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NOVEMBER 2016

TURNING
POINT
A New Comprehensive Strategy
for Countering Violent Extremism

commission cochairs

Tony Blair & Leon Panetta


senior advisers and commissioners

Juan C. Zarate & Farah Pandith


authors

Shannon N. Green & Keith Proctor


A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism
NOVEMBER 2016

TURNING POINT
A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism

commission cochairs

Tony Blair & Leon Panetta


senior advisers and commissioners

Juan C. Zarate & Farah Pandith


authors

Shannon N. Green & Keith Proctor

A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism


About CSIS
For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy
challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bi-
partisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward
a better world.

CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The


Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars con-
duct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into
the future and anticipate change.

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral
Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American
prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962,
CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institu-
tions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transna-
tional challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and
economic integration.

Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees


in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J.
Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer
since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views ex-
pressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Disclaimer
II Members of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism
served in an advisory capacity. Their participation and listing herein
does not necessarily imply that they, or their institutions, subscribe indi-
vidually to each and every recommendation or finding in the report.

All photos by CSIS.

© 2016 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.


All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-4422-7978-0 (pb); 978-1-4422-7979-7 (eBook)


TURNING POINT

Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield


1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard
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Contents

IV Executive Summary

V Letter from the Cochairs

1 Introduction

11 Defining the Problem

25 A New Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism


III
55 Implementation

65 Commissioner Biographies

73 Acknowledgments

75 CSIS Contributors

77 Consultations 

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


Executive Summary the problem goes away. And we
cannot abandon our commitment
he United States lost nearly 3,000
to human rights and freedom of
lives in the devastating terrorist
expression in an attempt to quell
attacks of September 11, 2001.
violent extremism.
On that day, a problem that had
been slowly festering and barely Diminishing the appeal of extrem-
noticed in the West broke onto ist ideologies will require a long-
the world stage in a forceful and term, generational struggle. The
heart-wrenching way. United States and its allies must
combat extremists’ hostile and
Those events and many that would
apocalyptic world view with the
follow have prompted trillions of
same level of commitment that
dollars to be poured into military,
we apply to dealing with its violent
law enforcement, and intelligence
manifestations. We urgently need
operations. Yet the problem of
a new comprehensive strategy
violent extremism has grown
for countering violent extrem-
more severe and urgent. Despite
ism—one that is resolute, rests in
the many efforts to extinguish the
soft and hard power, and galva-
flames of violence, new and pow-
nizes key allies and partners from
erful extremist movements have
government, civil society, and the
taken root. Terrorist groups around
private sector.
the world have used technology,
the media, religious schools and It is time for the U.S. government
mosques, and word of mouth to and its allies to go all in to prevent
sell their twisted ideologies, justify the radicalization and recruitment
their violence, and convince too of a whole new generation. This
many recruits that glory can be is a problem that affects every-
IV found in the mass murder of inno- one. All segments of society must
cent civilians. pull together to defeat this global
scourge. Yet, they should not have
The spread of extremist ideologies
to do so alone. The U.S. govern-
and increasingly frequent terrorist
ment, its allies, especially from
attacks are stoking anxiety and
Muslim-majority countries, and
fear across the globe. Accord-
the private sector have an essential
ing to a survey conducted by
role to play—providing leadership,
the Commission on Countering
political support, funding,
Violent Extremism (CVE), people
and expertise.
are willing to try just about any-
thing to stop the bloodshed: from The Commission’s goal was to
military action to stronger border clearly articulate what the next U.S.
controls and mandatory iden- administration, in close collabora-
TURNING POINT

tification cards to relinquishing tion with governmental and non-


privacy and accepting constraints governmental partners, must do
on speech. The increasing poten- to diminish the appeal of extremist
cy and reach of terrorist groups— ideologies and narratives. The plan
and a sense that governments’ has eight major components:
response to the threat has been
1) Strengthening resistance to
inadequate—is creating deep po-
extremist ideologies: The
litical divisions and fueling support
international community must
for populist solutions.
forge a new global partnership
There are no easy solutions to this around education reform to stop
problem. Neither troops nor po- the teaching of extremist ide-
lice nor economic sanctions alone ologies in schools. At the same
can address this threat. We cannot time, we must redouble efforts
close our borders and hope that to enhance respect for religious
diversity, stem the spread of intolerance, and reinforce community
resilience to extremist narratives.

2) Investing in community-led prevention: Governments should


enable civil society efforts to detect and disrupt radicalization and
recruitment, and rehabilitate and reintegrate those who have suc-
cumbed to extremist ideologies and narratives. Community and civic
leaders are at the forefront of challenging violent extremism but they
require much greater funding, support, and encouragement.

3) Saturating the global marketplace of ideas: Technology compa-


nies, the entertainment industry, community leaders, religious voices,
and others must be enlisted more systematically to compete with
and overtake extremists’ narratives in virtual and real spaces. It is the
responsibility of all citizens to rebut extremists’ ideas, wherever they
are gaining traction.

4) Aligning policies and values: The United States should put hu-
man rights at the center of CVE, ensuring that its engagement with
domestic and foreign actors advances the rule of law, dignity, and
accountability. In particular, the U.S. government should review its
security assistance to foreign partners to certify that it is being used
in just and sustainable ways.

5) Deploying military and law enforcement tools: The international


community needs to build a new force capability and coalition to
quickly dislodge terrorist groups that control territory, avert and
respond to immediate threats, weaken violent extremists’ projection
of strength, and protect our security and the security of our allies
and partners. V
6) Exerting White House leadership: The next administration should
establish a new institutional structure, headed by a White House
assistant to the president, to oversee all CVE efforts and provide clear
direction and accountability for results. The Commission finds that
strong and steady executive leadership is essential to elevating and
harmonizing domestic and international CVE efforts.

7) Expanding CVE models: The United States and its allies and partners
urgently need to enlarge the CVE ecosystem, creating flexible platforms
for funding, implementing, and replicating proven efforts to address the

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


ideologies, narratives, and manifestations of violent extremism.

8) Surging funding: The U.S. government should demonstrate its com-


mitment to tackling violent extremism by pledging $1 billion annually
to CVE efforts, domestically and internationally. These resources are
meant to catalyze a surge in investment from other governments, the
private sector, and philanthropic community.

We can change the course of this threat. Doing so will require aligning
all of these pieces into a comprehensive strategy and investing in CVE
programs, partnerships, and policies at scale and over the next decade
or more.


Letter from the Cochairs We are at a turning point. Continu-
ing to address extremist ideologies
hroughout both of our careers,
sporadically and on the cheap
we have personally witnessed the
guarantees that terrorist attacks—
devastation wrought by violent
and the related bloodshed—will
extremism. The cost measures not
continue indefinitely. To defeat the
only in the lives lost, but also in the
scourge of violent extremism, the
profound toll it has taken on our
United States and its allies need a
sense of security, societal cohe-
new comprehensive strategy that
sion, and international norms and
has weight, is capable of building
values. Since September 11, 2001,
the right alliances, and can be a
efforts to combat terrorism have
practical guide for policymakers.
been far-reaching and mostly ef-
This report offers such a strategy,
fective in preventing another large-
so that nations, faiths, and cultures
scale, complex attack in the United
States. Yet, terrorist groups contin- can live in peace and stability with
ue to gain strength and spread to each other, and so that our citi-
new corners of the globe, threat- zens can live free from the fear of
ening to derail an entire generation terrorism that has taken the lives of
of Muslim youth and destabilize so many innocents.
every country on earth. Purpose and Process
Current approaches are insuffi- In the fall of 2015, CSIS president
cient to cope with this intensi- and CEO John J. Hamre asked us
fying threat. We urgently need a to chair a Commission that would
new paradigm—one that recog- produce an innovative CVE strate-
nizes violent extremism as the gy for the next U.S. administration.
global, generational challenge
that it is and leverages all tools This bipartisan Commission,
VI
available to defeat it. In this fight, managed by Shannon N. Green,
military and law enforcement senior fellow and director of the
solutions are essential. We will CSIS Human Rights Initiative, was
need to continue to take ter- composed of 23 public- and pri-
rorists off the battlefield, disrupt vate-sector leaders from technol-
plots, and safeguard our borders. ogy companies, civil society, the
But we will never eradicate the faith community, and academia.
violence caused by these groups Juan Zarate and Farah Pandith
until we defeat their ideologies. were central to this effort. Serving
as senior advisers and commis-
We must be clear-eyed about the sioners, they lent their tremen-
nature of the enemy. This Commis- dous expertise, historical knowl-
sion focused on terrorist organiza- edge, energy, and passion to
tions that claim the religion of Islam
TURNING POINT

shaping the Commission’s analysis


as their motivating source and to and recommendations.
justify their nefarious goals. Due to
their perversion of Islam and their Since its public launch in February
targeting of Muslims as both recruits 2016, the Commission met six
and victims, a peaceful and honor- times—in February, June, Septem-
able religion is under attack. This is ber, and November in Washing-
an ideological threat that requires a ton, D.C., in March in New York
confident and robust response from City, and in April in Silicon Valley—
the West and our Muslim allies. We and consulted with more than a
also need civil society and the pri- hundred experts and practitioners
vate sector to step up and challenge throughout the United States, Eu-
extremist narratives. The United rope, South Asia, Southeast Asia,
States must lead but cannot face this Africa, and the Middle East. The
challenge alone. Commission’s consultations were
augmented by extensive research
and a survey conducted in China,
“We urgently Egypt, France, India, Indonesia,
need a new Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
paradigm—one United States.
that recognizes The report generated through this
violent extremism process provides an actionable
blueprint for the next administra-
as the global,
tion on how to effectively com-
generational bat the growing blight of violent
challenge that it is extremism within the United States
and leverages all and abroad. We endeavored to
tools available to chart a clear path forward for the
incoming U.S. president, a way of
defeat it.” overcoming the deep divisions that
have plagued CVE efforts. Follow-
ing a diagnosis of the challenge,
the report outlines a comprehen-
sive strategy, combining bolstered
investments in soft power with
sustained military and law en-
forcement efforts. To implement
this strategy, the report calls for a
major infusion of resources, strong
and steady U.S. leadership, and
an expansion of public-private
partnerships to scale up proven
CVE interventions. Not all of the
commissioners agreed with every
recommendation in this report.
However, overall, this document
represents a consensus view of the
challenge that we face and how
best to combat it.

While the primary audience is the


U.S. government, we anticipate
that the ideas presented in the
report will also resonate with other
governments, the private sector,
and civil society. It is our sincerest
hope that this report leads to more
effective and robust CVE policies
and programs, ultimately helping
prevent future terrorist attacks and
giving individuals and communities
the tools they need to reject the
siren call of extremism.

cochairs

TONY BLAIR, Former Prime


Minister of the United Kingdom

LEON PANETTA, Former Director


of the Central Intelligence Agency
and Former Secretary of Defense
INTRODUCTION
ifteen years after September rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Vio-
11, 2001, violent extremism has lent extremists are even altering
spread, gained favor among a new the political landscape and erasing
generation, and now casts an ev- national borders, and in so doing,
er-larger shadow over the globe.1 destroying evidence of people,
From all corners of Africa to Eu- history, and cultures that threaten
rope, from the Caucasus to South their world view.2
and East Asia, from North to South
America, the threat of violent ex- The Nature of the Threat
tremism continues to evolve in real
A major political fault line for CVE
and virtual spaces, enticing thou-
has been what to call the threat
sands of recruits and inciting the
we are facing. Some argue vo-
sympathies of many more.
ciferously for using language like
In one day in February 2016 alone, “radical Islamic extremism” to de-
the Center for Religion and Geo- scribe the phenomenon and its
politics recorded terrorist incidents connection to Islam. Others argue
in Syria, suicide attacks in Camer- equally passionately that a lexicon
oon, roadside bombs in Somalia, that uses Islamic terms is deeply
the destruction of a girls’ school by problematic because it can cause
the Taliban in Pakistan, the ghast- confusion; alienate critical part-
ly decapitation of a Hindu priest in ners and allies; reduce complex
Bangladesh, the arrest of suspect- religious concepts to narrow, typ-
ed terrorists in Indonesia, Islamic ically negative associations with
State (ISIS) beheadings of alleged violence; and lend support to ter-
spies in Egypt, operations against al rorists’ claims to legitimacy.
Shabaab in Kenya, concerns about In determining what language to
al Qaeda-linked violence in Mali use throughout this report, the
2
and Burkina Faso, arrests in Rus- Commission was guided by three
sia connected with terrorism, and principles: 1) the need to be explicit
moves to overcome extremism and about the nature of the enemy and
establish peace in the Philippines. ideologies we are confronting at
The repercussions of violent ex- home and abroad; 2) the need to
tremism are acute and wide- appeal to partners who are instru-
ranging. Humanitarian crises, per- mental in advancing our common
secution of human rights defend- goals; and 3) the need to ensure
ers, destruction of sacred historical that we do not reinforce narratives
put forth by our adversaries.
and cultural sites, threats to reli-
gious diversity, eradication of ed- Therefore, throughout this report,
ucational and development gains, we use the general term “violent
and fear and insecurity in commu-
TURNING POINT

extremism” to refer to the subset


nities are all exacerbated by the of violent extremist organizations
spread of extremist ideologies. To- that claim the religion of Islam as
day’s catastrophic global refugee their motivating source and to jus-
and migrant crisis—resulting in an tify their nefarious goals, and the
unprecedented 65 million people term “extremist” to describe the
displaced—has largely been driv- ideologies and narratives deployed
en by state violence alongside the by these groups. Although there is

1
Tony Blair, former prime minister of the United Kingdom (remarks at “CSIS Com-
mission on Violent Extremism,” CSIS, Washington, DC, February 23, 2016, https://
www.csis.org/events/csis-commission-countering-violent-extremism.
2
Farah Pandith and Juan Zarate, “Winning the War of Ideas,” in Global Forecast
2016, ed. Craig Cohen and Melissa Dalton (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2015), https://
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151116_Co-
hen_GlobalForecast2016_Web.pdf.
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database.
Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

“Violent extremists are • Selectively using theology to while focusing on violent extrem-
legitimize violence and compel ists that claim to represent or draw
altering the political
“true believers” to target their inspiration from Islam, this report
landscape and erasing governments, Western powers, offers broader recommendations
national borders, and and even civilians. for addressing growing intolerance 3
in so doing, destroying The Commission focused its anal-
and hatred.
evidence of people, ysis and recommendations on
history, and cultures this form of violent extremism as The Origins of Extremist
that threaten their it presents the most immediate Ideologies
transnational and national security
world view.” threat to the United States, its allies,
Modern extremists’ world view did
not just appear out of the blue. It
and communities across the globe.
has been deliberately cultivated
Groups like ISIS, al Qaeda, Boko
and spread for many decades. As
Haram, the Taliban, and others are

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


great diversity among such violent many Arab and Muslim-majority
unique in their global ambition:
extremist groups, the general fea- states throughout the twentieth
they seek to reshape borders; de-
tures of their ideologies include: century transformed into secular
fine the identity and beliefs of Mus-
lims around the world; undermine military dictatorships, social move-
• A willingness to use force and ments of various stripes competed
international values; and normal-
violence to return society to “a to define the relationship of Islam
ize abhorrent behavior like human
pure form” of Islam and create slavery, rape, and wanton violence to the state. This precipitated the
their version of an ideal global against civilians. In pursuit of these emergence of Islamic religious
community; goals, violent extremists specifically ideologies designed to provide
target Muslims to fill their ranks and direction and morale to the faith-
• Declaring Muslims who do not ful in the form of highly charged,
incite conflict around the world.
share this vision as “unbelievers,” powerful oversimplifications.
subject to torture or death; The Commission noted that these
terrorist organizations do not op- Early on, the religious establish-

Appropriating Islamic texts, erate in a vacuum—they derive ment played a central role in try-
teachings, and traditions to jus- strength and momentum from ing to put forth a blueprint for so-
tify their rule and support their other extremist groups, includ- ciopolitical change. Clerics such
narratives; and ing on the right and the left. Thus, as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid
are committing an act worthy of
punishment. A recent study points
to these linkages. Of a hundred
prominent terrorists profiled, over
half associated with non-violent
extremist groups before joining
violent movements.3 In this light,
ignoring the intimate connection
between the ideology and violence
is a major strategic error.

Others contend that while violence


invariably played a role in early Is-
lamic movements’ programs, it
would be circumscribed by the fact
that they had to appeal to society
at large to gain acceptance. In this
view, violent extremism descends
from an entirely distinct artery of
Muslim activism. It begins with
the wholesale condemnation not
merely of Muslim-majority gov-
TONY BLAIR, COCHAIR ernments but of Muslim society
in general. The centrality of ex-
communication or takfīr to this
Rida, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, and Commissioners hold different per-
ideology can be seen in the name
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani sought spectives about the relationship
of one of its earliest representa-
to redefine the mission of Islam in between today’s violent extremist
tives: al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (Ex-
4 the modern world. These thinkers organizations and these early Is-
communicating and Dissociat-
thought primarily in terms of reli- lamic movements. Some commis-
ing from Modern Muslim Society).
gious and intellectual reform, not sioners draw a direct link between
According to Professor Sherman
organized resistance. Their call the Muslim Brotherhood and its ilk,
Jackson, renowned scholar of Is-
to arms was not jihad but ijtihād, arguing that contemporary terror-
lamic thought and culture and
the unmediated interpretation of ist groups like ISIS, al Qaeda, Boko
commissioner, this is the first step
Islamic scripture for the purpose Haram, and others are the logical
in justifying the most violent and
of freeing modern Muslims from outgrowth of their political agenda inhumane treatment of adversar-
medieval presuppositions they and intolerant world view. For these ies—as apostate traitors to the faith.
saw as holding Muslims back. commissioners, it is impossible to It also sustains these groups’ view
However, their failures, both real separate the ideology espoused by that they are the only true repre-
and perceived, saw them soon these groups and violence. The vi- sentatives of Islam, which they sell
outflanked by the rise of Islamic olence has its roots in extremists’ to potential recruits who are often
movements, such as the Muslim core belief that everything should
TURNING POINT

starving for absolution, belonging,


Brotherhood, the Jamaati Islami, be subordinated to their ideology or identity. On this logic, to oppose
and the Liberation Party (Hizb and that those who do not share these groups is presented as op-
al-Tahrīr). While not completely it are misguided and should be posing Islam itself. And not to op-
abandoning reform, these move- forced to accept it. For example, pose the West is to oppose these
ments assigned greater priori- the kidnapping of girls by Boko groups. In contrast to the religious
ty to acquiring political power. Haram has its roots in a far more establishment and earlier Islamic
They saw Muslim states’ abuse of widely shared view that women movements who viewed sharī‘ah,
power as the source of the prob- should be subordinate to men. The at least in theory, as serving soci-
lem and sought to bring about idea that cartoon makers should ety, contemporary violent extrem-
change outside of the system, by be killed has its roots in the belief ists tend to conceive of sharī‘ah as
force if necessary. that those who print such cartoons punitive retaliation against society.

Mubaraz Ahmed, Milo Comerford, and Emman El-Badawy, “Milestones to Militancy” (Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Centre on
3

Religion and Geopolitics, April 2016), http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Milestones-to-Militancy.pdf.


According to these commission-
ers, violent extremists’ pursuit of
political power is palpably different
from that of the earlier movements,
for they have little to no sense of
accountability to society at all. It is
from this artery (both ideologically
and in terms of actual personnel)
that later groups such as al Qaeda
and ISIS would descend.

Despite these differences, all of


the commissioners agree that vi-
olent extremism as we experience
it today took shape in the cruci-
ble of geopolitical and ideological
contestation through the second
half of the twentieth century. Sau-
di support of extremism began in
the 1960s as an effort to counter
the Arab nationalism championed
by Egyptian president Gamal Ab-
del Nasser. The strategy’s appar- LEON PANETTA, COCHAIR
ent success in helping contain
Nasserism encouraged segments course, Saudi Arabia doubled down, perhaps feeling
within the Saudi elite, who, in prop- compelled to demonstrate its religious legitimacy.6
agating extremist ideas, believed
they could control the beast.4 Earlier that year, a youth-led revolution in Iran
brought a clerical regime to power with its own 5
Yet, even the Saudis would not be transnational ideology, threatening to undermine
entirely spared the lethal effects of Saudi Arabia’s perceived hegemony over the faith.7
violent extremism. In November Tehran’s strategy of exporting revolution through its
1979, militant groups, led by rad- own roster of militant groups, notably Hezbollah,
ical Saudi preacher Juhayman al- would escalate the dangerous proxy war between
Otaybi, seized the Grand Mosque competing violent extremist groups.
in Mecca and declared the arrival
of the Madhi, or redeemer. A spec- The December 24, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
tacular, drawn-out hostage crisis changed the course of history. If Afghanistan proved

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


ensued. The “Siege of Mecca” was to be the graveyard of empires, it was also a prov-
a harbinger of terrible things to ing ground for a new generation of violent extremists.
come.5 The militants’ demands— Eager to contain communism, the United States and
the overthrow of the royal family, Saudi Arabia poured arms, money, and tactical assis-
ending oil exports to the West, and tance to Afghan and foreign fighters that flocked to
the imposition of an extreme inter- Afghanistan from all over the world. These militants
pretation of the sharī‘ah—foreshad- ground down the Soviets, perhaps hastening the end
owed Bin Laden’s demands 15 years of the Cold War, but their success also raised the pro-
later. However, in the aftermath file of an international extremist movement hostile to
of the siege, instead of changing Saudi Arabia and Western powers.

4
Zalmay Khalilzad, “‘We Misled You’: How the Saudis Are Coming Clean on Funding Terrorism,” Politico,
September 14, 2016, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/saudi-arabia-terrorism-fund-
ing-214241.
5
Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of
Al Qaeda (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
6
Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (New York: Routledge, 2007).
7
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2002).
GLOBAL TERROR ATTACKS SINCE 2012

6 Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

With the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in itary and intelligence actions as well as policing and
1989, a global terrorist network emerged. Under the defensive measures.
leadership of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda became
These measures, aimed at thwarting opportunities
the refuge for battle-hardened and highly motivated
militants from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda would become for terrorists to plan and execute complex attacks on
emblematic of a new breed of terrorism: transna- the homeland, included: hardening and expanding
tional, well-financed, savvy to the theatrical nature physical barriers around sensitive locations and crit-
of terrorist tactics, and focused less on Arab auto- ical infrastructure; improving security procedures and
crats than on the “far enemy.” The 1992 bombing in equipment, identity checks, and luggage screening at
Aden, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, airports; enhancing detection and screening process-
TURNING POINT

the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es es for cargo coming into the United States via sea-
Salaam, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all pre- ports, land border ports, and mail facilities; strength-
saged the tragedy of September 11.8 ening investigation and prosecution capabilities for
terrorism-related cases; tightening controls on peo-
September 11, 2001, and beyond ple entering the United States; and training personnel
to effectively implement these measures.
For much of the twentieth century, the spread of ex-
tremist ideologies went largely unchallenged by the More than 263 government entities were either cre-
West. The devastating terrorist attacks of September ated or reorganized in response to the September 11
11 brought the danger home to the United States, attacks.9 Chief among them were the Department of
prompting a response that has relied heavily on mil- Homeland Security (DHS), which integrated all or part

8
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
9
Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,” Washington Post, July 19, 2010, http://projects.
washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/.
of 22 different federal departments The massive human and financial
and agencies to create a more uni- resources devoted to security since
fied approach to safeguarding the September 11 have made us safer in
United States against terrorism, some respects. It is more difficult for
and the Transportation Security terrorists to get into the United States
Administration (TSA), which cen- and, if they do, harder for them to
tralized and standardized airport pull off a complex attack.13 However,
security. Intelligence cooperation as the U.S. government—and its al-
was bolstered by the Intelligence lies and partners—improved coun-
Reform and Terrorism Prevention terterrorism capabilities, terrorists
Act of 2004, which established the quickly moved to exploit gaps in
position of director of national in- the response. As David Kilcullen ex-
telligence and the National Coun- plains, these counterterrorism, law
terterrorism Center to integrate enforcement, and intelligence ef-
terrorism-related intelligence. forts imposed “strong evolutionary
pressure on terrorist organizations,”
Internationally, the United States
since a technique that worked once
invested vast sums on countering
was highly unlikely to work again, at
terrorism and building the capacity
least not in the same form.14 Terrorist
of partner security and intelligence
groups adapted by choosing softer
services. According to estimates,
targets, conducting less complicated
Congress has appropriated $1.6
attacks, and relying on decentralized
trillion to the Department of De-
cells and individual actors (so-called
fense (DOD) for war-related oper-
“lone wolves”), making it harder for
ational costs since September 11.
law enforcement to detect and dis-
When combined with an estimated
rupt plots. These groups have also
$123.2 billion for relevant State De-
become much more proficient at
partment and Foreign Operations,
using social media and modern dig- 7
the DOD, Department of State, and
ital technologies to target recruits,
U.S. Agency for International De-
build their brand and market share,
velopment (USAID) have received
and expand their reach globally. The
over $1.7 trillion for activities and
terrorist threat today is therefore
operations since the attacks.10 This
more atomized, pervasive, and chal-
is comparable to more than 10
lenging to counter than it was at the
years of federal funding for edu-
turn of the century.
cation. Likewise, intelligence bud-
gets have significantly expanded. In As a result, the methods the U.S.
2007, Congress appropriated $43.5 government has used in the past

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


billion to the National Intelligence to prevent large-scale terrorist at-
Program (NIP).11 Ten years later, the tacks will likely not be as effective
budget requested for the NIP rose in the future at preventing smaller
to $53.5 billion.12 decentralized attacks.

10
Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams, “Overseas Contingency Operations
Funding: Background and Status,” Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
11
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for
FY 2017 Appropriations Requested for the National Intelligence Program,” press
release, February 9, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releas-
es/215-press-releases-2016/1315-dni-releases-budget-figure-for-fy2017-appropri-
ations-requested-for-the-national-intelligence-program.
12
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for
National Intelligence Program,” press release, October 30, 2007, https://www.dni.
gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releas-
es/20071030_release.pdf.
13
Steven Brill, “Is America Any Safer?,” Atlantic, September 2016, http://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/.
14
David Kilcullen, Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror
(London: C. Hurst, 2015).
What expanded to address the structur-
al social, economic, and political
grievances that can be conducive
is “CVE”? to terrorist radicalization and re-
cruitment. CVE includes efforts to
shrink public support for violent
extremist movements; build the
resilience of local communities;
The field of countering violent
offer peaceful alternatives to po-
extremism emerged from a rec-
tential recruits; dissuade radical-
ognition that military and law en-
ized individuals from committing
forcement operations are essen-
criminal acts; and rehabilitate
tial to taking terrorists off of the
and reintegrate individuals who
battlefield and disrupting plots,
have either served their prison
but are insufficient for extinguish-
sentences or are otherwise no
ing the underlying ideologies and
longer deemed a security threat.
grievances that motivate scores
Though the precise definition and
of recruits to join violent extremist
boundaries are widely debated,
groups. The White House reflected
in essence, CVE encompasses a
this understanding in the 2006 Na-
spectrum of interventions aimed
tional Security Strategy. The Strat-
at preventing the recruitment and
egy defined its short-run goals as
radicalization of individuals into
“using military force and other in-
violent extremist organizations.
struments of national power” to cut
off terrorists’ activities and sourc-
es of support, while underscoring
that in the long run, success would The Need for a New
mean “winning the battle of ideas, Comprehensive Strategy
8 for it is ideas that can turn the dis-
enchanted into murderers willing Despite the security enhance-
to kill innocent victims.”15 ments made in the last 15 years,
the United States and its allies do
The competition of ideas would not yet have an effective strate-
eventually come to be known as gy, with broad bipartisan support,
CVE.16 CVE refers to the nonco- for undermining the appeal of ex-
ercive, longer-range tools de- tremist ideologies and narratives
ployed in an effort to counter and stemming recruitment and
extremists’ ideologies and narra- mobilization to terrorism. Pop-
tives, reducing their appeal and ulist figures on both sides of the
ultimately neutralizing the threat Atlantic have taken advantage of
of violence.17 Initially focused on this gap—and the fear created by
the ideological dimension, over terrorist attacks—to sell their own
TURNING POINT

time, the parameters of CVE have isolationist remedies. Yet, closing

15
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washing-
ton, DC: The White House, March 2006), 9, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/nss2006.pdf.
16
The U.S. government defines CVE as “efforts focused on preventing all forms of ideo-
logically based extremist violence, to include prevention of successful recruitment into
terrorist groups. It is distinct from disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of
terrorism by those who have already subscribed to violence.” See U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, “A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent
Extremism,” n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/US%20Govern-
ment%20Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
17
The term “preventing violent extremism,” or PVE, has gained traction, particularly within
the United Nations and European countries. For some, PVE suggests a more proactive,
longer-term effort to address the underlying conditions and root causes associated with
support for violent extremism, whereas CVE is more reactive. The Commission does not
see this distinction. For the purposes of this report, CVE is inclusive of preventative efforts
at the societal, community, and individual levels.
off our borders will not prevent extremist ideol-
ogies from taking hold and inspiring people to
commit horrific attacks using any means avail-
able. So long as individuals throughout the world
are attracted to violent extremist groups and the
revolutionary ideologies they espouse, we must
continue to use our military, intelligence, and law
enforcement capabilities to protect our safety.
Until we defeat the ideologies themselves, how-
ever, we will not achieve lasting security.

We need a new comprehensive strategy to address


the ideological battle with vigor, unity of effort,
and persistence over the next generation. Such a
strategy must focus on significantly reducing the
number of people worldwide who are drawn to
and recruited by violent extremist organizations
and ensuring that such groups and their ideolo-
gies cannot gain purchase in the United States and
around the globe.

Success will require undermining the appeal


and legitimacy of extremist narratives and offer-
ing meaningful alternatives to young people so
they do not turn to violent extremist movements
to find the meaning, belonging, and dignity they
seek. This strategy must leverage soft and hard
power approaches proportionally and enable the
international community to address extremist
9
ideologies and their manifestations directly, con-
sistently, and at scale—outpacing the efforts of
violent extremists.18 By necessity, such an effort
must appeal across the political spectrum and
attract diverse allies and partners from civil soci-
ety, the philanthropy community, and the private
sector. And it must engender strong leadership
from Muslim countries and communities, the vast
majority of whom have no sympathy for ISIS, al
Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization.

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


In this report, the Commission offers such a
comprehensive strategy, incorporating lessons
learned over the past decade and aligning all of
the programs, policies, and capabilities that will
be needed to transform the conditions and mind-
set that nourish violent extremist groups. This
strategy is based on the following principles:

18
Soft power refers here to the ability to shape the
preferences and choices of others through appeal and
attraction rather than by coercion (hard power). The
currency of soft power is culture, political values, and
foreign policies. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Publi-
cAffairs, 2004). Also Richard L. Armitage and Joseph
S. Nye Jr., cochairs, A Smarter, More Secure Ameri-
ca: Report of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), https://csis-prod.s3.am-
azonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/
pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf. Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
https://www.csis.org/analysis/
survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
JUAN C. ZARATE, SENIOR ADVISER AND COMMISSIONER

• Go all in. The United States and not sufficient. We must address
its allies must build an around- the spread of extremist ideolo-
the-clock operation to confront gies to Africa, Europe, South and
violent extremism, with the right Southeast Asia, the Caucuses,
personnel, financial support, and Russia, and elsewhere to prevent
10
accountability structures. To terrorist groups from regenerat-
date, CVE has been ad hoc and ing in new forms.
undervalued compared to the
military, law enforcement, and • Forge dynamic partnerships.
intelligence aspects of the fight. The nature of the enemy—
We must significantly increase decentralized, globalized, com-
the resources and attention ded- mitted, and crowdsourced—
icated to challenging extrem- requires intensive and adapt-
ists’ narratives and creating new able partnerships between and
pathways for those vulnerable to among governments, the private
radicalization and recruitment. sector, and civil society. This de-
mands more than sporadic en-
• Take a global approach. The gagements and pilot programs,
threat of violent extremism can
TURNING POINT

which have dominated the last


be found throughout the world. decade and a half. Instead, it re-
ISIS is the most recent and brutal quires harnessing the talent, ex-
manifestation of the problem— pertise, and ingenuity that exist
but certainly not the last if we do outside of government.
not change course. Even as it fo-
cuses on destroying ISIS in Syria • Embrace experimentation. Al-
and Iraq, the international com- though we have learned a great
munity must keep pressure on deal about how and why ex-
other terrorist groups, including tremist ideologies are appealing,
al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hez- terrorists’ tactics are constantly
bollah, and al Shabaab, which evolving. Therefore, rather than
continue to execute devastating searching for a single solu-
attacks. However, combating tion, we must flood the zone
existing terrorist organizations is with alternative narratives and
ideas, allowing the strongest to win. Programs will
not always be successful, but we must encourage
calculated risk-taking and innovation, and make a
more concerted effort to learn from practitioners’
successes and failures. Such an approach requires
careful monitoring to ensure that the process is not
captured by proponents of the very ideologies that
we are trying to defeat.

• Avoid reactions that play into violent extremists’


hands. Terrorism thrives on a disproportionate re-
sponse to perceived and real threats. ISIS, for ex-
ample, has an explicit aim of creating rifts between
governments and their people, as well as between
Muslims and non-Muslims in Western countries. At-
tacks provoke fear and often lead to a rise in anti-
Muslim sentiment, which terrorist recruiters then
exploit. A former al Qaeda recruiter in the United
States explained, “radicals and recruiters love Is-
lamophobia. It drives recruitment.”19 In the face of
this dynamic, it is important for governments to
avoid rhetoric and responses that estrange Mus-
lim communities. In the United States, such an
approach would necessitate redoubling efforts to
engage with Muslim communities and address their
concerns about stigmatization, surveillance, entrap-
ment, and hate crimes. Abroad, this tenet would
require the United States to convince its partners
to shun counterterrorism approaches that alienate
Muslim communities.

19
Shannon N. Green, executive director, CVE Commission, interview with Jesse
Morton, CSIS, June 23, 2016.

DEFINING
THE
PROBLEM
The unique challenges and oppor- This section addresses three
tunities facing Muslim youth, who questions:
are growing up immersed in so-
1. Why do some young people find
cial media in the post-September
extremist ideologies appealing?
11 world, make them a particular
target for violent extremist recruit- 2.
What kinds of factors have
ers. There are 1.6 billion Muslims in facilitated the spread of violent
the world today—a number that is extremism?
expected to grow to nearly 2.8 bil-
3. What shortcomings inhibit our
lion in 2050.20 This increase is due
ability to effectively confront vi-
to the youthful nature of the glob-
olent extremism, and replicate,
al Muslim population and fertility
scale, and sustain successful
rates that exceed the world’s aver-
interventions?
age. In the Middle East and South
Asia, nearly two-thirds of the pop-
ulation is younger than 30 and in- Motivations and Drivers
creasing rapidly. Violent extremism is not caused
by any single factor or grievance.
While the vast majority of Muslim
It grows out of an intolerant world
youth are peaceful and hopeful,
view in which violence is the pri-
tectonic cultural, political, and
mary medium of exchange and
social changes—brought on by
society is a means to an end. That
September 11 and its aftermath,
said, nearly 15 years of global re-
globalization, the erosion of tra- search has shed light on why some
ditional societies and influencers, people are attracted to violent
the rapid evolution of technology, extremism while others are not.
widespread displacement, and ur- Experts have identified intersect-
14 ban migration—have created an ing “push” and “pull” factors often
opening for violent extremists to operating within fragile, oppres-
shape their world view. These dy- sive, or conflicted-affected envi-
namics are expected to transform ronments that help to explain this
the trajectory of Muslim-majority phenomenon. Structural condi-
and non-Muslim majority coun- tions, including real and perceived
tries over the next few decades.21 marginalization, grievances, and
If we fail to act, we could lose an experiences of injustice or cor-
entire generation and see com- ruption, may push individuals into
munities and countries ripped joining a violent extremist organi-
apart. However, with concerted zation, while radical recruitment
action and resources behind the narratives, propaganda, and social
strategy proposed in this report, ties to extremist networks work to
we can dramatically reduce the pull them in. Psychological factors,
TURNING POINT

appeal of extremist ideologies such as impulsive, thrill-seeking


and enable youth to harness their behavior or a desire to exact re-
immense potential, advancing venge or right perceived wrongs,
prosperity, innovation, and peace are also thought to play a role in
within their societies. the radicalization process.22

20
Pew Research Center, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projec-
tions, 2010–2050: Muslims,” April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/
muslims/.
21
Kristin Lord, “Here Come the Young,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2016, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2016/08/12/here-comes-the-young-youth-bulge-demographics/.
22
Magnus Ranstorp, “The Root Causes of Violent Extremism,” RAN Centre of Ex-
cellence, January 4, 2016, 3, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_
root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf.
Unfortunately, radicalization models
cannot predict who will become a
terrorist. There is no single pathway
into terrorism and no archetypal vio-
lent extremist. Violent extremists are
not simply marginalized misfits. They
are no more likely to suffer from men-
tal illness than the average person.
Many are married and have children.
Contrary to popular perceptions, vi-
olent extremists are often well-off,
employed, and educated.23 Nor is vi-
olent extremism simply rooted in re-
ligious devotion.24 Religious fluency,
in fact, can help individuals challenge
extremist ideas and narratives.

In spite of the diversity of paths that


may lead a person to take up the
banner of violent extremism, there
does appear to be a common thread.
Throughout the world, many Muslim
millennials suffer from a profound
identity crisis. From Boston to Paris,
Nairobi to Dhaka, young Muslims are
struggling to find purpose and be-
longing and overcome an unshakable
sense of emptiness or “otherness.”25
Reflecting on conversations with
young Muslims in over 80 countries,
senior adviser to the CVE Commis-
sion and commissioner, Farah Pan-
dith explained, “they are question-
ing what it means to be modern and
Muslim in a globalized and intercon-
nected world.”26

23
Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist:
Economics and the Roots of Terrorism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2008); Eli Berman et al., “Do Working Men
Rebel? Employment and Insurgency in
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55, No. 4
(2011): 496–528.
24
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence, 3rd. ed. (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2003); Christopher
Paul, “How Do Terrorists Generate and
Maintain Support?,” in Social Science for
Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces To-
gether, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2009).
25
Shannon N. Green, managing director,
CVE Commission, phone interview with
Suhaib Webb, CSIS, August 31, 2016.
26
Shannon N. Green, managing director,
CVE Commission, interview with Farah
Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
Source: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/,
Chart titled “Projected Global Muslim Population, 2010 to 2050”
in Germany, for example, encoun-
ter an education system that forc-
es young people to choose their
course of study in their early teens,
disadvantaging those who are non-
native German speakers.30 In the
Netherlands, the Dutch word used
for individuals born outside the
country or with at least one parent
born outside the country, alloch-
toon, is often applied more broadly
to those who are nonwhite and not
“indigenous” to the soil. This usage
creates a second class of citizens,
including Muslims, who are labeled
as outsiders even if they were born
and have lived their entire lives in
FARAH PANDITH, SENIOR ADVISER AND COMMISSIONER the Netherlands.31 The response
from some Muslims in the West
Violent extremists provide seem- ty, they face systematic disenfran- has been to reject assimilation
ingly authentic answers to these chisement and injustice. Muslims and adopt an inflexible, unfavor-
questions, offering a way to rec- are often passed over for jobs able view of Western culture and
oncile religious identity and mo- simply because of their last name ideals.32 According to an individual
dernity and to find glory, redemp- or address.28 For example, a 2010 incarcerated in the United States
tion, or simply a way out of their study indicated that French Mus- for linkages to terrorism, “I was so
current situation. Joining a violent lims of Middle Eastern or North Af- bitter. I felt discriminated against as
extremist movement is, for many, rican descent were 2.5 times less an African American man in Amer-
16 an aspirational social act—an op- likely to receive a call back from ica, but also as a Muslim. I felt like
portunity to gain power, prestige, an interview than their Christian Muslims in America were being tar-
and status; to address the abuses counterparts.29 Moreover, Muslims geted as the enemies, and this ex-
suffered by their coreligionists; or are often physically separated from clusionary treatment led me to seek
to participate in a utopian effort to society, as seen in the banlieues, answers from the wrong people. I
remake the world.27 In this sense, a pejorative term for the impov- went down the wrong path.”33
violent extremists offer something erished and neglected neighbor-
This dynamic may be exacerbated
universally appealing: a chance to hoods on the outskirts of Paris.
in countries where the govern-
participate in an enterprise larger
The failure to integrate generations ment attempts to impose secu-
than one’s self.
of Muslim immigrants, particular- larism on its citizens, demanding
This search for identity plays out ly in Western countries, sends the that national identity take prece-
differently depending on one’s message that they will never be dence over religious or cultural
circumstances. In some countries truly accepted as equal and valued identity.34 These efforts can back-
TURNING POINT

where Muslims are in the minori- members of society. Immigrants fire. Banning religious dress or

27
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Scott Atran, CSIS, May 13, 2016.
28
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Peter Neumann, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
29
Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences in the United States of America 107, no. 52 (December 2010): 22384–22390, http://www.
pnas.org/content/107/52.toc.
30
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016; and Katrine Thom-
asen, “A Hard Look at Discrimination in Education in Germany,” Open Society Foundations, October 17, 2012, https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/hard-look-discrimination-education-germany.
31
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
32
Peter Skerry, “Problems of the Second Generation: To Be Young, Muslim, and American,” Brookings Institution, June 28, 2013,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/problems-of-the-second-generation-to-be-young-muslim-and-american/.
33
Courtney La Bau, interview with an individual whose name and location have been withheld, June 16, 2016.
34
Dan Bilefsky, “France’s Burkini Debate Reverberates Around the World,” New York Times, August 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/09/01/world/europe/burkini-france-us-germany-africa.html.
symbols, in a bid to preserve the dominant cultural iden-
tity, contributes to “us vs. them” narratives manipulated
“Joining a by violent extremists. Researchers have found that Fran-
violent extremist cophone countries, which have taken a particularly hard
movement is, line on questions of secularism and identity, have prov-
for many, an en to be fruitful recruiting grounds for ISIS.35 Of course,
Muslim-minority countries do not have a monopoly on
aspirational the ill treatment of Muslims. In many Muslim-majority
social act—an countries, minority sects experience unrelenting perse-
opportunity cution, from the Ahmadiyya of Pakistan to Iran’s Sufis to
to gain power, the Shi’a in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
prestige, In countries in which opportunity is lacking and injustice is
and status; prevalent, terrorist recruiters offer a way out. Studies have
to address found that a profound sense of injustice and alienation
from formal state structures can motivate young people to
the abuses join terrorist groups.36 There is also a significant correlation
suffered by their between gross human rights abuses—such as extrajudicial
coreligionists; killings, arbitrary detention, and policies undermining re-
or to participate ligious freedom—and a high incidence of terror attacks.
In fact, 92 percent of all terrorist attacks over the past 25
in a utopian years occurred in countries where state-sponsored politi-
effort to remake cal violence was widespread.37 As one former extremist in
the world.” London explained, “if you are living under a dictatorship,
people will look for an outlet because they are already fac-
ing injustice and inequality.”38

These environments are often also characterized by pov-


erty, un- and underemployment, and widespread corrup- 17
tion. Former Canadian extremist Mubin Sheikh noted that
“young men and women [in Africa] are getting compen-
sated to join groups like Boko Haram… these people are
getting jobs that they otherwise wouldn’t have access to
in such impoverished and corrupt regions. Boko Haram
has oil money, and they are using that money to lure peo-
ple in.”39 Frustrated expectations, combined with an un-
realistic assessment of risk—common among youth—can
create a dangerous cocktail when youth do not have the
means to shape their own future.

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


35
Gilles Kepel, “French Lessons in Londonistan,” National Interest,
no. 106 (March 2010): 42–52; William McCants and Christopher
Meserole, “The French Connection: Explaining Sunni Militan-
cy Around the World,” Foreign Affairs, March 24, 2016; Bibi van
Ginkel and Eva Entenmann, eds., “The Foreign Fighters Phe-
nomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies,”
ICCT Research Paper (The Hague: International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism, April 2016), https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-
in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf.
36
Keith Proctor, Youth & Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice
and Violence (Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2015, https://www.mer-
cycorps.org/sites/default/files/MercyCorps_YouthConsequences-
Report_2015.pdf.
37
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index,
2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (New
York: IEP, November 2015), http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.
38
Courtney La Bau, consultant, interview with an individual whose
name has been withheld, London, July 11, 2016.
39
Courtney La Bau, consultant, interview with Mubin Sheikh,
London, July 11, 2016.
SURVEY FINDINGS— cite human rights abuses and poverty. At a
secondary level, Western countries consid-

GLOBAL er anti-Western sentiment to contribute to


radicalization, with active recruitment men-
tioned in the United Kingdom and France. A
PERCEPTIONS lack of moderate religious guidance comes
out as a secondary influence in Indonesia,

OF VIOLENT Egypt, and India.

EXTREMISM RESPONSES TO DATE


Globally, half of those surveyed feel that
their government’s response to containing
and preventing violent extremism has been
inadequate. The response from the broader
To better understand public perceptions of vi- international community is also seen as in-
olent extremism, CSIS commissioned a global sufficient—by 64 percent of people polled.
survey with 8,000 participants in eight coun- Military and economic actions were over-
tries: China, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, whelmingly chosen as the most effective
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United tactics to counter violent extremism; how-
States. Participants were asked 65 questions ever, most respondents also suggested that
on the scope of violent extremism, motiva- military efforts to date had not worked. With
tions and drivers, responses to the threat, and the exception of China and Indonesia, 70
effective strategies to combat it. percent of those surveyed think extremists
are successfully promoting their ideologies
PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM and narratives using the internet (versus a
Overall, respondents said terrorism is the minority who feel the internet is being ade-
number one challenge facing their country. quately policed).
18 Two in three respondents think violent ex-
tremism is a “major” problem in their coun- EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES
try, led by Turkey, Indonesia, and France. Even FOR THE FUTURE
where the proportion dips below half, violent
Respondents were overwhelmingly sup-
extremism is still seen as being at least a “mi-
portive of a wide range of interventions to
nor” problem. In everywhere except China,
counter violent extremism. Although mili-
at least 75 percent of those surveyed expect
tary action and law enforcement strategies
a terrorist attack in the next year. Indeed, in
(e.g., ID cards and immigration controls) are
France, 60 percent think this is “very likely,”
at the top of the list, a significant majority of
a view shared by 45 to 50 percent in Turkey,
those surveyed support community-led ef-
Indonesia, and the United States. On a more
alarming note, a majority in every country forts and targeted, prolonged information
believes that it is likely that violent extremist campaigns to undermine extremists’ narra-
groups will acquire and use weapons of mass tives and ideologies. Seventy-five percent of
TURNING POINT

destruction in their lifetime. Despite wide- survey participants think that social media
spread anxiety about the terrorist threat, 73 platforms can be used effectively to amplify
percent of respondents believe that the chal- positive messages. Respondents were also
lenge of violent extremism is solvable. open to cultural influencers, such as Holly-
wood, Bollywood, music and fashion icons,
and sports figures, playing a greater role in
MOTIVATIONS AND DRIVERS
contesting extremist propaganda. Howev-
Views on motivations for violent extremism er, when asked who are the most credible
are divided between Muslim-minority and
messengers, respondents defaulted to reli-
Muslim-majority countries. In every country
except for Turkey and Egypt, “religious fun- gious leaders in all countries. Finally, while
damentalism” is identified as the primary root 64 percent of survey respondents believe
cause of violent extremism. In Turkey, mili- that religious schools sometimes play a role
tary actions by foreign governments are per- in radicalization, 80 percent say that they are
ceived to be the main driver, while Egyptians an important part of the solution.
The Recruitment Process Former extremists interviewed Shabaab have long relied on per-
by the Commission emphasized sonal connections to facilitate re-
Charismatic recruiters fuse local
the importance of making a hu- cruitment.41 Indeed, social ties and
grievances, both real and per- man connection when recruiting. personal relationships may help
ceived, with emotion to fill their Individuals rarely graduate from explain why some extremists cross
ranks. Recruitment tends to pro- passively consuming propaganda into violence while others do not.
ceed in two phases. First, they cast to active support without direct For instance, one study estimates
a wide net, using general griev- engagement from a third party. that peer-to-peer recruiting ac-
ance narratives to attract sympa- Recruiters provide the personal counts for more than 80 percent
thizers and potential supporters. touch, showering potential recruits of ISIS recruits.42
Then, local and online recruiters with attention and supplying criti-
Social media is not the cause of
methodically monitor what po- cal information about how to con-
violent extremism, then, but a
tential sympathizers are saying tribute to the extremist cause.40
powerful amplifier and accelerant.
in their social circles and online, Evidence suggests that recruit- Digital platforms and increased ac-
evaluate their economic oppor- ers are more successful when cess to smart phones and internet
tunities, and assess their mental they have strong social, familial, connectivity help facilitate radical-
state, looking for some weakness or business ties with their target. ization and recruitment. Accord-
to exploit. al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al ing to CIA director John Brennan,

40
Shannon N. Green, “Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda,” CSIS Commentary, September 25,
2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-narrative-countering-violent-extremist-propaganda.
41
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
42
Scott Atran, “ISIS Is a Revolution: All World-Altering Revolutions Are Born in Danger and Death, Brotherhood and Joy. How
Can This One Be Stopped?,” AEON, December 15, 2015, https://aeon.co/essays/why-isis-has-the-potential-to-be-a-world-
altering-revolution.

Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism


https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
THE TACTICS
Interviewees predicted that the military cam-

FUTURE paign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq and im-


proved law enforcement and intelligence ef-

OF THE
forts aimed at foreign fighters will cause them
to increasingly focus on domestic attacks. As
such, homegrown extremists will become a
THREAT bigger threat. Terrorist groups are also likely to
continue the evolution toward attacks plotted
and executed by small groups or individuals,
against soft targets, using less sophisticated
In developing its recommendations, the and easy-to-acquire weapons. Such attacks
Commission considered how extremist ide- do not require extensive training, planning, or
ologies are manifesting today and what coordination, making them harder to detect,
the landscape may look like for the next 10 but no less lethal.
years. The strategy in this report is forward-
looking and meant to guide CVE efforts over SOCIAL MEDIA USE
the next decade. This forecasting is based on Violent extremists’ use of social media is also
interviews with former extremists, research- predicted to evolve. According to interview-
ers, youth, policymakers, and CVE practi- ees, to escape surveillance and account sus-
tioners across the United States, Europe, the pensions, terrorists are moving onto private,
Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and expertise encrypted platforms like WhatsApp and Tele-
drawn from commissioners themselves. gram and have experimented with smaller
social media platforms including Friendica,
THE FUTURE Diaspora, KIK, WICKR, and the Russian version
20 The Commission posits that the future of ter- of Facebook, VKontakte. However, industry
rorism is likely to be marked by growing com- experts expect that Twitter, Facebook, and
petition among terrorist networks; more fre- YouTube will remain important because they
quent but less complex attacks; and a wider offer unrivaled outreach opportunities.
array of recruits. The terrorist threat is likely to
morph in ways yet unimagined. CVE efforts PROFILE OF RECRUITS
must therefore anticipate a future that features Experts suggest that violent extremist groups
new technologies, infrastructure, and innova- will likely diversify their recruitment pool,
tion used by us as well as by violent extremists. reaching out increasingly to women and old-
er and younger generations. According to a
RESURGENCE OF AL QAEDA Nigerian CVE practitioner, “they will try to re-
The majority of those interviewed expect a re- cruit women and older men, because security
surgence of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Experts agencies are currently focusing much more
TURNING POINT

point out that once ISIS is defeated militarily, attention on young people.” Terrorists have
those drawn to its ideology will seek a new already started recruiting children in their pre-
home, which will likely be al Qaeda. As one in- teens—a trend that is likely to accelerate. Ex-
terviewee stated, “al Qaeda is playing the long perts also predict that the presence of women
game. ISIS has only released seven videos in high-profile roles as supporters, mobilizers,
during this past Ramadan, where al Qaeda has and members of terrorist groups will continue
released 300 videos.” Several people noted to be a key feature of the future landscape. Fi-
that al Nusra Front (which recently changed nally, interviewees emphasized that converts
its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) stands to are highly susceptible to radicalization, as
gain significantly as ISIS is degraded. Accord- the conversion process dramatically chang-
ing to interviewees, al Nusra Front has been es one’s life and dismantles existing social
steadily planting roots and gaining support networks and relationships, allowing violent
throughout Syria, offering a more moderate extremists to manipulate them into believing
form of governance than ISIS. warped interpretations of Islam.
the internet provides violent ex-
tremist groups with tools to “co-
ordinate operations, attract new
recruits, disseminate propaganda
and inspire sympathizers across
the globe.”43 Violent extremists’ ex-
ploitation of digital platforms allows
would-be terrorists to seek inspira-
tion and information online—and
rally around a terrorist group as a
brand, an idea, or a methodology—
without ever leaving their homes.44
The widespread use of social me-
dia has also made violent extrem-
ists’ plans more difficult to disrupt.
Security agencies have to track
a much larger number of poten- AHMED ABBADI, COMMISSIONER
tial plotters, giving terrorists more
space to plan large, complex oper- collapse. It seems, then, that violent feed their “us versus them” narra-
ations against a higher background extremism arises out of conflict and tive. Similarly, the invasions of Iraq
level of activity.45 disorder as much as it contributes and Afghanistan have manufac-
to these conditions.47 tured the grist for extremist propa-
ganda about the “crusading West.”
Enabling Environments For many youth in the Middle East This plays along sectarian lines as
and North Africa, marginalization well. The Iranian nuclear deal an-
Socioeconomic, cultural, and tech-
and powerlessness were dramat- imates conspiracy theories about
nological shifts have contributed to
ically accelerated by the disap- a U.S. agenda to keep Sunni Arabs
increasingly complex and contest-
pointments of the Arab Spring. fractured and weak. For some, the
ed environments, creating open- 21
Throughout this region, the Arab United States’ refusal to engage
ings for extremist ideologies to take
Spring saw a generation find its militarily in Syria against the Assad
root. The dimensions of this chal-
lenge should be addressed in turn: political voice only to be silenced. regime proves Washington’s cal-
More than five years later, the lousness to the mass suffering of
Widespread violence—whether per- promise of liberal democracy has Sunnis. Terrorist recruiters hold up
petrated by the state or the result faded, while the appeal of other these examples as evidence that
of civil conflicts—creates environ- ideologies, such as Arab national- the West is at war with Islam and
ments conducive to radicalization. ism and political Islam, has dimin- that Muslims will never truly be
The 2015 Global Terrorism Index ished. These factors have ceded valued by Western countries.
identified two factors closely asso- the ideological space to more in-

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


ciated with terrorist activity: political tolerant and violent currents.48
violence committed by the state and
Assessing Efforts to Date
the existence of a broader armed Geopolitical conditions create nar- The multifaceted nature and
conflict. Eighty-eight percent of ratives that violent extremists are scope of violent extremism today
terrorist attacks in 2015 occurred in able to manipulate to win popular presents a profound challenge to
countries embroiled in conflict.46 In sympathy. The generations-long current strategies. Extremist ideas
such environments, terrorist groups conflict in Israel and Palestine pro- threaten to draw in an entire gen-
are able to take advantage of the vides a ready flashpoint for ter- eration that is exasperated with the
chaos and vacuum created by state rorist propagandists who use it to status quo and seeks to change

43
“CIA Director Brennan: Social Media Makes It Harder to Fight Terror,” NBC News, March 13, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/isis-terror/cia-director-brennan-social-media-makes-it-harder-fight-terror-n323151.
44
Kilcullen, Blood Year, 120–123.
45
Ibid.
46
IEP, Global Terrorism Index, 2015, 4.
47
International Crisis Group, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Brussels: International Crisis Group, March
2016), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf.
48
Ibid.
22
TURNING POINT

Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism


https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
it—through revolutionary or violent means if neces- approach and focusing on prevention. In large part
sary. Developing an effective response requires that because law enforcement agencies have led domes-
we first appreciate the conceptual, organizational, tic CVE efforts, many Muslim activists in the United
and resource shortcomings that have hindered CVE States perceive CVE as a cover for counterterrorism
endeavors to date. operations. They argue that it has resulted in secu-
ritizing their relationship with the government, stig-
Conceptual Challenges matizing entire communities, and coaxing youth into
Successive U.S. administrations, foreign governments, committing criminal acts that they would not have
and other actors have devoted considerable resourc- without external influence.
es trying to understand and respond to violent ex-
Globally, there is momentum behind a broad, devel-
tremism. From the beginning, these efforts have been
opmental approach to prevent violent extremism.
stymied by a host of conceptual challenges:
The UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action on Pre-
• U.S. policymakers have severely underestimated the venting Violent Extremism epitomizes this thinking,
allure of violent extremism, which has constrained the offering a comprehensive approach for addressing
allocation of funding and manpower to deal with it. the underlying conditions that make individuals vul-
nerable to radicalization and recruitment. Yet, it too
• Successive U.S. administrations have failed to pro-
has its critics. Human rights groups have expressed
vide leadership and vision for addressing the ideo-
concern that it risks securitizing and contaminating
logical dimension of the threat.
development and peacebuilding efforts and sug-
• The U.S. government has struggled with how to gests that governments’ human rights obligations
tackle an ideology that “hides” within Islam without are subordinate to CVE. Academics and practi-
getting entangled in issues of religious interpreta- tioners have argued that taking such an expansive
tion or alienating Muslims. approach will not result in a decline in support for
violent extremist groups, as it conflates many dif-
• U.S. policymakers have viewed violent extremism as
ferent types of threats and responses. Some foreign
either a phenomenon contained to the Middle East
governments, particularly those in the Middle East,
or to a specific group, rather than the global, gen-
have complained that CVE efforts ignore the impact
erational struggle that it is today. 23
of U.S. and Western foreign policy and military ac-
• Government actors have tended to separate do- tion on support for violent extremism. Finally, civil
mestic and international CVE efforts, although in society actors have criticized the U.S. government’s
the era of social media, ideology clearly does not inconsistency in speaking out about the backslid-
recognize borders. ing, hypocrisy, and abuses of corrupt regimes, who
are often counterterrorism partners.
• Proponents and practitioners of CVE are not uni-
fied in their efforts. There is no consensus on the As a result of this polarization, many key actors, in-
basic parameters or goals for the field—how to de- cluding the private sector, philanthropic community,
fine CVE, or violent extremism for that matter; how nongovernmental organizations, religious leaders,
to target, sequence, and calibrate efforts; whether pop culture icons, and others have failed to mobilize

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


and how to synchronize CVE initiatives with intel- around CVE the way they have to address other major
ligence, military, and law enforcement efforts; and global crises like climate change, HIV/AIDS, or traf-
how to measure success. ficking in persons.

• Researchers are still seeking definitive answers re- Organizational and Funding Challenges
garding the radicalization process, the most salient
Political leaders often speak of their commitment to
drivers and how those drivers interact with each
“win the battle of ideas,” particularly after high-profile
other and the environment in which radicalization
attacks, but no consensus has emerged on the strate-
occurs, and the most effective strategies for break-
gies, resources, tools, and partnerships needed to ef-
ing the cycle of radicalization and recruitment.
fectively counter extremist ideologies and narratives.
• Civil society actors are unclear about whether violent The following organizational, operational, and fund-
extremism is primarily a military and law enforcement ing challenges have hindered a coherent response:
challenge—to which they have little to contribute—
• Coordination within government. To date, U.S.
or a social, political, and economic problem.
government efforts to deal with violent extrem-
Persistent controversy has hindered CVE efforts, par- ism have been fragmented. There has been in-
ticularly in the United States, obscuring the original sufficient coordination across government silos—
purpose of moving away from a purely securitized international and domestic, civilian and military,
law enforcement and social There are several forums for information sharing,
service delivery. As a result, ef- notably the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF),
forts to respond to the array of which brings together experts and practitioners
challenges facing Muslim com- from around the world to share expertise and de-
munities in the United States or velop tools and strategies on combatting terror-
align diplomatic, development, ism. Through its CVE Working Group, GCTF is also
and strategic communications supporting the development of national CVE action
initiatives overseas have suf- plans. However, the exchange of best practices has
fered. The creation of the inter- been sporadic and is often at too senior of a level
agency CVE Task Force—hosted to sustain and benefit those actually responsible for
by DHS with overall leadership implementing CVE policies or programs. In addition,
provided by DHS and the De- these forums do not typically focus on stemming
partment of Justice (DOJ)—and the spread of extremist ideologies and narratives.
the Bureau of Counterterrorism The United States needs to strengthen mechanisms
and Countering Violent Extrem- for collaboration, at multiple levels, with key allies
ism at the Department of State throughout the world, specifically geared toward
to coordinate CVE efforts do- reducing the appeal of violent extremism.
mestically and internationally,
• Collaboration with nongovernmental partners.
respectively, are steps in the
There is incredible room for innovative partnerships
right direction. However, public
to counter violent extremism and its manifestations;
diplomacy and messaging ef-
this is because CVE requires engagement with a
forts led by the Global Engage-
broad range of stakeholders. However, to date, pub-
ment Center fall outside both
lic-private partnerships and private-private partner-
of these structures. Even more
ships have been characterized by ad hoc or hastily
problematically, responsibility
assembled coalitions. Technology sector represen-
at the National Security Coun-
tatives, entertainment industry executives, and civil
cil (NSC) is diffuse and unclear.
society leaders complain of erratic outreach, broad
24 There are currently three sep-
statements of interest in collaboration with few con-
arate directorates at the NSC,
crete asks, and little follow-through from U.S. gov-
in additional to other regional
ernment officials. Developing meaningful, sustain-
and functional directorates, that
able, long-term partnerships will require rebuilding
are responsible for some aspect
trust between the government and partner commu-
of CVE, and they report to dif-
nities and better defining the scope of collaboration.
ferent deputy national securi-
ty advisers. Unified leadership • Measurement. Political leaders and Congressional
and commitment starting at the appropriators have largely focused on the issues
White House is needed to lever- that can be measured. The number of terrorists
age all relevant assets and en- killed or the number of troops deployed fit into
hance accountability for results. metrics that more easily satisfy government over-
sight bodies. Accountability and results are import-
• International cooperation with
ant. However, the old dictum of “what gets mea-
other governments. Many of
TURNING POINT

sured gets done” can unfortunately distort the kinds


our partners and allies have pi-
of interventions implemented. Long-term efforts to
oneered promising CVE efforts
stop cycles of radicalization and recruitment resist
in their own countries, includ-
quantification, requiring greater patience and more
ing on the emerging challenge
creative ways of assessing attitude and behavioral
of deradicalizing, rehabilitating,
changes over time.
and reintegrating fighters that
are returning from conflict zones • Funding. Despite the rhetorical commitment to
or those whose prison sentenc- preventing and countering violent extremism over
es for terrorism-related crimes the past decade, programmatic resources for the
are coming to an end. While we effort have failed to materialize. Within the U.S.
are still seeking to evaluate the government, the Office of Community Partner-
impact of these programs, the ships at DHS, charged with liaising with and sup-
U.S. government can and should porting the work of local partners, has a mere $10
benefit from their experiences. million in FY 2016 for grant programs and roughly
$3 million for staffing and other operational expenses. This in com-
parison to the $2 billion that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
spent in FY 2016 on counterterrorism investigations alone or the $7.3
billion at the TSA’s disposal in FY 2016.

The resources available for international efforts are similarly lacking. Al-
though precise figures are hard to come by given the definitional chal-
lenges mentioned earlier, State and USAID had roughly $100 million to
$150 million in FY 2016 for CVE programming and staffing. The adminis-
tration requested $187 million for international CVE efforts in its FY 2017
budget (nearly double the FY 2015 request),although convincing Con-
gress of the merits of investing in preventative efforts remains an uphill
battle.49 Even marshaling the resources to fully respond to the human-
itarian fallout from Syria has been difficult. The United States has con-
tributed $5.9 billion to support Syrian refugees and internally displaced
persons since 2011—and that barely scratches the surface of the need.50
In contrast, the United States spends over $50 billion annually on intel-
ligence efforts and nearly $60 billion a year for defense activities related
to combatting terrorism.51

All told, U.S. expenditures for “soft power” initiatives to confront ex-
tremist ideologies, domestically and abroad, total roughly 1/10th of 1
percent of the resources dedicated to military, law enforcement, and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism.

Outside of the U.S. government, the picture is equally bleak. Attempts to


get the private sector and foundations to fund CVE have been very disap-
pointing, largely because of concerns about working on issues linked to
25
counterterrorism and being perceived as agents of the U.S. government.
Some companies and foundations are stepping up to support local ef-
forts, and the technology sector has piloted several promising initiatives
to combat hate speech with positive speech.52, 53 Yet, significant funding
shortfalls severely restrict the ability of credible community and civil soci-
ety actors to mobilize against violent extremists and confront them with
the flexibility, consistency, and strength required.

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


49
Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Alex Tiersky, “FY2017 State, Foreign Op-
erations and Related Programs Budget Request: In Brief,” Congressional Research
Service, February 19, 2016, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc824741/
m2/1/high_res_d/R44391_2016Feb19.pdf
50
U.S. Department of State, “Syrian Refugee Response,” http://www.state.gov/j/prm/
policyissues/issues/refugeeresponse/.
51
Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams, “Overseas Contingency Operations
Funding: Background and Status,” Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
52
Matt Weinberger, “This CEO Barely Survived the 2008 Market Crash—Now His
Startup Has 400 Million Users, and It's Going Head-to-Head with Facebook,” Busi-
ness Insider, March 20, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/anchorfree-ceo-da-
vid-gorodyansky-interview-2016-3; Andy Greenberg, “Google’s Clever Plan to Stop
Aspiring ISIS Recruits,” Wired, September 7, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/09/
googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/.
53
For example, in Minneapolis, local companies have committed $2 million to sup-
port CVE efforts. These resources came about largely because of the persistent
efforts of the U.S. attorney and the severity of the challenge in that city.
A NEW
COMPREHENSIVE
STRATEGY
TO COUNTER
VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
he United States and its allies need jection of strength, and protect
a new, comprehensive strategy to our security and the security of
counter violent extremism. A reli- our allies and partners.
ance on fighting terrorists abroad
These five strategic elements
so we do not have to face them
encompass activities that are
on our soil may be effective in
CVE-specific and those that are
the short term but will fail in the
CVE-relevant. CVE-specific refers
long term if we do not significant-
to measures designed to prevent
ly weaken the appeal of extremist
violent extremism in a direct, tar-
ideologies and narratives.
geted fashion, such as interven-
A new strategy to prevent and ing with someone drawn to ex-
counter violent extremism must: tremist ideologies. By contrast,
CVE-relevant measures are more
1)
Strengthen resistance to ex-
general, intending to reduce vul-
tremist ideologies: Forging a new
nerability to extremism in an in-
global partnership around educa-
direct way.54 CVE-relevant efforts
tion reform and expanding efforts
are primarily advanced through
to enhance respect for religious
education, development, human
diversity, stem the spread of intol-
rights and governance programs,
erance, and reinforce community
and youth initiatives.
resilience to extremist narratives.
This strategy seeks to plug the
2)
Invest in community-led pre-
gaping holes in the United States’
vention: Enabling civil society
current efforts and amplify what is
efforts to detect and disrupt rad-
working. It is focused on actions
icalization and recruitment, and
that the U.S. government should
rehabilitate and reintegrate those
take, in partnership with key stake-
who have succumbed to extrem-
28 holders, in the United States and
ist ideologies and narratives.
abroad. Implemented together, at
3)
Saturate the global market- scale and with the right partners,
place of ideas: Mobilizing tech- these elements will have a signifi-
nology companies, the enter- cant impact on reducing the reach
tainment industry, community and regeneration of violent ex-
leaders, religious voices, and tremist groups.
others to compete with and
overtake violent extremists’ nar- 1. STRENGTHENING
ratives in virtual and real spaces.
RESISTANCE
4) Align policies and values: Put- TO EXTREMIST
ting human rights at the center IDEOLOGIES
of CVE and ensuring that U.S.
Violent extremists seek to impose
engagement with foreign part-
TURNING POINT

their vision of religion and gov-


ners advances the rule of law,
ernance on society, by force if
dignity, and justice.
necessary. For over a generation,
5)
Deploy military and law en- private donors in the Gulf and
forcement tools: Building a new elsewhere have contributed to
force capability and coalition to the spread of extremist ideologies
quickly dislodge terrorist groups by funding mosques, schools, and
that control territory, avert and various types of media that reject
respond to immediate threats, local religious, cultural, social, or
weaken violent extremists’ pro- political customs or understand-

Peter Romaniuk, Does CVE Work?: Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to
54

Counter Violent Extremism (Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Secu-


rity, September 2015), http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf.
Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
ings that contradict their own. In dismantle funding to groups that
addition to fueling sectarianism spread extremist ideologies and
and violence in the Middle East narratives without undermining “A reliance on
and North Africa, we see the in- support for legitimate, peaceful civ- fighting terrorists
fluence of these ideologies in set- il society and charitable actors who abroad so we do
tings as diverse as North America, are instrumental for CVE efforts.
South and Southeast Asia, Central
not have to face
Asia, Europe, the Horn of Africa,
A starting point is for partner na- them on our soil
tions to identify and openly dis-
and the Sahel. may be effective
cuss the most pernicious forms of
To strengthen societal and indi- incitement to violence, which are in the short term
vidual resistance to extremist ide- often combined with recruitment but will fail in the
ologies, the United States and its and material support for terrorism. long term if we do
allies should: In UN Security Council Resolution not significantly
1624, the international communi-
• Stem the export of extremist ide-
ty affirmed that every country has
weaken the appeal
ologies. Financial support for ex- of extremist
an obligation to curb incitement
tremist ideologues and groups
must be curtailed, without jeopar-
to terrorist violence. This resolu- ideologies and
dizing funds to legitimate, peace-
tion also provides a framework for narratives.”
reconciling that duty with interna-
ful civil society organizations.
tional law, particularly international
• Inculcate respect for diversi- human rights law, refugee law, and
ty and tolerance. The United humanitarian law.
States and its allies must work
Governments bear the prima-
together to ensure that edu-
ry responsibility for taking action
cation systems and materials
against offending individuals, or-
do not contribute to the intol-
ganizations, or institutions with-
erant attitudes, “us versus them”
30 in their borders. To support these
narratives, and prejudices that
fuel violent extremism. efforts, the United States and its
allies should provide technical as-
• Reinforce local resilience. Com- sistance to ensure that responses
munities and individuals that are address the source of the problem
able to resolve conflicts peace- without negatively affecting indi-
fully, have a strong group identi- viduals and civil society organiza-
ty or sense of self, and have op- tions operating legally and peace-
portunities to interact with each fully. If the host country does not
other positively are better able take concrete steps to rein in ne-
to resist extremist entreaties. farious actors, the international
These protective factors should community should consider pu-
be reinforced. nitive measures such as freezing
of assets, visa and travel bans, and
TURNING POINT

Stemming the export of criminal actions for material sup-


extremist ideologies port to terrorist activity.

Much of the ideology that animates The international community


violent extremist movements has must also help remediate the im-
been resourced and inspired by in- pact of decades of proselytization
dividuals and organizations based on affected countries. Such coop-
within allied countries. A genera- eration could involve reinforce-
tion of funding, flowing from Sau- ment of local cultures and tra-
dis, Qataris, Kuwaitis, and others, ditions that run counter to more
has helped foster a world view hos- extreme or foreign belief systems,
tile to religious, cultural, social, and exchange of best practices in mit-
political diversity, creating fertile igating the negative impact of ex-
ground for violence. Partner gov- tremist ideologies and narratives,
ernments must deter, disrupt, and and the development of programs
designed to curb intolerance,
sectarian tensions, and other re-
lated problems stemming from
extremism. Governments should
also initiate dialogue with grass-
roots actors to better understand
the circumstances and challeng-
es local communities and institu-
tions are facing.

Of course, CVE cannot be an ex-


cuse for cracking down on reli-
gious expression, political oppo-
sition, or civil society. Consistent
with international principles, gov-
ernments should take focused and
proportionate action against only
those organizations identified to
NANCY LINDBORG AND MOHAMED MAGID, COMMISSIONERS
be at risk. Moreover, steps taken
to shut down charitable organi-
zations or financial institutions for cation is central to shaping world Therefore, a comprehensive CVE
funding terrorism should be com- views, promoting citizenship, and strategy must include programs
plemented by organized charita- bridging ethnic or sectarian di- that enhance understanding of
ble backfill—by governments and vides. Conversely, a paucity of different religions and cultures
the non-profit community—and knowledge and understanding and defend the human rights and
financial access—provided by the about other faiths and cultures can dignity of all persons. These val-
international and regional finan- make individuals more susceptible ues should be taught and rein-
cial communities—to replace any to extremist narratives.55 For ex- forced for people at all ages—from
ample, in some Muslim-majority pre-kindergarten through college
31
lost services and fulfill humanitar-
ian needs, especially in crisis zones countries and communities, reli- and adulthood—and from all walks
and with at-risk populations. A gious education promotes the idea of life. Building on commitments
charitable backfill program and that all nonbelievers are infidels. made at the Leaders’ Summit on
steps to ensure financial inclusion This viewpoint legitimizes violence Refugees in September 2016,
could help protect against unnec- against non-Muslims or Muslims these education efforts should be
essary resentment and radicaliza- from different sects. Equally, many extended to refugees and internal-
tion in the wake of services being non-Muslims, as well as Muslims ly displaced persons to help inoc-
shut down. themselves, know very little about ulate them against radicalization
Islam or the diversity of Islamic his- and recruitment. Programs should

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


tory and cultures.56 This ignorance
Inculcating respect for be designed with lay and religious
may lead to profiling, bullying, hate
diversity and tolerance educators, mental health profes-
speech, physical attacks, and other
sionals, and community leaders.57
Knowledge and critical thinking adverse treatment of Muslims, in-
skills are indispensable for pre- cluding those fleeing the brutality Some models are available. In
venting violent extremism. Edu- of ISIS or other terrorist groups. Modesto, California, religious ed-

55
United Nations, “High Level General Assembly Thematic Debate, Promoting Tolerance and Reconciliation: Fostering Peaceful,
Inclusive Societies and Countering Violent Extremism: 21–22 April 2015, United Nations Headquarters, New York,” June 17, 2015,
http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/06/170615_HLTD-Promoting-Tolerance-Reconciliation-Summary.pdf.
56
Pew Research Center, “Public Remains Conflicted over Islam,” August 24, 2010, http://www.pewforum.org/2010/08/24/pub-
lic-remains-conflicted-over-islam/; Shibley Telhami, “What Americans Really Think about Muslims and Islam,” Brookings Insti-
tution, December 9, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/2015/12/09/what-americans-really-think-about-muslims-and-islam/.
57
Stevan Weine et al., Lessons Learned from Mental Health and Education: Identifying Best Practices for Addressing Violent Ex-
tremism, Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (College Park, MD: START, October
2015), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_LessonsLearnedfromMentalHealthAndEducation_FullReport_Oct2015.pdf.
58
Emile Lester and Patrick S. Roberts, Learning about World Religions in Public Schools: The Impact on Student Attitudes and
Community in Modesto, California (Nashville, TN: First Amendment Center, 2006), http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/FirstForum_ModestoWorldReligions.pdf.
ucation is used to bring together als who represent these groups.
diverse groups, from evangelical Where youth do not have safe
Christians to Sikhs, to teach under- “Shoring up community spaces and opportunities to pur-
standing, build bridges, and pro- sue their interests, explore their
and individual resilience
mote respect for the First Amend- identities, and contribute to their
ment.58 Similar efforts include the is vital to delegitimizing communities, it creates an open-
Faith Community Working Group extremist narratives ing for violent extremists. For
in Montgomery County, Maryland, and enabling peaceful example, research on the Soma-
which aims to increase respect for alternatives to gain li-American community in Minne-
religious traditions, and the An- apolis identified three risk factors:
hold.” (a) the perceived social legitimacy
ti-Defamation League’s antibias
educational programs.59,60 With of violent extremism, (b) youths’
silience is vital to delegitimizing unaccounted-for time in unob-
over 16 million participants, the
extremist narratives and enabling served spaces, and (c) contact
Anti-Defamation League’s Class-
peaceful alternatives to gain hold. with recruiters or associates of
room of Difference offers knowl-
edge and resources that promote Invest in social cohesion, peace- violent extremist movements.64
respect and inclusion in schools.61 building and conflict mitigation. Vio- In the case of Minneapolis, these
Nongovernmental organizations lent extremists capitalize on conflict findings informed a model called
are also experimenting with virtu- and political, ethnic, or economic Building Community Resilience,
al exchanges to build intercultural division. Indeed, conflict within a which involves active partnerships
understanding and respect be- community is a leading indicator between families, civic groups,
tween the United States and Mid- of whether violent extremists will religious leaders, law enforce-
dle East, impart critical thinking be able to find traction.63 By con- ment, and local government of-
skills, and improve communication trast, when communities are well- ficials to raise awareness of risk
and collaboration.62 integrated and individuals of differ- factors, improve communication
ent ethnicities and religions peace- with youth to get a better sense of
Such initiatives have successfully how they are spending their time
fully coexist, extremist organiza-
combated discrimination and bul- and what they are encountering in
32 tions are less able to manipulate
lying and can be models for pro- those spaces, and empower com-
local tensions. Empowering local
moting social cohesion in diverse munity leaders and parents to in-
voices for peace is important to re-
communities. tervene with at-risk individuals.
ducing the personal experiences of
violence and marginalization that Raising awareness of the threats—
Reinforcing Local facilitate violent extremism. but also giving communities the
Resilience to Extremist tools to address them—is vital to
Create safe spaces for commu-
Ideologies and Narratives strengthening local resilience to
nities and youth to interact posi-
violent extremism.
Violent extremist movements tively. In many cases, the key fac-
thrive where they can co-opt tor determining whether a young Foster meaningful civic engage-
local grievances and conflicts, person will support or participate ment opportunities for youth. Youth
where they have ready access to in violent extremist activity is not seek meaning, connection, and
a “supply” of recruits, and where simply sympathy for their ideolo- opportunities to shape the world
TURNING POINT

voices opposed to extremism are gy, or the existence of grievances; around them. Too often, however,
silenced. Consequently, shoring it is having the means and oppor- young people are shunted aside,
up community and individual re- tunities to engage with individu- contributing to widespread feel-

59
International Cultural Center, “Families, Faith and Your School,” May 2016, http://www.theicc.net/ourcauses/families-faith-and-
your-school.
60
Anti-Defamation League, “Anti-Defamation League, Education and Outreach, Anti-Bias Education,” http://www.adl.org/educa-
tion-outreach/anti-bias-education/.
61
Ibid.
62
Aspen Institute, “Stevens Initiative,” http://stevensinitiative.org/.
63
USAID, “Mali Transition Initiative (MTI): Evaluation of the Impact of Social Networks in Gounzoureye Commune, Gao Cercle,
Mali,” Washington, DC: USAID, 2016; Nils N. Weidmann and Patrick M. Kuhn, “Unequal We Fight: Between- and Within-Group
Inequality and Ethnic Civil War,” Political Science and Research Methods 3, no. 3, (2015): 543–68.
64
Stevan M. Weine and John G. Horgan, “Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: One Community’s Perspective,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, April 2014, https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/april/building-resilience-to-violent-extremism-one-communitys-per-
spective.
Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
ings of frustration. It is imperative For this initiative to be effective,
to create mechanisms, both formal robust monitoring and response
and informal, for young people to mechanisms must be put in place.
find their voices and articulate their A few models exist, with varying
goals in public spaces. Political, degrees of international ownership
community, and religious leaders and accountability:
must offer young people meaning-
• Open Government Partnership.
ful opportunities for representation.
The Open Government Partner-
ship (OGP) provides an interna-
Signature Recommendation tional platform for reformers to
The United States should lead an make their governments more
effort to establish international open, accountable, and respon-
principles to stem the spread of sive to citizens.68 Participation
extremist ideologies and intoler- in the initiative is voluntary and
ance in education systems, with requires governments to meet
stringent mechanisms for over- certain eligibility criteria, commit
sight and enforcement. The ten- to the principles of open gov-
sions, prejudices, and stereotypes ernment, and deliver a coun-
that facilitate exclusion—and by try action plan developed with
extension, violent extremism— broad public consultation. OGP
are often embedded in textbooks monitors progress through the
and curricula.65 The United States Independent Reporting Mecha-
should work with likeminded nism, which issues an annual re-
countries and the United Nations port assessing each participating
to advance initiatives, like Glob- government on the quality and
al Citizenship Education, that en- implementation of their reform
plans. Based on concerns about
34 courage governments to revise
civic space, OGP instituted a re-
curricula, textbooks, and other
sponse policy that offers reme-
instructional materials to reflect
diation to participating coun-
the diverse experiences, back-
tries, and eventually designates
grounds, and composition of so-
countries as “inactive” if they do
ciety itself.66 These commitments
not improve the enabling envi-
would also prohibit the teaching of
ronment for civil society.
intolerance in education systems
and reaffirm the responsibility of • Universal Periodic Review. The
governments to ensure that text- Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
books, teachers, and educational is a unique process in which all
materials do not justify the use of 193 UN member states submit
violence to advance political, reli- to a public review of their hu-
gious, or social change; vilify other man rights records.69 The review
TURNING POINT

countries; or defame certain reli- is based on three types of inputs:


gious or ethnic groups.67 1) an assessment provided by the

65
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: United Na-
tions, 2003), http://www.un.org/humansecurity/content/human-security-now.
66
UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Global Citizen-
ship Education,” http://en.unesco.org/gced.
67
“Homeland Security Advisory Council: Subcommittee on Countering Violent Ex-
tremism: Interim Report and Recommendations: June 2016,” 23, https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC/HSAC%20CVE%20Final%20Interim%20
Report%20June%209%202016%20508%20compliant.pdf.
68
Open Government Partnership (OGP), “About,” http://www.opengovpartnership.
org/about.
69
UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Basic Facts about the
Universal Periodic Review,” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Basic-
Facts.aspx.
state under review; 2) reports of nal buy-in is essential, particularly if the U.S. govern-
independent human rights ex- ment wants noncompliance with the principles to
perts and groups, known as the carry real consequences.
Special Procedures, human rights
treaty bodies, and other UN enti-
2. INVESTING IN COMMUNITY-LED
ties; and 3) information from oth-
er stakeholders including nation-
PREVENTION
al human rights institutions and Historically, efforts to counter extremist ideologies and
nongovernmental organizations. narratives have been reactive. Rather than anticipating
Following an interactive discus- emerging threats, appropriate resources and expertise
sion, the review committee drafts are often deployed after the fact. The public health
a report, involving the country field offers some important lessons for breaking this
under review, summarizing its reactive cycle. A public health-based approach to CVE
findings and recommendations. would entail detecting and interrupting a behavior be-
In future UPRs, the state is ex- fore it becomes dangerous and spreads, changing the
pected to provide information on thinking of those most at risk, and, in time, reshaping
what concrete steps it has taken the social norms that exacerbate those risks.71
to implement the recommenda-
tions in the previous report. To invest in community-led prevention, the United
States and its allies must:
• Annual Trafficking in Persons
Report. Established in several • Build trust among key communities and poten-
successive pieces of legislation, tial partners. The United States and its allies need
the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) to build bridges with a wide range of grassroots
Report functions as the principal actors and invest in relationship-building and on-
diplomatic tool to engage foreign going communication.
governments on human traffick- • Improve detection and referral. Systematizing the
ing. Using the TIP Report, the identification of local warning signs, raising aware-
U.S. government assigns coun- 35
ness, and intervening before extremist ideologies
tries to one of four tiers based
spread is vital to a more effective strategy.
on minimum standards (set out
in legislation) for the elimination • Raise awareness about radicalization and recruit-
of trafficking. Countries falling ment. Within the United States, the government
in the bottom tier for failing to should work with civil society and the private sector
meet the minimum standards to expand community awareness programs and or-
and to make serious and sus- ganize safe spaces for parents, students, and teach-
tained antitrafficking efforts face ers to learn about how terrorists radicalize and re-
serious repercussions unless the cruit youth, on- and offline.

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


president issues a waiver. Con-
• Increase investment in intervention, rehabilitation,
sequences may include restric-
tions on nonhumanitarian, non- and reintegration efforts in frontline communities.
trade-related foreign assistance; Long-term, flexible investments in community-
participation in cultural and ed- level responses are essential to preventing radi-
ucational exchanges; and U.S. calization and recruitment and reintegrating those
support for loans from multilat- who succumb to extremist narratives.
eral institutions.70
Building trust among key communities
Any of these templates could be
adopted alone or in combination,
and potential partners
to create, monitor, and enforce To succeed in the struggle against violent extremism,
international principles on educa- the United States and its allies must create authen-
tion reform. Getting Congressio- tic, collaborative, and sustained relationships with ac-

70
U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2016,” June 2016, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/258876.pdf.
71
Cure Violence, “The Model,” http://cureviolence.org/the-model/the-model/.
tors on the frontlines—including concerned citizens, cal actors and furthers CVE efforts.
religious leaders, public health and social workers, There, police officers partnered
teachers, and private-sector representatives. Credible with local businesses to fund and
local actors are best placed to counter the recruiting organize programs to empower
narratives and tactics of violent extremists and pro- women in the local community.73
vide compelling alternatives. These community lead- Programming sought to address
ers are also in the strongest position to address the the needs of women from minority
underlying grievances making their loved ones vul- communities by providing access
nerable to extremist ideologies. to career guidance sessions, men-
torship from local business lead-
Unfortunately, these opportunities have not been ful-
ers, English language workshops,
ly realized due to a profound trust deficit between and related vocational training.
governments, nongovernmental partners, and local These programs have not only
actors. In many communities, families live in fear of strengthened social services avail-
law enforcement or are alienated from formal gov- able to disadvantaged populations,
ernment, civic, and religious structures. Particularly but also have improved relations
in dictatorships, the opportunities for partnership are between community members
extremely limited. Peer-to-peer exchanges, cultural and law enforcement. As a result,
activity, and social media platforms are controlled. they collaborate more readily with
Official imams are often discredited, as they are per- local police on CVE, including
ceived as being co-opted by the government. Fur- communicating their concerns
thermore, when governments only reach out to their about individuals being radical-
preferred interlocutor, it creates a disingenuous rela- ized or recruited.74 As this exam-
tionship with communities. Governments need to “go ple demonstrates, governments
wide and go deep to bring in as many diverse voices interested in CVE must evidence
within a community as possible.”72 that they are committed to help-
This trust gap has real security implications. Mothers ing locals address their concerns
36 and fathers are less likely to report concerns or seek and priorities. Such an approach
help when their child is falling under the sway of re- creates opportunities to engage
cruiters if they do not trust authorities or believe their on more sensitive issues like CVE
child will be treated fairly. Women’s groups may be once trust is established.
wary of engaging in CVE-related efforts if their securi- Finally, building trust with local
ty or credibility is compromised, or if their operations actors requires creating new influ-
have been negatively impacted by other counterter- encer networks that can do things
rorism measures. And young people are unlikely to that governments cannot. This is a
consult a local imam whom they see as part of a cor- vital partnership tool that should
rupt and oppressive system. be recognized more broadly. For
example, in 2008, the U.S. govern-
Rebuilding trust will not happen overnight. It will re-
ment provided a small seed grant
quire extensive engagement and respect for the priori-
to the Vienna-based organization
ties and values of the communities concerned. Clumsy
Women Without Borders to create
TURNING POINT

government outreach can be profoundly risky, endan-


a network of women who could
gering local participants and diminishing their credibil-
push back against violent extrem-
ity. Similarly, private-sector actors need to be able to
ism. With a light U.S. footprint but
partner with the government without being perceived
transparent actions, this organi-
as acting on its behalf.
zation was able to launch Sisters
The town of Slough, England, provides one example Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)—
of partnership, which benefits a broad range of lo- first in Europe and then globally.

72
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22,
2016.
73
UK Department for Communities and Local Government, Empowering Muslim Women: Case Stud-
ies (London: UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008), 10, http://dera.ioe.
ac.uk/7422/7/669801_Redacted.pdf.
74
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, phone interview with Talene Bilazarian, CSIS,
August 17, 2016.
In the years since, SAVE has grown
exponentially and seeded dozens of
grassroots CVE programs as well as
designing new models for schools,
mothers, and the next generation.
The U.S. government should build
on these investments, expanding
and sustaining networks of credible
local actors to confront extremist
ideologies and narratives.

Improving detection
and referral
Identifying early-warning signs
Adopting a proactive approach to
CVE requires engaging at the ear-
liest sign that extremist ideologies
are taking hold. At the community-
level, such warning signs include:

Threats to civil society, human


rights defenders, and journalists.
In many environments, courageous
civil society actors who speak out
against violent extremism come un-
der attack. For example, in Bangla-
desh, violent extremists have con-
ducted a spate of attacks against
vocal critics and bloggers. Asif Mo-
hiuddin, a self-described “militant
atheist” blogger, was stabbed near
his office in Dhaka because of his
public opposition to religious ex-
tremism.75 Pakistan has experienced
similar tragedies. In April 2015, un-
identified gunmen shot human
rights advocate Sabeen Mahmud,
who had just hosted an event on
Balochistan’s disappeared people
in her bookshop café in Karachi—a
rare space for discussion of social
and political issues. In addition to
the human cost, threats to free-
doms of association, expression,
and assembly are clear indicators
that violent extremists are seeking
to intimidate and establish control
over local citizens.

Shannon N. Green, “Violent Groups


75

Aggravate Government Crackdowns on


Civil Society,” OpenDemocracy, April
25, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/openglobalrights/shannon-n-green/
violent-groups-aggravate-govern- Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
ment-crackdowns-on-civil-society. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
Attacks on historical and cultural tial to upholding their dignity and The international community
sites. Extremist groups routinely historical memory, and thus, is an must track threats to religious di-
target cultural and historical sites important element of prevention. versity and develop new tools, in-
as part of a strategy to undermine Existing international resources cluding in the atrocity prevention
community cohesion and resis- are woefully inadequate to this space, to preserve religious free-
tance. The Taliban’s destruction task. Protecting cultural heritage dom and protect at-risk religious
of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in and diversity from the “scorched and ethnic minorities.
2001 is an emblematic example. earth” tactics of violent extremists
As is Saudi Arabia’s destruction requires providing technical, finan- Raising Awareness
of ancient, pluralistic Mecca and cial, and potentially security assis-
the subsequent construction of Even where local actors already
tance to academics and conserva-
a modern city where, as Ziaud- oppose violent extremism, they
tionists, regional governments, law
din Sardar has written, “only one, may not have the tools or infor-
enforcement agencies, and tribal
ahistoric, literal interpretation of mation to sufficiently respond.
and religious leaders in areas rich
Islam is permitted, and where all There is a need to rapidly expand
with sacred sites. Quickly rebuild-
other sects, outside of the Salafist awareness-raising efforts about
ing destroyed sites is also critical to
brand of Saudi Islam, are regarded the dangers of radicalization and
undermining the effects—and util-
as false.”76 The destruction of his- recruitment to prevent the spread
ity—of such acts of destruction.78
toric places gives violent extrem- of extremist ideologies through
ist groups the ability to rewrite Threats to religious diversity and communities, families, and ex-
the past and impose a particular practice. One of the most visible tended social networks.81 In the
ideological vision on the present. early manifestations of violent ex- same way that parents, commu-
Such attacks—sometimes justified tremism is these groups’ hostili- nity leaders, physicians, teachers,
as a war on idolatry—often serve a ty toward religious diversity. Their coaches, and religious leaders are
military purpose as well, shocking insistence on ideological purity taught to spot signs of drug use,
locals into submission. Through- means that those who differ in their depression, sexual abuse, and
out Syria, Iraq, and Libya, ISIS has beliefs or practices are subject to criminal behavior, they should be
deliberately focused on libraries, enslavement, torture, or death. As made aware of the indicators of
38 disaffection or grievance that can
museums, and other sites of great a result, religious minorities have
cultural and historical significance been slaughtered by the thousands, facilitate radicalization.
along its path of devastation; it their very existence considered a Community leaders, families,
also gains funds through the ille- threat to extremist narratives. For educators, and civil society or-
gal sale of antiquities on the black example, Christians, Yazidis, Shi’a, ganizations should be given in-
market. If violent extremists suc- and countless other minorities have sights into behaviors or actions
ceed in their war on culture, the been killed, enslaved, raped, and that may indicate growing inter-
world will lose proof of the diver-
tortured by ISIS.79 In Pakistan, as in est in or support for violent ex-
sity of religious belief, including
some other parts of South Asia, the tremist groups. While there is no
within Islam, and the heritage of
Ahmadis have faced discrimination agreed-upon set of warning signs,
ancient civilizations.77
and violence for generations, suf- law enforcement officials, former
Helping these societies protect fering their most recent publicized extremists, and technology com-
valued sites and artifacts is essen- massacre in Lahore in 2010.80 panies could increase briefings
TURNING POINT

76
Ziauddin Sardar, “The Destruction of Mecca,” New York Times, September 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/opin-
ion/the-destruction-of-mecca.html?_r=0.
77
Pandith and Zarate, “Winning the War of Ideas.”
78
Bruno S. Frey and Dominic Rohner, “Protecting Cultural Monuments against Terrorism,” Defence and Peace Economics 18, no.
3 (2007): 245–52.
79
Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Kidnaps Shia Turkmen, Destroys Shrines: Pillaging, Threats in Capture of Villages near Mosul,”
June 27, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/27/iraq-isis-kidnaps-shia-turkmen-destroys-shrines.
80
Rizwan Mohammed and Karin Brulliard, “Militants Attack Two Ahmadi Mosques in Pakistan; 80 Killed,” Washington Post, May
28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052800686.html.
81
Lynn Davies, Zubeda Limbada, Laura Zahra McDonald, Basia Spalek, and Doug Weeks, “Formers & Families: Transition Jour-
neys in and out of violent extremisms in the UK,” ConnectJustice, 2015; Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Secu-
rity, “The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism,” Meeting
Note, May, 2014.
82
Tower Hamlets Partnership, Tower Hamlets Prevention Action Plan: April 2008 to March 2011 (London: Tower Hamlets
Partnership, June 2010), http://www.towerhamletsfoi.org.uk/documents/3034/LBTH%20%20Prevent%20Action%20Plan%20
June2010.pdf.
to community members on the unique ideological factors that groups have prevented approx-
recruitment tactics that violent draw people to violent extrem- imately 1,500 boys and young
extremist groups use, on- and ism, not just anyone is qualified men from being recruited by vi-
offline, provide a menu of fac- to intervene, regardless of their olent extremists. Similarly, Moth-
tors often present during pre- professional or religious back- ers’ Schools, created by Women
radicalization, and raise aware- ground.83 Those involved in this without Borders, connect moth-
ness of behavior changes or ac- sensitive work must be highly ers within their communities and
tivity associated with radicaliza- trained to deal with the specific across the globe to confidentially
tion. Awareness-raising should be drivers and motivations involved. discuss warning signs and inter-
incorporated into ongoing public vene with their children before
The goal of early intervention ef-
safety or public health programs they get too far down the path of
forts is to enhance a community’s
to mainstream the effort and radicalization.86 In addition, wom-
ability to act when it perceives a
avoid the tendency to see violent en’s groups, either individually or
vulnerability. There are many suc-
extremism as something entirely through networks, have continued
cesses using this approach to tamp
distinct from other dangers af- to advance women’s empower-
down on gang violence in the Unit-
fecting communities. ment, challenge oppressive norms
ed States and prevent radicalization
abroad. For instance, since 2000, and legislation, and support wom-
For example, in the London Borough
Cure Violence has applied public en’s inclusion in peace and securi-
of Tower Hamlets, law enforce-
health techniques to disrupt vio- ty processes. These are all critical
ment combined early-intervention
lence in communities throughout measures for challenging violent
programs with a reporting mech-
the United States. Using a mix of extremists’ assault on women’s
anism to log hate crimes against
interventions, including providing rights and security.
Muslims.82 This initiative integrated
the threat of radicalization into a safe spaces for youth, getting out Training and empowering commu-
broader approach of safeguard- in communities to detect potential nity members, particularly women,
ing the entire community, put- flare-ups of violence, and training allows communities to take charge
ting community-identified needs local actors on conflict preven- of radicalization at its earliest stages.
first, improving community cohe- tion, Cure Violence reduced shoot-
sion, and closing the trust gap. As ings in Chicago’s most dangerous Developing off-ramps 39
a result, over a two-year period, neighborhood by 67 percent and A key gap in CVE efforts is the
community referrals about poten- in Baltimore by 56 percent.84 These lack of “off-ramps”—programs
tial terrorist threats increased by gains have proven fragile, once that provide support for individ-
800 percent. again underscoring the need for a uals who are being radicalized,
steady and sustained presence and
but have yet to become violent
strategy for violence prevention.
Increasing investment or commit a criminal act. Devel-
in intervention and Internationally, women have been oping off-ramps is essential be-
rehabilitation at the forefront of such efforts. cause law enforcement’s tools are
The PAIMAN Trust, led by Mossarat circumscribed and because com-

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


Creating the community infra- munity members are less likely to
Qadeem, trains youth and women
structure for early intervention come forward if the only poten-
across the most conflict-afflicted
Addressing the threat of violent regions of Pakistan to address the tial outcome is criminal prosecu-
extremism requires building up specific drivers of radicalization. tion. When investigating some-
a cadre of skilled, credible com- PAIMAN has established male and one, law enforcement agencies
munity-level actors to engage in female peace groups throughout can bring criminal charges, con-
outreach efforts, offer counsel- the Federally Administered Tribal tinue the investigation if it meets
ing and conflict-mitigation tech- Areas to educate their respective a certain threshold, or close the
niques to those susceptible to communities on the signs of rad- case and move on. Without viable
violence, and develop alternatives icalization and build their capac- off-ramps, law enforcement offi-
for at-risk individuals. Given the ity to mediate conflicts.85 These cials have nowhere to turn to get

83
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Jesse Morton, CSIS, June 23, 2016.
84
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, phone interview and podcast with Gary Slutkin, CSIS, July 21, 2016.
85
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Mossarat Qadeem, CSIS, June 22, 2016.
86
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Edit Schlaffer, CSIS, August 4, 2016.
87
Mateen killed 49 people and wounded 53 others at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.
help for people like Omar Mateen, Focusing on Rehabilitation
who, though disturbed and sym- and Reintegration
pathetic to extremist causes, had
Increasingly, justice sector officials
not yet committed a criminal of-
are looking for alternatives or sup-
fense.87 Such off-ramps could be
plements to jail for extremists who
used to address violent extrem-
have committed a criminal offense
ism of all stripes, preventing the
(e.g., providing material support
retaliatory escalation of violence
to a terrorist group) but have not
that we are seeing in the United
engaged in violence. Expanding
States and elsewhere. For exam-
alternative sentences to incarcera-
ple, Dylan Roof, the 21-year-old
tion, particularly for young people
who gunned down nine black
who have fallen prey to extrem-
churchgoers in Charleston, South
ist recruiters, is viewed as a mor-
Carolina, told friends he intended
al imperative but is also strategic.
to murder in order to catalyze “a
In Minneapolis, where 10 Soma-
race war.”
li-Americans attempted to flee the
Throughout the United States, United States to fight for ISIS, U.S.
there are emerging programs in District Judge Michael Davis called
which community groups are on deradicalization expert Daniel
working closely with law enforce- Koehler to evaluate each defen-
ment, local officials, counselors, dant’s path to radicalization and
families, and public health pro- propose a plan to turn him away
fessionals to identify disillusioned from extremism.89 This evaluation
young people and steer them will inform Judge Davis’s decision
away from violence before it is too about what sentencing and addi-
late. For example, in Montgom- tional support is needed to reha-
ery County, Maryland, WORDE bilitate these individuals.
40 (World Organization for Resource
A few countries have gone a step
and Development and Education)
further, piloting deradicalization
has been a pioneer in communi-
programs in prison. For example,
ty-led intervention. Begun in late
Dr. Fatima Akilu, psychologist and
2013, WORDE works closely with
initiator of Nigeria's deradicaliza-
the Montgomery County Police
tion program, focuses on loosen-
Department, local government of-
ing Boko Haram’s psychological
ficials, trauma counselors, youth
and ideological grip on Nigerian
activists, faith leaders, and vio-
prisoners. This program takes a
lence-prevention experts to assess
comprehensive approach, incor-
each program participant’s unique
porating religious education with
grievances and motivations, and
local imams, psychological coun-
intervene to reduce these risk fac-
seling, and basic life skills training
tors. This model functions on the
TURNING POINT

to mold behaviors and ultimately


trust fostered between the com-
produce a change in attitude.90
munity and law enforcement offi-
cials to not only combat the allure Given the nature of the radicaliza-
of extremism but also coordinate tion process and the potential for
and execute interventions based further radicalization in prisons,
on referrals.88 the United States must contin-

88
World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), “The
Montgomery County BRAVE Model,”
http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/.
89
Nicole Hong, “Judge Tries New Approach with Terror Defendants: Derad-
icalization,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
judge-tries-new-approach-with-terror-defendants-deradicalization-1462751841.
90
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast
with Fatima Akilu, CSIS, June 22, 2016.
ue to experiment with alternative
sentencing practices and rehabil-
itation and reintegration efforts.
These programs should be rigor-
ously monitored and evaluated to
draw conclusions about their effi-
cacy and replicability.

Signature Recommendation
Support community-led preven-
tion efforts, including awareness
raising, intervention, and rehabili-
tation, by enlarging the space (i.e.,
legal and policy environment) for
civil society to do this work.

The U.S. government needs to


create legal and policy frame-
works, with clear boundaries, pro-
cedures, and principles, to govern
community-led intervention and
rehabilitation efforts within the
Unites States. In particular, there SHERMAN JACKSON AND AHMED ABBADI, COMMISSIONERS
need to be codified protocols
for referrals—that is, when law leaders will never get involved in from dangerous situations and/
enforcement agencies will refer this indispensable work. or small grants that organizations
cases to community groups, and can use for personal security,
The U.S. government also needs to
when community groups will refer hardening their offices’ physical 41
reach out to companies to increase
cases to law enforcement agen- defenses, legal costs, prison visits,
their understanding and buy-in
cies. Guidelines must also be in trial monitoring, equipment re-
place for how community-based for intervention efforts. Currently,
placement, etc.91 In the face of in-
organizations should follow up building managers, telecommu-
creasing threats from violent ex-
with program participants and nications firms, and other service
tremist groups, such funds should
what to do about those who drop providers do not want to rent of-
be expanded to civil society orga-
out or are not compliant with the fice space or provide support to
nizations and community-based
intervention regimen. civil society actors doing this work.
actors working on CVE.
U.S. government officials can help
Moreover, the U.S. government by destigmatizing these efforts and

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


should clarify the rules around ma- encouraging these companies to 3. SATURATING THE
terial support and create excep- support CVE in a variety of ways. GLOBAL MARKET-
tions for vetted civil society and
Finally, the United States and its
PLACE OF IDEAS
community groups that are en-
gaged in prevention, intervention, allies need to enhance protec- Violent extremists have thrived
deradicalization, rehabilitation, or tions for the courageous indi- by coopting local grievances and
reintegration in the United States viduals on the frontlines of com- conflicts and grafting them onto
or overseas. Currently, civil society bating extremists’ ideologies and a universal narrative of “us versus
actors take great legal and repu- narratives. Numerous funds and them.” ISIS, for example, has suc-
tational risks in engaging poten- programs exist to help scholars, ceeded at recruiting foreign fight-
tial extremists or those who have civil society activists, and journal- ers because it crafted tailored mes-
already fallen under the sway of ists threatened because of their sages that resonated with its target
terrorist recruiters. Without greater human rights work. These efforts audiences and provided a simple,
written protections, a critical mass provide temporary relocation op- affirmative solution for whatever
of organizations and community portunities to extricate individuals ailed them—“join us and help build

91
Lifeline, “Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund,” https://www.csolifeline.org/.
an ideal society where you will always belong.” Sim- 100 percent of respondents had
ilarly, al Qaeda offered a narrative of empowerment, a negative view of ISIS.92 Not sur-
an opportunity to strike back at “foreign aggressors.” prisingly, respondents from coun-
To protect youth from being radicalized, we must not tries closer in proximity and more
only ensure they understand how and why violent ex- directly affected by ISIS’s rise, and
tremists are targeting them, but also disrupt recruit- the resulting refugee flows, had
ers’ efforts to make these linkages. It is not enough much more hostile views toward
to merely counter these messages. We have to put the terrorist group.
our own affirmative vision forward, amplifying many
This rejection of violent extrem-
different kinds of ideas and voices.
ism is not unique to ISIS. Extremist
To saturate the global marketplace of ideas, the Unit- ideologies are often at odds with
ed States and its allies must: local beliefs and practices. Rigid
interpretations of the Quran, pro-
• Reboot strategic communications efforts. The Unit-
moted by violent extremist groups,
ed States and its allies need to fundamentally re-
often clash with grassroots tradi-
think the scale and delivery of “counternarratives”
tions that are more pluralistic and
and “alternative narratives”, on- and offline. Strate-
tolerant. These differences may
gic communications efforts will only be effective if
be magnified by their tactics—
they are organic, embedded in local peer networks,
excessive violence, cruelty, and
delivered by credible messengers, and articulate a
oppression of locals—which can
positive vision for society.
further undermine public sympa-
• Engage the private sector to produce and deliver thies.93 For example, following
compelling narratives across media platforms. The the 2002 terrorist bombings in
storytelling and technical know-how of leading tech- Bali, citizens cooperated to build
nology and digital media companies, when paired a “peace park” on the site of the
with local knowledge, perspectives, and communi- attack to mobilize popular opinion
cation specialists, can professionalize and amplify ef- against violent extremist groups.94
42 Aversion to terrorist tactics can
forts to promote alternative and counternarratives.
be a powerful tool in the struggle
• Create alternative opportunities for young peo- against violent extremism if the
ple to achieve meaning and status. Helping youth voices of the majority of Muslims
channel their energy and passion in a positive di- are heard. Unfortunately, one-off
rection is necessary for decreasing the potency of statements, speeches, or sound-
extremist ideologies and narratives. bites cannot substitute for a con-
sistent and normalized view that
Rebooting strategic this sentiment exists.
communications efforts In spite of this deep-seated antip-
The vast majority of Muslims worldwide reject ex- athy, the United States and its allies
tremist ideologies and the groups that espouse them. have not effectively competed with
A 2015 Pew survey found that most citizens in Mus- extremists’ narratives, on- or offline.
TURNING POINT

lim-majority countries detest ISIS. In Indonesia, only 4 Much of the attention to CVE in the
percent of respondents had a favorable view of ISIS; last few years has been focused
in Pakistan it was 9 percent. In Turkey, 73 percent of on “countermessaging.” Yet, these
respondents had an unfavorable view, compared to 8 programs have had mixed success
percent favorable (and 19 percent who did not know). because of the absence of cre-
In the Palestinian territories, the unfavorables jump to ativity, risk-taking, and nimbleness
84 percent, while in Jordan 94 percent of those polled within government bureaucra-
had a dismal view of the terrorist group. In Lebanon, cies; lack of funding; and difficulty

92
Jacob Poushter, “In Nations with Significant Muslim Populations, Much Disdain for ISIS,” Pew Research
Center, November 17, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-signifi-
cant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/.
93
Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Cam-
paigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
94
Ibid.
43

Source: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-
populations-much-disdain-for-isis/, Chart titled “Views of ISIS Overwhelmingly Negative

in scaling up what works. Messaging efforts are also enemy. We must be prepared to advance a positive

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


bound to disappoint when they are designed from for- vision for society: one based on fundamental values
eign capitals, detached from reality, reactive, or solely of diversity, equality, dignity, and justice.
focused on what we are against. “Norms shaping”—the
Ultimately, civil society and Muslim leaders are in the
aim of strategic communications efforts—is not pos-
best position to advance alternative narratives and
sible without credible messengers carrying a message
that appeals to local communities and addresses the interpretations. The job of governments is to make
contextually specific push and pull factors driving sup- sure that they have the space and support to play
port for extremist ideologies. this pivotal role.

Narrative efforts must be anchored in the local so-


Engaging the private sector
cial context, in the communities and networks in
which violent extremism thrives. Technology-driven The social media revolution and the rise in global con-
solutions, in and of themselves, cannot push young nectivity have presented new opportunities for violent
people in a positive direction. Alternative narratives extremist groups to spread their propaganda and re-
must have roots on the ground to produce behav- cruit a new generation of adherents. They are able to
ioral change. Moreover, messaging efforts will never falsely inflate their image—and the perception of their
have the intended impact if we are always on the successes—through their online network of commit-
defensive and countering the narratives set by the ted supporters and validators. These online recruit-
the immensity of the challenge. opportunities to identify and eval-
Extremists have proven far nimbler uate the most effective messages,
“It is not enough to than governments in using digital messengers, and platforms for dis-
merely counter these tools and popular culture to drive seminating proven messages and
messages. We have to radical narratives. To move away targeting narratives to particular
from a reactive posture, market- online users. For example, they can
put our own affirmative ing and communications expertise determine how target audiences
vision forward, from the private sector must be interacted with messages, whether
amplifying many harnessed. The next administration they shared or amplified them, and
different kinds of ideas needs to help facilitate collabora- what they did online after consum-
tion between private companies,
and voices.” nonprofit actors, and government
ing the content. Our instincts on
CVE are often misguided, so data
agencies. For example, the U.S. collection and analysis are critical
ment efforts are highly organized
government could sponsor ex- to the success of strategic com-
and hierarchical. The most effective change programs between tech-
method to turn the tide on extrem- munications efforts. Developing re-
nology companies and local and
ists’ dominance over the narrative search and analytical partnerships
national government officials to
is to amplify the voices of the vast with universities, think tanks, and
build knowledge, expand expertise,
the technology sector can produce
majority of people who are speak- and establish relationships.95
the knowledge and data we need
ing out against extremist ideas.
Social media and technology com- to craft more effective narratives.
Private-sector partnerships will be panies, as the hub of global com- The government has an important
necessary to scale our efforts to munications, also offer important but low-profile role to play in such

“Homeland Security Advisory Council,” 23.


95

Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism


https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
efforts, using its convening power to build research violent extremists give actionable
coalitions, providing long-term funding for analytical answers. Providing peaceful oppor-
efforts, and sharing cutting-edge research on the driv- tunities for young people to pursue
ers of violent extremism. Using data to guide messag- meaning, stature, and belonging will
ing will help to create campaigns that have more cred- help defuse interest in extremist ide-
ibility and successfully target the audiences that violent ologies and narratives.
extremist groups are trying to reach.
Successful examples abound. In
Similarly, the creative community and entertainment eastern Afghanistan, the Natural
industry offer critical insights and tools to promote al- Resources Counter-insurgency
ternative narratives. Research has found that narrative Cell (NRCC), in collaboration with
media, such as television shows and radio soap operas, local elders, developed a leader-
can provide a space for audience members to explore ship development program for
their values and process difficult or emotionally fraught up-and-coming young men—
material in an unthreatening way. For instance, in Egypt, precisely the kinds of individu-
an immensely popular competition reality show subtly als who would make ideal mid-
embedded messages of hope and tolerance for Egypt’s level commanders for insurgent
struggling youth cohort. The contestants, 14 young groups. The program found that
Egyptians from a diverse range of cultural, religious, these young men were primarily
and ethnic backgrounds, work closely with one anoth- motivated by a desire to achieve
er to become the next top entrepreneur and succeed status in their communities, so
because of, rather than in spite of, their differences. the NRCC developed a high-
Children’s entertainment is also an important venue ly selective, merit-based train-
for engaging with communities and inculcating re- ing program—in other words, an
spect for civic values, because families tend to watch alternative status marker for the
TV, listen to the radio, or read books together. For community—and created small
example, in Pakistan, artists and producers are taking development projects that partic-
on extremists’ propaganda through cartoons, apps, ipants could design, lead, and im- 45
and comic books that give youth positive role mod- plement. The program appeared
els and heroes to emulate.96 Such efforts must be to succeed in driving down local
stepped up. Music, film, video games, and television recruitment and attacks.97
shows offer profound, but largely untapped, oppor-
In the United States, prominent
tunities to shape attitudes at an early age.
imams are dealing with the chal-
To work effectively toward shared ends, govern- lenge of violent extremism by get-
ments need to identify meaningful entry points ting young people involved in com-
for collaboration with the private sector. The tech munity service. For example, one
community and entertainment industry are made imam orchestrates outings with lo-

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


up of problem solvers, engineers, and storytellers cal refugee families and service trips
who can perform well when presented with a dis- to refugee camps in Jordan. The
crete, actionable challenge—and poorly when goals goal is to get young people engaged
are not clear or realistic. and to demonstrate that they can
make a difference by serving their
Creating alternative opportunities community in positive ways.
for young people To give narratives life and validity,
Alternative narratives will prove empty if they promote we must help create opportunities
paths that do not exist on the ground. It is vital that narra- for young people to funnel their
tives are attached to meaningful opportunities for youth energy and desire to make a dif-
to prove themselves. Where youth are unable to marry, ference into peaceful, productive,
start families, or make a full transition into adulthood, and sustainable outcomes.

96
Lawrence Pintak, “Can Cartoons Save Pakistan’s Children from Jihad?,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/19/can-cartoons-save-pakistans-children-from-jihad/.
97
Rachel Kleinfeld and Harry Bader, Extreme Violence and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Eastern Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2014), http://carnegieendowment.
org/files/violence_rule_of_law.pdf.
MARTHA MINOW, COMMISSIONER

Signature Recommendation that foreign policy is often driven


by pragmatic requirements and
Establish an independent presidential advisory
that there are occasionally com-
council composed of technology and private-sector
peting priorities that cannot be
representatives to provide guidance and innovative
easily reconciled. Yet, that is no
ideas to the president on how best to compete and
excuse for the United States not
46 win the war of ideas. Modeled on the President’s Intel- to press its allies and partners to
ligence Advisory Board, an independent element with- take meaningful steps to improve
in the Executive Office of the President, the council respect for human rights.
would have four main functions: formulating various
approaches to reducing the spread of hate speech and To better align policies with values,
extremist propaganda online; ensuring that CVE ef- the United States and its allies must:
forts abide by the Constitution and all applicable laws; • Prioritize rule of law and human
sharing information about how extremists are using rights. We must elevate strength-
digital platforms to inform messaging campaigns and ening the rule of law, stemming
community briefings; and forging new partnerships to corruption, and addressing in-
contest extremist narratives and amplify alternatives. justice as part of a long-term
This body would be a critical ligament to the private investment in undermining sup-
sector and would provide a consistent platform for port for violent extremism.
engagement and solidifying public-private partner-
TURNING POINT

ships—which is currently a major gap in CVE efforts. • Resolve tensions between coun-
terterrorism objectives and hu-
man rights. Too often, human
4. ALIGNING POLICIES rights concerns are subordinated
AND VALUES to other foreign policy priorities,
The most compelling message violent extremists including the need for counter-
can deploy against the United States and its allies terrorism cooperation. These
tradeoffs should be minimized to
is the charge of hypocrisy. When the United States
avoid charges of U.S. hypocrisy
abandons bedrock principles, such as keeping sus-
that feed extremists’ propaganda.
pected terrorists indefinitely detained at Guantana-
mo Bay or torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, we not • Protect and enlarge civic space
only undermine our own credibility, but also supply as a foreign policy priority. Civil
violent extremists with fodder for their narratives. society—and citizens’ voices—
We must do better. The Commission acknowledges must be protected in order to
address the grievances and nar- one template. The central aim of this
ratives that drive radicalization initiative is to help partner countries
and recruitment. develop policies, structures, and
processes to deliver security and
Prioritizing rule of law and justice to their citizens.100 SGI is not
human rights focused on tactical-level engage-
ments but rather on improving the
Oppressive, abusive and corrupt management, oversight, account-
states are the headwaters from ability, and sustainability of secu-
which violent extremism often rity-sector institutions. Such ap-
springs. Where governments are proaches need to be strengthened
predatory and unaccountable, re- in close partnership with civil soci-
cruits are largely motivated by a ety and expanded to other regions
desire for justice and dignity.98 The where security and law enforce-
Department of State and U.S. Agen- ment practices do more to drive vi-
cy for International Development’s olent extremism than ameliorate it.
Joint CVE Strategy underscores
these findings: “in today’s terror- In countries where the govern-
ist landscape, terrorist groups of- ment has long relied on repres-
ten thrive in areas with limited or sion, discrimination, or corruption
abusive governance, weak rule of to maintain its grip on power, the
law, high degrees of violence and relationship between the state
corruption… and where civil so- and society is typically in sham-
ciety has limited agency or space bles. Rebuilding the social con-
to operate.”99 Rooting out violent tract between citizens and all lev-
extremism, therefore, will require els of government must be part of
that we employ our diplomatic and the solution to violent extremism.
development tools to promote hu- Donors and policymakers need to
look for opportunities to rebuild 47
man rights; advance government
policies that support good gover- trust and mutual confidence—for
nance and inclusion; enhance just example, by creating forums for
law enforcement and security ap- governments and civil society to
proaches; and reconcile policy ten- work together on issues of com-
sions that advance short-term se- mon concern—without jeopardiz-
curity cooperation at the expense ing the independence or legitima-
of longer-term stability. cy of civil society organizations.

Taking such an approach will require


Resolving tensions between

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


the U.S. government to reorient its
priorities, and budget according-
counterterrorism objectives
ly. The primary objective should be and human rights
working with partner countries to Overall, security and human rights
improve security sector practices, are mutually reinforcing. Corrup-
including increased engagement tion and rampant abuses perpe-
with local populations, within a ci- trated by security forces undermine
vilian-led framework. The Security the long-term stability and pros-
Governance Initiative (SGI), a multi- perity of a state, while the failure to
year $65 million effort with six Afri- address these abuses may result in
can countries—Ghana, Kenya, Mali, the United States not having a via-
Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia—provides ble partner over the long term.

98
Proctor, Youth & Consequences.
99
U.S. Department of State, “Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Coun-
tering Violent Extremism,” May 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/257913.pdf.
100
U.S. Department of State, “Security Governance Initiative: 2015 Review,” March 2,
2016, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/2016/253906.htm.
However, security cooperation— address the challenges of terror- forefront of CVE. They cannot per-
such as train-and-equip programs ism and violent extremism in just form this critical function when
with partner government militaries and sustainable ways.104 they are squeezed between violent
and law enforcement agencies— extremists on the one hand and
can backfire when their values and Protecting and enlarging their governments on the other.106
interests diverge from our own,
civic space
particularly on issues of human Signature Recommendation
rights, accountability, and civilian An empowered civil society is one
oversight.101 For example, in So- of the best defenses against violent Review and monitor all security
malia, the heavy-handed conduct extremism, serving as a powerful assistance provided to foreign
of AMISOM (African Union Mission bulwark against the pernicious in- partners to ensure that it is being
in Somalia) partners—particularly fluences and narratives of extrem- used effectively to address ter-
the allegations of widespread ci- ist groups. Yet, in spite—or perhaps rorist threats and is in alignment
vilian abuses and casualties—has, because—of the key role played by with U.S. values and interests in
in spite of some field successes, civil society, civic space is increas- advancing rule of law, dignity, and
undermined the effort to quash ingly under siege. In 2015 alone, justice. The next administration
al Shabaab. Indeed, such partner- there were serious threats to civ- should conduct a thorough review
ships can fuel grievances that mo- ic freedoms in over 100 countries, of all weapons transfers, train-
tivate violence, such as when part- including restrictions on foreign and-equip programs, and oth-
ners use heavy-handed tactics and funding, onerous registration re- er security assistance provided
extra-legal measures to address quirements, intrusive government to countries that restrict politi-
terrorist threats.102 oversight, and politicized charges cal rights or civil liberties or with
or legal proceedings against a record of other serious human
The U.S. government should nongovernmental organizations.105 rights violations. Countries ranked
ensure that its commitment to Many countries with serious ter- as “not free” or “partially free” in
strong security relationships rorist threats, like Egypt, India, Freedom House’s annual index
abroad is matched by a commit- and Russia, have enacted laws or of Freedom in the World should
ment to human rights and the rule regulations limiting foreign sup-
48 be subjected to this review. The
of law. Providing partners with port for civil society organizations. administration can triage this in-
training, equipment, and other Elsewhere, as in Kenya, the gov- formation with the Department
support to fight terrorism runs ernment has waged a sustained of State’s annual Country Reports
the risk of exacerbating sympa-
campaign to discredit civil society on Human Rights Practices and
thy for terrorists if this assistance
actors. These restrictions have had other independent human rights
is not coupled with a parallel ef-
a devastating impact on human reports. This assessment should
fort to developing partners’ ca-
rights and other civil society groups consider whether the assistance,
pacity to pursue democratic and
who are critical for addressing the on balance, is contributing to
rights-based approaches.103 This
underlying conditions that violent security and counterterrorism
will require improving collabora-
extremists exploit. objectives or exacerbating the
tion, planning, and decisionmak-
ing within the U.S. government Whether threats to civil society conditions exploited by violent ex-
to ensure that security coopera- come from violent extremists or tremist groups. Assistance should
tion decisions take broader for- governments, we must act to pre- be suspended or used as leverage,
TURNING POINT

eign policy considerations into serve civic space. The United States as appropriate, to incentivize po-
account and help advance our and its allies should engage con- litical reforms or improvements in
short-, medium-, and long-term sistently with partner governments human rights.
objectives. It will also require to open and protect the space for
training partner security forces to civil society actors who are at the

101
Ibid.
102
Nancy Lindborg, “The Causes and Consequences of Violent Extremism and the Role of Foreign Assistance” (testimony before
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, April 12, 2016), http://www.usip.
org/publications/2016/04/12/the-causes-and-consequences-of-violent-extremism-and-the-role-of-foreign.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Civicus, State of Civil Society Report 2016: Executive Summary (New York: Civicus, June 2016), http://civicus.org/images/docu-
ments/SOCS2016/summaries/State-of-Civil-Society-Report-2016_Exec-Summary.pdf.
106
Green, “Violent Groups Aggravate.”
5. DEPLOYING To effectively deploy military and • Strengthen counterterrorism
MILITARY AND LAW law enforcement tools as part of a capabilities. The United States
comprehensive strategy, the Unit- should deepen partnerships with
ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
ed States and its allies must: frontline states and strengthen
Preventing the radicalization and its own and its partners’ opera-
recruitment of young people and • Utilize counterterrorism tools as
tional capabilities to address to-
dealing with the physical manifes- part of a broader political and
day’s global terrorist threats.
tations of extremist ideologies will diplomatic strategy. The Unit-
require mobilizing all elements of ed States and its allies will need • Build rapid response teams.
national and international pow- to continue to conduct military Militaries and law enforce-
er, including military and law en- and law enforcement operations ment agencies should use their
forcement tools. While the Com- to avert and respond to imme- unique assets and training to
mission believes that CVE must diate terrorist threats, dislodge protect civilian populations and
be kept separate from counter- extremist groups that control important religious, cultural,
terrorism in terms of the tactics, territory, assist and support oth- and historical sites at risk from
agencies, and actors involved, an er nations engaged in the fight violent extremist groups.
effective strategy will require soft against terrorism, and discredit
and hard power operating at scale terrorists’ assertions of invinci-
and in tandem.107 bility and momentum.

Some commissioners felt that discussions regarding military strategies were outside their areas of expertise, and accordingly
107

did not participate in deliberations or recommendations on this topic.

Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism


https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
Utilizing counterterrorism tools as part
of a broader strategy
Military force has been instrumental in reversing the
territorial gains of violent extremists. In Afghanistan,
Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia, terrorist groups have
been rolled back by military operations, curtailing safe
havens and robbing them of access to funding sourc-
es (e.g., oil, artifacts and profits from extorting locals)
that they could use to support their operations. Unit-
ed States-led military strikes have shrunk ISIS’s oper-
ating space in Iraq and Syria and freed thousands from
its brutality. The increase in information gathering on
the battlefield in Afghanistan and elsewhere has led
to more consequential counterterrorism operations
against high-value targets. And high-profile military
setbacks have helped puncture the propaganda and
appeal of terrorist groups, such as al Shabaab.

Though the U.S. military, acting unilaterally or with


partners, can effectively degrade a conventional ter-
rorist group on foreign soil, military force is rarely the
primary reason why terrorist organizations come to
an end.108 Where terrorists adopt the tactics of insur-
gents or guerillas and blend into the civilian popula-
tion, police and intelligence agencies are often more
important than military forces. They typically have a
better understanding of the on-the-ground threat
50 picture, can infiltrate the group in question, and are
better placed to influence a political transition.

Military force and law enforcement approaches can


play a vital role in slowing violent extremists’ mo-
mentum and loosening their grip on territory, but ex-
tremist ideologies—and the long-term, generational “An empowered
threat they represent—will not be defeated on the civil society
battlefield. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen cautioned in 2008, “we
is one of the
can’t kill our way to victory.” Moreover, poorly execut- best defenses
ed kinetic responses that result in civilian casualties or against violent
undermine a government’s authority are a propagan- extremism,
da boon for violent extremist groups and widen the
serving as
chasm between American values and actions.
TURNING POINT

a powerful
Military and law enforcement tools, then, are nec- bulwark against
essary but not sufficient for countering terror-
ism. These approaches need to be coordinat-
the pernicious
ed and embedded in a comprehensive strategy influences
that also includes diplomacy, development, and and narratives
cyber and information operations. Most impor- of extremist
tantly, soft and hard power must be better bal-
groups.”
anced to ensure that prevention is not always an
after-thought.

Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups


108

End: Lessons for Countering Al-Qaida (Santa Monica, CA:


RAND, 2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.sum.pdf.
Strengthening counterter-
rorism capabilities
Resolve and clarity of purpose are
critical for counterterrorism cam-
paigns to be successful. The local
population who might otherwise
provide support to the terrorist or-
ganization must be convinced that
external support will be provided
for as long as is needed, even if the
kind of support evolves as circum-
stances change.

The following components are


also important, but should be cal-
ibrated to the particular region
and dynamics in which the United MARK J. PENN, COMMISSIONER
States and its allies are operating:

• Invested partners on the ground, bust Special Operations Forces to partner military forces. Current-
in the form of effective local and tactical military intelligence ly under consideration by the U.S.
government and security forces; capabilities honed in Iraq and Af- Army, such a training component
ghanistan, as well as investing in would encourage long-term rela-
• Coalition partners, to increase a broader set of tools needed for tionships between the United States
legitimacy and augment con- defeating terrorist groups. The and partner security forces.109 An
strained resources; U.S. military has largely reverted institutionalized training compo-
• Intelligence, surveillance and to its traditional training regimes nent would also free up combat
reconnaissance, including un- to prepare soldiers for large-scale troops who previously would have
conventional conflicts. Policymak- been taken out of battle to train their 51
manned aerial vehicles, strategic
intelligence systems, and human ers need to strike a better balance counterparts. This training should
intelligence resources; training and equipping the U.S. include how to stabilize and estab-
armed forces for the spectrum of lish governance in territory retaken
• Special forces to help target conflicts they are likely to face. from terrorists; how to engage ef-
terrorist leaders and communi- fectively with communities, devel-
cations infrastructure and train The United States should also
opment agencies, and civil society
local security forces; demonstrate its sustained commit-
organizations; and importantly, how
ment to its partners, offering more
• Persistent close air support and to ensure respect for human rights
systematic capacity-building as-
tactical mobility to support local and prevent civilian harm.

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


sistance in counterinsurgency and
security forces; and counterterrorism operations. For Finally, the U.S. government and
• Access arrangements to support over 15 years, the U.S. military has its allies need to identify solutions
relied upon ad hoc solutions to train for training foreign police forces.
efforts on the battlefield, es-
partner militaries, using both a mix Long-term success in counterter-
pecially in priority regions such
of general-purpose forces, special rorism depends upon our partners
as the Middle East, Africa, and
operations forces, and contractors. developing effective police and in-
Southeast Asia.
The results of these efforts in Iraq, telligence services. Though inter-
Going forward, the United States Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and else- national training for law enforce-
should balance its conventional where have been disappointing. ment exists, including through the
training focus with the develop- To address this issue, the United International Law Enforcement
ment and retention of capabilities States should consider establishing Academies, the United States can-
that will be effective in a long-term a permanently staffed, specialized not train and maintain relationships
campaign against terrorist groups. training component focused on with all police forces. To bridge this
This requires maintaining the ro- providing instruction and guidance gap, especially in crisis zones, the

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Mulls Train & Advise Brigades: Gen. Milley,” Breaking Defense, December 14, 2015,
109

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/army-mulls-train-advise-brigades-gen-milley/.
corridors or protected zones for
civilians. For example, the interna-
“Preventing the tional community should build and
radicalization and institutionalize the capacity to con-
recruitment of young duct life-saving operations, such
as the rescue mission on Mount
people and dealing
Sinjar, which delivered food, wa-
with the physical ter, and urgent supplies to Yazidis
manifestations of trapped by ISIS and lifted others to
extremist ideologies safety. In addition to being in line
will require mobilizing with U.S. values, helping preserve
life and sacred sites would under-
all elements of national mine terrorists’ assertions that the
and international West is callous to others’ suffering.
power, including
military and law Signature Recommendation
enforcement tools.” Build an enduring coalition to
degrade and defeat terrorist or-
United States has pieced together ganizations and dismantle their
support from the U.S. military, State strategic communications infra-
Department, and private contrac- structure, while creating rapid
tors. Rather than taking the lead on response mechanisms to protect
this element of the fight, at the risk threatened civilian populations
of militarizing local police forces, and cultural heritage sites. Con-
the United States should leverage siderable progress has been made
European and Asian allies that have in building the network of interna-
comparable national police forces tional cooperation needed to fight
52 terrorism in the 15 years since Sep-
that can provide training.
tember 11. Those existing arrange-
ments provide a strong foundation.
Building rapid response However, the next administration
teams needs to develop deeper partner-
Military forces have unique assets ships with frontline states in the
and training that can be leveraged to Middle East, Africa, Central Asia,
protect civilian populations; import- South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
ant religious, cultural, and histori- The United States must play a
cal sites; and critical infrastructure central role in persuading allies
or natural resources from terrorist and partners, especially Muslim-
groups. Strengthening these ca- majority countries, to contribute
pabilities—including investing in militarily to the struggle against vi-
TURNING POINT

the creation of specialized “jump olent extremism and to use all oth-
teams” to protect civilians, sites, and er tools to starve terrorist groups
infrastructure—is essential. of the recruits, weapons, money,
These teams should be led by and legitimacy they need to survive
skilled representatives of civilian, and spread into new regions. This
multilateral, or international or- outreach should include pressing
countries throughout the world to
ganizations, and buttressed, as
provide for the basic needs of their
necessary, by military and police
population so they do not search
forces. Depending on the nature of
elsewhere for fulfillment.
the extremist threat, these teams
would have two primary mandates: To build a broad-based coalition,
a) securing sacred religious, cultur- the next administration should
al, and historical sites and artifacts; start by reinvigorating its leadership
and b) establishing humanitarian role in the world, particularly in the
Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism 53
https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism

Middle East. The relative absence Partnership does not mean turn- • ceasing to provide support to
of American leadership throughout ing a blind eye to the shortcom- terrorist groups; and
a period of great turmoil has un- ings and human rights abuses that
• participating in a political and
dermined our credibility within the feed into the cycle of radicaliza- military campaign against vio-
region. Reestablishing our credibil- tion and recruitment that we are lent extremism.
ity will not be an easy task. Sunni trying to stop. Rather, the United

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


powers are deeply suspicious of the This coalition must go beyond de-
States should be clear about what
United States’ intentions and highly feating ISIS and reach beyond the
it expects of its allies:
anxious about Iran’s rise. To rebuild Middle East. It should degrade and
trust with these partners, the Unit- • adhering to their international defeat terrorist groups wherever
ed States will need to make clear its human rights obligations; they emerge and pose a threat to ci-
commitment to peace and security vilians and to our collective security.
in the Middle East, articulate its in- • taking steps to address the driv- In building such a global coalition,
terests, and lay out a comprehen- ers of violent extremism; the United States should be upfront
sive strategy for addressing violent that defeating violent extremists and
• preventing civilian harm in the
extremism. The next administration the ideologies and narratives that
conduct of military and police
will also need to listen and seek to give them sustenance will require
operations;
understand our partners’ priorities, leadership, tenacity, and vision for a
fears, and constraints. Without a • curbing financial support from generation or more.  
common framework and shared their citizens to extremist causes;
goals, collaboration on CVE is
bound to remain transactional and • bringing to justice those respon-
frustrate both the United States sible for the worst forms of in-
and our allies. citement to violence;
IMPLEMENTATION
strategy—no matter how compre- and the Bureau of CT and CVE at
hensive—is destined to fail with- the Department of State.
out the right implementation plan.
Yet, these structures are inade-
Operationalizing this strategy will
quate. Without a designated focal
require: empowered and qualified
point at the NSC, there is nobody
leadership and personnel; devoted
accountable for CVE results. No-
budgets; and much greater coordi-
body has a bird’s-eye view of all
nation within the U.S. government,
relevant efforts across CVE and
among domestic and foreign af-
counterterrorism and can there-
fairs agencies, civilian and military
fore align policy and rationally al-
authorities, and law enforcement
locate resources. No one with the
and social service delivery officials.
president’s ear wakes up every day
It will also hinge on the ability to
with the sole responsibility of CVE.
massively increase flexible funding
for civil society groups and com- This must change. The Commis-
munity actors operating in the sion recommends a new institu-
United States and abroad. tional structure for CVE, headed by
an assistant to the president based
Debates over the right organiza-
in the NSC. S/he would be situat-
tional structures have plagued CVE
ed between and working closely
efforts since September 11, severe-
with the assistant to the presi-
ly weakening our capacity to deal
dent for homeland security and
with this ideological threat. After
counterterrorism and the deputy
equivocating over various organi-
national security adviser. This per-
zational models for over a decade,
son would be responsible for syn-
the U.S. government cannot afford
chronizing policies and programs
to sink more time into determining
across counterterrorism and CVE,
the best set-up. To implement this
56 domestically and internationally;
strategy, the Commission recom-
mobilizing and coordinating re-
mends the following organization-
sources for all government agen-
al structures and funding mecha-
cies with CVE-relevant mandates,
nisms, inside and outside of the U.S.
including domestic agencies with
government, to significantly reduce
a service provision focus (e.g., the
the number of people in the Unit-
Department of Education and De-
ed States and worldwide who are
partment of Health and Human
drawn to violent extremist groups. Services); and building the pub-
lic-private partnerships neces-
Organizing the U.S. sary to advance this strategy. S/he
Government to Be an would also be the primary liaison
Effective Leader on CVE to the independent presidential
advisory council comprising tech-
Responsibility for CVE is spread
TURNING POINT

nology and private-sector repre-


across dozens of government de-
sentatives described in the strate-
partments and agencies, as well
gy. Most importantly, the assistant
as several different directorates at
to the president would manage
the NSC. Although the U.S. gov-
the execution of the comprehen-
ernment has extremely talented
sive strategy for CVE and be held
individuals working on CVE, their
accountable for producing results.
efforts are undermined by turf bat-
tles over mandates and authorities, Under this new position, the Com-
bureaucratic constraints on inno- mission recommends a tripartite
vation and agility, and coordination leadership structure. The White
challenges. This situation has im- House should rely on existing en-
proved significantly with the cre- tities and capabilities, rather than
ation of the CVE Task Force, under creating a large footprint at the
the coleadership of DHS and DOJ, NSC. The CVE Task Force should
remain the domestic policy lead to The international policy lead should double the number of CVE slots in
leverage the coordination mech- continue to be the State Depart- the bureau to fulfill its coordination
anisms it recently established. To ment Bureau for CT and CVE, as it function and offer technical assis-
make this arrangement sustainable, has the policy influence and rela- tance to those in Washington and
the Task Force should be given per- tionships needed to drive CVE ef- in embassies responsible for CVE.
manent office space, dedicated forts overseas. Under the leadership
personnel, and a line-item budget of the deputy coordinator for CVE, Embassies and USAID missions also
to fund its operational costs. The the bureau has the critical mandate play an instrumental role in identi-
Task Force also needs greater au- of coordinating within the State fying, supporting, and connecting
thority to enhance coordination Department and with USAID, and grassroots actors who can make
among domestic agencies. Requir- serving as a bridge to the CVE Task a real difference in their commu-
ing all domestic departments and Force. Currently there are four full- nities. As such, each country team
agencies to get the Task Force’s time staff in the bureau’s CVE office, should have a full-time CVE offi-
clearance on new policies, pro- with three more positions being cer, from the State Department or
grams, or outreach efforts would created. This pales in comparison USAID, whose job is to provide a
go a long way in synchronizing CVE to those focused on counterterror- platform for promising influencers
efforts domestically. ism. The next administration should and entrepreneurs, build and ex-

57

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


pand networks, and find ways to
support cutting-edge CVE work.
The Bureau for CT and CVE should
ensure that all U.S. efforts incorpo-
rate monitoring and evaluation ap-
proaches that withstand Congres-
sional scrutiny. It should also be
responsible for providing training
to all foreign service officers head-
ing overseas and those designated
as the CVE focal points.

Expanding the Ecosystem


for CVE
Governments cannot and should
not be the main face of CVE efforts.
The private sector and civil society
have tremendous contributions to
make, if given sufficient resources,
guidance, and backing. For the past
15 years, the U.S. government has
seeded a variety of networks and ini-
tiatives—from Generation Change,
a global network of young lead-
ers building community resilience
and cohesiveness, to Peer-to-Peer:
60 Challenging Violent Extremism, an
effort to enlist technology-savvy
university students in developing
strategic messaging campaigns. It
is time to build on these efforts and
reinvigorate U.S. investment into ex-
isting programs and people. There
is no need to reinvent the wheel—
we must be aware of all of the tools
at our disposal and use them to the
best of our ability.

Funders
TURNING POINT

As discussed throughout this re-


port, a dearth of resources has
been a major barrier to galvanizing
a CVE movement and scaling up
promising initiatives. The Commis-
sion recommends three different
funding mechanisms to infuse re-
sources into the CVE space.

1. Technology Innovation Fund.


To stimulate innovation in the
online space, we need to tap
into the creativity and techno-
logical prowess of the private
sector. The U.S. government
should partner with leading companies to seed a
technology innovation fund, modeled on In-
Q-Tel, for this purpose. In-Q-Tel is an independent, “It is time to build
not-for-profit organization created to bridge the on these efforts and
gap between the technology needs of the U.S. reinvigorate U.S.
intelligence community and commercial ventures.
It invests in startups developing technologies
investment into existing
that provide “ready-soon” innovation (within 36 programs and people.
months) vital to the intelligence community. Simi- There is no need to
larly, a CVE innovation fund, initiated by the gov- reinvent the wheel—we
ernment with the support of Congress, would bring
U.S. technological innovation to the fight against
must be aware of all of
violent extremist propaganda and narratives. the tools at our disposal
and use them to the
2. Private Philanthropy Consortium. The next admin-
istration should facilitate funding from the private best of our ability.”
sector, foundations, and private philanthropists for
community-based CVE efforts. In particular, “venture lion that the Department of
philanthropists,” which act more like venture capital- Justice requested in the pres-
ists than traditional foundations, should be a major ident’s FY 17 budget for CVE.112
target of outreach. Practitioners spend an enormous At the same time, the Com-
amount of time and effort raising small increments mission strongly recommends
of funding from donors with different procedures, that other domestic agencies
timelines, and requirements. This time would be bet- like the Department of Educa-
ter spent implementing programs and safeguarding tion, Department of Health and
community members from violent extremist groups. Human Services, and Depart-
The White House could help community stakehold- ment of Housing and Urban
ers tap into resources more efficiently by issuing a Development—with stronger
call to action—like My Brother’s Keeper, which raised community linkages—assume
61
$1 billion from the private sector—to mobilize pri- a bigger role in CVE. Likewise,
vate-sector and philanthropic funding and in-kind the Commission supports ef-
support. The administration could also play a lead- forts within the Department of
ership role in pulling together a consortium of these State—including the Bureau for
private donors to streamline fundraising and match CT and CVE, Global Engage-
funders with organizations with a proven track re- ment Center, Bureau for De-
cord on CVE.110 This model would help communi- mocracy, Human Rights and
ty-based organizations access resources without Labor, and Bureau for Educa-
the stigma of government involvement and give pri- tional and Cultural Exchang-

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


vate donors greater safety in numbers.111
es—and USAID to accelerate
3. U.S. Government Grants. Even with increased grantmaking to grassroots
private-sector and philanthropic investment in organizations and networks
CVE, there will always be a need for government on the cutting edge of CVE.
funding. The Commission supports the U.S. gov- However, in providing CVE re-
ernment’s efforts to increase small grants for sources, the U.S. government
domestic and international efforts. In particular, must keep a low profile and
we agree that the budget for the Office of Com- provide flexibility on branding
munity Partnerships at DHS should be increased requirements; embed rigor-
to $100 million to cover grantmaking and relat- ous evaluation mechanisms to
ed operational costs and endorse the $17.4 mil- measure programs’ impact and

110
“Homeland Security Advisory Council,” 19.
111
This consortium would complement the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF),
a public-private partnership aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas.
However, unlike GCERF, governments would not be involved in the management, decisionmaking, or
oversight of the consortium, beyond the initial facilitative role played by the U.S. government.
112
“Homeland Security Advisory Council,” 19.
build the knowledge base; and ant part of the CVE ecosystem.
offer long-term, core support However, such groups are few and
to strengthen the capacity of “Implementing this far between and need help with
its partners. vision will require capacity building from their peers.

Research Institutions
approximately $1 1)
Civil Society-Led Prevention
billion on an annual Network. The Commission en-
Research institutions, including
think tanks and universities, have a
basis. While that is a dorses the idea, put forward by
The Prevention Project, for a civil
significant role to play in creating huge figure…it is orders
society-led network in the United
the analytical and evidence base of magnitude less than States “to harness the efforts of
for more successful CVE initiatives. the trillions required the growing number of commu-
These institutions should increas-
in military and law nities and professionals around
ingly be tapped to generate an-
swers on motivations and drivers,
enforcement spending the country interested in help-
ing to prevent the violent radi-
the radicalization process, and ef- and the billions needed
calization of individuals in their
fective interventions. for humanitarian aid communities.”113 Such a network
1)
Public-Private Research Co- if violent extremist would help amplify community
alition. A major barrier to ev- groups are able to efforts to intervene with individ-
idence-based programming gain traction.” uals at-risk or in the process of
has been the divide between being radicalized. It would also
governments and technology provide emerging CVE profes-
companies who have access to 2) Programmatic Database. Do- sionals with a platform for shar-
data and researchers who need nors and policymakers have ing information, best practices,
the data to conduct rigorous been reluctant to invest in CVE and lessons learned with each
experiments and research. For over lingering doubts about other and with more established
example, researchers could whether competent organiza- practitioners and social service
use data on how users behave tions exist to do this work and providers (e.g., those working
62 in related fields like drug pre-
online after being exposed to whether programs make a tan-
counter- or positive messag- gible difference. CSIS could vention and treatment, mental
es to draw conclusions about contribute to advancing the field health provision, gang violence
the impact of those efforts and by developing a database of all prevention and rehabilitation).
make recommendations for CVE-specific programs, with
2)
Network of Young Leaders.
improving them. However, that concrete measures of effective-
Through its education and cul-
would require the government ness that could be tracked over
tural exchange programs, the
and technology companies to time. Using this data, CSIS could U.S. government has identified
provide access to such infor- identify the characteristics of ef- and invested in young leaders
mation. Likewise, researchers fective programs, sharing these from all over the world. These
should open their datasets to best practices and recommen- are individuals who were hand-
the government and other re- dations for scaling up success- picked because of their poten-
searchers to avoid recreating ful efforts. This database could tial as role models and change-
TURNING POINT

the wheel and allow for the rep- serve as the “gold standard” for makers. The government should
lication of quantitative studies. assessing the efficacy of CVE capitalize on these investments,
Building on RESOLVE—a global programs worldwide. creating a global network of
network of researchers con- young leaders who are interest-
Community-based Actors
ducting locally informed analy- ed in CVE, community resilience,
sis on the drivers and solutions Civil society and community-based or related areas. Through the
to violent extremism—the U.S. organizations working on preven- network, thousands of grass-
government should forge re- tion, intervention, deradicalization, roots actors could share infor-
search partnerships with uni- reintegration, and rehabilitation, as mation and best practices, rais-
versities, think tanks, and the well as strategic communications, ing the bar for a new generation
technology sector. are in many ways the most import- of practitioners.

Eric Rosand, “Communities First: A National Prevention Network to Defeat ISIS,” The Hill, August 2, 2016, http://thehill.com/
113

blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/290046-communities-first-a-national-prevention-network-to
Capacity Building and Intermediary Organizations to gain traction. This number is the least amount re-
For CVE efforts to ever reach scale, the United States quired to scale up CVE efforts to match the serious-
and its allies need to invest in international and na- ness of the threat and catalyze further investment.
tional nongovernmental organizations with a proven The United States cannot do this alone, but this
track record in CVE, existing partnerships and net- commitment is the first step in the right direction.
works, and strong capacity. The Commission rec- The Commission recommends the following alloca-
ommends investing in such “intermediary organiza- tion of funds to maximize the impact of this strategy on
tions” to drive major strides in the field and help build
reducing the radicalization and recruitment of young
the capacity of policymakers and practitioners.
people in the United States and all over the world.
1) CVE Accelerators. The United States and its allies,
Grantmaking—$550 million
as well as the private sector, should make major in-
vestments in existing hubs and agencies that use Technology Innovation Fund (In-Q-Tel model):
research, technology, and a start-up mentality to $150 million
incubate and accelerate evidence-based CVE pro-
grams and narrative campaigns. Such organizations Domestic small grants and related operational
occupy a central role in creating opportunities for costs: $150 million
entrepreneurs to design and implement success- International small grants and related operational
ful CVE operations. With a proven track record and costs: $250 million
trust from both the government and civil society,
they are also essential in delivering cutting-edge Research—$50 million
CVE programs, innovating and distributing strategic
Public-Private Research Coalition: $10 million
messaging campaigns, and mobilizing social move-
ments against extremism, both on- and offline. Programmatic Database: $5 million

2) CVE Training Academies. Training academies in the Independent Research: $35 million
United States and overseas—run by nongovern-
Community-based Actors—$65 million
mental organizations and civil society actors and
funded by the government—could fill vital knowl- 63
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs:
edge gaps for government actors, law enforcement $45 million
officials, local organizations, parents, teachers, and
social workers. One model for this effort is the He- Network of Networks—Young Leaders: $20 million
dayah International Center of Excellence, a UAE- Capacity Building Organizations—$85 million
based hub for building the capacity of CVE actors
across the globe. Educational programs could cov- CVE Accelerators: $55 million
er: the risks and warning signs of radicalization; ef-
Training Academies (3 at $10 million/year):
fective methods of counseling and mentoring; child
$30 million
brain development; how violent extremists use so-

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


cial media; how parents and social workers can dis- Civil-Military “Jump Teams”—$250 million
cuss extremist propaganda; and trust-building and
Operational Costs: $250 million
prevention fundamentals, including how to inter-
vene with at-risk individuals. Ideally, CVE academies U.S. investment in these areas is not intended to fulfill
would connect policymakers and practitioners, in- the vast need. Rather, the Commission’s recommen-
forming community-level engagements with the dations are meant to spur other countries and stake-
understanding of how violent extremism manifests holders to ramp up their support for and commitment
and how it can be stopped. to CVE. With these elements and resources in place,
we can significantly reduce support for violent ex-
Funding CVE tremism and safeguard this generation and genera-
Implementing this vision will require approximately tions to come.
$1 billion from the U.S. government on an annual
basis. While that is a huge figure—and a significant
increase for CVE funding—it is orders of magnitude
less than the trillions required in military and law
enforcement spending and the billions needed for
humanitarian aid if violent extremist groups are able
TURNING POINT

64
Commissioner Biographies
Cochairs

TONY BLAIR,
FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM

Tony Blair served as prime minister of the United


Kingdom from 1997 to 2007. Since leaving office he
has spent most of his time on work in the Middle East,
in Africa, and on the fight against religiously based
extremism. The Tony Blair Faith Foundation and its
Centre on Religion and Geopolitics track extremism
across the world, providing thought leadership and
education programs to counter extremist ideology.

LEON PANETTA,
FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND FORMER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A U.S. representative for 16 years, Leon E. Panetta was


named director of the Office of Management and
Budget for the Clinton administration in 1993 and then
chief of staff to the president. Later, as director of the
CIA, he oversaw the operation that brought Osama
bin Laden to justice. Named secretary of defense in
2011, Secretary Panetta led the effort to develop a new
defense strategy, conducted critical counterterrorism 65
operations, strengthened U.S. alliances, and opened
up opportunities for everyone to serve in the military.

Senior Advisers and Commissioners

FARAH PANDITH,
FORMER SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES AND ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


A diplomatic entrepreneur and foreign policy strate-
gist, Farah Pandith is a member of Secretary Jeh John-
son’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, an adjunct
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and
a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School
of Government. As a political appointee in the George
H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama
administrations, she has served in positions at the Na-
tional Security Council, U.S. Agency for International
Development, and U.S. Department of State, most re-
cently as the first-ever special representative to Mus-
lim communities. A CVE pioneer and author, she has
traveled to nearly 100 countries and launched global
youth-focused initiatives and networks to counter vi-
olent extremism and continues to do so from outside
government most notably cofounding Halcyon, an
innovative global organization dedicated to mobiliz-
ing youth against extremist ideologies.
JUAN ZARATE,
FORMER DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
FOR COMBATING TERRORISM AND SENIOR
ADVISER, CSIS

The Honorable Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at CSIS,


the chairman and cofounder of the Financial Integrity
Network (FIN), and the chairman and senior coun-
selor for the Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance
(CSIF) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Mr. Zarate also serves as the senior national securi-
ty analyst for NBC News and MSNBC and is a visiting
lecturer of law at the Harvard Law School. Mr. Zarate
served as the deputy assistant to the president and
deputy national security adviser for combating terror-
ism from 2005 to 2009, was the first-ever assistant
secretary of the treasury for terrorist financing and fi-
nancial crimes, and is a former federal prosecutor. Mr.
Zarate sits on several boards, including the Vatican's
Financial Information Authority, and is the author of
multiple publications, including his most recent book,
Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Finan-
cial Warfare (2013).

Commissioners

AHMED ABBADI,
SECRETARY GENERAL, MOHAMMADIAN
66 LEAGUE OF SCHOLARS, MOROCCO

Dr. Ahmad Abaddi is secretary general of the Moham-


madian League of Religious Scholars (Rabita Moham-
madia des Oulémas). He was a professor of Islamic
studies, comparative history of religions, tafsir, and
Islamic thought at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities
in Marrakesh, and a professor of sociology of North
Africa in the program of cooperation between Cadi
Ayyad University and the University of De Paul in Chi-
cago. Dr. Abaddi has been appointed to a number of
councils in Morocco including the Economic, Social
and Environmental Council, the National Council for
Human Rights, and the Higher Council for Education.
TURNING POINT

SCOTT ATRAN,
DIRECTEUR DE RECHERCHE, CENTRE NATIONAL
DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE AND FOUNDING
FELLOW, CENTRE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Professor Scott Atran is senior research fellow, Har-


ris Manchester College, University of Oxford and
cofounder of ARTIS Research and of the Centre for
the Resolution of Intractable Conflict at Oxford. He
is tenured as research director in anthropology at
France’s National Center for Scientific Research, In-
stitut Jean Nicod-Ecole Normale Supérieure, in Paris.
He also holds positions as research professor of pub-
lic policy and psychology, University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor, and currently serves as a member of the
UN Security Council Advisory Board on Youth, Peace,
and Security.

MONIKA BICKERT,
HEAD OF PRODUCT POLICY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM, FACEBOOK

Monika Bickert is Facebook’s head of product poli-


cy and counterterrorism. Bickert joined Facebook in
2012 as lead security counsel, advising the company
on matters including child safety and data security.
She was a formal federal prosecutor with the U.S. De-
partment of Justice for over a decade.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) NICHOLAS BURNS,


PROFESSOR, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL

Nicholas Burns is professor of the practice of diplo-


macy and international relations at the Harvard Ken-
nedy School. He serves on Secretary of State John
Kerry's Foreign Policy Advisory Board. In a long dip-
lomatic career, he was U.S. under secretary of state
for political affairs, U.S. ambassador to NATO and to
Greece, and State Department spokesman. He also
served on the National Security Council staff for Pres-
idents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush.
67
KARL-THEODOR ZU GUTTENBERG,
CHAIRMAN, SPITZBERG PARTNERS, LLC;
DISTINGUISHED STATESMAN, CSIS; AND
FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF GERMANY

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg served as German feder-


al minister of defense and as federal minister of eco-
nomics and technology in the cabinet of Chancellor
Angela Merkel. As minister of defense, he led the most
significant structural reform of the German armed

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


forces since the Bundeswehr’s founding in 1955. Bar-
on zu Guttenberg is a distinguished statesman at CSIS
as well as chairman and founder of Spitzberg Part-
ners, an international advisory and investment firm
that focuses on new technologies and geopolitics.

STEPHEN HADLEY,
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER AND
CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Stephen J. Hadley is a principal of RiceHadleyGates


LLC, an international strategic consulting firm found-
ed with Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, and Anja
Manuel. Mr. Hadley is also board chairman of the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and execu-
tive vice chair of the Board of the Atlantic Council.
Mr. Hadley served for four years as the assistant to
the president for national security affairs from 2005
to 2009. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Hadley was the as-
sistant to the president and deputy national security
adviser, serving under then National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice.

SHERMAN JACKSON,
KING FAISAL CHAIR OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND
CULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Sherman Jackson is the King Faisal chair in Islam-


ic thought and culture and professor of religion and
American studies and ethnicity at the University of
Southern California and an adjunct scholar and a
member of the board of advisors at ISPU. He is the
author of a plethora of books, including Islam and the
Blackamerican, the Boundaries of Theological Toler-
ance in Islam, and Islamic Law and the State: The Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence of Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi.

FRED KHOSRAVI,
COFOUNDER AND PARTNER, INCEPT, LLC AND
BOARD MEMBER, CSIS

Fred Khosravi is the cofounder and managing part-


ner at Incept, LLC, a health sciences and medical
technology development company. Mr. Khosravi is
a Silicon Valley medical device entrepreneur who
has, over the last 25 years, pioneered development
68 of life-saving technologies such as stents and an-
gioplasty devices for coronary artery interventions,
minimally invasive implantable heart valves, and life-
improving technologies such as intraocular lenses
for treatment of cataracts. A cofounder of 14 medical
companies, Mr. Khosravi also held senior manage-
ment positions in large medical device companies
such as Guidant Corporation (now part of Abbott),
Boston Scientific Corp, and Alcon Surgical Corp
and is the author or coauthor on over 160 issued or
filed patent applications, involving unique and novel
medical devices.
TURNING POINT

NANCY LINDBORG,
PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Nancy Lindborg has served since February 2015


as president of the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP), an independent institution founded by Con-
gress to provide practical solutions for preventing and
resolving violent conflict around the world. Prior to
joining USIP, she served as the assistant administra-
tor for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Hu-
manitarian Assistance (DCHA) at USAID. From 2010
through early 2015, Ms. Lindborg led USAID teams
focused on building resilience and democracy, man-
aging and mitigating conflict and providing urgent
humanitarian assistance.
MOHAMED MAGID,
IMAM, ALL DULLES AREA MUSLIM SOCIETY
AND CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL INTERFAITH
PEACE CORPS

Imam Mohamed Hagmagid is the executive direc-


tor of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS),
the chairperson of the International Interfaith Peace
Corp (IIPC), and the former president of the largest
Muslim organization in North America, the Islamic
Society of North America (ISNA). Imam Magid has a
long history of commitment to public service through
organizations such as The Peaceful Families Project,
Annual Twinning of Mosques and Synagogues, Fairfax
Faith Communities in Action, Interfaith Conference of
Metropolitan Washington Assembly, and the Buxton
Interfaith Initiative. He also has extensive experience
in public health advocacy, development, countering
violent extremism, and peace building in West Africa.

MARTHA MINOW,
MORGAN AND HELEN CHU DEAN AND PROFESSOR,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

Martha Minow, the Morgan and Helen Chu dean and


professor of Law, has taught at Harvard Law School
since 1981, where her courses include civil procedure,
constitutional law, family law, international criminal jus-
tice, jurisprudence, law and education, nonprofit orga- 69
nizations, and the public law workshop. She served on
the Independent International Commission Kosovo and
helped to launch Imagine Co-existence, a program of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, to promote
peaceful development in post-conflict societies.

VALI NASR,
DEAN AND PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. Vali Nasr is dean and professor at Johns Hopkins


University’s School of Advanced International Stud-
ies. He is a Middle East scholar, foreign policy adviser,
and commentator on international relations. He is the
author of The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign
Policy in Retreat and The Shia Revival. He served as
a special adviser to the president’s representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2011.

MARK PENN,
PRESIDENT AND MANAGING PARTNER,
THE STAGWELL GROUP

Mark Penn served as White House pollster to President


Bill Clinton for 6 years and was a key adviser in his 1996
reelection and second term in office. Mr. Penn also
served as chief strategist to Hillary Clinton during her
Senate campaigns and her 2008 presidential run. He
was also executive vice president and chief strategy of-
ficer at Microsoft, where he was responsible for work-
ing on core strategic issues across Microsoft’s prod-
ucts, value propositions, and investments and leading
the company’s competitive research and analysis, and
is the author of the best-selling book, Microtrends.

DINA POWELL,
HEAD OF GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING, GOLDMAN
SACHS, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS
AND DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Dina Powell is head of Goldman Sachs’ Impact In-


vesting business and president of the Goldman Sachs
Foundation. She also serves as global head of the Of-
fice of Corporate Engagement and is a member of the
Partnership Committee. Ms. Powell joined Goldman
Sachs as a managing director in 2007 and was named
partner in 2010. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, she
had an exemplary career in government, serving as
assistant secretary of state for educational and cul-
tural affairs and deputy undersecretary of public af-
fairs and public diplomacy. Ms. Powell also served as
a member of the senior staff of the White House as
assistant to the president for presidential personnel.
70
JANE ROSENTHAL,
EXECUTIVE CHAIR OF TRIBECA ENTERPRISES
AND COFOUNDER OF THE TRIBECA FILM FESTIVAL
AND THE TRIBECA FILM INSTITUTE

Jane Rosenthal is executive chair of the multiplatform


media company Tribeca Enterprises, which operates a
diverse network of branded entertainment business-
es, including the Tribeca Film Festival, Tribeca Studios,
and Tribeca Film Festival International. A distinguished
producer, Rosenthal cofounded the Tribeca Film Fes-
tival following the attacks on the World Trade Center,
evolving from an annual event to spur the econom-
TURNING POINT

ic and cultural revitalization of lower Manhattan into


one of the foremost innovative storytelling events in
the United States. She is a member of the Academy
of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences and sits on the
boards of the Tribeca Film Institute, the National Sep-
tember 11 Memorial & Museum at The World Trade
Center, the Child Mind Institute, and the NYU Tisch
School of the Arts Dean’s Council, and Interlude.

BRAD SMITH,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
MICROSOFT

Brad Smith is Microsoft’s president and chief legal offi-


cer, responsible for the company’s corporate, external,
and legal affairs. In addition to his work at Microsoft,
Mr. Smith is active in several civic and legal organi-
zations and in the broader technology industry. He
works to advance several significant diversity and pro
bono initiatives, serving as chair of the Board of Direc-
tors of Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) and as chair of
the Leadership Council on Legal Diversity (LCLD).

FRANCES TOWNSEND,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR WORLDWIDE
GOVERNMENT, LEGAL AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS,
MACANDREWS AND FORBES INCORPORATED

Frances Fragos Townsend is executive vice president


for worldwide government, legal and business affairs
at MacAndrews and Forbes Incorporated and presi-
dent of the Counter Extremism Project. From 2004 to
2008, Ms. Townsend served as assistant to the pres-
ident for homeland security and counterterrorism
and chaired the Homeland Security Council. She also
served as deputy national security adviser for com-
bating terrorism from May 2003 to May 2004.

KENT WALKER,
GENERAL COUNSEL, GOOGLE

Kent Walker serves as senior vice president and gen-


eral counsel for Google. Before joining Google, he
was deputy general counsel of eBay Inc., where he
71
managed corporate legal affairs, litigation, and legal
operations. Earlier in his career, Mr. Walker was an as-
sistant attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice,
where he specialized in the prosecution of technolo-
gy crimes and advised the attorney general on man-
agement and technology issues.

JAY WINIK,
AUTHOR AND HISTORIAN

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


Jay Winik is one of the nation's leading historians. He
is the author of three consecutive New York Times
bestsellers, most recently 1944 and April 1865. He is
a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an
elected fellow of the Society of American Historians,
and served on the Governing Council of the Nation-
al Endowment for the Humanities, a presidential ap-
pointment, as well as the boards for American Heri-
tage magazine and the journal World Affairs.
TURNING POINT

72
Acknowledgments A warm thanks to Courtney La Bau
for conducting interviews and re-
CSIS would like to thank all of the
search on the future of the threat,
commissioners for their immea-
which is summarized in the report.
surable commitment, expertise,
Also, CSIS would like to thank So-
and judgment throughout the
hini Chatterjee for offering analysis
Commission’s hearings and de-
on constituency-building.
velopment of this report. Without
their invaluable contributions and CSIS would also like to express its
creativity, this report would not appreciation to the senior advisers
have been possible. and staff of the cochairs and com-
missioners, particularly Ed Husain,
In particular, CSIS would like
Robert Danin, Corey Ganssley,
to thank Tony Blair and Secre-
Cabrina Flanagan, Alysha Tierney,
tary Leon Panetta for agreeing to
Will Guarino, and many others who
take on the challenge of cochair-
helped facilitate the completion of
ing this Commission and giving it
the report.
the full measure of their support.
Throughout the process, both The deliberations of the com-
cochairs were asking the tough missioners were informed and
questions, listening to a wide va- guided by a number of CSIS se-
riety of perspectives, and guiding nior scholars, especially Kathleen
the Commission toward final rec- Hicks, Melissa Dalton, Kimberly
ommendations that would make a Goddess, Jon Alterman, Andrew
real and lasting impact on the way Shearer, Stephen Morrison, and
CVE is understood and practiced in James Lewis, and others listed on
the United States and abroad. the following pages. These experts
offered their knowledge, expertise,
The Commission’s two senior
and advice to the Commission and 73
advisers and commissioners—
managing director, briefing com-
Juan Zarate and Farah Pandith—
missioners, commenting on drafts
provided vital substantive guidance
of the report, and appearing on the
and expertise in shaping the Com-
companion podcast On Violent Ex-
mission's analysis and recommen-
tremism. Their contributions sub-
dations. Their unflagging support,
stantially enhanced the Commis-
advice, and energy were integral to
sion’s understanding of the issues.
crafting this report. Juan and Farah
are both pioneers of CVE and con- Special thanks are due to Dr. John
tinue to be on the leading edge of J. Hamre, president and CEO

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


innovation in countering the radi- of CSIS, Craig Cohen, executive
calization and recruitment that has vice president, and H. Andrew
had such a devastating impact on Schwartz, senior vice president
our national security and commu- for external relations, who served
nities throughout the world. We are as valued guides throughout the
so grateful for their engagement. entirety of the Commission. This
report would not have been possi-
Shannon N. Green, director and
ble without their unwavering sup-
senior fellow of the Human Rights
port and leadership, wise counsel,
Initiative, was the managing di-
and encouragement.
rector of the Commission and the
driving force behind its work. She A number of CSIS associates and
and Keith Proctor, independent research assistants in the Human
consultant, served as the principal Rights Initiative contributed im-
drafters of the report. Both pro- measurably to the production of
vided vital research and lent their this report. Jillian Rafferty played a
expertise to inform the Commis- central role in organizing Commis-
sion’s deliberations and findings. sion meetings, conducting back-
ground research, and managing consultations. Elliot
Hecht made sure that Commission meetings went
smoothly. Julie Snyder, helped get the report over the
finish line, organizing countless meetings and consul-
tations, drafting key elements of the report, and re-
viewing multiple drafts. They are the unsung heroes
of this effort.

Special recognition is due to Jim Dunton and his


publications team who edited the report. We are ex-
tremely grateful to the ideasLab, particularly Lauren
AbuAli, Max Markusen, Rebecka Shirazi, Willa Hine,
Caroline Amenabar, and Fran Burkham, for their work
in editing, producing, and guiding the podcast series
that accompanied the Commission’s work as well as
creating the beautiful report layout. Thanks also to
Ella Weiner for her input on the cultural heritage sec-
tion of the report.

We are extremely thankful for each of our podcast


guests, listed in the following pages, whose unique
insights and expertise helped to create a mosaic of
voices and perspectives on CVE.

CSIS would also like to recognize the National Sep-


tember 11 Memorial & Museum, Google, Gen Next,
and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue for gracious-
ly hosting meetings and private roundtables over the
duration of this Commission.
74
Finally, CSIS would like to express its deep gratitude
to Mark Penn and Fred Khosravi for their financial and
substantive support to the Commission. In addition to
being the founding contributor to its work, Mark ele-
vated the Commission’s deliberations beyond measure,
overseeing a global survey on perceptions of CVE. This
one-of-a-kind survey informed the Commission’s un-
derstanding of the challenge and options for addressing
it. Fred brought his unrivaled enthusiasm and passion
to this project, offering guidance and connecting com-
missioners and the managing director to a range of di-
verse experts and stakeholders who offered their unique
views on CVE.
TURNING POINT


CSIS Contributors THOMAS M. SANDERSON,
SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
Managing Director TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT

SHANNON N. GREEN,
H. ANDREW SCHWARTZ,
DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE

CSIS Experts ANDREW SHEARER,


SENIOR ADVISER ON ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY
JON B. ALTERMAN,
Research Associates
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
CHAIR IN GLOBAL SECURITY AND GEOSTRATEGY, JILLIAN RAFFERTY,
AND DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM PROGRAM MANAGER AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,
HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
KATHERINE BROWN,
VISITING FELLOW, HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE JULIE N. SNYDER,
PROGRAM COORDINATOR AND RESEARCH
CRAIG S. COHEN, ASSISTANT, HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

HEATHER A. CONLEY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE,
EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC; AND DIRECTOR,
EUROPE PROGRAM

JENNIFER G. COOKE,
DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM
75
MELISSA DALTON,
SENIOR FELLOW AND CHIEF OF STAFF,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

KIMBERLY GODDES,
VISITING FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

JOHN J. HAMRE,

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


PRESIDENT AND CEO

KATHLEEN H. HICKS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT; HENRY A. KISSINGER
CHAIR; AND DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM

JAMES A. LEWIS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM

J. STEPHEN MORRISON,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY CENTER

DANIEL F. RUNDE,
WILLIAM A. SCHREYER CHAIR AND DIRECTOR,
PROJECT ON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT
TURNING POINT

76
Consultations AMBASSADOR (RET.) DANIEL BENJAMIN,
NORMAN E. MCCULLOCH, JR. DIRECTOR, JOHN
The CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extrem-
SLOAN DICKEY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ism consulted with a wide and diverse array of ex-
UNDERSTANDING, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
perts, practitioners, academics, private-sector repre-
sentatives, government officials, and others to shape
ALEJANDRO J. BEUTEL,
the strategy and recommendations in this report. We
RESEARCHER, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR
are eternally grateful for each of their contributions
THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES
and have included their names here. However, we
TO TERRORISM, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
would like to note that being listed does not neces-
sarily indicate endorsement of the report's findings or
JEROME P. BJELOPERA,
conclusions. We would also like to thank those inter-
SPECIALIST, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM,
viewed and consulted, not listed here, for their sup-
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
port and input.
HILLARY BRIFFA,
MASOOD AKHTAR,
DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
ENTREPRENEUR AND ADVISER TO THE MADISON,
WISCONSIN MUSLIM COMMUNITY
RABIA CHAUDRY,
JENNINGS RANDOLPH SENIOR FELLOW,
FATIMA AKILU,
U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEEM FOUNDATION
SARAH COCHRAN,
MOHAMED ABDULKADIR ALI,
ONEBLUE.ORG, PRESIDENT AND COFOUNDER
FOUNDER, IFTIIN FOUNDATION
JARED COHEN,
RASHAD ALI,
PRESIDENT, JIGSAW
SENIOR FELLOW AND COUNTERTERRORISM PRAC-
TITIONER, INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
MICHAEL P. DAVIDSON,
77
CEO, GEN NEXT
AMBASSADOR YOUSELF AL-OTAIBA,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AMBASSADOR TO
MARY DEBREE,
THE UNITED STATES
FACEBOOK
NAIF AL-MUTAWA,
MICHAEL P. DOWNING,
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST; CREATOR, THE 99;
DEPUTY CHIEF AND COMMANDING OFFICER,
AND FOUNDER, THE SOOR CENTER
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
BUREAU, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
SHAHED AMANULLAH,

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER AND COFOUNDER,
WILLIAM H. DRAPER III,
AFFINISLABS
COCHAIR, DRAPER RICHARDS
KAPLAN FOUNDATION
FRANCIS X. ARCHIBALD,
FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CLANDESTINE
MAHMOUD EL-GAMAL,
SERVICE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, RICE UNIVERSITY
PETER BAUMAN,
JASMINE M. EL-GAMAL,
FOUNDER AND CEO, BAUMAN GLOBAL
SENIOR FELLOW, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
TALENE BILAZARIAN,
MOHAMED ELSANOUSI,
DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
DIRECTOR, THE NETWORK FOR RELIGIOUS AND
TRADITIONAL PEACEMAKERS
CAROL BELLAMY,
CHAIR, GOVERNING BOARD, GLOBAL COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE FUND
LEANNE ERDBERG, KHALID KOSER,
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GLOBAL COMMUNITY
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE FUND
SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE JAMES KUNDER,
AFFILIATED EXPERT, THE LUGAR CENTER
NAUREEN CHOWDHURY FINK,
DIRECTOR, CVE AND MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS, LARRY D. LAUER,
GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY VICE CHANCELLOR EMERITUS,
TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
DONNIE FOWLER,
CEO, TECH4AMERICA NANCY LEFKOWITZ,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, TALENT RELATIONS,
MICHAEL GERMAN, TRIBECA ENTERPRISES
FELLOW, LIBERTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
PROGRAM, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, MATTHEW LEVITT,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW FROMER-WEXLER FELLOW, AND DIRECTOR,
STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND
JAMES K. GLASSMAN, INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
VISITING FELLOW, EAST POLICY
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
DAVID GORODYANSKY, SENIOR COUNSEL, KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES &
COFOUNDER AND CEO, ANCHORFREE FRIEDMAN LLP

ALEXANDER GUITTARD, MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN,


ACCOUNT DIRECTOR, SPECIAL ENVOY AND COORDINATOR,
78 M&C SAATCHI WORLD SERVICES GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEAMUS HUGHES,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, PETER MANDAVILLE,
CENTER FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SECURITY, SENIOR ADVISER, OFFICE OF RELIGION
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ED HUSAIN, JAMES E. MAHONEY,


SENIOR ADVISER AND DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, EXECUTIVE, CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS
TONY BLAIR FAITH FOUNDATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, BANK OF AMERICA

RASHAD HUSSAIN, MICHAEL G. MASTERS,


SENIOR COUNSEL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, THE SOUFAN GROUP
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TURNING POINT

WILL MCCANTS,
JONATHAN KAPLAN, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
FOUNDER AND CEO,
PURE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES ROBERT MCCAW,
DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
HUMERA KHAN, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MUFLEHUN
HISHAM MELHEM,
ADNAN KIFAYAT, COLUMNIST, AL-ARABIYA ENGLISH AND
SENIOR FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND ANNAHAR NEWSPAPER

RACHEL KLEINFELD, CHRIS MESEROLE,


SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT PRE-DOCTORAL FELLOW,
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
HEDIEH MIRAHMADI, AMBASSADOR (RET.) ISLAM SIDDIQUI,
FOUNDER AND BOARD MEMBER, WORDE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN MUSLIM INSTITUTION,
AND SENIOR ADVISER, CSIS
MOHAMMAD-MAHMOUD OULD MOHAMEDOU,
DEPUTY-DIRECTOR AND ACADEMIC DEAN OF KATE O’SULLIVAN,
THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY MICROSOFT CORPORATION
AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR AT THE GRADUATE
INSTITUTE, GENEVA DINA TEMPLE-RASTON,
CORRESPONDENT, COUNTERTERRORISM,
LISA O. MONACO, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL MAURICIO PALMA,
DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INITIATIVES AND PROJECTS,
SECURITY COUNSEL
SILICON VALLEY COMMUNITY FOUNDATION
JESSE C. MORTON,
FAIZA PATEL, CODIRECTOR,
RESEARCH FELLOW, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND LIBERTY PROGRAM,
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

SANAM NARAGHI-ANDERLINI,
OMAIR PAUL,
COFOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION NETWORK MUSLIMS FOR PROGRESSIVE VALUES

AHLEM NASRAOUI, MOSSARAT QADEEM,


COFOUNDER, SWAN FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR, PAIMAN ALUMNI TRUST

PETER R. NEUMANN, CHETHAN RAMACHANDRAN,


PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES, COFOUNDER AND CEO, PLAYNOMICS
DEPARTMENT OF WAR, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON 79
NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN,
EILEEN O’CONNOR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM
VICE PRESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS, CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
MICHAEL E. ROLINCE
ERIK OKSALA, SENIOR ADVISER, FEDERAL BUREAU
CHIEF OF STAFF, RL LEADERS OF INVESTIGATION

JACOB OLIDORT, ERIC ROSAND,

SHANNON N. GREEN & KEITH PROCTOR


SOREF FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE DIRECTOR, THE PREVENTION PROJECT:
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ORGANIZING AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

MANAL OMAR, MADELINE ROSE,


ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR MIDDLE SENIOR POLICY ADVISER, MERCY CORPS
EAST AND AFRICA, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
RUSTY RUEFF,
GREGORY ORFALEA, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, GRAMMY FOUNDATION
AUTHOR, WRITER-IN-RESIDENCE,
JONATHAN RUSSELL,
WESTMONT COLLEGE
HEAD OF POLICY, QUILLIAM FOUNDATION
MICHAEL R. ORTIZ,
IRFAN SAEED,
DEPUTY COORDINATOR, COUNTERING VIOLENT
DIRECTOR, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM,
EXTREMISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COREY SAYLOR, IVO VEENKAMP,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT TO MONITOR AND DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HEDAYAH,
COMBAT ISLAMOPHOBIA, COUNCIL ON THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

EDIT SCHLAFFER, GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL,


FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
WOMEN WITHOUT BORDERS AND SISTERS COMMAND (SOCOM)
AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM
SUHAIB WEBB,
GEORGE SELIM, IMAM, BOSTON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR COMMUNITY PARTNER-
SHIPS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY THINZAR SHUNLEI YI,
YOUTH ADVOCATE, MYANMAR
D. BRUCE SEWELL,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LEGAL AND GLOBAL PARISA SABETI ZAGAT,
SECURITY; AND GENERAL COUNSEL, APPLE, INC. POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS, FACEBOOK

ANTHONY SGRO, ANI ZONNEVELD,


FOUNDER AND CEO, EDVENTURE PARTNERS PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, MUSLIMS FOR
PROGRESSIVE VALUES
AMRIT SINGH,
HEAD, ACCOUNTABILITY, LIBERTY, AND THE NETWORK OF THE GEN NEXT FOUNDATION
TRANSPARENCY, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

GARY SLUTKIN,
FOUNDER AND CEO, CURE VIOLENCE
80
DAVID SOLOFF,
COFOUNDER AND CEO, PREMISE DATA

ALI SOUFAN,
CHAIRMAN AND CEO, THE SOUFAN GROUP

BRETTE STEELE,
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CVE TASK FORCE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MEREDITH STRICKER,
PROGRAM DIRECTOR, PEACE AND SECURITY
FUNDERS GROUP
TURNING POINT

VASILI TSAMIS,
COO, STAVROS NIARCHOS FOUNDATION

CRAIG VACHON,
VICE PRESIDENT, CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT,
ANCHORFREE

MOBEEN VAID,
AUTHOR, MUSLIMMATTERS

LT. COLONEL (RET.) DANIEL R. VASQUEZ,


CEO, INTELLIWINGS, LLC
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COVER PHOTO ANADOLU AGENCY / CONTRIBUTOR / GETTY IMAGES

MOSUL, IRAQ - OCTOBER 25: A child is seen on the street as smoke rises from oil
wells set on fire by ISIS to limit coalition forces’ eyesight and take the wells out of
service following the Iraqi army’s retaking of Al Qayyarah. Picture taken in Mosul,
Iraq on October 25, 2016.

ISBN 978-1-4422-7978-0

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