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The President and Fellows of Harvard College
The Supply of Muskets and Spain's War of Independence

Author(s): J. Clayburn La Force
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Business History Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter, 1969), pp. 523-544
Published by: The President and Fellows of Harvard College
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By J. ClayburnLa Force
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
The Supply of Muskets and

Spain's War of Independence*
Et Professor La Force traces the frustrated efforts of the Spanish revo-
lutionary government to arm its forces against the invading army of
Napoleon.
In this modern day of industrialized economies, we have

grown accustomed to rapid and generous responses by industry
when demand for an item increases significantly. Ready availability
of sophisticated technical knowledge, more widely diffused and
greater supplies of human skills, and vastly larger amounts of capital
equipment now available relative to times past afford many nations
of the Western World- and some of the East - this far greater
capability. Responsiveness of supply in contemporary economies
is well illustrated by recalling the swift rise in output of armaments
following the sudden outbreak of World War II. It is even more
dramatically illustrated by setting forth a contrasting example of
how a pre-industrial economy reacted to the shock of an unex-
pected and massive expansion of demand for armaments.
For such a case, consider Spain in her desperate struggle against
domination by Napoleon from 1808 to 1814. A sudden, large in-
crease in demand for muskets by the Spanish government oc-
curred after the French invasion of 1808. This essay investigates
how Spanish authorities attempted to induce a larger supply from
domestic sources and how they ultimately went beyond the Penin-
sula's resources and sought arms from foreign suppliers; it offers an
anatomy of the inadequacies of pre-industrial economies when
confronted by a sudden rise in demand for armaments.
Business History Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (Winter 1969). Copyright ? The President
and Fellows of Harvard College.
* The author wishes to express his debt of gratitude for the useful comments on an earlier
draft of this essay made by his esteemed friend and colleague, the late Warren C. Scoville.
A grant from the American Philosophical Society and a Fulbright Research Grant for Spain
made possible the archival research underlying this essay. The author sincerely thanks the
American Philosophical Society and the Commission for Educational Exchange between
the United States of America and Spain for this generous support.

I
A massive political and military crisis engulfed Spain early in

1808 as Napoleon, in a masterly display of deceit, dispatched
100,000 warriors onto the Peninsula. Swiftly and without opposi-
tion they occupied strategic military outposts while supposedly
enroute to partition Portugal.' Then, lured to Bayonne and intim-
idated by Napoleon, Spain's royal family ignominiously relin-
quished all rights to the throne, thereby sending the country's
political institutions crumbling into confusion and indecision.2 By
the end of June, it appeared that Spain was Napoleon's: the Em-
peror's brother, Joseph, had donned the Spanish Crown, Murat had
brutishly quelled the resistance that had burst forth in Madrid on
May 2, and the French army had begun to occupy the remainder
of the country.
But opposition slowly and unexpectedly arose. Throughout May
and June, revolutionary juntas in unoccupied territories brushed
aside the idle, temporizing vestiges of traditional government in
the provinces and assumed sovereign power.3 As they attempted
to organize a defense of their regions, these independent juntas
soon realized the futility and deep peril of a divided struggle and
set about to coalesce into a united government.4 On September
25 they created the Junta Central Suprema y Gubernativa del Reyno
(Supreme and Central Governing Junta of the Kingdom).5
When 1809 began, this week, inexperienced, revolutionary gov-
1 Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain (New York, 1965), I, 84;
Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito, Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814), Antecedentes
y Preliminares (Madrid, 1966), I, 283-288; Justiniano Garcia Prado, Historia del Alza-
miento, Guerra y Revolucidn de Asturias (1808-1814), (Oviedo, 1953), 94-96.
2Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain, 104-132; Jer6nimo B6cker, Historia de
las Relaciones Exteriores de Espaila Durante el Siglo XIX (Madrid, 1924), 187; Miguel
Artola, Los Origenes de la Espaia Contemporanea (Madrid, 1959), 103-8; E. Christiansen,
The Origins of Military Power in Spain 1800-1854 (Oxford, 1967), 10-11; Estado Mayor,
Guerra de Independencia, 416-38; Brigadier General Vincent J. Esposito and Colonel John
Robert Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1964),
Map 84.
SB6cker, Historia de Las Relaciones Exteriores de Espaiia, 188; Owen Connelly,
Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms (New York, 1965), 224-5; Artola, Los Origines de La Espaiia
Contemporanea, 123, 126-7, 144-5; Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain, 150-68.
B6cker, Historia de Las Relaciones Exteriores de Espaika, 193-4; J. Holland Rose,
"Canning and the Spanish Patriots in 1808," American Historical Review, XII (October
1906), 39-52; Artola, Los Origenes de La Espaiia Contemporanea, 167-79; Archivo
Hist6rico Nacional (hereafter cited as Archivo Nacional), Seccidn de Estado (hereafter cited
as Estado), Junta Central Suprema Gubernativa del Reino (hereafter cited as Junta
Suprema), legajos 70a, no. 84; 701, no. 170; Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain,
290-2.
5B6cker, Historia de Las Relaciones Exteriores de Espaita, 248-9; Artola, Los Origenes
de La Espaila Contemporanea, 205; Archivo y Biblioteca del Antiguo Senado, E2-5-49;
An Account of the Central or Supreme Junta of Spain, Its Chief Members and Most
Important Proceedings (London, 1809); Archivo del Reyno de Valencia, Real Acuerdo,
Afio 1808, folios 86, 317-21; Afio 1810, folios 171-4; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta
Suprema, legajos 2; 1, nos. 1-140; Estado, Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 3072;
Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain, 292-8.
524 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW

ernment found itself backed into a corner of Spain, bereft of much
of the nation's resources, and confronted with the seemingly im-
possible assignment of making war against one of the greatest
armies of all time. Of the many imperative challenges facing the
Junta Suprema, the variety, complexity, and magnitude of the tasks
involved just in reorganizing, enlarging, and arming the relatively
small, inefficient, and dispersed military force in a country occupied
or threatened by the enemy were immense. The attempts of the
Junta Suprema to accomplish one of these tasks - obtaining a supply
of muskets for its soldiers - is an excellent case study of the prob-
lems involved.
During much of the century preceding 1808, muskets for Spain's
infantry had originated in the workshops and forges of Guipfizcoa
and Catalonia. Ripoll, in Catalonia, had been famous for its fire-
arms since at least the middle of the sixteenth century when it
boasted of eighty master gunsmiths who in time of war could
create 300 guns a week.6 Perhaps the most famous and certainly
by far the most important center of small arms manufacture was
in Guipfizcoa; the villages of Eibar, Tolosa, Elgoibar, and especially
Placencia had enjoyed widespread fame from time immemorial for
their superior armaments.
Spanish kings had traditionally turned to Catalonia and Guipiz-
coa in moments of war and had contracted with the guilds of gun-
smiths. Throughout much of the eighteenth century - until the
French invasion of 1794 - the artisans of Placencia supplied nearly
all the army's demand for arms. Although production fell dra-
matically during the occupation by French soldiers, the industry
had resumed production by 1796 and apparently supplied around
1,000 muskets each month until Napoleon's intrusion in 1808 ended
production for the war's duration.8
The invasion and occupation of Guipizcoa by French soldiers in
1794 not only eliminated Spain's primary source of muskets; it
fully exposed the strategic military weakness of an armaments in-
6 W. Keith
Neal, Spanish Guns and Pistols (London, 1955), 33.
?Andoni de Soraluze, Riqueza y Economia del Pais Vasco (Buenos Aires, 1945), 133;
Pedreo Mendez de Parada, "El Armamento en la Guerra de la Independencia," in La
Guerra de la Independencia Espaiiola y los Sitios de Zaragoza (Zaragoza, 1958), 377;
Jorge Vigon, Historia de la Artilleria Espaiiola (Madrid, 1947), I, 331; II, 503. The village
of Placencia in Guipuzcoa should not be confused with the town of Plasencia in Extre-
madura. (Indice General Alfabitico de las Entidades de Poblacidn de Espafia [Madrid,
1966], 453-4.)
8 Vigon, Historia de La Artilleria, II, 494, 504; Archivo General de Simancas (here-
after cited as Archivo de Simancas), Secretaria de Hacienda, Siglo XVIII, lagajo 799-
Conde del Campos de Alange to Diego de Gardoqui, June 26, 1791. The stock of muskets
in Spain supposedly stood at 83,384 new and 40,957 used in 1794; and by 1808 there
reputedly were 386,836 military firearms of all kinds in the armories of Spain. (Archivo de
Simancas, Secretaria de Guerra, legajo 5777; Parada, "El Armamento en la Guerra de la
Independencia," 339-40.)
MUSKETS AND SPAIN'S INDEPENDENCE 525

dustry located so close to the traditional enemy's frontier. Even
though compelling economic reasons - supplies of excellent quality
iron ore and wood for charcoal- had generously abetted the in-
dustry in Guipiizcoa, Charles IV sought a more militarily secure
location and in April 1794 ordered the creation of a royal factory
for muskets at Oviedo.9 Brought there from their occupied villages
in Guipdzcoa, Basque artisans were soon producing 400 muskets
with bayonets each month; 10 and by the end of 1796 their monthly
output had risen to 941. During 1797 and 1798 they averaged over
800 muskets with bayonets a month. While evidence is extremely
scarce, production of muskets at Oviedo most likely continued at
the same or a slightly higher rate over the next decade."
Thus it was that on the eve of the French invasion of 1808 ar-
tisans in the villages of Guiptizcoa and in and around Oviedo were
creating an adequate supply of firearms for the Spanish infantry.
Producing mainly for private consumption, the industry at Ripoll
stood in reserve. But calamity soon came to pass. Three times
French soldiers occupied Ripoll. The first time in 1808 they de-
stroyed the workshops of gunsmiths.12 The factory recovered par-
tially and withstood the second occupation, but in 1813, on their
third return, French troops demolished what remained.'3 At the
war's outset the Guipdzcoan industry almost immediately once
again fell victim to French troops who held that territory for six
years. Although Oviedo remained free for a year, by December
1808, the factory there was producing only a few pistols and no
muskets for want of funds from Madrid and iron and steel from
Guipizcoa and Vizcaya.'4 The Junta Suprema made an attempt
to invigorate production early in 1809 but French troops occu-
pied Oviedo before any results came about.'"
By early summer of 1808 the steady supply of muskets from Gui-
pdzcoa and Oviedo abruptly perished, confronting the Spanish
patriots with a problem of immense proportions. Not only would
the Spaniards have to replace the previous flow of firearms, they
la
SArchivo de Simancas, Secretaria de Guerra, legajo 5782; Vigon, Historia de
Artilleria, II, 504; Parada, "El Armamento en la Guerra de la Independencia," 375.
xoArchivo de Simancas, Secretaria de Guerra, legajo 5782, Consejo de Estado to Conde
de Colomera, May 20, 1795; Secretarfa de Hacienda, Siglo XVIII, legajo 798, both in
Archivo de Simancas; Vigon, Historia de la Artilleria, II, 504; Prado, Historia del Alza-
miento, 94.
11Archivo de Simancas, Secretaria de Hacienda, Siglo XVIII, legajo 798.
Is Neal, Spanish Guns and Pistols, 34; James D. Lavin, A History of Spanish Firearms
(London, 1965), 218-19.
'3 Neal, Spanish Guns and Pistols; Lavin, History of Spanish Firearms; Archivo
Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, no. 151; 36, nos. 5, 9, 11.
14Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 72a, no. 123; 76a, no. 9 - Actas de
las Sesiones de la Junta del Reyno de Galicia; Prado, Historia del Alzamiento, 94-6.
15Archivo Nacional, Estado, legajo 11995; Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 15, no. 2;
Justiniano Garcia Prado, loc. cit.

would have to increase it strikingly if they were to succeed in their
grandiose design to raise an army of 350,000 or more infantry and
50,000 cavalry, as well as to arm innumerable bands of guerrillas
and peasants.'6 Moreover, at the war's very beginning a critical
shortage of muskets arose: some initial stocks quickly evaporated,
authorities having distributed them to new recruits, many of whom
in turn lost or abandoned their arms in battles or sold them in the
open market; other stores of muskets fell into the possession of
French invaders.
As most users do when an item's scarcity rises sharply and their
demand for it also increases, the various provincial juntas and the
Junta Suprema took immediate action to round up and use more
sparingly those muskets still in unoccupied Spain.7 The Junta
Suprema commanded soldiers to conserve their muskets above all
else and established harsh penalties for anyone who failed to do
so.18 Nevertheless, inexperienced, undisciplined Spanish infantry-
men by the thousands frequently dropped their muskets and scat-
tered in panic when confronted by enemy forces; 19others fled with
their arms, deserting their units, and later sold their muskets to
private citizens. A series of royal orders by the Junta Suprema
commanded local officials to scour battlefields for abandoned weap-
ons.20 Other royal orders instructed provincial juntas to requi-
sition muskets owned by private citizens; 21 on February 19, 1809,
the Junta Suprema directed local authorities to pay forty reals
for each army musket thus obtained and set a penalty of 200
lashes for anyone refusing to sell.22 Still other measures encour-
xe Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 1; 7b, no. 7; 15, no. 7; 16, no. 2;
Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5608.
The total land force of Spain before 1808 usually amounted to about 50,000 regulars.
(Christiansen, Origins of Military Power in Spain, 2.)
17Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 18, 163, 185; 42b, no 297;
Servicio Hist6rico Militar, Coleccidn Documental del Fraile, Tomo 788, folio 216; Archivo
Hist6rico de la Ciudad de Barcelona (hereafter cited as Archivo Hist6rico de Barcelona),
Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 318.
1sArchivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 44a, no. 20.
x9Ibid., legajos 7c, no. 34; 44a, no. 20. When French forces defeated the Spanish at
Ocafia on November 20, 1809, Spanish soldiers reputedly left 40,000 muskets scattered
across the battlefield. (Ibid., legajo 40, un-numbered document.) At the battle of Castella
in 1808, the defeated army of General Jos6e O'Donnell left 6,000 muskets behind but
suffered casualties of only 743 dead and wounded and 2,690 taken prisoner. (Gonzalo
Vidal Tur, "Alicante y sus Pueblos en la Guerra de la Independencia [1808-1813]" in
Estudios de la Guerra de la Independencia [Zaragoza, 1964], I, 611.)
o Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 9, 15, 35, no. 223; 66b, no. 158;
Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 8261.
n Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 4a, nos. 16-130; 9, 60m, no. 341;
=
Servicio Hist6rico Militar, Coleccidn Documental del Fraile, Tomo 789, folio 74.
Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 9; Servicio Hist6rico Militar, Colec-
ci6n Documental del Fraile, Tomo 762, folio 99. Of course, peasants were loath to give up
their muskets; the repeated exhortations indicate that few individuals complied. The
severity of the penalty for intransigency increased through 1809. For example, by October,
local officials in Hoz de Molina declared it a treasonable act to hide a musket and
threatened incarceration in a presidio for those who continued to defy the ruling. (Archivo
Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 16, no. 211.)

aged the collection of arms - the Junta Suprema coaxed citizens
to inform on deserters and offered rewards for each soldier and
military equipment thus gained.23 In some provinces, authorities
offered draft exemptions to men who provided muskets, horses, or
other equipment.24
These and other similar actions surely had some success. But
such attempts to assemble and economize the existing stock of
muskets in late 1808 and early 1809 brought forth only a small
portion of the desired quantity. Authorities naturally turned to
substitute armaments. Sabres, swords, lances, slings, crossbows,
and especially pikes were commonly suggested alternatives.25 After
the crushing defeats of the Spanish army by Napoleon late in 1808
and the subsequent regrouping of patriots in southern Spain, the
Junta Suprema ordered newly recruited soldiers without muskets
to be armed mainly with pikes.26 On February 10, each of the
eleven provincial juntas was to have artisans immediately manu-
facture 40,000 to 50,000 pikes. Although there is no evidence to
suggest that craftsmen constructed anything like this number, some
provincial juntas did have modest quantities produced.27 Through-
out 1809, the Junta Suprema encouraged provincial authorities to
continue their efforts along this line.28
As the Junta Suprema desperately sought to use more providently
the remaining muskets in Spain and to create substitute weapons,
so it also offered substantial prizes to anyone who would bring
muskets to Spain,29 and it sent purchasing agents into the inter-
2 Archivo del Reino de Valencia, Real Acuerdo, Afio 1809, folios 114, 141; Archivo
Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 60, no. 16. The Junta Suprema on February 28,
1809, reserved for the Government the right of preference in purchasing such muskets.
(Ibid., legajo 4a, no. 8.) Spaniards also attempted to induce non-French soldiers in the
French army to surrender, offering 200 reals to each deserter- 300 reals if he brought
along his musket. (Archivo Hist6rico de Barcelona, Impresos en Caja, ordenes circulares,
1806-1813.)
2 Archivo Hist6rico de Barcelona, Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 317. This prac-
tice drew strong criticism from the Junta Suprema, which early (January 24, 1809) pro-
hibited local juntas from awarding similar draft deferments. (Archivo Nacional, Estado,
Junta Suprema, legajo 83n, nos. 228, 229.)
2 Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 44, 94; Servicio Hist6rico Militar,
Coleccidn Documental del Fraile, Tomo 789, folio 86; Florencio Idoate Iragui, "Catlogo
de Documentos de la Secci6n de Guerra del Archivo General de Navarra (1807-1808)" in
Estudios de la Guerra de la Independencia, I, 547.
2 Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 46a, no. 10. While some English
observers looked upon this type of action as a futile response to panic, it might be men-
tioned that in 1803, when Napoleon menaced England from across the Channel, the British
authorities, lacking a sufficient supply of muskets, issued 103,572 pikes to newly raised
volunteers. (Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation [Cambridge, 1963], 57.)
n Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 4a, nos. 116-30; 9, 35, 36, nos.
336; 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385; Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la
Independencia, Junta Superior, caja 187.
2 Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 9s; 36, nos. 369, 370, 371; Archivo
del Ministerio de Hacienda (hereafter cited as Archivo de Hacienda), legajo 5459; Jos6
Canga Argiielles, Documentos Pertenecientes a los Observaciones Sobre la Historia de la
Guerra de Espaiia que Escribe en Ingls el Teniente Coronel Napier (Madrid, 1836), 254-5.
2 In February 1809, the Junta Suprema promised to pay 100,000 reals to the first boat

national market for armaments. Portugal early received the patriots'
attention. Late in October 1808, the Junta Suprema received
news that the Portuguese government had 200,000 muskets stored
in its armories and that a slave trader named Despuig had about
12,000 firearms warehoused at Lisbon and wished to sell them.s30
Immediately the Junta ordered Pasqual Tenorio y Moscoso, Spain's
charge' d'affaires at Lisbon, to open negotiations with the Por-
tuguese government to acquire all 200,000 muskets by way of
an outright grant. At the same time he was to purchase the muskets
from Despuig. Tenorio's efforts in this latter quest proved fruit-
less, for all but 125 of Despuig's arms were either of small, random
calibre and made of inferior metal or were useless, purposefully
ruined by the French during their recent occupation of Portugal.31
Since the Portuguese government also had attempted to collect all
useful firearms from its citizens, Tenorio found no other private
stocks. Of course, the fanciful hope of securing all or even part
of that government's supply, whatever size it might have been,
quickly vanished.
Early in 1809 the Junta Suprema decided to seek arms in Austria,
and, to this end, a group of merchants at Cadiz in May offered to
ship Spanish goods to Trieste and trade them for 80,000 muskets.
While the Junta and the merchants agreed upon a contract, there is
no evidence that this arrangement came to fruition before Austria
fell once again to Napoleon in the Spring of 1809.32 North and
South America were also prospective sources, but they provided few
if any arms. Even though it recognized that the relatively few
factories in the United States militated against success, the Junta
Suprema sent an agent there early in 1809.3* Nothing came of
this. Apparently the Junta did not dare pressure the Spanish
arriving in Spain with a minimum of 10,000 muskets; smaller prizes existed for smaller
shipments. The Junta distributed copies of this offer throughout Spain, Portugal, England,
and elsewhere. In addition, the Junta promised 70,000 reals to the first person to establish
a factory for musket barrels, 70,000 reals to the first person to manufacture 1,000 barrels,
and 140,000 reals to the first to produce 2,000 barrels. (Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459;
Servicio Hist6rico Militar, Coleccidn Documental del Fraile, Tomo 789, folio 74.)
Though this tempting bait failed, on at least one occasion it succeeded in attracting the
attention of persons on the Continent. Sometime before November 1809, the secretary of
the Austrian legation at London, acting on behalf of someone at the Hague, contacted Luis
Apodaca at London offering to sell 40,000 muskets with the intention of collecting the
prize. Intensely interested and with the Junta's approval, Apodaca warily began negoti-
ations. However, hostilities between Austria and France soon ceased, the secretary of the
Austrian legation left England, and Spain thereby lost her intermediary. On May 15, 1810,
Apodaca conceded that the opportunity had vanished. (Archivo Nacional, Estado, Emba-
jadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5460, 5461; Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo
8173.)
SOArchivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 22b, no. 72; 44a, no. 23; 67a,
no. 2.
a' Ibid., legajo 22b, nos. 74, 79.
a Ibid., legajos 4a; 15, no. 21; 16, nos. 32-4; 36, no. 369.
a• Ibid., legajo 36, no. 369.

dominions in America to supply arms, for it fully acknowledged
the precarious military position of its rule there.34
Of the European countries outside the Continental System, only
England was capable of selling large quantities of muskets to Spain.
Acutely aware of this, the Junta Suprema wasted little time after
its creation in instructing Luis Apodaca, its plenipotentiary at Lon-
don, to approach the British government.35 On December 10, 1808,
in a conference with George Canning, Great Britain's Foreign Secre-
tary, Apodaca asked if he might contract with private producers
for the enormous quantity of 600,000 muskets.36 Canning imme-
diately refused the request; in his official answer, written eleven
days later, he stated that England produced only about 130,000 mus-
kets each year, the Board of Ordnance purchased the entire annual
output, and, besides, his government had no intention of letting
Spain enter the market and bid up prices.37 To accentuate this
stand, the British government prohibited all exports of firearms.38
This attempt to exclude foreign purchases of arms failed to deter
Spain. Throughout the remainder of 1809 and for most of 1810,
agents of the Junta Suprema and provincial juntas made repeated
efforts to purchase English muskets either legally or illegally. From
the evidence available, it appears that nearly all of these ventures
failed.39
SHowever, during the desperate days of early 1809, the Junta Suprema did ask the
Governor of Havana to send the stock of rifles stored in the Castle of Perote on the
first ships that might leave for Spain. (Ibid., legajo 59a, no. 47.)
There were, of course, other sporadic attempts to purchase muskets in other foreign
markets. For example, the Junta Provincial of Valencia sent its agents to North Africa,
Malta, Sicily, and Sardinia in search of muskets. While these men did not succeed in pur-
chasing large quantities, the government in Sicily gave them 1000 muskets and the
English Governor on Malta gave them 2000. (Ibid., Estado, Guerra de la Independencia,
legajo 8064; Coleccidn de Documentos Iniditos de la Guerra de la Independencia Existentes
en el Archivo de la Excma. Diputacidn de Vizcaya [Bilbao, 19591, 59-63; Archivo Nacional,
Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 12, 21e, 21t, no. 1; 36, no. 334.)
Apparently some rifles from France found their way into Spanish hands; as an example,
in September 1810, a Capuchin monk offered to supply the Junta Superior of Catalonia
with French muskets. Evidently he delivered at least 75 and received about 20 to 25
reals for each. (Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la Independencia, Junta
Superior, caja 187.) Of course, the Spanish guerrillas captured many French muskets
throughout the war. Also, the Junta Suprema and the Council of the Regency made plans,
some of which were carried out, to venture into occupied territory- even to Madrid -
to steal stocks of French muskets. (Archivo Nacional, legajos 16, no. 23, 41&; Estado, Guerra
de la Independencia, legajo 3082.)
to enter
*5On November 15, 1808, the Junta Suprema ordered Juan Ruiz de Apodaca
into contracts with private artisans in England for the construction of 600,000 muskets
within a year and for their delivery at the rate of 50,000 a month. (Archivo de Simancas,
Estado, legajo 8172.)
asArchivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones
y consulados, legajo 56192.
s cArchivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones
as Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones
s Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5374, 53742,
5459, 5460, 5461, 5462, 5463, 5466, 5609; Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 15, nos. 3-5;
36, nos. 363-7; 62g, no. 177.

It was with characteristic overconfidence and perhaps naivety
that Spain searched the international market for muskets; and it
was equally characteristic that her search met with failure. Her
inability to buy large quantities of muskets became indelibly ap-
parent by spring, 1809. Much earlier, however, the Junta Suprema
had assessed the full range of alternative sources of armaments
and among its first actions as a sovereign power it set about to
pursue them all. This included a program for manufacturing mus-
kets.
II
Recognizing that Spanish industry for many centuries had been

making muskets, the Junta accepted the notion that it could easily
expand and diffuse this activity across the country. It immediately
took action to do so. Yet the Junta failed to begin with a compre-
hensive, well-formulated, realistic plan. Bit by bit, piece by piece a
program of action evolved. Three days after its birth on September
25, the Junta began to ponder the state of the domestic industry.40
Responding to its investigation on November 17, 1808, the Junta
ordered the provincial juntas to employ all gunsmiths, blacksmiths,
and locksmiths in constructing firearms and bayonets.41 Authorities
were to employ any means necessary to ensure that all artisans of
these skills worked only on this project. Then, in December, so that
it might more vigorously pursue all its objectives, the Junta Suprema
buttressed its authority over the frequently anarchic provincial juntas
by sending a representative to each province.42 In January 17,
1809, the Junta replaced the vague, grandiose order of November
17, 1808, with a slightly more specific pronouncement.43 On all of the
cities and towns of their jurisdictions, the provincial juntas were to
produce as many muskets as possible; they were to build factories,
if material conditions merited it. If it were impossible to make
complete rifles in some cities or towns, the blacksmiths and lock-
smiths were to prepare iron for barrels, using metal from balconies
if nothing else were available; knife-makers were to produce bayo-
nets; or carpenters were to make gunstocks. The orders of Novem-
ber 17 and January 17 constituted the enabling legislation for the
SIbid., Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 1.
"x Ibid., legajos 7c, no. 18; 72,, nos. 83, 104, 110, 111, 112, 117. On the same day, the
Junta ordered the Secretary of the Navy to employ all navy gunsmiths in constructing
muskets. (Ibid., legajo 36, no. 353.) The response to the general request of November 17
was not overwhelming; while most local juntas agreed to make an effort, most indicated
pessimism for success. (Ibid., legajo 7c, nos. 17-21.)
SIbid., legajos 9,, 22d2.
a Ibid., legajos 9, 36, nos. 126, 304, 334.

creation of a number of ambitious musket factories in southern
Spain; and the representatives sent out in December 1808, frequently
initiated action.
Yet industry of this nature was alien to southern Spain. The
Mediterranean littoral from Valencia to Cadiz lacked most of the
physical attributes required for a relatively efficient operation of
arms manufacture: deposits of iron ore and coal were either sub-
standard or of trifling quantity; the supply of timber for charcoal and
gunstocks was inappreciably small; water power for turning the
boring lathes and working the forges was frequently unavailable;
the many kinds of specialized tools and equipment were extremely
scarce; and, most crucially, there was but a handful of artisans with
sufficient skills. Despite these seemingly insurmountable obstacles,
the Junta, in its desperation, quixotically barged ahead with manu-
factories at Seville, Cadiz, Granada, Murcia, Valencia, Mglaga,
and Xerez de la Frontera.44
Preliminary efforts to establish manufactories at Seville, Cadiz,
Granada, Valencia, and Murcia got underway during December
1808, and January 1809, in a surprisingly swift response to the
orders of November 17 and January 17.45 Not until April 1809, did
work on Milaga's factory first begin,46 and Xerez de la Frontera's
lagged even more, commencing in November 1809.47 At Cadiz,
Murcia, and MAlaga agents of the Junta Suprema played the entre-
preneurial roles; whereas at Valencia and Granada provincial juntas
themselves initiated action. The Junta Suprema directly established
one at Seville and the magistrate of Xerez de la Frontera proposed
the establishment of, and then made the engagements for, one in
that city.48
Differing sizes characterized the manufactories. Scale of operation
for Seville's factory was to be relatively large, with a planned out-
put of 5,000 to 6,000 muskets a month; Cadiz was to produce 3,000
a month and Granada, Valencia, and Murcia each were to manufac-
ture 1,000 monthly. Less grandiose in design, the manufactories at
" The Junta Suprema and local juntas proposed a number of other factories for muskets,
a few of which actually came to fruition. For a description of these, please see footnote 54.
* Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 18, 122, 172, 173, 177,
196; 35b, nos. 6, 7, 10, 11, 18; 36, nos. 8, 18, 19, 25, 40, 120, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130,
174, 178, 332, 334, 335, 343, 345; 78a, no. 122.
* Ibid., legajos 26, 36, nos. 92, 94; 60, no. 340. This factory had begun to founder
within several months. The Junta Suprema had made large initial grants of funds to the
two contractors who in turn failed to obtain the promised results. As a consequence of
several investigations in late August and early September 1809, a debate ensued as how
best to reorganize the factory. The Junta had not reached a decision by December; most
likely the enterprise stagnated until the French arrived early in 1810. (Ibid., legajo 36,
nos. 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118.)
7 Ibid., legajo 36, nos. 36, 79, 80, 81.
4s Ibid., nos. 2, 18, 36, 40, 92, 120, 124, 128, 129, 174, 178, 332.

Xerez and Milaga had planned capacities of 200 and 50 muskets
each month respectively.49
As the scales of the factories varied, so the forms of their organiza-
tion differed. Francisco Datoli, Director of the manufactory at
Seville, who had gained experience in French armaments establish-
ments and at the Royal Factory for muskets at Oviedo in the
1790's, set out to recreate an organization similar to the one he had
known at Oviedo: Basque artisans brought from Oviedo were to be
housed independently of one another, each was to have his own
workshop and tools and would produce his specialized part of the
rifle for a set fee.50 On the other hand, the Count of Rio Molino,
Director at Cadiz and a neophyte in this line of endeavor, con-
structed a factory in the more modern sense; rather than disperse his
workers about in separate shops, he concentrated them in larger
units and knitted the various aspects of production more closely
together."5' While at Seville Datoli chose the more informal way
because of his and his artisans' experience at Oviedo, so Rio Molino
at Cadiz chose to concentrate his workers because of his and their
lack of experience. Those who instituted the large establishments
at Valencia, Granada, and Murcia generally followed Rio Molino's
pattern and concentrated their artisans within a few large build-
ings.52
However they might have differed in structure and size, each
factory was to have the capability of moving basic materials through
the production process to finished muskets and bayonets. This in-
volved constructing, among other things, numerous forges, machines
for boring musket barrels and grinding metal, shops for forging and
filing locks, bayonets, ramrods, and a host of other parts, and
facilities for making rifle stocks. Power for boring and grinding
machines and forges emanated from water wheels in most instances,
though mules supplied movement at Cadiz.68
Throughout 1809 the manufactories came to life and most stood
nearly ready to produce by January 1810.54 A few new muskets had
49Ibid., nos. 79, 80, 81, 87, 94, 100, 127, 130, 134, 135, 174, 181, 208.
5oIbid., nos. 179, 180, 186, 187, 190, 193.
51Ibid., legajo 35, nos. 150, 151.
52Ibid., legajo 36, nos. 25, 27, 33, 36, 37, 120, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 174, 343, 345.
s Ibid., legajos 35, nos. 87,
100; 36, nos. 120, 124, 125, 343, 345. Although at least
three steam engines existed in and around Seville and although several entrepreneurs
offered to provide steam power for the musket factory, Rio Molino decided to stay with
animal power. (Ibid., legajo 35, nos. 28, 31, 33, 93, 98, 102.)
r While these seven factories constituted the major effort of the Spanish Patriots to
manufacture muskets, there were several other manufactories that apparently produced
some, though few, firearms. Early in 1810 the Council of the Regency decided to create a
factory across the straits of Gibraltar at Ceuta and provided funds for that purpose. By
December 1810, a first supply of muskets from Ceuta arrived at Cadiz. There is some
evidence to suggest that this establishment continued to create a small but insignificant

even begun to trickle forth. To have achieved what they did, Spanish
officials and workmen had to struggle against enormous obstacles.
As its first task, every factory had to secure skilled workers. With-
out their knowledge and dexterity, the boring and grinding ma-
chines could not be built, the forges and bellows could not be con-
structed, and the apprentices could not be trained, let alone any
muskets produced. Most factories acquired some workers by search-
ing the cities and villages for gunsmiths, locksmiths, and black-
smiths. To obtain the initial workforce for Granada, for example,
the Captain General of Granada, in September 1809, circulated an
order of the Junta Suprema throughout the region asking officials of
each village to submit within eight days a list of all master and
journeymen gunsmiths, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and carpenters in
their villages, along with a list of equipment each workman pos-
sessed.55 Local authorities were to alert these persons for a transfer
to Granada. The Junta Suprema had already passed a similar notice
throughout the provinces of Seville, Ja&n,Cadiz, and C6rdoba dur-
ing August 1809, in search of artisans for Seville and Cadiz. A long
list of workmen resulted from both circulars, for the labor supply of
most agricultural villages included crudely trained blacksmiths,
carpenters, and locksmiths.56 Though it was an inadequate lot,
this formed the pool of labor from which the factories at Seville,
Cadiz, and Granada first had to select.
Soldiers and prisoners-of-war also became part of the labor supply.
When the Marquis de Villar began to organize the factory at Murcia
in spring, 1809, he lacked funds to advertise for artisans and thus
number of muskets throughout 1811 and 1812. (Ibid., Estado, Guerra de la Independencia,
legajos 3072, 3110; Lavin, History of Spanish Firearms, 144.)
As mentioned above, the industry at Ripoll in Catalonia continued to produce some
firearms until the third occupation by French soldiers in 1813. Early in 1809, however,
the producers there reportedly were selling their products to the French rather than the Span-
ish. At this time the capacity of the producers at Ripoll was reputedly about 300 muskets a
week; however, with the first French invasion later in 1809, many of the artisans fled to
unoccupied areas, leaving their equipment to be damaged or destroyed by the enemy.
Many returned later but their output never recovered to its former level and suffered anni-
hilation during the third French visitation in 1813. In August 1811, the loyal government
in Catalonia created another nucleus for manufacture of muskets at Berga when it con-
tracted with a group of artisans there. For the remainder of the war, their output never
varied much beyond 25 to 30 firearms a week; the industry at Ripoll and Berga suffered
at all times during the war from penury and poorly-made arms, a large percentage of
which (perhaps j) burst when tested. (Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la
Independencia, Junta Superior, cajas 88, 172; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema,
legajos 35, no. 151; 36, nos. 5, 9, 11; Neal, Spanish Guns and Pistols, 34; Lavin, History
of Spanish Firearms, 218-19.)
Besides these factories at Ceuta, Ripoll, and Berga, a number of others were proposed by
various individuals or juntas but never consumated. Locations of these were, for example,
La Corufia, Isla de Leon, Badajoz, Utrilla de Aragon, and Gijon. (Archivo Nacional,
Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 109, 139, 162; 36, nos. 14, 15, 17, 328.)
56Archivo Nacional, Ibid., lagajo 36, nos. 40, 42, 47, 306.
56 Ibid., legajos 35, nos. 226; 36, nos. 36, 42, 56, 311, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323,
324,
325, 326, 327.

selected some members of the Regiment of Almansa and the Pro-
vincial Militia.57'Villar'suse of soldiers served as a precedent for
FranciscoDatoli at Seville, who, in early August,requestedthat the
army send to Seville all soldiers skilled as gunsmiths,blacksmiths,
and locksmithsand not employed as such in the army. On August
14, the Junta issued the order, and over the next few weeks Datoli
obtained some additional artisans,though the number was small.58
SouthernSpain'ssupply of artisanshad dwindled, as a consequence
of the earlier searches, when Joaquin de Mergalina,magistrateof
Xerez de la Frontera,proposed a factory for his town. What made
this project attractive to the Junta, other than a relatively small
initial investment,was a suggestionthat the factory employ French
soldiers imprisoned at Xerez and on prison ships (pontones) at
Cadiz, Carraca,and Isla de Leon. Some of these men were masters
and journeymenin the art of gunmakingand would receive wages
sufficientto pay for their prisonkeep. The factory'sdirectorselected
one hundred of them and the Junta Supremaissued an order for
their release to the factory."9
Village blacksmiths,locksmiths,carpenters,soldiers, and French
prisoners-of-warconstituted a work force of dismal quality and
proportions;had it not been braced with highly skilled gunsmiths
from northernSpain and Catalonia,it would have been totally in-
adequate. The factory at Seville was unique among the seven in
that a group of Basques broughtfrom the Royal Factory at Oviedo
formed the core of its original labor force.60When the seventy-six
mastersand journeymenarrivedin late spring,1809, they combined
all the skills, and the correctrelative numbersof each, required to
produce complete muskets and bayonets.
Although these Basques had come from Oviedo, few of their
compatriotsremainedat that Royal Factoryby spring for most had
dispersedabout the countrysideupon the enemy'sarrival.Yet, many
skilled gunsmiths still resided in occupied Guipuzcoa, and they
became the object of the government'sattention during 1809. To
transportthem past their Frenchcaptorsto Seville, Cadiz, and other
cities in the south would requirethe utmost cunning, audacity,and
s7 Ibid., legajo 6, no. 170.
68Ibid., nos. 34, 305, 306, 308, 312, 315, 316, 318.
os Ibid., nos. 69, 81, 82, 83, 85.
eoIbid., nos. 178, 277. The first request for artisans from Oviedo occurred on December
20, 1808, when the Junta Suprema ordered the Junta of Asturias to send to Seville 6
barrelmakers and 6 locksmiths for repairing used muskets and producing new ones.
(Ibid., no. 273.) Apparently, this order fell on deaf ears, for early in January 1809,
Seville had no artisans skilled in gunsmithing. (Ibid., no. 175.) On January 14, the
factory's director requested Basque artisans, and within two weeks the Junta Suprema had
sent an agent to the Royal Factory at Oviedo with orders to bring back a group of gun-
smiths from the Royal Factory there. (Ibid., no. 274.)

good fortune. Early in June 1809, the Junta Suprema asked for
volunteer recruiters, preferably Basque military men. Within several
weeks at least seven individuals, most likely more, came forward
with proposals and were commissioned by the Junta Suprema.
Several of the agents, such as Manuel Equaguirre y Redin and
Manuel de Gaminde, chose to travel by sea, while others, such as
Trijon Ortiz de Pinedo, Ignacio Larrar, Luiz de Alda, and Mario
Ofiate, selected overland routes. During late summer and early fall,
1809, they began their dangerous and exciting quests for gun-
smiths.61
How many artisans thus came to southern Spain? Only a crude
estimate can be made for the archives of Spain have thus far failed
to reveal more specific data. We know that Mariano Ofiate brought
120 to Valencia and 13 to Cadiz; 62 Manuel de Gaminde's adventure
resulted in an excess of 100 workers; Manuel de Equaguirre y Redin
and the Trio of Ortiz de Pinedo, Larrar, and Alda most likely
brought several hundred, though evidence is less sound here."6 The
76 artisans from Oviedo who arrived at Seville in the spring of
1809, plus those who came as a consequence of the missions men-
tioned above, most likely did not exceed 500 masters and journey-
men. If one considers the many obstacles and grave dangers that
bedeviled the Spanish agents, their achievements were indeed ad-
mirable; yet, if the new factories were to have achieved their
planned outputs, the number of artisans acquired fell far short of
the minimum target. The number would not even have sufficed for
Seville: Francisco Datoli estimated that to produce 300 rifles a day
at that factory would require at least 2265 workers, including 690
masters.64
Even had there been far more skilled artisans available, their
productivity would have been very low without tools and equip-
ment. The supply of specialized accoutrement in southern Spain
failed to satisfy much of the demand, as organizers of factories
quickly discovered. The only Spanish sources were Catalonia and
northern Spain. But Catalonian producers had lost much of their
equipment to the French occupation and were using what remained
in an attempt to produce arms for their region.65 As part of its pro-
6llbid., legajos 35, no. 199; 36, nos. 233, 234, 236, 237, 239, 240, 250, 251, 252,
253, 254, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 338, 339, 341; Estado, Guerra
de la Independencia, legajos 3072, 3110; Jose Berruezo, "Guipizcoa en la Guerra de la
Independencia," in Estudios de la Guerra de la Independencia, I, 707.
82 Archivo Nacional, Estado, Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 3110.
3 Ibid., Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, no. 199; 36, nos. 260, 261, 262, 265;
Estado, Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 3110.
SIbid., Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 36, no. 181.
8 Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 8302.

gram to transfer artisans from Guipizcoa, the Junta Suprema at-
tempted to obtain equipment for the new manufactories. Although
the migrating workers brought tools and equipment with them and
the government's agents collected additional quantities, the supply
fell far short of that required to equip the factories.66 Nor did
Spain possess the resources to produce the hundreds and thousands
of vises, anvils, files, rasps, and other important tools.
So Spain entered the English market. The first purchase took
place early in 1809. On February 2 of that year, the Marquis de
Villel, agent of the Junta Suprema whose pessimism first surrounded
the nascent factory at Cadiz, sent the Junta a list of equipment he
considered essential for the factory.67 A modest request, it consisted
of 30 anvils of varying sizes, 800 files of many shapes, sizes, and
fineness, and 100 tools for trimming musket barrels, among other
items. Martin Garay, First Secretary of State, remitted the order to
London, where, on March 16, Tomas Sisto, an army officer sent there
by the Junta Suprema in January to purchase munitions, placed the
order with the firm of Bennett and Lacey.
The second and largest purchase occurred in July 1809. By that
time Francisco Datoli had come to realize the grave difficulty he
would have in acquiring sufficient tools and equipment from
Asturias, Guiplizcoa, and Catalonia to outfit his establishment at
Seville. In a memorandum on July 18 to Vicente Maturana, Direc-
tor General of the Royal Artillery Corps, he expressed the desir-
ability of procuring tools from England as well as obtaining plans
of machinery used by the musket industry there.68 Eventually
Datoli sent a list of items to the Junta Suprema which in turn asked
Luis Apodaca at London to acquire the items immediately. The
quantities were impressive: for example, 600 anvils, 1,000 bench
vises, 1,000 hand vises, and over 120,000 files of many shapes, sizes,
and fineness. Shipped from England in three lots, these items
arrived at Cadiz in January, February, and June 1810.69
Southern Spain lacked a sufficient supply of still another vital
ingredient - iron. Endeavoring to create a local source, the Junta
SArchivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 36, nos. 176, 177, 306, 350; Estado,
Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5608, 5640; Archivo de Simancas, Estado,
legajo 83021.
67 Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021; Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459.
g8Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5640; Archivo
de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021 - Francisco Datoli to Vicente Maturana, July 18, 1809.
69Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajos 8218, 83021; Archivo Nacional, Estado,
Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5461. In July, 1811, Apodaca arranged for one
final shipment of tools and equipment, this time for the factory at Valencia which was
still struggling to produce muskets. Apodaca had arranged with Lord Liverpool to obtain
a complete set of tools and equipment. It is doubtful, however, that the items reached
Valencia before the French occupation of that city on January 8, 1812. (Archivo Nacional
Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 56191, 56192.)

Suprema on April 25, 1809, selected Gregorio de Sola y Arrizabala,
an experienced metalurgist, to establish iron works in the mountains
about Ronda.70 But the project's estimated cost dampened the
Junta's enthusiasm and turned its thoughts toward alternative
sources. The Junta naturally coveted the fine quality iron of Viz-
caya, and, as it had attempted with the artisans and equipment in
Guip6izcoa and Asturias, it arranged to have supplies smuggled past
the French surveillance. But only limited quantities arrived in
southern Spain; the close scrutiny of French military personnel
and frequent confiscations by Britain's squadron raised the cost of
securing and shipping the metal and thereby made Vizcaya a
rather minor market."
England's mills constituted the major, and by far the least expen-
sive, alternative source of iron. Thus it was that on June 20, 1809,
Luis Apodaca requested permission of the British government to
purchase 50,000 pieces of metal plate suited for forging into musket
barrels.72 George Canning, Foreign Secretary, approved the solicita-
tion nine days later." But many difficulties followed. On July 15,
Apodaca notified Canning that in Spain it was the custom to select
5 of every 100 plates, have barrels forged from them, and fire each
with a large charge of powder to test the metal's quality. Yet Great
Britain prohibited the manufacture of musket barrels for anyone
but the government. Thus, would the Foreign Secretary arrange to
set aside the ruling and allow Spain to test plates in this fashion and
then export both metal pieces and tested barrels? 4 Not until April
2, 1810, did England's Board of Ordnance consent. Earlier, in July
1809, Francisco Datoli requested that the plates be the exact shape
as those traditionally used in Spain and that a model of the Spanish
plate be sent immediately to England. It did not arrive until late
November 1809.75 Only then did Pablo Venades and Miguel Lang-
ton, Spanish agents who later arranged for the purchase of tools and
equipment, begin to negotiate with producers for iron plates. By
December 15, 1809, Venades and Langton had received bids from
at least four companies, none of which wished to be subject to
toArchivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 36, nos. 86, 306; Estado, Guerra de
la Independencia, legajo 2995.
fl Ibid., Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, no. 56; 36, nos. 241, 242; Estado, Consejo
de Estado, legajo 154; Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5640, 5641;
Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021. The Junta also sought to purchase iron in
Portugal; however, its efforts yielded but insignificant quantities. (Archivo Nacional, Estado,
legajos 11995; Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 15, no. 21.)
72Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459.
75Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5640 - Canning
to Apodaca, June 29, 1809.
7aIbid. - Apodaca to Canning, July 14, 1809.
75Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas,
legaciones y consulados, legajo 5460.

quality tests demanded by the Spanish government. The parties
had failed to agree upon terms by as late as April 1810, and there
is no evidence that they ever did.76
III
Had all the factories achieved their maximum production by the
end of 1809, their combined outputs would have surpassed 100,000
muskets a year, a quantity exceeding by at least 300 percent the
pre-war output of the industry in Catalonia, Guipizcoa, and
Asturias. But it was not to be. For, as we have seen, the supply of
essential skills fell far short of the required quantity - even had
peace prevailed, the quantity would have been woefully inadequate;
tools and equipment were also far too scarce, and when shipments
did reach Spain, they arrived late. Though a domestic supply of
metal existed, it was small and costly, and imports from England
were slow in materializing.
In the end the insurmountable problem of the quality, quantity,
and location of resources became largely an academic one. On
November 19, 1809, the forces of King Joseph annihilated a Spanish
army at Ocafia and gained free passage into Andalusia. His legions
swept southward in January 1810, capturing Seville on February 1
without a fight and occupying all southern Spain, except Cadiz, by
mid-March.77 Nearly a year of toil on the factories at Xerez de la
Frontera, Seville, Granada, and Mglaga had been for nothing. The
factories at Murcia and Valencia survived throughout 1810 and
1811. In the latter year, Marchal Suchet vanquished the Spanish
army of Catalonia and moved against Valencia and Murcia, forcing
their defenders to capitulate early in 1812. The production of new
muskets at Murcia and Valencia for 1810 and 1811 and at Cadiz
(never occupied by the French) from 1810 to 1814 appears to have
76 Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021 - Pablo Ventades to Apodaca, February 17,
1810; Pablo Ventades to Apodaca, April 2, 1810. Financing the construction and operation
of the factories composed another serious problem. The Junta Suprema, in most cases,
assigned each factory a weekly or monthly sum and directed the administrators of the
Postal Tax (Renta de Correos) to remit the funds to these manufactories. For example,
Cadiz was to receive 200,000 vellon reals each week and Granada 100,000 each month.
Unfortunately, the tax officials frequently delayed the remittances for one reason or another,
thereby placing the factories in constant financial jeopardy. Funds for the creation and
operation of Murcia's factory came from an ecclesiastical tax (Voto de la Santa Apostdlica
y Metropolitana Yglesia del Glorioso Apostal Santiago) collected in 17 cities and villages
throughout Murcia. (Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 35, nos. 42, 58, 62,
64, 67, 69, 74, 115, 126; 36, nos. 30, 31, 32, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 63, 64, 67,
119, 121, 131, 139, 140, 144, 153, 157, 161, 164, 167, 170, 171; Estado, Guerra de la
Independencia, legajo 3072; Archivo de Simancas, Tesoro, Inventario 16, legajo 16.)
7Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 248-9; C. Perez Bustamente, Compendio de
Historia de Espafia, sexta ed. (Madrid, 1957), 432. Most of the factory's workmen escaped
to Cadiz, thanks to the assistance of Juan Manuel de Telleria, a functionary of the Govern-
ment. (Archivo General Militar [Segovia], Hojas de Servicios, Inspecci6n General de
Comisarios, Don Manuel de Telleria.)

been inconsequentially small. The extreme scarcity of nearly all the
required resources only partially explains this. Of greater signifi-
cance was the fact that the government had found an alternative
supply of new muskets and thus had turned the surviving factories
into centers for cleaning and repairing used and damaged firearms.78
Great Britain was the alternative source. Even though she had
prohibited Spaniards from entering her domestic market and pur-
chasing muskets, England provided the Spanish patriots with more
than 600,000 muskets in the form of grants-in-aid from 1808 to
1814. Her refusal to allow alien purchases of muskets was not aimed
solely at Spain. Nor was it in effect a new edict, for England's
Board of Ordnance had established a firm monopsony of regulation
arms in Great Britain as early as 1804.79 Besides wanting to prevent
foreign powers from competing with Ordnance for the domestic
supply and driving up prices, the British government also aimed at
absorbing the entire output so as to control the supply of arms to its
various allies. By so doing, Britain gained a conspicuous advantage
in influencing the conduct of the war on the Peninsula and also
secured a strong position for negotiating with Spain for commercial
privileges in Spanish America.
The granting of military aid by England evolved haphazardly.
Spain and Britain were at war in May 1808, when the Spanish
provinces rebelled against Napoleon. Despite this, the Junta of
Asturias, the first of the independent juntas to materialize, sent
representatives to London in search of assistance.80sReceiving them
warmly and quickly recognizing the military significance of Spain's
uprising, the British Government on June 12 officially promised
military assistance and immediately dispatched Major General Sir
Thomas Dyer to Asturias with supplies, arms, and munitions.8'
Delegates from other provincial juntas arrived at London in subse-
quent months.
From the time the Asturian delegates arrived until the end of
78Archivo Nacional, Estado, Guerra de la Independencia, legajo 3110; Estado, Junta
Suprema, legajo 15, nos. 152, 153, 154, 161. As evidence that Spanish authorities aban-
doned their policy of attempting to create musket factories in southern Spain is the fact
that the Regency in December 1812, decided to send gunsmiths and equipment, rather than
muskets, to Lima, Peru, in response to a plea by the Viceroy there for military assistance.
Archivo de Simancas, Direcci6n General del Tesoro, Inventario 26, legajo 1.)
1961), 139;
79Howard L. Blackmore, British Military Firearms, 1650-1850 (London,
Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation, 61.
so Jer6nimo B6cker, Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores de Espatia, 189; Jer6nimo
B&cker, Espaiia e Inglaterra, sus Relaciones Politicas desde las Pdces de Utrecht (Madrid,
1907), 56; Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain, II, 754.
81 B6cker, Historia de
las Relaciones Exteriores, 190-1; Jos6 Canga Argiielles, Observa-
ciones sobre la Historia de la Guerra de Espaiia que Escribieron los Sefiores Clarke, Southey,
Londonderry y Napier Publicadas en Londres el Afo de 1829 (Madrid, 1833), I, 224;
Lovett, Napoleon and Birth of Modern Spain, 756, 757; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Guerra 1.
de la Independencia, legajo 3024; Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 69c, no. 84; 71a, no.

December, Great Britain had sent from 150,000 to 170,000 muskets,
among many other items, to Spain for use by the patriots.82 On
January 14, 1809, hostilities between the two nations formally ceased
with the signing of a Peace Treaty; however, diplomats had failed
to draw up terms for an alliance.83 Despite the lack of a schedule of
military assistance, Britain supplied the Junta Suprema with at
least 100,000 and perhaps as many as 150,000 more muskets during
1809.84 Unsatisfied by these contributions, the Junta Suprema re-
peatedly requested permission to purchase English arms and also
asked for more and larger grants of military aid. Their entreaties
rejected by Britain's Foreign Office, some of the Junta's members
feared that English aid would cease or that Great Britain would
exact too high a price for it in the form of commercial concessions.
Such anxiety and mistrust carried over into the Council of
Regency when it succeeded the Junta Suprema on January 31,
1810. The Council's worry seemed well founded, as only about
50,000 to 60,000 muskets arrived from England for Spanish use from
January to August 1810.85 The majority of these, like those in 1809,
were delivered by the British navy directly to Spanish officials, who,
in turn, allocated them. However, the British Foreign Secretary,
Viscount Wellesley, on September 10, 1810, inaugurated a basic
procedural change in arms aid to Spain. From then on, all muskets
assigned to Spanish forces were to go to General Wellington who
would determine their distribution on the Peninsula.86 On the same
82Archivo de Hacienda, legajos 739, 5459; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas,
legaciones y consulados, legajos 56191 (see especially: Nota de Subsidios Suministrado por
las Ingleses en dinero, armas, municiones, vestuarios, y otras efectos por donativos o contra-
tos, segun se expresa en los documentos que se citan), 56192; Estados; legaciones, legajo
63021; Estado, Junta Suprema, legajos 69b, nos. 70, 74; 69b, nos. 2, 69, 70, 72, 74; no.
84; 71b, no. 59; Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la Independencia, Junta 69e, Su-
perior, Caja 69; Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021; Public Record Office, A.O.,
3/765, p.189.
S Archivo Nacional, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 22b, no. 27; Estado, Embajadas,
legaciones y consulados, legajo 5612; Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 3621; Alejandro del
Cantillo, Tratados, Convenios y Declaraciones de Paz y de Comercio que han Hecho con las
Potencias Estranjeras los Monarcas Espafoles de la Casa de Borbon desde el Afo de 1700
Hasta el Dia (Madrid, 1843), 719-20.
4Archivo de Hacienda, legajo 5459; Archivo Nacional, Estado, legajo 11995; Estado,
Junta Suprema, legajos 12, 14a, nos. 11, 97, 102; 26b, no. 12; 36, nos. 91, 360, 361; 36e,
62, 62g; Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5374, 5460, 56191, 56192,
Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 83021. The Morning Herald of April 20, 1809,
claimed that Great Britain had sent 200,177 muskets to Spain and Portugal since May
1808. (Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 56192.)
Canga Argiielles intimates that perhaps 200,000 muskets arrived from England during
1809. (Canga Argiielles, Observaciones sobre la Historia de la Guerra de Espafia, 254.)
8Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajos 8173, 8218, 8261; Archivo Nacional, Estado,
Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5461, 5462, 56191, 56192; Estado, Junta
Suprema, legajo 15, nos. 3, 5; Archivo Hist6rico de Barcelona, Guerra de la Independencia,
legajos 315, 318; Public Record Office, A.O., 3/765, p. 189.
8 Wellesley notified Apodaca on September 10 that "in consequence of the unfavorable
state of affairs on the Peninsula, it is in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government to
send all the arms and military stores which can be spared to the Tagus to be placed under
the dispose of Lord Viscount Wellington for the general service of Spain." (Achivo de
Simancas, Estado, legajo 8218; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y con-

day, Wellesley committed 60,000 more arms to the Spanish army,
bringing the total for 1810 to over 100,000.87 The Regency be-
moaned this English control throughout the remainder of 1810 and
all of 1811. In the latter year, Spain got at least, but most likely
more than, 75,000 British muskets.88
In January 1812, the sporadic, random rate of delivery gave way
to a more formal, less restrictive plan. The British Government
consented to place at Spain's command during that year arms,
clothing, accoutrement, and ammunition for 100,000 soldiers, plus
?600,000 and such provisions as could be spared.89 Scattered
archival evidence suggests that Britain most likely sent the 100,000
muskets as agreed, most of them going to a warehouse at Cadiz
from where Spanish officials distributed them about the country.90
Early in 1813, Britain agreed once again to provide supplies for
100,000 soldiers, though she indicated a preference for sending less
than 100,000 muskets provided Spain might return to producing a
supply of her own.9' In May, Wellington judged that 60,000 mus-
kets should suffice for the Spanish army, and the Council of the
Regency implicitly agreed when it offered to accept cash in lieu of
the remaining 40,000.92 Britain's Foreign Secretary sharply refused.
By August 30, 1813, it appeared that Spain would get the remaining
40,000 muskets,93 though the archives are silent as to whether they
ever arrived. The archives are also silent regarding English arms
aid for the three months of war remaining in 1814.
Thus it was that the grand total of muskets provided the patriots
by Britain throughout the war probably exceeded 600,000 and very
sulados, legajo 56191.) Four days later, Wellesley, while speaking of armaments his
government planned to remit to the Peninsula, wrote to Apodaca: "It is the decided opinion
of his Majesty's Government, that Lord Viscount Wellington will be best able to judge in
what proportions, and in what points of the Peninsula, these stores may be most usefully
applied, according to the wants and circumstances of the several Provinces." (Archivo de
Simancas, Estado, legajo 8218; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y con-
sulados, legajo 5462.)
s Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5461, 5462,
56191, Estado, Junta Suprema, legajo 15, nos. 3-5; Archivo de Simancas, Estado,
legajos 5619?;
8218, 8219, 8261; Archivo Hist6rico de Barcelona, Guerra de la Independencia,
legajo 315; Public Record OfBfice,War Ofice, 6/205, p. 488, 511.
a Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 8218; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas,
legaciones y consulados, legajo Public Record Office, A.O., 3/765, p. 189.
Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5464; Archivo
s Archivo Nacional, Estado,5378?;
de Simancas, Estado, legajo 8285.
469;
sopublic Record Office, War O•ice, 6/152, pp. 125, 242, 300, 1/262, pp. 461-7,
Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 56191, 56192;
Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Guerra de la Independencia, Junta Superior, caja 23.
Some muskets and other military supplies were delivered by English naval ships directly to
northern Spain and Catalonia. (Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, ibid., legajos 22, 23.)
*' Archivo Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 56191, 56192;
Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajos 8174, 8175.
"Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajos 8175, 8219; Archivo Nacional, Estado, Emba-
jadas, legaciones y consulados, legajos 5465, 56191.
* Archivo de Simancas, Estado, legajo 8219- Castlereigh to Conde de Fernan-Nufiez,
August 30, 1813.

well might have approached 750,000.94 If England possessed such a
sizeable capacity to manufacture muskets and an apparent willing-
ness to share them, why did the Junta Suprema expend such energy
and large quantities of resources attempting to purchase arms
abroad and to create an industry in southern Spain? The answer
lies, on the one hand, in extravagant armament plans of the Junta
Suprema early in 1809 and its distrust of Britain's intentions, and, on
the other hand, in England's initial unwillingness or inability to
satisfy completely the huge Spanish demand for firearms and her
frequent requests later on for concessions in American trade as a
condition for larger grants. After Napoleon had driven the Spanish
army out of Madrid and into Andalusia late in 1808, the Junta Su-
prema urgently set about to raise an army of more than 400,000 and
thereby created an immense and immediate demand for arms. Eng-
land refused to supply so many so quickly. And she refused to al-
low Spain to contract for muskets at London and Birmingham.
Moreover, mutual mistrust and hostility intensified between the
Foreign Office and the Junta Suprema as Spain pressed ever more
hard for an increased rate of musket shipment. When not demurring
in the face of these requests, Great Britain frequently intimated
that a quid pro quo in the form of commercial concessions on the
Peninsula and in America might induce larger grants of muskets -
a suggestion that created deep apprehension among Spaniards.95
So the Junta strove to establish a musket industry in the south.
While Joseph's massive invasion of Andalusia in January 1810,
quashed this effort in all but Cadiz, Murcia, and Valencia, it also
reduced the government's capacity for building a huge military
' The author estimated these numbers from many different sources, many of which he
cited above. No single secondary source has attempted to set the number of muskets
supplied by England. A. Matilla Tasc6n in his "La Ayuda Econ6mica Inglesa en la
Guerra de la Independencia" in Estudios de la Guerra de Independencia, II, 141-60,
deals almost exclusively with financial aid from England; and Jos6 Gomez de Arteche in
De la Cooperacidn de los Ingleses en la Guerra de la Independencia, Discurso Leido en el
Ateneo de Madrid, la Noche del 19 de Abril de 1887 (Barcelona, 1887) engages in polem-
ics rather than empirical verification.
After the author had completed this essay, Harvard University Press published John M.
Sherwig's Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-
1815. (Cambridge, 1969). In the chapters on Spain and Portugal, Sherwig concentrates
more on Great Britain's financial assistance than on grants of war material. While he does
not attempt a summary of the number of arms Spain received from England during the
War, Sherwig does scatter through these chapters mention of shipments to Spain of around
450,000 muskets.
For example, on November 23, 1809, John Hookham Frere, English Ambassador at
Seville, responded to the request of more aid from Francisco Saavedra, First Secretary of
State, partly as follows: "But the Spanish Government at the time when they make such
unlimited demands upon the generosity of His Majesty should on their part consider how
far it is in their power to facilitate to His Majesty the means of satisfying them." (Archivo
Nacional, Estado, Embajadas, legaciones y consulados, legajo 5608.) And on August 6,
1811, Apodaca reported to Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara, First Secretary of State, that
whenever he pressed the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Wellesley, for more assistance, the
latter usually responded that England did not have the means to supply it if Spain would
not concede England freedom to trade in Spanish America. (Ibid., legajo 5468.)

force. Moreover, the victories of the Anglo-Portuguese armies that
began in 1811 further relieved the Spanish government from such
pressure and further reduced its target for so large an army.96 The
rate at which Britain provided muskets, as well as other arms and
munitions, thereafter met the requests of Spain.
' On January 1, 1811, there were 147,690 men in the Spanish army; this included the
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. (Ibid., legajo 3527.) Christiansen (Origins of Military
Power in Spain, 18) claims that the regular army grew to about 160,000 men by war's
end- a far cry from the 350,000 to 400,000 men originally planned in late 1808 and
early 1809.


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The Supply of Muskets and Spain's War of Independence

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The Supply of Muskets and

In this modern day of industrialized economies, we have

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A massive political and military crisis engulfed Spain early in

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MUSKETS AND SPAIN'S INDEPENDENCE 525

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MUSKETS AND SPAIN'S INDEPENDENCE 529

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Recognizing that Spanish industry for many centuries had been

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