It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FACTS: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for
the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s
departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees
to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
“(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added
to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
– one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a
representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence
of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have
made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the
JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would
deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives
of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of
providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members
who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.
ISSUE:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the
JBC is unconstitutional?
HELD:

1
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of
Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for
being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be
affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph
calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who
shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
2
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid
purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism
which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect
that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting
deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the
word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read
as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize
that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on
the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case
and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
3
GONZALES vs. COMELEC
GR No 28196 09 November 1967
FACTS: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed the following resolutions, (1) increasing the number of seats in the
lower house from 120 to 180, (2) calling for a constitutional convention, and
(3) allowing members of the Congress to run as delegates to the constitutional
convention without forfeiting their seats. Congress passed a bill, which,
approved by the President on 17 June 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967.
ISSUE: Whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.
DECISION: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments
is not included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. Pursuant
to Section 1 Article XV, “The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote
of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.” The said resolutions are null and void because the Congress may
not avail of both amending and calling a convention at the same time and the
election must be a special election not a general election for amendment to
the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification.
TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
GR No 34150 16 October 1971
FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved on 28 September
1971 Organic Resolution No 1, amending Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution so as to lower the voting age to 18 and that the plebiscite for
partial amendment to take place with the local elections on November 1971.
President Diosdado Macapagal called upon the COMELEC to help the
Convention implement the said resolution. On 30 September 1971 COMELEC
resolved to inform the Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Succeeding
resolutions on campaigning and confirming the authority of the President of
the Convention to implement the Organic Resolution were approved.
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino contended that under Section 1 Article XV of the
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Convention may call for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution 1 pursuant to Section 1 Article
XV of the Constitution.
DECISION: Petition is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide
for the holding of a plebiscite on 08 November 1971, as well as the resolution
of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are declared null and void.
The condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single plebiscite
pursuant to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. The part that the people
play in its amendment becomes harder, when a whole constitution is
submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an
integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. When
an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed
amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts
4
SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
GR No 127325 19 March 1997
FACTS: On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by Peoples Initiative wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order to (1) fix the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
(2) cause the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution and (3) Instruct Municipal Election
Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated. Delfin alleged that he intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution pursuant to Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution. Petitioner contended that RA 6735 deals with people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No 2300 is a
valid prescription of rules and regulations on the conduct of initiating an
amendment as issued under Section 20 of RA 6735. On 18 December 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago filed action for prohibition contending that
(1) constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress, (2) RA 6735 failure to
provide subtitle to the initiative indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law, (3) Resolution 2300 is
ultra vires since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations
for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
DECISION: Petition granted. Declaring RA 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Declaring void those
parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution. ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS
the DELFIN petition.
Without implementing legislation Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution
cannot operate. The right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,
while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. R.A. No. 6735 did not provide full compliance for the
implementation of the exercise of the said right. It exerted utmost diligence
and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local legislation but failed to do so on the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments
to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2
of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not
self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional
action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
5
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide
for its implementation.
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people
“before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned”
that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly
6
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering
environmental tragedies.
the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments. Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the
TLAs.
oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on
11 October 2006. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
question.
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
prohibited by the Constitution.
revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not the action.
comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative
ISSUES:
clause on amendments to the Constitution.
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined (3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment
of contracts.
by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital RULING:
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they First Issue: Cause of Action.

7

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be
the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-
stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192
and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of
the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
RULING: (1) Yes, it is a substantive right.
Right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice."
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come. (2) Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
8
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to
accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
RULINGS:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that –
9
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid
of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government
be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or
gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the
Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity
to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after
the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
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Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds
as may be necessary for the purpose.
HELD: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on
matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between
a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over
the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
11
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44
per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
MERLIN MAGALLONA vs. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic
baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the
Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by
the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
“archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and
aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself
is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law
has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the
Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased
it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was
440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision
of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may
term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However,
due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of
their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
12
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under
UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed
within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island
group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area
which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the
demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime
zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where
we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where
we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is
covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945
FACTS: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of
First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on
the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the
ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines
in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during
the Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
ISSUES:
Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General
MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts.
Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before
them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.
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DISCUSSIONS:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de
facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving
their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while
in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from
the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for
the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private
rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change
the existing laws or make new ones.”
General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his
proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a
state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force,
resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . .
Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which
enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the
external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
RULINGS:
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The
governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not
only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well
as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de
facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and
valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into
the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
14
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place,
in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into
his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the
laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War
states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And
Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said
that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all
pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the
stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision
of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of
transient character.

15