Whether an action for establishment of illegitimate filiation is filed under the

Civil Code or the Family Code, the result will be the same.
Under Article 283 (2) of the Civil Code, a father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child "when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or that of his family."
Under Art. 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation
shall be proved by "the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child." Thus, whether the case is decided under the Civil Code or the
Family Code, the result will be the same. --- Loth R. Ayco vs. Lourdes S.
Fernandez, G.R. No. 84770, March 18, 1991

Whether the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child or of the
alleged parent depends on the basis of the action.
If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous
possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that
the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of
the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used
to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly,
Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since
it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private

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respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed. --- Corito Ocampo Tayag vs.
Court of Appeals and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan, G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992

How “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” is

proved.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child
as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any
particular length of time. The foregoing standard of proof required to establish
one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence. --- Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of
Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998

What constitutes “open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child”.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever
but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. -
-- Casimiro Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuñacao, G.R. No.
86302, September 24, 1991

“Authentic writing” for purposes of voluntary recognition, defined.

"Authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary

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public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his. --- Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

The acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is increasingly

liberalized.
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely
govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context or private relations, the domain of civil
law --- Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

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How filiation of illegitimate children is established.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. --- Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

When judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in

order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory

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recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated
on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the child's acknowledgment. --- Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

Judicially approved compromise agreement by parents may constitute a

statement by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
A compromise agreement entered into by parents acknowledging their five (5)
natural children and providing for their support approved by the court,
constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be
voluntarily acknowledged. --- Yao Kee vs. Aida Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960,
November 24, 1988

A judicial order to compel a person to submit to DNA paternity testing does not
violate his right against self-incrimination.
The proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-
incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. ---
Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba, et al., G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005

ARTICLE 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father

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through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission
in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts
to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

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Illegitimate children should bear the surname of their mother.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries
in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of
marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname
should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname. --
- Republic of the Phils. vs. Gerson R. Abadilla, G.R. No. 133054, January 28, 1999

If alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, inscription of his name
therein is null and void.
It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged
father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e. g., supplying the information
himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null
and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father
is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part. --- Francisco L.
Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998

Changing of surname to that of stepfather's will invite confusion as to child's

paternity.
The reason alleged by Andrew Barretto (because it is the surname of his step-
father) is not compelling enough to warrant the change of name prayed for. The
surname "Barretto" is his mother's surname. He is the illegitimate child of Lucy
Barretto. But he is not a natural child of Magin V. Velez. The circumstances of his
illegitimate filiation are not known. Magin V. Velez had children of his own before
he married the applicant's mother. Magin V. Velez and Lucy Barretto also have
their own children. To warrant the change of name sought will necessary invite
confusion as to paternity, to the prejudice of Magin V. Velez, the applicant's

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mother, as well as their common and separate offsprings. --- Republic of the
Phils. vs. Hon. Judge of Branch III of CFI-Cebu, G.R. No. L-35605, October 11, 1984

This provision [Art. 176 of the Family Code] was later amended on March 19,
2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. — Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
[T]he general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may
use the surname of the father.

Recognizing father of illegitimate children cannot demand that his surname be

used as surname of his illegitimate children for the choice of surname is given to
the illegitimate children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent's prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given
to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core
issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as
follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a

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 legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now
reads:
Art. 176. — Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of
the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children's surname as Antonio. HTAEIS
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent's prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given
to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is
there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that
of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit
and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255.

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Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity,
it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free
from any interpretation. Respondent's position that the court can order the
minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. --- Grande v. Antonio,
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

CHAPTER 4
Legitimated Children

ARTICLE 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who,
at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or
both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated.

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Legitimation does not include children born of adulterous relations.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations. --- Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla vs. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter
No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995

Legitimation is a privilege available only to natural children.

Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,
available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although
natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural
children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they
likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially,
as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father
and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between
their parents. --- Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No.
105619, December 12, 1995

To effect legitimation, the parents should be married to each other.

The parents should be married to each other in order to effect the legitimation of
their acknowledged natural children. And once legitimated, the child becomes

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legitimate child. Since the parents marry each other, the acknowledgment of the
natural children need no judicial approval. --- Alfonso Colorado vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985

Legitimated child enjoys all rights and privileges associated with legitimacy.
The status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue.
Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of
wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently
do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the
"legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with
legitimacy. --- Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No.
105619, December 12, 1995

ARTICLE 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage

between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the
legitimation. (270a)

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Problem:
A had a relationship with B who were still minor at that time. During the said
relationship they begot a child C. After reaching the age of majority, A and B got
married. However, after living together for five years, A discovered that B is a
practicing homosexual, a circumstance that B hid to A and only discovered after
the marriage. The petition was granted.
Question:
What is the status of C, is the child legitimate, natural child or natural child by
legal fiction? Is the child’s status not affected by the fact that his parent’s
marriage was subsequently annulled by reason of fraud?
Ans.:
C is a legitimated child of A and B by reason of the subsequent marriage of the
child. The legitimation is made by operation of law. The subsequent annulment
will not affect the legitimation as expressly provided under Article 178.

ARTICLE 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate
children. (272a)

ARTICLE 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's
birth. (273a)

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ARTICLE 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the
marriage shall benefit their descendants. (274)

ARTICLE 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced
in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues.
(275a)

TITLE VII
Adoption

ARTICLE 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and care for his
children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family.
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person
of majority age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to
be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the
spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted. (27a, EO 91 and PD
603)

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Who can be adopted?

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Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. --- Republic of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. James Anthony and
Lenita Hughes, G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993

The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue

that an adoption court must first confront.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of the father, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction
since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances
under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of
written consent to the adoption of their minor children. However, in cases where
the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only
upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
considered on its merits. --- Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald
and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Adopted child has sole right to sever legal ties created by adoption.
R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) affirmed the legitimate status of
the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the

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forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. ---
Isabelita S. Lahom vs. Jose Melvin Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
The interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration in determining whether or not to set aside a decree of adoption.
a) The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings
involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts
to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of
protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it,
it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval
of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should
be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the
natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. --- Rep. of the
Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, January 24,
1992
b) Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the
adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. --- In re: Frederick William Malkinson vs. Corazon Juliano
Agrava, G.R. No. L-36309, November 26, 1973
c) The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the
child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. --- Paulina
Santos vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966

Adoption laws should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to
exist.
The rule of "dura lex sed lex" should be softened so as to apply the law with less
severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more
for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock —
than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts
designed to provide homes, love, and care and education for unfortunate children
should be given the widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance.
The law is not, and should not be made an instrument to impede the achievement
of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts

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and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life
to exist.
Sometime in May, 1967, a three-day old baby was given by a lawyer to petitioning
spouses for adoption. Later, the child was baptized, and the names of said
spouses appeared in the baptismal records as the child's parents. The lawyer, on
the other hand, received the infant from its unwed mother who told the former
to look for a suitable couple who would adopt the child, and never reveal her (the
mother's) identify because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy
her future.
In the petition for adoption, the lawyer as the child's de facto guardian or loco
parentis gave the written consent required by law. The trial court dismissed the
petition on the ground that the consent given is improper and falls short of the
express requirement of Art. 340 of the Civil Code that the consent must be given
by the parents, guardian or person in charge in change of the to be adopted.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal order, holding that the
child's unidentified mother can be declared as having abandoned the child so that
there is no more legal need to require her written consent; and that the consent
given by the de facto guardian who exercised patria potestas over the abandoned
child was sufficient.
Appealed decision under review annulled, and the minor declared as the adopted
child and heir of petitioners. --- Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen vs. CFI of Rizal, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976 & Slobodan
Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic vs. Hon. Sylvia P.
Montes, G.R. No. 71370, July 7, 1986

Written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption.
Notwithstanding the amendments introduced by the Family Code to the Child and
Youth Welfare Code on adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. --- Herbert Cang vs. Court of
Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25,
1998

However, written consent of natural parent can be dispensed with if said parent
has abandoned the child.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition
for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance

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therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats
the procedural aspect of adoption. ---- Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps.
Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of an adoption decree.

Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But
there cannot be a valid decree of adoption when the findings of the trial court on
the issue of the husband's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. ----
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R.
No. 105308, September 25, 1998

ARTICLE 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final
accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except;
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse;
or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
(28a, EO 91 and PD 603)

ARTICLE 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a,
EO 91 and PD 603)

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In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim (588
SCRA 98)\\

Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides “Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases:(i)if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or (ii)if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or (iii)if the spouses are legally separated from each
other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised
by the spouses. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.

ARTICLE 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts
the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, EO 91 and PD 603)

ARTICLE 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter
or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person had been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority;
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no
diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been
previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, EO 91 and PD 603)

ARTICLE 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent,
if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and

28 | P a g e
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, EO 91
and PD 603)

Landingin vs. Republic (493 SCRA 415)

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the

validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian
of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the
written consent of their legal guardian.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim (588
SCRA 98)

Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides “Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases:(i)if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or (ii)if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or (iii)if the spouses are legally separated from each
other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised
by the spouses. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.

ARTICLE 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
29 | P a g e
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopter;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the
spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the
adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood
relatives. (39(1)a, (2)a, (3)a, PD 603)

In The Matter of The Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (454 SCRA
541)

Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle

name will maintain her maternal lineage. Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18, 24 Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. X x x
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

ARTICLE 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted

shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving
spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants
of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate,
one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the
adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted
concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares,
one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted
and the other half, by the adopters;
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving
spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-

30 | P a g e
third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving
spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the
biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological
parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code.
We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552
wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We
invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child
that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a
time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence
or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee's biological
one. --- Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

[E]ven though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties

between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from
the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code. . . --- Del
Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

ARTICLE 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the

adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by
the court or proper government instrumentality acting on his behalf, on the
same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the
adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission
of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.
(40a, PD 603)

ARTICLE 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission
of the adoption in any of the following cases:

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(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for
disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during
minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated
the adoption. (41a, PD 603)

Lahom vs. Sibulo (406 SCRA 135)

Re: Republic Act 8552 which repealed Article 192, FC – R.A. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act) which took effect in 1998, repealed right of adopter to rescind
decree of adoption under Article 192 FC, without prejudice to right of adopter to
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided by law.

ARTICLE 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at
the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the same
proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature,
unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall
appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted
person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the
same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and
obligations between the adopters and the adopted arising from the relationship
of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the
surnames of the adopters and shall resume his or her surname prior to the
adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper
registries. (42a, PD 603)

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 TITLE VIII
Support

ARTICLE 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,

dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)

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Characteristics of legal support.
Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family
ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot
be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or
execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. --- Perla G. Patricio vs.
Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

Mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of husband to support

his wife.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied

34 | P a g e
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband;
an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving
his wife to seek protection in the parental home. --- Eloisa Goitia y de la Camara
vs. Jose Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916

An unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by law. --- Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao, G.R. No. L-
26795, July 31, 1970

Rationale for entitling illegitimate children to support and successional rights.

Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be
visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should
help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of
their parents. --- Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February
23, 1994

Right to support presupposes existence of a justifiable cause on the part of the

claimant spouse.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by
one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within
the intendment of the law granting separate support. --- Teodoro E. Lerma vs.
Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, G.R. No. L-33352, December 20, 1974

Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such
adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the husband;
hence, would not be entitled to support as such. --- Feliciano Sanchez vs.

35 | P a g e
Francisco Zulueta, G.R. No. 45616, May 16, 1939 & Maria Quintana vs. Gelasio
Lerma, G.R. No. 7426, February 5, 1913

The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the
husband.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance and that the wife is
entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live
with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her
residence apart from that provided for by the former. In such event, there is no
plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband. ----
Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng, G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958

Husband's repeated illicit relations with women justify separate maintenance

for the wife.
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring
a concubine into the marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women
outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so unreasonable
as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity
towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. --- Aurelia
Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Rafael Villanueva, G.R. No. 29959, December 3, 1929

A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise.

No valid compromise is possible on the issue of future support. Hence, a showing
of previous efforts to compromise required under Art. 222 of the Civil Code would
be superfluous. --- Cecilio Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Luisa de la Rosa
Mendoza, G.R. No. L-23102, April 24, 1967

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a

parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support
consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
36 | P a g e
means of the person obliged to support. --- Charles Gotardo vs. Divina Buling,
G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012

ARTICLE 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following
are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding
article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (291a)

[P]etitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the [Family] Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same
only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties. . . . This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner's son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. . . . It is incumbent
upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either
before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree) . . . . In view of
respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus,
since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. --- Del Socorro v. Van
Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

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[Respondent]'s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation. --- Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Arhbencel Ann Lopez, G.R. No. 181258,
March 18, 2010

Filiation must be duly proved before illegitimate children are entitled to support.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish
the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
petitioner's demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is
respondent's illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had
not acknowledged him, until petitioner shall have proved his relation to him. The
child's remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against respondent
for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. ---- Cherryl B. Dolina vs.
Glenn D. Vallecera, G.R. No. 182367, December 15, 2010

ARTICLE 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or
half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth
in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister,
being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.
(291a)

ARTICLE 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants,

whether legitimate or illegitimate, and brothers and sisters, whether
legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person
obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has
no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if
financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the
share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or
of the conjugal partnership. (n)

ARTICLE 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their
children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership. After final judgment granting the petition, the
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of

38 | P a g e
legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to
the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)

ARTICLE 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. --- Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22,
2014

From the aforecited provisions [Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, Art. 199 of
the Family Code, Sec. 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code], it is undeniable
that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
the members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law partner.
[I]t is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one's common
law partner.
[I]t is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has
no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or
renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for
the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been
waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the
door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.

39 | P a g e
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not
be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their
children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once
a family member joins his Creator.
Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband
should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the
deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the
deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.

From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form
of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As
thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the
Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of
burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law,
commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of
the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. As
Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly
provided. It cannot be inferred lightly . . .

[T]he wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr.
Tolentino further wrote:

The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglementary provisions
concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the
time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be
observed.
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one.

40 | P a g e
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it.
This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to
bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for
purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer
it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of
the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this
right may recover the corpse from third persons. --- Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No.
182894, April 22, 2014

ARTICLE 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more
persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion
to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may
order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to
his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the
same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient
means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be
followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child
subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)

ARTICLE 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and
196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. (296a)

The capacity or resources of both parents and the child's monthly expenses must
be proved to justify award of support.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both
parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under
Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation
of the child. --- Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004

The allowance for support is provisional.

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Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period
that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means
of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. --- Manuela
Advincula vs. Manuel Advincula, G.R. No. L-19065, January 31, 1964

Judgment for support is never final.

Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his
illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the
premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and
not excessive nor exorbitant. --- Dolores Montefalcon, et al. vs. Ronnie S. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008

A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount
be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended
or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist. --- Bernarda S. Canonizado
vs. Judge Regina G. Ordonez Benitez, G.R. Nos. L-49315 and 60966, February 20,
1984

ARTICLE 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to furnish the same. (297a)

ARTICLE 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month.
When the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has
received in advance. (298a)
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Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If the amount of support
pendente lite ordered is found to be too onerous, a motion to modify or reduce the
same can always be filed. --- Froilan C. Gandionco vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda,
G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987

Court order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final.
The order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in
the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing
conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
--- Buenaventura San Juan vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-59906,
October 23, 1982

Complaint may be filed in court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa where
the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties are
essentially involved.
A complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon
Tagapayapa in actions coupled with provisional remedies such as support
pendente lite. The issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not ‘coupled’ in the
strict sense of the word with the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership,
are essentially involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter,
and because the resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition
would be incomplete without a clear-cut disposition on the partition of the
personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery
thereof to the proper parties. --- Mauro Blardony, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose L. Coscolluela,
Jr., G.R. No. 70261, February 28, 1990

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the
action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent
upon the result of the main action. The subject orders on the matter of support
pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of

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marriage. --- Ma. Carminia C. Calderon vs. Jose Antonio F. Roxas, et al., G.R. No.
185595, January 9, 2013

ARTICLE 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto. (299a)

ARTICLE 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money
or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or
execution. (302a)

ARTICLE 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give
support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same
from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without any intention of being
reimbursed. (2164a)

ARTICLE 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or
fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with a right of reimbursement from the
person obliged to give support. This Article shall apply particularly when the
father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support
or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

A quasi-contract exists between the person obliged to give support and the third
person who furnished support.
[C]ontextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the [the person obliged
to give support] and [the third person who furnished support] is a quasi-contract,
an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another. --- Edward V. Lacson vs. Maowee Daban Lacson et al., G.R.
No. 150644, August 28, 2006

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ARTICLE 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in
amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on
attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever
modification is necessary due to changes in circumstances manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties. (n)

TITLE IX
Parental Authority
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
ARTICLE 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. (n)

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Definition of “parental authority”.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass
of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." --- Leouel
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Joint parental authority is vested by law on the father and mother.

The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised
by the surviving grandparent. --- Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113054, March 16, 1995

As far as joint parental authority is concerned, there is no more distinction

between legitimate or adopted children and acknowledged illegitimate children.
The new Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted
children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar
as joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code merely
formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority. --- Christina Marie
Dempsey vs. RTC Branch LXXV, Olongapo City and Joel Dempsey, G.R. Nos. 77737-
38, August 15, 1988

Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of

parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to
be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
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parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social
and spiritual needs of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his
family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them
the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
--- Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R.
No. 105308, September 25, 1998

A “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.

The actuality that the father carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken
as sufficient basis for the conclusion that he was necessarily an unfit father.
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a "bad"
husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive
him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. ---
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R.
No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same. --- Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.

The husband may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental
authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to his wife in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the
agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may be waived, as in law it
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may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal
separation case that the husband was such an irresponsible person that he
should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the
law that could deprive him of parental authority. --- Herbert Cang vs. Court of
Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25,
1998

“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary

right of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be
implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to
exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected
and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. --- Herbert Cang vs. Court of
Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25,
1998

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the

minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. . . . There can be no other interpretation of this provision [Section 7
of the RH law] except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision-making process of the
minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the
parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution. --- Spouses
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
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establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society. ---
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority. --- Spouses Imbong v.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014

ARTICLE 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or

transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)

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ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence toward their parents and
are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
(17a, PD 603)

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ARTICLE 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving
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parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the
children. (17a, PD 603)

ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall

be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Article 213 does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under
seven years of age.
Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. [The mother]
can raise it as a counter argument for [the father's] petition for custody. But it is
not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
age. --- Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, et al. vs. Loran S.D. Abanilla, et al.,
G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006

The "tender-age presumption" may be overcome only by compelling evidence of

the mother's unfitness.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother
is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or
affliction with a communicable disease. --- Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007

The sole and foremost consideration in controversies regarding custody of

minors is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child.
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court

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deviated from this criterion. ---- In re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon
Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27, 1989

In custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
interest of the child.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is
always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an
international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "In
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." --- Nerissa Z.
Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996

In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled

rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if
already over 7 years of age, the child's choice as to which of his parents he prefers
to be under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be
unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996], We
held that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and
best interest of the child, as reflected in no less than the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child which provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration." --- Geoffrey Beckett vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013

Right of parents to custody of minor children is a constitutional and natural

right.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the estate of decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parent relationship. --- Teresita
Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January 16,
1997

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Right of parents to custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, courts
must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions of the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount", and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
ordered separated from the mother. This is as it should be, for in the continual
evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the
jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution,
due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is
now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now "there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result, the right of parents to the
company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development. --- Zenaida Medina vs. Dra.
Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969

Even if estranged, mother and father may be granted joint custody of common
children.
a) Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and
welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and
their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their
offspring invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the
well-being of the child. --- Carlitos E. Silva vs. CA and Suzanne T. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 114742, July 17, 1997
b) The visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children is sustained in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over
their children. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any
real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child. --- Sabrina Artadi
Bondagjy vs. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001

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If child is under seven years of age, law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by
the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under
seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive: It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". --- Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995

[U]pon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if
the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void.
Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket
(and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced
parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the
provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven
years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed,
immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable
disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime
under the second paragraph of Article 213. --- Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision's
enforceability to court-sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements
beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children
under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated
parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative
policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven
years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her." This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They
have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999,
respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its

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ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine
courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement.
Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing"
jurisdiction to Philippine courts. HTDCAS
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of
jurisdiction because of the Illinois court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce the
divorce decree.
Issue:
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioner's suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties'
child.

Ruling:
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement
which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied
legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning." For lack of
relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the
Agreement's joint child custody stipulations.
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21
September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married
under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother . . . ." (This
statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory,
grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not
alleged to obtain here. Clearly then, the Agreement's object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

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The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also
been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the
father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or
separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody
under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children
under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within
this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to
give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot
contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years any more than they can privately agree that a mother
who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted
with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as
these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive
maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision's
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements
beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children
under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated
parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative
policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven
years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her." This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
It could very well be that Article 213's bias favoring one separated parent
(mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes
incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or
hijacks decision-making between the separated parents. However, these are
objections which question the law's wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature,
not this Court. At any rate, the rule's seeming harshness or undesirability is
tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such
as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the
care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213
is limited in duration, lasting only until the child's seventh year. From the eighth
year until the child's emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom,
subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see
57 | P a g e
fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not
barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie,
respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent's act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default
custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity — not because
the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse — to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in
this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera to dismiss criminal complaints
for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree)

58 | P a g e
against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended
spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it
should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity
against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien's nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's suit, the logical end to its lack of
cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of
Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the
case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under
Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child
custody proceedings — the best interest of the child. As the question of custody
is already before the trial court and the child's parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of
swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of
the court's jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best
serving Stephanie's interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This
disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child's best interest.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling. --- Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon
Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

If child is over seven, his choice is paramount.

The mother and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that the
father promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that she is
earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her
means. Even now that the child is over seven years of age the mother's custody
over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. --- Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar,
G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995

However, the court may find the chosen parent unfit.

If a child is over seven, the law allows him to make a choice. Once the choice has
been made, the burden lies on the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen
is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility. The child’s
choice is paramount but the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion,
the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other

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parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. ---
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995

The right of the child to choose the parent he wishes to live with may be invoked
only if the parents are married to each other but are separated but not when
they are not married.
Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which the
parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue
of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. ----
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

Moral dereliction is not a ground to deprive mother of custody of child below 7

years old.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of
age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission: "The general rule is
recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who
is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be
for 'compelling reasons' for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be
rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of
adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce)
will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will
not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her
situation."---- Nerissa Z. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29,
1996

Lesbianism is not a ground to deprive mother of custody pendente lite of her

child who is less than 7 years old.
In Espiritu v. CA, the Court took into account psychological and case study reports
on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and anxiety had been traced to strong
conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child revealed, among other
things, that the latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother hugging and kissing
a 'bad' man who lived in their house and worked for her father." The Court held
that the "illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused the child
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values . . ."||

It is not enough for the husband to show merely that the wife was a lesbian. He
must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a

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person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
conducive to the child's proper moral development. ---- Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto
vs. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V, G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005

The mother has sole parental authority over an illegitimate child.

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The
Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her
unfitness to exercise such authority and care. --- Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P.
Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father is not a ground for awarding

him custody of said child.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering
the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child. It is only if
she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. ---
Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995

Parental authority is inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced.

a) Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same. ---- Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
b) When the mother entrusted the custody of her minor child to the latter’s
paternal grandmother, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody
and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For
the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution --- Teresita Sagala-Eslao
vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997

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Custody of child may be awarded to the father to free her from her mother's
immoral influence.
It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the obviously unwholesome,
not to say immoral, influence that the situation in which the mother has placed
herself, might create in the moral and social outlook of her daughter who is now
in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact that the
father might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when
she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own
correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of
her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents. --- Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C.
Navarro and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242, November 17, 1980

A parent’s love outweighs that of the grandparents’.

The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority. --- Leouel
Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the
award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable disease. --- Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No.
156343, October 18, 2004 & Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R.
No. 122906, February 7, 2002

Adopting parents have the right to custody of the adopted child.

The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of
dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except

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where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in
which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the
adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. --- In
re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27,
1989
Decisions on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment.
Decisions even of the Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always
open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in
the light of the inflexible criterion --- Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro
and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242, November 17, 1980

“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary

right of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be
implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to
exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and
harmonized to the fullest extent possible. --- Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald
and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take

custody of her children.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding
whether a non-Muslim woman is worthy to have custody of her children. What
determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that
she is not a Muslim. Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the
ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical
and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents. ---- Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy vs. Fouzi
Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
Father’s use of trickery to take his son away from in-laws is not a ground to
deprive him of custody.

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The father’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof
that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact
that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to
over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission,
should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's
custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only
the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his
custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It
would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son
to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. His being a
soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the
nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our
soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the
normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary
separation from their families. Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to
wrest custody from him. Private respondents' attachment to the young boy
whom they have reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all,
the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact
which has not been proven here. --- Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054,
March 16, 1995

The welfare of the child, not the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent, is the paramount consideration.
The law or jurisprudence does not intend to downplay a father's sense of loss
when he is separated from his child: While the bonds between a mother and her
small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is
bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or
her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration. --- Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V.
Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Contending parents stand on equal footing in custody cases of minor children.

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In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children,
the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make
the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven
years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with,
but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all
cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. ----
Reymond B. Laxamana vs. Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana, G.R. No. 144763, September
3, 2002

Every child's rights should not be dependent solely on the whims and caprices of
his parents.
Legal provisions grant to every child rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents.
His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement
alone. Where the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in
to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted
to him by law. --- Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson and CA, G.R. No. L-
23482, August 30, 1968

ARTICLE 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,

substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In
case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the
same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the
authority. (19a, PD 603)

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ARTICLE 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify
against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is
indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the
other. (315a)

CHAPTER 2
Substitute and Special Parental Authority

ARTICLE 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the

following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
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(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a,
351a, 354a)

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ARTICLE 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or
abused children and other children similarly situated, parental
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions
duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

ARTICLE 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the

individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have

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 special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)

ARTICLE 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under

the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. (n)

CHAPTER 3
Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental

authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide
for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance,
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical
and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;

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 (6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under
the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
parents and guardians. (316a)

Right of parents to the custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties.
In the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law,
under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parent, into a radically
different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is
no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result, the
right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to
the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate
support. education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development ----
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995 & Zenaida Medina vs.
Dra. Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969

Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and

filiation with corresponding rights and duties.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. --- Republic of the Phil. vs. CA and Sps. James Anthony and Lenita Hughes,
G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993

Right of parents to custody of minor children is an inherent one.

The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. --- Teresita
Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January 16,
1997

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Parents’ right to impose discipline on their children does not authorize them to
invade the latter's honor.
Although the Family Code recognizes the parents' rights and duties to "impose
discipline" on their unemancipated children; "supervise their activities, recreation
and association with others . . .; and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their . . . morals", it does not authorize them to force their
offspring to copulate with them under the mask of discipline, or invade their
honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish the
product of their marital union. --- People of the Phils. vs. David Silvano, G.R. No. 127356,
June 29, 1999

ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180 (2)a
and (4)a)

ARTICLE 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's

property, or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so require. (317)

ARTICLE 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the

individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child
resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the
child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel,
either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary
hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child
shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or
when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order
the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

ARTICLE 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article

may include the commitment of the child for not more than
thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in
children's home duly accredited by the proper government
agency.

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 The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with
the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for
his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the
court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just
and proper. (319a)

CHAPTER 4
Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children

ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of
the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance
of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the
proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place
where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding
in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this
Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory
except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or
the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which
case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

ARTICLE 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned

or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous
title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title
or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's
property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a,
323a)

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ARTICLE 227. If the parents entrust the management or
administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated
child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the
owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance
in an amount not less than that which the owner would have
paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner
grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds
thus given in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's
legitimate. (322a)

CHAPTER 5
Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

ARTICLE 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

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 ARTICLE 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment,
parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in
a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the
party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the
person exercising parental authority. (327a)

Abandonment, defined.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon" means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting
under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or
body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment

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imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998

Physical absence, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to

abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, the father was physically absent
as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. His conduct did not manifest
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
over his children as to constitute abandonment.--- Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps.
Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of

parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental,
social and spiritual needs of the child. The conclusion that the husband
abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that
his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to
adopting parents.
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998

ARTICLE 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of

the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which
carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

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ARTICLE 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose or in a
related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or
the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of
lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases
which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or
the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the
child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be
proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental
authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same
proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased
and will not be repeated. (332a)

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ARTICLE 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the
child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be
permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

ARTICLE 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have
the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child
care and exercising special parental authority, inflict corporal punishment upon
the child. (n)

TITLE X
Emancipation and Age of Majority

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ARTICLE 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the
age of eighteen years.

ARTICLE 235.

ARTICLE 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority

over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age
of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the
duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

TITLE XI
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law
CHAPTER 1

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 ARTICLE 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases
shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
technical rules. (n)

CHAPTER 2
Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife

ARTICLE 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has
abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a
transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in
court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction,
and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason
why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed
duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.
(n)

ARTICLE 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the
proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n)

ARTICLE 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to
the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family
cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent, sitting in the
place where either of the spouses resides. (n)

ARTICLE 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other
spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering
said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before
the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known
address of the spouse concerned. (n)

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ARTICLE 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge
personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial
conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel
at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n)

ARTICLE 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is

sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his or her failure to appear,
and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)
ARTICLE 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting
spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as
the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor
to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)

ARTICLE 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said
petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits,
documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If
testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the
subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said
witnesses. (n)

ARTICLE 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. (n)

No right to appeal is granted to any party, including the State, in judgments

rendered in summary judicial proceedings.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As had been ruled,
the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the
Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family
Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted
to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently.
It had no right to appeal the RTC decision.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore,
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on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. --- ---
Republic of the Phil. vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19,
2005 & Republic of the Phil. vs. Robert P. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

ARTICLE 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber

specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or
proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these
rules. (n)

CHAPTER 3
Incidents Involving Parental Authority

ARTICLE 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code
involving parental authority shall be verified. (n)

ARTICLE 250. Such petitions shall be filed in the proper court of the place
where the child resides. (n)

ARTICLE 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the
parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions
exercising parental authority over the child. (n)

ARTICLE 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary
proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable. (n)

CHAPTER 4
Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings

ARTICLE 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable. (n)

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 TITLE XII
Final Provisions
ARTICLE 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic
Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended,
and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. (n)

ARTICLE 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid. (n)

ARTICLE 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws. (n)

Example of Retroactivity of the Family Code:

a. The Provision of the Family Code on the property regime governing

bigamous marriages or adulterous relationship (Article 148, FC) governs
even if the relationship started before the effectivity of the Family Code ---
Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006; Francisco vs.
Master Iron Works & Const. Co., G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005;
Suguid vs. CA, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003; Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernande,
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000.

b. The liberalized provisions of the Family Code on proving legitimate filiation

may be applied retroactively --- Tecson vs. Comelec, 424 SCRA 277 (2004).

c. Under the Family Code, the illegitimate child is now also allowed to
establish his illegitimate filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.” This provision may be applied retroactively ---
Uyguangco vs. CA, G.R. NO. 76873, October 26, 1989; Jison vs. CA, G.R.
No. 124853, February 24, 1998.

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Example of Non-Retroactivity of the Family Code:

a. Under the Civil Code, an action to establish illegitimate filiation may be

brought during the lifetime of the parent, except when the child is a minor
at the time of the death of the parent. Under the Family Code such
exception has been removed (if the basis of the action is secondary
evidence). Such removal of exception, however, does apply to the
prejudice of illegitimate children born before the family code --- Bernabe
vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002; Aruego vs. CA, G.R. No.
112193, March 13, 1996; and Tayag vs. CA., 209 SCRA 665 (1992).

b. Sale of conjugal asset by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse would be voidable under the Civil Code but void under the Family
Code. If the sale took place before the Family Code, then it is considered
merely voidable, and is thus valid until attacked within the prescriptive
period. It cannot be considered void (which may be attacked any time
under the Family Code, as application of the latter will be prejudicial to
vested rights --- Villaranda vs. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, February 23,
2004l Ainza vs. Spouses Padua, G.R. No. 165420, June 30, 2005.

While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are
inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains
and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific
assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach
back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all
conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those
with prenuptial agreements. --- Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al.,
G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012

[T]he petitioner's claim of vested right [by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a
person's vested right] is not one which is written on stone. A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
"vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right
reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or
an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to

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inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. To be vested, a right
must have become a title — legal or equitable — to the present or future
enjoyment of property. The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. ---
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010

[W]hile one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. . . .
[T]he alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not
only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the
guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. . . . [T]he petitioner's
claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the
Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is
the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner
was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim
may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the
guilty party. --- Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4,
2012 citing ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. vs. The
Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005

Francisco vs. CA (299 SCRA 188)

Re: Article 105 (conjugal partnership) in relation to Article 256 (retroactive

application of the Family Code). Properties acquired by husband thru inheritance
or thru purchase during first marriage continue to be exclusive property of
husband who contracted second marriage before effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, pursuant to the vested rights acquired by husband under Article
256, FC. The fact that title to land is “Eusebio Francisco married to Teresita
Francisco” is merely descriptive of civil status of Eusebio since land had been
acquired prior to registration.

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ARTICLE 257. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as certified by the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President.

Publication shall likewise be made in the Official Gazette. (n)

DONE in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.

Effectivity: August 3, 1988

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The correction or change of entry in the civil registry relative to clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for judicial order.
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides: No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision
was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register. --- Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the
Phil., G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007

The local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such
petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname.
Indeed, there was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority
of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. It can
thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive,
jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first
name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the
petitioner and local civil registrar should follow. --- Re: Final Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted at the RTC, Br. 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-7-414-RTC,
October 19, 2007

The Rules of Court provides for requirements before a judgment may be

annotated in the civil registry.
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must
be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. --- Gerbert R.
Corpuz vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

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