III.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.
Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva
Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;
(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,
Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur,
Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern
Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental,
Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of
Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.
Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as
hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is
geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and
(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by
the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of
common concern.
Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than
one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate.
On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make
an apportionment of Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of
the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next
succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the
month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports
including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be
referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in
writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of
Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who
have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors.
Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation
basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees
submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from
any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside
of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for
more than two terms.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it
shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons
of Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may
be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of
Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out
the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.
Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who
shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves
or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the
regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of
their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall
automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from
year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall
prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than
one term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board,
and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and
employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term
of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the
President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to
hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of
Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or
position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his
membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be
made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.
Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for
grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the
Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his
name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.
Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the
Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall
receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any
service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of
his functions.
Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar
and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper
Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper
audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the
Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes
therewith.
Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon
the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.
Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local
Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges
throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17,
1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the
meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election
of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the
Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each
Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its
Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter
is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate
Delegates.
The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the
Purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and
forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately
assume their respective positions.
Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the
"earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No.
5262 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.
On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the
Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney
as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State.
Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization
of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
 (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained
through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services
throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to
elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance
of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects
of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages
44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the
administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no
collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing
so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom
to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
 The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual
dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed,
would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even
the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been
dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious
or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay
annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto
have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore
enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been
able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by
the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration
takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is
not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time —
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of
the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4)
greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate
the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand,
it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities
to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission
on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association
and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or
4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective
on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the Commission is composed of
Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals
Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator
Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano
Jover Ledesma (Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P.
Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous
consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far
Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the Camarines
Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the
Manila Bar Association.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in favor of Bar
integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989
at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates
(composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc.
However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had
witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of
president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were
done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power
of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into
the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3,
1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was
unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to
device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized
the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis
Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar"
(Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July
8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the
"vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys.
Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win
over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly
used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had
the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who
had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants
alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where
Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the
Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her
(Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined
and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which
allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP
politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the
PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x
x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and
incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to
appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the
aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem
of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political
in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors
and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption
was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and
ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by
candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-
buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue,
upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and
the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a
formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and
Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as
members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording
Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light
on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday
Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where
they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport
Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine
Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the
convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports
that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the
nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters,
phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they,
invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such
persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending
to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in
the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the
Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective
public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
 SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices
relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the
Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata
of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of
such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the
elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement
thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against
a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink,
entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3)
making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of
the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office
if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-president, the
officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p.
4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in
Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes,
and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
 I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas,
Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra,
Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil,
Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R.
Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino
C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R.
Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P.
Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election
(t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n.,
July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary
Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary
for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony
Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the
availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May
1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to
the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary
Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB
plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a
ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the
IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for
their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that
on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development
projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty.
Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and
requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria,
together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took
off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty.
Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP
national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for
Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni
(Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel
(Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza,
Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao
for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza
(Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia),
Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao),
Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo
Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola,
Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles
to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a
voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him
(Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in
that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them, because if
he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79,
95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-
Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of
the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid
P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso
Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe
Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco,
Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano
Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan,
Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay,
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the
presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife
of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use
of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager,
Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the
name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came
to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name
of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon
group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of
P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

 (g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a
project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She
allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where
she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty.
Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon
Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro
Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius
Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for
rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July
5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are
fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma
rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the legal
aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July
6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew,
like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a
classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29
rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20,
1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and
reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his
candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes,
Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot,
Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R.
Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to
attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral
assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about
the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss,
the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony
Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the
campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later
part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day
IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for
Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the
"action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in
these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who
promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the
delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made
(t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year. This year,
the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP
By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a
leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets
and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at
the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The
election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the
House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls
and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-
145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-
Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman
of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp.
137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet
IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers
of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her
to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support
during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce
changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was
Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p.
104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29,
1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying,
"I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed
him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de
la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that
when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered
to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to
transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989,
pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt.
He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to
campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL
tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because
he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him
to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty.
Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the
Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign
which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up
over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty.
Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the
Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP
By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-
Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star
hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates
billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House
of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of
candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the
procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB
plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents
in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of
Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers
(by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating
of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration;
all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the
ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of
the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not
uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-
finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those
parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing
for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated
Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the
reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the
stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the
recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP
as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its
resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art.
XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII,
Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July
9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office
of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves.
The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as
president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
 Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President
for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors
to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by
a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to
be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985
(Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months,
after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors
shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and
executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June
3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as
well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are
ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the
IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such
further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

IV. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES

OF COURT)
1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyer
a. Sui generis
Disciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, x x
x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather investigation[s] by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
b. Prescription
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:

SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of

attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and
Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of
their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original
owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land
dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses
since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect.
However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their
differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the
recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo,
Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty.
Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this
purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the
alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a
sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was
pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has
already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion
she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No.
1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty.
Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa
Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and
Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code;
and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975,
Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed
of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of
Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years before in the
year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los
Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of
said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed
vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void
the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal
(complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living
donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the
property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor
of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized
the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal) and
her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the
counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543) against
Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the Second
Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975,
Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were ordered
consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. When Atty.
1âwphi1

Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the
investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis,
Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of
complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala of
Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos and
Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative
Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw
from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of
their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40
O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of
Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there
was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan
Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant
or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated
when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus,
purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170.
The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge,
Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than
negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31, 1978).
When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334,
Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by
another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate
and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent
introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense
of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must
advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to
resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that
a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment,
therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293).
Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but she
never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She
eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
1âwphi1

contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded
this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be
dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso factoresult
in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We
are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information
furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay.
"Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391 was
not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in executing the
falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors and only
two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a
meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty.
Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil
Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One of the
fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the
law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they)
eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney
Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court
is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who
ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that
the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966,
he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did
serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the
plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of
time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on
May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the
same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied
upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest
case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the
question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based
on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier
than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965.
Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it
"without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case
(Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its
 prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila
Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied
the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967.
Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him.
So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court
on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such
request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He
also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you
shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you.
But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the
beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck
from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck
from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this
is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble
profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO
MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from
this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular
case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is
still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision
of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We
were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its
duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing
that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
 xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated
so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ...
We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal
state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution
and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice,
we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it,
to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful
thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial.
Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been
lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable
to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is
the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons
may read different justices to the same result ... .
 Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively,
on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions
calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart
from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held
that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are
often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be
moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court
of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law
and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4
and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.
Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper
(Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs.
Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the
Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which
he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame.
His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift
away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he
assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is
natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious
case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such
right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's
actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on
them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their
official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment
on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and
officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished
by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the
best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on
the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called
to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class
has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in
Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
 obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of
an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide,
and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40
Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And
he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame
of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision
in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide
comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not
aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As
a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it
is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court
and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
 We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the
bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to
the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against
the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17
LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the
first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by
the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted
to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence
in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter
and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the
libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic
action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and
said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring
the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in
the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-
up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any
of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings,
deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
 legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of
civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an
affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted
and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered
grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is
his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers
for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify
an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him;
and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or
the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties,
when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert
the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and
when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations
more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have
been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism,
but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity
of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the
court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good,
if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as
to the ethics of the profession. ...
 The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under
our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the
best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right
does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably
both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly
asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of
the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar
the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to
the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state
bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or
any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-
minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the
Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of
insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and
could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with
due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law;
and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge
alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused
of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation,
and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a
citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which
reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced.
To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an
officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his
obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by
an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act
constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others.
The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized
in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right
of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his
rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting
or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the
judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of
the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold
judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of
his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held
in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in
which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result
is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under
the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may
redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the
case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the
 latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374,
49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our
duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter
in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for
two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for
courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable:
Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under
the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
 stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary."
He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then
and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he
is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent
also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of
this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently
to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
 ... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez
stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to
earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not
entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so
called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now
be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over
a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this
was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted
in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case
closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to
the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief
Justice Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable
by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
 against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice
is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or
to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected
is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be
liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power
in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is
not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude
them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment
of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise
of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not
the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox
though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In
haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court.
The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused
the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no
apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in
them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons
of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand
but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a
very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives,
would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end,
the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence
of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are
impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of
that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]

IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A.

RAYOS, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene
Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro
Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for
members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then
85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for
safekeeping. Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be
excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from
inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with
the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he
was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of
her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent
deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in trust for
seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22,
1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00
plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for another month and
promised to return the whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent,
however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
 On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal
as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement
stating:

"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to

(respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn by the parties from the
Philippine National Bank on said date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of
(complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they
hereby agree on the following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above
sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only
the sum of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated
check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated
check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the
aforesaid postdated checks fall due, the same should be backed up with
sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby
acknowledges the same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the
former when able or at his option. (Complainant) however assures (respondent)
that she will not institute any collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither
will she transmit the same by way of testamentary succession to her heirs,
neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their
previous cordial filial relationship."[2]
 In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant
the following checks:

1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount
of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount
of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due
to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check
because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed that the
checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the
other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the brewing dispute between the
two. They begged respondent to pay his obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea,
respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and
another for P35,200.00.Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second
because it was dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No.
487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack
of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and
a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To
pay his debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting
to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed cash to provide for her
daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against complainant. It
appears that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by
complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized him to
negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance payment for the lots they were
occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the
land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because she
did not intend to make respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent
for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her
promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of
Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings
No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the pleading although he
was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for
allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent on
two grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2)
that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's counsel,
Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit
tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4)
subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended the
dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-22
stating:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to
be supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to
Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied the
motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for
Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for
disbarment.[11]
 We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:

"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an
attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later
refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by
the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the
disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him
unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires
that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's
good standing in the profession.[12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's privilege to
practice law not only for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether,
on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has been sufficiently
proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ, concur.

2. Grounds
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

a. Deceit

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005]

WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D.
PIZARRO, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham
(complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and
misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers oath.
Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the filing of the present
administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased
Mario Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for
sale to him a parcel of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified
as Lot1683 of Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the
property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro arranged a meeting
between him and respondent at the latters residence in Balanga, Bataan[1] where respondent
categorically represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and
disposable.[2]Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of
Payment[3] dated July 10, 1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal
Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale [4] dated July 25,
1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose
R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of
Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed
consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of Attorney[5] dated July 25, 1995
executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him (respondent) to:

1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows:
AREA: 40 has. more or less
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale of the
subject property; and to sign the same.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the corresponding share of
each co-owner;
 x x x[6] (Underscoring supplied)
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option to Buy, [7] the
pertinent portions of which provide:

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners

of rights with planted trees (improvements) containing an area of FORTY THREE (43)
hectares, situated in Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion of Lot
1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre), covered by Tax Declaration 6066.
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of THREE
MILLION AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00) payable in
two (2) gives (sic), as follows:
a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the balance of full
payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms
and conditions hereunder specified the parties have agreed on the following:
1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon
signing of this contract, which shall form part of the contract price if and when the buyer
comply (sic) with his obligation to pay in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof,
otherwise should the BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on
the scheduled period the P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in favor of the
SELLER and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.
2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final Deed of Sale
and shall surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to the properties subject of
sale;
3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the above stated
properties including the trees planted on it as against the rights of third party except that
of the government.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the amount
of P10,000.00 for which respondent issued the corresponding Receipt [9] reading:

Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR. WILSON
CHAM, representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262 situated
at Boundaries:
NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo
SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
 WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao
including the trees and improvement situated thereon.
Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date hereof.[10] (Underscoring
supplied)
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [11] over the property in
his favor, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED

SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE (P3,372,533.00),
Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged from the BUYER to
the entire satisfaction of the SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL,
TRANSFER and CONVEY, in manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said
BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all their rights, interest and participation over that
certain real estate destined for, and in actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas,
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly described as follows:
Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan
Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an area of
392,155 square meters more or less.
Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo
South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao
The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land are visible by
means of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land including the permanent
improvements existing thereon consist of fruit-bearing trees assessed for the current year
at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as
per Tax Declaration No. 5010; and that the property is presently in the possession of the
SELLERS.
The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute owners of the
rights over the said property; that they have the perfect right to convey the same; that
they acquired their rights over the said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R.
Monzon who acquired his rights over the property from Marianito Holgado; that
Marianito Holgado acquired his right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired his
right from Julian Agujo who was the original owner who cleared the land and who was
in possession of the same immediately after the Second World War.
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real estate
including the trees planted thereon and they undertake to defend the same unto said
Vendee, his heirs and assigns against the claims of any third person
whomsoever.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 5010 [13] with
Property Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued in his (respondents) name and his alleged co-
owners, and Real Property Tax Receipt No. 025201 [14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in his
(respondents) name.
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase
price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210 [15] in the
amount of P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers Check No.
004639GA[16]in the amount of P3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.
He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its
front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the
property could not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.[17]
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a Certification[18] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:

This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land claimed by
spouses Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto
Pizarro, all located at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.
Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this Office, said
lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on
December 1, 1945. Under the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not
subject for disposition.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
He also obtained a Letter-directive[20] dated August 31, 1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge
Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of
Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:

Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some forest occupants
that are securing land tax declarations from your office in (sic) the pretext that the
area they occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands. Presently,
this tax declaration is being used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession within
the Bataan Natural Park which is prohibited under our laws.
xxx

In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of informing us and in
controlling this land rush and massive selling and buying of rights of possession within
prohibited areas as stated above.[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification[22] dated March 14, 1996 stating
that those named by respondent as prior owners of rights over the property from whom
respondent and his alleged co-owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those
inventoried as occupants per the PENRs 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO)
Survey.
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights
over the property.[23]
In his present complaint[24] dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges respondent
to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and
evident misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over
the property which property he represented to be disposable and alienable. [25]
In his Comment[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having employed deceit or
having pretended to co-own rights over the property or having represented that it was
alienable and disposable. He claimed that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the
purchase of property, knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his
purchase;[27] and that despite complainants awareness that he was merely buying rights to
forest land, he just the same voluntarily entered into the transaction because of the propertys
proximity to the Subic Bay Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the property in the hope
that lands belonging to the public domain in Morong would be eventually declared alienable
and disposable to meet the rising demand for economic zones. [28]
By Resolution[29] of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety
(90) days from notice.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply[30] to respondents Comment,
maintaining that the sale of rights over the property was attended with deceit as respondent
deliberately did not disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.[31] And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that with his purchase of
the property, he would venture into low-cost housing for the employees of the nearby Subic
Bay area.[32]
To complainants Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.[33]
 Complainant later filed his Affidavit[34] and Position Paper[35] on June 21,
2002 and September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating his assertions in his previous
pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and Navarro in 1999 [36] arising from the questioned
sale of rights. The complaint was twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On
petition for review, however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B.
Perez, by Resolution[37] of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the complaint as it found
probable cause to indict respondent et al. in court. An information for estafa was thereupon
filed against respondent et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-00-94232.
By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath
as a member of the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the
members of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and Recommendation
read:

. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of NIPAS ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas
occupied within the Bataan Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as per letter
of OIC CENRO Laurino D. Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P.
Map No. 34 to the Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that
subject property which is within this category was not subject for disposition; a fact
supposed to be known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in
the practice of his profession also in said area.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among those
inventoried occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since 1978 up to the latest
census in 1994 from whom respondent allegedly bought the subject property;
the Absolute Deed of Sale executed between the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the
respondent relative to the same subject property was not notarized which partook the
nature of a private and not official document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to prove their
rights, interest and possession to the subject property, respondent and his co-owners
failed to show a permit from the government conferring upon them rights or concessions
over the subject property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as
public and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent and his co-owners have no
rights and interests whatsoever over the subject property and their representations to
complainant were simply not true but a falsehood.
Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the law took
advantage of his versatility in the practice of law and committed misrepresentations that
he and his co-owners have irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the subject
property which convinced complainant into purchasing subject property unmindful that
the same is not alienable or disposable being a portion of the public domain;
whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as member of the Philippine Bar for
having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the
complainant.[39] (Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report and Recommendation.
The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.[40]
The IBP findings are well-taken.
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of
honesty and fair dealing.[41] Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession.[42]
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.[43]
Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit;
2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.
And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited
in connection with the performance of professional duties.[44]
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the
DENR that the property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the
Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24[45] issued on December 1,
1945, all properties of the public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National
Park were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of
having irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to
complainant. E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the government
conferring upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-
interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none. He merely presented a Deed
of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and
Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as
neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of
possession over realty unless supported by other effective proof. [46] The presentation of a tax
declaration must indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted
portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is]
within alienable and disposable land.
Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase,
for P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and participation over an
inalienable property.
In Lizaso v. Amante[47] where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein complainant
to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her
substantial profit, but therein respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the
investment but also the principal thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning
lawyers for committing fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private dealings:

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent

Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that complainant entered into
with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for
complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by
respondent to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that
it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the
relationship of an attorney and client. x x x
x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this
is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the
attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of
such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and
unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a distinction
can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court
requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character.
xxx

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating
to professional or non-professional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was
expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence
and restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate
matters which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and
trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those
who satisfy the standard of test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be
hoped for if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-
professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x x misconduct, indicative of moral
unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies
dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo x xx:
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is
not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough
to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorneys character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him.[48] (Italics in the original)
This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino[49] and Lao v. Medel.[50]
To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a modicum of
prudence before entering into the transaction with respondent, he would have spared himself
from respondents sham.
It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial
that the complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant
relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect
the public and the courts.[51]
 The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent. His
conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as the present administrative case
against him is concerned.[52]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension,
clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will
not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless
from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[54]
While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of so severe
a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this Court to discipline an errant member of
the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his
solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.[55]
The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP is not, however,
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. This Court finds that
respondents suspension from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will merit a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member
of the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[A C. No. 3919. January 28, 1998]

SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N.

BERNARDINO, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a

businesswoman, against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and
unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law.
Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for
her shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo
N. Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of
Customs such as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division,
and OIC of the Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to
give her some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a month after, or
in November of the same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from
complainant P120,000.00 with the promise to pay the amount in full the following month,
broadly hinting that he could use his influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To
ensure payment of his obligation, respondent issued to complainant several postdated Boston
Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December 1989 for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4
December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January 1990 for P65,000.00 and No.
092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C," "D,"
respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No.
051946 dated 9 January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks covering the
total amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of
account.
Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able
to pay her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after
to be secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car. [1] As complainant agreed respondent
handed her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6)
copies of the deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration
certificate and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold
the same car to another.
Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade
complainant altogether so that she was constrained
to write him a final demand letter dated 22 September 1992[2] preceding the filing of several
criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22.[3] Complainant also filed a letter-
complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman.[4]
It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and
civil cases against respondent similarly involving money transactions. [5] Ms. Ortiz claimed that
respondent had volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton
fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time
for the holidays. However, despite her successive payments to respondent
totalling P410,000.00, the latter failed to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's
personal check for P410,000.00 representing reimbursement of the amount he received from
Ms. Ortiz was returned dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by
way of rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to
her. He brushed aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague,
confusing, misleading and full of biases and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated
a special relationship with the two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings
with them.
On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings -

1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of
the subject checks has been paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular
phones have been delivered to the complainant;
2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject
bouncing checks and wherein he was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal
was not due to payment of the obligation but rather that 'private complainant
knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter did not have
sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is
committed where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have
sufficient funds in the bank; and
3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated
26 August 1995 x x x and the release of real estate mortgage x x x x If it is true
that he had already paid his obligation with five (5) cellular phones, why pay
again?
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in
his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]).
Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is
so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re
Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad
checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact
that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much
delayed.[6]
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of
respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this
Court. Thus we held in Lizaso v. Amante[7] where Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in
the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of 10%
profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment
but also the principal thereof (P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands -

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44
Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers
for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x x
In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x x As a general rule,
a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct
alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions x x x x The nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require
that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is
a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him x x x x[8]
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo[9] where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year
from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated
that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an
unfit and unworthy lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same
time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as
to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him x x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support." [10]
Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to
conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through
insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a
series of bad checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid
government office constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly
deserves. His propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier
attitude towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them is
reprehensible.This disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is
an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED
FOR ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts
in the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in
respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]

SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W.
Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an
attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:

The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four (4)
RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks issued
to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that
[respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith effect
immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the
earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter
dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of only ten (10)
days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect
payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this present
complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on
his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals
to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay
complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because of the following:

(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney
for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case,
it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the complainant,
is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a
special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is
self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of
Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in
payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false
pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138
of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment
of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27,
would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not
countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly
shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member
of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the
Supreme Court; and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22,
does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law
profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable
and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of
his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22,
the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the doubt. [4]
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several
cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent
acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his
principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4,
2002 to settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the
next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled
hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on leaving,
supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainants counsel objected and
Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to
wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is
more important.[6] And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made no
effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7] Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of
violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The former explained
that, contrary to the latters claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved moral
turpitude.Further, he observed that [w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted against
[respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts
of violation of BP 22.[8] The refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken
promises, his arrogant attitude towards complainants counsel and the [commission sufficiently]
warrant the imposition of sanctions against him.[9] Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was
transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).

The Courts Ruling

 We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but
reduce the period of suspension to one year.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[11] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts
and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant. While
acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks, he contends that such act
constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he
made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to
accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation
to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for
the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the
payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to
settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in
incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his moral character in serious
doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks,
unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order. [13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. In Co v.Bernardino,[14] the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as a
violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may
not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses
and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member
of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does
not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation
to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal
services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation
from this Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567
(1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which
do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x
x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as
well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications
of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him x x x.
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year
from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm
reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which
show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals
of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons
whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x
x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x
x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with
Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to
settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of
respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue
of his membership therein.[15]
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to
investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend to, he
could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and asked
permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior by raising
his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. [16] It demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.[17] In this case, respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. [18]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two
years. However, in line with Co v. Bernardino,[19] Ducat Jr. v. Villalon
Jr.[20] and Saburnido v. Madroo[21] -- which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we
find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP,
as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

b. Malpractice

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J.
VALDES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the
50s during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness
extended to their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and
accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to
purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on
July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant
IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates,
handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was appointed as
administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages
against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership
over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics
when he:

I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong

Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was settling as its
lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate
properties he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time,
charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property
 as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the
title to the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that
retained him as its counsel and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as
lawyer and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition
for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in
the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval
Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of
maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She
claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the
late Nakpil in his correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes
and Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet
included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which
respondent represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase of a house
and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes
and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while
respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate
and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when
his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
against her husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant
averred that there is no distinction between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent
is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In
hisANSWER,[4] respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second
charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance
case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute
owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from
him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of
Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of
the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up
by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were applied
probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent
insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase
probably for the purchase did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected
acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H)
of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or
oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did
not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance
Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting
firms in the settlement of her husbands estate. [5] However, he pointed out that he has
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty.
Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law
firm represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes
& Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis:
First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a
family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel
Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of
ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even
during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests
was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no
conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi,
i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank
creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
after satisfying the banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused
prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as common auditor
redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the
claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15,
1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SECs
certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it
was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed
the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were represented by their
own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility
that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as a
lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors.
Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran
property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of
Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that
complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes
and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C. J.
Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not
proofs that respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to
remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant
alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional counsel of respondent
and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with
greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself
prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of
claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran
property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents
prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must
accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of
his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9,
1976 to several years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence
referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his
resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondents accounting
firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate
and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm
but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they
were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized
that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure
of respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
 In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground
that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which
involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We
granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled
that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant
waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the
OSG submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the
decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that
respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It opined that there
was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute
owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It
also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The
OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. [12] The measure of good faith
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms
length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public
policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for
reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late
Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To
place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later
transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
trust nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his
family corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision,[17] thus:

x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during

the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly
recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong
Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx

The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x
x x can be bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the
estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil,
which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of
herein respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the application of the
proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by
the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the
name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already
transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been
included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the
arrangement outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x
x take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests
due on the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would
continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without
remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does not
mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner
(Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes
could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap.
 Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval
Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late
Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence
(Exhibits H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop
respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in
trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which
his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent
truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed
complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should
have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate
proceedings. Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity
in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the
loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the
information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from
respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the
accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not have been
committed without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it
too and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. [19] The
proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter[20] and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith. [21] However, representation of conflicting
interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure
of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to
such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict
and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. [22]
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets
and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the
estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor,
and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance,
respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not
personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records
of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant
of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his
law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case)
is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by
any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent
returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for
the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when
respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the
intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that
respondent could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates
was the legal counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was
the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that
complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as
there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal
situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement
does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per
se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against
her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a
position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice
the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of
interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to
inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
 Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could
not be charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions.
He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at
bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common
accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm
to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to
represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a
breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms
loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to his
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the
Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character is not
only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members
of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part. Previous associate with respondent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 1359 October 17, 1991

GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
Jorge A. Dolorfino for petitioners.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted and Benito Bolisay filed an administrative complaint for malpractice
against respondent Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the latter with having wantonly abused professional secrets or
information obtained by him as their counsel.
After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on 25 June 1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4 October 1974 referred
the complaint to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearing where respondent took the witness stand on his own
behalf.
The record of the case shows the following background facts:
In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was
counsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted. Involved in said partition case was a parcel of land
Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive
ownership over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was
issued in the name of complainant spouses.
the latter
When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the defendants, 2
retained the services of respondent Atty. Hernando however claims that he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free
of charge. Subject of this case was a contract of lease executed by Benito's co-defendant therein, Enrique Buted, over
a house standing on a portion of Lot No. 9439-B. It appears that the Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to the
aforementioned lot. Benito was then asserting ownership over the realty by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Luciana Abadilla in his favor. Eventually, the Sy's were ordered to vacate the house subject of the lease. Respondent
avers that the relationship between himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4 December
1969. 3
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant spouses, filed a petition on behalf of the heirs
of Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla, seeking the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of complainant spouses over the lot.
Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. 4 At
the hearing,
respondent Hernando testified that if the petition for cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would no longer be
owned by complainant spouses but would be owned in common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated
30 July 1974. 6Respondent
however, pursued the case until it was eventually dismissed by the trial court on 2 September
1974 on the ground of prescription. 7
At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor General and in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his
involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but denied having seen or taken hold of the
controversial Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to Lot
9439-B.
In its Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the Solicitor General recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
months for violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting interests, and filed before this Court the corresponding
Complaint 8 dated 30 March 1990.
The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the
circumstances described above.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a
conflict of interests situation in the following manner:
6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests.—
xxx xxx xxx
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence
forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting
any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Though as regards the first and second cases handled by respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same cannot be
said with respect to the action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own admission,
he defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of
complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a conflict of interest
situation.
It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of
interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties concerned are necessary. 9 The
present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is now
required to be in written form. 10 In the case at bar, such consent was wanting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims of complainant spouses, he had never seen nor taken hold
of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor obtained any confidential information in handling the
action for specific performance. 11 The contention of respondent is, in effect, that because complainant has not clearly
shown that respondent had obtained any confidential information from Benito Bolisay while representing the latter in
the action for specific performance, respondent cannot be penalized for representing conflicting interests. That is not
the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather, that the mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel
for the other side in the subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses
Generosa and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential information to
an attorney in the course of his employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting
employment by the second or subsequent client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients. The reason for this rule was set out by the Court in Hilado v. David 12in the following terms:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential
communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character
of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the
freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are
their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the
attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would be in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation
be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n. 183 III., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said another case, the question is not necessarily one of
the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 13
(Emphasis supplied)

where the lawyer was charged with malpractice for having represented a new client
This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, 14

whose interest was opposed to those of his former clients in another case:
The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing that the petitioner
had obtained a favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that his efforts in the subsequent civil case
No. 5952 would frustrate said judgment and render it ineffectual, as has really been the result upon his
obtaining the writ of injunction above-mentioned. Obviously his conduct is unbecoming to an attorney and
cannot be sanctioned by the courts. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good practice
to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm in the following manner:
An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a former one, to do anything which will injuriously affect the former client in any
manner in which the attorney formerly represented him, though the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new employment is in a
different case; nor can the attorney use against his former client any knowledge or information gained through their former connection. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against
pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client
relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that respondent Hernando is guilty of violation of the Canons
of Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting interests. We believe, however, that a heavier penaltyis
appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Harold M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period
of five (5) months, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
A copy of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal record of respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998]

GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S.

GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

A complaint for disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25, 1983, by Glorito V.
Maturan against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales, charging him with immoral, unethical,
and anomalous acts. The respondent filed his comment thereto on February 6, 1984. On
November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13) years, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines submitted their report and recommendation on the instant case.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan
(herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated
November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters
occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases
against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty.
Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.
Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several
squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot was registered in the name of
Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of
property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case
No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February 18,
1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983.
In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement,
which was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and
without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino
Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case
No. 2067.The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of petitioner to
represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record
in Civil Case No. 2067. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et
al., also filed Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
with damages, against petitioner.
Aggrieved by respondents acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in
Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had
been transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against the former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and
asked for his disbarment.
Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any
malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent
declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was
the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner, and that
his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the
lawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of
employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his
childrens sustenance.
The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report
dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and
recommended that he be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner but
recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year.
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty
of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one
party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited
from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client.[1] That the representation of conflicting interest is in
good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition
inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer must have
the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by
the loss thereof.[2]
This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provide in part:
 It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
Moreover, respondents justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the
fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not
terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies
that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally
terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.
As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to
one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the penalty of two or three years suspension has been imposed where respondent was
found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo vs. Jalandoon,
Sr.,[3] the respondent, who appeared for complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even
though he had been the counsel of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was
suspended for a period of two years. In Bautista vs. Barrios,[4] a suspension of two years was
imposed on respondent Barrios, who had drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who
appeared for the other party therein, when the same was sought to be enforced by
petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo,[5] the Court even suspended the respondent therein for three
years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also
deliberately intended to attract clients with interests adverse to his former employer. Finally,
in Natan vs. Capule,[6] respondent was suspended for two years after he accepted
professional employment in the very case in which his former client was the adverse party.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend
respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, ,
Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Purisima, J., no part. Did not take part in the deliberation.
Panganiban, J., no part. Related to one of involved clients of respondents.