Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
That the Electoral Commission is an
Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor 63 Phil. 139 – Political Law –
Judicial Review – Electoral Commission
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as
member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had
thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding
the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest
and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in
cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict
and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but
the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
the source of all authority.
independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
AQUINO vs ENRILE
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974
FACTS: The petitioners having been arrested and held pursuant to
General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for
being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to
take over the Government by force ...", filed the petitions for habeas
corpus. General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the
exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No.
1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 is
subject to judicial inquiry
HELD: Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino
held that the question is political and should not be determined by
court. Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political
questions are not per se
beyond the Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the
Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of
policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from
interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with
national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter
in him alone. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the
President on the existence of the grounds for the declaration of
martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. Justice Antonio,
finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 1
rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor
of
necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the
Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to
whether or not there is such necessity is wholly
confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his
responsibility being directly to the people.
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of
Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals
including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan
Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special
affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to
the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when
public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein
under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing
the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and
imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid
exercise pursuant to the President’s order.
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional
seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a
member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election.
However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and
he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito
Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose
Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though
Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed in
his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to
Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they
withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new
election be held and that the new LDP representative be
appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for
Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then
removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
(SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of
Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the
judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the
validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of
separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar
without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly
a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must
be noted that what is being complained of is the act of HRET not the
act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the
tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal
have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda
and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached
a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has
already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their
representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura
should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or
valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 2
 membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the
SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the
minority.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
BONDOC V PINEDA
FACTS:
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal
(HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen)
that he voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth,
justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the results of
the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because
it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his
nomination from the tribunal.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
to HRET from its resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE
DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY
REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE
MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW
AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID
HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL
PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL
HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS
RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS
VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:
1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE
ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION
INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL
AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER
(LDP)
2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN.
CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE
DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY
TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID
GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH
AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT
DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL
AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID
CAUSE!
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 3
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan
1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
Who may exercise the power ?
Held: yes. Sa EO is unconstitutional.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
the first instance by these lower courts.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it
is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded,
there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.
ONGSUCO V. MALONES
EVELYN ONGSUCO, ET AL. vs. MARIANO M. MALONESEVELYN ONGSUCO and
ANTONIA SALAYA, vs. HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and
official capacity asMayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.[G.R. No. 182065.
October 27, 2009.]
Facts:
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 4
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a
meeting with the stall holders, Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin
approvedMunicipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal
Revised Revenue Code."The Code contained a provision for
increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in
the amount of P20,000.00 andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the
first and second floors of the municipal public market, respectively.
The same Code authorizedrespondent to enter into lease contracts
over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of
lease for the stall holders at themunicipal public market.Sangguniang
Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving
to have the meeting declared inoperative as a publichearing,
because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the
goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However,Resolution
No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was
vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998. Respondentwrote a
letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls
in the newly renovated municipal public market without anylease
contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered
vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.Petitioners
filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
against respondent. The RTC found that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. Because
they failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls
without paying the goodwill fees and also on theground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
W/N there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative
remedies- NOW/N the imposition of the goodwill fees is valid- NO, it
is defective due to lack of public hearings
Held/Ratio:
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
acontroversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
Thus, a case where theissue raised is a purely legal question, well
within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
administrative agency,would clearly constitute an exception.There is
no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall
holders at the municipal public market were sent out,informing th
them of the supposed "public hearing" to be held on 11 August
1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice,
the"public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted,
only five days later.
This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that
the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the
notices were sent out, posted, or published.When the Sangguniang
Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through
Resolution No. 68, series of 1998 vetoed thesaid resolution.
Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to
override respondent's veto, it no longer did so.
The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not
cured when another public hearing was held on 22 January
1999,after the questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998.
Section 186 of theLocal Government Code prescribes that the public
hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of
an ordinancelevying taxes, fees, and charges
.Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the
enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void
andcannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective
ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction
toorder petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market vacant
SALONGA vs PAÑO
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 5
 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October
of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial
law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the
contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him
nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a
prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982,
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for
violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would
be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues:
1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves
a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 6
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude
this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall
not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph
2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183),
the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
Guingona V. CA
G.R. No. 125532 July 10, 1998
SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS
JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS,
JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO ROQUE, petitioners,
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows: 3
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation on the alleged participation and
involvement of national and local government
officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal
gambling.
The case was also the subject of a legislative
inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming
to be an eyewitness to the networking of . . .
national and local politicians and gambling lords,
sought admission into the Government's "Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program." Allegedly,
he gained first-hand information in his capacity as
Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG)
during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also
revealed that he and members of his family were in
danger of being liquidated, facing as he did the
formidable world of corruption with a well-
entrenched hold on Philippine social, political and
economic systems.
After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications,
convinced of his compliance with the requirements
of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 7
 "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the
Department of Justice admitted Roque to the
program, providing him a monthly allowance,
temporary shelter and personal and security
protection during witness duty.
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn
statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr.
and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his
stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling
(TFAG), several gambling lords, including private
respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians
offered him money and other valuable
considerations, which he accepted, upon his
agreement to cease conducting raids on their
respective gambling operations (Annex "B").
On the basis of Roque's sworn statement, the sworn
statement and supplemental affidavit of one Angelito
H. Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen.
Lorenzo Mateo (Annexes "C," "D" and "E"), then NBI
Director Mariano M. Mison forwarded the result of
their investigation on the "jueteng" scam to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending the
filing of the following charges against Pineda and
other persons . . . .
In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded
with their preliminary investigation, and on February
2, 1996, they issued a resolution finding probable
cause to charge private respondent Pineda with
several offenses (Annex "K"). On February 5, 1996,
three (3) Informations for corruption of public
officials were filed against him in the Manila and
Pasig City Trial Courts (Annexes "L," "M" and "N").
He was subsequently arraigned on February 28,
1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the
City of Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes,
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
and on March 14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 168, of Pasig City, presided by Judge
Benjamin Pelayo.
On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up
with a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining both
trial courts from hearing the criminal actions in the
meantime.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of
whether the secretary of justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a)
in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program and (b) in excluding
him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private
respondent contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two
grounds: first, his testimony could not be substantially corroborated
in its material points; and second, he appeared to be the most guilty
or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes
charged in the Informations were concerned.
Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of
witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or
information on, the commission of a crime under Section 3; and (b)
a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10.
The Issue
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
Whether or not a witness' testimony requires prior
or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is
admitted into the witness protection, security and
benefit program. 5
As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in
their favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 8
that admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous
corroboration of the material points in the witness' testimony.
Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that
Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that
corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness'
application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program
The Court's Ruling
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by
petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power.
No Actual Controversy
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the
petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that
judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable." 6 According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle disputes between real
conflicting parties through the application of the law. 7 Judicial
review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the
following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; 8 and
(3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury. 9
The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to
pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems 10 or friendly suits collusively
arranged between parties without real adverse interests. 11 Courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. 12 As a condition
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy
between litigants must first exist. 13
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable
controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific
relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an
opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. 14
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on
Elections 15 regarding the provision in the Organic Act, which
mandates that should there be any conflict between national law and
Islamic Law, the Shari'ah courts should apply the former. In that
case, the petitioner maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shari'ah)
was derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law, the
Shari'ah may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. This
Court dismissed petitioner's argument because, as enshrined in the
Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. No actual controversy between real litigants existed,
because no conflicting claims involving the application of national
law were presented. This being so, the Supreme Court refused to
rule on a merely perceived potential conflict between the provisions
of the Muslim Code and those of the national law.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, "will
neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action] . . . ." 19
The legislative and the executive branches are not allowed to seek
its advice on what to do or not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be
postponed in the meantime. Before a court may enter the picture, a
prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 9
by either branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been
done but, then again, only "when . . . properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding." 20
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not
requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court
and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's
testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be
in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit
out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of
said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify.
But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this
particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a
justiciable controversy.
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of
Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court
against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's
admission to the Program is already a moot and academic issue that
clearly does not warrant judicial review.
Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated
nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being
sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel
for private respondent that this action is a "purely academic
exercise," which has no relevance to the criminal cases against
Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered,
trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all of
them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his
"academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with
witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged
to testify against their co-accused." 21
Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also
to show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this
Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. 22
Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further
enlighten petitioners as to its true message. Respondent Court did
sustain Roque's admission into the Program — even as it held that
the first contention of petitioners was untenable — based on the
latter's alternative argument that Roque's testimony was sufficiently
corroborated by that of General Mateo. While Respondent Court
insisted that corroboration must exist prior to or simultaneous with
Roque's admission into the Program, it sanctioned subsequent
compliance to cure this defect. The reason for this is found in the
penultimate paragraph of the Decision, in which Respondent Court
categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of discretion in
the petitioners' action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a
more opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981
arises, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition VS. Lim
G.R. No. 119775
October 24, 2003
Facts: During March 13, 1992, Republic Act 7227 were enacted. The
R.A. 7227 is also known as “ Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992” . This grants Subic SEZ incentives which provides tax and
duty free importations, exemption of business therein from local and
national taxes, to other hallmarks of liberated financial and bhsiness
climate. This also gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones in
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 10
the areas covered respectively by the Clark Military reservation, the of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is VOID
Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union and Camp John Hay. for being violative of the Constitution.
July 5, 1994, President Ramos issued proclamation no. 420 which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay.
In maintaning the validity of proclamation no. 420, respondents
contend that by extending the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, which was established
under R.A. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent of said law to turb the U.S. Military bases into hubs
of business activity or investment.

Issue: Whether Proclamation no. 420 is constitutional by providing

for national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ?

Held/Ruling: No. It is settled that when questions of constituional

signifance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are present: (1) existence of
actual and appropriate case; (2) person challenging the act must
have the standing to question or have personal/substantial interest
in the case; (3) question of constitutionality must be raised at
earliest opportunit; (4) issue of constitutionality must be the very lis G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982
mota of the case. There is none that have been mentioned in R.A
7227, a grant of tax exemption to SEZ yet to be established in base HONORATO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 which provides for tax vs.
exemption to the established Subic SEZ. The tax exemption grant to PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L.
John Hay SEZ contravenes Articles VI, Section 28 (4) of the 1987 JOSON, in his capacity as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and
constitution which provides that “No law granting any tax exemption VALENTIN C. ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Treasurer of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
members of Congress. Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless
limited by a provision has the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its powerto exempt ESCOLIN, J.:
being as broad as its powerto tax. Thegrant by Proclamation No. 420

Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 11

This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to
annul Resolution No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, dated August 21, 1972; to enjoin respondents from
enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel
respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting
provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this petition are not
disputed. When former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija Celestino Juan
was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the
Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 388, dated
September 9, 1971, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of
Nueva Ecija as acting provincial fiscal. 1
On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner
Honorato Perez for appointment to the position of Provincial Fiscal of
Nueva Ecija. 2 It appears, however, that the nomination which was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation was
by-passed upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 1972.
On the following day, May 19, President Marcos designated
petitioner as acting provincial fiscal. 3
Reacting to the said designation, respondent Provincial Board
enacted Resolution No. 146 addressed to the Commission on
Appointments, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of
petitioner's appointment. 4 Respondent Governor Joson also filed a
formal protest with the Committee on Justice of the Commission on
Appointments, making known his strong and emphatic opposition to
the confirmation. 5 After submission of the evidence in support of
the opposition, the said Committee resolved not to recommend the
confirmation of petitioner's appointment. 6
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
On June 7, 1972, or during the sixth special session of Congress,
petitioner was nominated anew for appointment to the office in
question; 7 but the same was likewise by-passed upon adjournment
of Congress on June 22, 1972. 8
On August 11, 1972, petitioner took his oath of office as acting
provincial fiscal 9 pursuant to the designation extended by the
President on May 19, 1972; and on August 14, 1972, he formally
assumed formally assumed office. 10
On August 21, 1972, respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution
No. 228, ordering respondent Provincial Treasurer to stop payment
of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal. 11
The dispute came to a head on August 28, 1972, when respondent
treasurer disapproved petitioner's requisition for various office
supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the
respondent Governor.
Hence, the instant petition, petitioner raising the following legal
questions:
1) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has
the power to pass and enact a resolution not
recognizing herein petitioner as acting provincial
fiscal despite the fact that the latter has assumed
such office pursuant to a designation lawfully
extended to him by the President of the Philippines.
2) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has
the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the
validity of the said designation and assumption.
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 12
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition
having become moot and academic. We take cognizance of the fact
that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980.
12
The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture
of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of the
Election Code of 1978 which provides:
SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or
position.— Every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in
the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the
pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied).
A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive
office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office
has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an
elective office.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LACSON V. PEREZ
FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion
(Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No.
1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this
instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly
faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
ISSUES: Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with
the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected
by the same.
RULING:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on
May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered
moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice
Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based
on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested
has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly
arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities,
otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 13
departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave
the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders
null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore,
the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
[Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and
Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017
declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to
take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017,
directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches
on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting
from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of
PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent
of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed
forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the
Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section
18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first
provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 14
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely
an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section
17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar
as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority
to declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 15
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a
state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency
powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever
is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for
the government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and
the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same
day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)
SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion
to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary,
et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power
to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al,
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi
to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred
by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 16
the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of
Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising
a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no
legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October
of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial
law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the
contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him
nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a
prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982,
he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for
violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 17
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would
be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves
a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude
this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall
not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph
2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183),
the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners
question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 18
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity ,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda – international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
“concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a
valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE v. VERA
65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial
but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new
trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging
that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place
Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act
No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the
law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.
Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of
legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions: An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 19
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation
Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must
be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
Rulings: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system
of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected
by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces
or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of
our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to
flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course
of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary
fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another
province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation
Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the
latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation
in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial
boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the
probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would
be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
SENATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
495 SCRA 170 – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North
Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating
Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a
similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 20
heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of
the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by
the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves.
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is
alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid
of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should not be considered
as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim
of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 21
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of
legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are
valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular
No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum
Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ROMULO
FACTS: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its
affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court to exercise its power of
judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order
assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. In an original action for certiorari, they invoke
their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose rights and
interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order
185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters
and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the
Unions argue that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law – was an
integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the
Secretary of Justice.
During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was
endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292
was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the
DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative
supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was
expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC
was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination
only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman.
The subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise
administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and
personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending
the latter law which only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his
capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her
capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on
procedural and substantive grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for
and in behalf of their members (more or less 50,000 workers) –--
has the requisite standing.
HELD: NO. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a “personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 22
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.” For a citizen to have standing, he must establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the Unions have not shown
that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the enactment of EO 185.
As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that
EO 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the
scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does
not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of
the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section
1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and
specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover,
and if at all, only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any
injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative
function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can standing
be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not
established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or
the Constitution. A taxpayer’s suit is properly brought only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. EO
185 does not even require for its implementation additional
appropriation. All told, if the Court was to follow the strict rule on
locus standi, the petition should be forthwith dismissed on that
score. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
interest. However, the issue posed in the present petition did not
meet the exacting standard required for the Court to take the liberal
approach and recognize the standing of the Unions.
The subject matter of EO 185 is the grant of authority by the
President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative
supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its
personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters.
Its impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby
limited to the departments to which it is addressed. Considering that
the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its
impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not
one of those exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in
sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in
the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of powers
KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of
the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line
lottery system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery
system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It
submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No.
1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not
violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of
wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department
are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 23
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the
instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside
the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues
raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow
the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and
prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws,
acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or
instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners
whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on
the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent
of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the
contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the
party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract
of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.
FRACISCO CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and
AMARI
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
384 SCRA 152
FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central
implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the
DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar
as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO
FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed
petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000,
then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 24
22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners
in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a
Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as
Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning
petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-
Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a
Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en
banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s
failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV
of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7
dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
"transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election
period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied
her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting the
Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to
the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.
Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the
Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment
violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules
and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and
the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued
by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
ESTARIJA v. RANADA
FACTS: Respondent, On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F.
Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and
Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an
administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V.
Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 25
of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. The complaint alleged that Estarija, who
as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships
that dock in the DavaoPort, had been demanding money ranging
from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing
permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. The
complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the
mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported
Estarija’s activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On
August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000
marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. Consequently, the
Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension and directed
him to answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case
against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act ,before the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch No. 8.In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-
affidavit, petitioner denied demanding sums of money for
the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an
employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had
payables to the PPA, and although he went to the association’s
office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the
association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija
claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial
remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing
10% of the monthly gross revenue of their association. Nonetheless,
he received the money but assured Cagata that he would send an
official receipt the following day. He claimed that the entrapment
and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy
to exact personal vengeance against him on account of Ranada’s
business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latter’s sub-
agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc., which was
eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarija’s son.
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the
administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
misconduct. Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.
Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the
Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove
government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not
removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely
recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it
gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not
provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion
for reconsideration in an Order dated October 31, 2000. Thus,
Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed
the Ombudsman’s decision. In his petition for review on certiorari,
Estarija contends that he cannot be liable for grave misconduct
because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by
Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and
that it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration
of the issuance of berthing permits since the signing of berthing
permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep.
Act No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only
the powers enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, which powers do not include the power to directly
remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure a government official. According to him, the
Ombudsman’s power is merely to recommend the action to the
officer concerned. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out,
restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do,
since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simplya
framework within which to build the institution.
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 26
Issue No.1: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold
Estarija liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct
The petition is DENIED. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Estarija did not deny that he went to the DPAI office to
collect, and that he actually received, the money which he
demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was
no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no
reason to go to the latter’s office to collect any money. Even if he
was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency,
he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he
did not do so. Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about
accepting money from DPAI. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be
liable for grave misconduct.
Issue No.2: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to
directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure erring officials is
constitutional Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing
Rep. Act No.6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the
people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the
legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable
him to implement his own actions.
Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the
Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character.
Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and
conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the
Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation
when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members
of Congress and the Judiciary (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals)
The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987Constitution, but allows the
Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No.
6770,specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the
Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees,
except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Sections 15, 21, 22
and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The
powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His
office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely
functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act
No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit, easier to file public
suit, Apply real party in interest test for private suit and direct injury
test for public suit, Validity test varies depending on which inherent
power
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued
LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades
of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold
to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 27

FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who
applies to the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc.
(PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of
the P10 levy. Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a
refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and
damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI
No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful
resulting to denial of due process of law.
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the
state in ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country
and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden
imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the
power of taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose
as PPI is a private corporation.
ISSUE:
1.W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation
rather the police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real
party in interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the
ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful
government intrusion and illegal official action subject to the direct
injury test or where there must be personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest
that locus standi may be waived in the public interest such as cases
of transcendental importance or with far-reaching implications
whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which
made its products more expensive and harm its business. It is also
of paramount public importance since it involves the constitutionality
of a tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers
of the state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police
power is the power of the state to enact the legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty on property in order to promote
general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy
taxes as to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police
power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is
revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are
used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police
power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed
by inherent and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the
State to tax the citizen and use the funds generation for a private
purpose. Public purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose
which are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function
such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also
includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus,
public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
TARROSA v SINGSON
Appointing Power, Commission on
Appointments, Confirmation Power
Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 28
FACTS: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa,
as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as
the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of
Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds
in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress
exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section
16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s

confirmation.

HELD: No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the

confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the
BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand
the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other government officials
not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution.

Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 29