RULE 1

1. Manalo vs. CA
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children,
namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo,
Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda
Manalo, who are all of legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45
General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator thereof.

- TC -> order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government.”
- order of general default set aside upon motion of pets (wife & remaining 3 children)
- TC -> order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate.
- Pets -> pet for certiorari under Rule 65
- absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same family; and no
certification of non
forum shopping was attached to the petition.
- CA denied the petition & MFR
- Pets – petition claiming Pet for issuance of letters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is
an ordinary civil action thus should be dismissed under Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the
ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with as there was
failure to comply with the requirement in Art 222 CC

ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an
ordinary civil action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a
ground for the dismissal of the petition

HELD:
NO

 Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling.
o scrutiny of the Petition for ILASD of Estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action.
 petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate
1. fact of death
2. residence at the time of his said death
3. enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
4. tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
 reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
o petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action & so
petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of
Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.

 civil action/suit - action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
 Use of term “suit”
 excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only to civil actions which
are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

 Special proceedings – remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular
fact.
o Pet for ILASD of Estate = special proc

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

HELD:
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. It is a fundamental rule that in t he determination of
the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought
in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of
the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on
February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The
fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition is
SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a
tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as
regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition,
the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not
by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to
have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. So
it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would
nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding"
is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough.

Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for
the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can
validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 2. Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
149 SCRA 562

Principles:
1. Case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of actual date of filing in
Court.
2. Basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
3. All complaints, petition, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and that the
damages should be considered in the assessment of the filing fees.

Facts:
The case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary
restraining order, etc. The prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that
maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as
maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.

Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained. After the Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering
the re- assessment of the docket fee, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to
rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then
that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount
of P10,000,000.00. Still no amounts of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.

Issue:
Whether or not the basis of assessment of the docket fees should be the amount of damages in
the amended complaint.

Ruling:
YES
The motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the
action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not
stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the
amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership
and possession of real property. An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court
to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages,
and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. The
action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the
docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of
the computation of the filing fee.

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of
the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the
amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For a legal purpose there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned
and reversed.
 3. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong
GR No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a
prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the
reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case
against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were
not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that
it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million.

In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was
paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint
wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent
was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
thanP10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim
of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On
October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of
this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid
an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the
amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that
private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not
been paid?
‘
Ruling:
Yes.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.

Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect. The Court dismissed
petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-assess the docket fees.

Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by
paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended
complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the
respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket
fees.
 4. Ballatan v. CA
304 SCRA 34 (1999)

- In Real Actions, the docket & filing fees are based on the value of the property & amount of
damages claimed, if any.
- If a complaint is filed but not paid during filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.
- Where the prescribed fees for the real action have been paid but fees for damages have
not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the claim for damages.
o The court may expunge those claims or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
amendment of the complaint to allege the precise amount of damages & accept
payment of the requisite legal fees.

Facts:
In 1985, Eden Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24 in Araneta University Village,
Malabon. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence & side pathway of the
adjoining house of Winston Go encroached upon the entire length of the eastern side of her
property. Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that
described in the title.

Ballatan informed Go about the discrepancy and encroachment, but Go claimed that his house
(including its fence and pathway) were built within the parameters of his father’s lot.

The owner-developer of the subdivision, Araneta Insitute of Agriculture (AIA) authorized a survey
of the land by Engr. Jose N. Quedding. Quedding found that the lot area of Ballatan was less by a
few meters & that of Li Ching Yao (3 lots away), increased by 2 meters. He declared that he made
a verification survey of the lots belonging to Go in 1983, and found the boundaries to be in order.
However he could not explain the reduction in Ballatan’s area.

Engr. Quedding made another relocation survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot 24
lost approx.. 25sqm. on its eastern boundary; that Lot 25 did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot
26 lost around 3 sqm which were however gained by Lot 27.

On the basis of this survey, Ballatan made a written demand on Go to remove & dismantle their
improvements on Lot No. 24. Go refused, thus Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Go
did not appear.

Ballatan filed a case for recovery of possession before the RTC of Malabon. The Go’s filed an
answer with third-party complaint, impleading Li Ching Yao, AIA & Engr. Quedding.
The RTC decided in favor of Ballatan, ordering Go to vacate Lot No. 24 and demolish their
improvements and to pay Ballatan actual damages. It also dismissed the third-party complaint
against AIA, Quedding & Li Ching Yao.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the RTC. It ordered Li Ching Yao & Engr. Quedding to
pay Ballatan; and Li Ching Yao to pay Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which
they encroached – the value to be fixed at the time of taking.

Issues:
1) Is the award of damages proper, despite Go’s failure to specify the amount prayer for & failure
to pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon?
2) Given the fact of encroachment on Ballatan’s property, what are her rights?

Ruling:
1. YES, the award of damages is proper.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of accion publiciana of
Ballatan against Go, which is a real action. In real actions, the docket & filing fees are based
on the value of property & the amount of damages claimed.

Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid, but the fees of certain related
damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the court may
expunge those claims for damages, or allow (on motion) a reasonable time for amendment
of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of damages & accept payment of the
requisite legal fees.

In the instant case, the third-party complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint,
but added a prayer for attorney’s fees & costs without specifying their amounts. The additional
filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.

2. The erroneous survey by Engr. Quedding triggered the discrepancies. It was upon said
erroneous survey that Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father’s land. Otherwise
stated, Go had no knowledge that they encroached on Ballatan’s lot. They are deemed builders in
good faith.

Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. There is no evidence,
much less, any allegation that Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that
a portion thereof encroached on Go’s adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, & upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.

Thus, Ballatan as owner of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by Go on
their land, or sell to Go the subject portion.

If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render Go’s house useless, then Ballatan may
sell to Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go’s are unwilling or
unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to
Ballatan.
In the event that Ballatan elects to sell to Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must
be fixed at the prevailaing market value at the time of payment. The time of taking is determinative
of just compensation in expropriation proceedings; clearly the instant case is not one for
expropriation.

Ballatan was ordered to decide within 30 days whether to buy the portion of Go’s improvement on
Lot 24, or to sell to Go the portion of their land on which the improvement stands. Engr. Quedding
was ordered to pay attorney’s fees of P5,000 to Go.
5. AYALA LAND, INC. vs. SPOUSES CARPO
G.R. No. 140162. November 22, 2000

This is a petition for review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated May 14, 1999,
dismissing petitioners appeal from the summary judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
255, Las Pias City in Civil Case No. 96-0082 for its failure to pay the full amount of docket fees
as well as the appellate courts resolution, dated September 15, 1999, denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.

Facts:
On March 10, 1995, respondent spouses Carpo brought an action in the Makati Regional Trial
Court against Ayala Land Corporation and Property Ventures Corporation for quieting of title. In
their complaint, respondents claimed to be the true and lawful owners of a parcel of land in Las
Pias registered in their names. They sought the annulment of the titles in the defendants name:
and all other titles derived therefrom. Respondents later amended their complaint by changing the
name of Ayala Land Corporation to that of Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI).

On December 17, 1996, ALI moved for summary judgment. As its motion was denied, ALI filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which, on September 25, 1997, rendered a decision
ordering the trial court to render summary judgment. ALI took exception to the resolution of the
Court of Appeals and asked that summary judgment be rendered by it but the appellate court
denied ALIs motion.

ALI filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the Court of Appeals refusal to render
summary judgment. Respondents also filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the Court
of Appeals ruling that summary judgment was proper. Both petitions were dismissed by this Court.
Accordingly, on December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered summary judgment finding
respondents title superior to that of ALI because the latter was based merely on a survey plan
which was not approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

On January 5, 1999, ALI filed with the trial court a notice of appeal. On the same date, it
paid P415.00 for docket and other lawful fees as assessed by the cash clerk of the trial court.

On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the first of its assailed resolutions dismissing
ALIs appeal on the ground that it failed to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. It
appears that per its computation, the amount paid by ALI was P5.00 short of the correct amount.
After paying P5.00 on June 7, 1999, ALI moved for reconsideration on June 8, 1999. But on
September 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied ALIs motion.

ALI, therefore, filed the instant petition for review on October 13, 1999.
On November 17, 1999, this Court denied ALIs petition for review. The resolution denying the
petition for review stated:
Petitioner contends that the dismissal of its appeal by the Court of Appeals is too harsh a sanction
for the P5.00 deficiency in the payment of the required legal fees. The contention has no merit. It
is settled that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the requirement for the timely payment
of full appeal fees renders the decision final since appeal is only a statutory privilege and,
therefore, it should be exercised in the manner provided by law. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, 1 of Rule 50, in relation to 4 of Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the dismissal of the appeal for failure to pay the full amount of the required
docket and other lawful fees.
On December 13, 1999, ALI moved for a reconsideration. On January 19, 2000, this Court
granted ALIs motion for reconsideration and reinstated its petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing ALIs appeal for failure to pay the correct
amount of docket and other lawful fees.

Held:
YES
The petition is meritorious.
To be sure, the remedy of appeal is a purely statutory right and one who seeks to avail
thereof must comply with the statute or rule. For this reason, payment of the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdictional. However, as we have ruled in Aranas v. Endona, the strict
application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate docket fees
may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice. As early as 1946, in the case of Segovia v. Barrios, we ruled that where an appellant in
good faith paid less than the correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he
was required to pay by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss
his appeal because every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by
law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law. To penalize
such citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice.

The ruling in Segovia was applied by this Court in subsequent cases where an appellants right to
appeal was threatened by the mistake of public officers in computing the correct amount of docket
fee. Respondents draw attention to Rule 41, 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid in full to the clerk of
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from within the period for taking the
appeal. They argue that this Rule has overruled the decision in Segovia.

This contention is untenable. Rule 41, 4 must be read in relation to Rule 50, 1(c) which
provides that:
An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee,
on the following grounds:. . . .
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule
41.. . . .

With the exception of 1(b), which refers to the failure to file notice of appeal or the record on
appeal within the period prescribed by these Rules, the grounds enumerated in Rule 50, 1
are merely directory and not mandatory. This is plain from the use of the permissive may in the
text of the statute. Despite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fee,
therefore, the appellate court still has the discretion to relax the rule in meritorious
cases. The ruling in Segovia is still good law which the appellate court, in the exercise of its
discretion, must apply in circumstances such as that in the present case where an appellant
was, from the start, ready and willing to pay the correct amount of docket fee, but was
unable to do so due to the error of an officer of the court in computing the correct
amount. To hold otherwise would be unjust and unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 6. Spouses GO vs. JOHNSON Y. TONG
G.R. No. 151942. November 27, 2003

FACTS:
 Petitioner Juana Tan Go purchased a cashiers check from the Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) in the amount of P500,000.00, payable to private respondent Johnson
Y. Tong. On petitioner Juanas instruction, the cashiers check bore the words Final
Payment/Quitclaim
 After the check was delivered to private respondent, he deposited it with the words Final
Payment/Quitclaim already erased, hence, it was not honored.
 FEBTC did not grant the request of private respondents counsel for the check be replaced
with another, hence, private respondent filed a complaint against FEBTC and petitioner
Juana and her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for sum of money, damages, and
attorneys fees, subject of the case at bar.
 Petitioners filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court the
amount of P500,000.00 representing the amount of the check, subject to the condition
that it shall remain deposited until the disposition of the case.
 Public respondent, acting on the verbal manifestation/motion of private respondents
counsel, allowed the release of petitioners P500,000.00 deposit to private respondent.
 By order of November 17, 1999, public respondent, in the interest of justice and because of
the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court considers the business climate and the peso
crunch prevailing), allowed private respondent to first deposit P25,000.00 on or before
December 15, 1999 and P20,000.00 every month thereafter until the full amount of docket
fees is paid, and only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the payment, on
staggered basis, of the docket fees for the Supplemental Complaint.

HELD:
NO
 While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even
its non- payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. While the cause of action of private respondent was
supposed to prescribe in four (4) years, he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the
docket fee in a years time. We do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable.
Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the
government of the required docket fee.
 We sustain the CAs findings absolving respondent judge of any capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
 7. ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKERn vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

FACTS
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and thereafter issued an order
for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. Petitioner then filed a
contingent claim for agent's commission for the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by him in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that
(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not
been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3)
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.

RTC ordered dismissal of the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari before SC questioning the grounds raised by
Respondent.

ISSUE
WON RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim.

HELD:
YES.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated
upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement
of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent
money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the
court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable”. In the
present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should
have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done
personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion
under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of
substantial justice.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services
rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate
even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien
on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court
may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court
had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore,
non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for
dismissing a money claim against the estate. ***
 8. Original Dev't. and Construction Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
202 SCRA 753 , October 15, 1991

Civil Procedure – Payment of Docket Fees – Pure Money Claims vs In Rem Actions
Principle:
Civil Procedure|Docket Fee|The amount of any claim for damages arising on or before the filing of
the complaint of any pleading should be specified
- Fact that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the
lower court to compute for docket fees payable and left to the judge "mere guesswork" as to these
amounts is fataI.
- Requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleadings but also in
the prayer has not been altered
- Trial court now is authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
- Court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the complaint so as to
allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the prescriptive period.

Facts:
Original Development and Construction Corporation (ODECOR) sued Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMC) for
breach of contract and for damages. ODECOR accused the two of divesting its customers which
resulted to massive losses for the corporation.

In ODECOR’s claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and
moral damages, “the amount of which will be proved at the trial”; that for actual damages it’s
claiming P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to be unspecified amount of damages which the trial
court could not assess. ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for the actual damages
specified as well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.

HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.

The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed the Clerk of Court to issue
a certificate of reassessment of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency ODECOR should
pay the same. In the assessment, the Clerk of Court determined that the claim for attorney’s fee
which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the PRAYER of the complaint
hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have included payment for the fees for the
claim of attorney’s fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its complaint.

In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its allegations in the first complaint
except that it specified its claim for attorney’s fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monthly
liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.

HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of
the trial court. The CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court from hearing the case.
ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
No.
The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The terms used by ODECOR in
its claims i.e. “the amount of which will be proved at the trial” and the demand for attorney’s fees
as “equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of
this suit” are not definite enough to be the basis of the computation of the proper docket fees.

While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in his
estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such docket and
other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the
Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge “mere
guesswork” as to these amounts, which is fatal.

NOTES:
The court may allow amendment of a pleading (in complaints purely for money and
damages) if such does not specify the amount of claims. When amended, the pleader shall pay
the appropriate docket fees. Where the amount of claim is specified but the docket fees paid
were not sufficient, the pleader is allowed to cure the defect by paying the deficiency.
PROVIDED, that in both cases prescription has not set.

If the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and the prescribed fees
for an action involving real property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action on the real
property but may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Accordingly, the court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the
prescriptive period.

Dispositive Portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
 9. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. CA

Facts:
Jose Ma. Jacinto (J), private respondent was the former owner of record of 100 shares of stock of
the Manila Golf and Country Club (MGCC) now owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
NSC. For valuable considerations, Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (MGCCI) issued its stock
certificate to J representing 100 shares of MGCCI. J went abroad in advent of the 1972 Martial
Law and returned to the Philippines in early 1986.

Upon return J discovered that his stock certificate had been cancelled and a replacement stock
certificate had been issued in the name of NSC. J questioned the cancellation and the
replacement of his certification alleging absence of consent, contract and its consideration
between him and NSC, as well as transfer and replacement is illegal and the cancellation as
invalid. J made several demands for the return and retransfer of his certificate against NSC but to
no avail. Thus, J filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati demanding the MGCC for execution
of deed of assignment and to deliver the deed of assignment executed by MGCC to NSC of the
said shares of stocks for its cancellation with prayer that if it is impossible to satisfy his demand
MGCCI be ordered to (1) cancel in its stock and transfer book the stock certificate issued to NSC
issued in replacement of J’s stock certificate; (2) issue a new stock certificate in the name of NSC
or the stock certificate that might have been issued in replacement thereof; (3) declare as lost and
of no force and effect the MGCCI stock certificate now outstanding and registered in the name of
NSC. J in the same complaint also filed damages, attorney’s fees, and costs against MGCC and
NSC.

NSC in its Answer moved for dismissal of the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that
J’s action being a recoveyance of property, satisfaction of the prescribed docket fees acquires
jurisdiction being action in personam, of which J failed to comply prescribe docket fees. RTC
denied NSC’s motion. On appeal before the CA, the latter sustained RTC’s denial. According to
CA, there is no allegation in the complaint of any quantified amount and/or of the actual value of
the stock certificate in question and is not even alleged in the body of the complaint, and which is
not also sought to be recovered in the action.

Issue:
1) WON Jacinto’s complaint is action for reconveyance of property (in personam).
2) WON RTC acquires jurisdiction even when Jacinto failed to satisfy immediately the
prescribed docket fees.

Ruling:
1. YES. NSC correctly argues that the action in this case is for the recovery of property rather
than for specific performance and, hence, the docket fee should be based on the value of
the property sought to be recovered. It is similar to an action in which petitioner seeks the
execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor. Such action has been held to be for
the recovery of the real property and not for specific performance since his primary objective is
to regain the ownership and possession of the parcel of land. Jacinto, seeks the execution in
his favor of a deed of assignment of shares of stock, it follows that the action is for the
recovery of personal property, the main purpose of which is to regain the ownership and
possession of the said shares of stock.

2. YES. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action, if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time
of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
 reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in, in the
meantime.

It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of
Jacinto to pay the correct amount of docket fees. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this
requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be
considered in estoppel. NSC filed in 1990 a motion to dismiss but did not raise this point. Instead
it based his motion on prescription. Upon the denial by the trial court of its motion to dismiss, it
filed an answer, submitted its pre-trial brief, and participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. NSC is estopped from raising this issue. Indeed, while the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may
be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and
he only objects to the court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him.
 10. Ago Timber Corp. vs. Ruiz
[G.R. No. L-23887. December 26, 1967

Principle:
COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT RECKONED FROM DATE OF PAYMENT OF FILING FEE. —
Where a petition has been filed with the clerk of the CFI without the necessary filing fee, which
was paid only sometime later, the date that should be reckoned as the filing of such petition is
when the filing fee was actually paid, and not when the petition was received (Sec. 1, Rule 13, and
Sec. 1, Rule 141).

MOTION TO DISMISS; PENDENCY OF ANOTHER CASE. — Where two separate cases

involving the same parties and subject matter have been filed, one in Manila by petitioner Ago
Timber Corporation against respondent Excellent Management Corporation, and another in
Agusan at a later date by respondent against petitioner, it was incumbent upon the Agusan Court
to grant petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on pendency of another action between the same
parties not only as a matter of comity with a coordinate and co-equal court (Laureta & Nolledo,
Commentaries & Jurisprudence on Injunctions, p. 79, citing Harrison vs Littlefield, 57 Tex. Div. A.
617, 619, 124, SW 212) but also to prevent confusion that might seriously hinder the
administration of justice (Cabigao, Et Al., v. Del Rosario, Et Al., 44 Phil., 182). As the Agusan Court
did not act upon the motion to dismiss, but issued writs of preliminary injunction and attachment
and garnishment, such writs are set aside and declared null and void and the Agusan Court
directed to dismiss the case.

Petition: injunction with preliminary injunction.

Facts:
The petitioner and the respondent Excellent Management Corporation entered into a contract on 1
August 1963 for the latter to manage the logging operations of the former as set forth in their
Memorandum Agreement; and on the following day the former executed in favor of the latter a
contract of management and general power of attorney constituting the latter as the former’s
general manager in the said industry and providing that the contract is irrevocable for 5 years and
is one coupled with a valuable consideration (Annex "B").

On 30 September 1963, however, the petitioner informed the respondent Excellent Management
Corporation that for its failure to perform its part of the contract, the petitioner was taking over the
management of its logging operations.

One year thereafter, or on 28 October 1964, the petitioner filed in the CFI of Manila an action for
rescission of the aforesaid contract and revocation of the general power of attorney, with
damages.

On a date which is in dispute (and discussed later), the respondent filed action in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan against the petitioner, for injunction with preliminary injunction, attachment and
garnishment, and for damages, praying for the enforcement of the same contract that the
petitioner was seeking to rescind in the CFI of Manila. The case filed in Agusan was docketed
therein as Special Civil Case No. 182. On 6 November 1964, the Agusan Court, thru Butuan City
Judge Jesus S. Ruiz, for and in the absence of the District Judge, issued ex parte a writ of
preliminary injunction and another writ of attachment and garnishment.
The petitioner moved to dismiss Special Civil Case 182 and to dissolve the writs issued
thereunder on the ground of pendency of another suit between the same parties, but since action
thereon was not forthcoming, the petitioner resorted to this Court.

This Court, by resolution on 7 December 1964, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the writs issued by the Agusan court, restraining the respondents from entering
into, and taking possession of the petitioner’s logging area, from seizing or taking the
management of the logging operation, from cutting and hauling logs in the area and from
preventing or stopping the sale, exportation or shipment of logs by petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the order of the respondent judge in Special Civil Case of Agusan, issuing its writ of
preliminary injunction is null and void because the filing of the petition by Excellent
Management Corporation, as well as the injunction bond, were antedated to make it appear that
the petition was filed ahead of Civil Case of the CFI of Manila, done through connivance of the
respondent judge and court personnel in Agusan, aside from the fact that the preliminary
injunction was granted without notice or hearing.

Held:
Yes
We perceive that, whether by design or plain imprudence, an irregularity involving the integrity of a
court record has been committed. Be that as it may, the date that should be reckoned as the
filing of the petition in Special Civil Case 182 of the Agusan Court is when the filing fee was
paid, 6 November 1964, and not when the petition was received on 24 October 1964. (See
Sec. 1, Rule 13 and Sec. 1, Rule 141, Rules of Court.)

Since the case in Manila was filed earlier than the case in Agusan and the parties, in their
respective motions to dismiss had pleaded pendency of another action between the same parties
for the same cause, allegations that they are now estopped from denying or varying, it was
incumbent upon the Agusan court to grant the petitioner’s motion to dismiss Special Civil Case
No. 182, not only as a matter of comity with a coordinate and co-equal but also to prevent
confusion that might seriously hinder the administration of justice. (Cabigao, Et. Al. v. Del Rosario,
Et Al., 44 Phil. 182)

The respondents, as defendants in Civil Case 58827 (Manila) received the summons on 3
November 1964, yet they filed their petition in Special Civil Case 182 in Agusan only on 6
November 1964. It is, therefore, plain that they resorted to the Agusan court with unclean hands
and wangled therefrom, under dubious circumstances, an ex parte preliminary injunction.

While it is true that the respondent court of Agusan had jurisdiction in Special Civil Case 182, the
acts complained of by the petitioner constitute grave abuse of discretion and injudiciousness on
the part of the respondent court, combined with trickery on the part of the private Respondent.

For the foregoing reasons, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted, and the writs of preliminary
injunction and attachment and garnishment issued by the respondent court are hereby set aside
and declared null and void. The respondent Court of First Instance of Agusan is hereby directed to
dismiss its Special Civil Case No. 182. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court
is hereby made permanent. Costs against the respondent Excellent Management Corporation.