The Role of Identity in U.S.-Chinese Relations

The Role of Identity in U.S.
-Chinese Relations
Corey Velgersdyk
Political Science 390
Professor Joel Westra
May 17, 2009

Velgersdyk 2
The realist perspective is the dominant analytical framework in the study of international
relations. According to the realist perspective, actors are self-interested and view state-to-state
interactions as zero-sum games where gains by the other necessarily mean losses by the self.
Such a perspective has often been applied to U.S.-Chinese relations in the past.1 However, the
realist perspective alone is insufficient. Realist predictions based on current material factors do
not correspond with the reality of U.S.-Chinese relations. The constructivist perspective is useful
to supply answers to the discrepancies and gaps found in realist expectations of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship because it provides an alternative explanation for the practices of states that is based
out of state identity. The way that the United States and China perceive themselves and each
other affects how each state defines its interests, which in turn influences its practices.2
To demonstrate the usefulness of the constructivist perspective in analysis of U.S-
Chinese relations, the significant materialist factors will be analyzed and a set of realist
predictions for how the East Asian region would look will be made. These predictions will be
contrasted with the actual reality of the situation to see what there discrepancies there are that the
realist perspective cannot explain. These discrepancies will be explained by examining the
1
Richard Berstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with China,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (1997): 18-
32.; Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward
East Asia,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 81-126.
2
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 73.
Velgersdyk 3
identity-derived interests. This is accomplished by determining the historical process that formed
each state’s identity, what that identity is, and what interests result from said identity. The
identity-driven interests and the practices they determine will provide a complete explanation of
U.S.-Chinese relations and a foundation to make predictions about the future outlook of the
United States and China in East Asia and the world.
REALITY AND THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE
Realist predictions about East Asia, and the U.S.-Chinese relationship more specifically,
are based off of the material factors of the region and realist assumptions. The key assumptions
are that states are unitary actors, states are inherently self-interested, and interactions between
states should be seen with a zero-sum perspective. Implicit in these assumptions is the
precedence of materialism in determining state interests.3
Material Factors
The first factor to be discussed is the bipolarity of East Asia.4 China and the United States
are the two poles of power within the region, each exercising dominating influence in their
respective spheres of influence. The bipolarity is exhibited by the differences in military
3
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 392.
4
Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security
23, no. 4 (1999): 82.
Velgersdyk 4
capabilities both states control in the region as well as by the geographical boundary along the
eastern coast of China.5
The United States is by far the dominant naval power in the region. Benjamin O.
Fordham uses aircraft carriers as an indicator of military capabilities as they have been central to
power projection since WWII. Moreover, the technological sophistication required of modern
carrier groups means aircraft carriers are also a good measure of technological advancement.6
Even by China’s own admission, the U.S. power projection capabilities outmatch anything that
China has.7 Furthermore, the United States has a large military base and economic presence in
Japan. 8
China has the greatest land forces within the region. This is in part due to China’s huge
population but also to China’s efforts to modernize their military forces.9 Chinese military
planners are aware of the significant capability gap between China and the United States. To
overcome the gap, China has not only developed advanced weapons like nuclear submarines and
5
Ibid., 86.
6
Benjamin O. Fordham, “A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to
Use Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 641-2.
7
Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security
Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 8-9.
8
Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International
Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 50.
9
Bernstein and Munro, “The Coming Conflict,” 18.
Velgersdyk 5
ballistic missiles, but also on military capabilities that can undermine U.S. capabilities such as
information warfare and special forces.10 China also benefits from immense strategic depth
granted by its large resource reserves, numerous cities with populations numbering in the
millions, its geographical features like rivers and mountains, and simply its large size.11 This
strategic depth affords China the ability to withstand attack even by a more advanced invader,
like Japan during WWII.12
The capabilities and advantages of the United States and China discussed above have led
to a de facto boundary running along the eastern coast of China. China lacks the power
projection capabilities to spread its presence far beyond its coastal waters, but the limitations of
power projection capabilities over land, especially in light of China’s immense strategic depth,
prevent the United States from advancing its influence far into mainland China.13 The region is
thus in a stalemate as both powers have a stable foundation for their power, but neither of the
states can threaten the other state’s hold in the region. Thus the region is a stable bipolar system.
Another material factor important in the region is the territorial disputes involving China
and its neighbors. One deals with the Spratly Islands, which are claimed, at least in part, by not
10
Christensen, “Posing Problems,” 8-9.
11
Ross, “Geography,” 84.
12
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999): 413-58.
13
Ross, “Geography,” 84.
Velgersdyk 6
only China but also Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. The islands
themselves are very small, but are located on productive fisheries and potential oil deposits.
Outright conflict occurred in 1988, when China sunk a Vietnamese ship and allegedly interfered
with rescue attempts, although China denies this latter claim.14 However, violence does not seem
likely in the near future, even though none of the parties to the dispute seem likely to forfeit their
claims to the islands.15
The other territorial dispute concerns Taiwan’s independence or reintegration and is the
issue most likely to lead to conflict between China and the United States.16 Taiwan was taken by
the Nationalist Party near the end of the Chinese Civil War and has maintained its autonomy
from mainland China, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, ever since.17 China has
declared that if Taiwan should declare formal independence, then it would retaliate with force.18
And while China may lack the necessary capabilities to conquer the island of Taiwan
successfully, China does have the capabilities to significantly disrupt Taiwan’s ability to trade, a
14
“China Warns on Island Feud,” Herald, April 6, 1988.
15
Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,” International Security 19, no. 1
(1994): 172-3.
16
Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 52; Denny
Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival 42, no. 1 (2000): 76.
17
Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 105.
18
Roy, “Tensions,” 77.
Velgersdyk 7
vital part of Taiwan’s economy and survival.19 Currently, a delicate balance of unstated
compromises and the conditional support of the United States for Taiwanese autonomy have
maintained the peace. However, the United States has stated it will not defend Taiwan if it
declares formal independence outright, even if that meant China would successfully reintegrate
the island to the mainland, a huge gain in power in absolute terms.20
The final factor to consider in East Asia is the security dilemma between China and Japan.
Japan fears China’s growing influence, developing military, and economic might. China fears
Japan’s technological advancements and growing military role in East Asia. Actions by either
side to increase its own security through increasing capabilities threaten the security of the other
state. This dilemma is mitigated by the presence of the United States in Japan; the U.S. presence
allows Japan to have a guarantee of security without needing to increase its own capabilities.
However, China is still suspicious of developments that may indicate Japan’s increasing role in
East Asia or its decreasing reliance on American guarantees of security, such as the Theater
Missile Defense system that reduces the strategic value of China’s ballistic missile arsenal. 21
Realist Predictions – A Zero-sum View
19
O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 74-78.
20
21
Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 51.
Velgersdyk 8
Based on the factors described above, certain behaviors would be predicted by the realist
based off of a zero-sum understanding of the bipolar system in East Asia.22 The two poles of
power in East Asia are considered to be competing with one another directly; gains in power or
influence within the region by one actor necessitate a loss of power or influence by the other
actor. In other words, China and the United States are on opposite ends of a scale that is
constantly shifting as each actor tries to secure more power. Actors will be completely self-
interested and measure gains in terms relative to the other actor. In a zero-sum game there is little
if any cooperation or interaction between actors for fear of benefiting the other actor. The five
following behaviors would be seen in a zero-sum East Asia: (1) limited economic interaction (if
any at all) to prevent any absolute gains for the other state, (2) limited political cooperation (if
any at all) because of the mutual distrust and lack of incentives to cooperate, (3) Chinese
opposition to U.S.’s presence in Japan because of the restraint on Chinese military action it
creates, (4) U.S. opposition to China’s rising influence because of the resulting loss of influence
for the United States, and (5) complete U.S. support of Taiwanese independence to prevent the
significant gain it represents in both absolute and relative terms.
In a zero-sum world, competing actors would be unwilling to trade with one another even
if this meant both could gain in the absolute sense for two reasons. First, even if trade is
22
Christensen, “Fostering Stability,” 82.
Velgersdyk 9
beneficial for both parties, one actor will gain more from the transaction than the other. Neither
China nor the United States would be willing to risk being the state with the short end of the
stick. Even if one state could be fairly certain that they stood to gain in a relative sense by trade
(i.e. China with its favorable trade balance with the United States), economic interaction would
still be unlikely as the other actor would not be foolish enough be caught in an uneven trade
relationship. Second, states would not be willing to risk becoming vulnerable to trade coercion
by the other party and would not even begin the economic interaction. This is especially true
when the other state is the rival power in the region.
Similarly, states would not be likely to cooperate politically either. During the Cold War,
the two poles of the international system cooperated rarely and only as a response to the threat of
mutually-assured destruction or as a means to boost a political leader’s image.23 The geopolitical
stalemate along the eastern coast of China means China is not sufficiently threatening enough to
garner enough interest domestically to overcome the American public’s apathy towards foreign
affairs24, so the incentives to cooperate that existed during the Cold War for the United States are
not present. For China, the government’s control over popular opinion is still sufficiently strong
23
George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 771-6.
24
David L. Larson, The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy, ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966): 19.
Velgersdyk 10
to prevent the need to use cooperation with a foreign power as a means of garnering domestic
support.
If China were viewing East Asia with a zero-sum perspective, then it would not support
the U.S. presence in Japan. A military base in Japan gives the United States far greater power
projection capabilities and a much more influential and real presence in East Asia.25 While the
American military presence in Japan may provide a restraint on Japanese military development it
also makes U.S. promises to defend Japan (and possibly Taiwan) far more credible.26 This
restrains the actions China can take regarding both Japan and Taiwan for fear of American
reprisals.
Similarly, the U.S. would oppose the increasing influence China has in Southeast Asia. In
a zero-sum perspective, any increase China has in influence in the region means a loss of
influence for the United States. The United States would try to either limit or damage China’s
influence with Southeast Asia or would try to subvert the multilateral organizations, especially
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that have been key to China’s increasing
influence.27
25
Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 74-5.
26
Ibid., 74-8.
27
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3
(2004): 68-9.
Velgersdyk 11
Finally, if the United States were operating under a zero-sum perspective, the United
States would unconditionally defend Taiwan from reintegration with mainland China. If China
were to successfully reintegrate Taiwan, it would represent a significant gain in both absolute
and relative terms; by controlling Taiwan, China would control valuable sea lanes, gain a
profitable and developed economic power, and take away the potential “unsinkable aircraft
carrier” the United States had in Taiwan.28 This would be an unacceptable loss, so the United
States would be forced to defend Taiwan unconditionally from China.
The Reality of the Situation – A Mixed-sum View
Economic interaction is not only present but is strong between China and the United
States. The United States is responsible for just over 19% of Chinese imports worldwide, and 7.3%
of U.S. imports go to China. China is the sixth largest recipient of foreign direct investment in
the world. 29 Much of that foreign direct investment comes from the United States.30 Clearly
economic ties are prevalent in East Asia. Furthermore, part of China’s development strategy is to
continue to foster economic ties with the United States.31
28
29
CIA, “China,” World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
30
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 71.
31
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 12
Political cooperation is also evident in East Asia. For example, the United States
supported China’s World Trade Organization membership bid. U.S. support was crucial in
China’s success, and it paid off in a beneficial trade relationship for both China and the U.S.
Another example of political cooperation is the six party talks with North Korea about its nuclear
weapons program hosted by China that included the United States. China used its influence to
get North Korea to sit down and discuss its program with its neighbors and with the United
States.32 The United States and China cooperate at the political level as well as the economic.
In a zero-sum world, the United States’ presence in Japan would be irksome to China as
it grants the United States a great deal of influence in East Asia by giving them a physical
presence in the region as well as lessening the difficulty of projecting power into the region.
However, in reality China has not only come to accept the U.S. presence in East Asia, but has
actually gone on record giving its approval and appreciation for the U.S. presence and the
stability it brings to the region.33
If the realist assumptions are true, then the United States would resent China’s increasing
influence in the region, especially in Southeast Asia. Yet the United States has used a strategy of
engagement instead of one of containment when it comes to China. During the Cold War,
32
Ibid., 80.
33
Ibid., 90.
Velgersdyk 13
China’s growing influence offset some of the Soviet Union’s presence in Southeast Asia; in the
present day, China has proven itself an acceptable choice for regional leader and stabilizing force
in Southeast Asia.34 The United States may hedge against the growth of Chinese military growth
by restricting technology transfers and maintaining security alliances with Japan and Taiwan, but
it has done nothing to stop China’s diplomatic influence from growing. 35 In fact, the United
States has supported China’s growing political and economic role by supporting its WTO bid and
participating in China’s six party talks.36
In the case of Taiwan, the United States seems to be much more concerned with
preventing the escalation of tensions to full blown war more than preventing China from gaining
a valuable political, economic, and military asset.37 The United States is currently performing a
delicate balancing act; the United States conditionally provides defensive assistance to Taiwan if
Taiwan does not declare formal independence. In this way, the United States can avoid being
dragged into a conflict by an overly bold Taiwan, but can also increase the cost of forceful
integration and dissuade China from attempting it.38 The United States has certainly involved
itself in the Taiwan issue, but not to oppose China categorically.
34
Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a conservative power,” Foreign Affairs (1997): 33-45.
35
Christensen, “Fostering Stability,” 101, 108.
36
Ibid., 108, 93.
37
Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” 88-9.
38
Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs (1996): 37-53.
Velgersdyk 14
Explaining the Differences – The Constructivist View
Clearly, there are several discrepancies between the realist predictions for East Asia and
what is actually going in. How can the differences be explained? States actions are determined
by what interests a state has because a state works towards fulfilling its interests. The realist
relies on the materialist factors of the situation to define a state’s interests, but some of the
predictions for East Asia based on these interests are false. The constructivist perspective can fill
in the gaps that are left by the realist perspective by allowing interests to be defined by more than
just the material factors of the situation. Constructivism argues that some interests are derived
from the identity of the state. The identity of the state, in turn, is derived from the historical
process.39
States are self-interested actors, so a state’s actions are intended to achieve its interests. In
most situations states have a variety of different actions that could achieve their interests, but
they may face constraints placed on them by international law, other actors, or even by their own
identity. For example, a state that claims to be “civilized” would not use biological or chemical
weapons in war, as this would violate international law, anger other states, and be morally
reprehensible and uncivilized. States may also be confronted by decisions in which one interest
must be weighed more heavily than another. A state’s actions, therefore, are the result of a state’s
39
Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 393-4.
Velgersdyk 15
efforts to secure its interests within the constraints presented internally – opportunity cost and
identity – and externally – international law and other actors.
Identity can not only constrain what actions a state considers in the pursuit of interests,
but also help determine what interests it has in the first place.40 The Soviet Union’s identity, for
example, as a communist state constituted its interest in spreading communism globally because
communism was understood to be an international revolution. Therefore, the Soviet Union had
an interest in expanding its influence either through military conquest or political control.
A state’s understanding of the identity of another state, known as the identity of the other,
can also determine interests. Wendt uses the example of the United States when considering its
interest in national defense in regards to other states. Even though the United Kingdom has a far
superior and larger nuclear arsenal than North Korea, the United States does not have an interest
in opposing the United Kingdom’s possession of nuclear arms like it does with North Korea.
This is because the identity of the United Kingdom is that of a trusted ally, whereas North
Korea’s identity is that of a rogue state.41 A state’s identity, and the identity of other states in
relation to that state, helps define the state’s interests.
40
Ibid., 398.
41
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 78.
Velgersdyk 16
Identity is the result of the historical process. In terms of identity of the self, a state’s
identity is the result of that state’s history and background.42 Wendt argues that identity is
endogenous to interaction between states because states cannot have a sense of “self” without a
sense of “other”.43 While interaction between states is important to the formation of an identity
of self and is undoubtedly necessary to a formation of identity of other, Wendt neglects the
state’s domestic history which also plays a significant role in state identity formation. The
various events that take place on the domestic level, such as civil war or economic
industrialization, are critical phenomena in identity formation. Any understanding of the
relationship between two states will require an understanding of not only the states’ shared
history of interaction, but also an understanding of each state’s individual history as both play a
role in identity formation.
CHINA
In order to determine how China’s interests have diverged from the realist predictions, a
determination must be made of China’s historically formed identity. This will involve looking at
what is known as the “century of humiliation”, China during the Cold War, and the gaige kaifang
(opening up and reform). These three times in Chinese history were instrumental in the
42
Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 397-8.
43
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 17
formation of China’s current identity and China’s understanding of the United States’ identity of
the other. China’s particular perspective on these identities can help explain the divergence from
the realist predictions made above.
Process
China has a long history, having been unified as a single country since 221 BC, but the
current government was formed in 1949 AD.44 The question is how much of China’s history is
relevant to the current identity. All of China’s history has some impact on identity, of course, but
the most significant time period for the current identity begins in the mid-nineteenth century and
continues through the present. This timeframe encompasses a defining historical era known as
the “century of humiliation”, the ascension of the Chinese Communist Party during the Cold War,
and the opening up and reform under Deng Xiaoping and other leaders. This should provide an
accurate understanding of China’s state identity and its view of U.S. identity.
Century of Humiliation
What is commonly referred to as the “century of humiliation” began in 1842, when China
lost the First Opium War, and it lasted until 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party won the
Chinese Civil War, although there are still some symbolic “victories” China must win before the
44
CIA, “China,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
Velgersdyk 18
“century of humiliation” can be laid to rest, namely the reintegration of Taiwan.45 Other
important events during this time include the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, and
World War II. As a result of these incidents and others like them, China was confronted by its
weakness relative to the industrialized West and Japan and was forced to make many
concessions like treaty ports and extraterritoriality.46
To put the “century of humiliation” in perspective, China was the leading nation of the
world for centuries. Then quite suddenly, the Industrial Revolution propelled the West and Japan
far ahead of China, which faced unrest and famine. 47 This resulted in a significant loss of
international status that was made more real by repeated military defeat by not only Westerners
but by the small island nation of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s victory was a special
insult because of Japan’s relative weakness compared to China for many centuries before
industrializing during the Meiji Restoration which began in 1868. The Treaty of Shimonoseki
that ended the war included terms ceding Taiwan to Japan.48 This is why Taiwan holds special
significance for China as a continual reminder of the humiliation of this period.
45
Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkely: University of California
Press, 2004): 45-7.
46
Ibid.
47
48
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 222.
Velgersdyk 19
Due to China’s weakness during this period, it became a hotly contested prize for
imperial powers in the West and Japan, and even the United States to some extent.49 The foreign
powers had increasing access and influence in the growing number of treaty port cities where
they could live and do business with no interference or regulation by the Chinese government.
This treatment was reined in to some extent by the “Open Door” policy of the United States,
which sought to keep China free and open for trade by preventing the pseudo-colonization of
China through treaty ports. In this way, no state should interfere with the others’ spheres of
influence in China. The “Open Door” policy placed a moral constraint on the foreign powers and
prevented competition between powers from getting out of hand, but without an effective
sanctioning mechanism, the policy had too little weight to truly restrain the foreign powers.50
This was a fundamental change from previous invaders who were absorbed into the Chinese
culture; now the invaders were instead forcing change upon China. This has led to a
“victimization narrative” of the “century of humiliation” that blames foreign powers and incites
distrust and anger towards the West and Japan.51
Another notable aspect during the “century of humiliation” was the rampant disorder.
The central government exercised little control over China which is made evident through the
49
Ibid., 230.
50
Ibid.
51
Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 47-50.
Velgersdyk 20
numerous rebellions, such as the Taiping rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion, and the Triads, a
criminal organization in existence to this day.52 This disorder was only compounded by the
conflict with foreign powers. The disorder cost thousands of lives and any credibility the central
government had with the populace.53 As a result, in China a fundamental role of government is to
institute and preserve order, and thus prevent the destruction seen during incidents like the
Taiping rebellion.
The Cold War
The next part of the historical process to be examined is the Cold War. It was during the
Cold War that China made the transformation from one of the weakest states on the international
stage to a regional power and an economic world leader. However, this transformation was far
from painless. China was embroiled in a civil war, opposed the United States during the Korean
War, and suffered under the failed Great Leap Forward program and Cultural Revolution. 54 One
of the many thorns in China’s side was, and still is, Taiwan. At the end of the Chinese Civil War,
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan. Mainland China has never been able
to reintegrate Taiwan with the rest of the state55; to this day, the peace between mainland China
52
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 168-171.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid., 498-587.
55
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 231.
Velgersdyk 21
and Taiwan is tenuous. Currently Taiwan is still legally a part of China but has complete
autonomy without independence. However, this could change with the rise of the Democratic
Progressive Party which has long been in support of a formal declaration of independence.56
Should this occur, China has declared that it will resort to force to bring Taiwan back under its
control, even though the former currently lacks the means to invade and conquer the latter
successfully.57 Declaration of independence or not, Taiwan challenges the Chinese Communist
Party’s claim that it leads a unified China.
Development was a key goal of the Chinese Communist Party in order to transform
China from a predominately agrarian society to an industrialized power. Success in this regard
would not only benefit China’s overall well-being, but would also raise China’s standing in the
international system.58 This was crucial for the credibility of the Chinese model of communism
and for the credibility of the central government. To this end, Mao Zedong enacted an ambitious
development project known as the Great Leap Forward. Under this program, radical
communization of farms, massive public works focusing on infrastructure, and even centralized
child care spread throughout the country. The program focused on increased agricultural, mineral,
and industrial production. Regions were responsible for fulfilling quotas of production, but
56
O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 51.
57
Ibid., 54-74.
58
Velgersdyk 22
because the quotas were so unrealistically high, misreporting and low quality production became
rampant. Despite initially high production in agriculture, the Great Leap Forward resulted in
widespread famine that claimed over 20 million lives. 59 The failed development effort called
Mao’s leadership into question and set China back by years. Development remains a goal of the
CCP and an important contributor to its legitimacy in the present; what has changed since the era
of Mao is the way in which China goes about pursuing development which will be discussed
below.
A significant turning point of U.S.-Chinese relations was Richard Nixon’s visit to China
in 1972. While there was some thawing of the opposition in China and the U.S. to one another,
this visit, and the visit of the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the year before, was
groundbreaking. It came at a time when both Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon faced decreasing
domestic support as well as increasingly cold relations between China and the Soviet Union. The
visit marked the beginning of formal interaction between mainland China and the U.S. in
decades and a fundamental change in China’s attitude towards the West. Mao and the CCP began
to understand the value of formal interaction with the West in hedging against the Soviet Union,
59
Ibid., 550.
Velgersdyk 23
who was building up forces along its Chinese border, and in increasing economic development. 60
This move paved the way for future interaction between China and the U.S.
Opening Up
Changes in China occurred not only in foreign policy, but at the domestic level as well in
what is known in China as gaige kaifang. With the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to the position of
Paramount leader, China underwent a period of opening up and reform. One of Deng’s sayings
about reforming and moving away from the traditional centrally-controlled economy was that “It
does not matter whether a cat is black or white: as long it catches mice it is a good cat.”61 Under
his leadership, development was quickly understood to be central to the well-being of the people
and the state. To spur along development, Deng designated special economic zones that were
opened to world trade. Enterprises began focusing on “enterprise returns” (i.e. profits) instead of
ensuring employment for workers. Soon China began to experience explosive growth with GDP
growth rates of over ten percent in the early 1990’s and again in the early 2000’s. China began to
emulate the “four little dragons” (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea)
economically.62 The reforms had taken root and the justification for the changes from the old
ways was the successful economic development that followed. In order for the current leadership
60
Ibid., 597-600.
61
Ibid., 697.
62
Ibid., 714.
Velgersdyk 24
to maintain legitimacy, it must continue to foster economic growth in China through domestic
development and international trade.
The final event to be examined is the Asian Financial Crisis. Not only did China’s refusal
to devalue its currency despite pressure from the United States help stabilize the region, but
China also offered aid packages and low interest loans to the affected states. The responsibility
shown by China, particularly in contrast to the perceived tyranny of the International Monetary
Fund, was greatly appreciated by the ASEAN states and went a long ways to increasing
engagement between China and the Southeast Asian region.63
Identity – View of Self
With this understanding of the historical process China has undergone, a picture of how
China views itself can be drawn. This self-perceived identity has grown out of China’s
understanding of the past and its role within that history as well as its perception of how others
have affected it in the past. China’s identity can be seen on three different levels: the state level,
the regional level, and the international level.
The State
At the state level, China wishes to become a fully developed state and among the world’s
leading powers so as to reclaim the status it once held for centuries. This desire is seen in the
63
Velgersdyk 25
portrayal of China as a sleeping lion about to awaken, a metaphor originated by Deng Xiaoping
himself.64 China’s economic growth is equated with the lion’s awakening. Soon all will hear the
lion’s roar as China becomes one of the greatest economic powers in the world. Development
then is indelibly linked to Chinese nationalism; nationalism, in turn, has replaced communist
ideology as the primary source of credibility for the government.65 Development has become the
scale upon which the Party is weighed. The Party is able to maintain its claim as the rightful
leadership for the state if it can maintain economic growth. So far, China has been growing at a
pace that far outstrips virtually all other states.66 Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party enjoys
the support of the people, whether they are migrant workers, private entrepreneurs, or the
intellectual elite. People from all economic levels see the Party as the provider of order and
economic opportunity, even those that are the “losers” in China’s transitioning economy like the
laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises.67
Another key aspect of China’s, or more specifically the CCP’s, identity is that of
guarantor of order. China suffered from numerous peasant revolts and uprisings that caused
widespread death and destruction. The people expect that the central government will prevent
64
Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 44-5.
65
Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” 37-53.
66
67
Teresa Wright “Disincentives for Democratic Change in China,” Asia Pacific Issues (2007): 3-6.
Velgersdyk 26
these tragedies by maintaining order within the state, even if this comes at the cost of personal
liberties.68 This identity has spread to everywhere within China. Even public dissenters respect
the authority of the central government and target their appeals to central government officials.
The Chinese government is not like the U.S. government which exists to protect the rights of
citizens, but rather it exists to prevent and stop the spread of disorder.69
In the present, disorder has any even higher cost than the destruction associated with
quelling resistance. Chinese analysts fear that disorder in geographically distant provinces like
Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang or in the politically distant province of Taiwan could lead to
secession and declarations of independence. The fear is that the departure of even one province
could call Chinese power and authority into question and have a “domino effect” that would
encourage similar actions by the other provinces.70 If this were to happen, then not only would
China fail to be the guarantor of order but would also lose the more important ideal of a “unified
China”.
Role in Asia
68
Ibid., 7.
69
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006): 7.
70
Velgersdyk 27
Possibly born out of its experiences of mistreatment and exploitation at the hands of the
imperialist powers during the “century of humiliation”, part of China’s identity in the Asian
region is that of a “hero of the weak”. This aspect of China’s identity can be seen both in China’s
military involvement in Vietnam to prevent the spread of Soviet influence71 and in China’s
assistance to the states that suffered from the Asian financial crisis.72 China has become a model
and leader for the global South as it is not only a late-developing state but also one of the most
successful developing states. For example, China has typically voted with the Third World
within the United Nations.73 China’s New Security Concept argues for states to practice
nonintervention in each others’ internal affairs, a stance taken by much of the Third World as
well. China has also increased its engagement with multilateral institutions, especially ASEAN,
as it practices “soft power” diplomacy.74 China sees itself as one of the states that has come from
a position far below the West but now will challenge the West and become a leader of the global
South.
A second aspect of China’s identity within the region is that of trading partner. China is
well-known for its massive amount of exports. The amount of exportation China engages in is
71
Robert S. Ross, “China as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (1997): 33-45.
72
73
74
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 64-7.
Velgersdyk 28
second only to Germany, and China is third in the world in amount of imports (only the United
States and Germany import more).75 The United States may be the largest importer of Chinese
goods (19.1%), but Asia as a whole is a much larger consumer of Chinese goods (28.1% with
just Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea). China imports more from Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan than it does the United States.76 Deng Xiaoping successfully argued for the importance
of trade to China’s economy77, and more specifically the importance of trade within the region.78
China has become increasingly more and more coupled to international trade and its identity as a
trading partner with its Asian neighbors.
The last facet of China’s identity within the region originally came from outside of Asia.
China has adopted the name urged upon it by the United States of “responsible stakeholder”.79
This name implies that China is willing to identify itself as a status quo state, and China has
indeed demonstrated that, for the most part, it is willing to use peaceful negotiations to solve
disputes. The only territorial disputes in which China has not completely forgone the use of
coercion or military capabilities are the Spratly Islands and Taiwan.80 In the case of the former,
75
76
Ibid.
77
78
Ibid.
79
Ross, “China as a Conservative Power,” 33-45.
80
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 29
China’s limited military presence on some of the islands may simply be a means to prevent other
states from establishing their own bases. The small size of the islands makes them easy to take
but difficult to hold, so any value ascribed to a military presence should be heavily discounted
because of the inherent vulnerability of the islands. This makes it seem unlikely that China
would use the islands as a staging area for military projection. In the case of Taiwan, China does
use its military capabilities as a significant deterrence against Taiwanese independence but even
this has been done with restraint.
As a “responsible stakeholder”, China has shown a great deal of support for multilateral
institutions such as ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as
numerous track two organizations, many of which discuss matters of security and economics.81
China has become a nonthreatening regional power in the eyes of many Asian states and has
proven its commitment to a peaceful region through organizing the six party talks that dealt with
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.82 China has also come to accept the presence of
the United States within the region as beneficial and perhaps even necessary as well. In 2001,
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan gave a statement that welcomed “the American presence in the
81
Ibid., 73.
82
Ibid., 80.
Velgersdyk 30
Asia-Pacific region as a stabilizing force.” This statement countered the perception that China
wanted the U.S. out of the region so it could become the sole power in Asia.83
Role in the World
China is first and foremost an economic power in the current international system.
China’s GDP (purchasing power parity) is the second largest in the world for an individual state,
the first being the United States; China’s GDP growth rate is 9.8% for this year84 and has been at
least 8% since 1992.85 China also has the second largest stock of foreign reserves in the world
and is the sixth largest target of foreign direct investment (FDI).86 These figures alone
demonstrate the immense size of China’s economy. Now consider also that China is the world’s
second largest exporter and third largest importer.87 China’s importance in the world economy is
undeniable.
China’s economic role is not limited to being one of the world’s largest trading partners.
China has undergone many changes in banking and business practice to conform to World Trade
Organization (WTO) standards and has created the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Centre
83
Ibid., 91.
84
85
86
87
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 31
to ensure Chinese firms follow WTO regulations and to defend Chinese interests.88 China has
also exercised an important role in the financial crisis of 1997. China did not devalue its currency
despite international pressure and offered aid in the form of loans to the states most affected by
the crisis like Thailand.89 China’s involvement in the past financial crisis combined with its
considerable economic capabilities has raised questions about China’s role in the current
developing crisis. China’s economy is considered by many experts to be a key part of the
international economic system; China is many states’ largest trading partner and China’s
continuing economic growth is crucial for these states to recover from the economic downturn90
China could mitigate the impact of the current economic downturn if it can maintain a stable
economy and its interaction with other states.
China is also a burgeoning diplomatic player in the international system. In 1971, the
People’s Republic of China was admitted to China’s seat in the United Nations and on the
Security Council.91 China has become significantly involved in Africa, acting as a stabilizer in
88
Gong Baihua “Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working Together to Take Advantage of WTO
Membership,” Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation, World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case11_e.htm.
89
90
Kerrie Sinclair, “China Slump Spells Bad News All Round,” The Advertiser, January 23, 2009,
http://www.lexisnexus.com; China Daily, “China Can Weather Storm,” October 13, 2008, chinadaily.com.cn.
91
Velgersdyk 32
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.92 Jean Ping, chair of the African Union commission has
praised China’s role in developing infrastructure in African states as well as being a valuable
trading partner.93 China’s influence is slowly spreading out from Asia to the rest of the world, in
particular the Third World. This fits the “hero of the weak” identity discussed above and further
demonstrates China’s increasing identity as a significant political player in the international
system.
Identity – View of Other
The Chinese perception of the United State’s identity is also important in determining
Chinese interests because of the United States’ position as a regional and global power as well as
a significant trading partner. Simply put, the United States will affect the field. The question is
how China sees this involvement and the United States itself. There are two important aspects to
China’s understanding of U.S. identity. First, the United States is the “least-distrusted” actor in
the region, and second, the current relationship between China and the United states.
“Least Distrusted” Actor
92
“African Union commission chair lauds China's role in development,” BBC Monitoring, January 28, 2009,
http://www.lexisnexus.com.
93
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 33
The perception of the United States that China (and many of the other states in East Asia)
holds is that the United States is the “least distrusted” actor.94 This stems from the conflict that
pervades much of the history of interaction between East Asian states. Japan and China were
bitter enemies during World War II, China fought on the side of North Korea in the Korean War,
which soured relations with South Korea, and the while economic interaction between Taiwan
and mainland China increases, there is little love lost between the two in the political world.95
The United States, by comparison, has had a more pleasant history with China, although there
are some significant blots on the record, most notably the limitations on Chinese immigration
into the United States (the only state to be directly targeted by immigration quotas), the
mistreatment of Chinese laborers in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, and
the initial opposition to the PRC during the first half of the Cold War.96 On the other hand, the
U.S. “Open Door” policy during the colonial period did stave off the worst of the abuse possible
by the foreign powers, even if it was not strictly enforced; once diplomatic contact was
reestablished with the famous “Nixon Visit” in 1972, the United States supported China’s claim
that Taiwan is not a separate entity but just a part of China.97 Overall, the United States is
94
95
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 668, 6992.
96
Ibid., 208-214, 526-528.
97
Ibid., 599-600.
Velgersdyk 34
perceived as being the most objective actor in the region as well as the actor best capable of
maintaining stability in the region.
Another important aspect of China’s perception of the United States is the security
dilemma between China and Japan. In a security dilemma, any action taken by one state to
increase its security threatens the security of the other state. Even purely defensive capabilities
can threaten the other state. For example, Japan, partnered with the United States, has a
developing a theater ballistic missile defense system; even though this is a purely defensive
capability, it threatens Chinese security by undermining its ballistic missile capabilities which
are an integral part of China’s military. 98 The situation can be improved, however, by the
introduction of a third party. The United States can act as a guarantor of Japanese security, which
reduces the pressure on Japan to respond to developing Chinese capabilities. This in turn reduces
the perceived threat for China because, as previously explained above, China distrusts the United
States less than Japan, so U.S. capabilities are less threatening because they are perceived to be
less likely to be used.99 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s statement welcoming the U.S. presence
in East Asia mentioned above proves the value of the U.S. presence in the eyes of China.100
98
99
Ibid., 58.
100
Velgersdyk 35
However, China is less than enthused about the potential for U.S. involvement in Taiwan.
At its current capabilities, China would be unable to invade and conquer Taiwan successfully,
but is very capable of destabilizing and weakening Taiwan’s economy by disrupting sea lanes
with mines and submarines, dumping its reserves of the Taiwanese dollar, and by ceasing all
trade to the island. There is little incentive to use these tactics at present because Chinese
analysts believe that as China’s rapid growth continues so will its abilities to reintegrate Taiwan
down the road. 101 However, China has stated that a formal declaration of independence would
necessarily mean conflict. Should the United States extend its protection to Taiwan, the island
may feel secure enough to risk war and declare independence.102 This is a very real fear for
China, and quite possibly the likeliest impetus for conflict between China and the United States,
which would be disastrous for the region.103 Currently, the United States has given a conditional
guarantee of security; if Taiwan declares independence, the United States will not come to its
aid.104 Nevertheless, China remains sensitive to any U.S. involvement with Taiwan, so any move
on the U.S. side could dampen the Chinese perception of the U.S.
Current Relationship
101
Roy “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” 90.
102
Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 66.
103
Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” 76.
104
Ibid.,88.
Velgersdyk 36
China has found it useful to resort to soft power when pursuing its interests in East Asia,
whether it is in solving border disputes or in pursuing its New Security Concept.105 China has
found soft power to be particularly advantageous when confronted with the U.S. presence in East
Asia. China lacks power projection capabilities on par or near U.S. capabilities; to overcome this,
China uses soft power diplomacy to pursue its interests.106 In this way China continues to
maintain its role as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system while pursuing its
interests. While this approach cannot be entirely explained by the U.S. presence in East Asia, the
United States does act as an implicit restraint on Chinese policy; Chinese leadership must take
U.S. interests and involvement into consideration when making decision.107 The relationship that
has resulted between the states is one of compromises. China cannot pursue its interests without
restraint or consideration for the region, but the United States does little to oppose China’s soft
power activities.108
The dominating feature of the current relationship between China and the United States is
undeniably that of trading partners. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese thinkers came to the
conclusion that the United States is the most important state within the region for Chinese
105
106
Ibid., 77-8.
107
108
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 76, 93.
Velgersdyk 37
interests.109 The United States is China’s largest export market and China is the United States’
third largest export partner and the largest outside of North America.110 Clearly both states figure
strongly into each other’s foreign trade. If either state makes a decision for within the region, it
must take into account the economic ramifications of that action; the beneficial trade relationship,
in essence, can be held hostage by either state.
Interests
According to Wendt, material resources (wealth, military capabilities, etc.) do not have
intrinsic meaning, but rather draw their meaning from the social context including state
identity.111 While Wendt may overstate the influence that state identities and social context on
material factors, state identity does help shape the interests of states. To use Wendt’s example
cited above, the United States cannot draw any conclusions about the threat posed by Great
Britain or North Korea without also having drawn conclusions about the inherent potential for
harm of nuclear weapons.
China’s interests in the region can be determined by combining the material factors with
an understanding of how China views itself (identity of self) and the United States (identity of
other). These identity-derived interests will explain the practices and features of U.S.-Chinese
109
Ibid., 71
110
111
Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 73.
Velgersdyk 38
relations that diverge from the realist predictions. The relationship features far more cooperation
and mutual consideration with the United States and its neighbors than the realist predictions
allow.
Internal Development
China, and more specifically the CCP, derives much of its legitimacy from nationalism,
which in turn has been closely linked to development. Thus a primary interest of China’s
leadership is the continuation of growth and development of the economy in order to ensure its
legitimacy.112 An important aspect of maintaining growth is to keep international trade going
strong which has become a difficult task considering the global economic downturn. China has
sought to bolster its economy, and by extension the global economy, by increasing government
spending dramatically.113 China has many tools with which to combat the economic downturn,
including large foreign reserves and the windfall of fiscal surpluses the past four years. With
these tools, China may help the international system recover from the downturn and be able to
maintain its own growth.114
U.S. Presence in East Asia
112
Wright “Disincentives for Democratic Change in China,” 7-8.
113
Sinclair, “China Slump,” January 23, 2009, http://www.lexisnexus.com.
114
China Daily, “China Can Weather,” October 13, 2008, www.chinadaily.com.cn.
Velgersdyk 39
The U.S. role in mitigating the security dilemma with Japan has led to China having an
interest in the continued presence of the United States in East Asia. The United States, as the
“least distrusted actor”, can use its third party status and considerable power projection
capabilities to guarantee Japanese security, thereby reducing Japan’s need to develop its own
military capabilities, a fact that China is well aware of.115 While conflict and opposition are far
from uncommon in the history of interaction between the United States and China, Japan’s
history with China is far worse.116 This has tempered the potentially negative view of China
concerning U.S. involvement in the region; the United States is the preferable power.
Sovereignty
The numerous uprisings and the destruction caused by disorder in Chinese history have
led to the important identity of the state as the protector and guarantor of order, a mandate which
includes preventing the secession of the outlying provinces.117 Along these lines, China has
developed a highly sensitive interest in sovereignty in domestic affairs which is manifested in its
NSC argument for nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states.118 China does not want
other states or organizations involving themselves with the outlying regions, even on claims of
115
116
Spence, The Search for Modern China, 215-23, 419-49.
117
118
Velgersdyk 40
protecting human rights, for fear that foreign involvement would encourage secession, an action
that could spread to the other provinces.
Increased Influence
The last interest to be discussed is in reality a means of pursuing the other interests.
China seeks increasing influence in both the region and the international system as a whole. Both
would allow China to better fulfill its objectives. Generally speaking there are two broad
categories of influence: hard power and soft power. Hard power consists of materialist means,
especially wealth and military capabilities. Soft power consists of things like diplomatic
influence and membership in multilateral organizations.119
China has one of the largest economies in the world, but its large population means that
this wealth is spread out over a very large number of people. China’s GDP per capita is $6000,
which is approximately one-seventh of the U.S. GDP per capita.120 China’s wealth, while
growing, is not as effective of a tool as it first appears, although China has used its wealth, in the
form of aid, to gain influence and prestige in Africa.121 As for military capabilities, China has the
preeminent land force in Asia and a considerable arsenal of ballistic missiles, but lacks the
technologically advanced aircraft and blue water navy necessary for significant power
119
120
121
“African Union,” January 28, 2009, http://www.lexisnexus.com.
Velgersdyk 41
projection.122 The gap between China and the United States, or even Japan, is large enough that it
will be decades before China can develop military capabilities that would rival those already in
the region.123 In summary, Chinese hard power is not sufficient for China to satisfactorily pursue
its other interests.
The deficiency in hard power as led China to focus on developing its soft power in the
mean time. China has increased its engagement with multilateral institutions, particularly
ASEAN. In fact, the relationship with the ASEAN states and China has the potential to boost
both economic interaction and security measures through the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).124 China has also worked hard to develop
bilateral ties with numerous states, including India, South Korea, and Vietnam.125 Economic
cooperation is not the only area in which China has sought to increase its political influence.
China formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with five former Soviet Union
republics; the SCO members have a multilateral security agreement and also use the SCO as a
forum to discuss military and economic cooperation.126 The SCO increase China’s influence in
Central Asia and increased confidence in its security along its western border; furthermore,
122
Ross, “The Geography of Peace,” 98.
123
Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat,” 175-177.
124
125
Ibid., 78-83.
126
Ibid., 74.
Velgersdyk 42
because the SCO is a multilateral organization, it is less threatening than increased military
capabilities positioned along the border and more politically tenable. Soft power has been
rewarding for China. China is now seen in a positive light as a non-aggressive state and
beneficial economic and political partner by most Asian states.127 Soft power has not come
without its costs though. China will have to forfeit its military advantage when it comes to the
negotiating table over territorial disputes like the Spratly Islands.128
China’s use of soft power has been mostly positive, but even soft power has failed to
always secure Chinese interests. In 1997, Chinese officials called for the end of all bilateral
military alliances in Asia (this move basically targeted U.S. alliances). The call was met with
disapproval by Asian states and China eventually had to back away from its previous
statement.129 The basis for China’s call was the fear that China would replace the Soviet Union
after the Cold War as the target of these alliances; this fear now seems to have been allayed by
the growing friendly relations between China and most of Asia.130 Soft power did fail China in
the short term to secure its interest, but in the long run soft power indirectly achieved China’s
objective by erasing the fear that made the objective necessary in the first place.
127
Christensen, “Fostering Stability,” 81-2.
128
Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat,” 187.
129
130
Ibid., 64-5.
Velgersdyk 43
THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. historical process relevant to its interests and practices in East Asia begins with
its Puritan heritage before it was even a state, includes its involvement in China during the
colonial period, and finally its ascension as a world superpower after WWII. Throughout all of
this history, the United States’ particular moralism is evident. This so-called Puritan Ethic has
led to some interests not found in the realist predictions and has constrained the practices the
United States can take when pursuing any of its interests, even those acknowledged by the realist
perspective.
Process – The Puritan Ethic
The beginning of the U.S. historical process can be traced back to the Puritans that settled
at Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1620. They were responsible for the Mayflower Compact which
laid the foundations for the egalitarianism fundamental to later political works and eventually the
United States Constitution. They also imparted a strong moral tradition, one that was so
distinctive that Alexis de Tocqueville argued it was central to American democracy. This moral
tradition, known as the Puritan Ethic, has a tendency to frame the world in black and white terms
and is highly sensitive to abuses of power. This latter characteristic is perhaps best seen in the
system of checks & balances found in the U.S. Constitution. 131
131
DLarson “Objectivity, Propaganda, and the Puritan Ethic,” 6-11.
Velgersdyk 44
This sensitivity extends to the international system as well. The United States has had
fairly consistent aversion to the self-interested pursuit of interest and opportunistic violence,
although this sensitivity has been deferred at times in favor of other ideological frameworks such
as the Manifest Destiny. The greatest periods of U.S. involvement with the international system,
WWII and the Cold War, were both framed in moralistic terms of “Right” versus “Might”
appropriate to the simplistic nature of the Puritan Ethic.132 The end result of the Puritan Ethic on
U.S. foreign policy has been two conflicting tendencies: an aversion to using power
internationally and international action under the auspices of “Right” versus “Might”. This
conflict of ideas can be seen in the “Open Door” policy, the post-WWI through the Cold War
period, and the post-Cold War period.
The “Open Door” Policy
During the colonial period, the United States, like many other foreign powers, wanted
access to the valuable Chinese markets, but was unwilling to use force to secure a sphere of
influence, unlike other foreign powers despite the Roosevelt Corollary, which declared the
United States would resort to arms to defend its interests.133 The solution was the “Open Door”
policy. States were to respect each others’ right to trade and do business in China and to not slice
132
Ibid., 12-21.
133
Joyce P. Kaufman, A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2006): 43.
Velgersdyk 45
China into spheres of influence.134 Unfortunately, without a credible sanctioning mechanism, the
“Open Door” policy did not prevent Japan’s aggression in northwest China and the eventual
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War.135 The “Open Door” policy was a compromise of the
two conflicting aspects of the Puritan Ethic. It allowed the United States to define certain types
of interference in China as an abuse of power, or in terms of the Puritan Ethic, “Might”, and it
did this in a way that allowed the United States to avoid exercising too much power abroad.
Post-World War I Through the Cold War
The United States prior to World War I was able to walk the line between claimed
neutrality and non-intervention (which is in line with the Puritan Ethic) on the one side and
engagement and self-interested pursuit of goals internationally in large part because of Pax
Britannica.136 This contradictory balancing act was the result of U.S. leaders being confronted
with the realities of the international system while feeling constrained by the state identity of the
Puritan Ethic.137 After World War I, the United States could no longer afford the luxury of
straddling the fence and had to choose between engagement with the international system or
isolation. Initially, the United States, recoiling from the horrors of World War I and disgusted
134
135
Kaufman, “U.S. Foreign Policy,” 61.
136
Larson, “Objectivity, Propaganda, and the Puritan Ethic,” 11.
137
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001): 25.
Velgersdyk 46
with the self-interested bargaining during the Treaty of Versailles, the United States tried to
isolate itself. It did not last.138
With the onset of World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was
thrust into the international system and made to engage. Left standing as one of two superpowers
after the war, the United States soon saw itself opposing the Soviet Union. The Puritan Ethic
framed the bipolar world so the United States was the “Right” that would somehow overcome
the Soviet Union’s “Might”.139
This framework defined the domestic attitude towards the international system, but was
somewhat divorced from reality. The United States and the Soviet Union certainly did oppose
one another in a number of proxy wars and the United States was ideologically opposed to Soviet
communism, but the Puritan Ethic tends to cast everything into black and white terms.
Cooperation between the two states did occur, particularly later in the Cold War. Nonetheless,
the United States has continually perceived itself to be the force for “Right”.140
The post-Cold War Period
The end of the Cold War has left the Puritan Ethic without a personified “Might” to
oppose. The United States still tries to be the force for “Right” and act as a benign hegemon, but
138
Larson, “Objectivity, Propaganda, and the Puritan Ethic,” 16-7.
139
Ibid., 17-8.
140
Ibid., 23.
Velgersdyk 47
the perceived necessity for engagement with the international system has been greatly reduced.
David L. Larson calls this perception, and its resulting apathy for foreign policy, U.S. intellectual
isolationism. The United States becomes involved in the international system when it perceives
an instance of “Might” that should be opposed. For example, the United States’ continued
presence in Japan prevents both Japan and China from going too far in their efforts to ensure
their security rather than allow escalation and conflict.141
Identity – View of Self
The United States’ identity of self is simple yet contradictory. In the time from the
founding of the United States up to the years leading into World War I, the United States actively
involved itself in the international system to better pursue its interests, but when the United
States attained superpower status and possessed the greatest advantage to pursue its interests
worldwide it retreated from a realist prescribed strategy of involvement (self-centered pursuit of
interests). Instead, foreign policy is packaged in moral terminology; the United States acts
abroad out of a moral authority. 142 The United States is faced with an international system that
demands actors to be self-interested, yet the moralism of the U.S. identity interferes and
constrains the practices of the United States.143 The effect of this particular identity on its roles in
141
Ibid., 21.
142
Ibid., 15.
143
Mearsheime, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 23.
Velgersdyk 48
Asia and the world will be seen shortly, but first the U.S. understanding of its identity at the state
level will be examined.
The State
During much of the twentieth century it seems that the general public had a poor
understanding of the importance of foreign policy, due in part to the experiences in the first half
of the century.144 Indeed, foreign policy has often had to be packaged in terms of ideology, like
the U.S. opposition to communism as the justification for involvement in Korea and Vietnam.145
At the state level, the American people had placed domestic policy above foreign policy instead
of valuing both as equal parts of a comprehensive state policy. The U.S. public was focused
inward.146 In the present, the American public certainly has a greater appreciation for foreign
policy’s importance born out of the experiences of 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a global
economic downturn to name a few. Still, some lingering effects of the twentieth century view
remain, namely the use of a moralist perspective to understand foreign policy.
What may be noticeable about the discussion of U.S. state identity is the emphasis placed
on the people. This is because the United States identifies itself (correctly) as a liberal democracy
144
Larson, “Objectivity,” 19.
145
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 4-6.
146
Velgersdyk 49
responsible to the people.147 As a democracy, the United States strives to follow the “mood” of
the people, which can constrain the choices available in foreign policy. This has influenced how
the United States determines its foreign policy and how it explains its foreign policy to the
American public and the world.148 The effect of the moralist perspective of the general American
public influences the U.S. role in both Asia and the world.
Role in Asia
The United States has always seen itself as an honest broker, an objective third party that
can arbitrate conflicts and maintain peace in the world.149 This is particularly true in East Asia,
where the U.S. presence in Japan allows the United States to be effective in mitigating the
security dilemma between Japan and China.150 Paul H. Nitze in an article for Foreign Affairs
discusses the viability of Japan as the leader of the East Asian region, but argues that Japan’s
history in the region as well as its inability to consider other states’ interests makes it an unviable
choice. He concludes that the United States can best fulfill the role of honest broker in East Asia
and elsewhere.151
147
Kaufman, U.S. Foreign Policy, 3.
148
Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 4-5.
149
Paul H. Nitze, “America: An Honest Broker,” Foreign Affairs (1990): 1.
150
Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” 78.
151
Paul H. Nitze “America: An Honest Broker”, 13-4.
Velgersdyk 50
Similarly, the United States perceives itself as the protector of democracy within the
region as well. U.S. involvement in the Korean War (and continued presence in South Korea)
and its conditional security guarantee to the democratic government of Taiwan both provide
empirical evidence of the United States fulfilling its role as the ultimate guarantor of peace
within the region.152 The United States has the power projection capabilities necessary to defend
Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan in the event of conflict and appears to be willing to remain in the
region indefinitely.153
The third part of the U.S. role in East Asia is that of trading partner. The United States is
Japan’s second largest source of imports, Taiwan’s second largest, South Korea’s third largest,
and China’s fourth largest. China and Japan are the United States’ first and fourth largest sources
of imports respectively. 154 The economic relationship with Japan, in particular, has been
portrayed as a reaped benefit of supporting Japanese security, although it is also argued that
Japan’s protection measure for its economy has come at a cost for the United States.155
Nevertheless, the United States is strongly connected with the economy of East Asia as one of its
largest trading partners.
152
Kaufman, U.S. Foreign Policy, 90-1, 98-100; Christensen, “China, U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” 78.
153
Ibid.
154
155
Christensen “China, U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” 55-6.
Velgersdyk 51
Role in the World
The identity of the United States is that of the sole superpower. The United States
benefits from relative geographical isolation, large size and sources of resources, powerful
economy, and technological advancement.156 As the sole superpower, the United States has the
ability project power into multiple regions of the world, East Asia not excluded. Instead of
capitalizing on its distinct advantage in capabilities to serve its own interests, the United States
has tried to broker peace and stabilize conflicted regions.157 There is, of course, an economic
reward; the United States is the largest economy in the world, the largest importer, and the third
largest exporter.158 Still, the United States has been a benign hegemon, although this has been to
some degree disputed in light of the Bush Doctrine.159
Identity – View of Other
The U.S. view of China is in many ways an unanswered question. There are numerous
accusations made that Chinese imports cause job loss in the United States, China is the greatest
violator of intellectual property rights, and that China is furiously developing its military
capabilities.160 In actuality, China’s booming trade with the United States has cut into other states’
156
Ross, “Geography,” 94-6.
157
Nitze “America: An Honest Broker,” 13-4.
158
159
Kaufman, U.S. Foreign Policy, 135-7.
160
David Lampton, “China,” Foreign Policy no. 110 (1998): 13-26.
Velgersdyk 52
share of the U.S. market not U.S. domestic producers’ share. China is a significant violator of
intellectual property rights, but the highest numbers of violations come from Europe and the
United States itself. China is undoubtedly developing its military capabilities, but China spends a
fraction of what the United States spends on development.161 Much of the negative opinions that
are directed at China seem to be the projection of fear of what the future may bring for the
United States onto China.162 There is also a great deal of acknowledgment of China’s positive
role in East Asia, some of which has been supported by the United States (including support for
China’s WTO bid).163 All in all, there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning China.
Unfortunately, uncertainty is the underlying cause of the pessimism of the realist perspective,164
but the cooperation between China and the United States would seem to indicate that the U.S.
perception of China is more complex than any single quality can describe.165
The Rising Dragon
It seems that the United States has yet to make up its mind about what China’s identity is
beyond a rising power, but the decision will be based on China’s increasing political influence,
immense economic power, and the balance that is struck between positive-sum and zero-sum
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
164
Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 188.
165
Velgersdyk 53
perspectives. The United States had supported China’s increasing role in Southeast Asia during
the Cold War as a way to offset the Soviet Union’s influence. Since then, China’s political
influence in Southeast Asia has rapidly grown. China is now a valued neighbor and stabilizer in
the region.166 China influence on the Korean peninsula is also growing. The lack of an effective
multilateral organization in Northeast Asia has led to an increased need for the political
leadership of China. China has fulfilled this role with its organization of the six party talks,
which include the United States. There is even speculation that the six party talks could become
institutionalized as the multilateral organization the region lacks.167 All in all, China’s political
role is increasing, seemingly to the benefit of the region.
To reiterate what has already been discussed in detail above, China is the largest trading
partner of almost every state in Asia. It is also growing in influence worldwide, particularly in
Africa.168 China also may be the key to many states’ recovery from the current economic
downturn. As discussed above, China’s large foreign reserves, growing domestic market, and
importance in international trade provide it with the tools necessary to combat the downturn,169
and China’s growth rate is still high compared to the United States and Europe even if it has
166
Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” 33-45.
167
Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001): 106-115.
168
169
Velgersdyk 54
dropped from its previously explosive levels.170 The common complaint heard in the United
States’ about China’s economic growth is the trade imbalance with the United States. However,
China has struck a fairly even equilibrium with its trading partners in Asia and the U.S. trade
imbalance has more to do with the United States’ high levels of consumption than Chinese trade
strategies.171 China’s economic importance worldwide is undeniable and has had a positive
impact on the international economy.
Current Relationship
The defining facet of the current relationship is economics. The United States and China
are arguably each others’ largest trading partner in the world.172 The trade imbalance that exists
seems to be the result of U.S. consumption.173 The question that arises out of this relationship is
what influence it will have in other areas of interaction? It seems that the economic ties are
strong enough that any both states have an incentive to cooperate in other areas for fear of
risking a valuable relationship.
Cooperation certainly has extended to other areas of interaction. The United States and
China share a common interest in keeping the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. While
170
CIA, “China,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html
171
172
173
Velgersdyk 55
North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, China and the United States have used and will
continue to use the six part talks to negotiate with North Korea to keep it from selling the
technology and potentially dismantle the weapons.174 The cooperation between China and the
United States may even lead to the formation of a formal multilateral institution for Northeast
Asia which could be crucial for addressing the tensions on the Korean peninsula, the security
dilemma between Japan and China, and even deal with the Taiwan issue.175
Interests
As is befitting the state that considers itself the “honest broker” of the international
system, the United States has an interest in maintaining its presence within the region, hedging
against Chinese military aggression, continue to encourage China’s adoption of the “responsible
stakeholder” name, and ensure its continued influence in Asia to fulfill its identity as a benign
hegemon.
Strong Military Presence
Two of the United States’ biggest trading partners are entangled in a security dilemma
with one another. Conflict would disrupt trade and would challenge the U.S. identity as the
protector of democracy. Therefore, the United States has an interest to maintain a strong military
174
Calder, “The New Face,” 106-116.
175
Ibid.
Velgersdyk 56
presence in East Asia, more specifically Japan. The U.S. military presence reduces pressure on
Japan and China to build up military capabilities and also keeps forces nearby should worse
come to worse and the U.S. is forced to maintain its credibility as the defender of democracy. 176
The United States also has an interest in maintaining its military presence in Japan
because of its identity as an honest broker. The U.S. presence prevents the security dilemma
from escalating out of control and leading to conflict; as a benign hegemon, the United States
uses its power projection capabilities to ensure peace to the benefit of both China and Japan.
Hedge Against Chinese Capabilities
The United States has been supportive of China’s development as a political power in
East Asia, but the United States does have an interest in preventing some key areas of military
development, namely a blue water navy. The United States wishes to prevent conflict between
China and Japan or China and Taiwan, and in either scenario China would require a blue water
navy to be able to successfully fight a war.177 As it stands, China’s navy is sufficient to threaten
shipping, a nuisance to be sure but it does not threaten the survival of Japan or Taiwan.178
China’s capabilities do not threaten the United States’ security, yet the United States hedges
176
Christensen, “China, U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” 78.
177
178
O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 74-79.
Velgersdyk 57
against possible Chinese aggression. This is because the United States, as a benign hegemon and
a protector of democracy, hedges against possible aggression in the future.
Encourage China’s Adoption of the Title “Responsible Stakeholder”
While the United States may seek to hinder some aspects of China’s military
development, it has an interest in China continuing to live up to its name as the “responsible
stakeholder”. The diplomatic channels and soft power diplomacy China uses under this name fit
into the moralist perspective that dominates the American public’s understanding of foreign
policy.179 Furthermore, U.S. support for Chinese diplomatic efforts allows the United States to
preserve its role of “honest broker”. If the United States opposed China at every turn, it would
hardly deserve the name.180
Prevent Loss of Influence
The United States must maintain its own capabilities to influence other states, particularly
through soft power means. Without influence in the region the United States cannot continue to
act as a benign hegemon or an honest broker. Both roles require the United States to have a
presence within the region. Fortunately, influence within Asia is not a zero-sum game. The
United States, by engaging the burgeoning multilateral organization in the region like ASEAN,
179
180
Nitze, “America: An Honest Broker,” 1.
Velgersdyk 58
can gain influence without compromising China’s developing diplomatic influence. The smaller
states within the region do not want to be forced to choose either the United States or China, but
similarly they do not want to see either power gone from the region.181
The United States can also maintain its influence through the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). Since it was founded in 1989, APEC has grown to twenty-one members,
including the United States, China, and Japan. APEC is an informal forum that lacks a charter
and whose decisions are non-binding on all members; APEC is considered to be “shallow
integration”.182 APEC’s low-level of commitment is both a benefit and a curse. The lack of
binding agreements or even a written charter mean it imposes little, if any, cost to the
sovereignty of member states, but the shallow integration also means that it does not have the
capabilities in its current form to be the guiding economic organization of East Asia. APEC will
help the United States maintain influence, but it will, by no means, be an active enough
organization to be sufficient to meet U.S. interests.
Continue Economic Relationships
181
182
Saman Kelegama, “Open Regionalism and APEC: Rhetoric and Reality,” Economic and Political Weekly 35,
no. 51 (2000): 4527.
Velgersdyk 59
This last interest is particularly important because of the economic downturn. The
economic climate has worried states around the world, including in Asia.183 The fear is that
economic partners, like the United States, will retreat from international trade and focus on
internal development and consumption to overcome the slump. This would harm the smaller
Asian states that are highly dependent on international trade for their economic well-being.184 If
the United States were to make their fears of abandonment manifest, it would undermine any
efforts to gain influence in the region. On the other hand, efforts made to improve economic ties
with other states provide a way for the United States to gain influence in the region, which will
likely perceive the economic presence as a boon.
Furthermore, retreat from international trade is a double-edged sword. The United States
may not depend on international trade for survival, but it is doubtful the United States would be
able to transition smoothly to domestic production of products that were formerly supplied by
trade.185
OUTLOOK ON EAST ASIA AND U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS
After examining the identity-derived interests of China and the United States, it is
important to remember the limitations of this approach. No matter how positive one state views
183
184
Ibid.
185
Velgersdyk 60
the other, there is always the problem of uncertainty.186 There is always the problem of potential
for harm in the future that must be guarded against. If this were not the case, then the United
States would not have to hedge against Chinese military development and China would not still
be concerned with Japan’s potential military development. The interests of actors are not
determined solely by identity or solely by materialist factors but rather the combination of the
two provide the accurate picture of interests in East Asia.
Nevertheless, identity-derived interests provide an explanation for the gaps between the
realist predictions and the reality of the situation. The insights provided allow a more accurate
outlook on the current relationship between China and the United States, a better estimate of the
future direction of that relationship, and an understanding of the potential power transition from
the United States and China as the capabilities gap diminishes.
Current Situation
The current relationship between China and the United States is positive but delicate.
Both states gain from the other’s presence in Asia and the world, but uncertainty forces both
China and the United States to hedge against the other becoming too powerful in the region.
186
Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” 188.
Velgersdyk 61
From an economic standpoint, U.S.-Chinese relations are strong. China and the United
States account for a large portion of each other’s international trade.187 Uncertainty is the least
problematic in this aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations because international trade, while important,
is not crucial to the survival of either state, so neither state is concerned over possible harms in
the future.
From a political standpoint, both the United States and China have exercise significant
influence within the region as individual actors and as key members of multilateral organizations
like ASEAN, SCO, and APEC. The United States has numerous bilateral agreements with
several Asian states, and is particularly close to Japan.188 Furthermore, the United States as an
“honest broker” is seen by China as the “least distrusted actor” within the region. The United
States’ political influence is not diminishing relative to China’s rising political clout, but the
United States will have to work to maintain its relationships with Asian states as it is no longer
the only player in town.
China has stepped into its name “responsible stakeholder”. China has increasing
influence in Southeast Asia in particular where the United States has been supportive of growing
Chinese influence.189 The cooperation between the two powers necessary for the six party talks
187
188
189
Ibid., 97.
Velgersdyk 62
reveals that both United States and China are willing to use soft power diplomacy to pursue their
interests; this bodes well for the relationship between China and the United States that both states
see a place for soft power in pursuing security.
Identity even has a role in the military aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations. The U.S. identity
as the protector of democracy adds depth to the reasoning behind the U.S. presence in Japan. By
providing stability in the security dilemma, the United States protects Japan but also allays
Chinese fears of Japanese capabilities. The U.S. presence is effective in this role because the
Chinese perception of the United States as the “least distrusted actor” means China trusts the
United States will actually be a restraint to Japanese military development.
The role of identity is not completely positive in this aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations,
however. China’s emphasis on maintaining order as well as the importance of nationalism to
state legitimacy has placed pressure on China to prevent Taiwanese independence even to the
point of war.190 This conflicts with the U.S. role as the guarantor of peace and democracy.191 The
Taiwan issue is arguably the most dangerous issue when it comes to the potential for military
conflict between the United States and China. However, the material realities of the situation,
190
191
Nitze, “America: An Honest Broker,” 1.
Velgersdyk 63
namely China’s lack of the necessary power projection capabilities to take Taiwan, mitigate the
fears of conflict.192
Future Direction
The identity-derived interests and material factors taken together predict that Asia will
develop into a stable and peaceful bipolar system. The United States will be the predominant
actor in Northeast Asia and China will be the predominant actor in Southeast Asia. Both will
have a presence in the other’s sphere. China’s influence on the Korean peninsula will mitigate
the preponderance of U.S. influence in Northeast Asia; U.S. influence with allies like Singapore
and the Philippines will prevent complete domination of Southeast Asia by China. These
exceptional states to the overall regional bipolarity may actually encourage further cooperation
between China and the United States. Both actors may find that only with the cooperation of the
other power can sufficient cooperation with the exceptional states be garnered and political
objectives, like a free trade zone, become achievable.
The stability of this bipolar system comes not only from the pressure from China’s and
the United States’ respective identities as “responsible stakeholder” and “honest broker”, but also
from some key material factors. The geopolitical dividing line along the Chinese coast discussed
192
O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 53.
Velgersdyk 64
at the very beginning of the paper acts as a barrier both preventing and protecting each state from
armed conflict.193
Power Transition – China as Hegemon?
The current bipolar regional system is stable, but should China become a superpower
there is considerable consternation about the likelihood and scale of conflict between it and the
United States. To predict the chances for armed conflict between China and the United States, it
is important to examine the transition event, generally held to be the most unstable and conflict-
prone time, and the long run under such an international system.
Transition Event – Resolution of the Taiwan Issue
Many Chinese analysts have come to the conclusion that mainland China will inevitably
reintegrate Taiwan once Chinese capabilities and China’s economy have grown strong
enough.194 Unless the agreement between the United States and Taiwan changes, this will
directly conflict with the United States’ guarantee of security extended to Taiwan. The chances
for peace during this tense time will depend on Taiwan’s attitude towards reintegration. It could
be that Taiwan will willingly join with mainland China, and that U.S. security guarantees will
not be necessary. However, if Taiwan is reintegrated unwillingly or under duress, this would be
193
Ross, “Geography,” 82, 93.
194
David Shambaugh, “Facing Reality in China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001): 50-60.
Velgersdyk 65
sufficient grounds for the United States’ security guarantees to be activated. If the United States
fails to act in this situation, the credibility of U.S. commitment to its security alliances, which it
has with numerous states in Asia (most notably Japan), will be severely shaken. If it does act,
armed conflict seems likely.
If there is not armed conflict, or China successfully repels U.S. forces, the reintegration
of Taiwan will be symbolic of China’s step up to the status of superpower. Not only will
Taiwan’s reintegration have domestic symbolism as the final victory necessary to move on from
the “century of humiliation”, but it will also have international symbolism as China’s successful
opposition to the United States.
The timeline on the transition to superpower status or on the likely reintegration of
Taiwan into mainland China is, of course, difficult to declare with complete confidence.
However, the current prediction for when China’s GDP will surpass the United States is the late
2020’s.195 Even after this point, though, it is important to realize China’s economy will not be as
powerful as the United States because per capita income will still be far lower than the United
States and China is not as technologically advanced as the United States. China’s population is
roughly four times larger than the United States, so China economy will not be as efficient in
195
Chris Oliver, “China's GDP to overtake U.S. by early 2020s, says analyst,” MarketWatch, April 23, 2009,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-gdp-overtake-us-early.
Velgersdyk 66
terms of power until it is four times larger than the United States, if it ever reaches that point.196
China’s economy is currently an industrializing power that focuses on resource production and
light manufacturing whereas the United States’ economy is highly advanced and diversified.197
Also, estimates place Chinese military capabilities approximately twenty to thirty years behind
the United States and other advanced states.198 Until China has closed the military gap and the
economic gap, which will not be until at least 2050, I do not believe it will be successful in any
attempt to forcefully reintegrate Taiwan.
After the Transition
Assuming that China’s transition to superpower status is peaceful, the resulting bipolar
system will be stable and peaceful. Two spheres of influence will form around the United States
and China, the spheres resulting from histories of interaction and cooperation. The United States’
sphere of influence will include North America, most of Europe, and Latin America. China’s
sphere of influence would include Asia and Africa. Unlike the last bipolar system, the Cold War,
the two superpowers will not be opposed to one another. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
and the United States were ideologically opposed to one another and considered the other to be
an enemy. A bipolar system with the United States and China as the two poles would not suffer
196
CIA, “China,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html
197
Ibid.
198
Christensen, “Posing Problems,” 8.
Velgersdyk 67
the same fate. The United States and China would go into the system with a history of economic
and political interaction that would prevent the identity of other from ever being construed as
that of an enemy. Furthermore, the geography of the United States and China affords them the
strategic depth to avoid direct conflict.199 Proxy wars are also unlikely because of the developing
collective security agreements, like in ASEAN and the SCO, that help prevent smaller-scale
conflicts.200 If and when China finally gains superpower status, the stability of the material
factors will mean that the role of identity will be even more crucial in determining state interests.
199
200
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 73-6, 95-6.
Velgersdyk 68
Bibliography
"African Union commission chair lauds China's role in development." BBC Monitoring, 28
January 2009. http://www.lexisnexus.com (4 May 2009).
Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. "The Coming Conflict with America." Foreign Affairs
76, no. 2 (1997): 18. http://www.galegroup.com (19 February 2009).
Calder, Kent E. "The New Face of Northeast Asia." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001): 106.
http://www.galegroup.com (12 February 2009).
"CHINA CAN WEATHER STORM WB ECONOMIST." China Daily, 13 October 2008.

http://www.lexisnexus.com (4 May 2009).
Christensen, Thomas J. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East
Asia." International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 49-80.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294 (5 February 2009).
---. "Chinese Realpolitik." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996): 37. http://www.galegroup.com (12
February 2009).
---. "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? ." International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 81-126.
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.81 (19 February 2009).
---. "Posing Problems without Catching up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security
Policy." International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 5-40.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092132 (25 January 2009).
---. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
CIA. "China." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/ch.html (26 April 2009).
Copeland, Dale C. "Review: The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review

Essay." International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 187-212.
Velgersdyk 69
Fordham, Benjamin O. "A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on
American Decisions to Use Force ." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004):
632-656. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149813 (2 May 2009).
Gallagher, Michael G. "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea." International Security
19, no. 1 (1994): 169-194. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539152 (5 February 2009).
Gong, Baihua. "Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working Together to Take
Advantage of WTO Membership." World Trade Organization. World Trade Organization.
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case11_e.htm (2 May 2009).
Gries, Peter H. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2004.
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kaufman, Joyce P. A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006.
Kelegama, Saman. "Open Regionalism and APEC: Rhetoric and Reality." Economic and
Political Weekly 35, no. 51 (2000): 4525-4533. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410085 (4
May 2009).
Lampton, David M. "China." Foreign Policy (1998): 13-27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149274

(4 May 2009).
Larson, David L. "Objectivity, Propaganda, and the Puritan Ethic." In The Puritan Ethic in
United States Foreign Policy, David L. Larson, 3-24. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1966.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2001.
Nitze, Paul H. "America: An Honest Broker." Foreign Affairs 69, no. 4 (1990): 1-14.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044492 (14 April 2009).
O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan." International Security 25, no. 2
(2000): 51-86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626753 (5 February 2009).
Velgersdyk 70
Oliver, Chris. "China's GDP to overtake U.S. by early 2020s, says analyst." MarketWatch, 23
April 2009. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-gdp-overtake-us-early (2 May
2009).
Ross, Robert S. "Beijing as a Conservative Power." Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (1997): 33.
http://www.galegroup.com (12 February 2009).
---. "The Geography of the PEace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century." International Security
23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539295 (5 February 2009).
Roy, Denny. "Tensions in the Taiwan." Survival 42, no. 1 (2000): 76-96.
Shambaugh, David. "China Engages Asia." International Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 64-99.
---. "Facing Reality in China Policy." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001) http://find.galegroup.com/
(19 February 2009).
Sinclair, Kerrie. "China slump spells bad news all round." The Advertiser, 23 January 2009.
http://www.lexisnexus.com (4 May 2009).
Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1999.
Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics." International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.
---. "Constructin International Politics." International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81.
Wright, Teresa. "Disincentives for Democratic Change in China." Asia Pacific Issues (2007).

The Role of Identity in U.S.-Chinese Relations

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

The Role of Identity in U.S.-Chinese Relations

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

The Role of Identity in U.S.

Political Science 390

Professor Joel Westra

May 17, 2009

To demonstrate the usefulness of the constructivist perspective in analysis of U.S-

United States and China in East Asia and the world.

REALITY AND THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE

precedence of materialism in determining state interests.3

respective spheres of influence. The bipolarity is exhibited by the differences in military

eastern coast of China.5

like Japan during WWII.12

claims to the islands.15

the island to the mainland, a huge gain in power in absolute terms.20

Realist Predictions – A Zero-sum View

significant gain it represents in both absolute and relative terms.

when the other state is the rival power in the region.

mutually-assured destruction or as a means to boost a political leader’s image.23 The geopolitical

States would be forced to defend Taiwan unconditionally from China.

The Reality of the Situation – A Mixed-sum View

continue to foster economic ties with the United States.31

stability it brings to the region.33

participating in China’s six party talks.36

itself in the Taiwan issue, but not to oppose China categorically.

Explaining the Differences – The Constructivist View

identity – and externally – international law and other actors.

relation to that state, helps define the state’s interests.

industrialization, are critical phenomena in identity formation. Any understanding of the

role in identity formation.

the realist predictions made above.

concessions like treaty ports and extraterritoriality.46

significance for China as a continual reminder of the humiliation of this period.

distrust and anger towards the West and Japan.51

The Cold War

successfully.57 Declaration of independence or not, Taiwan challenges the Chinese Communist

Party’s claim that it leads a unified China.

development and international trade.

engagement between China and the Southeast Asian region.63

Identity – View of Self

the regional level, and the international level.

laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises.67

trading partner with its Asian neighbors.

this has been done with restraint.

Role in the World

economy and its interaction with other states.

demonstrates China’s increasing identity as a significant political player in the international

Identity – View of Other

“Least Distrusted” Actor

maintaining stability in the region.

in essence, can be held hostage by either state.

harm of nuclear weapons.

legitimacy.112 An important aspect of maintaining growth is to keep international trade going

maintain its own growth.114

U.S. Presence in East Asia

that could spread to the other provinces.

influence and membership in multilateral organizations.119

its other interests.

negotiating table over territorial disputes like the Spratly Islands.128

THE UNITED STATES

Process – The Puritan Ethic

system of checks & balances found in the U.S. Constitution. 131

period, and the post-Cold War period.

The “Open Door” Policy

Post-World War I Through the Cold War

isolate itself. It did not last.138