Recovery of Real Property: (Accion Interdictal) Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Posted 17th July 2016 by AJ Solbrilla

Forcible Entry

 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth".
 The possession is unlawful from the time of entry.

Unlawful Detainer

 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession".
 The possession is at first lawful and later becomes illegal.

Nature
They are summary in nature because they involve disturbance of social order, which must be
abated as promptly as possible.

Rationale
To provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved without delay in the determination thereof.

Jurisdiction
Municipal Trial Court/Metropolitan Trial Court

Issue
Mere physical or material possession (possession de facto); not juridical or civil possession,
which arises from ownership (possession de jure)

Prescription
Within 1 year from the date of actual entry (Forcible Entry) or from the date the last demand
to vacate (Unlawful Detainer)

Peralta-Labrador v. Bagarin (G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005)

It was clear that Peralta-Labrador's averment was a case for forcible entry because she
alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry
thereon by Bulgarin. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent
occurred 2 years prior to the filing of the complaint in 1996, the cause of action for forcible
entry had prescribed and the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case.

The complaint therefore should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.

Nuñez v. SLTEAS (G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010)

If the unlawful entry was done through strategy or stealth, the 1-year prescriptive period
should be counted from the date of the discovery. The forcible entry requisite of prior
possession does not necessarily mean physical occupation of the property. It can mean doing
acts of possession (payment of real property tax).

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006)

The ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te
complaint, is an unlawful detainer case. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between then, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

In such case, the unlawful possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate. Since the last demand was sent on January 14, 1997 and the action was filed in
September, 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the 1 year period reckoned from the
date when the last demand was sent.

De La Paz v. Panis (G.R. No. L-57023, June 22, 1995)

The action was not for forcible entry; there was no allegation in the complaint that the
petitioners were denied possession of the land in question through any of the methods stated
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, although private respondents prior possession
was clearly alleged.

Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there was no lease
contract between the parties, and the demand to vacate made upon the private respondents
did not make them tenants of the petitioners.

In order to gain possession of the land occupied by the private respondents, the proper
remedy adopted by the petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of possession before
the then Court of First Instance. Respondent judge, therefore, had jurisdiction over the case
and should not have dismissed it on the ground of lack thereof.

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995)

This case involved a fence encroaching upon the parcel of land of a neighbor. It was not a
forcible entry case because there was no unlawful entry dispossessing the neighbor of the
property. It was also not for unlawful detainer because there was no contract or agreement
making the possession lawful at first and then it expired or was terminated making the
possession unlawful. It was for accion reivindicatoria since it was a recovery of ownership.

Ocampo v. Dionisio (G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014)

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action.

A forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while
the recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the
right to possess the same.

The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that
the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior
physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the parcel of land.

Suarez v. Emboy (G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement of
facts to determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the
complaint fails to state the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reividicatoria.

In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how
Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about the details
on who specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance
came about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not commit
an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.