines.
MIAA filed with the CA a petition seeking to restrain The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the City from imposing the tax on, levying against, the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
Buildings. character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. NCC420 of
the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public facility.
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale.
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic or any of its political subdivisions, except when the beneficial use
thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person, are exempted from payment of the real property tax. Therefore,
the portions which are leased to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax.
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REPUBLIC VS Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the land
CA sought to be registered is part of the public domain and therefore not
registerable. The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since
(1984) a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with water four
to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de
Bay, or is at least, a foreshoreland, which brings it within the
enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and
therefore it cannot be the subject of registration. Petitioners private
oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that they
reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they
have been in possession of the same for more than twenty (20) years
Maneclang vs Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of
IAC First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title
over a certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land
(1986) belonging to them. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a
finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of
petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River;
therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation. The
parties decided to settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the body of
water found within their titled properties, stating therein, among other
things, that "to pursue the case, the same will not amount to any
benefit of the parties, on the other hand it is to the advantage and
benefit of the municipality if the ownership of the land and the water
found therein belonging to petitioners be recognized in their favor as it
is now clear that after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] had
built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin
of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director
of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration
as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due
to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the land is
not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a
foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by
petitioner Director of Lands..
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging
to the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it
cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual.
Considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the
water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its
conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek
as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise
Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being
contrary to law and public policy.

Bureau of Four (4) parcels of land were the subject of an application for
Forestry vs CA registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that
she herself occupied said parcels of land. The Director of Lands
(1987) opposed said application on the ground that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title
over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the
Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at
least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The Director
of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition
principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the
lands subject matter of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps
and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C.
Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the
Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land
in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as
there was no question of whether the land is forest land or not.
Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as
classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry
on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence
they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of
registration proceedings. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not of the courts.
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With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave
error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block
and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed
for forest purposes.

Chavez v. PEA The Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title, in the name of PEA, covering the
(2002) three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands”. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. Later, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution confirmed the JVA. Then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. Petitioner
Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified
as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares [110] of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares[111] of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
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REPUBLIC VS Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the land The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or
CA sought to be registered is part of the public domain and therefore not basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the
registerable. The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of
(1984) portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with water four to registration as private property provided that the applicant proves
five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or that he has a registerable title.
is at least, a foreshoreland, which brings it within the enumeration in Art.
502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot be the The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is
subject of registration. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R. No. L- due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay
43190, on the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by from different sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the
dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in possession land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be
of the same for more than twenty (20) years considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities
cited by petitioner Director of Lands..
Maneclang vs Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
IAC Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property
certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private
(1986) them. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water,
body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and any individual.
not subject to private appropriation. The parties decided to settle the Considering further that neither the mere construction of
case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which
judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject
land the body of water found within their titled properties, stating therein, fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the
among other things, that "to pursue the case, the same will not amount nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the Court
to any benefit of the parties, on the other hand it is to the advantage and finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal
benefit of the municipality if the ownership of the land and the water effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
found therein belonging to petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is
now clear that after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] had built
the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land.
B. Patrimonial property of the state
Laurel v. Garcia Petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
(1990) Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the property.
Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on
(See infra). the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
"property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's
no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro,
for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). based on correct legal premises.

The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a
necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of
an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot
be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in
more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30
Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at
the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains
property of public dominion so long as the government has not
used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention
by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located.
Republic v. Respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of
Rizalvo Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an
application for the registration[3] of a parcel of land. The Office
(2011) of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that
neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts
did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property
was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of
thePhilippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.
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A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study
of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were
merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.
Given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the subject land since 1948, respondent is still not
entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2) [ , and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

Cebu Oxygen v. City Council of Cebu declared the terminal portion of M. Borces
Bercilles Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same
not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently,
(1975) the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755,
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a
public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the
herein petitioner being the highest bidder the City of Cebu,
through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute
sale to the herein petitioner. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court
of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land
registered. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the
property sought to be registered being a public road intended
for public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it
cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.
C. Private ownership
Tan Toco v. Mun. Municipal council of Iloilo failed to pay Tantoco the purchase
of Iloilo price of 2 strips of land, which it appropriated for road widening.
By virtue of a writ of execution, the sheriff attached “two
(1926) autotrucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini St., and other
structures, plus the market
Zamboanga del CA 39 converted Zamboanga from a municipality to a city and
Norte v City of provided that properties left by the province when it transfers to
Zamboanga a new capital will be paid for by the new city. RA 711 divided
the province into Zamboanga del Norte became netitled to
(1969) 52.39% of the amount payable by Zamboanga City. However,
RA 3039 was passed which provided that assests belonging to
the former Zambo City are transferred free of charge to
Zamboanga City. Zamboanga del Norte assailed the
constitutionality of RA 3039.
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The withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registerable title over the lot in question.
Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object
of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for
governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at a public auction to
satisfy a judgment against the municipality
If the properties were owned by Zambo province in its public and
governmental capacity, then it is public and Congress has absolute
control, making RA 3039 valid. If they were owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Zambo province cannot be
deprived without due process and just compensation.
However, there are 2 norms of classification, that of the Civil Code and
that under the law of Municipal Corporations.
SC applied law on Municipal Corporations: It is enough that property be
held and devoted to governmental purposes. Thus, RA 3039 is valid. The
lots were held by Zambo province in its governmental capacity and thus,
subject to absolute control of Congress.
Take note why CC was not applied. Art. 424 of CC provides: “without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws”
 CIVIL LAW REVIEW – Legarda 9
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Salas v Jarencio RA 418 was passed converting the communal property into
disposable or alienable land of the State. To implement it, the
() LTA proposed subdivision plan to which it did not object. Upon
LTA’s request, the city surrendered the TCT, which was
replaced with one in the name of LTA. Later, the Mayor brought
an action to prohibit LTA from further implementing RA 4118.
The TC declared the statute unconstitutional as deprivation of
the city’s property without due process and just compensation.
Municipality of In one case, the CFI of Bulacan rendered against the
San Miguel v municipality of San Miguel Bulacan a money judgment. The
Fernandez municipality moved to quash on the ground that its property or
funds are all public funds exempt from execution. CFI denied
() the motion.
Villanueva v
Castaneda
NOT PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE CITY
It failed to present evidence in showing in what manner it acquired the
land as its private or patrimonial property. In the absence of deed or title
to any land claimed by the City as its own, showing that it was acquired
with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came
from the State upon the creation of the municipality.
GENERAL RULE:
Regardless of the source of classification of land in the possession of
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private
capacity, such property is held in trust for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose.
PUBLIC FUNDS, EXEMPT
Public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason is that they
are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment
of the purposes for which municipal creations are created, and that to
subject said properties and public execution would materially impede,
even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose.

()

City of Manila v
IAC

()

Municipality of Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land
Makati v CA owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati
() determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must
pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of
garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in
PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a
motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB
could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do
so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such
motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter
affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for
review.
Casimiro v Mateo
(2011)
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It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge
involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished
by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund
and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In
this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly
effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land
which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.
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BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
A. Concept of Ownership
Fajardo v Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low- The Court held that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor
Freedom to Build cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a house and lot and in area limits of the Restrictive Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be
the contract to sell, there contained a Restrictive Covenant required to demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the
() providing for some prohibitions regarding the expansion to the prescribed floor area limits for as Article 1168 of the New Civil Code
house which the owners would like to do with their house. The provides that “when the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor
controversy arose when the petitioner-spouses extended the does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his expense”.
roof of their house to a point directly above the original front
wall wherein respondent filed an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures on the RTC and when it favored the
respondent, the spouses filed an appeal but the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this petition. The
petitioner-spouses argue that for lack of a specific provision,
prescribing the penalty of demolition in the Restrictive
Covenant, in the event of a breach thereof, the player of
respondent to demolish the structure should fail.

Madrid v Mapoy

(2009)

PADILLA v The respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana,
VELASCO accounting and damages against petitioners. The respondents
are the heirs of Artemio Velasco who, they claim, is the owner
(2009) of said property as evidenced by a “Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tunay" executed between Artemio and spouses Brigido Sacluti
and Melitona Obial over Lot No. 2161. The petitioners, on the
other hand, entered the property as trustees of the Solomon
spouses. They claim that the Solomon spouses owned the
property having bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale over Lot No. 76-pt.
The respondents have a better right of possession over Lot No. 2161.
Accion publiciana is a plenary action filed to determine the better right to
possession of realty independently of the title. It is also used to refer to
an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the
grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has
been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under
Rule 70 of the Rules of court. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.

LUNOD v Petitioners filed a written complaint against respondent alleging
MENESES that they each owned and possessed farm lands and that from
time immemorial there existed and still exists in favor of the rice
(1908) fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of
water over the land in Paraanan owned by the respondent.
They allege that in 1901, the defendant, without any right or
reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by
means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage
of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and
damaged by the stagnant waters, there being no outlet except
through the land in Paraanan.
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Respondents were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161
when the petitiones occupied the property. Lot No. 2161 was the subject
of Decree No. 403348. The Original Certificate of Title to the land was
issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. The original owners sold
the same to Artemio. From the date of sale until Artemio’s death, he was
in continuous possession of the land. On the other hand, the land
bought by the Solomon spouses from the bank is denominated as Lot
76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved
during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the
name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the Solomon
spouses was Lot 76-pt. Given this factual milieu, it can be readily
deduced that respondents are legally entitled to the possession of Lot
No. 2161
The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, only four years had elapsed
from the time of dispossession. Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code,
the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. It is
settled that the remedy of accion publiciana prescribes after the lapse of
ten years. Thus the instant case was filed within the allowable period.
Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked. Petitioner’s
claim that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one and the same, is in effect
a collateral attack on the title of the property registered in the name of
Artemio which cannot be countenanced. In accion publiciana, the
principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto.
Only in cases where the possession cannot be resolved without
resolving the issue of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim
of ownership.
Respondent had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which
blocks the passage of the waters which flood the higher lands of the
plaintiffs.
Article 530 provides that an easement is a charge imposed upon one
estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner,
and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate. The
lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of
receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher
lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by
agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and
the law (Articles 552 and 563 of the Civil Code) had imposed it for the
common public utility in view if the difference in the altitude of the lands
in the barrio Bambang.

CUSTODIO v The respondents own a parcel of land
COURT OF surrounded by other immovables
APPEALS pertaining to the petitioeners. As an
access to the street from the
(1996) respondent’s property, there are two
possible passageways. The petitioners
constructed adobe fence in such a wat
that the one of the entire passageway
was enclosed.
ANECO REALTY Aneco and Landex are the buyers of lot
v LANDEX owned by FHDI. Aneco filed a complaint
for injunction when Landex, owner of
(2008) adjacent lots, started the construction of
a concrete wall on one of its lots. Aneco
insists that it has the intention of
continuing the subdivision project earlier
commenced by the former owner,
thus,the limitation imposed under RA 440
that no portion of a subdivision road lot
shall be closed without the approval of
the Court.
NAPOCOR v Respondents instituted an action against
IBRAHIM petitioner for recovery of possession of
land and damages. They claim that they
(2007) were the owners of several parcels of
land and that NAOCOR through alleged
stealth and without respondents’
knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain of their
lands and constructed therein
underground tunnels
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The respondents are granted the right of way but they are not entitled to damages.
Petitioners are barred from raising the issue on the entitlement of respondents to a permanent
access to the public street because they did not appeal from the decision of the trial court
granting the respondents the right of way.
However, in this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The act of
petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
it is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of
the Civil Code provides that “every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.” At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not
subject to any servitudes. Hence, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained
by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnun
absque injuria
Landex had the right to construct the concrete wall.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from
the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the
limitations and restrictions provided by law. absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here,
the Court will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership. Aneco failed
to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own
property. Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because
it knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, fromFHDI. If
Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision
for road lots.
The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain
some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law. (Art 437) In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could
have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so precisely
because of the construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of the
property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as
they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay
not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for the land. This is so because in
this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial
use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just
compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.

PEREZ v Petitioners filed an action to quiet title over a piece of
MENDOZA parcel of land against the respondents
(1975)
CANTA v Petitioner was charged of violation of PD No. 533,
PEOPLE otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. He admitted taking the cow but claimed that it
(2001) was his and that it was lost. He presented two
certificates of ownership.
TECSON v Att. Fausto acquired in co-ownership with his sister
FAUSTO Waldetrudes a 1015 sq meter parcel of land. The co-
owners executed an Agreement of Partition. This was
(2011) never registered with the Register of Deeds. When
Atty. Fausto died Waldetrudes entered into a contract to
sell with Aurora Tecson. A second partition prepared
which drastically altered the first agreement. Atty.
Fausto’s share was decreased from 508 sq m to 51 sq
m. The second partition was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
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The respondents, the possessors of the subject property, have a better right to
the property in question.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the
possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of
ownership. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that “actual possession under
claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. It is a fact
that the respondents were in possession of the property and the presumption of
ownership in their favor has not been successfully rebutted by evidence that they
are mere lessees of the land in possession as claimed by petitioners.
Petitioner is guilty of violating PD No. 533.
PD No. 533 Section 2(c) defines castle-rustling as the taking away by any
means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser of any of
the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any or force upon
things. The evidence shows that the Certificate of ownership of large cattle which
petitioner presented to proves his ownership was falsified. It is not only “not in
order.” It is fraudulent, having been antedated to make it appear it had been
issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. In any event,
petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and consent
of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he allegedly lost, he should have
resorted to the court for the settlement of his claim. Article 433 of the Civil Code
provides that “the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
the property.”
The second partition is invalid. The sale is valid only up to the share of
Waldetrudes according to the First Agreement of Partition and the heirs of Atty.
Fausto can recover 457 sq m.
Wadetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners in equal share. The mother title
states in no unclear terms that they were co-owners of the subject lot. The
inscription in the original title carries more than sufficient weight to prove the
existence of a co-ownership between them. The tax declaration presented by
petitioners cannot prevail over the OCT as conclusive evidence of the true
ownership of the subject property. Waldetrudes herself stated the Atty. Fausto
was a co-owner. Article 485 provides that “the portions belonging to the co-
owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proved.
The second plan having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of
any of the co-owners have no binding effect on them. The deceit employed by
Atty. Tecson goes into the very nature of the Second partition agreement and not
merely to its object or principal condition. Waldetrudes can only sell her lawful
share of 507 square meters.
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SAMPACO v Respondent filed an action to quiet title with Respondent is the owner of the subject property covered by the OCT in his name.
LANTUD damages against petitioner. He alleged that
he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
(2011) residential lot and petitioner forcibly and therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration
unlawfully entered his property. proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title
Subsequently, the Barangay Captain issued a which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. An original certificate of title issued by the
decision stating that petitioner is the owner of Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate if
the subject parcel of land. title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of
title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

LALUAN v Petitioners filed a complaint against the
MALPAYA respondent for recovery of ownership and
possession of 2 parcels of land as heirs of
(1975) Marciana Laluan. They alleged that the first
parcel was the exclusive property of Marciana
while the second parcel was part of the
conjugal property. The respondent claims
that the properties belonged to his exclusive
property. These 2 properties were sold by
respondent to third persons
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove 2 things:
first, the identity of the land claimed; second, his title thereto. In this case, petitioner claims
that the property in dispute is part of his larger property. However, petitioner failed to
identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that
the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title of
respondent. Petitioner’s claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous possession
of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim
by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property.,
The heirs are entitled to one-half of the second property which is part of the conjugal
partnership but as to the first parcel, the case was remanded for a new trial to establish the
identity of land.
The invariable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership,
the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to
recover must fix the identity of the land he claims. And where doubt and uncertainty exist
as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question by recourse to
the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.

JAVIER V. CA Javier claimed that he filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
over the lot in 1973, and that the lot was in his peaceful and
(1994) adverse possession since 1971. He sold the lot to de Guzman
via a deed of absolute sale in 1974. De Guzman allowed the
spouses Dionisio and Cesaria Caay to build their house on the
lot, since the latter worked for him. In 1981, Javier repurchased
the property from de Guzman. Javier didn’t immediately eject
them from the property. In 1982, he found out that Demetrio
Caringal, Cesaria’s father, was awarded by the Bureau of
Lands a free patent over the lot and was issued an OCT in his
name.
Caringal claimed he filed a free patent application over the lot in
11981, and the lot was sold to him by a certain Tesorero, only
heir of the original applicant for the free patent, who had been in
possession of the lot since 1942.
Although the action for reconveyance is available to Javier, he failed to
show sufficient proof of ownership of the lot.
After the lapse of 1 year, a decree of registration is no longer open to
review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud.
However, the aggrieved party can still avail of reconveyance if the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser. The action for
reconveyance is an action in personam and is always available as long
as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
the remedy is an action for damages. In this case, the disputed property
is still registered in the name of respondent Demetrio Caringal, so that
petitioner was correct in availing himself of the procedural remedy of
reconveyance.

B. Right of Accession
BACHRACH V. Bachrach’s will provided that his wife, Mary, shall enjoy a
SEIFERT usufruct over his estate, and that upon her death, ½ shall go to
charity and ½ shall go to his heirs. The lower court authorized
Mary to pay the other heirs monthly allowances from the fruits
(1949) and income of the estate, making these amounts advances
from her personal funds. Mary stopped giving the heirs their
allowances some time after WW2 and requested that she be
allowed to sell ½ the estate designated for the heirs in case she
be made to continue to give them allowances.
BACHRACH Bachrach filed a complaint against Talisay-Silay for the delivery
MOTOR CO. V. of a sum of money or PNs in that amount as bonus in favor of
TALISAY-SILAY Mariano Ledesma. PNB filed a 3rd party claim alleging a
MILLING CO. preferential right over the amount, since that would be civil fruits
of the land Mariano mortgaged to it.
(1931)
Mariano mortgaged the land to PNB as security for Talisay-
Silay’s debt, and his bonus consisted of a percentage paid by
Talisay-Silay to Mariano on account of the mortgage.
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In order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the
person who claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his
ownership of the same but he must also satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof.
The SC found that there is serious doubt as to the precise identity of the
parcel of land Javier sought to recover, the description of the land
described in the application for sales patent is different from the one in
his complaint for reconveyance. Because of this, the action for
reconveyance must fail. But, assuming in gratia argumenti that the
property which petitioner seeks to be reconveyed to him is the same as
that covered by the OCT in the name of Caringal, he has not proved his
ownership of the same. The filing of the miscellaneous sales application
did not vest title upon Javier over the property as there was no showing
that his application was approved by the Bureau of Lands or that a sales
patent over the property was granted to him prior to the issuance of free
patent and the OCT in favor of Caringal.
There is no valid reason for ordering the sale of the ½ of the estate
belonging to the heirs.
The cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the ½
of the estate adjudicated to the heirs is sufficient for the monthly
allowances being paid to the heirs and that there is no necessity for the
sale of the ½ of the estate corresponding to them. The main objection to
the heirs to the sale of ½ of the estate adjudicated to them, which ½
besides the cash already mentioned, consist mostly of shares of stock, is
that said shares if sold now may not command a good price and that
furthermore said heirs prefer to keep said shares intact as long as there
is no real necessity for their sale. Of course, once said cash in the hands
of the administratrix, corresponding to the heirs is exhausted because of
the payment of the allowances made to the heirs, some other
arrangements might be necessary. The administratrix would then have a
right and reason to refuse the payment of said allowances from her said
personal funds or from the fruits of the estate, which as a usufructuary,
belong to her during her lifetime.
Mariano’s bonus is not civil fruits of the land.
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First,
the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and,
third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources
of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the
phrase "u otras analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the
adjectives"otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun "rentas," as do
also the other adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias." That is why we say

PHIL. SUGAR Gabriela De Coster executed a general power of attorney in
ESTATES V. favor of her husband, Juan Poizat, authorizing the latter to loan
POIZAT any amount with or without securities. Poizat obtained a loan
from PSE and executed a mortgage upon Gabriela’s main
(1925) property. When PSE wanted to foreclose the mortgage,
Gabriela claimed Poizat acted beyond the scope of his
authority.
ORTIZ V. Ortiz continued to administer the lot which was formerly the
KAYANAN subject of a Homestead Application in his ward’s name after the
latter died. In the Application, his ward named Martin Dolorico I
(1979) as his heir and successor in interest. Dolorico executed an
affidavit relinquishing all his rights over the property in favor of
Comintan and Zamora and requested that the Application be
cancelled. Ortiz claimed he had a preferential right to the lot
since he had been occupying it, but wasn’t able to bid at the
public auction. The court ordered an Order and a Writ of
Execution in favor of Comintan and Zamora.
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that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only
three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain
kinds of income.
In order to determine if the bonus is “income” under CC355, it is obvious
to inquire whether it is derived from the land mortgaged by Mariano to
PNB for the benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that land but
from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land. The bonus bears no
immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the land mentioned,
having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected
one's land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity
granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it
is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano's
generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but
certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property,
which, as far as this case is concerned, has nothing to do with it.
The mortgage as to the paraphernal property is declared null and void ab
initio.
Poizat was the only person who signed the mortgage, without indicating
that his signature was binding on his wife. Also, he had no authority to
mortgage his wife’s property, unless the mortgage was executed for her
"and in her name, place or stead," and as her act and deed. The
mortgage was over his wife’s lot and the buildings built thereon after the
marriage.
To make the mortgage valid, it should have been signed by the husband
in his own proper person and by him as attorney in fact for his wife, and
it should have been executed by both husband and wife, and should
have been so acknowledged.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that the
building is conjugal property of the husband and wife. As such, it is
subject of the debts of the conjugal partnership for the payment or
security of which the husband has the power to mortgage or otherwise
encumber the property.
Ortiz is not entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of
the property.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known
to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in
court by the true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the
fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in
court, or when he answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by
him to the owner or lawful possessor.

Ortiz claimed that so long as the aforesaid amount of
P13,632,00 decreed in the judgment representing the expenses
for clearing the land and the value of the coconuts and fruit
trees planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his
exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may derive from the
property, without any obligation to apply any portion thereof to
the payment of the interest and the principal of the debt.
TUATIS V. Tuatis claimed that Escol sold to her a piece of real property by
ESCOL installment. Tuatis said she had paid Escol the entire amount
due in installments, and took possession of the lot and built a
(2009) house thereon. When Tuatis asked Escol to sign the deed of
sale, the latter refused, claiming the entire amount had not yet
been paid.
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However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can still
retain the property, pursuant to CC546, until he has been fully
reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on
the property. This right of retention has been considered as one of the
conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the protection of the
possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the reimbursement of
the expenses, such as those for the preservation of the property, or for
the enhancement of its utility or productivity. It permits the actual
possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed by
the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary
expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing
possessed. The principal characteristic of the right of retention is its
accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation. Considering
that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his
good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order that this right to retain may be
useful, to concede to the creditor the right to secure reimbursement from
the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the
interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains in
possession.
According to Manresa, the right of retention is analogous to that of a
pledge, if the property retained is a movable, and to that of antichresis, if
the property held is immovable. Under CC1731, any person who has
performed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge
until he is paid. Similarly, CC1914, the agent may retain in pledge the
things which are the object of the agency until the principal effects
reimbursement of the funds advanced by the former for the execution of
the agency, or he is indemnified for all damages which he may have
suffered as a consequence of the execution of the agency, provided he
is free from fault. To the same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994
of the same Code, may retain the thing in pledge until the full payment of
what may be due him by reason of the deposit. The usufructuary,
pursuant to Article 612 of the same Code, may retain the property until
he is reimbursed for the amount paid for taxes levied on the capital
(Article 597) and tor extraordinary repairs (Article 594).
In all of these cases, the right of retention is used as a means of
extinguishing the obligation.
The rule that the choice under CC448 belongs to the owner of the land is
in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows
the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land.

Tuatis claims CC448 must apply, and that since the value of the
building is greater than the value of the lot, Tuatis can choose
between selling the building to Escol or buying the lot from the
latter.
NARVAEZ C. Alciso sold the subject lot to Bate, who later on sold the lot to
ALCISO Narvaez. The Deed of Sale of Realty had a stipulation allowing
Alciso to repurchase the property; Narvaez furnished Alciso
(2009) with a copy of the Deed. A TCT was issued in Narvaez’s name
and they built a commercial building thereon. Alciso wanted to
repurchase the property, but they could not agree on the
repurchase price.
LAUREANO V. Laureano was the owner of two lots, which were both leased to
ADIL Ong Cu. When the 15 year lease period expired, Ong Cu failed
to vacate the lots and remove the improvements thereon.
(1976) Laureano filed an ejectment suit against him.
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Escolin has two options:
1. Appropriate for herself the building after indemnifying Tuatis for the
current value of the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for
said building, as provided in CC546.
2. Choose not to appropriate the building and instead, oblige Tuatis to
pay the present or current fair value of the land. The amount stated in
the Deed of Sale shall no longer apply, since the obligation is statutory
(under CC448) and not contractual. If the present or current value of the
land turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built
thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she
must pay reasonable rent for the same. They must agree on the terms of
the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
CC448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter.
In Pecson v. CA, the SC held that: Article 448 does not apply to a case
where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then
later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. The SC said so
in Coleongco v. Regalado: “Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not
applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his
own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies
only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of
another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not
apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own
land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on
the part of the builder. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself
is the builder of the works on his own land, the issue of good faith
or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.”
In sales with the right to repurchase, CC1606 and CC1616 apply.
The lower court erred in assuming the Ong Cu was a possessor in good
faith. As a lessee who constructed a building on the leased land, Ong Cu
cannot be characterized as a builder in good faith. Under CC448 the
owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith may
appropriate the building after payment of the indemnity provided in
CC546 and 548.
CC448 applies to a case where one builds on land of which he honestly
claims to be the owner and not to lands wherein one's only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract. A contrary rule would place it
within the power of the lessee "to improve his landlord out of his
property". In other words, CC448 refers to a possessor who occupied the
land in the belief that he was the owner thereof. It does not apply to the
lessee because the lessee knows at the outset that he is not the owner
of the land. The tenant has no pretension to being the owner of the land.

FLOREZA V. The Evangelistas, who are mother and son, owned a residential
EVANGELISTA lot. They borrowed from Floreza in 1945, and allowed the latter
to occupy and build a barong-barong on the lot. They did not
(1980) have an agreement as to the payment for the use of the lot. The
Evangelistas borrowed money from Floreza on 4 other
occasions, and Floreza tore down the barog-barong and built a
house of strong materials thereon. The Evangelistas later sold
the lot to Floreza with the right to repurchase within 6 years in
consideration of their total outstanding loan. They paid the full
repurchase price within the period, but Floreza refused to
vacate until he was reimbursed the value of the house.
BACHRACH V. Bachrach’s will provided that his wife, Mary, shall enjoy a
SEIFERT usufruct over his estate, and that upon her death, ½ shall go to
charity and ½ shall go to his heirs. The lower court authorized
Mary to pay the other heirs monthly allowances from the fruits
(1949) and income of the estate, making these amounts advances
from her personal funds. Mary stopped giving the heirs their
allowances some time after WW2 and requested that she be
allowed to sell ½ the estate designated for the heirs in case she
be made to continue to give them allowances.
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CC448 is inapplicable to this case. It applies only when the builder,
planter, or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow
because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a claim
of title.
Since Floreza is not a vendee a retro, he cannot invoke the rights under
CC1616. The house had already been constructed as far back as 1949
(1945 for the house of light materials) even before the pacto de
retro sale in 1949. Floreza incurred no useful expense, therefore, after
that sale. The house was already there at the tolerance of the
Evangelistas in consideration of the several loans extended to them.
Since he cannot be classified as a builder in good faith within the
purview of CC448, nor as a vendee a retro, who made useful
improvements during the lifetime of the pacto de retro, petitioner has no
right to reimbursement of the value of the house which he had erected
on the residential lot of the Evangelistas, much less to retention of the
premises until he is reimbursed. The rights of petitioner are more akin to
those of a usufructuary who, under CC579, may make on the property
useful improvements but with no right to be indemnified therefor. He
may, however, remove such improvements should it be possible to do so
without damage to the property: For if the improvements made by the
usufructuary were subject to indemnity, we would have a dangerous and
unjust situation in which the usufructuary could dispose of the owner's
funds by compelling him to pay for improvements which perhaps he
would not have made.
There is no valid reason for ordering the sale of the ½ of the estate
belonging to the heirs.
The cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the ½
of the estate adjudicated to the heirs is sufficient for the monthly
allowances being paid to the heirs and that there is no necessity for the
sale of the ½ of the estate corresponding to them. The main objection to
the heirs to the sale of ½ of the estate adjudicated to them, which ½
besides the cash already mentioned, consist mostly of shares of stock, is
that said shares if sold now may not command a good price and that
furthermore said heirs prefer to keep said shares intact as long as there
is no real necessity for their sale. Of course, once said cash in the hands
of the administratrix, corresponding to the heirs is exhausted because of
the payment of the allowances made to the heirs, some other
arrangements might be necessary. The administratrix would then have a
right and reason to refuse the payment of said allowances from her said
personal funds or from the fruits of the estate, which as a usufructuary,
belong to her during her lifetime.

Inter-Regional Ricardo Caballero owns an agricultural land and had
Development leased it to Inter-Regional Development Corp. represented
Corp. vs. CA by spouses Jose Bañez and Isabel Bañez. Conflict started
(1975) when Caballero sold the land to Isidro Estrada even though
there was still a standing crop to be harvested by the
petitioner. Caballero's argument is that when he sold the
land, it follows that whatever was planted there comes with
it. The petitioner for this certiorari case argues otherwise.
Sarmiento vs. Mother-in-law offered a lot for the construction of house by
Agana (1984) the spouses. Here comes Sarmiento, alleging himself to
be the owner of the land. The trial court ordered Sarmiento
to exercise option and there was failure to do so. The
spouses then consigned the amount in court.
Fernandez del Spouses Estanislao and Abesia were co-owners of a
Campo vs. certain lot. When the lot was partitioned, it was found out
Abesia (1988) that Abesia’s house encroached on a 5 sq. m. portion of
the spouses’ part of the lot. Lower court held that Art. 448
does not apply in the case and ordered Abesia to demolish
her house within a period of 60 days.
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True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property
includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally
or artificially, and that under article 415, trees, plants and growing fruits, while
they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is equally true that
when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the
landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted;
he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same. And
so provides article 448: The owner of the land in which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in articles 546 and 548.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is
paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner,
of the l a n d , u p o n , t h e o t h e r h a n d , h a s t h e o p t i o n , under
article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to
sell his land to the o w n e r o f t h e b u i l d i n g . B u t h e c a n n o t ,
as respondents here did, r e f u s e b o t h t o p a y f o r t h e b u i l d i n g
a n d t o s e l l t h e l a n d and compel the owner of the building to remove it
from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such demolition or removal
only when, after having chosen to sell h i s l a n d , t h e o t h e r p a r t y
f a i l s t o p a y f o r t h e same.
Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or
sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow
upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.
The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation
is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when the co-ownership is
terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-
owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which
was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should
apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. As in the present
case, the house of Abesia overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 sq. m. of the
land pertaining to the spouses which Abesia obviously built in good faith.
Applying Art. 448, the ff. are the parties options: the spouses have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of Abesia upon payment of indemnity to
the latter, otherwise, the spouses may oblige Abesia to pay the price of the
land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the Abesia’s house built thereon,
then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Abesia shall then pay the
reasonable rent to the spouses upon such terms and conditions that they
may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof.
Of course, Abesia may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at
their own expense, if they so decide.
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Pecson vs. CA Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land wherein With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy.
(1995) he built an apartment complex. Due to his failure to Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted
pay for realty taxes, his land was sold in a public or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the
auction and was sold to spouses Nuguid. He moved land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses ownership
for the setting aside of the auction but was denied. by sale or donation. Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which
shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it
does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement. The
respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient
reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to previous
rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be the present
market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties.
[the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to
pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to retain the improvements and the
income thereof. The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the
current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson
otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.
Pleasantville vs. Robillo bought a parcel of land from petitioner Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his
CA (1996) Pleasantville. She later found out that the lot she and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith
bought already had improvements built thereon by belongs to the one asserting it. At the time when Kee constructed his improvements
one Wilson Kee. Wilson alleged that he bought the on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him.
land from CT Torres Enterprises which is the Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden
exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. It was later of proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the
found out that petitioner sold the exact same lot to violation of the contract with CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith
both Robillo and Kee on account of the negligence and as a sufficient ground to negate the presumption of good faith. Petitioner cannot
or oversight of petitioner’s agent. claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was not directly involved in
the delivery of the property. The principalmust be responsible for the acts of the
agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the sole real estate
representative of the petitioner when the delivery was made. Wilson Kee is therefore
declared a builder in good faith. Petitioner and respondent CTTEI are declared
solidarily liable for damages due to negligence.
Technogas vs. Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even
CA (1997) improvements including the wall which encroached that of the the respondent did not knew about the encroachment until he has hired
defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner a surveyor. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act,
offered to buy the land but defendant refused. After 2 years, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall the property, is evidence against the former. And possession in good
(but the case did not state what happened to this agreement, faith does not lose this character except when the possessor is aware of
my assumption is that it did not happen due to conflicts that this impropriety. Encroachment was very narrow which can be
arose after). Defendant dug a canal along the wall which considered as a mere error. The petitioner, despite being a purchaser of
caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental the original builder, can compel the landowner to either buy the property
complaint re the action and a separate criminal action of or sell the piece of land because he was really unaware of the
malicious mischief (which the wife was convicted of). RTC encroachment basing on the fact presented by both sides and when the
decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the original
respondent wants to have the wall demolished. owner (hence, the right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also
transferred).

Ballatan vs. CA This is a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential
(1999) land belonging to petitioners. Parties herein were owners of
adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street,Araneta
University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Eden Ballatan
discovered the there was an encroachment when she
constructed her house which was surveyed by the authorized
surveyor of AIA, the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondent to
remove and dismantle their improvements on the said lot.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan instituted against
respondents Go Civil Case for recovery of possession before
the Regional Trial Court.
Tuason vs. Plaintiff JM Tuason filed a civil case against defendant
Macalindong Macalindong alleging that it is the registered owner of a parcel
(1962) of land, commonly known as the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision
and that the defendant, thru force, strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered into the possession of some 200 square
meters, within said parcel of land and constructed his house
thereon. Defendant answering, stated among others, that prior
to 1955 and since time immemorial, he and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, adverse, public, continuous and
actual possession of the lot in question in the concept of owner
and, by reason of such possession, he had made improvement
thereon.
MWSS vs. CA The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former
(1998) National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS),
for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special
defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout
the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the
reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary
and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00.
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It was the survey made the authorized surveyor of AIA that respondent
Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father’s land. He
built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of
his father’s land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they
encroached petitioners’ lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until
the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her
property.
From the documents submitted, it appears that defendant was not a
builder in good faith. From the initial certificate of title of plaintiff’s
predecessors-in-interest, there is a presumptive knowledge by defendant
of plaintiff’s Torrens Title (which is a notice to the whole world) over the
subject premises and consequently defendant cannot, in good
conscience, say now that he believed his vendor (Flores), his vendor’s
vendor (Teotico) and the latter’s seller (De Torres) had rights of
ownership over said lot. Defendant, had likewise, a sufficient warning
from the fact that the lot, subject of his purchase, is described in his
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, to be a portion of an unnumbered and, therefore,
unapproved subdivision plan. Had he investigated before buying and
before building his house on the questioned lot, he would have been
informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the
name of J.M. Tuason. If he failed to make the necessary inquiry,
defendant is now bound conclusively to appellee’s Torrens Title.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad
faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without
right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a
possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the
right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be
done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the
useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have
at the time he enters into possession (Article 549).

Republic v. Modesto Castillo owned parcels of land (consolidated and then
Castillo subdivided into 9) in Tanauan, Batangas. After his death, his
wife Amanda partitioned the property and passed on the
1988 mortgage to Florencio Castillo. Thus the titles of the lots were
subsequently titled and annotated in the names of the new
owners.
The Philippine government appealed, saying tha the lands had
always formed part of Taal Lake (washed and inundated) and
could not be private property.
The Castillos claimed prescription and estoppel, and that there
was accretion of their lakeshore properties that added land to
what they already owned.
Asst. Exec. Sec. Jesus Larrabaster was granted a home lot of 1,500 m2 in
v. CA and Cotabato, on the premise that the lot was vacant and free from
Mendoza claim or conflict. However, Jesus subleased the land to Basilio
Mendoza and tolerated the squatting og Jorge Gellerto.
1989
Larrabaster and wife later assigned their rights to Jose Pena.
Pena then claimed that the property was 3,600 m2, and
requested the government to adjust the title to “conform” to the
actual area.
The additional land was found out to be due from accretion from
a creek, and alloted/distributed already to different lots. This suit
is based on decisions of government agencies.
Ferrer v. Bautista Gloria Ferrer claims ownership over a lot by virtue of accretion,
while Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon by virtue of
1994 long occupation and a Certificate of Title pursuant to a free
patent application.
Ferrer initated several cases against Balanag and Domondon,
but this is a case arising from the [first] complaint for
reivindicacion.
Agne v. Director Hermenigildo Agpoon was the first registered owner of a parcel
of Lands of land in Pangasinan. Presentacion Gascon inherited the land
from her father, and was issued a TCT.
1990
Allegedly, during the Japanese occupation, Mariano Agne et al
took possession of the land. They claimed that the Agno-Chico
River changed its course in 1920 and so land was deposited
unto their properties. They also said that they had openly
possessed and used the land since then.
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The property is still clearly a shorelands of Taal Lake, sometimes
underwater, that the Castillos just filled up so that they can use for their
business.
Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the
owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a
sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for
private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no
longer needed for public use. This distinction does not help the Castillos
because there is no accretion shown to exist. On the contrary, it was
established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck
raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
When the accretion occurred, the lot had already been allocated and
assigned to Larrabaster, thus accrues to the private property.
Larrabaster may not have been the owner (naked title-owner was still the
government), he had already acquired the beneficial and equitable title
over the lot. Thus, the aread within it original boundaries belong to the
awardee whether the creek advances or recedes.
Ferrer is the owner of the land by alluvion.
Alluvion gives to the owners of lands on riverbanks any accretion which
is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. This is
“compensation” to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive
force of water and subjected to various easements. Because this was
private property, the government thus had no authority to grant a free
patent over it.
Agne et al are the owners of the abandoned bed, as riparian owners.
The natural occurrence where the river bed was abandoned makes the
newly uncovered land private. There is no need for a formal act of
acquisition, according to the old civil code which was in effect that time.
The right to additions by accretion = right of an owner of a tree to fruits,
or right of an owner of animals to the offspring.Private ownership
cannnot be distrubed by ythe issuance of a free patent over the land.

Baes v. CA A parcel of land was dug by the government for the construction
of a canal to streamline the river. Felix Baes eventually bought
1998 the land, which was subdivided into three parcels. The middle
parcel covered the canal. The government gave him another
equivalent parcel as compensation.
After resurvey, it was discovered that there were errors. New
TCT’s were issued to represent the enlargements.
Government opposed as the lots were allegedly unlawfully
enlarged. Baes claimed that he should own dried up land as the
creek was discovered to the canal in his property.
Jagualing v. CA Janita Eduave inherited a parcel of land in Misamis Oriental
from her father and uncles, which later was eroded due to a
1991 typhoon and through the movement of land deposit. She
granted Maximo Jagualing et al to plant corn and bananas,
hired a surveyor to put monuments, paid the taxes.
Jagualing denied the assertions of Eduave, saying that they
claimed ownership after a typhoon caused the formation of the
island, which they occupied for 15 years thence. They
presented pictures of their occupation, and the improvements
and the house established thereon.
The trial court ruled that it was a delta, forming part of the
riverbed and thus part of the public domain. The CA found that
it was an island, and formed due to alluvial deposits.
Siari Valley v. Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle
Lucasan that were driven from its lands to that of Filemon Lucasan.
Lucasan however argued that although there was commixtion
1957 of cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals. The CFI of
Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.
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Baes is entitled to compensation for the damage or loss to property due
to a ‘deliberate act’ of the government. But he has already been
compensated for the trouble damage brought about by the canal, so the
case is dismissed.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss
of his property due to natural causes, all the more reason to compensate
him when the change in the course of river is effected through
artificial means.
The parcel of land is an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-
flotable river, and ans such belongs to the owner of the land with the
nearest margin.
If the riparian owner fails to assert his claim, it could be open to adverse
possession.
Lucasan lost the argument re commixtion, ordered to deliver the 321
heads that had been entrusted to his care to Siari; pay damages for the
others he had since sold; and ordered to allow Siari to round up all the
buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch.
Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that “if the commingling of 2
things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share”
thus since Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share in the
commixtion.
Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing animals were
taken by Lucasan or his men, on two occasions however, his men drove
away 30 heads of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe that the others
must have also been driven away applying by analogy the principle that
one who stole a part of the stolen money must have taken also the larger
sum lost by the offended party.

Faja v. CA Levine Frial sued Felipa Faja for illegally possessing and
occuying the property of the owner (Levine was a heir) for about
1977 30 years. He also asked for about P150K in unearned income
from the property for the period. His claim was through a
reconstituted OCT.
Faja claimed that she inherited the lot from her father and
grandfather, and so on, with the property having been in the
family for 60 years. Her claim was under a TCT. She also
argued that the other OCT was fake.
Mamadsual v. Spouses Ali and Salika Mamadsual sought to quiet the title held
Moson by spouses Abdula and Kagui Macarapan to a property in
Cotabato City, before a Shari’a District Court.
1990 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, since it is similar to a reconveyance which
prescribes after ten years
The relevant question was whether the petitioners were the
correct parties in interest, and whether the action had
prescribed.
Republic v. Modesto Castillo owned parcels of land (consolidated and then
Castillo subdivided into 9) in Tanauan, Batangas. After his death, his
wife Amanda partitioned the property and passed on the
1988 mortgage to Florencio Castillo. Thus the titles of the lots were
subsequently titled and annotated in the names of the new
owners.
The Philippine government appealed, saying tha the lands had
always formed part of Taal Lake (washed and inundated) and
could not be private property.
The Castillos claimed prescription and estoppel, and that there
was accretion of their lakeshore properties that added land to
what they already owned.
Vda. de Aviles v. The deceased Eduardo and his wife Anastacia vda. de Aviles
Court of Appeals owned a parcel of land in Lingayen, Pangasinan. She was in
actual possession thereof. On the other hand, Camilo Aviles,
(1996) who owned one of the adjacent lots, asserted color of title over
the northern portion of the land owned by the vda. de Aviles by
putting up a bamboo fence. This prompted her to file an action
to quiet title against Camilo.
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Frial as the possessor has the right to sue, not the other party. (This
case was also referred for sumamry proceedings.)
A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible, and must be filed by the persons
in possession of the property – in this case the Mamadsuals. Anyhow,
this case was remanded for further proceedings.
In such an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must" have legal or equitable
title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and
equitable title to mean beneficial ownership. It is not necessary that the
person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in
question.
The property is still clearly a shorelands of Taal Lake, sometimes
underwater, that the Castillos just filled up so that they can use for their
business.
Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the
owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a
sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for
private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no
longer needed for public use. This distinction does not help the Castillos
because there is no accretion shown to exist. On the contrary, it was
established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck
raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
Boundary disputes are not cognizable in the special civil action for
quieting of title.
Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, only a person who is interested
‘under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.’ This
means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory
relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This
is under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

C. Ownership
Hernandez v. Perla Hernandez bought a parcel of land in Masbate from
Quitain Sancho Manlapaz. The land was originally part of a larger
parcel of land that belonged to the spouses Crispulo Manlapaz
(1988) and Antonia Villanueva. Upon their death their children
partitioned their estate. Ernesta Valdemoro, one of the children
of the spouses Manlapaz, filed a complaint for redemption
against Hernandez to recover the parcel of land she bought
from Sancho.
Gatchalian v. Jose Gatchalian and other co-plaintiffs purchased a lotto ticket
Collector of from the National Charity Sweepstakes Office and won
Internal Revenue P50,000.00. The provincial treasurer of Bulacan made an
assessment of P1,499.94 on Jose Gatchalian & Co., but
(1939) Gatchalian et al. asked for an exemption. It was denied.
Obillos v. Court Obillos Sr. completed payment to Ortigas & Co. for the
of Appeals purchase of two lots. He then transferred his rights to his
children. Purpose of the purchase of the lots was to be made
(1985) into residential lots, however due to economic reasons, the
children decided to resell the lots to WCSC and Olga Canada.
They treated the profit as a capital gains tax and paid said
income tax.
The Commissioner made an assessment requiring petitiones to
pay corporate income tax in addition to the individual income
taxes they have paid. The Commissioner considered the profits
as distributive dividends taxable in full and not for only 30%.
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Valdemoro cannot exercise the right of redemption against
Hernandez.
The basis of the right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil
Code is the existence of a co-ownership as defined under Article 484 of
the same Code. The Court emphasized that if the party seeking to
redeem is the owner of a portion which has been concretely determined
and Identifiable he cannot be considered a co-owner, and thus not
entitled to the right of redemption granted under Article 1620.
Gatchalian and the others formed a partnership, and is thus liable
to pay taxes.
According to the stipulation of facts the plaintiffs organized a civil
partnership because each of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes
ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may
win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000. The partnership was
not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the winning of the
prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the
Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such
collection the prize, the office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of
Jose Gatchalian & Co., and the said partner, in the same capacity,
collected the said check. All these circumstances militate against the
assertion that he and the other plaintiffs organized and formed a mere
co-ownership.
Obillos is not liable to pay corporate income tax.
There was no intention to form a partnership. They were co-owners pure
and simple. To consider them as partners would be to obliterate the
distinction between co-owners and parteners. The division of the profit
was merely incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership which was in
the nature of the thing a temporary state. Art. 1769 of the Civil Code
provides that sharing of gross returns does not in itself establish a
partnership.

Dailisan v. Court Jose Dailisan, in a Complaint for Partition, alleged that he
of Appeals purchased ¼ of the land of Federico Pugao in Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. Dailisan had already paid part of the purchase
(2008) price. However, Pugao refused Dailisan’s plea for partition. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Dailisan’s action for partition had
prescribed and that the proper cause of action for him is one for
specific performance instead.
Cruz v. Catapang Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are co-owners of a
parcel of land in Taal, Batangas. In 1992, Teofila Catapang built
(2008) a house on a lot adjacent to the lot in question with Maligaya’s
consent. The house intruded on a portion of the property held in
co-ownership. When Leonor learned of this, she demanded that
Catapang vacate the portion intruded upon. When She did not
heed the demand, Leonor sued Catapang for forcible entry.
Pardell v. Vicenta de Pardell and Matilde Bartolome were heirs of the late
Bartolome spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. In 1888 Bartolome and
her husband Gaspar Bartolome took upon themselves the
(1912) administration of the property of the deceased spouses in Ilocos
Sur without judicial authorization. Pardell went to court,
demanding payment of rend from the Bartolomes.
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Dailisan’s action for partition has not yet prescribed as he is still a
co-owner of the property in question.
Dailisan's action before the RTC was properly captioned as one for
partition because there are sufficient allegations in the complaint that he
is a co-owner of the property. The regime of co-ownership exists when
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By
the nature of a co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to a specific
portion of the property owned in common as his own because his share
therein remains intangible. The description "undivided 1/4 portion" shows
that the portion sold is still undivided and not sufficiently identified. While
the description provides a guide for identifying the location of the lot sold,
there was no indication of its exact metes and bounds. This is the reason
why Dailisan was constrained to cause the survey of the property. As a
co-owner of the property, therefore, he has the right to demand partition,
a right which does not prescribe.
Norma Maligaya’s consent constitutes devoting a property held in
common to her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without
the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. The Court ruled that it would necessarily follow that none of the
co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly give
consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as
Catapang in this case, in the thing owned in common. In addition, Article
486 of the same Code states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it
is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to construct
a house on the co-owned property would be to injure the interest of the
co-ownership and would prevent other co-owners from using the
property in accordance with their rights.
The Bartolomes are not liable to pay rent.
The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their
occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of their right to use
the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owner’s right of
use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of
the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to provide
proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented
Vicenta from utilizing the same.

Plasabas v. Court Nieves Plasabas and Marcos Malazarte brought an action for
of Appeals recovery of title to property with damages against Dominador
Lumen and Aurora Aunzo. Lumen and Aunzo moved to dismiss
(2009) the complaint, alleging that Plasabas and Malazarte, not being
the sole owners of the property, failed to implead the other co-
owners, Jose, Victor and Victoria, as indispensable parties.
Sunset View v. Aguilar-Bernares Realty was the assignee of a unit in the
Campos Sunset View Condominium Project owned by Sunset View
Corporation, a condominium corporation. Sunset View sued
(1981) Aguilar-Bernares Realty for collection of assessments levied on
the latter’s unit. Aguilar-Bernares Realty moved to dismiss,
arguing that the court does not have jurisdiction over the case.
The CFI dismissed the case, ruling that pursuant to Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 4726 (the Condominium Law), a “holder of a
separate interest” and consequently, a shareholder of the
plaintiff condominium corporation; and that “the case should be
properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission
which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising
between shareholders of the corporation.”
Republic v. Heirs The heirs of Tito Dignos sold Lots A and B to the Civil
of Dignos- Aeronautics Administration for the construction of an airport in
Sorono Mactan, Cebu. In 1996, the Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority built a security fence on Lot B.
(2008)
The heirs of Dignos filed a complaint for quieting of title against
MCIAA, alleging that the existence of tax declarations would
cast a doubt on their validly existing titles over the lots. They
argue that they never sold their shares in the lots. Trial court
upheld the validity of Tito Dignos’ ¼ share of the lots.
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The action by Plasabas and Malazarte may proceed even without
being joined by the other co-owners.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the
plaintiff will benefit the co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the
same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Thus, Plasabas and Malazarte need not implead the other co-owners,
the only exception to this rule being when the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is thus entitled to
the possession thereof.
The CFI and the city courts have jurisdiction.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit will be transferred accordingly
to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price
at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently,
even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is
conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily
follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price
thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a
shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only
upon full payment of the purchase price.
Aguilar-Bernares Realty has not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence
they are not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction over the
claims.
The sale was valid only as to Tito Dignos’ ¼ share therein.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.

METROBANK V Florencia and Nicholson had their marriage annulled under Art.
PASCUAL 36. But there was no liquidation of their properties. Thereafter,
Florencia mortgaged one of their properties to Metrobank.
(2008) When the loan wasn’t paid, the property was foreclosed.
Therefore, Nicholson filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the mortgage.
MONTEROSO V The children of Benjamin, son of first wife, filed with the RTC a
CA Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against their
uncle, Tirso (son from first wife). Benjamin's share of the estate
of his deceased mother was entrusted in the care of his brother,
Tirso. However, he said that it wasn't entrusted to him but to
(2008) Soledad, his sister. Tirso, in turn filed a Complaint for Partition
and Damages with Receivership involving 12 parcels of land
against his stepmother (his father's 2nd wife) and all his full and
half-siblings. RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have been
deprived of their inheritance which corresponded to ¼ share
due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother.
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Since there was still no liquidation of properties, the mortgage is only
valid as to the share of Florencia.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to
subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition
of the partnership. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Art. 493 governs this case. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage
or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property
even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion
that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
Partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the
subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir. The right to
seek partition is imprescribtible and can't be barred by laches.
Prescription does not run against a co-owner or co-heir thus acquisitive
prescription didn't apply in favor of Soledad and against Tirso.
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were
excluded from the possession of their legitimate and the enjoyment of
the fruits does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership.
By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought
into the open the reality that Soledad (and her husband0 were holding
some of the properties in trust and he is a co-owner of all of them to the
extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. Before a partition and
eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-
ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate
of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right
over a share thereof is imprescriptible.

QUIMPO v ABAD Eustaquia died intestate and left parcels of land to her grand
and great grandchildren. Joaquin and the respondents
(2008) partitioned 1 of the parcels of land and divided it into 2. ½ to
Joaquin and ½ to the respondents; however there was no
document evidencing this partition. 2 of the respondents were
minors at the time of the partition, when they became of age,
they wanted to occupy their shares already which were
administered by Joaquin but he refused. He also refused to
partition the other 2 parcels of land. Respondents filed a
complaint for judicial partition with the RTC. Joaquin denied this
and said that he bought the parcels of land from Eustaquia.
BETTY During the illicit relationship of Lacbayan and Samoy, they were
LACBAYAN v able to establish a company. 5 parcels of land were also
BAYANI SAMOY acquired during the said period and were registered in their
names (as husband and wife). When they ended their
relationship, they executed a Partition Agreement. However,
(2011) when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in
her share, Samoy refused thus she filed a complaint for judicial
partition.
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A parol partition (an oral partition) may also be sustained on the ground
that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
For forty-three (43) years, the respondents occupied their portions of the
San Jose property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their
possession. They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not
prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the
same. These unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral
partition of parcels III and IV. Regardless of whether an oral partition or
agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in
proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated
by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by
the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
Likewise, A contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces
no effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause or
consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the
purchase price which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has
never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. Joaquin was a student
at the time of the alleged sale and Eustaquia was in fact supporting him.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of
the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains
otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of the disputed properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to
whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties. Samoy is not allowed by law to waive whatever share
his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.
Lacbayan herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other
matters. Lacbayan does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

TECSON v Atty Fausto acquired in co-ownership with his sister a
FAUSTO parcel of land. They then decided to partition the lot
through an Agreement of Partition. However, this was
never registered with the Register of Deeds. When Atty.
(2011) Fausto died, his sister sold her share of the land but it was
greater than her allotted share under the Agreement of
Partition. A second Partition Agreement was executed by
the sister and the heirs of Atty Fausto. This substantially
changed the first one and increased the share of the sister.
The sale of the lot as well as this 2nd Agreement was now
registered. Years later, the heirs filed a complaint to nullify
the documents and recover457 sqm of land which they
believed was unlawfully taken from the lawful share of Atty.
Fausto. They insisted that the first Agreement was the true
one.
CO GIOK LUN v This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by two
JOSE CO brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun) and Co Bon Fieng
(Fieng), the father of respondent Jose Co (Co). Petitioners
claim that the one of the properties was named under
(2011) Fieng only since it has been a common practice and
custom in China that properties intended for the children
are placed in the name of the eldest child.
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The mother title of Lot 2189, OCT No. 734, states in no unclear terms that the
sister and Atty. Fausto were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in
the original title for Lot 2189 carries more than sufficient weight to prove the
existence of a co-ownership in equal shares.
The Second Partition Agreement is null and void as an absolute simulation,
albeit induced by a third party. The fraud perpetrated by Atty. Tecson did
more than to vitiate the consent of the sister and the respondents. It must be
emphasized that the sister and the respondents never had any intention of
entering into a new partition distinct from the First Partition Agreement. The
established facts reveal that the sister and the respondents assented to the
Second Partition Agreement because Atty. Tecson told them that the
instrument was merely required to expedite the sale of the sister's share.
there is an absence of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be
bound under a new partition proposing a new division. There is an absence
of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a new
partition proposing a new division of the lot.
The sister can only sell her lawful share (under the first agreement) of the lot.
Her sale to Atty Tecson is therefore null and void as it exceeded her share of
the lot. test.
A division of property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of
co-ownership is first established.
Court held that evidence of petitioners were insufficient or immaterial to
warrant a positive finding of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona
properties. The CA correctly observed that petitioners failed to substantiate
with reasonable certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up capital of
P8,000 to be used by Lun and Fieng in setting up a business, (2) that the
Philippine Honest and Company was a partnership between Lun and Fieng,
and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 involving the Barcelona
property is sufficient to establish co-ownership. Also, petitioners were not
able to prove the existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing
properties in the name of the eldest child as provided under Article 12 of the
Civil Code.
In contrast, respondents were able to show documents of sale from the
original owners of the Gubat property rendering the claim of custom as
immaterial.12 Also, respondents sufficiently established that Fieng was the
registered owner of the Gubat and Barcelona properties while Lun was
merely an administrator.
The action for partition cannot be acted upon since petitioners failed to
establish any rightful interest in the properties. Petitioners also failed to prove
that co-ownership existed between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest.
Thus, respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng, are entitled to the exclusive
ownership of the Gubat and Barcelona properties.

HEIRS OF GO V Protacio Jr sold a parcel of land which was a part of their
SERVACIO conjugal property. The heirs filed for the annulment of the sale
of the property. The RTC declared that although the property
was conjugal, as long as the portion sold, alienated, or
(2004) encumbered will not be allotted to the heirs in the final partition
of the property, or as long as the portion sold does not
encroach upon the legitime of the other heirs, it is valid.
SERING v PLAZO Sering brought an action for forcible entry against the
respondents. However, the RTC dismissed his complaint
because his other co-owners weren’t impleaded in his
complaint. It rationed that for forcible entry cases, all of the co-
(1988) owners must be joined as plaintiffs. Only in unlawful detainer
cases can any one of the co-owners sue.
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Article 130 of the Family Code mandates that upon termination of the
marriage by death, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. This
will apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
the spouses before the effectivity of this Code. It is clear that the
conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules of the Family Code.
Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation,
otherwise the disposition is void. However, before applying such rules,
the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code. Since the spouses were married, prior to
the effectivity of the FC, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
Upon the wife's death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protactio and the other
heirs of his wife with respect to her share.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect
of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim
title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of
the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s
share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence,
Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and detainer
should be brought in the name of all co-owners, the Court held that
under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring
the action.
In forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter to be determined is
simply the question of prior physical possession. It having been alleged
in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the
properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual possession,
could file the complaint.

REYNALDO Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of
BALOLOY v title of real property with damages against
ALFREDO the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy.
HULAR He alleged that Baloloy, the petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure
(2004) a Free Patent over the property through
fraud. Evidence showed that Hular co-
owned the property with other people. The
action of Hular in the trial court is for: (a)
reinvidicatoria, to declare the respondent the
absolute owner of the subject property and
its reconveyance to him as a consequence
of the nullification of the Free Patent and (b)
publiciana, to order the petitioners and the
other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate
the property and deliver possession thereof
to him.
METROBANK V Florencia and Nicholson had their marriage
PASCUAL annulled under Art. 36. But there was no
liquidation of their properties. Thereafter,
(2008) Florencia mortgaged one of their properties
to Metrobank. When the loan wasn’t paid,
the property was foreclosed. Therefore,
Nicholson filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the mortgage.
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Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the
same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including
an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.[27] Any judgment of the court in favor of the
co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice
the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone
who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not
prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
Here, Hular filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-
owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his
siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties.
Since there was still no liquidation of properties, the mortgage is only valid as to the share of
Florencia.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall
govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Art. 493 governs this case. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her
one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEW – Legarda 35
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Adille v. CA Land belonged to Feliza who was married
twice. Dispute over the land is between the
(1988) child (defendant) from the first marriage and
children from the second marriage. Felisa sold
the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd
persons, period of repurchase being 3 years,
but she died in 1942 without being able to
redeem and after her death, but during the
period of redemption, herein defendant
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that,
he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and
child of his mother Felisa with the consequence
that he was able to secure title in his name
alone also
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share
alone. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety,
shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect
reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a
vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a
partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its
totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in
his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the
entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

After some efforts of compromise had failed, his
half-brothers and sister filed present case for
partition with accounting on the position that he
was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed the land.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in
his name terminate the existing co-ownership.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private
respondents. The Civil Code states:

May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
over the property held in common? force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
Melencio v. Dy This is an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. Plaintiffs Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an
further demand monthly rentals already due. act of management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet
(1930) arise, either owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to the period of
Defendant alleged in substance that he was occupying the said duration, which may render it imperative to record the contract in the
tract of land by virtue of a contract of lease executed on July registry of property, in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where the
24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by Ruperta contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee, and it
Garcia, among others, under the terms specified therein, and would then constitute such a sundering of the ownership as transcends
which contract is still in force. mere management; in such cases it must of necessity be recognized that
the part owners representing the greater portion of the property held in
The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other common have no power to lease said property for a longer period than
things, that Ruperta Garcia was not one of the co-owners of the six years without the consent of all the coowners, whose propriety rights,
land in question; that the person who signed the alleged expressly recognized by the law, would by contracts of long duration be
contract of lease never represented themselves as being the restricted or annulled; and as under article 1548 of the Civil Code such
sole and exclusive owners of the land subject to the lease as contracts cannot be entered into by the husband with respect to his
alleged by the defendant in his answer; that the said contract of wife's property, by the parent or guardian with respect to that of the child
lease is null and void for being executed without the or ward, and by the manager in default of special power, since the
intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio contract of lease only produces personal obligations, and cannot without
and Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the the consent of all persons interested or express authority from the
husbands of Juliana and Ruperta Melencio. owner, be extended to include stipulations which may alter its character,
changing it into a contract of partial alienation of the property leased.

Castro v. Atienza Brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased to
plaintiff a fishpond. The lessors are co-owners in equal shares
(1973) of the leased property.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. Plaintiff as lessee and
defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed
to set aside and annul the contract of lease (exhibit A).
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant
did not return the advances made by plaintiff. Demand for
payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on but to no avail,
hence the present action.
The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as co-owner of
the fishpond owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas
(succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly lease his
half-interest to a third party (respondent Atienza)
independently of his co-owner, and in case his co-owner also
leased his other half interest to the same third party, whether
Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third
party?
Estoque v. Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim
Pajimula that she is a co-owner of Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3
portion thereof.
(1968) Defendant, who acquired the other 2/3 portion of Lot No. 802
from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the
plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely
identified and segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership
at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid portion,
upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken
advantage of.
Land was originally owned by spouses. Ownership was
transferred to their heirs through succession. Eventually, the
other heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement wherein
they assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot No.
802 to Crispina Perez.
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The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the
products of land owned in common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof
of knowledge of the existence of the contract of lease when it is
considered that the land in question was only a small portion of a large
tract which Pedro R. Melencio was administering in connection with
other community property.
Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-half
interest in the fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party,
respondent Atienza, independently of his co-owner (although said co-
owner had also leased his other undivided one-half interest to the same
third party) and could likewise by mutual agreement independently
cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said predecessor-in-
interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs) therefore
stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental
paid to him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the
non-cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such liability.
The judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the rights
and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which
expressly provides that
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. *
Contention is without merit.
The deed of sale to Estoque clearly specifies the object sold as the
southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an
area of 840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller,
Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this particular
portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two brothers, Lorenzo
and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell
to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned.
There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the
seller could have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant
is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non
valet illatio.
While on the date of the sale to Estoque said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion

The plaintiff's stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative
to convey the southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario
Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the deed itself, for
the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right
to sell any definite portion of the land held in common but could
only transmit her undivided share, since the specific portion
corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until
partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the appellant argues
that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area,
should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3
interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor.
PNB v. CA It is not disputed that the property in question originally
belonged to the spouses Iñigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver as their
(1980) conjugal property. Husband died. The wife mortgaged the
entire property to PNB.
In the meantime, wife had defaulted in the fulfillment of her
obligation with the Manila Trading Company. So the said
company levied upon her share in the lot in question. Her
interest in the lot in question was afterwards sold at public
auction, at which the Manila Trading Company was the highest
bidder; deed of sale was subsequently annotated. Thereafter,
as stated, one-half of the said property passed into the hands of
Manila Trading Company.
Wife, likewise, failed to settle her obligation with the Philippine
National Bank, the latter sold at public auction the whole lot
that the former had mortgaged to it, and in the same auction
sale, the Philippine National Bank emerged as the highest
bidder after the period of redemption had expired without the
property having been redeemed, the Philippine National Bank
consolidated its title over it.
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described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully
effective when the next day (October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina
Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners (Annex B)
and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario
Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that — .
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and
delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."
Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of
the southeastern third of lot 802 on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she
never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years
later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-
thirds of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the
property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and
separate.
Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code), one of
the essential requisites to the contract of pledge and mortgage is that the
pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or
mortgaged. And under Article 493, New Civil Code (Art. 399, Old Civil
Code), each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shag be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Hence, We fully agree with the trial court and the respondent Court and
affirm the holding that "what the Philippine National Bank had acquired
from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was simply one-half (½) of the
entire property, for this was all she had in her power to convey — the
other half being, as it still is, the lawful share of the plaintiffs-appellees as
inheritance from their father, Iñigo Bitanga. Nemo date quod non habet
— One cannot give what is not his.
Applying the provisions of the Old Civil Code 7 the law in force at the
time of Inigo Bitanga's death in 1935, Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse,
cannot take part legally in the sharing of the estate left by her deceased
husband (one-half (½) of Lot 9068) with respect to which she only had
usufructuary rights. "The usufructuary not being an owner, cannot
alienate or dispose of the objects included in the usufruct. Thus, he
cannot ... mortgage or pledge the thing ...

Carvajal v. CA Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had
instituted a complaint for ejectment and recovery of
(1982) possession.
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq.
qmeter land originally owned by Hermogenes
Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death
their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo, Faustina,
Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the
ownership of the whole lot.
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole
lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children.
Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern
one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is
also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio
Espique. The land subject of the controversy is the
most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the
Espique children which petitioner claims he had
bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which
respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo on
April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for partition
filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. T-966.
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Respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for
the use of the property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the
share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor
respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute.
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein
respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must be settled frist is the
action for partition. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by
agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose
of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among
the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has
no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in
common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is
represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 3 An
individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement
or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-
owners. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon
partition. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo Espique in favor of
respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were
made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or
invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the interests
thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that
may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the
partition of the estate 7 subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to
the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code.

Hagosojos v. CA Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. His first marriage with Jacinta Jaucian produced three
(1987) off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis and the two other
private respondents, Araceli and Lourdes.
After death of first wife but without the conjugal partnership
assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and
distributed, he got married a second time to Araceli Hian Out of
the second marriage were born the other private respondents,
Fred, Heidi, and Henry. On January 22, 1973, Anastacio
donated to Henry, who was then only seven years young, Lot
No. 2736, which was part of the conjugal partnership assets of
the first marriage. The donation was accepted on behalf of
Henry by his mother, Araceli. There is nothing in the records of
this case as to whether or not the deed of donation was
registered.
To compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage, the petitioner, together
with his two sisters, filed the corresponding complaint against
their father, Anastacio. While the case was still pending
however, Anastacio died on, which compelled Luis to file an
amended complaint substituting as defendant Araceli, in her
personal capacity and as guardian of the minors Fred, Heidi,
and Henry. In a compromise agreement reached (adopted by
trial court as its decision), the donated property was given to the
children of the first marriage. The respondents claim mistake as
this property has already been donated to Henry.
Segura v. Segura Land in dispute was originally registered in the name of
Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and without debts in
(1988) 1936 and was survived by four children, who never got around
to dividing the property among themselves. This controversy is
not among the four brothers, who are now also deceased. It is
Gertrudes's grandchildren by three of her sons (the fourth
having died without issue) who are involved in this complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed
inheritance, plus damages.
The conflict began when on April 6, 1941, three of these nine
grandchildren, namely, Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio
Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the
entire property to themselves alone as equal pro
indiviso owners (thereby, curiously, excluding Nicolas and
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Donation not valid.
Among those specifically designated in favor of the heirs of the first
marriage was the whole property covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-740 comprised of six lots including lot No. 2736." In view of that
partition in 1967. Anastacio could no longer donate Lot No 2736 to Henry
on January 22. 1973 because it had already been adjudicated "To The
Heirs of the First Marriage" as the Compromise Agreement specifically
states. On the other hand, even it he (Anastacio) is included among the
"Heirs of the First Marriage" he could not donate a specific lot by metes
and bounds, but only an aliquot part of the whole mass of properties
which he and his three children of his first marriage (with Jacinta
Jaucian) co-owned.
Even in the unlikely event that the statement regarding the liquidation
and partition on February 15, 1967 would be found to be a mistake, still
Anastacio could not have validly donated Lot No. 2736 to Henry.
Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise
Agreement were described conjugal partnership properties of the first
marriage, it follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal
partnership evolved into a co-ownership between her surviving spouse
Anastacio, and her three children, the petitioner and the two other private
respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-
Nicolas. Anastacio became the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties
while each of the three children, of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation,
and pending the partition of the properties owned in common and the
adjudication in his favor Lot No. 2736, Anastacio could not validly donate
the same at that time he claimed he did within the purview of the law on
co-ownership.
As a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, the buyer
can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally
transfer. The deed of partition being invalid as to the other heirs, the
vendors could dispose only of their respective shares in the land, or one-
third only of the property and not the other two-thirds as well which did
not belong to them.
To repeat, the general rule is that no one can give what he does not
have — nemo dat quod non habet. Hence, even if it be assumed that
Amojido had bought the land in good faith from the parties to the
extrajudicial partition, only so much of their share could be validly
acquired by him, with the rest of the property remaining under the
ownership of the six excluded co-heirs In other words, Amojido
became pro indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who
retained title to their respective shares although he had possession of

Santiago's own brother and two sisters, and Gaudencio's own
sister, besides the other two co-heirs.) This partition was not
registered immediately, but only in 1946, or five years later.
Land was then subject of a sale to Amojido by the parties who
executed the extra-judicial partition.
Paulmitan v. CA Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died and left the two following
parcels of land. Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely:
(1992) Pascual Paulmitan, died after his mother passed away, and
Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Pascual
Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the
respondents, who are his children.
The estate of Agatona remained unsettled and the titles to the
two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona.
However, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself
Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir
of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of
Deeds and TCT No. 35979 was issued in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a
Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P.
Fanesa, his daughter.
Aromin v. A parcel of land was owned in common by the siblings. One of
Floresca them was able to secure different tax declarations covering
parts of the land. He then sold these portions of the land.
(2006)
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the entire property. The portion pertaining to the herein appellants should
be deemed held by Amojido under an implied trust for their benefit,
conformably to the ruling in Bargayo v. Camumot, thus:
In law it is understood that the co-owners or co-heir who is in possession
of an inheritance pro indivisofor himself and in representation of his co-
owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the
rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-
heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee, or a trustee.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the
subsequent passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate
remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore,
co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever
made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the
respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed
property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided
portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the time of
Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his
daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents
and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him
upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the
rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which
they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire
land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in
the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land
until it is partitioned.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that
same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. The
honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from
knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on
inquiry.

VAGILIDAD VS. Loreto Labiao, together with his siblings, inherited a parcel of
VAGILIDAD land from their father. After their father’s death, Loreto sold a
portion of the land to Gabino Jr. (respondent). After a few years,
(2006) Loreto sold the same portion of the land to petitioner.
Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of document,
reconveyance and damages with the RTC. The RTC ruled that
Loreto did not validly convey the lot to respondent since at that
time, the time of the sale, the heirs of Loreto’s father did not
partition the land therefore Loreto could have only sold his
aliquot share and not a divided part designated by metes and
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The petitioners' knowledge that the subject property was, at one time,
co-owned by Paulo, his brother Alberto and sister Josefa should have
impelled them to inquire and investigate, as any prudent vendee should,
about the status of the co-ownership before buying the subject property.
The petitioners' reliance on Paulo's word alone that he was the sole
owner of the subject property when they bought the same, despite their
knowledge of facts that should have put them on guard, constitutes
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. They cannot therefore rightfully
claim that they are buyers in good faith.
Having established that the subject property was owned in common by
Paulo and the siblings, it necessarily follows that Paulo could only
dispose to the petitioners his share in the subject property. Article 493 of
the Civil Code provides that "[e]ach co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
Under the said provision, while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner he cannot
alienate the shares of his other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet.
Paulo, however, sold the entire subject property to the petitioners without
the consent of the co-owners. Following the well-established principle
that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is
legally possible to do so – quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum
valere potest - the disposition affects only Paulo's sharepro indiviso, and
the transferee, in this case the petitioners, gets only what corresponds to
Paulo's share in the partition of the subject property, i.e., one-half of the
areas described as riceland, sandy land and swampland which constitute
the subject property.
The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is subject to the rules of
co-ownership under the Civil Code.
Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more
persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically
divided. Before the partition of the property held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share
in the entire property.

bounds. The CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that when
Loreto sold the portion of the land, he already had the right as
co-owner to his share even if at that time, the property had not
yet been partitioned since the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of their father’s death.
ANGELA Angela, Nieves and Antonio Tuason owned a parcel of land in
TUASON VS. common. When Nieves sold her 1/3 share to respondent
ANTONIO corporation, the latter, together with Angela and Antonio,
TUASON and entered into a MOA wherein they agreed to have the whole lot
GREGORIO improved and subdivided into small lots and then sold, the
ARANETA, Inc. proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. The MOA
provided a stipulation stating that the contract shall remain in
full force and effect during all the time it may be necessary for
respondent corporation to fully sell the property in small and
(1951) subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices.
Later, when Angela filed a complaint with the CFI to order the
partition of the property, the complaint was dismissed.
The main contention of Angela is that the contract should be
declared null and void because its terms violate the provisions
of Art. 400 of the Civil Code.
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Loreto sold the subject property to Gabinoas a co-owner. loreto had a
right, even before the partition of the property to transfer in whole or in
part his undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of his co-
heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine
that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indivisoshare and has the
right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for
its enjoyment. Thus, what Gabino obtained by virtue of the sale were the
same rights as the vendor Loreto had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
Consequently, when Loreto sold the same portion of the lot to Wilfredo,
he was no longer the owner of the same property and therefore could not
have validly sold it.
The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by
metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the sale a
nullity. In Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, the fact that an agreement
purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not
render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
In the case at bar, the contract of sale could be legally recognized. At the
time of sale, Loretp had an aliquot share of one-third but he sold more
than that portion. It has been ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his
aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Article 400 is not applicable therefore the contract is valid.
The contract far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner
being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its
purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the
community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the
proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in
the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have
been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-
owners. By virtue of the MOA, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and
most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership,
the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation
shall have been attained.
And even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable,
under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing
undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear
that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four
years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

JOSEFINA Petitioners and respodnent’s husband, Federico Valdez, Jr., are
VALDEZ et al. vs. the heirs of the deceased spouses Federico Valdez, Sr., from
TEOFILA whom they inherited a piece of land.
OLORGA When Vadez, Sr. purchased the lot, the transfer of the title in
his name was never done because the OCT was lost. After his
death however, his heirs were able to transfer the title through
Valdez, Jr., whose name appeared on the deed of sale as the
(1973) only vendee. This was done pursuant to the wishes of Mr.
Quicho (a lessee of a portion of the lot0 who advanced the
money, in order that he could facilitate the deed of sale
between him and the Valdezes, with the understanding that
Federico Valdez, Jr. will hold the same in trust for his other
brother and sisters.
However, upon Valdez, Jr.’s death, his wife, respondent, tried to
eject the plaintiffs.
When petitioners filed for an action for partition, respondent
claimed acquisitive prescription.
CONCEPCION Ernesto and Victor Roque are co-owners of a lot with their half-
ROQUE VS. IAC sister petitioner. They sold to her the ¾ portion of a lot which
they owned. When petitioner sought for a partition of the
property, respondents refused to acknowledge petitioner’s claim
of ownership of any portion of the lot. Petitioner’s complaint for
(1988) partition with specific performance was granted by the RTC but
reversed by the IAC. The IAC stated that from the moment
respondents alleged absolute and exclusive ownership of the
whole lot, the RTC should have immediately ordered the
dismissal of the action for partition and petitioner, if she so
desired, should have refilled the case but this time as an accion
reinvindicatoria and, should this action prosper, a second action
for partition would still have to be instituted in order to effect
division of the property.
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As between co-owners, an action for partition does not prescribe.
Given the antecedents of the property and the fact that its acquisition by
Federico Valdez, Jr. was for the benefit not of himself alone but also of
his brother and sisters, although for purposes of convenience he was
made to appear as the sole vendee, the juridical relation that arose
among them was one of co-ownership, with the plaintiffs-appellees
actually in possession of a portion of the property.
Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, "No prescription shall run in favor of
a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Insofar as the aspect of extinctive prescription referred to in this article is
concerned, it is but a restatement of Article 1965 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which provides: "As between co-heirs, co-owners, or proprietors
of adjacent estates, the action to demand the partition of the inheritance
or of the thing held in common, or the survey of the adjacent properties,
does not prescribe."
And from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, or prescription of
ownership, this Court has held in numerous decisions involving fiduciary
relations such as those occupied by a trustee with respect to the cestui
que trust that as a general-rule the former's possession is not adverse
and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription.
Adverse possession in such a case requires, the concurrence of the
following-circumstances: (a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) that
such, positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui
que trust and (c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and
conclusive. These circumstances are not present in this case.
An action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of
a determinate portion of the property involved.
An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming to
be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether
the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue,
there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant.
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Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of
the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual
partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants assert in
their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the
court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the
contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the
question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court
find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-
owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive
owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to
dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not
because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather
because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-ownership rights in
himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition
the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should
find the eidstence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court
may and should order the partition of the property in the same action.
Judgment for one or the other party being on the merits, the losing party
(respondents in this case) may then appeal the same. In either case,
however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another
action, separate and independent from that for partition originally
instituted.

It must also be noted that Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
"each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how long the
co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-
ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have
theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they
cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition.

But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time,
the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-owner will
have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order
requiring partition.

In this case, neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a

claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the lot. The co-
ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the
owners.

VIRGILIO Petitioner and respondent Senen are brother who purchased a
AGUILAR VS. CA house and lot for their father. Initially, they agreed that
petitioner’s share in the co-ownership would be 2/3 while that of
respondent would be 1/3. However, by virtue of a written
memorandum, both agreed that their interests would be equal,
(1993) with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the
original owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their father. Since
Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS,
the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed
and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It
was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father
and his needs.
When their father died, petitioner demanded from Senen that he
vacate the property so that it may be sold and the proceeds
divided among them, to which the latter refused.
The trial court found them to be co-owners of the house and lot,
in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement and
ordered the sale of the property and the proceeds divided
between the two. The CA set aside the order of the trial court.
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Since petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot
in equal shares, either one of them may demand the sale of the house
and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at
any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing
is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be,
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the
right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (2) the
co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-
owners.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house
and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the
property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the
other co-owners.
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of
the
same.
But when petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and
the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay
of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them.

REMEDIOS Private respondents are the children and grandchildren of Alipio
SALVADOR and Yabo, who inherited 2 lots from him upon his death.
GRACIA Pastor Makibalo, who is married to Maria, daughter of Alipio,
SALVADOR vs. claims that he purchased the shares of 7 of Alipio’s children and
CA and YABO inherited Maria’s share. He filed a complaint before the CFI for
Quieting of Title, Annulmnet of Documents and Damages
against private respondents, and that he may be declared the
(1995) absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots.
Respondents filed a complaint before the same CFI for partition
and quieting of title with damages against Pastor and
petitioners, who are strangers to the Yabo family and assignees
of Pastor.
The CFI ruled in favor of petitioners but the CA overturned the
decision.
JOSE MARIA Petitioner filed an action against respondents for the partition of
RAMIREZ vs. a parcel of land owned by both parties pro indiviso (1/6 to the
JOSE EUGENIO petitioner, 5/6 to the defendants).
RAMIREZ, et. al.
Only 2 of the defendants did not object to the partition, while the
(1967) other defendants objected upon the theory that said partition is
"materially and legally" impossible and "would work great harm
and prejudice to the co-owners."
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner for the partition of the
property. Respondents argue that instead of making the
aforementioned segregation, plaintiff's share should be sold to
them, as provided for in Art. 495, since if the plan of partition is
executed, there will be “inestimable damage” to the property.
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Pastor did not acquire acquisitive prescription of ownership of 8/9 of the
lots therefore respondents action for partition was granted by the SC.
Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property implies
that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot,
however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the
property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it
by prescription.
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous,
open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a period of time fixed
by law. In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the
following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
In this case, the period of prescription started to run only from the time
Pastor filed complaint for Quieting of Title. However, this was tolled when
his co-heirs, the private respondents herein, instituted an action for
partition of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for
only about six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his
wife's estate, and absent acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches
and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor.
There is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiff's share, the
buildings left on the remaining portions representing defendants' share,
would be unserviceable, either for commercial or for residential
purposes.
On the contrary, it seems obvious that plaintiff would not insist upon the
partition prayed for, if his share were unserviceable for either —
particularly the commercial — purpose. In fact, every one of the
aforementioned commissioners, including the one representing
defendants herein, recommended the segregation of plaintiff's share.
The commissioners merely failed to agree on the precise configuration
thereof.

MARINA REYES Petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and
VS. damages, seeking to enjoin private respondents from selling to
CONCEPCION a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight
parcels of registered land. Petitioner claims that under Article
1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a
(1990) preferential right (or preemptive right) to purchase these shares
from private respondents for a reasonable price.
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In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to
any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance
on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced.
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated
his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of
"legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only after the
shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the
co-ownership.
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for
injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale of the
latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus,
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents
from alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a
co-owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493. The law does
not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the portion of the property
which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the
subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents
continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership
arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge
acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his order requiring the
parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining
whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of
the New Civil Code were present in the case.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article
is resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-
owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the
New Civil Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See
Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the
other co-owners.

CORNELIO Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of
RAMOS VS. land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal
DIRECTOR OF Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and
LANDS1 was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
(1918) information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein
petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not
acquired a good title from the Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first
parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the
petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
J.M. TUASON, Petitioner’s ownership of the land in question is admitted by
Inc. VS. VICENTE Vicente and Ester Jurilla and support by a TCT. Jurilla took
JURILLA2 possession of a portion of said property and constructed therein
a house and other improvements without petitioner’s consent of
(1977) knowledge. Hence, petitioner claims rents for the area occupied
by the Jurillas.
Respondents claim that said portion of the property occupied by
them was acquired by them by virtue of an alleged deed of sale
executed by one Florencio Deudor in their favor. They also
claim that they have improvements introduced and that theya re
builders in good faith.
1 Digest taken from batasnatin.com
2
taken from http://www.scribd.com/doc/75727043/03-Property-Reviewer
CIVIL LAW REVIEW – Legarda 48
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The actual occupancy of a part of the land by Romero described in the
instrument giving color of title is sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land.
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract
of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of
all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for
his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is
in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the
law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
Since Deudor is not the owner of the property, the latter could not
transmit the title to respondents.
Petitioner presented a TCT in it’s name while respondents based their
rights on the alleged Testimonial Title. Thus, petitioner’s title is
indefeasible and against the whole world, while that of respondent is not
and could not even be considered an imperfect title as well known in
Land Registration Act 496.
The fact that respondents admit not only in their pleading but also in
open court that petitioner corporation is the owner of the property cannot
be seriously questioned by respondents and its right thereto
imprescriptible.
At the time they bought the property from Deudor, they did not inquire
whether the said Deudor was a registered owner of the property.
Besides, they never registered the deed of sale in the Office of the
Registry of Deed of QC. In order that defendantsmay be called buyers in
good faith, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that upon
buying the property, they were not aware of any flaw in their title or made
of acquisition. The fact that Jurilla tendered to the Bulacan Subdivision
the balance of the consideration and refused to accept the tender, is a
clear indication that notice to Jurilla, who is a lawyer, that the party from
whom he was supposed to have bought the property was not the owner.
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Javier v Respondnets filed a petition for reconveyance against the The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the
Concepcion petitioners, Javier et. al for having taken in possession land partnership is void.
subject of the dispute since 1945. The established rule is that one cannot acquire title to a registered land
(1979) by prescription or adverse possession. Adverse, notorious and
Petitioners argue that they have acquired the said lot in dispute continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by
partly by purchase and partly by inheritance and their law is ineffective against a Torrens title. The right to secure possession
predecessors in interest have been in possession of the same under a decree of registration does not prescribe.
adversely, publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits received
of owners against the whole world since the Spanish time up to before their possession was legally interrupted upon receipt of judicial
the present; summons in connection with the filing of the complaint for reconveyance
on October 17, 1959.
Caram v Laureta On 1947 Mata sold a parcel of land to The ownership of the land is vested on Laureta.
respondent. However such sale was not
registered because it was not Art. 1544 provides that If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees…Should it
acknowledged before a notary public. be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
(1981) first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
On 1945, the same land was sold by
Mata to Petitioner Caram through his In the case at hand, the agents of Caram acted in bad faith. They should have known that there
agents which was acknowledged before was a previous sale to Laureta and should have inquired about it. The acts of the agent are
a notary public. An OCT was issued to deemed acts of the principal and therefore Caram is deemed to be in bad faith. Since Caram
Petitioner. was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.

Thus respondent filed an action for
nullity, recovery of ownership and/or
reconveyance with damages and
attorney's fees against Petitioners and
he Register of Deeds.
Manotok Realty v Petitioner is the registered owner of
CA and Carillo parcel of land obtained from a purchase
from the Testate Estate of Tambunting
de Legarda. However, the lot cannot be
(1985) subdivided because it is occupied by
several houses, including one occupied
by respondent Carillo.
Failing to recover possession of the
property, petitioner filed a reivindicatory
action against respondent.
Petitioner argues that respondent is not
a builder and possessor in good faith.
Since if he was in good faith he should
have verified with the Register of Deeds
who the registered owner is.
It was Laureta who was a possessor in good faith. A possessor in good faith is one who is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Laureta
was first in possession of the property. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in
favor of Laureta was procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse
of four years from the time the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an
action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the
same.
The Petitioner is entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in dispute..
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a
defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. The same rule must be applied to one
who has knowledge of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claims
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
When the deed of' assignment was executed in favor of the respondent, the disputed lot was
already registered and titled in the name of the petitioner. Such an act of registration served as a
constructive notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his
ownership conclusive.
Respondent’s failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a
prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him
from claiming possession in good faith

Tan Queto v CA Respondent acquired a land allegedly by purchase or donation
and a TCT was acquired for the said land
A contract of lease for ten years was entered between
respondent and petitioner
(1987) Later on, a barter agreement was executed between petitioner
and respondent where petitioner became the owner of the land.
Petitioner then proceeded to construct a concrete building
without any objection from respondent.
Respondent is now suing petitioner for reconveyance of the title
of the property of the land.
The question now is whether Petitioner is a builder in bad faith
not entitled to reimbursement.
Escritor v IAC In a cadastral proceedings, the court rule that
Escritor(older/petitioner) was the owner of the lot in dispute and
the latter started taking possession of it.
Acuna then filed a petition for review alleging fraud and
(1987) misrepresentation.
The Court ruled in favor of Acuna as owner and ordered
petitioners to vacate
Later, a suit was again filed by respondent against the
petitioners(heirs of original petitioner) to recover the damages
for the fruits acquired during the pendency of the earlier case.
The main issue is whether the petitioners were in bad faith and
should be held liable for damages.
De la Cruz IAC Gregorio Monte owned two parcels of land and was survived by
his wife Dela Cruz(petitioner) and children of Gregorio’s
siblings (respondent).
Respondents filed a petition to recover the possession and
(1988) ownership of the lands in dispute.
CFI ruled in their favor and ordered that the lands be
surrendered to them. CA affirmed and the decision became
fina.
Respondents executed an extrajudicial partition representing
themselves as the only legal heirs of Gregorio. They sold the
lots to the Rabara’s (co-respondents)
Petitioners then filed a complaint for partition but this was
denied by the lower court. The appellate court reversed and
remanded the case to the lower court. Respondents thus filed
this petition for certiorari.
One of the issues presented was whether or not the buyers of
lands were buyers in good faith.
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The property is the exclusive property of petitioner Tan Queto.
Petitioner nursed the belief that the lot was actually respondent’s(making
him in bad faith), still respondent’s failure to prohibit him from building
despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes
her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle
petitioner to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code),
ergo, reimbursement should be given him if respondent decides to
appropriate the building for herself.
However, it is to be noted that in the case at hand, due to the barter
agreement, petitioner became the owner-possessor of the lot. He is a
builder-possessor jus possidendi because he is the owner himself.
A possessor in bad faith is one in possession of a property knowing that
his title thereto is defective. Here it was not shown that petitioners were
aware of any flaw in their title nor in the title of their predecessors.
Assuming Escritor(older) was in bad faith, this should not prejudice his
successors in interest. The rule is that only personal knowledge of flaw in
one’s title can make on e a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not
transmissible even to an heir.
Under Art 527, good faith is always presumed and upon him who allges
bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof.
They were not buyers in good faith.
The buyers herein had notices of the claim of third persons aside from
the claim or right of the registered owners. These claims were annotated
on the two (2) titles of the land.
A purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there were no defect in
the title of the vendors. Respondents-buyers should have acted with that
measure of precaution which may reasonably be required to a prudent
man in a like situation.

Suobiron v CA The parcels of land subject of the dispute was originally
awarded to the Adelantar’s in a court decision. However the
(1995) records were burned. Thus a motion was filed for their
reconstitution which was granted.
Taking advantage of the chaotic situation at the time, the
Lorezo’s appropriated the property for themselves. Thus the
Ponce’s filed a petition to recover the property from them
which was granted in Civil Case No. 938.
The property became the subject of a cadastral survey and
thus the Adelantar (now in the person of Ponce, widow of
Adelantar) again claimed ownership. However, the
Suobiron’s are also claiming ownership on the basis of the
sale between their predecessors in interest and the
Lorezo’s.
Thus the present case for quieting of title.
One the issues raised was whether or not the Suobiron’s
were in good faith.
Banco Espanol A certain Reyes was indebted to Petitioner and secured it
Filipino v with mortgages and pledges of properties.
Peterson
Petitioner filed a case against respondent for a judgment to
be rendered declaring that under the contract of pledge they
(1907) had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of the said
goods to the payment of the debt for the security of which
the said merchandise was pledged, with preference over the
claim of the other defendants.
Astudillo v PHHC Respondent filed in behalf of Ramon Mitra for the purchase
of the lot in dispute. This was approved. However, the lot
was in the possession of petitioner Astudillo. Petitioner that
(1976) she had been a squatter since 1957 but requested the
PHHC that the award be granted to her instead of Mitra.
Thus she filed a petition to have the lot in dispute be sold to
her.
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The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses owners
of the two (2) parcels of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and
Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their
successors-in-interest, the parties herein, under the doctrine of res judicata.
It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith and
had since then occupied the same but suchbona fide character of
possession ceased when they were served summons. Possession acquired
in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully, conformably with Art. 528 of
the Civil Code.
As held in Tacas v Tobon, to every possessor in good faith there comes a
time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or
possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that
what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the
grounds in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under
articles 1857 and 1863 of the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown
that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods pledged through
a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a
duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and
that the pledgee, itself, received and collected the proceeds of the goods as
they were sold.
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made
arrangements for the sale of the goods pledged and that the bills for the
goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the
contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods,
(art. 1869, Civil Code), he being the one principally interested in the sale of
the property on the best possible terms.
As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the
law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any
rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award.
Also, She is not a bona fide occupant of. The State is committed to promote
social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing
but the State's solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean
that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private. Her act of
squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be
sold her because she does not yet own a residential lot and house is not
justified
As held in Bernards v Bernards:“In carrying out its social readjustment
policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and
aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and
unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would
perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution.”

Arcal v CA Defendants occupied the subject lot in dispute allegedly on the
implied tolerance of plaintiffs. Finally on 1984, an ejectment suit
was filed by plaintiffs against defendants. On the same year
(1998) defendants also filed a suit to recover the lot in dispute against
plaintiffs but this case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
As regards the ejectment suit, the court renderd a decision
ordering to the defendants to vacate but the CA reversed the
said decision in 1992 stating that the occupation was not on
the mere tolerance since the tolerance was withdrawn when an
order to vacate was made on them. Thus unlawful detainer was
not a proper remedy.
Yu v Honrado The subject matter of the case was the 42 metric tons of
scrap engines blocks which were sold by the Marcelo Steel
() Corp to an alleged swindler (paid by check which was later
dishonored). The swindler in turn sold it to Yu spouses who
purchased it in good faith. Marcelo Steel retrieved the
objects from the purchasers by means of a search warrant.
However, in the criminal case for estafa, the Court did not
yet decided on the issue of civil liability
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The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A
person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the
possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
In such case , the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to vacate
An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical or
material possession over the property or possession de facto, that is who
between the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to possess the
property in question. Where, however, the issue is who has the better
and the legal right to possess or to whom possession de
jure pertains, accion publiciana in proper. In the case at bar, petitioners’
complaint for unlawful detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or
physical possession of the property and was resorted to after private
respondents has indubitably failed in their suit assailing petitioners’ right
to ownership.
Spouses Yu are entitled to possession. The Court ordered the return
of the properties. The trial court had not yet ruled on the restitution
of the objects. Thus, there is no legal basis for allowing Marcelo
Steel to recover possession. The possessor in good faith of a chattel
is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession until a
competent court rules otherwise
A possessor in good faith of a chattel is entitled to be respected
and protected in his possession, until a competent court rules
otherwise.
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the
consequences of the breach of trust, the one who made it
possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.
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D. Possession
1. Concept of Owner
Donato v CA

()

De Jesus v CA

()

2. Presumption of just title

Heirs of Jumero
v Lizares

()
 CIVIL LAW REVIEW – Legarda 54
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Casimiro v Mateo

(2011)

3. Good Faith
Calagan v CFI

()

Cabigas v
Limbavo

(2011)
 CIVIL LAW REVIEW – Legarda 55
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4. Bad Faith
5. Applicable presumption
Luga v Arciaga

(2011)

6. Possession in the concept of a holder

Cruz v Pahati

()

Dizon v Suntay

()

PAJUNAR V CA In 1969, respondent Eluna bartered his cow for a female
(1989) caraboa (which bore the brand “ART” in her front and hind
legs). He was unable to register the transfer in his name.
In 1980, petitioner filed a Petition for Recovery of
Personal Property with Writ of Replevin, claiming to be the
original owner of the carabao, which was lost in 1974.
EDCA V SANTOS In 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Cruz
placed an order by telephone with the petitioner for 406
(1990) books, payable on delivery. EDCA delivered the books as
ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check. Cruz
thereafter sold 120 of the books to Santos who, after
verifying the seller’s ownership from the invoice he
showed her, paid him P1700.00.
EDCA had Cruz arrested when they found out he wasn’t
really the Dean of La Salle and that he had no more
account with the bank, against which he had drawn the
payment check, and the 120 books from Santos seized
without a warrant.
Santos sued for recovery of the books.
3
Art. 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner
has not pursued the swarm, or ceases to do so within two consecutive days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated
animals may also claim them within twenty days to be counted from their occupation by another person. This period having expired, they shall pertain to him who
has caught and kept them.
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Respondents did not comply with the required registration under the
Administrative Code. They are not possessors in good faith, as a possessor in
good faith is one not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it. Furthermore, failure of a party to exercise
precaution to acquaint himself with the defects in the title of his vendor
precludes him from claiming possession in good faith. Respondents failed to
make a closer inquiry into the certificate of registration of the carabao.
It is thus clear that possession in good faith for 4 years isn’t applicable, neither
can possession in bad faith of 8 years benefit respondents, for when the
owner of a movable has lost or has been illegally deprived of his property can
he recover the same without need to reimburse the possessor, as provided in
NCC 559.
Neither can NCC 7163 apply for this article evidently refers to a possessor in
good faith.
Petitioner’s contention that Santos hasn’t established their ownership of the
books because they haven’t even produced a receipt to prove he has bought
the stock was found to be untenable. The Court held that NCC 559 dispenses
with further proof to acquire title.
Santos was held to have acquired the books in good faith. He ascertained the
ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice showing that they had been
sold to Cruz, who then said he was selling them at a discount because he was
in financial need.
The court held that the petitioner was not unlawfully deprived of the books. It
held that actually delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired
ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the
respondent. The fact that he hadn’t yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and didn’t impair the title acquired by the respondents
to the books.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she
did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under NCC 559 by his mere
possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos
nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.

ARANDA V Petitioner filed an Application for
REPUBLIC Registration of Title, invoking the
liberal provision of CA 141, having
(2011) been in continuout possession of the
subject land in the concept of owner,
publicly, openly and adversely for
more than 30 years prior to the filing
of the application.
Petitioner’s witnesses sought to prove
that the land was acquired by
petitioner’s father in 1946 and was
transferred to petitioner in 1965
through a donation from his father.
They likewise testified that he had
been tilling the land since then,
planting it with corn and rice.
7. Acquisition and loss of possession
CATHOLIC Petitioner filed an application for
VICAR registration of title over 4 lots in
APOSTOLIC V Benguet. The heirs of Juan Valdez,
CA and heirs of Egmildo Octaviano filed
their Answers/Opposition on Lots No.
(1988) 2 and 3, asserting ownership and title
thereto.
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The Court held that the requisites for registration were not met. First, the status of the land applied
for as alienable and disposable was not clearly established.
It also held that petitioner’s evidence failed to show that he possessed the property in the manner
and for the duration required by law. It found that contrary to its claim, it had only started paying for
tax beginning 1994, or three years before filing the application. While, as a rule, tax declarations or
realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession – they constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. Even
assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to
establish possession in the concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of
the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to
ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness
of the evidence of the oppositors.
The Court held that petitioner didn’t meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive
prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for
ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
By the very admission of petitioner, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by Valdez and Octaviano. Both
Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of
private respondents, not petitioner, were in possession of the questioned lots since 1906
.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner
after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but
when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.
The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse
possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of
commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for
taxation purposes. The action of petitioner by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way
of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
The predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership
in good faith from 1906; that petitioner was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse
claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951.
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E. Usufruct
1. Imperfect
2. Distinguished from lease
3. Kinds
4. Rights of usufructuary
FABIE V DAVID Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses in Fabie has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of
Santo Cristo, Binondo and Ongpin, under the will of deceased administration – to collect the rents, conserve the property, etc. – were
(1945) Rosario Fabie. by said judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension of Juan
Grey that he is the is the administrator of the property with the right to
A judgment through written stipulation was rendered in a case choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of the lease is contrary
between Fabie and Juan Grey, owner of the Santo Cristo to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will, the
property, whereby it was agreed that Fabie will collect the rents stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot
of the Sto. Cristo and Ongpin properties, pay all the real estate manage or administer the property after all the acts of management and
taxes, special assessments, insurance premiums, make administration have been vested by the court, with his consent, in the
necessary repairs. In case of default on the part of the usufructuary. He admitted that before said judgment he had been
usufructuary, the respective owners shall have the right to make collecting the rents as agent of the usufructuary under an agreement
necessary payment and repairs, and in that even the owner(s) with the latter.
shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property
concerned until the amount paid by him or them and the As long as the property is properly conserved and insured he can have
expenses of collection are fully covered thereby, afterwhich the no cause for complaint, and his right in that regard is fully protected by
usufructuary shall again collect the rents. the terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the court above
mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose
In 1945, Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and to sue when the
against Ngo Boo Soo, alleging that the latter had subleased the lessee fails to comply therewith, would be to place the usufructuary
property to another Chinese without consent and contrary to entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of having
agreement. The defendant answered, in part, that Fabie was a a certain indisputable right without the power to protect, enforce, and
mere usufructuary and has no authority to eject tenants. Juan fully enjoy it.
Grey intervened and sided with defendant.
BALURAN V Sps. Paraiso were the owners of a residential lot. On Antonio Obedencio is entitled to recover the possession of the residential lot.
NAVARRO Feb. 2, 1964, they executed an agreement entitled
“Barter” whereby they argreed to barter and exchange With the material ion being the only one transferred, all that the parties acquired
(1977) with Sps. Baluran their residential lot with the latter’s was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the property of
unirrigated riceland, under the following conditions: another. Under the document in question, Sps. Paraiso would harvest the crop of
1. That both parties shall enjoy the material the unirrigated riceland while the other party could build a house on the residential
possession of their respective properties. Sps. lot, subject, however, to the condition, that when any of the children of Natividad
Paraiso shall reap the fruits of the unirrigated Paraiso Obedencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall choose to reside in the
Riceland and Sps. Baluran shall have a right to municipality and build his house on the residential lot, Avelino Baluran shall be
build his own house in the residential lot. obliged to return the lot to said children "With damages to be incurred." Thus, the
2. In the event any of the children of Natividad mutual agreement — each party enjoying "material possession" of the other's
Obendencio, daughter of Sps. Paraiso, shall property — was subject to a resolutory condition the happening of which would
choose to reside in this municipality and build his terminate the right of possession and use.
own house in the residential lot, Sps. Baluran shall
be obliged to return the lot with damages. Usufruct may be constituted by the parties for any period of time and under such
3. Neither of the parties shall encumber, alienate, or conditions as they may deem convenient and beneficial subject to the provisions
dispose of the properties without the consent of the of the Civil Code on Usufruct. The manner of terminating or extinguishing the right

other.
In 1975, Antonio Obendencio filed a complaint for
recovery, claiming that he is the rightful owner of eh
residential lot, having acquired it from his mother
Natividad Obendencio, and that he needed the
property for the purpose of constructing his house
thereon.
5. Obligations of usufructuary
GABOYA V CUI Don Mariano Cui sold 3 of his lots to his children
(Rosario, Mercedes and Antonio) pro indiviso.
(1971) Because Rosario was unable to pay for her
corresponding share, the sale to her was cancelled
and her 1/3 share was returned to the vendor. In said
deed of sale, Don Mariano retained for himself the
usufruct of the property.
Rosario and Antonio applied for a loan to build a 12-
door commercial building on the property. Don
Mariano executed an authority to mortgage, with the
condition that the rents of said land shall always be
received by him.
The commercial building was built and Rosario and
Antonio received rents, from which they paid the loan
with.
Victoriano Reynes was appointed guardian of Don
Mariano’s properties. Reynes filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings seeking authority to collect
rentals from the lots in question, which was denied.
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of usufruct is primarily determined by the stipulations of the parties which in this
case now before Us is the happening of the event agreed upon. Necessarily, the
plaintiff or respondent Obedencio could not demand for the recovery of
possession of the residential lot in question, not until he acquired that right from
his mother, Natividad Obedencio, and which he did acquire when his mother
donated to him the residential lot on October 4, 1974.
With the happening of the resolutory condition provided for in the agreement, the
right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and each is entitled to a return of his
property. it is true that Natividad Obedencio who is now in possession of the
property and who has been made a party to this case cannot be ordered in this
proceeding to surrender the riceland. But inasmuch as reciprocal rights and
obligations have arisen between the parties to the so-called "barter agreement",
We hold that the parties and for their successors-in-interest are duty bound to
effect a simultaneous transfer of the respective properties if substance at justice is
to be effected.
The court held that the reserved usufruct was limited to the rentals of the land
alone. Had it been designed to include also the rents of the buildings intended to
be raised on the land, an express provision would have been included to that
effect, since in both the deeds of sale and authority to mortgage, the possibility of
such construction was clearly envisaged and mentioned.
The argument that the terms of the deed constituting the usufruct aren’t
determinative of the extent of the right conferred and that by law, the enjoyment of
rents of the building subsequently passed to the usufructuary, by virtue of NCC
571 was not accepted by the Court. It held that under the NCC articles on
industrial accession by modification on the principal land, such accession is
limited either to buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings constructed
by the owner of the land with materials owned by someone else. Nowhere in
these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the case of
landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself.
The limitations set by NCC 595 to the construction rights of the naked owner of
the land are evidently premised upon the fact that such constructions would
necessarily reduce the area of the land under usufruct, for which the latter should
be indemnified. This is precisely what the court a quo has done in sentencing the
appellee owners of the building to pay to the usufructuary a monthly rent of
P1,758.00 for the area occupied by their building, after mature consideration of
the rental values of lands in the neighborhood.
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6. Extinguishment of the usufruct

FAJARDO V Respondent, an owner-developer and
FREEDOM TO seller of low-cost housing, sold to
BUILD4 petitioner-spouses, a house and lot in
Marikina. The Contract to Sell contained a
(2011) Restrictive Covenant providing certain
prohibitions:
1. Easements – two meters in front.
2. Upward expansion – 2nd storey is not
prohibited but it must be placed
above the back portion of the house
and shouldn’t extend forward beyond
the apex of the original building
3. Front expansion – no unit may be
extended in the front beyond the line
as designed and implemented by the
developer.
Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it may be
correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of
buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can
also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use
his own property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden),
sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements.
Negative easement is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose
effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he
would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on the
use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are
reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject to
these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial sanction
to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on constructions
have been held to be valid stipulations.

Petitioner, despite repeated warnings, There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to
extended the roof of their house to the promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
property line and expanded the 2nd floor to
a point directly above the original front Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made
wall. Respondent filed an action to by one for whose benefit it is intended. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has no
demolish the unauthorized structures, right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been imposed. Thus, a
which was decided in their favor. developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots,
only if he retains part of the land. There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners -
that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is
precluded from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not the homeowners'
association, confirmed by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions
of the restrictive covenant.
ALBAR V Deceased Dona Rosario Fabie bequeathed the naked A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the building located on a
CARANDANG ownership of land in Ongpin and of the building and certain place includes the rentals on both the building and on the land on
improvements thereon to petitioners, and the usufruct thereof to which it is erected, because the building cannot exist without the land.
(1962) respondent. Because the improvements were destroyed during Hence, the usufruct isn’t extinguished by the destruction of the building,
the battle for the liberation of the City of Manila, the Philippine for under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the
War Damage Commission paid petitioners a certain sum of thing subject of the encumbrance.
money war damage. It was respondent, however, who paid the
real estate taxes due on the land for the years 1945 to 1954.

Petitioners filed an action to limit respondent’s usufruct to the

legal interest on the value of the land.

4
Nothing about usufructuary here. Must be under easements.